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Thank you , Senator uh General Nakasone 

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on a scale of 1 to 10 where 10 is 

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essential for the national defense . 

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And one is nice to have , where would 

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you rank section 702 , 10 plus ? Uh And 

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let me talk a little bit about +702 . 

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Thank you , Senator for that question . 

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Uh As you know , F A +702 allows the U 

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S intelligence community to collect the 

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information and communications of 

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foreign targets of interest operating 

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outside the United States that you , 

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that use us infrastructure and services . 

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So outside the United States , the 

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intelligence community can , can 

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collect against foreign targets of 

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interest . It's critical for what we do 

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and what have we seen since F8702 was 

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enacted in 2008 and reauthorized two 

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times . It's disrupted terrorist plots . 

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It's alerted us to cyber attacks . And 

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finally , it's uncovered ci threats 

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last year were able to utilize this in 

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a series of ransomware and a series of 

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being able to uncover what adversaries 

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are trying to do to us against our 

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critical infrastructure . And most 

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importantly , as General Fenton can 

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testify as you know what we were able 

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to do against Zawahiri . An essential 

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piece that we need as a nation . I 

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think the key word is essential . Thank 

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you . General , talk to me about the 

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relationship between electronic warfare 

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and cyber is elect who's in charge of 

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electronic warfare of because in a 

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conflict , electronic warfare and cyber 

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is going to be where it begins . So 

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traditionally , the services had 

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electronic warfare capabilities that 

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they deploy with their forces . I think 

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what you speak to is the 

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synchronization of this battlefield and 

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cyberspace , which we are starting now 

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to work very , very closely with the 

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combatant commands . I'm concerned that 

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if , if electronic warfare is scattered 

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among the services , it's not going to 

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have the attention , for example , that 

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Cyber has because we have Cyber command 

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and uh electronic warfare is definitely 

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going to be part of the conflict , 

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whether it's jamming or disabling uh 

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satellite communications , those kinds 

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of things . Uh There's no central , 

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what you're telling me is , there's no , 

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it's not part of your command and 

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there's no central command that 

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controls , it is not part of my command . 

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But again , a lot of the electronic 

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warfare has done is done in support of 

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service requirements . And so they have 

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service forces that do this . I think 

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what you're speaking to . Um Senator is , 

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You know , much in the same way we have 

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tactical forces that , that assist the 

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services . Is there some type of 

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national capability that we might need ? 

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And I think that's something that we 

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have to look very carefully and I worry 

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about coordination and duplication to 

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two sides of the same coin . Uh you 

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mentioned briefly in your opening 

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statement , election interference in 

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2022 is election interference in terms 

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of cyber , an ongoing problem . Didn't , 

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hasn't gone away , it hasn't gone away 

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that this is , this is something we 

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will deal with for as long as I can 

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look at the future and we see 

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cyberspace and the ability for 

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adversaries to influence . What goes on 

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is it , is it uh things like hacking 

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and , and uh meddling with the system 

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or is it more in terms of , of 

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disinformation ? So what we have seen 

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Senator really , when you talk about 

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infrastructure , that's more of an 

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interference piece , we see the 

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influence piece much more prevalent 

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these days and being able to operating 

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outside the United States go after 

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trolls and other different actors that 

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are trying to create influence . And 

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these are can be Russia around North 

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Korea , China , they're actively 

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involved in trying to affect and uh 

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interfere in our politics . Is that 

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correct ? You've hit the top four plus 

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proxies . Um China cyber capability , 

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is it on the rise ? They , they've been 

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not as aggressive in terms of elections 

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and interference as the Russians have 

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been over the last 10 years or so ? Is 

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China starting to become more 

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aggressive ? Are you seeing more 

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activity uh less worry about 

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reputational risk and those kinds of 

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things . So they have a different 

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playbook , I think than the Russians 

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from what we've seen . Uh the other 

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pieces that as I mentioned last year , 

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this is a very capable , capable force . 

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And so we can cover many of the areas 

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that I can discuss in close testimony . 

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But again , a very formidable foe , uh 

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The new National Cyber strategy was 

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just issued last week . Any gaps , I 

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don't expect you to criticize it . But 

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do you have any suggestions you can 

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share with us ? Uh really pleased with 

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the national Cyber strategy . I think 

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that this is something that uh that 

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we've long wanted in terms of what's 

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the responsibility of both the 

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government and the private sector and 

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being able to meld that is critically 

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important for us . I think in the weeks 

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to come , obviously , the , the 

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Department of Defense's Cyber strategy 

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will nest within that . And so I think 

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for the first time , we'll probably 

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have , you know , from the government 

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all the way down to our department , 

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something that's very effective . Think 

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of that . A coherent government wide 

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strategy . Yes , Senator , thank you , 

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General Senator Bud . 

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Thank you all for being here . So 

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General Fenton , you know , there's 

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been a series of concerning incidents , 

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um suicides , murders , overdoses , 

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drug trafficking , arrests surrounding 

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the special operations community , Fort 

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Bragg . But I think you being members 

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here of the committee , we know that 

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those reports , they're not indicative 

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of the thousands of incredible men and 

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women at UC . Um 

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I'm hoping that you can discuss some of 

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the issues that we're actually seeing a 

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brag including those . And if you can 

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describe what socom is doing to combat 

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these challenges , and I would just 

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also just say um that our office is 

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here to help and I'm sure on both sides 

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of the aisle , all of us are here um on 

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your team in that regard , Senator , 

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thank you very much uh for an ability 

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to comment on that for an opportunity 

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that very issue hits at the heart of 

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our . Number one priority are people 

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who are competitive and comparative 

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advantage and who we place a lot of 

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trust and confidence in . And this type 

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of behavior uh atypical to the 

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70,000 plus that are doing the right 

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thing almost every single day . Um 

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Every , each and every day , majority 

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are absolutely doing that . Um Is a uh 

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first and foremost , it disrespects 

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that type of work that are so calm 

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enterprises known for . Second , it's 

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certainly um uh uh is not 

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behavior that's welcome . I want 

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everybody know that is not the type of 

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behavior that's welcome in this 

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formation and is not indicative of an 

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organization and whom the nation has 

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placed a lot of trust . We hold 

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ourselves to a higher standard and the 

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command sergeant major and I are , 

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first of all , we're very angry when we 

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get reports like that and we're 

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deliberately laser like focused on this . 

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And in fact , we talked about it as a 

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corrosive . These are corrosive toward 

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the trust and confidence that this 

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uh this committee , uh the secretary 

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and certainly the nation has in , in us 

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and we're laser focused on eradicating 

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that from so called enterprise . One is 

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too many , but we recognize we're not 

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immune . So we look at it through a 

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number of lenses versus it's a leader 

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issue and uh preventing this 

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reinforcing the standards that behavior 

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of uh drug , some type of other 

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untoward , illegal , not moral and 

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ethical behavior is not who we are not . 

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We want our formation and we ask our 

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whole formation to be on alert and to 

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help point that out for us and let us 

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as leaders start to take action . 

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Second , it is reinforcing policies 

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that tell folks this an event , they 

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just came into this formation , they 

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didn't know any better and they're at 

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risk of doing something like that , 

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that disrespects decades of successful 

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operations and many , many who came 

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before and those who come after uh 

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responding , I think a key piece in 

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that one is holding folks accountable . 

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Uh And you'll see us do that because 

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that sends a very big signal back when 

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appropriate center back to the 

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enterprise about this behavior is 

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absolutely not welcome and not part of 

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the SOCOM enterprise . So you got my 

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commitment on this center . I've been 

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in about six months , has been a top 

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priority because of what it does , not 

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only the trust that this committee and 

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others have in the SOCOM team , but to 

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overall readiness and that readiness is 

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important because it needs to be a very 

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lethal force . Each and every time the 

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secretary puts us on , on the job . 

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Thank you . And you have our commitment 

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as well . Um , Secretary Meyer and also 

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General Fenton . Um , you've talked a 

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little bit about this today , but can 

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you please expand on balancing the need 

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for special operations forces to 

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continue conducting counterterrorism in 

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the Middle East and Africa versus the 

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important role they play in great power 

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competition ? And do we have the right 

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mix of forces to accomplish both ? 

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We'll start with you , secretary . So 

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Senator , thanks for this , this point . 

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This is may be among the most important 

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points that I focus on every day . And 

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I think the answer is um somewhat . So 

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I think we have a very lethal , very 

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capable counterterrorism force . What 

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we are working to do is make that force 

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more sustainable over time because 

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frankly , many of the threat actors are 

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still out there and we're still having 

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to do this mission but being able to 

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make it more sustainable . So we can 

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draw on the unique capabilities of the 

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soft enterprise to bring that to the , 

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the fight against the potential PRC or 

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Russia . Certainly to establish that 

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integrated deterrence we seek . Thank 

259
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you , Senator . I would just add that 

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uh it is a balance as we look at it 

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across the enterprise with the three 

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missions of the integrated deterrence 

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and counterterrorism crisis response . 

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And as I mentioned before and will 

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reinforce the uh capabilities we have 

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in the counterterrorism arena , arena 

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transfer as well over into our 

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integrated deterrence approach . But at 

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the same time , we know that very often 

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they are unilaterally asked for . In 

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this case , in Africa , we work with uh 

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Africom commander and our Special 

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Operations Command , Africa R T sock as 

274
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a way to address their requirements . 

275
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Keep the pressure as I mentioned 

276
00:10:18,170 --> 00:10:20,281
earlier . One of the things that's so 

277
00:10:20,281 --> 00:10:22,448
come we look at is the threat has been 

278
00:10:22,448 --> 00:10:24,670
disrupted , but it persists and our job 

279
00:10:24,670 --> 00:10:26,781
is to remain vigilant and when we can 

280
00:10:26,781 --> 00:10:28,837
sense , see and illuminate , we take 

281
00:10:28,837 --> 00:10:31,059
action uh in concert with the combatant 

282
00:10:31,059 --> 00:10:33,003
commanders and certainly under the 

283
00:10:33,003 --> 00:10:35,226
direction . Thank you all very much . I 

284
00:10:35,226 --> 00:10:37,281
have some questions for the record . 

285
00:10:37,281 --> 00:10:39,559
General Nakasone , I'll submit for you , 

286
00:10:39,559 --> 00:10:39,360
but you'll back . Thank you . Thank you 

287
00:10:39,360 --> 00:10:41,360
very much , Senator Senator Kaine , 

288
00:10:41,360 --> 00:10:43,582
please . Thank you , Mr Chair and thank 

289
00:10:43,582 --> 00:10:45,582
you to our witnesses . Um Secretary 

290
00:10:45,582 --> 00:10:47,693
Mayor , I want to talk to you about a 

291
00:10:47,693 --> 00:10:49,693
previous job you had that . I still 

292
00:10:49,693 --> 00:10:51,582
think you're very involved in . I 

293
00:10:51,582 --> 00:10:53,749
understand that you previously led the 

294
00:10:53,749 --> 00:10:55,916
D O D defeat ISIS task force . Is that 

295
00:10:55,916 --> 00:10:58,420
correct ? And that you continue in your 

296
00:10:58,420 --> 00:11:00,531
role as Assistant Secretary of Soul , 

297
00:11:00,531 --> 00:11:03,130
like to focus on the antiterrorism 

298
00:11:03,130 --> 00:11:05,650
mission , including the defeat of ISIS 

299
00:11:05,650 --> 00:11:08,460
correct . That task force included 

300
00:11:08,470 --> 00:11:10,637
international partners . I think there 

301
00:11:10,637 --> 00:11:12,748
are about 80 international partners . 

302
00:11:12,748 --> 00:11:14,914
Um , and it's fair to say that in your 

303
00:11:14,914 --> 00:11:17,026
work on that task force and currently 

304
00:11:17,026 --> 00:11:19,192
it involved a lot of coordination with 

305
00:11:19,192 --> 00:11:21,081
Iraqi defense forces . Isn't that 

306
00:11:21,081 --> 00:11:22,970
correct ? It did . I know that my 

307
00:11:22,970 --> 00:11:24,748
colleagues might have seen that 

308
00:11:24,748 --> 00:11:26,359
Secretary Austin has paid an 

309
00:11:26,359 --> 00:11:29,130
unannounced visit to Iraq . The news of 

310
00:11:29,130 --> 00:11:31,241
that broke this morning , I just want 

311
00:11:31,241 --> 00:11:33,570
to read a phrase , a quote from him . 

312
00:11:33,830 --> 00:11:36,150
Us forces are ready to remain in Iraq 

313
00:11:36,150 --> 00:11:38,317
at the invitation of the government of 

314
00:11:38,317 --> 00:11:40,539
Iraq . He said this following a meeting 

315
00:11:40,539 --> 00:11:42,761
with Prime Minister Al Sudani . Further 

316
00:11:42,761 --> 00:11:44,983
quote , the United States will continue 

317
00:11:44,983 --> 00:11:46,650
to strengthen and broaden our 

318
00:11:46,650 --> 00:11:48,700
partnership in support of Iraqi 

319
00:11:48,710 --> 00:11:50,877
security , stability and sovereignty . 

320
00:11:50,877 --> 00:11:52,770
Do you think the US being in 

321
00:11:52,770 --> 00:11:54,590
partnership with Iraq for their 

322
00:11:54,590 --> 00:11:56,980
stability and sovereignty for their own 

323
00:11:56,980 --> 00:11:59,202
sake and for the region is an important 

324
00:11:59,202 --> 00:12:01,530
priority . Senator , yes , I do . And I 

325
00:12:01,530 --> 00:12:03,720
think it's critically important to 

326
00:12:03,730 --> 00:12:05,910
managing a very challenging political 

327
00:12:05,910 --> 00:12:08,220
situation to with obviously the Iranian 

328
00:12:08,220 --> 00:12:10,500
and proxy threats there as well , sir . 

