1 00:00:00,860 --> 00:00:03,220 Good afternoon , everyone . It's my 2 00:00:03,220 --> 00:00:05,680 pleasure to introduce Dr Mara Karlin 3 00:00:05,680 --> 00:00:07,680 performing the duties of the deputy 4 00:00:07,680 --> 00:00:09,736 undersecretary of defense for policy 5 00:00:09,736 --> 00:00:11,736 who will provide some brief remarks 6 00:00:11,736 --> 00:00:13,513 about the Aucas optimal pathway 7 00:00:13,513 --> 00:00:15,791 announced by President Biden yesterday . 8 00:00:15,791 --> 00:00:17,958 This is a trilateral commitments based 9 00:00:17,958 --> 00:00:19,958 phase plan for Australia to acquire 10 00:00:19,958 --> 00:00:22,013 conventionally armed nuclear powered 11 00:00:22,013 --> 00:00:24,236 submarines . Please note Dr Carlin will 12 00:00:24,236 --> 00:00:26,069 have time uh for a few questions 13 00:00:26,069 --> 00:00:28,124 afterwards and then must depart . Um 14 00:00:28,250 --> 00:00:30,194 I'd ask that you please limit your 15 00:00:30,194 --> 00:00:32,194 questions to Aucas given that's her 16 00:00:32,194 --> 00:00:34,194 focus here today . And then after a 17 00:00:34,194 --> 00:00:36,139 brief pause , I'll stick around to 18 00:00:36,139 --> 00:00:38,083 provide some non Aucas updates and 19 00:00:38,083 --> 00:00:40,306 answer questions as well . So thank you 20 00:00:40,306 --> 00:00:42,528 for your assistance on this , Dr Carlin 21 00:00:42,528 --> 00:00:41,930 over to you , ma'am . Alright , thanks 22 00:00:41,930 --> 00:00:44,041 so much . Good afternoon . It's great 23 00:00:44,041 --> 00:00:46,152 to see all yesterday . You heard from 24 00:00:46,152 --> 00:00:47,986 President Biden , Prime Minister 25 00:00:47,986 --> 00:00:50,097 Albanese and Prime Minister Son ac on 26 00:00:50,097 --> 00:00:52,263 the agreement for Australia to acquire 27 00:00:52,263 --> 00:00:54,430 a conventionally armed nuclear powered 28 00:00:54,430 --> 00:00:56,430 submarine capability through the 29 00:00:56,440 --> 00:00:58,800 Australia United Kingdom , United 30 00:00:58,800 --> 00:01:01,022 States enhanced security partnership or 31 00:01:01,022 --> 00:01:03,950 Aucas . Yesterday concluded our 18 32 00:01:03,950 --> 00:01:05,740 month thorough and expert led 33 00:01:05,740 --> 00:01:08,150 consultation period to identify the 34 00:01:08,150 --> 00:01:10,170 optimal pathway for Australia to 35 00:01:10,170 --> 00:01:12,281 acquire this capability while setting 36 00:01:12,281 --> 00:01:14,337 the highest nuclear nonproliferation 37 00:01:14,337 --> 00:01:16,392 standard . This plan will deliver on 38 00:01:16,392 --> 00:01:18,337 that commitment and lift all three 39 00:01:18,337 --> 00:01:20,559 nations submarine industrial base is an 40 00:01:20,559 --> 00:01:22,448 undersea capabilities , enhancing 41 00:01:22,448 --> 00:01:24,559 deterrence and promoting stability in 42 00:01:24,559 --> 00:01:26,670 the Indo Pacific . For the last seven 43 00:01:26,670 --> 00:01:28,614 decades , our three countries have 44 00:01:28,614 --> 00:01:30,726 stood shoulder to shoulder along with 45 00:01:30,726 --> 00:01:32,948 our allies and partners to help sustain 46 00:01:32,948 --> 00:01:35,281 peace and stability in the Indo Pacific , 47 00:01:35,281 --> 00:01:37,392 the optimal pathway will sustain that 48 00:01:37,392 --> 00:01:39,559 in the decisive decades ahead . As the 49 00:01:39,559 --> 00:01:41,781 national security strategy and national 50 00:01:41,781 --> 00:01:43,837 defense strategy describe the United 51 00:01:43,837 --> 00:01:45,900 States must pursue a free open and 52 00:01:45,900 --> 00:01:47,990 secure world to protect our national 53 00:01:47,990 --> 00:01:50,101 interests and those of our allies and 54 00:01:50,101 --> 00:01:52,101 our partners . August advances this 55 00:01:52,101 --> 00:01:53,768 goal by building our military 56 00:01:53,768 --> 00:01:55,823 capabilities and those of two of our 57 00:01:55,823 --> 00:01:57,823 very closest allies enabling closer 58 00:01:57,823 --> 00:02:00,260 military planning and cooperation . It 59 00:02:00,260 --> 00:02:02,400 is a generational opportunity to 60 00:02:02,400 --> 00:02:04,456 enhance the national security of all 61 00:02:04,456 --> 00:02:06,678 three nations . As the president shared 62 00:02:06,678 --> 00:02:08,844 in his remarks yesterday , the optimal 63 00:02:08,844 --> 00:02:11,011 pathway will deliver deterrence across 64 00:02:11,011 --> 00:02:13,178 several phases . Under the first phase 65 00:02:13,178 --> 00:02:15,178 of the optimal pathway , the United 66 00:02:15,178 --> 00:02:17,122 States and the United Kingdom will 67 00:02:17,122 --> 00:02:19,178 immediately increase sport visits of 68 00:02:19,178 --> 00:02:21,233 conventionally armed nuclear-powered 69 00:02:21,233 --> 00:02:23,344 submarines in Australia . And then as 70 00:02:23,344 --> 00:02:25,233 early as 2027 will begin rotating 71 00:02:25,233 --> 00:02:27,122 through Australia under submarine 72 00:02:27,122 --> 00:02:29,344 rotational force west . This deployment 73 00:02:29,344 --> 00:02:31,400 will ensure Australian personnel can 74 00:02:31,400 --> 00:02:33,567 continue familiarizing themselves with 75 00:02:33,567 --> 00:02:35,622 how these vessels operate , how they 76 00:02:35,622 --> 00:02:37,789 are properly maintained and how we can 77 00:02:37,789 --> 00:02:39,844 continue safely operating together . 