329
00:12:10,510 --> 00:12:13,510
Just for my colleagues , we have to war 

330
00:12:13,510 --> 00:12:15,621
authorizations against the government 

331
00:12:15,621 --> 00:12:18,380
of Iraq , our strategic partner who uh 

332
00:12:18,390 --> 00:12:20,612
Secretary Austin is visiting today . We 

333
00:12:20,612 --> 00:12:23,000
have 2500 American troops in Iraq at 

334
00:12:23,010 --> 00:12:26,080
the Iraqi government's request . One of 

335
00:12:26,080 --> 00:12:28,136
the war authorizations was passed in 

336
00:12:28,136 --> 00:12:30,770
1991 . It's 32 years old . The other 

337
00:12:30,770 --> 00:12:33,060
war authorization was passed in the 

338
00:12:33,060 --> 00:12:36,180
fall of 2000 to the invasion of Iraq 

339
00:12:36,190 --> 00:12:39,640
began on March 19 , 2003 , 20 years 

340
00:12:39,640 --> 00:12:42,820
ago . Next week , I have a proposal 

341
00:12:42,820 --> 00:12:45,042
that's varied bipartisan , 12 Democrats 

342
00:12:45,042 --> 00:12:47,580
in 12 . Um Republicans have joined 

343
00:12:47,580 --> 00:12:50,700
together to urge Congress to repeal the 

344
00:12:50,700 --> 00:12:53,270
two Iraq war authorizations . Um This 

345
00:12:53,270 --> 00:12:55,492
is going to be marked up in the Foreign 

346
00:12:55,492 --> 00:12:57,659
Relations Committee likely in the next 

347
00:12:57,659 --> 00:12:59,826
few days and hopefully we'll be on the 

348
00:12:59,826 --> 00:13:01,937
floor for a vote soon . Coincidence , 

349
00:13:01,937 --> 00:13:04,103
in timing with the 20th anniversary of 

350
00:13:04,103 --> 00:13:06,214
the Iraq invasion . And I just wanted 

351
00:13:06,214 --> 00:13:08,159
to bring it to the attention of my 

352
00:13:08,159 --> 00:13:10,381
colleagues . I urged that we repeal the 

353
00:13:10,381 --> 00:13:12,437
Iraq war authorizations to recognize 

354
00:13:12,437 --> 00:13:14,659
reality an enemy that we were trying to 

355
00:13:14,659 --> 00:13:17,540
push out of Kuwait in 1991 , an enemy 

356
00:13:17,540 --> 00:13:19,762
whose government we wanted to topple in 

357
00:13:19,762 --> 00:13:22,470
2002 is no longer an enemy there . A 

358
00:13:22,480 --> 00:13:25,310
security partner of impor right now . 

359
00:13:25,450 --> 00:13:27,930
Second . Congress should exercise our 

360
00:13:27,930 --> 00:13:29,950
article one , authority over war , 

361
00:13:29,950 --> 00:13:32,117
peace and diplomacy and not allowed to 

362
00:13:32,117 --> 00:13:33,960
be an autopilot . Third , an 

363
00:13:33,960 --> 00:13:36,010
authorization that is no longer 

364
00:13:36,010 --> 00:13:37,960
necessary becomes sort of a zombie 

365
00:13:37,960 --> 00:13:40,170
authorization that can be grabbed and 

366
00:13:40,170 --> 00:13:42,460
used for mischievous purposes if we're 

367
00:13:42,460 --> 00:13:44,890
not careful . And fourth , I even think 

368
00:13:44,890 --> 00:13:47,640
we send a powerful message , not just 

369
00:13:47,650 --> 00:13:50,440
allies and strategic partners . We even 

370
00:13:50,440 --> 00:13:52,780
send a message to adversaries that you 

371
00:13:52,780 --> 00:13:56,150
may be our adversary today . Iraq once 

372
00:13:56,150 --> 00:14:00,090
was , but the US specializes over time 

373
00:14:00,090 --> 00:14:02,210
and turning adversaries into allies . 

374
00:14:02,210 --> 00:14:05,180
Look at Japan , look at Germany look at 

375
00:14:05,180 --> 00:14:07,930
other nations and we hold that hope out 

376
00:14:07,930 --> 00:14:10,220
to everyone that we will defeat you 

377
00:14:10,220 --> 00:14:12,700
should we need to . But we also hold 

378
00:14:12,700 --> 00:14:14,700
out an olive branch and look for an 

379
00:14:14,700 --> 00:14:16,922
opportunity to be the sword into a plow 

380
00:14:16,922 --> 00:14:19,750
share and turn an adversary into a 

381
00:14:19,750 --> 00:14:22,130
partner . The proposal that I have Mr 

382
00:14:22,130 --> 00:14:24,241
Chairman that I hope will be voted on 

383
00:14:24,241 --> 00:14:26,463
on the floor this month has the support 

384
00:14:26,463 --> 00:14:28,352
of the administration and they've 

385
00:14:28,352 --> 00:14:30,241
indicated that neither of the two 

386
00:14:30,241 --> 00:14:32,297
authorizations are necessary for any 

387
00:14:32,297 --> 00:14:34,352
current U S military operation . And 

388
00:14:34,352 --> 00:14:36,519
thus their repeal will not endanger in 

389
00:14:36,519 --> 00:14:38,463
any way the security of the United 

390
00:14:38,463 --> 00:14:40,463
States or Americans anywhere in the 

391
00:14:40,463 --> 00:14:42,297
world . And I would just urge my 

392
00:14:42,297 --> 00:14:44,408
colleagues possibly to take a look at 

393
00:14:44,408 --> 00:14:46,186
this once the Foreign Relations 

394
00:14:46,186 --> 00:14:48,186
Committee acts because I believe we 

395
00:14:48,186 --> 00:14:50,241
will be taking this matter up on the 

396
00:14:50,241 --> 00:14:52,408
floor very soon . With that Mr Chair , 

397
00:14:52,408 --> 00:14:52,110
I yield back . Thank you , Senator 

398
00:14:52,110 --> 00:14:54,790
Kaine , Senator Mullen , please . Thank 

399
00:14:54,790 --> 00:14:57,400
you , Mr Chairman um Jerry Flint , 

400
00:14:57,410 --> 00:15:00,210
General Fenton . Um Can you explain to 

401
00:15:00,210 --> 00:15:02,266
us and I know you've been asked this 

402
00:15:02,266 --> 00:15:04,321
question before , but I just want it 

403
00:15:04,321 --> 00:15:06,377
for context again , the value of the 

404
00:15:06,377 --> 00:15:10,230
soft community . Senator , 

405
00:15:10,230 --> 00:15:12,540
I think the value of the soft community 

406
00:15:12,550 --> 00:15:15,000
transcends all , all three missionaries 

407
00:15:15,000 --> 00:15:17,620
that we have right now . Um Our 

408
00:15:17,620 --> 00:15:19,860
integrated deterrence approach , which 

409
00:15:19,870 --> 00:15:22,210
previous was strategic competition . 

410
00:15:22,210 --> 00:15:25,180
The days before the tragic events of 9 

411
00:15:25,180 --> 00:15:27,810
11 when we were out developing partners 

412
00:15:27,810 --> 00:15:30,030
and allies competing for relationships 

413
00:15:30,040 --> 00:15:32,420
building partners of force of choice 

414
00:15:32,430 --> 00:15:34,319
and , And in many places with our 

415
00:15:34,319 --> 00:15:36,097
security cooperation approach , 

416
00:15:36,097 --> 00:15:38,675
actually , uh strengthening nations 

417
00:15:38,685 --> 00:15:41,845
across the globe , I think that's 

418
00:15:41,855 --> 00:15:44,305
called for even more now . And as we 

419
00:15:44,305 --> 00:15:46,375
come forward with 20 years of hard 

420
00:15:46,375 --> 00:15:48,795
earned combat credibility , uh 

421
00:15:48,805 --> 00:15:51,315
technology influence and an incredible 

422
00:15:51,315 --> 00:15:53,740
formation , the soft formation is 

423
00:15:53,750 --> 00:15:57,570
uh it's a formation that knows the hard 

424
00:15:57,570 --> 00:16:00,650
skills , it knows technology , uh it 

425
00:16:00,650 --> 00:16:02,817
deploys around the world on a moment's 

426
00:16:02,817 --> 00:16:04,928
notice . And , and in that case , all 

427
00:16:04,928 --> 00:16:06,650
that value transitions over to 

428
00:16:06,650 --> 00:16:08,706
integrated deterrence on the counter 

429
00:16:08,706 --> 00:16:11,165
terrorism uh side of the House Center 

430
00:16:11,165 --> 00:16:13,985
for 20 plus years uh in places all over 

431
00:16:13,985 --> 00:16:15,985
the world , your special operations 

432
00:16:15,985 --> 00:16:18,207
command team along with the rest of our 

433
00:16:18,207 --> 00:16:20,955
military interagency and partners , I 

434
00:16:20,955 --> 00:16:22,955
think brought immense value to this 

435
00:16:22,955 --> 00:16:26,305
nation , disrupting degrading uh 

436
00:16:26,315 --> 00:16:28,955
terrorist actor networks globally and 

437
00:16:28,965 --> 00:16:31,132
figures and names that many folks know 

438
00:16:31,132 --> 00:16:33,355
here um are no longer and have been 

439
00:16:33,355 --> 00:16:35,355
removed from the battlefield are no 

440
00:16:35,355 --> 00:16:37,244
longer a threat to this nation on 

441
00:16:37,244 --> 00:16:39,411
crisis response . Our ability as SOCOM 

442
00:16:39,411 --> 00:16:43,070
to do within a very short notice , uh 

443
00:16:44,040 --> 00:16:46,530
um deploy forces and arrive in a 

444
00:16:46,530 --> 00:16:49,050
country and either safeguard or U S 

445
00:16:49,050 --> 00:16:52,100
diplomats , citizens or rescue them if , 

446
00:16:52,110 --> 00:16:54,110
if that is indeed the task and then 

447
00:16:54,110 --> 00:16:56,166
bring home safely . I think it's all 

448
00:16:56,166 --> 00:16:58,332
part of the Special operations command 

449
00:16:58,332 --> 00:17:00,443
value proposition . And I would add a 

450
00:17:00,443 --> 00:17:02,490
very small investment on , on the 

451
00:17:02,490 --> 00:17:04,601
budget that we're very grateful for . 

452
00:17:04,601 --> 00:17:07,270
Uh And uh I think a very high return on 

453
00:17:07,270 --> 00:17:09,326
investment across all those and many 

454
00:17:09,326 --> 00:17:12,720
more that in the interest of time , I 

455
00:17:12,730 --> 00:17:14,786
can follow up with you in a class in 

456
00:17:14,786 --> 00:17:17,510
session . Uh 11 last quick question for 

457
00:17:17,510 --> 00:17:19,880
you . And then um if you could be brief 

458
00:17:19,880 --> 00:17:22,970
on it , I would like to you just kind 

459
00:17:22,970 --> 00:17:24,970
of explain the partnerships that we 

460
00:17:24,970 --> 00:17:26,914
have with our , with our allies in 

461
00:17:26,914 --> 00:17:30,280
Europe and how that is . Um Now that is 

462
00:17:30,290 --> 00:17:33,880
uh benefiting us . And I would say in 

463
00:17:33,880 --> 00:17:36,370
the , with Russians illegal invasion of 

464
00:17:36,370 --> 00:17:40,370
Ukraine , Senator , I go back to a 

465
00:17:40,380 --> 00:17:42,380
very specific part here of the very 

466
00:17:42,380 --> 00:17:44,602
high value proposition . I think you're 

467
00:17:44,602 --> 00:17:47,160
special operations team spring . Uh It 

468
00:17:47,160 --> 00:17:49,049
started with a relationship , our 

469
00:17:49,049 --> 00:17:51,271
ability and small teams to , to be with 

470
00:17:51,271 --> 00:17:52,993
Ukrainians in the mid nineties 

471
00:17:52,993 --> 00:17:55,104
developed a level of trust , speed of 

472
00:17:55,104 --> 00:17:57,438
trust is important in these as you know , 

473
00:17:57,438 --> 00:17:59,940
very well . And then in 2014 began in 

474
00:17:59,940 --> 00:18:02,130
earnest a level of training that was 

475
00:18:02,130 --> 00:18:04,650
about resistance and resilience and 

476
00:18:04,650 --> 00:18:08,120
those look like skills of uh developing 

477
00:18:08,120 --> 00:18:10,580
a military , Ukrainian special 

478
00:18:10,580 --> 00:18:13,780
operations that has an N C O court that 

479
00:18:13,780 --> 00:18:15,558
knows about mission command has 

480
00:18:15,558 --> 00:18:18,060
initiative and frankly has been as a 

481
00:18:18,070 --> 00:18:20,050
have seen and certainly talk a lot 

482
00:18:20,050 --> 00:18:23,090
about very valuable to the Ukrainian 

483
00:18:23,100 --> 00:18:26,060
military effort at large . I think 

484
00:18:26,070 --> 00:18:28,120
we've also had the ability to learn 

485
00:18:28,120 --> 00:18:30,231
from them . They've got an incredible 

486
00:18:30,231 --> 00:18:32,340
way that they take equipment off the 

487
00:18:32,340 --> 00:18:34,451
battlefield reengineer it . Uh that's 

488
00:18:34,451 --> 00:18:36,673
really great for us because we learn as 

489
00:18:36,673 --> 00:18:38,784
much from our partners is I hope they 

490
00:18:38,784 --> 00:18:41,007
do from us . So I think in a very small 

491
00:18:41,007 --> 00:18:43,229
way that ability for the Ukrainian soft 

492
00:18:43,229 --> 00:18:45,396
and the Ukrainian military to resist . 

493
00:18:45,396 --> 00:18:47,780
Uh And now absolutely certainly fight 

494
00:18:47,780 --> 00:18:50,760
against this aggression . Um And has 

495
00:18:50,770 --> 00:18:52,714
paid dividends started with a high 

496
00:18:52,714 --> 00:18:55,048
investment with special operations team . 

497
00:18:55,048 --> 00:18:57,310
Thank you so much and Mr Chairman uh 

498
00:18:57,320 --> 00:18:59,542
kind of kind of divvy here a little bit 

499
00:18:59,542 --> 00:19:01,653
during , okay , Sony and I have known 

500
00:19:01,653 --> 00:19:04,160
each other . Um And I just want to 

501
00:19:04,160 --> 00:19:07,360
raise a point here . Um The general is 

502
00:19:07,370 --> 00:19:09,314
over a program that's very forward 

503
00:19:09,314 --> 00:19:13,180
leaning . And I would ask that we would , 

504
00:19:13,190 --> 00:19:17,090
uh we would ask the Senate Intel on the 

505
00:19:17,090 --> 00:19:20,210
House Intel to brief us on a program 

506
00:19:20,220 --> 00:19:23,810
that general is over . Uh And uh and 

507
00:19:23,810 --> 00:19:26,860
you'll reflect , um in my opinion , is 

508
00:19:26,860 --> 00:19:29,850
complete incompetence and in his 

509
00:19:29,850 --> 00:19:32,180
ability to lead this program , I think 

510
00:19:32,180 --> 00:19:34,402
it's important when we're talking about 

511
00:19:34,402 --> 00:19:37,350
a budget that he's over , that it is 

512
00:19:37,360 --> 00:19:39,560
important for us to know that we have 

513
00:19:39,560 --> 00:19:43,180
leadership there that , that we can 

514
00:19:43,180 --> 00:19:46,970
rely on to make sure the dollars are 

515
00:19:46,970 --> 00:19:49,580
protected and the investment has 

516
00:19:49,580 --> 00:19:52,040
returned . And I think before we can do 

517
00:19:52,040 --> 00:19:54,096
that , we actually need to know what 

518
00:19:54,096 --> 00:19:56,410
has happened . I was involved in the 

519
00:19:56,410 --> 00:19:58,520
briefing when I was on the Intel 

520
00:19:58,520 --> 00:20:01,630
committee uh that turned into a hearing 

521
00:20:01,640 --> 00:20:03,790
and I think it's imperative for us to 

522
00:20:03,790 --> 00:20:07,160
know uh the , the uh the 

523
00:20:07,160 --> 00:20:09,830
general's risk adverse approach to a 

524
00:20:09,830 --> 00:20:11,774
program that needs to be extremely 

525
00:20:11,780 --> 00:20:15,780
proactive . Thank you , Senator Mohan , 

526
00:20:15,780 --> 00:20:17,836
your comments have noted and we will 

527
00:20:17,836 --> 00:20:21,660
follow up uh at this 

528
00:20:21,660 --> 00:20:23,493
point , let me recognize Senator 

529
00:20:23,493 --> 00:20:25,604
Mansion . Thank you , Mr Chairman and 

530
00:20:25,604 --> 00:20:27,716
General . Let me just say , I'm sorry 

531
00:20:27,716 --> 00:20:29,771
because I have all the confidence in 

532
00:20:29,771 --> 00:20:31,660
the world in you . And we've been 

533
00:20:31,660 --> 00:20:31,660
working very close together and I'm 

534
00:20:31,670 --> 00:20:34,400
chairman of the Cyber Committee and 

535
00:20:34,400 --> 00:20:36,400
also along with Mike , Senator Mike 

536
00:20:36,400 --> 00:20:38,456
Rounds , and we both appreciate your 

537
00:20:38,456 --> 00:20:40,511
service and we're looking forward to 

538
00:20:40,511 --> 00:20:42,567
any hearing you want to have . And , 

539
00:20:42,567 --> 00:20:44,733
but I can tell you have the support of 

540
00:20:44,733 --> 00:20:47,067
a bipartisan group here , which is very , 

541
00:20:47,067 --> 00:20:48,956
very deep . Next of all , General 

542
00:20:48,956 --> 00:20:50,900
Fenton , I would like to ask you a 

543
00:20:50,900 --> 00:20:53,122
question based on the publishing of the 

544
00:20:53,122 --> 00:20:55,289
2019 sec def D O D Cyber Com Operation 

545
00:20:55,289 --> 00:20:57,011
Forces memo which directed the 

546
00:20:57,011 --> 00:20:59,670
organization of D O D cyber Operation 

547
00:20:59,670 --> 00:21:01,670
Forces . There has been substantial 

548
00:21:01,670 --> 00:21:03,837
appropriation development of cyber com 

549
00:21:03,837 --> 00:21:05,614
organization capabilities . The 

550
00:21:05,614 --> 00:21:07,837
question is , what is the status of the 

551
00:21:07,837 --> 00:21:09,726
current Special Operations Forces 

552
00:21:09,726 --> 00:21:12,000
program developed within so calm and 

553
00:21:12,000 --> 00:21:14,111
what effort is needed in , in to keep 

554
00:21:14,111 --> 00:21:17,970
peace with Cyber Con Center ? I'll 

555
00:21:17,970 --> 00:21:20,040
start by uh we've got a very close 

556
00:21:20,040 --> 00:21:22,151
relationship with General Nakase Sony 

557
00:21:22,151 --> 00:21:25,720
and Cyber camp . Um And it's uh it's 

558
00:21:25,720 --> 00:21:27,720
progressed into an area that we now 

559
00:21:27,720 --> 00:21:30,760
call a capability , soft space , cyber 

560
00:21:30,760 --> 00:21:33,700
triad uh at its heart , it's the 

561
00:21:33,700 --> 00:21:36,610
ability to converge those capabilities , 

562
00:21:36,620 --> 00:21:40,030
uh soft placement access . Uh The cyber 

563
00:21:40,030 --> 00:21:42,070
work and certainly the space , the 

564
00:21:42,080 --> 00:21:44,860
space work , uh , in places for 

565
00:21:44,860 --> 00:21:46,971
integrated deterrence effects that we 

566
00:21:46,971 --> 00:21:48,916
would otherwise not get if we were 

567
00:21:48,916 --> 00:21:51,082
doing it individually . Uh , and bring 

568
00:21:51,082 --> 00:21:53,670
certainly a bigger some back to , to 

569
00:21:53,670 --> 00:21:55,892
not only the mission but to any partner 

570
00:21:55,892 --> 00:21:57,837
we're working with . That's , uh , 

571
00:21:57,837 --> 00:21:59,892
that's been a , an incredible effort 

572
00:21:59,892 --> 00:22:02,114
alongside Paul General Jackson's team . 

573
00:22:02,114 --> 00:22:04,560
We're very grateful for that . And also 

574
00:22:04,570 --> 00:22:07,670
in the space com arena , we are moving 

575
00:22:07,670 --> 00:22:09,337
that forward with exercises , 

576
00:22:09,337 --> 00:22:11,392
experimentation . A number of senior 

577
00:22:11,392 --> 00:22:13,559
leader huddles and I think that , that 

578
00:22:13,559 --> 00:22:15,559
you'll see that progress center and 

579
00:22:15,559 --> 00:22:17,392
we'll be happy to talk about the 

580
00:22:17,392 --> 00:22:19,614
progress . My final question is for all 

581
00:22:19,614 --> 00:22:19,060
three of you and I'll start with 

582
00:22:19,060 --> 00:22:22,030
Secretary Mayor General Sony and then 

583
00:22:22,030 --> 00:22:24,290
the General Fenton . What can we do to 

584
00:22:24,290 --> 00:22:26,346
help as Congress ? What would be the 

585
00:22:26,346 --> 00:22:28,568
greatest help we could be to you all of 

586
00:22:28,568 --> 00:22:30,920
us in the Senate and our Congress , our 

587
00:22:30,930 --> 00:22:33,152
uh cohorts over on the side , the other 

588
00:22:33,152 --> 00:22:35,263
side of the house . That would be the 

589
00:22:35,263 --> 00:22:37,620
greatest . And I think if I'm asking uh 

590
00:22:37,630 --> 00:22:41,120
the having a budget done on time , what 

591
00:22:41,120 --> 00:22:44,970
does that mean for you ? So , Senator , 

592
00:22:44,970 --> 00:22:47,026
thanks for the question . I think we 

593
00:22:47,026 --> 00:22:49,070
will probably all say that having a 

594
00:22:49,070 --> 00:22:51,348
budget that's consistent , predictable . 

595
00:22:51,348 --> 00:22:53,348
And does it save you time ? Does it 

596
00:22:53,348 --> 00:22:55,514
save you money ? It saves us time , it 

597
00:22:55,514 --> 00:22:57,848
saves us money . It adds predictability . 

598
00:22:57,848 --> 00:22:57,570
It , it allows us to put things on 

599
00:22:57,570 --> 00:22:59,514
contract and frankly , for , we're 

600
00:22:59,514 --> 00:23:01,570
talking September 30th . Yes , sir . 

601
00:23:01,570 --> 00:23:03,570
And I think from the perspective of 

602
00:23:03,570 --> 00:23:05,737
enterprise in the special operations , 

603
00:23:05,737 --> 00:23:07,514
enterprise that's going through 

604
00:23:07,514 --> 00:23:09,570
transition , ability to modernize is 

605
00:23:09,570 --> 00:23:11,990
hurt by the fact that the budgets don't 

606
00:23:11,990 --> 00:23:14,010
come predictably . So that's really 

607
00:23:14,010 --> 00:23:16,177
where sometimes it comes home to roost 

608
00:23:16,177 --> 00:23:18,121
and it's a budget on time would be 

609
00:23:18,121 --> 00:23:20,454
pretty high priority . Yes , sir . John , 

610
00:23:20,860 --> 00:23:23,082
it's the same thing , Senator . It's on 

611
00:23:23,082 --> 00:23:25,082
time . It really does . How does it 

612
00:23:25,082 --> 00:23:27,304
reduce your cost ? Its predictability . 

613
00:23:27,304 --> 00:23:29,082
It's being able to , you know , 

614
00:23:29,082 --> 00:23:31,193
actually uh spend the money when it's 

615
00:23:31,193 --> 00:23:33,360
actually actually do as opposed to a , 

616
00:23:33,360 --> 00:23:35,527
you know , a short period of time . We 

617
00:23:35,527 --> 00:23:37,638
also have new starts that will not be 

618
00:23:37,638 --> 00:23:39,749
delayed would actually be able to get 

619
00:23:39,749 --> 00:23:41,749
on . So we would , we would welcome 

620
00:23:41,749 --> 00:23:43,804
that . When's the last time that you 

621
00:23:43,804 --> 00:23:45,916
had a predictable budget on time ? Uh 

622
00:23:45,916 --> 00:23:47,916
Not since I've been the commander , 

623
00:23:47,916 --> 00:23:51,640
Senator , I'll start first by uh you 

624
00:23:51,640 --> 00:23:53,696
already helped in many ways with the 

625
00:23:53,696 --> 00:23:55,862
number of the tools that we use the so 

626
00:23:55,862 --> 00:23:57,862
called triple 3 12 to 1 27 . But to 

627
00:23:57,862 --> 00:24:00,084
your point on the budget , I'll echo my 

628
00:24:00,084 --> 00:24:01,807
colleagues here at the table , 

629
00:24:01,807 --> 00:24:04,029
predictable , reliable on time . Um And 

630
00:24:04,029 --> 00:24:07,830
then I'll just add that uh CRS hurt uh 

631
00:24:07,840 --> 00:24:10,550
in uh so called my priority number 

632
00:24:10,550 --> 00:24:12,606
three is transformed and we think of 

633
00:24:12,606 --> 00:24:14,383
ourselves as a pathfinder and a 

634
00:24:14,383 --> 00:24:16,250
Trailblazer . And uh we need new 

635
00:24:16,250 --> 00:24:19,400
capabilities to not only uh surpass 

636
00:24:19,400 --> 00:24:21,520
adversaries but always to be dominant 

637
00:24:21,530 --> 00:24:23,830
that that's not possible with new 

638
00:24:23,830 --> 00:24:26,052
capabilities and new contracts with the 

639
00:24:26,052 --> 00:24:28,840
cr um It's also , we work with a lot of 

640
00:24:28,840 --> 00:24:30,840
little , little companies that want 

641
00:24:30,840 --> 00:24:32,729
business with special ops command 

642
00:24:32,729 --> 00:24:35,007
because they know we're transformative . 

643
00:24:35,007 --> 00:24:37,229
Uh And , and that we're Trailblazer for 

644
00:24:37,229 --> 00:24:39,062
the department , they can't wait 

645
00:24:39,062 --> 00:24:41,118
forever to get their , their , their 

646
00:24:41,118 --> 00:24:43,118
money and many of them aren't there 

647
00:24:43,118 --> 00:24:45,340
anymore as a result of my senses of the 

648
00:24:45,340 --> 00:24:47,451
number of CRS from this makes sense . 