78 00:02:39,844 --> 00:02:41,511 The increased presence of U S 79 00:02:41,511 --> 00:02:43,400 submarines will buttress regional 80 00:02:43,400 --> 00:02:45,122 stability and support the safe 81 00:02:45,122 --> 00:02:47,233 development of Australian stewardship 82 00:02:47,233 --> 00:02:49,233 of its own sovereign conventionally 83 00:02:49,233 --> 00:02:51,011 armed nuclear powered submarine 84 00:02:51,011 --> 00:02:53,067 enterprise . In the next phase , the 85 00:02:53,067 --> 00:02:55,067 United States intends to sell three 86 00:02:55,067 --> 00:02:57,233 Virginia class submarines to Australia 87 00:02:57,233 --> 00:02:59,122 in the twenties thirties with the 88 00:02:59,122 --> 00:03:01,122 potential to sell up to two more if 89 00:03:01,122 --> 00:03:03,178 needed . This will provide Australia 90 00:03:03,178 --> 00:03:05,178 with a conventionally armed nuclear 91 00:03:05,178 --> 00:03:07,289 powered submarine capability prior to 92 00:03:07,289 --> 00:03:09,289 their enduring sovereign capability 93 00:03:09,289 --> 00:03:11,233 coming online , you will see three 94 00:03:11,233 --> 00:03:13,233 allied and highly interoperable SSN 95 00:03:13,233 --> 00:03:15,400 fleets operating in the Indo Pacific . 96 00:03:15,670 --> 00:03:17,892 The final phase will be our support for 97 00:03:17,892 --> 00:03:20,260 what we call SSN August and next 98 00:03:20,260 --> 00:03:22,482 generation conventionally armed nuclear 99 00:03:22,482 --> 00:03:24,204 powered submarine designed and 100 00:03:24,204 --> 00:03:26,560 constructed by Australia and the UK and 101 00:03:26,560 --> 00:03:28,300 incorporating cutting edge us 102 00:03:28,300 --> 00:03:30,467 technologies in the propulsion plant , 103 00:03:30,467 --> 00:03:32,522 combat control and weapons systems . 104 00:03:32,522 --> 00:03:34,522 Australia's acquisition of SSN will 105 00:03:34,522 --> 00:03:36,689 bolster the capabilities of one of our 106 00:03:36,689 --> 00:03:38,633 strongest allies by increasing the 107 00:03:38,633 --> 00:03:40,411 Royal Australian Navy's range , 108 00:03:40,411 --> 00:03:42,633 survivability and striking power . Thus 109 00:03:42,633 --> 00:03:44,689 strengthening deterrence in the Indo 110 00:03:44,689 --> 00:03:46,744 Pacific . Every phase of the optimal 111 00:03:46,744 --> 00:03:48,800 pathway will set the highest nuclear 112 00:03:48,800 --> 00:03:51,022 nonproliferation standards . Moreover , 113 00:03:51,022 --> 00:03:53,078 August will diversify us , posturing 114 00:03:53,078 --> 00:03:55,300 the Indo Pacific offering new locations 115 00:03:55,300 --> 00:03:57,480 from which U S forces can operate and 116 00:03:57,490 --> 00:03:59,546 August will strengthen us and allied 117 00:03:59,546 --> 00:04:01,657 submarine industrial capacity , which 118 00:04:01,657 --> 00:04:03,712 is key to modernizing innovating and 119 00:04:03,712 --> 00:04:05,823 maintaining our military and economic 120 00:04:05,823 --> 00:04:07,823 competitive edge today . And in the 121 00:04:07,823 --> 00:04:09,879 future , three highly capable allied 122 00:04:09,879 --> 00:04:12,101 and interoperable submarine forces will 123 00:04:12,101 --> 00:04:14,101 strengthen us national security and 124 00:04:14,101 --> 00:04:16,157 budget stability in the Indo Pacific 125 00:04:16,157 --> 00:04:18,046 for decades to come . We are also 126 00:04:18,046 --> 00:04:20,101 working to modernize our information 127 00:04:20,101 --> 00:04:19,710 sharing and export control systems 128 00:04:19,720 --> 00:04:21,776 which is necessary for the effective 129 00:04:21,776 --> 00:04:23,664 implementation of August . As the 130 00:04:23,664 --> 00:04:25,831 national defense strategy outlines the 131 00:04:25,831 --> 00:04:27,998 capacity to share information with key 132 00:04:27,998 --> 00:04:29,942 allies and partners is of critical 133 00:04:29,942 --> 00:04:31,942 importance to how the United States 134 00:04:31,942 --> 00:04:33,831 deters aggression and succeeds in 135 00:04:33,831 --> 00:04:35,887 contingencies . We will work closely 136 00:04:35,887 --> 00:04:38,053 with the the US government , including 137 00:04:38,053 --> 00:04:40,164 the Congress of course and the United 138 00:04:40,164 --> 00:04:42,053 Kingdom and Australia to identify 139 00:04:42,053 --> 00:04:44,276 obstacles to information sharing and to 140 00:04:44,276 --> 00:04:46,387 develop innovative rapid and scalable 141 00:04:46,387 --> 00:04:48,442 solutions to develop , to deliver on 142 00:04:48,442 --> 00:04:50,220 the president's vision for this 143 00:04:50,220 --> 00:04:52,387 historic partnership . And with that , 144 00:04:52,387 --> 00:04:52,005 I'd be delighted to take your questions . 145 00:04:52,025 --> 00:04:54,995 Thank you very much , ma'am . Go to 146 00:04:55,365 --> 00:04:58,460 questions . Yes , sir . Alright , ask , 147 00:04:58,560 --> 00:05:02,440 sorry . Have you had any direct 148 00:05:02,450 --> 00:05:04,590 communications with other militaries 149 00:05:04,900 --> 00:05:08,500 airing concerns or issues about the 150 00:05:08,500 --> 00:05:10,611 orcas deal ? And if so what have they 151 00:05:10,611 --> 00:05:14,190 been ? And also just on the selection 152 00:05:14,190 --> 00:05:16,340 of the Virginia class submarines that 153 00:05:16,350 --> 00:05:18,670 you will eventually sell to Australia ? 154 00:05:18,680 --> 00:05:20,930 What's the criteria for which 155 00:05:20,930 --> 00:05:23,097 submarines you select ? And , and when 156 00:05:23,097 --> 00:05:26,020 you deliver them ? I want to make sure 157 00:05:26,020 --> 00:05:28,020 I understand the first part of your 158 00:05:28,020 --> 00:05:29,798 questions when you talked about 159 00:05:29,798 --> 00:05:29,760 communications with militaries , are 160 00:05:29,760 --> 00:05:31,982 you citing specific allies , partners , 161 00:05:35,200 --> 00:05:38,130 any other foreign military ? Great . Uh 162 00:05:38,140 --> 00:05:40,251 We have had a number of conversations 163 00:05:40,251 --> 00:05:42,251 with our allies and our partners in 164 00:05:42,251 --> 00:05:44,584 civilian channels and military channels , 165 00:05:44,584 --> 00:05:46,251 of course , um throughout the 166 00:05:46,251 --> 00:05:48,529 Consultative period and then of course , 167 00:05:48,529 --> 00:05:50,140 in the run up to yesterday's 168 00:05:50,140 --> 00:05:51,862 announcement and have heard uh 169 00:05:51,862 --> 00:05:53,973 substantial amount of enthusiasm from 170 00:05:53,973 --> 00:05:56,196 them for this historic game changing uh 171 00:05:56,196 --> 00:05:58,362 partnership regarding engagements with 172 00:05:58,362 --> 00:06:00,418 the People's Republic of China , the 173 00:06:00,418 --> 00:06:02,473 State Department did do that . And I 174 00:06:02,473 --> 00:06:04,640 would refer to you , I would refer you 175 00:06:04,640 --> 00:06:06,529 to them for the substance of that 176 00:06:06,529 --> 00:06:08,696 dialogue . I would of course highlight 177 00:06:08,696 --> 00:06:10,918 where you've heard often from Secretary 178 00:06:10,918 --> 00:06:10,890 Austin , which is that open 179 00:06:10,890 --> 00:06:13,112 communication between our two countries 180 00:06:13,112 --> 00:06:15,168 is important for risk management and 181 00:06:15,168 --> 00:06:17,279 for understanding what one another is 182 00:06:17,279 --> 00:06:19,223 thinking . And then on your second 183 00:06:19,223 --> 00:06:21,930 question regarding Virginia , um you 184 00:06:21,930 --> 00:06:23,819 know why , why we chose that ? We 185 00:06:23,819 --> 00:06:26,041 looked at a wide number of options that 186 00:06:26,041 --> 00:06:27,986 has been a robust and very busy 18 187 00:06:27,986 --> 00:06:30,097 months of of consultations and trying 188 00:06:30,097 --> 00:06:32,319 to look at a wide variety of options in 189 00:06:32,319 --> 00:06:34,430 terms of which submarine specifically 190 00:06:34,430 --> 00:06:36,652 will go that will will go to rotate for 191 00:06:36,652 --> 00:06:38,930 submarine rotational forces West . 192 00:06:38,940 --> 00:06:41,051 That's really going to be figured out 193 00:06:41,051 --> 00:06:43,218 to our normal military processes of of 194 00:06:43,218 --> 00:06:42,980 such efforts . 195 00:06:48,250 --> 00:06:50,306 Okay , thank you very much for doing 196 00:06:50,306 --> 00:06:52,630 this . I have two questions about 197 00:06:52,640 --> 00:06:55,990 submarine rotational force West . Can 198 00:06:55,990 --> 00:06:58,990 you say the new rotational force will 199 00:06:59,000 --> 00:07:01,160 increase the total number of U S 200 00:07:01,160 --> 00:07:03,690 submarines operating in the western 201 00:07:03,690 --> 00:07:07,490 past week compared to today ? And then 202 00:07:07,490 --> 00:07:09,768 do you have another question ? Oh yeah . 203 00:07:09,768 --> 00:07:11,990 Then the secondary . Can you tell us uh 204 00:07:11,990 --> 00:07:13,990 can you talk a little bit about the 205 00:07:13,990 --> 00:07:17,300 advantage of having locational presence 206 00:07:17,310 --> 00:07:20,130 of the U S submarine outside of the 207 00:07:20,130 --> 00:07:22,750 second island chain in terms of 208 00:07:22,750 --> 00:07:25,100 deterring Chinese aggression in the 209 00:07:25,100 --> 00:07:29,090 region ? Alright , on 210 00:07:29,090 --> 00:07:32,170 that first one , uh having three allies 211 00:07:32,180 --> 00:07:36,080 operating capable submarines around the 212 00:07:36,080 --> 00:07:38,450 Indo Pacific is really critical for 213 00:07:38,450 --> 00:07:40,790 security and stability . And I think 214 00:07:40,790 --> 00:07:42,957 that really tracks nicely to your next 215 00:07:42,957 --> 00:07:45,234 question , which look to be very clear , 216 00:07:45,234 --> 00:07:47,346 August is not about any one country , 217 00:07:47,346 --> 00:07:49,346 it is about the need for security , 218 00:07:49,346 --> 00:07:51,401 stability and prosperity in the Indo 219 00:07:51,401 --> 00:07:53,346 Pacific and our three countries of 220 00:07:53,346 --> 00:07:55,234 course , have a robust history of 221 00:07:55,234 --> 00:07:57,179 collab Creating together . This is 222 00:07:57,179 --> 00:07:59,234 going to take us to another level of 223 00:07:59,234 --> 00:08:01,290 interoperability . I would highlight 224 00:08:01,290 --> 00:08:03,123 the significance of sharing this 225 00:08:03,123 --> 00:08:05,234 information with Australia as you all 226 00:08:05,234 --> 00:08:07,457 probably know the last time we did . So 227 00:08:07,457 --> 00:08:09,700 it was 1958 . So it's really a sign of 228 00:08:09,700 --> 00:08:12,500 just how close this relationship is for 229 00:08:12,500 --> 00:08:14,611 that to really occur in a responsible 230 00:08:14,611 --> 00:08:16,611 way . It's important that Australia 231 00:08:16,611 --> 00:08:18,611 developed stewardship practices and 232 00:08:18,611 --> 00:08:20,833 that's why we have developed this multi 233 00:08:20,833 --> 00:08:22,889 phased mutual commitments approach . 