649
00:24:47,451 --> 00:24:49,673
This makes , does this sound reasonable 

650
00:24:49,673 --> 00:24:51,840
to you all that I've been told by some 

651
00:24:51,840 --> 00:24:53,951
retired admirals and generals that if 

652
00:24:53,951 --> 00:24:56,173
we did our budget on time now by the 85 

653
00:24:56,173 --> 00:24:59,000
budget , the budget law that we had uh 

654
00:24:59,010 --> 00:25:01,066
the president's supposed to have his 

655
00:25:01,066 --> 00:25:02,899
budget submitted by the first of 

656
00:25:02,899 --> 00:25:05,850
February and here we are the House and 

657
00:25:05,850 --> 00:25:07,906
the Senate supposed to have those by 

658
00:25:07,906 --> 00:25:09,961
April the first American South April 

659
00:25:09,961 --> 00:25:12,072
the 15th . And then we're supposed to 

660
00:25:12,072 --> 00:25:11,990
have a budget completed by September 

661
00:25:11,990 --> 00:25:14,280
30th . I've been told if all that 

662
00:25:14,280 --> 00:25:16,690
happened , That the military could have 

663
00:25:16,690 --> 00:25:19,140
a savings anywhere between 5-10% on 

664
00:25:19,140 --> 00:25:21,910
today's cost . You're talking $40-80 

665
00:25:21,910 --> 00:25:24,530
billion . Does that , does that sound 

666
00:25:24,530 --> 00:25:26,320
reasonable ? That something is 

667
00:25:26,320 --> 00:25:29,520
tremendous has that type of effect ? I 

668
00:25:29,520 --> 00:25:31,520
don't know if you all looked at and 

669
00:25:31,520 --> 00:25:33,850
evaluated per , per area of D O D 

670
00:25:34,850 --> 00:25:37,072
Secretary of you , you have anything on 

671
00:25:37,072 --> 00:25:39,294
that or if you looked at it under those 

672
00:25:39,294 --> 00:25:41,294
conditions because the person never 

673
00:25:41,294 --> 00:25:43,406
hesitated when they told me this . So 

674
00:25:43,406 --> 00:25:45,350
Senator , I can't account for that 

675
00:25:45,350 --> 00:25:47,572
exact measure , but I can tell you that 

676
00:25:47,572 --> 00:25:49,683
it is more costly . And as I think my 

677
00:25:49,683 --> 00:25:51,906
colleagues and I have indicated there's 

678
00:25:51,906 --> 00:25:54,128
a risk to it as well that it's not only 

679
00:25:54,128 --> 00:25:56,072
financial stability to execute and 

680
00:25:56,072 --> 00:25:57,628
operate with some degree of 

681
00:25:57,628 --> 00:25:59,683
predictability , which of course the 

682
00:25:59,683 --> 00:26:01,683
nation looks at us to do . Well , I 

683
00:26:01,683 --> 00:26:03,739
know that with examples that you can 

684
00:26:03,739 --> 00:26:05,850
look back on and find out when we did 

685
00:26:05,850 --> 00:26:08,017
do one on time and everything . But if 

686
00:26:08,017 --> 00:26:09,961
you could and give us an , an , an 

687
00:26:09,961 --> 00:26:12,183
accurate account or closest accurate as 

688
00:26:12,183 --> 00:26:14,350
you can be , what would be the savings 

689
00:26:14,540 --> 00:26:16,762
because we're in a position now , we're 

690
00:26:16,762 --> 00:26:18,929
having debates and discussing , we can 

691
00:26:18,929 --> 00:26:21,151
do things , we can change this year and 

692
00:26:21,151 --> 00:26:23,373
change our ways and not commit the sins 

693
00:26:23,373 --> 00:26:25,596
of the past . I'm hoping we can do that 

694
00:26:25,596 --> 00:26:24,850
but has a tremendous effect on our 

695
00:26:24,850 --> 00:26:26,572
military , which is what we're 

696
00:26:26,572 --> 00:26:28,794
depending . First of all . Thank all of 

697
00:26:28,794 --> 00:26:30,850
you and all of you sitting there for 

698
00:26:30,850 --> 00:26:30,270
your service . I appreciate it more 

699
00:26:30,270 --> 00:26:32,680
than you know . And again , I wanna 

700
00:26:32,680 --> 00:26:34,791
thank you all . Thank you all my time 

701
00:26:34,791 --> 00:26:36,791
back . Thank you , Center Mansion , 

702
00:26:36,791 --> 00:26:38,958
Senator Schmitt , please . Thank you , 

703
00:26:38,958 --> 00:26:40,958
Mr Chairman , um General Fenton . I 

704
00:26:40,958 --> 00:26:42,958
appreciate the time we had to spend 

705
00:26:42,958 --> 00:26:44,958
together and talk about some of the 

706
00:26:44,958 --> 00:26:47,124
threats around the world and your role 

707
00:26:47,124 --> 00:26:49,347
and your team's role in combating those 

708
00:26:49,347 --> 00:26:51,291
threats and getting ahead of those 

709
00:26:51,291 --> 00:26:53,347
threats and to me , as I mentioned , 

710
00:26:53,347 --> 00:26:55,458
there is no greater threat than China 

711
00:26:55,458 --> 00:26:57,730
on the world stage and uh in this , you 

712
00:26:57,730 --> 00:27:01,610
know , great powers era that um we've 

713
00:27:01,610 --> 00:27:05,440
been discussing um the alliances in the 

714
00:27:05,440 --> 00:27:07,990
Indo Pacific to me are , are critical . 

715
00:27:08,000 --> 00:27:11,750
Um You've mentioned it um in my 

716
00:27:11,750 --> 00:27:14,410
meeting with you , we've heard about 

717
00:27:14,410 --> 00:27:17,210
that today . Uh General Nakasone had 

718
00:27:17,210 --> 00:27:19,543
mentioned Indonesia and the Philippines , 

719
00:27:19,543 --> 00:27:21,599
we've talked about the Philippines . 

720
00:27:21,599 --> 00:27:24,980
What specifically um would you like to 

721
00:27:24,980 --> 00:27:28,150
see this committee address as we move 

722
00:27:28,150 --> 00:27:31,300
forward uh in this Congress to do 

723
00:27:31,300 --> 00:27:33,411
everything we can to put ourselves in 

724
00:27:33,411 --> 00:27:37,180
the best position to continue to uh 

725
00:27:37,190 --> 00:27:40,710
cultivate and support those uh those 

726
00:27:40,710 --> 00:27:41,550
alliances . 

727
00:27:44,540 --> 00:27:46,750
Senator first . Thanks for the session 

728
00:27:46,760 --> 00:27:48,871
with you the other day . I appreciate 

729
00:27:48,871 --> 00:27:50,982
your time . I know how busy you are . 

730
00:27:50,982 --> 00:27:54,660
Um I would uh comment on the extreme 

731
00:27:54,670 --> 00:27:57,320
importance and the power of , of the 

732
00:27:57,330 --> 00:27:59,497
partners and allies . Uh You , you and 

733
00:27:59,497 --> 00:28:01,719
I spoke quite a bit about it and in the 

734
00:28:01,719 --> 00:28:03,830
Indo Pacific , but certainly globally 

735
00:28:03,830 --> 00:28:07,020
as the secretary has uh discussed with 

736
00:28:07,020 --> 00:28:09,131
the department and , and in many ways 

737
00:28:09,131 --> 00:28:11,187
of doing that with the NATO alliance 

738
00:28:11,187 --> 00:28:14,060
vis a vis uh Ukraine and all the work 

739
00:28:14,060 --> 00:28:16,580
that has gone into the entire whole of 

740
00:28:16,580 --> 00:28:18,691
government team to make that stronger 

741
00:28:18,691 --> 00:28:21,440
than ever as a signal that aggression 

742
00:28:21,450 --> 00:28:24,240
by adversaries like Russia will not be 

743
00:28:24,240 --> 00:28:26,462
tolerated . I think it's just important 

744
00:28:26,462 --> 00:28:28,518
just as important as we discussed in 

745
00:28:28,518 --> 00:28:30,629
the Indo Pacific . We've got a number 

746
00:28:30,629 --> 00:28:32,796
of bilateral treaty allies out there . 

747
00:28:32,796 --> 00:28:35,290
They're extremely uh important partners 

748
00:28:35,300 --> 00:28:39,230
as indo pay com goes ahead on , 

749
00:28:39,240 --> 00:28:41,296
on its daily and , and certainly its 

750
00:28:41,296 --> 00:28:43,980
overall mission , uh in particular for , 

751
00:28:43,990 --> 00:28:46,340
for the special operations team . We 

752
00:28:46,340 --> 00:28:48,500
actually like to think that we're a 

753
00:28:48,510 --> 00:28:51,200
premier partner for us . We , we have 

754
00:28:51,210 --> 00:28:53,099
long standing ties throughout the 

755
00:28:53,099 --> 00:28:55,043
region that we look to continue to 

756
00:28:55,043 --> 00:28:57,620
strengthen and maintain . And , uh and 

757
00:28:57,620 --> 00:28:59,731
we certainly each and every day don't 

758
00:28:59,731 --> 00:29:02,150
take them for granted and we looked to 

759
00:29:02,150 --> 00:29:03,928
reinforce them . I think that's 

760
00:29:03,928 --> 00:29:06,150
important that that continues to grow . 

761
00:29:06,160 --> 00:29:08,271
And I think it's , is uh as you think 

762
00:29:08,271 --> 00:29:10,271
about this senator , it's about the 

763
00:29:10,271 --> 00:29:12,327
growth of partners and allies in the 

764
00:29:12,327 --> 00:29:15,110
power uh in that not only for uh the 

765
00:29:15,110 --> 00:29:17,210
rules based order , but probably for 

766
00:29:17,220 --> 00:29:20,810
the vision of where we go , uh the next 

767
00:29:20,820 --> 00:29:24,180
3 to 5 , even 10 years . So I would 

768
00:29:24,190 --> 00:29:26,250
just recommend that it's a continue 

769
00:29:26,590 --> 00:29:29,040
focus on partners and allies , the 

770
00:29:29,040 --> 00:29:30,873
power that comes with that , the 

771
00:29:30,873 --> 00:29:32,873
partnering , the burden sharing and 

772
00:29:32,873 --> 00:29:35,530
certainly the capability grows growth 

773
00:29:35,540 --> 00:29:37,650
that we've all experienced in that I 

774
00:29:37,650 --> 00:29:39,761
can talk certainly more . Well , that 

775
00:29:39,761 --> 00:29:41,872
and I don't listen , I don't want you 

776
00:29:41,872 --> 00:29:44,240
to um I want to give you the time to be 

777
00:29:44,240 --> 00:29:46,462
able to get back to , to my office with 

778
00:29:46,462 --> 00:29:48,629
this because this is something that to 

779
00:29:48,629 --> 00:29:50,296
me is of paramount importance 

780
00:29:50,296 --> 00:29:50,220
particularly in the Indo Pacific 

781
00:29:50,220 --> 00:29:54,060
Theater um and be a long term 

782
00:29:54,070 --> 00:29:58,000
um commitment on my end . And um 

783
00:29:58,010 --> 00:30:00,177
as you work through . And by the way , 

784
00:30:00,177 --> 00:30:02,232
you won't be the only one I'm asking 

785
00:30:02,232 --> 00:30:01,510
this question that comes before the 

786
00:30:01,510 --> 00:30:03,790
committee um of what can we do ? 

787
00:30:03,790 --> 00:30:06,012
Because I do think that's just critical 

788
00:30:06,012 --> 00:30:08,930
uh and in doing everything we can to , 

789
00:30:08,940 --> 00:30:12,210
to guard against China's um 

790
00:30:13,300 --> 00:30:16,120
global domination , ambition , which 

791
00:30:16,120 --> 00:30:19,190
has been stated . And so uh I wanna 

792
00:30:19,190 --> 00:30:22,480
work with you on that and I guess um uh 

793
00:30:22,490 --> 00:30:24,712
General Nakasone , e if I could ask you 

794
00:30:24,712 --> 00:30:26,940
this into the extent that you can share 

795
00:30:26,940 --> 00:30:29,107
what you can share with this committee 

796
00:30:29,107 --> 00:30:31,890
in the open setting here , just where 

797
00:30:31,890 --> 00:30:34,740
we're at with China's capabilities , 

798
00:30:34,740 --> 00:30:37,800
whether it's on cyber or ai our 

799
00:30:37,800 --> 00:30:40,460
defensive capabilities versus their 

800
00:30:40,460 --> 00:30:42,640
offensive capabilities . This will be 

801
00:30:42,640 --> 00:30:44,862
an ongoing discussion . But in the open 

802
00:30:44,862 --> 00:30:47,084
setting , I certainly wanted to ask you 

803
00:30:47,084 --> 00:30:49,140
about that senator there in Europe , 

804
00:30:49,140 --> 00:30:51,251
your threat . Uh They are very good . 

805
00:30:51,251 --> 00:30:53,418
Uh They have been able over the period 

806
00:30:53,418 --> 00:30:55,529
of two decades to uh develop not only 

807
00:30:55,529 --> 00:30:55,300
their military but also their 

808
00:30:55,300 --> 00:30:57,390
industrial base . As we look to the 

809
00:30:57,390 --> 00:30:58,950
future , those capacity and 

810
00:30:58,950 --> 00:31:01,061
capabilities , whether or not it's in 

811
00:31:01,061 --> 00:31:02,950
artificial intelligence , machine 

812
00:31:02,950 --> 00:31:05,117
learning , whether or not it's looking 

813
00:31:05,117 --> 00:31:07,960
at the capacity to , to um grow cyber 

814
00:31:07,960 --> 00:31:10,080
forces . Uh They are , they are very 

815
00:31:10,080 --> 00:31:13,220
good but they are not , they are not 

816
00:31:13,230 --> 00:31:15,063
first of all as good as us . And 

817
00:31:15,063 --> 00:31:17,450
secondly , uh they are not 10 ft tall 

818
00:31:17,460 --> 00:31:19,682
and so we can get in close session more 

819
00:31:19,682 --> 00:31:21,904
in terms of some thoughts on this . But 

820
00:31:21,904 --> 00:31:23,960
I did want to make sure I hit that . 

821
00:31:23,960 --> 00:31:23,720
Well , I'll just close with this . I 

822
00:31:23,720 --> 00:31:25,887
agree with the concerns that have been 

823
00:31:25,887 --> 00:31:27,998
raised by other committee members and 

824
00:31:27,998 --> 00:31:30,164
you with tiktok , to me , tiktok is in 

825
00:31:30,164 --> 00:31:32,387
Chinese AI weapon aimed directly at the 

826
00:31:32,387 --> 00:31:34,553
United States of America and we better 

827
00:31:34,553 --> 00:31:36,609
take it seriously . So , among other 

828
00:31:36,609 --> 00:31:38,553
things , thank you , Mr Chairman . 

829
00:31:38,553 --> 00:31:40,664
Thank you , Senator Schmitt , Senator 

830
00:31:40,664 --> 00:31:42,776
Duckworth's , please . Thank you , Mr 

831
00:31:42,776 --> 00:31:41,960
Chairman . And I just have to say I had 

832
00:31:41,960 --> 00:31:44,071
a wonderful working relationship with 

833
00:31:44,071 --> 00:31:45,904
Senator Blunt , who has recently 

834
00:31:45,904 --> 00:31:47,793
retired . And I would have to say 

835
00:31:47,793 --> 00:31:49,904
Senator Smith , I agree with you with 

836
00:31:49,904 --> 00:31:51,793
your concerns on the Indo Pacific 

837
00:31:51,793 --> 00:31:53,849
region . And in fact , my question , 

838
00:31:53,849 --> 00:31:55,738
gentlemen is going to follow up a 

839
00:31:55,738 --> 00:31:58,000
little bit on my colleagues line of 

840
00:31:58,000 --> 00:32:00,040
questioning . Um but I did want to 

841
00:32:00,040 --> 00:32:02,207
start with saying that um Mr Assistant 

842
00:32:02,207 --> 00:32:04,160
Secretary and General Field , your 

843
00:32:04,160 --> 00:32:06,104
written testimony , references the 

844
00:32:06,104 --> 00:32:08,140
first soft truth , humans are more 

845
00:32:08,140 --> 00:32:10,030
important than hardware . And I 

846
00:32:10,030 --> 00:32:12,252
couldn't agree with this more . And two 

847
00:32:12,252 --> 00:32:14,474
weeks ago , I led a code L to Japan and 

848
00:32:14,474 --> 00:32:16,474
Indonesia . My interactions on that 

849
00:32:16,474 --> 00:32:18,474
trip reinforces how important those 

850
00:32:18,474 --> 00:32:21,370
alliances and partnerships are . Um We 

851
00:32:21,370 --> 00:32:23,820
must not forget that human ties are the 

852
00:32:23,820 --> 00:32:25,876
United States strategic advantage in 

853
00:32:25,876 --> 00:32:27,876
the Indo Pacific region . And these 

854
00:32:27,876 --> 00:32:29,876
human relationships are critical to 

855
00:32:29,876 --> 00:32:32,530
countering malign CCP activity in that 

856
00:32:32,530 --> 00:32:35,290
region . General Fenton . I appreciated 

857
00:32:35,290 --> 00:32:37,457
our discussion last week . And can you 

858
00:32:37,457 --> 00:32:39,568
please elaborate further more in that 

859
00:32:39,568 --> 00:32:41,568
questioning line ? Um And and on an 

860
00:32:41,568 --> 00:32:43,760
unclassified level on how the soft 

861
00:32:43,760 --> 00:32:45,871
community fosters close relationships 

862
00:32:45,871 --> 00:32:47,593
with our allies and partners . 

863
00:32:47,593 --> 00:32:49,660
Specifically , how does Special 

864
00:32:49,660 --> 00:32:51,716
Operations command ongoing work with 

865
00:32:51,716 --> 00:32:53,882
other nations ? From the smallest unit 

866
00:32:53,882 --> 00:32:57,220
operations all the way up through your 

867
00:32:57,230 --> 00:32:59,397
leadership to leadership relationships 

868
00:32:59,397 --> 00:33:01,900
with um military leaders in some of 

869
00:33:01,900 --> 00:33:04,067
these countries reinforce our campaign 

870
00:33:04,067 --> 00:33:07,610
plans in Southeast Asia . Senator . 

871
00:33:07,610 --> 00:33:09,620
Thank you . I really appreciate a 

872
00:33:09,620 --> 00:33:11,840
discussion as well and I appreciate 

873
00:33:11,840 --> 00:33:13,840
your reference in that . I'll start 

874
00:33:13,840 --> 00:33:17,000
with uh just emphasizing that partners 

875
00:33:17,000 --> 00:33:19,490
and allies are absolutely a key focus 

876
00:33:19,490 --> 00:33:22,230
for the department , the secretary uh 

877
00:33:22,240 --> 00:33:24,462
and for your special operations command 

878
00:33:24,462 --> 00:33:26,518
team . And I put that in contrast to 

879
00:33:26,518 --> 00:33:28,684
what China's focus , maybe in terms of 

880
00:33:28,684 --> 00:33:30,573
clients or customers were about , 

881
00:33:30,573 --> 00:33:32,573
partnerships were about friendships 

882
00:33:32,573 --> 00:33:36,540
were about the power of many to make uh 

883
00:33:36,550 --> 00:33:38,890
make us all stronger . Um And I think 

884
00:33:38,890 --> 00:33:41,223
we see that in the way that we approach . 

885
00:33:41,223 --> 00:33:43,279
Uh firstly , your special operations 

886
00:33:43,279 --> 00:33:45,612
team , as you mentioned , we start very , 

887
00:33:45,612 --> 00:33:48,470
very much from a perspective of uh it's 

888
00:33:48,470 --> 00:33:50,359
in our training and in our school 

889
00:33:50,359 --> 00:33:52,581
houses to work through these because we 

890
00:33:52,581 --> 00:33:54,581
recognize it's the speed of trust , 

891
00:33:54,581 --> 00:33:56,692
it's the speed of relationship , many 

892
00:33:56,692 --> 00:33:58,950
uh in many ways with partners and 

893
00:33:58,950 --> 00:34:01,172
teammates around the world . You'll see 

894
00:34:01,172 --> 00:34:03,350
us at a very tactical level . Um And I 

895
00:34:03,350 --> 00:34:05,461
won't , I won't mention any countries 

896
00:34:05,461 --> 00:34:07,517
and certainly I could talk more in a 

897
00:34:07,517 --> 00:34:07,490
closed session . You'll see us at a 

898
00:34:07,490 --> 00:34:09,900
tactical level doing events like 

899
00:34:09,910 --> 00:34:12,950
training , shooting jumping driving 

900
00:34:12,960 --> 00:34:15,560
building capabilities that used the 

901
00:34:15,560 --> 00:34:17,727
tools that , that this committee has , 

902
00:34:17,727 --> 00:34:19,790
has honored us with . I think at an 

903
00:34:19,790 --> 00:34:22,080
organizational level , we'll be showing 

904
00:34:22,080 --> 00:34:24,530
folks how we've grown ourselves in the 

905
00:34:24,530 --> 00:34:26,770
20 plus years of combat , what it meant 

906
00:34:26,770 --> 00:34:29,170
to weave in technology , how we 

907
00:34:29,170 --> 00:34:31,490
understand gathering of intelligence , 

908
00:34:31,490 --> 00:34:33,580
how we understand uh mission type 

909
00:34:33,580 --> 00:34:35,136
orders . And I think at the 

910
00:34:35,136 --> 00:34:37,247
institutional level , what you'll see 

911
00:34:37,247 --> 00:34:39,469
your special operations team doing in , 

912
00:34:39,469 --> 00:34:41,691
in , in any of the co coms is work with 

913
00:34:41,691 --> 00:34:43,858
the co comes to ensure that the nation 

914
00:34:43,858 --> 00:34:45,880
we we have a relationship with , 

915
00:34:45,890 --> 00:34:47,834
understand this special operations 

916
00:34:47,834 --> 00:34:50,170
forces and what they can do the types 

917
00:34:50,170 --> 00:34:54,170
of missions and uh maybe the return 

918
00:34:54,170 --> 00:34:56,281
on investment and the value that they 

919
00:34:56,281 --> 00:34:58,448
will bring that nation in a way that I 

920
00:34:58,450 --> 00:35:00,728
believe we certainly bring this nation . 

921
00:35:00,728 --> 00:35:02,950
Thank you , General . Um Turning now to 

922
00:35:02,950 --> 00:35:05,172
General Nakasone General , I just wanna 

923
00:35:05,172 --> 00:35:07,390
say I too have um complete trust in 

924
00:35:07,390 --> 00:35:09,650
your ability to do your job . And in 

925
00:35:09,650 --> 00:35:12,170
fact , um your forward leaning posture 

926
00:35:12,170 --> 00:35:14,170
allowed us to keep tabs on the well 

927
00:35:14,170 --> 00:35:16,730
being of my constituent who was held in 

928
00:35:16,730 --> 00:35:18,841
Haqqani network hands and also in his 

929
00:35:18,841 --> 00:35:20,970
safe return . So thank you very much 

930
00:35:20,970 --> 00:35:22,914
for , for the work of you and your 

931
00:35:22,914 --> 00:35:25,137
subordinates and that um I want to talk 

932
00:35:25,137 --> 00:35:27,359
about the cyber domain , of course , it 

933
00:35:27,359 --> 00:35:29,880
has no boundaries . Um uh I include 

934
00:35:29,880 --> 00:35:32,590
legislation in fiscal year 2021 India , 

935
00:35:32,590 --> 00:35:34,757
authorizing D O D to establish a pilot 

936
00:35:34,757 --> 00:35:36,979
program to enhance the cybersecurity of 

937
00:35:36,979 --> 00:35:39,070
our allies and in particular the 

938
00:35:39,070 --> 00:35:41,403
readiness of military forces of Vietnam , 

939
00:35:41,403 --> 00:35:43,681
Thailand and Indonesia . And this year , 

940
00:35:43,681 --> 00:35:45,514
I plan to expand that program to 

941
00:35:45,514 --> 00:35:47,681
include Malaysia and the Philippines . 

942
00:35:47,681 --> 00:35:49,570
Could , could you elaborate on um 

943
00:35:49,570 --> 00:35:51,681
specifically why the cybersecurity of 

944
00:35:51,681 --> 00:35:53,737
our allies and partners is important 

945
00:35:53,737 --> 00:35:56,110
for us overall U S national security . 

946
00:35:56,110 --> 00:35:58,277
And and if you , if possible , can you 

947
00:35:58,277 --> 00:35:59,999
comment on the value of direct 

948
00:35:59,999 --> 00:36:02,110
engagement with our overseas partners 

949
00:36:02,110 --> 00:36:04,166
to help build their cyber skills and 

950
00:36:04,166 --> 00:36:06,054
how that is important for our own 

951
00:36:06,054 --> 00:36:08,388
national security ? Certainly , Senator , 

952
00:36:08,388 --> 00:36:10,554
I think that there's no better example 

953
00:36:10,554 --> 00:36:12,554
than , than Ukraine . We've watched 

954
00:36:12,554 --> 00:36:14,666
this now for over a year where a very 

955
00:36:14,666 --> 00:36:16,721
cable partner that was able to raise 

956
00:36:16,721 --> 00:36:18,832
their level of cybersecurity was able 

957
00:36:18,832 --> 00:36:21,740
to fend off a much larger foe . But 

958
00:36:21,740 --> 00:36:23,620
it's not only that it's also the 

959
00:36:23,620 --> 00:36:25,620
ability for us to share information 

960
00:36:25,620 --> 00:36:27,676
with that partner . Uh We want to be 

961
00:36:27,676 --> 00:36:29,731
able to share our information in the 

962
00:36:29,731 --> 00:36:31,453
future and being able to share 

963
00:36:31,453 --> 00:36:33,509
information in cyberspace means that 

964
00:36:33,509 --> 00:36:35,676
you have to have an assurance that the 

965
00:36:35,676 --> 00:36:37,898
partner can secure your information and 

966
00:36:37,898 --> 00:36:39,953
that's a critical piece . And I know 

967
00:36:39,953 --> 00:36:39,820
that the work that you've done to drive 

968
00:36:39,820 --> 00:36:41,987
that type of cybersecurity , both from 

969
00:36:41,987 --> 00:36:44,209
the element of the bar has to go higher 

970
00:36:44,209 --> 00:36:46,376
for our partners to operate . But also 

971
00:36:46,376 --> 00:36:48,542
we have to have the confidence that we 

972
00:36:48,542 --> 00:36:50,709
share information that our information 

973
00:36:50,709 --> 00:36:53,470
is between us and that partner . Thank 

974
00:36:53,470 --> 00:36:55,540
you . Thank you very much , Senator 

975
00:36:55,540 --> 00:36:57,540
Duckworth's sooner Scott , please . 

976
00:36:58,180 --> 00:37:00,236
Thank you , Chairman . I wanna thank 

977
00:37:00,236 --> 00:37:02,930
each of you for being here . Um General 

978
00:37:03,120 --> 00:37:06,080
Sony 1st , Let's talk about China . 

979
00:37:06,690 --> 00:37:09,220
The is there anything that China sells 

980
00:37:09,220 --> 00:37:13,200
us ? We have cranes now at the 

981
00:37:13,210 --> 00:37:15,410
airport in Miami that they're worried 

982
00:37:15,410 --> 00:37:17,990
that there was the ability for China to 

983
00:37:18,000 --> 00:37:20,111
surveil what we're doing at reports . 