234 00:08:23,620 --> 00:08:26,500 Thank you . Let's go to Will . Thank 235 00:08:26,500 --> 00:08:28,900 you . Um just regarding the the 236 00:08:28,900 --> 00:08:31,067 Virginia class submarines that um that 237 00:08:31,067 --> 00:08:33,289 Australia will purchase in the twenties 238 00:08:33,289 --> 00:08:35,289 thirties has , has a specific model 239 00:08:35,289 --> 00:08:37,511 been selected . Um Or is that something 240 00:08:37,511 --> 00:08:36,600 that's a little bit down the road and 241 00:08:36,610 --> 00:08:38,388 will basically be what's on the 242 00:08:38,388 --> 00:08:40,443 production line for that ? The US is 243 00:08:40,443 --> 00:08:42,666 purchasing at that point , will they be 244 00:08:42,666 --> 00:08:44,666 equipped with the V P M to increase 245 00:08:44,666 --> 00:08:46,666 missile capacity or is it something 246 00:08:46,666 --> 00:08:48,888 tailored to Australia specifically ? So 247 00:08:48,888 --> 00:08:50,999 first of all , it's worth noting that 248 00:08:50,999 --> 00:08:53,110 Australia will get these subs in just 249 00:08:53,110 --> 00:08:55,221 about a decade that is frankly faster 250 00:08:55,221 --> 00:08:57,221 than I suspect a lot of folks might 251 00:08:57,221 --> 00:08:59,277 have expected when this whole effort 252 00:08:59,277 --> 00:09:01,500 was announced just 18 months ago . Um 253 00:09:01,500 --> 00:09:03,790 Australia will be purchasing a mix of 254 00:09:03,800 --> 00:09:06,060 new , new submarines and old submarines 255 00:09:06,070 --> 00:09:08,181 and right now , it looks like it will 256 00:09:08,181 --> 00:09:10,181 be two with the potential to have . 257 00:09:10,181 --> 00:09:12,292 Excuse me , it will be three with the 258 00:09:12,292 --> 00:09:14,514 potential for two more if needed . As I 259 00:09:14,514 --> 00:09:17,110 noted earlier , the cohort of folks 260 00:09:17,110 --> 00:09:19,110 looked at a wide range of different 261 00:09:19,110 --> 00:09:21,170 options and really came , came down 262 00:09:21,170 --> 00:09:23,392 with Virginia is the right is the right 263 00:09:23,392 --> 00:09:25,337 approach . Uh and Virginia payload 264 00:09:25,337 --> 00:09:27,337 module will not be a part of it . I 265 00:09:27,337 --> 00:09:29,392 think the three countries saw that , 266 00:09:29,392 --> 00:09:31,559 that , that , that didn't make sense . 267 00:09:31,559 --> 00:09:31,510 Uh As you no doubt know , well , of 268 00:09:31,510 --> 00:09:33,677 course , these submarines are going to 269 00:09:33,677 --> 00:09:35,899 be especially special though because of 270 00:09:35,899 --> 00:09:38,010 their stealth , their range and their 271 00:09:38,010 --> 00:09:40,232 endurance . So they really will will be 272 00:09:40,232 --> 00:09:42,121 kind of a meaningful , meaningful 273 00:09:42,121 --> 00:09:44,232 deterrent in the region . Let's go to 274 00:09:44,232 --> 00:09:47,640 Jim . Hi . It's good to see you . 275 00:09:47,650 --> 00:09:50,600 Um on the info sharing . Going back to 276 00:09:50,600 --> 00:09:52,822 the question you answered just , just a 277 00:09:52,822 --> 00:09:55,150 little bit before . Is that , is that a 278 00:09:55,150 --> 00:09:57,460 real showstopper ? I mean , these these 279 00:09:57,460 --> 00:09:59,970 countries are all five I participants . 280 00:09:59,980 --> 00:10:02,450 You don't really anticipate that being 281 00:10:02,450 --> 00:10:05,360 a problem with the info sharing with 282 00:10:05,360 --> 00:10:07,830 Australia . Do you , you know Jim , 283 00:10:07,840 --> 00:10:10,062 allies and partners are at the heart of 284 00:10:10,062 --> 00:10:12,062 the National Defense strategy right 285 00:10:12,062 --> 00:10:14,284 there . Center of gravity for realizing 286 00:10:14,284 --> 00:10:16,396 that 2022 national defense strategy . 287 00:10:16,396 --> 00:10:18,229 And we know we have to lower the 288 00:10:18,229 --> 00:10:20,229 barriers to working with them . And 289 00:10:20,229 --> 00:10:22,451 information is just a piece of it . You 290 00:10:22,451 --> 00:10:24,673 are exactly right that these are two of 291 00:10:24,673 --> 00:10:26,673 our very closest allies who we have 292 00:10:26,673 --> 00:10:28,673 stood shoulder to shoulder with for 293 00:10:28,673 --> 00:10:30,618 much of the last 100 years or so . 294 00:10:30,618 --> 00:10:32,729 Nevertheless , nevertheless , we have 295 00:10:32,729 --> 00:10:34,840 processes that have to be figured out 296 00:10:34,840 --> 00:10:37,007 and to ensure that both pillars of our 297 00:10:37,007 --> 00:10:39,118 right , there are two pillars today , 298 00:10:39,118 --> 00:10:41,062 we're very focused on pillar one , 299 00:10:41,062 --> 00:10:43,173 which is the the conventionally armed 300 00:10:43,173 --> 00:10:45,007 nuclear powered submarines . But 301 00:10:45,007 --> 00:10:44,585 there's also pillar to write this 302 00:10:44,585 --> 00:10:46,696 cooperation , advanced capabilities . 