984
00:37:20,111 --> 00:37:22,278
You look at some of my colleagues have 

985
00:37:22,278 --> 00:37:25,200
talked about the risk of tiktok . Is 

986
00:37:25,200 --> 00:37:27,422
there anything that China sells in this 

987
00:37:27,422 --> 00:37:30,380
country that you don't believe it 

988
00:37:30,390 --> 00:37:33,780
creates a potential cybersecurity risk ? 

989
00:37:33,790 --> 00:37:35,846
And what would it be that they could 

990
00:37:35,846 --> 00:37:38,640
sell us ? And that wouldn't Senator ? 

991
00:37:38,640 --> 00:37:40,862
Certainly you point to the challenge of 

992
00:37:40,862 --> 00:37:43,029
cyber which is a huge attack surface , 

993
00:37:43,029 --> 00:37:44,973
right ? There's whether or not you 

994
00:37:44,973 --> 00:37:47,196
trade in some type of good or you trade 

995
00:37:47,196 --> 00:37:49,196
in some type of commodity , there's 

996
00:37:49,196 --> 00:37:51,418
always that opportunity . Uh You know , 

997
00:37:51,418 --> 00:37:53,473
I think this points to the challenge 

998
00:37:53,473 --> 00:37:53,360
that we have to be able to address , 

999
00:37:53,360 --> 00:37:55,582
which is supply chain to make sure that 

1000
00:37:55,582 --> 00:37:57,693
the elements of the supply chain that 

1001
00:37:57,693 --> 00:37:59,749
we operate , particularly within the 

1002
00:37:59,749 --> 00:38:01,860
department defense are secure . So do 

1003
00:38:01,860 --> 00:38:04,027
you think that Americans should have , 

1004
00:38:04,027 --> 00:38:06,390
do you think it puts America at risk if 

1005
00:38:06,390 --> 00:38:08,557
Americans have tiktok on their phone ? 

1006
00:38:10,180 --> 00:38:12,330
My concern with tiktok Senator really 

1007
00:38:12,330 --> 00:38:14,480
is from two pieces . One is the fact 

1008
00:38:14,480 --> 00:38:16,647
that there's tremendous amount of data 

1009
00:38:16,647 --> 00:38:18,813
and understanding where your data is , 

1010
00:38:18,813 --> 00:38:21,036
is is critical , I think and the second 

1011
00:38:21,036 --> 00:38:22,813
piece is uh the opportunity for 

1012
00:38:22,813 --> 00:38:25,240
influence . This is a means upon which , 

1013
00:38:25,250 --> 00:38:27,361
you know , you receive information or 

1014
00:38:27,361 --> 00:38:29,306
don't receive information . Uh And 

1015
00:38:29,306 --> 00:38:31,528
that's where , you know , I always look 

1016
00:38:31,528 --> 00:38:31,350
at that in terms of being able to 

1017
00:38:31,360 --> 00:38:33,720
measure that risk . So if you were 

1018
00:38:33,720 --> 00:38:37,640
running a say one of our electrical 

1019
00:38:37,640 --> 00:38:40,150
grids in the country , if you were 

1020
00:38:40,150 --> 00:38:42,483
responsible , knowing now what you know , 

1021
00:38:42,483 --> 00:38:44,594
in , in the job that you have , now , 

1022
00:38:44,594 --> 00:38:46,817
would you , would you allow , would you 

1023
00:38:46,817 --> 00:38:48,817
buy anything from China ? Would you 

1024
00:38:48,817 --> 00:38:50,872
allow the employees to have tiktok ? 

1025
00:38:50,872 --> 00:38:53,094
Would you , would you do , would you do 

1026
00:38:53,094 --> 00:38:55,039
any business ? Would you buy D G I 

1027
00:38:55,039 --> 00:38:57,206
drones ? Would you do anything knowing 

1028
00:38:57,206 --> 00:38:59,317
what you know ? And now in this job , 

1029
00:38:59,317 --> 00:39:01,483
Senator very difficult in the scenario 

1030
00:39:01,483 --> 00:39:03,706
that , that you point to our picture to 

1031
00:39:03,706 --> 00:39:05,928
imagine that you can really do that . I 

1032
00:39:05,928 --> 00:39:08,150
mean , there's so much of what we do is 

1033
00:39:08,150 --> 00:39:10,261
based upon a national trade and China 

1034
00:39:10,261 --> 00:39:12,372
has the corner on some things I think 

1035
00:39:12,372 --> 00:39:14,840
what I would do is ensure that the 

1036
00:39:14,840 --> 00:39:16,896
areas that are most sensitive to our 

1037
00:39:16,896 --> 00:39:19,062
operation are well censored and I have 

1038
00:39:19,062 --> 00:39:21,220
the confidence that what's being 

1039
00:39:21,220 --> 00:39:23,350
utilized there . I understand where 

1040
00:39:23,350 --> 00:39:25,294
that information may be going in a 

1041
00:39:25,294 --> 00:39:27,930
world where there was an alternative to , 

1042
00:39:28,210 --> 00:39:31,770
to um every Chinese product and app and 

1043
00:39:31,770 --> 00:39:33,881
service out there . If there was , if 

1044
00:39:33,881 --> 00:39:35,937
there was an American alternative or 

1045
00:39:35,937 --> 00:39:37,937
American ally alternative to them , 

1046
00:39:37,937 --> 00:39:39,937
would you at that point if you were 

1047
00:39:39,937 --> 00:39:39,380
running one of these companies , would 

1048
00:39:39,380 --> 00:39:41,547
you guarantee that , that your company 

1049
00:39:41,547 --> 00:39:43,769
did no business with China if there was 

1050
00:39:43,769 --> 00:39:45,713
a good alternative ? And would you 

1051
00:39:45,713 --> 00:39:45,280
think the same thing about our 

1052
00:39:45,280 --> 00:39:48,500
government knowing what , you know ? So 

1053
00:39:48,500 --> 00:39:50,940
again , coming back as a perspective , 

1054
00:39:50,940 --> 00:39:53,240
perhaps future business owner , I would 

1055
00:39:53,240 --> 00:39:55,018
take a very , very hard look of 

1056
00:39:55,018 --> 00:39:56,851
anything that was coming from an 

1057
00:39:56,851 --> 00:39:58,907
adversarial nation and being able to 

1058
00:39:58,907 --> 00:40:02,840
understand that . Um John Finn on , 

1059
00:40:02,850 --> 00:40:04,840
can you talk about what the things 

1060
00:40:04,840 --> 00:40:08,010
you're doing to prepare your , your 

1061
00:40:08,010 --> 00:40:11,250
forces to deal with China and where are 

1062
00:40:11,250 --> 00:40:13,920
they beating us and where um and what 

1063
00:40:13,920 --> 00:40:16,990
do we need to do more and better ? Um 

1064
00:40:16,990 --> 00:40:19,300
knowing that China doesn't like our way 

1065
00:40:19,300 --> 00:40:21,522
of life and what to demolish our way of 

1066
00:40:21,522 --> 00:40:25,500
life . So I think the 

1067
00:40:25,510 --> 00:40:27,732
very first thing we're doing in special 

1068
00:40:27,732 --> 00:40:29,510
operations command to focus the 

1069
00:40:29,510 --> 00:40:31,566
formation on , on the adversaries of 

1070
00:40:31,566 --> 00:40:33,732
China and Russia . But in particular , 

1071
00:40:33,732 --> 00:40:35,899
China's uh reordering the formation in 

1072
00:40:35,899 --> 00:40:38,650
terms of focus . Uh there are a number 

1073
00:40:38,650 --> 00:40:42,000
of uh elements in our formation that 

1074
00:40:42,000 --> 00:40:44,870
understand the PRC um and what they've 

1075
00:40:44,870 --> 00:40:47,670
been doing for years pretty well , but 

1076
00:40:47,680 --> 00:40:49,736
there's work that we've got to do to 

1077
00:40:49,736 --> 00:40:51,902
certainly bring in additional portions 

1078
00:40:51,902 --> 00:40:54,124
of formation along . We do much of that 

1079
00:40:54,124 --> 00:40:56,620
through our education process in our 

1080
00:40:56,630 --> 00:40:58,630
school houses at the , all the 

1081
00:40:58,630 --> 00:41:00,686
components are Army Navy , Air Force 

1082
00:41:00,686 --> 00:41:02,797
and Marine components and frankly our 

1083
00:41:02,797 --> 00:41:04,908
joint Special operations , University 

1084
00:41:04,908 --> 00:41:06,963
Understanding of the PRC and the PRC 

1085
00:41:06,963 --> 00:41:09,850
way of warfare . We , we uh we knew 

1086
00:41:09,850 --> 00:41:12,390
that very well when we fought the ISIS 

1087
00:41:12,390 --> 00:41:14,557
that we understood how they were gonna 

1088
00:41:14,557 --> 00:41:16,320
wage war . And now that's the 

1089
00:41:16,320 --> 00:41:18,960
understanding of the , of the PRC . 

1090
00:41:18,970 --> 00:41:21,630
Second I would say is being present in 

1091
00:41:21,640 --> 00:41:24,130
any region and trying to understand 

1092
00:41:24,140 --> 00:41:25,862
their malign activities . As I 

1093
00:41:25,862 --> 00:41:27,730
mentioned before , uh diplomatic 

1094
00:41:27,730 --> 00:41:29,897
pressure from the China , from the PRC 

1095
00:41:29,897 --> 00:41:32,810
economic coercion from the PRC creates 

1096
00:41:32,820 --> 00:41:35,042
clients and customers were out there to 

1097
00:41:35,042 --> 00:41:37,264
build partners and allies . And I think 

1098
00:41:37,264 --> 00:41:39,376
that also allows us to get a sense of 

1099
00:41:39,376 --> 00:41:41,209
what prc's Malign activities are 

1100
00:41:41,209 --> 00:41:43,830
globally and then on any given sense , 

1101
00:41:43,840 --> 00:41:46,950
uh Senator , we're providing ranges of 

1102
00:41:46,950 --> 00:41:49,100
options for the combatant commanders 

1103
00:41:49,100 --> 00:41:52,200
and certainly for the secretary uh to , 

1104
00:41:52,210 --> 00:41:54,730
to address either in deterrence uh 

1105
00:41:54,740 --> 00:41:57,290
preparing and if needed to prevail . 

1106
00:41:57,300 --> 00:41:59,078
And you've got the best special 

1107
00:41:59,078 --> 00:42:01,411
operations team in the world to do that . 

1108
00:42:01,411 --> 00:42:03,189
Uh And at the same time , we're 

1109
00:42:03,189 --> 00:42:05,189
presenting a lot of dilemmas to the 

1110
00:42:05,189 --> 00:42:07,522
adversary , the PRC . Thank each of you . 

1111
00:42:07,522 --> 00:42:09,522
Thank you , Senator Scott , Senator 

1112
00:42:09,522 --> 00:42:11,522
Rosen , please . Well , thank you , 

1113
00:42:11,522 --> 00:42:13,689
Chairman read . Uh I really appreciate 

1114
00:42:13,689 --> 00:42:15,856
you holding this hearing . I'd like to 

1115
00:42:15,856 --> 00:42:17,856
thank each one of the witnesses for 

1116
00:42:17,856 --> 00:42:20,078
being here and of course , for everyone 

1117
00:42:20,078 --> 00:42:21,967
to service to our nation . And so 

1118
00:42:21,967 --> 00:42:24,022
General Nakase only , I have quite a 

1119
00:42:24,022 --> 00:42:25,967
few questions for you on our cyber 

1120
00:42:25,967 --> 00:42:28,078
workforce and Nevada National Guard . 

1121
00:42:28,078 --> 00:42:29,856
But I'm going to get into cyber 

1122
00:42:29,856 --> 00:42:31,911
workforce first because the National 

1123
00:42:31,911 --> 00:42:33,744
Cybersecurity strategy which was 

1124
00:42:33,744 --> 00:42:35,911
released just last week . It calls for 

1125
00:42:35,911 --> 00:42:38,189
expanding the national cyber workforce . 

1126
00:42:38,189 --> 00:42:40,133
I know it's Chris , we continue to 

1127
00:42:40,133 --> 00:42:42,133
invest in innovative nontraditional 

1128
00:42:42,133 --> 00:42:44,810
cyber capabilities and in talent to 

1129
00:42:44,810 --> 00:42:47,150
support the Department of Defense cyber 

1130
00:42:47,150 --> 00:42:49,330
mission requirements . So in last 

1131
00:42:49,330 --> 00:42:51,580
year's N D A as reported out of this 

1132
00:42:51,580 --> 00:42:54,340
committee , it included my civilian 

1133
00:42:54,340 --> 00:42:56,720
Cyber Reserve Act bipartisan 

1134
00:42:56,720 --> 00:42:58,831
legislation I introduced with Senator 

1135
00:42:58,831 --> 00:43:00,887
Blackburn to create a civilian cyber 

1136
00:43:00,887 --> 00:43:04,210
reserve that ensures additional cyber 

1137
00:43:04,210 --> 00:43:07,650
capacity for cyber com and greatest 

1138
00:43:07,660 --> 00:43:09,716
times of greatest need . And so this 

1139
00:43:09,716 --> 00:43:11,771
year , of course , I look forward to 

1140
00:43:11,771 --> 00:43:13,771
working with the chairman to ensure 

1141
00:43:13,771 --> 00:43:15,882
this critically important legislation 

1142
00:43:15,882 --> 00:43:17,827
will be included , included in the 

1143
00:43:17,827 --> 00:43:19,827
final conference . But I was hoping 

1144
00:43:19,827 --> 00:43:21,771
general that you could discuss the 

1145
00:43:21,771 --> 00:43:23,882
value of reserve models including the 

1146
00:43:23,882 --> 00:43:25,549
value of a potential civilian 

1147
00:43:25,549 --> 00:43:28,790
cybersecurity reserve to support your 

1148
00:43:28,800 --> 00:43:32,720
cyberspace operations . Senator , 

1149
00:43:32,720 --> 00:43:34,609
first of all , thank you for your 

1150
00:43:34,609 --> 00:43:36,776
support of U S Cyber command and , and 

1151
00:43:36,776 --> 00:43:38,776
in general , the work that we do in 

1152
00:43:38,776 --> 00:43:40,998
cyberspace , it begins with humans . Uh 

1153
00:43:40,998 --> 00:43:43,164
And so this idea of being able to have 

1154
00:43:43,164 --> 00:43:45,000
many more analysts , many more 

1155
00:43:45,010 --> 00:43:48,010
operators , many more uh developers is 

1156
00:43:48,010 --> 00:43:50,232
something that is , you know , part and 

1157
00:43:50,232 --> 00:43:52,343
parcel to our success in the future . 

1158
00:43:52,370 --> 00:43:54,314
Uh It's not only with the civilian 

1159
00:43:54,314 --> 00:43:56,481
workforce that you've championed , but 

1160
00:43:56,481 --> 00:43:58,703
it's also this idea of how do you bring 

1161
00:43:58,703 --> 00:44:00,926
a larger base to bear , how do we bring 

1162
00:44:00,926 --> 00:44:03,092
it from K through 12 that makes people 

1163
00:44:03,092 --> 00:44:04,814
very interested that science , 

1164
00:44:04,814 --> 00:44:07,092
technology , engineering , mathematics , 

1165
00:44:07,092 --> 00:44:07,080
it's the way of the future girls that 

1166
00:44:07,080 --> 00:44:09,302
code all these things that will provide 

1167
00:44:09,302 --> 00:44:11,524
a greater base for us to , to draw from 

1168
00:44:11,524 --> 00:44:13,524
are really important to us . Well , 

1169
00:44:13,524 --> 00:44:15,747
you're speaking my language as a former 

1170
00:44:15,747 --> 00:44:17,913
software developer , the co founder of 

1171
00:44:17,913 --> 00:44:20,080
the women in Stem Caucus and trying to 

1172
00:44:20,080 --> 00:44:22,191
promote stem education all the time . 

1173
00:44:22,191 --> 00:44:24,490
This is music to my ears . And so , of 

1174
00:44:24,490 --> 00:44:27,110
course , in fiscal year 2021 the N D A 

1175
00:44:27,120 --> 00:44:29,231
required the Department of Defense to 

1176
00:44:29,231 --> 00:44:31,670
submit to Congress and evaluation of 

1177
00:44:31,670 --> 00:44:33,559
the reserve models to support the 

1178
00:44:33,559 --> 00:44:36,520
cyberspace operations and the report 

1179
00:44:36,530 --> 00:44:38,800
was never submitted . So , could you 

1180
00:44:38,800 --> 00:44:41,022
update me on the status of the report ? 

1181
00:44:41,022 --> 00:44:43,244
And also the requirement I added in the 

1182
00:44:43,244 --> 00:44:46,110
F by 23 bill to have D O D enter into 

1183
00:44:46,110 --> 00:44:48,277
an agreement to assess the benefits of 

1184
00:44:48,277 --> 00:44:50,388
such a program . I really like to see 

1185
00:44:50,388 --> 00:44:52,332
us be able to move forward on this 

1186
00:44:52,332 --> 00:44:54,388
senator if I might take that for the 

1187
00:44:54,388 --> 00:44:56,610
record just to make sure I can leverage 

1188
00:44:56,610 --> 00:44:56,540
the Department of Defense for that . 

1189
00:44:56,550 --> 00:44:59,420
That would be perfect . Um I have some 

1190
00:44:59,420 --> 00:45:02,710
other questions too on , on 

1191
00:45:03,350 --> 00:45:05,480
excuse me , specifically for Nevada 

1192
00:45:05,480 --> 00:45:07,480
National Guard . But you know , the 

1193
00:45:07,480 --> 00:45:09,702
National cybersecurity strategy rightly 

1194
00:45:09,702 --> 00:45:11,424
identifies a strengthening our 

1195
00:45:11,424 --> 00:45:13,647
international partner capacity . It's a 

1196
00:45:13,647 --> 00:45:15,924
pillar of our collective cybersecurity , 

1197
00:45:15,924 --> 00:45:18,202
our hunt forward operations in Ukraine , 

1198
00:45:18,202 --> 00:45:20,313
in particular , it really show us the 

1199
00:45:20,313 --> 00:45:22,424
value of international partnerships . 

1200
00:45:22,424 --> 00:45:24,424
I've advocated for more funding for 

1201
00:45:24,424 --> 00:45:26,450
hunt forward as we identify more 

1202
00:45:26,450 --> 00:45:29,260
vulnerabilities . And so are Nevada 

1203
00:45:29,260 --> 00:45:31,600
National Guard , we have three partner 

1204
00:45:31,600 --> 00:45:33,600
nations as the National Guard State 

1205
00:45:33,600 --> 00:45:36,630
Partnership program , Fiji Tonga and 

1206
00:45:36,630 --> 00:45:40,110
Samoa . So how is the program promoting 

1207
00:45:40,110 --> 00:45:42,277
cyber partnerships with our allies and 

1208
00:45:42,277 --> 00:45:44,470
partners ? And what challenges do you 

1209
00:45:44,470 --> 00:45:46,790
see ? Uh are you facing building these ? 

1210
00:45:46,790 --> 00:45:49,000
And where can we create a better 

1211
00:45:49,000 --> 00:45:52,510
strategy for this command ? So first of 

1212
00:45:52,510 --> 00:45:54,732
all , I see very , very future , very , 

1213
00:45:54,732 --> 00:45:56,954
very few limitations on what we need to 

1214
00:45:56,954 --> 00:45:59,066
do in the future , the countries that 

1215
00:45:59,066 --> 00:46:01,177
you talk about there in the Southwest 

1216
00:46:01,177 --> 00:46:03,177
Pacific , we've worked very closely 

1217
00:46:03,177 --> 00:46:05,232
with our partners in Australia uh to 

1218
00:46:05,232 --> 00:46:07,343
look at how do we kind of incorporate 

1219
00:46:07,343 --> 00:46:09,288
all of them as we understand their 

1220
00:46:09,288 --> 00:46:11,232
needs , their requirements , their 

1221
00:46:11,232 --> 00:46:13,399
vulnerabilities uh and then be able to 

1222
00:46:13,399 --> 00:46:15,454
system a very , very small amount of 

1223
00:46:15,454 --> 00:46:14,960
money and a very , very small amount of 

1224
00:46:14,960 --> 00:46:17,090
time yields tremendous results in my 

1225
00:46:17,090 --> 00:46:20,650
opinion . Yeah , I agree . I want to uh 

1226
00:46:20,660 --> 00:46:22,660
tell you that I'm also very excited 

1227
00:46:22,660 --> 00:46:24,882
because Department of Homeland Security 

1228
00:46:24,882 --> 00:46:26,900
recently announced another Cyber 

1229
00:46:26,910 --> 00:46:28,966
strategy as it's going to expand the 

1230
00:46:28,966 --> 00:46:31,270
Abraham Accords collaboration among the 

1231
00:46:31,270 --> 00:46:33,720
US , Israel U A E Bahrain and Morocco 

1232
00:46:33,720 --> 00:46:37,210
to include Cyber security . And so As 

1233
00:46:37,210 --> 00:46:39,043
you work to promote multilateral 

1234
00:46:39,043 --> 00:46:41,266
partnerships between the Abraham Accord 

1235
00:46:41,266 --> 00:46:43,321
countries , how do you think this is 

1236
00:46:43,321 --> 00:46:45,377
going to help you with that ? Well , 

1237
00:46:45,377 --> 00:46:45,280
just think about the hunt forward 

1238
00:46:45,280 --> 00:46:47,780
operations . We began those in 2018 , 

1239
00:46:47,790 --> 00:46:51,240
since 2018 , different nations , 22 

1240
00:46:51,240 --> 00:46:53,590
countries set 70 different networks . 

1241
00:46:53,640 --> 00:46:55,807
And when we take a look at what's been 

1242
00:46:55,807 --> 00:46:57,973
able to be done . What we've been able 

1243
00:46:57,973 --> 00:47:00,140
to do is the fact that one , it builds 

1244
00:47:00,140 --> 00:47:02,362
tremendous confidence between nations , 

1245
00:47:02,362 --> 00:47:04,529
right ? When the United States deploys 

1246
00:47:04,529 --> 00:47:06,473
a hunt forward team to Country X , 

1247
00:47:06,473 --> 00:47:08,640
country X knows that the United States 

1248
00:47:08,640 --> 00:47:10,807
cares . Uh And it , it is for us being 

1249
00:47:10,807 --> 00:47:12,529
able to work with a partner to 

1250
00:47:12,529 --> 00:47:14,696
understand their requirements and then 

1251
00:47:14,696 --> 00:47:14,530
also build a higher bar of 

1252
00:47:14,530 --> 00:47:16,586
cybersecurity . Well , thank you for 

1253
00:47:16,586 --> 00:47:18,697
being there . We have heard that from 

1254
00:47:18,697 --> 00:47:20,752
our allies and partners . It means a 

1255
00:47:20,752 --> 00:47:22,863
lot . When you're there , you show up 

1256
00:47:22,863 --> 00:47:25,030
and we work in partnership with others 

1257
00:47:25,030 --> 00:47:26,863
to help potentially eight , what 

1258
00:47:26,863 --> 00:47:28,974
they're doing to protect themselves . 

1259
00:47:28,974 --> 00:47:31,197
So , thank you again . My time is up Mr 

1260
00:47:31,197 --> 00:47:33,363
Chairman . Thank you , Senator Rosen . 

1261
00:47:33,363 --> 00:47:35,586
And the open portion of the hearing has 

1262
00:47:35,586 --> 00:47:34,990
concluded for the benefit of my 

1263
00:47:34,990 --> 00:47:37,200
colleagues who might be listening . We 

1264
00:47:37,200 --> 00:47:38,978
have two votes , one is already 

1265
00:47:38,978 --> 00:47:42,800
underway . We will adjourn here 

1266
00:47:42,810 --> 00:47:46,780
and convene are closed session and SDC 

1267
00:47:46,780 --> 00:47:50,300
217 immediately following this . I urge 

1268
00:47:50,300 --> 00:47:52,578
my colleagues to vote and then join us . 

1269
00:47:52,578 --> 00:47:56,310
Uh and uh I would also like to 

1270
00:47:56,310 --> 00:47:58,421
commend the panel for their excellent 

1271
00:47:58,421 --> 00:48:01,660
testimony . We've done our excellent 

1272
00:48:01,660 --> 00:48:03,770
testimony and also 

1273
00:48:14,880 --> 00:48:17,350
uh Senator Sullivan , please . Thank 

1274
00:48:17,350 --> 00:48:19,920
you , Mr Chairman . I appreciate it 

1275
00:48:19,920 --> 00:48:23,390
very much . Um General Fenton 

1276
00:48:24,250 --> 00:48:28,030
and Mr Mayor I know this has been 

1277
00:48:28,030 --> 00:48:30,970
touched on , but it's an issue that I 

1278
00:48:30,970 --> 00:48:33,026
think it's really important . How is 

1279
00:48:33,026 --> 00:48:35,790
the , how is the shift 

1280
00:48:36,490 --> 00:48:40,040
going from your 

1281
00:48:40,050 --> 00:48:43,640
rightful , an exceptional focus 

1282
00:48:45,020 --> 00:48:48,810
on C T operations primarily in the 

1283
00:48:48,810 --> 00:48:52,330
Centcom Kor to the end up a 

1284
00:48:52,330 --> 00:48:55,580
com region as our pacing threat . 

1285
00:48:56,430 --> 00:49:00,330
And what is the kind of orientation 

1286
00:49:00,340 --> 00:49:04,280
of the strategy in that region ? And 

1287
00:49:04,280 --> 00:49:08,210
what I mean by that is the C T 

1288
00:49:09,040 --> 00:49:12,250
socom focus 

1289
00:49:14,080 --> 00:49:18,060
Post 9 11 was very kinetic uh 

1290
00:49:19,330 --> 00:49:21,880
which our guys did an incredible job at . 

1291
00:49:22,970 --> 00:49:26,800
Um But the indo pay 

1292
00:49:26,800 --> 00:49:30,620
com strategy and focus is 

1293
00:49:30,620 --> 00:49:34,070
not kinetic . At least not now , we all 

1294
00:49:34,070 --> 00:49:36,850
hope it's never gonna be kinetic . So 

1295
00:49:36,850 --> 00:49:39,520
it's a very different mission set . 

1296
00:49:41,260 --> 00:49:43,371
I don't know if that impacts morale . 

1297
00:49:44,220 --> 00:49:48,150
It's not as well . 

1298
00:49:48,160 --> 00:49:50,382
I'd like both of you to talk about that 

1299
00:49:50,382 --> 00:49:53,000
because I've been concerned that it's 

1300
00:49:53,000 --> 00:49:56,380
been hard . You've done such a good job 

1301
00:49:56,380 --> 00:49:58,280
in that A O R 

1302
00:50:01,190 --> 00:50:04,910
and that A are still important in the 

1303
00:50:04,910 --> 00:50:08,200
issue of making sure that violent 

1304
00:50:08,200 --> 00:50:10,580
extremist organizations do not threaten 

1305
00:50:10,580 --> 00:50:12,747
our nation , particularly with weapons 

1306
00:50:12,747 --> 00:50:15,060
of mass destruction is still critical . 