303 00:10:46,696 --> 00:10:48,955 We know for that to be realized , we're 304 00:10:48,955 --> 00:10:51,615 going to need very clear , transparent , 305 00:10:51,615 --> 00:10:53,965 robust information sharing practices . 306 00:10:54,105 --> 00:10:56,105 It's a great case study . These are 307 00:10:56,105 --> 00:10:58,272 exactly the right to allies to make it 308 00:10:58,272 --> 00:11:00,383 real . And we look forward to working 309 00:11:00,383 --> 00:11:02,327 with our colleagues around the U S 310 00:11:02,327 --> 00:11:04,605 government , including the Congress to , 311 00:11:04,605 --> 00:11:06,716 to make that a reality . We have time 312 00:11:06,716 --> 00:11:08,980 for just a couple more . Joe . 313 00:11:11,420 --> 00:11:14,830 Hi , thanks for doing this um told 314 00:11:14,830 --> 00:11:16,997 defense news . Um just to follow up on 315 00:11:16,997 --> 00:11:19,274 Jim's question . I mean , what are the , 316 00:11:19,274 --> 00:11:21,497 can you drill down a little bit to talk 317 00:11:21,497 --> 00:11:23,830 about ? What are the specific obstacles ? 318 00:11:23,830 --> 00:11:26,052 Do you have a sense ? I mean , after 18 319 00:11:26,052 --> 00:11:28,108 months , do you have a sense of what 320 00:11:28,108 --> 00:11:30,770 some of the the pieces of it are ? Um 321 00:11:30,780 --> 00:11:33,160 And what kind of information sharing um 322 00:11:33,170 --> 00:11:36,690 needs to get changed ? You know , Joe , 323 00:11:36,690 --> 00:11:38,746 we've spent a lot of time over these 324 00:11:38,746 --> 00:11:40,801 last 18 months , figuring out how we 325 00:11:40,801 --> 00:11:42,746 can ensure that we deliver on this 326 00:11:42,746 --> 00:11:44,960 historic game changing pledge by the 327 00:11:44,970 --> 00:11:46,970 three heads of state . And so we've 328 00:11:46,970 --> 00:11:49,026 looked hard at the different changes 329 00:11:49,026 --> 00:11:51,248 that might need to happen . But I would 330 00:11:51,248 --> 00:11:53,303 say that there's probably more to be 331 00:11:53,303 --> 00:11:55,248 done along those lines . But I can 332 00:11:55,248 --> 00:11:57,990 assure you that we will do all we can 333 00:11:58,000 --> 00:12:00,445 to both deliver on the submarines and 334 00:12:00,445 --> 00:12:02,667 to deliver on the advanced capabilities 335 00:12:02,667 --> 00:12:04,278 piece . We are in very close 336 00:12:04,278 --> 00:12:06,501 consultation with our colleagues at the 337 00:12:06,501 --> 00:12:08,556 State Department on the guitar piece 338 00:12:08,556 --> 00:12:10,278 specifically and also with our 339 00:12:10,278 --> 00:12:12,334 colleagues in , in Congress . But on 340 00:12:12,334 --> 00:12:14,278 the whole , I think we've all been 341 00:12:14,278 --> 00:12:16,112 pleased to see robust bipartisan 342 00:12:16,112 --> 00:12:18,223 support for making this a reality and 343 00:12:18,223 --> 00:12:19,945 really recognizing the sort of 344 00:12:19,945 --> 00:12:22,056 generational leap that we see in this 345 00:12:22,056 --> 00:12:25,120 alliance . Okay , thank you very much , 346 00:12:25,120 --> 00:12:27,176 ma'am . Appreciate your time today . 347 00:12:43,530 --> 00:12:45,641 All right . Thank you all very much . 348 00:12:45,641 --> 00:12:47,752 Just a few things at the top and then 349 00:12:47,752 --> 00:12:50,250 I'll get right to your questions . Uh 350 00:12:50,260 --> 00:12:52,560 So first of all , um I would like to 351 00:12:52,570 --> 00:12:55,480 highlight us European command's 352 00:12:55,490 --> 00:12:57,434 statement released earlier today , 353 00:12:57,434 --> 00:13:00,160 confirming that two Russian S U 27 354 00:13:00,170 --> 00:13:02,020 aircraft conducted unsafe and 355 00:13:02,030 --> 00:13:04,200 unprofessional and unprofessional 356 00:13:04,200 --> 00:13:06,740 intercept with a U S Air Force 357 00:13:06,740 --> 00:13:08,518 Intelligence , surveillance and 358 00:13:08,518 --> 00:13:10,407 reconnaissance , unmanned MQ nine 359 00:13:10,407 --> 00:13:12,500 aircraft that was operating within 360 00:13:12,500 --> 00:13:14,611 international airspace over the Black 361 00:13:14,611 --> 00:13:17,950 Sea today to recap at approximately 703 362 00:13:17,950 --> 00:13:20,140 AM central European time . One of the 363 00:13:20,140 --> 00:13:22,440 Russian S U 27 aircraft struck the 364 00:13:22,440 --> 00:13:25,190 propeller of the MQ nine causing us 365 00:13:25,190 --> 00:13:27,190 forces to have to bring the MQ nine 366 00:13:27,190 --> 00:13:29,530 down in international waters several 367 00:13:29,530 --> 00:13:31,752 times before the collision . The S U 20 368 00:13:31,752 --> 00:13:33,697 seven's dumped fuel on and flew in 369 00:13:33,697 --> 00:13:36,040 front of the MQ nine in a reckless and 370 00:13:36,040 --> 00:13:38,500 unprofessional manner . This incident 371 00:13:38,500 --> 00:13:40,556 demonstrates a lack of competence in 372 00:13:40,556 --> 00:13:42,167 addition to being unsafe and 373 00:13:42,167 --> 00:13:44,270 unprofessional us . Air forces in 374 00:13:44,270 --> 00:13:46,530 Europe air forces , Africa routinely 375 00:13:46,530 --> 00:13:48,530 fly aircraft throughout Europe over 376 00:13:48,530 --> 00:13:50,474 sovereign territory and throughout 377 00:13:50,474 --> 00:13:52,641 international airspace in