1307
00:50:16,430 --> 00:50:19,200
But the pacing threat is China . Every 

1308
00:50:19,200 --> 00:50:21,256
day . We see something . You saw the 

1309
00:50:21,256 --> 00:50:23,256
Foreign Minister of China yesterday 

1310
00:50:23,256 --> 00:50:25,200
publicly saying , hey , we're on a 

1311
00:50:25,200 --> 00:50:27,422
collision course towards war . We don't 

1312
00:50:27,422 --> 00:50:29,533
want that but we better well be ready 

1313
00:50:29,533 --> 00:50:31,533
for it . And your operators are the 

1314
00:50:31,533 --> 00:50:34,400
best in the world . There's no Chinese 

1315
00:50:34,410 --> 00:50:37,040
forces that can hold a candle to the U 

1316
00:50:37,040 --> 00:50:40,610
S Special operations enterprise , not 

1317
00:50:40,610 --> 00:50:43,550
even close . So it's a giant strategic 

1318
00:50:43,550 --> 00:50:45,620
advantage we have over them . I want 

1319
00:50:45,620 --> 00:50:48,700
them to fear the hell out of it . So , 

1320
00:50:48,700 --> 00:50:50,644
what are we doing ? And how's that 

1321
00:50:50,644 --> 00:50:54,370
shift going ? So , Senator , thanks for 

1322
00:50:54,370 --> 00:50:56,370
the question . Maybe I'll start and 

1323
00:50:56,370 --> 00:50:58,426
then General Fan can address some of 

1324
00:50:58,426 --> 00:51:00,592
the issues that are , that are core to 

1325
00:51:00,592 --> 00:51:02,703
his , his force here . So I would say 

1326
00:51:02,703 --> 00:51:04,990
that the shift is very much underway . 

1327
00:51:05,000 --> 00:51:07,200
But I think it's , it's a question of 

1328
00:51:07,210 --> 00:51:09,670
how do we maintain the counter 

1329
00:51:09,670 --> 00:51:11,781
terrorism capabilities because if you 

1330
00:51:11,781 --> 00:51:14,003
look at the maps are , of course , many 

1331
00:51:14,003 --> 00:51:15,781
of the areas that were problems 

1332
00:51:15,781 --> 00:51:17,837
continue to be problems . So we're , 

1333
00:51:17,837 --> 00:51:20,059
we're having to manage that risk at the 

1334
00:51:20,059 --> 00:51:22,281
same time we are doing as you correctly 

1335
00:51:22,281 --> 00:51:24,503
said , sir , a different mission in the 

1336
00:51:24,503 --> 00:51:26,503
Indo Pacific . And I think the idea 

1337
00:51:26,503 --> 00:51:28,760
that we're not very kinetic or not 

1338
00:51:28,760 --> 00:51:31,580
kinetic at all in the Indo Pacific is 

1339
00:51:31,590 --> 00:51:33,830
not necessarily something that means 

1340
00:51:33,830 --> 00:51:36,480
that the same kind of soft skills are 

1341
00:51:36,480 --> 00:51:38,702
not relevant . So as we think of things 

1342
00:51:38,702 --> 00:51:40,758
like placement and access and really 

1343
00:51:40,758 --> 00:51:42,924
relying on partners sometimes for that 

1344
00:51:42,924 --> 00:51:44,924
placement and access , but also the 

1345
00:51:44,924 --> 00:51:46,869
ability to work unilaterally go to 

1346
00:51:46,869 --> 00:51:48,980
places that lie tactical mile that at 

1347
00:51:48,980 --> 00:51:51,410
times only U S special operations can 

1348
00:51:51,410 --> 00:51:53,466
do that's still relevant in the Indo 

1349
00:51:53,466 --> 00:51:55,730
Pacific , even if the finish is , is 

1350
00:51:55,730 --> 00:51:58,040
not a kinetic or lethal finish . And I 

1351
00:51:58,040 --> 00:52:00,330
think second uh Senator I would 

1352
00:52:00,330 --> 00:52:02,219
highlight the by with and through 

1353
00:52:02,219 --> 00:52:04,108
approach , really working through 

1354
00:52:04,108 --> 00:52:06,540
partners that has really been the 

1355
00:52:06,570 --> 00:52:08,550
hallmark of the counter terrorism 

1356
00:52:08,600 --> 00:52:10,780
efforts especially the last decade or 

1357
00:52:10,780 --> 00:52:12,891
so . It is very , very relevant again 

1358
00:52:12,891 --> 00:52:15,113
in the Indo Pacific because we want our 

1359
00:52:15,113 --> 00:52:17,280
partners to be in the lead . But we've 

1360
00:52:17,280 --> 00:52:19,391
demonstrated in places like Ukraine , 

1361
00:52:19,391 --> 00:52:21,558
we can do that from a distance . So it 

1362
00:52:21,558 --> 00:52:23,502
doesn't have to be the hand on the 

1363
00:52:23,502 --> 00:52:25,724
shoulder that we're always , we've been 

1364
00:52:25,724 --> 00:52:27,891
familiar with in the past . So I think 

1365
00:52:27,891 --> 00:52:29,724
these fundamental tools that and 

1366
00:52:29,724 --> 00:52:31,780
approaches we've used are still very 

1367
00:52:31,780 --> 00:52:33,836
relevant in the Indo Pacific , sir , 

1368
00:52:33,836 --> 00:52:35,336
General Fenton . How's the 

1369
00:52:35,336 --> 00:52:37,280
reorientation of the Indo pay come 

1370
00:52:37,280 --> 00:52:39,750
theater going ? Senator , I'm , if I 

1371
00:52:39,750 --> 00:52:41,750
might , I'm gonna start by agreeing 

1372
00:52:41,750 --> 00:52:43,639
with you that your , your special 

1373
00:52:43,639 --> 00:52:46,090
operations formation is the best , the 

1374
00:52:46,090 --> 00:52:48,250
very best in the history of Chinese 

1375
00:52:48,260 --> 00:52:50,850
don't have anything remotely close to 

1376
00:52:50,850 --> 00:52:53,840
it . Uh They know that we know that and 

1377
00:52:53,850 --> 00:52:56,280
uh I agree with that and the same thing 

1378
00:52:56,280 --> 00:52:58,730
with Russia and any other adversary out 

1379
00:52:58,730 --> 00:53:00,841
there . And the other part is that we 

1380
00:53:00,841 --> 00:53:02,750
exist in the uh included with the 

1381
00:53:02,750 --> 00:53:04,861
entirety of the US military . And the 

1382
00:53:04,861 --> 00:53:07,028
cyber com team is exactly the best and 

1383
00:53:07,028 --> 00:53:09,360
we have all that . So I think I would 

1384
00:53:09,360 --> 00:53:12,260
want everybody uh that , that wishes 

1385
00:53:12,260 --> 00:53:14,149
this nation harm . And there's an 

1386
00:53:14,149 --> 00:53:16,371
adversary out there in China and I just 

1387
00:53:16,371 --> 00:53:18,427
want to pay com theater to know that 

1388
00:53:18,427 --> 00:53:20,538
we're out there to write . I want the 

1389
00:53:20,538 --> 00:53:20,120
Chinese to wake up thinking they got 

1390
00:53:20,120 --> 00:53:23,290
navy seals all over them every day , 

1391
00:53:23,900 --> 00:53:27,240
sir . And your special operations team 

1392
00:53:27,250 --> 00:53:30,730
is out there and in a 

1393
00:53:30,740 --> 00:53:33,640
very sustainable durable way and in , 

1394
00:53:33,650 --> 00:53:36,140
in a concert with Admiral actually 

1395
00:53:36,140 --> 00:53:38,196
knows requirements and , and I would 

1396
00:53:38,196 --> 00:53:40,084
tell you that we can handle these 

1397
00:53:40,084 --> 00:53:42,196
challenges . And I'll start by saying 

1398
00:53:42,196 --> 00:53:44,251
special operations really never left 

1399
00:53:44,251 --> 00:53:46,029
strategic competition and great 

1400
00:53:46,029 --> 00:53:48,251
deterrence . And you and I talked about 

1401
00:53:48,251 --> 00:53:50,418
this senator , I think last year where 

1402
00:53:50,418 --> 00:53:50,130
I was a special ops commander 

1403
00:53:50,140 --> 00:53:52,610
responsible in the Pacific for the 

1404
00:53:52,610 --> 00:53:54,832
Special Operations Forces that both did 

1405
00:53:54,832 --> 00:53:56,999
counterterrorism with one partner that 

1406
00:53:56,999 --> 00:53:59,054
we can , I can talk more in a closed 

1407
00:53:59,054 --> 00:54:01,370
session about but competed with the PRC 

1408
00:54:01,380 --> 00:54:03,602
all day long by building partnerships , 

1409
00:54:03,602 --> 00:54:05,769
relationships and capability that that 

1410
00:54:05,769 --> 00:54:07,936
continues . At the same time , we will 

1411
00:54:07,936 --> 00:54:09,936
not take our eye off the persistent 

1412
00:54:09,936 --> 00:54:12,102
threat of global terrorism . And so we 

1413
00:54:12,102 --> 00:54:14,213
will still handle the CT mission . Uh 

1414
00:54:14,213 --> 00:54:16,269
And there will be a number of forces 

1415
00:54:16,269 --> 00:54:18,491
that have the CT mission each and every 

1416
00:54:18,491 --> 00:54:20,547
day hunting anybody that wishes harm 

1417
00:54:20,547 --> 00:54:22,436
this nation but can slide over to 

1418
00:54:22,436 --> 00:54:24,436
present some level of dilemma to an 

1419
00:54:24,436 --> 00:54:26,547
adversary in an integrated deterrence 

1420
00:54:26,547 --> 00:54:28,602
arena . And I would just add much of 

1421
00:54:28,602 --> 00:54:30,547
our counterterrorism experience is 

1422
00:54:30,547 --> 00:54:32,658
desired by these partners and nations 

1423
00:54:32,658 --> 00:54:34,880
as we go forward to train and becomes a 

1424
00:54:34,880 --> 00:54:36,713
key part of the partnership . So 

1425
00:54:36,713 --> 00:54:39,890
Senator , I would just stand with your 

1426
00:54:39,890 --> 00:54:41,779
SOCOM team is absolutely ready to 

1427
00:54:41,779 --> 00:54:44,001
handle that challenge . I think there's 

1428
00:54:44,001 --> 00:54:46,001
a large portion of our force that's 

1429
00:54:46,001 --> 00:54:48,057
excited about this . They want to do 

1430
00:54:48,057 --> 00:54:50,168
what the nation needs . And right now 

1431
00:54:50,168 --> 00:54:52,112
the nation needs us to get uh very 

1432
00:54:52,112 --> 00:54:55,480
involved and we are uh and deter PRC 

1433
00:54:55,490 --> 00:54:57,870
and certainly to address aggression by 

1434
00:54:57,870 --> 00:55:00,010
the rush and they want to be uh knee 

1435
00:55:00,010 --> 00:55:02,066
deep in it , you know , your special 

1436
00:55:02,066 --> 00:55:04,066
operations team . Well , and at the 

1437
00:55:04,066 --> 00:55:06,288
same time , handle the counterterrorism 

1438
00:55:06,288 --> 00:55:08,510
mission and any crisis response mission 

1439
00:55:08,510 --> 00:55:11,220
where us uh citizen or a diplomat needs 

1440
00:55:11,220 --> 00:55:13,320
to be safeguarded or rescued . Thank 

1441
00:55:13,320 --> 00:55:15,320
you . Thank you Mr Chairman . And I 

1442
00:55:15,320 --> 00:55:17,598
just want to say that General Nakasone , 

1443
00:55:17,598 --> 00:55:19,487
no question . I just think you're 

1444
00:55:19,487 --> 00:55:21,598
publicly because a lot of what you do 

1445
00:55:21,598 --> 00:55:23,764
is not public . I I think you and your 

1446
00:55:23,764 --> 00:55:25,764
team are doing an exceptional job . 

1447
00:55:25,764 --> 00:55:25,080
General . Thank you . Thank you , Mr 

1448
00:55:25,080 --> 00:55:27,413
Chairman . Thank you , Senator Sullivan . 

1449
00:55:27,413 --> 00:55:30,830
Uh The open session has concluded again . 

1450
00:55:30,840 --> 00:55:34,000
Uh We have two votes . I urge my 

1451
00:55:34,000 --> 00:55:36,222
colleagues to go to the first vote . We 

1452
00:55:36,222 --> 00:55:39,360
will resume immediately in S V C to 17 

1453
00:55:39,360 --> 00:55:41,840
for the closed session and to each of 

1454
00:55:41,840 --> 00:55:43,896
you , gentlemen . Thank you for your 

1455
00:55:43,896 --> 00:55:46,173
testimony , General Fenton , Secretary , 

1456
00:55:46,173 --> 00:55:48,340
Mayor John Macaluso Neal . Let me tell 

1457
00:55:48,340 --> 00:55:50,229
you all been extremely diligent , 

1458
00:55:50,229 --> 00:55:52,840
dedicated and offered superb service to 

1459
00:55:52,840 --> 00:55:55,210
this nation over many years and we are 

1460
00:55:55,210 --> 00:55:57,377
in your debt . Thank you all very much 

1461
00:55:57,377 --> 00:55:59,210
for that . I'll adjourn the open 

1462
00:55:59,210 --> 00:55:59,510
hearing .