coordination 378 00:13:52,641 --> 00:13:54,419 with applicable host nation and 379 00:13:54,419 --> 00:13:56,252 international laws . In order to 380 00:13:56,252 --> 00:13:58,474 bolster collective European defense and 381 00:13:58,474 --> 00:14:00,363 security . These missions support 382 00:14:00,363 --> 00:14:02,086 allied partner and us national 383 00:14:02,086 --> 00:14:04,210 objectives . As the US Air forces in 384 00:14:04,210 --> 00:14:06,266 Europe air forces , Africa commander 385 00:14:06,266 --> 00:14:08,060 emphasized in European command 386 00:14:08,060 --> 00:14:09,950 statement , quote , us and allied 387 00:14:09,950 --> 00:14:12,006 aircraft will continue to operate in 388 00:14:12,006 --> 00:14:14,117 international airspace and we call on 389 00:14:14,117 --> 00:14:16,061 the Russians to conduct themselves 390 00:14:16,061 --> 00:14:18,890 professionally and safely . In separate 391 00:14:18,890 --> 00:14:20,890 news Secretary , Austin concluded a 392 00:14:20,890 --> 00:14:22,890 successful visit to the Middle East 393 00:14:22,890 --> 00:14:24,834 region last week where he met with 394 00:14:24,834 --> 00:14:26,890 leaders in Jordan's Iraq , Egypt and 395 00:14:26,890 --> 00:14:28,890 Israel . The weeklong trip served a 396 00:14:28,890 --> 00:14:30,723 deep in defense partnerships and 397 00:14:30,723 --> 00:14:32,946 enabled the exchange of views on shared 398 00:14:32,946 --> 00:14:35,279 regional and global security challenges . 399 00:14:35,279 --> 00:14:37,446 Specific topics of discussion included 400 00:14:37,446 --> 00:14:39,650 ongoing coalition led defeat ISIS 401 00:14:39,650 --> 00:14:42,030 operations in Iraq and Syria . The 402 00:14:42,030 --> 00:14:44,086 concerning range of threats posed by 403 00:14:44,086 --> 00:14:45,919 Iran including its destabilizing 404 00:14:45,919 --> 00:14:47,974 regional activities and provision of 405 00:14:47,974 --> 00:14:50,086 unmanned aerial systems to Russia for 406 00:14:50,086 --> 00:14:52,086 use in their unprovoked war against 407 00:14:52,086 --> 00:14:54,141 Ukraine and implementing commitments 408 00:14:54,141 --> 00:14:56,308 made by Israeli and Palestinian senior 409 00:14:56,308 --> 00:14:58,197 officials in Aqaba Jordan and the 410 00:14:58,197 --> 00:15:00,419 importance of deescalating violence and 411 00:15:00,419 --> 00:15:02,530 restoring calm in the West Bank . The 412 00:15:02,530 --> 00:15:04,641 secretary also had the opportunity to 413 00:15:04,641 --> 00:15:06,863 talk to a number of U S service members 414 00:15:06,863 --> 00:15:08,919 currently serving in the U S Central 415 00:15:08,919 --> 00:15:10,863 command area of responsibility and 416 00:15:10,863 --> 00:15:13,086 thank them and their families for their 417 00:15:13,086 --> 00:15:14,974 commitment to mission service and 418 00:15:14,974 --> 00:15:17,197 safeguarding our nation . And finally , 419 00:15:17,197 --> 00:15:19,252 Secretary Austin and chairman of the 420 00:15:19,252 --> 00:15:21,308 Joint Chiefs of Staff General Milley 421 00:15:21,308 --> 00:15:23,197 will host the 10th meeting of the 422 00:15:23,197 --> 00:15:25,474 Ukraine defense contact group tomorrow . 423 00:15:25,474 --> 00:15:27,530 The meeting will be hosted virtually 424 00:15:27,530 --> 00:15:29,752 here in the Pentagon and will allow for 425 00:15:29,752 --> 00:15:29,530 the secretary , the chairman and senior 426 00:15:29,530 --> 00:15:31,641 defense leaders from around the world 427 00:15:31,641 --> 00:15:33,752 to discuss ongoing efforts to provide 428 00:15:33,752 --> 00:15:35,919 Ukraine with the means and resources . 429 00:15:35,919 --> 00:15:38,086 It needs to defend itself from Russian 430 00:15:38,086 --> 00:15:40,252 aggression . Additional information on 431 00:15:40,252 --> 00:15:42,419 tomorrow's meeting will be forthcoming 432 00:15:42,419 --> 00:15:44,252 and with that , I will take your 433 00:15:44,252 --> 00:15:43,710 questions . We'll start with the 434 00:15:43,710 --> 00:15:47,200 Reuters Bill Secretary or anyone else 435 00:15:47,200 --> 00:15:49,850 in the U S military reached out to his 436 00:15:49,850 --> 00:15:51,906 Russian counterpart or anyone else's 437 00:15:51,906 --> 00:15:53,950 counterparts from Russia . And 438 00:15:53,960 --> 00:15:56,290 regarding the MQ nine , uh you know 439 00:15:56,290 --> 00:15:58,620 what detail a little bit more , what 440 00:15:58,620 --> 00:16:00,787 its mission was and where it was being 441 00:16:00,787 --> 00:16:03,250 piloted from . Yeah , sure . Um So in 442 00:16:03,250 --> 00:16:06,360 terms of Secretary Austin , talking to 443 00:16:06,360 --> 00:16:08,490 his counterpart , not at this time to 444 00:16:08,490 --> 00:16:11,830 my knowledge . Uh D O D officials have 445 00:16:11,830 --> 00:16:14,370 not spoken specifically to Russian 446 00:16:14,370 --> 00:16:16,703 authorities on this particular incident . 447 00:16:16,703 --> 00:16:18,870 I do know that the State Department is 448 00:16:18,870 --> 00:16:21,092 raising our concerns about the incident 449 00:16:21,092 --> 00:16:23,259 directly with the Russian government . 450 00:16:23,259 --> 00:16:23,250 So I'd prefer you to them for details 451 00:16:23,250 --> 00:16:26,220 on that . Um In terms of the mission of 452 00:16:26,220 --> 00:16:28,387 the MQ nine , as I mentioned , it's an 453 00:16:28,387 --> 00:16:31,420 I S AR platform . Um you know , these , 454 00:16:31,430 --> 00:16:33,652 these aircraft had been flying over the 455 00:16:33,652 --> 00:16:35,541 Black Sea region for some time to 456 00:16:35,541 --> 00:16:37,541 include before the current conflict 457 00:16:37,541 --> 00:16:39,652 started . It is an important and busy 458 00:16:39,652 --> 00:16:41,763 international waterway . Uh And so it 459 00:16:41,763 --> 00:16:44,210 is not an uncommon mission for us to be 460 00:16:44,210 --> 00:16:45,543 flying in international 461 00:16:45,543 --> 00:16:48,650 airspace 462 00:16:50,530 --> 00:16:53,880 company aircraft or , and when was this 463 00:16:53,880 --> 00:16:55,936 aircraft armed ? Uh So I'm not gonna 464 00:16:55,936 --> 00:16:58,670 get into the specific uh profile of 465 00:16:58,670 --> 00:17:00,837 this particular aircraft as you know , 466 00:17:00,837 --> 00:17:03,059 the MQ nine does have the ability to be 467 00:17:03,059 --> 00:17:05,810 armed . Um It was again conducting an I 468 00:17:05,810 --> 00:17:08,710 S our mission in international airspace , 469 00:17:08,720 --> 00:17:10,887 uh something that we've been doing for 470 00:17:10,887 --> 00:17:14,450 some time uh in terms of the types of 471 00:17:14,460 --> 00:17:16,460 tactics , techniques and procedures 472 00:17:16,460 --> 00:17:18,627 that we take to protect our aircraft . 473 00:17:18,627 --> 00:17:20,960 I'm not going to get into the specifics . 474 00:17:20,960 --> 00:17:22,904 I think the key point here is that 475 00:17:22,904 --> 00:17:25,016 while intercepts in and of themselves 476 00:17:25,016 --> 00:17:27,016 are not that uncommon . Uh the fact 477 00:17:27,016 --> 00:17:29,127 that this type of behavior from these 478 00:17:29,127 --> 00:17:31,127 Russian pilots that is uncommon and 479 00:17:31,127 --> 00:17:33,349 unfortunate and unsafe . And so again , 480 00:17:33,349 --> 00:17:35,516 would echo General hackers call on the 481 00:17:35,516 --> 00:17:38,240 Russians to continue to fly safely . 482 00:17:38,250 --> 00:17:39,330 Thank you , Liz . 483 00:17:42,520 --> 00:17:45,760 Was this collision itself an accident 484 00:17:45,770 --> 00:17:47,860 on Russia's behalf ? And is the U S 485 00:17:47,860 --> 00:17:51,630 responding as such ? You know , we 486 00:17:51,630 --> 00:17:54,570 are continuing to assess exactly what 487 00:17:54,570 --> 00:17:57,660 happened . But I think based on the 488 00:17:57,670 --> 00:17:59,726 actions of the Russian pilots , it's 489 00:17:59,726 --> 00:18:01,226 clear that it was unsafe , 490 00:18:01,226 --> 00:18:04,020 unprofessional . Um And I think the 491 00:18:04,020 --> 00:18:06,620 actions speak for themselves . What we , 492 00:18:06,620 --> 00:18:09,400 what we saw again , we're fighter 493 00:18:09,400 --> 00:18:12,120 aircraft dumping fuel in front of this 494 00:18:12,130 --> 00:18:15,760 uh U A V . Uh and then getting so close 495 00:18:15,770 --> 00:18:17,670 to the aircraft that had actually 496 00:18:17,680 --> 00:18:20,310 damaged the propeller on the MQ nine , 497 00:18:20,600 --> 00:18:23,430 we , we assess that it likely caused 498 00:18:23,440 --> 00:18:25,607 some damage to the Russian aircraft as 499 00:18:25,607 --> 00:18:28,500 well . Um To our knowledge , we know 500 00:18:28,500 --> 00:18:30,650 that the aircraft , uh the Russian 501 00:18:30,650 --> 00:18:33,220 aircraft did land . I'm not gonna go 502 00:18:33,220 --> 00:18:36,630 into where they landed . Um But again , 503 00:18:36,630 --> 00:18:39,320 it just demonstrative of very 504 00:18:39,320 --> 00:18:41,431 unprofessional , unsafe airmanship on 505 00:18:41,431 --> 00:18:43,730 the part of these pilots . One more 506 00:18:43,730 --> 00:18:46,470 question . Sorry . Um Will the US try 507 00:18:46,470 --> 00:18:49,260 to recover this drone ? So I'm not , I 508 00:18:49,260 --> 00:18:51,093 don't have anything right now to 509 00:18:51,093 --> 00:18:53,427 provide in terms of recovery operations , 510 00:18:53,427 --> 00:18:55,538 if we have any updates to provide and 511 00:18:55,538 --> 00:18:55,140 we'll be sure to do that . Thanks , 512 00:18:55,650 --> 00:18:59,310 David . Is there video 513 00:18:59,390 --> 00:19:01,390 of the incident ? Are you going to 514 00:19:01,400 --> 00:19:05,300 release the video ? Um Where 515 00:19:05,310 --> 00:19:07,366 in the Black Sea did it happen ? How 516 00:19:07,366 --> 00:19:11,100 close to Russian airspace ? And 517 00:19:11,110 --> 00:19:14,660 um did you say that this particular 518 00:19:14,660 --> 00:19:17,850 Reaper was unarmed ? Again , I didn't 519 00:19:17,850 --> 00:19:20,360 say whether it was or was not . I'm not 520 00:19:20,360 --> 00:19:22,193 going to get into the particular 521 00:19:22,193 --> 00:19:24,304 mission profile of this aircraft . It 522 00:19:24,304 --> 00:19:27,530 was conducting an AN I S our mission um 523 00:19:28,510 --> 00:19:30,820 in terms of the specifics David , I'm 524 00:19:30,820 --> 00:19:32,987 not gonna at this point be able to get 525 00:19:32,987 --> 00:19:35,153 more specific other than the Black Sea 526 00:19:35,153 --> 00:19:37,487 region in international airspace . Well , 527 00:19:37,487 --> 00:19:41,080 well clear of , of any type of um yeah , 528 00:19:41,090 --> 00:19:43,540 it was international airspace . Um And 529 00:19:43,540 --> 00:19:45,484 I'm sorry , the other part of your 530 00:19:45,484 --> 00:19:47,318 question ? Yes . So we are going 531 00:19:47,318 --> 00:19:49,373 through the declassification process 532 00:19:49,373 --> 00:19:51,540 now . Uh and we'll keep you updated on 533 00:19:51,540 --> 00:19:53,262 that front in terms of imagery 534 00:19:53,262 --> 00:19:55,550 associated with this incident . Trust . 535 00:19:57,100 --> 00:19:59,200 I'm laser focused on your question . 536 00:19:59,210 --> 00:20:01,410 That was just a very quick one . you 537 00:20:01,410 --> 00:20:03,299 haven't said reaper , but he said 538 00:20:03,299 --> 00:20:05,466 reaper , is it accurate to say it's MQ 539 00:20:05,466 --> 00:20:09,330 nine , reaper ? I'm just gonna stick 540 00:20:09,330 --> 00:20:12,420 with MQ nine . Thanks , Joe . 541 00:20:14,900 --> 00:20:18,580 I thanks so much , Pat . Um The MQ 542 00:20:18,580 --> 00:20:21,060 nine um potentially contains some 543 00:20:21,060 --> 00:20:24,860 sensitive technology . Is the U S 544 00:20:24,860 --> 00:20:26,804 military undertaking any effort to 545 00:20:26,804 --> 00:20:28,920 recover the MQ nine ? Is it in the , 546 00:20:28,930 --> 00:20:31,097 isn't in the waters of the Black Sea ? 547 00:20:31,097 --> 00:20:35,000 Has Russia recovered it ? Um Is 548 00:20:35,000 --> 00:20:37,610 there a U S naval asset in the , in the 549 00:20:37,610 --> 00:20:39,443 region that could undertake that 550 00:20:39,443 --> 00:20:41,554 recovery ? Yeah . So , um again , I'm 551 00:20:41,554 --> 00:20:43,721 not going to get into the specifics of 552 00:20:43,721 --> 00:20:45,943 what's on this particular aircraft . Um 553 00:20:45,943 --> 00:20:47,832 Other than again , it's an I S AR 554 00:20:47,832 --> 00:20:51,060 platform uh because of the damage , we 555 00:20:51,060 --> 00:20:53,360 were uh in a position to have to 556 00:20:53,360 --> 00:20:57,060 essentially um crashing into the Black 557 00:20:57,060 --> 00:20:59,520 Sea . Uh to my knowledge at this point 558 00:20:59,520 --> 00:21:02,500 in time , uh the Russians have not 559 00:21:02,510 --> 00:21:04,788 recovered that aircraft . Um But again , 560 00:21:04,788 --> 00:21:07,940 in terms of um our recovery efforts 561 00:21:07,950 --> 00:21:10,172 don't have any updates to provide right 562 00:21:10,172 --> 00:21:12,283 now . I'd refer you to Navia in terms 563 00:21:12,283 --> 00:21:14,339 of what assets they may have in that 564 00:21:14,339 --> 00:21:17,750 region . Thank you , Janie . Thank you , 565 00:21:17,750 --> 00:21:20,900 General uh regarding the North Korea's 566 00:21:20,910 --> 00:21:24,320 summary in Ranchi strategic cruise 567 00:21:24,320 --> 00:21:27,710 missiles . Recently , North Korea has 568 00:21:27,720 --> 00:21:31,320 announced that it is possible to mount 569 00:21:31,320 --> 00:21:35,170 a nuclear warhead on a strategic cruise 570 00:21:35,170 --> 00:21:38,960 missiles . What is the readiness of the 571 00:21:38,960 --> 00:21:42,180 United States against the escalating 572 00:21:42,190 --> 00:21:45,560 provocations such as the nuclear 573 00:21:45,560 --> 00:21:48,970 provocation by the North Korea ? Let me 574 00:21:48,970 --> 00:21:51,137 just make sure I understand what's the 575 00:21:51,137 --> 00:21:53,137 readiness of the US to respond to a 576 00:21:53,137 --> 00:21:56,230 nuclear provocation by North Korea ? Um 577 00:21:56,230 --> 00:21:58,500 Well , I think we've been very clear uh 578 00:21:58,510 --> 00:22:01,970 that were North Korea to employ a 579 00:22:01,970 --> 00:22:04,192 nuclear weapon , it would be the end of 580 00:22:04,192 --> 00:22:06,880 the North Korean regime . But again , 581 00:22:06,880 --> 00:22:09,047 our focus continues to be working very 582 00:22:09,047 --> 00:22:10,824 closely with our allies and our 583 00:22:10,824 --> 00:22:12,602 partners in the region to deter 584 00:22:12,602 --> 00:22:14,769 aggression uh to preserve security and 585 00:22:14,769 --> 00:22:16,991 stability in the region . And that will 586 00:22:16,991 --> 00:22:19,213 continue to be our , our focus . You go 587 00:22:19,213 --> 00:22:20,730 to Carla just a real quick 588 00:22:20,730 --> 00:22:23,240 clarification . What did the fighter 589 00:22:23,240 --> 00:22:25,870 jet , what did he strike the MQ nine 590 00:22:25,870 --> 00:22:28,690 with ? Was it the wing ? Was it that I 591 00:22:28,700 --> 00:22:30,533 can't tell you specifically what 592 00:22:30,533 --> 00:22:33,050 portion of the aircraft ? But the fact 593 00:22:33,050 --> 00:22:35,780 that it essentially ran into the MQ 594 00:22:35,780 --> 00:22:38,002 nine ? Okay . Thank you . And then just 595 00:22:38,002 --> 00:22:40,224 separately on Ukraine , there's reports 596 00:22:40,224 --> 00:22:42,447 out there from the battlefield that the 597 00:22:42,447 --> 00:22:44,780 Ukrainians are running out of munitions , 598 00:22:44,780 --> 00:22:46,836 they're having shortages . Is that a 599 00:22:46,836 --> 00:22:49,058 concern for the Pentagon and what's the 600 00:22:49,058 --> 00:22:48,750 Pentagon doing to alleviate that 601 00:22:48,750 --> 00:22:50,972 problem ? Yeah . So as we've been doing 602 00:22:50,972 --> 00:22:53,139 since the beginning of this campaign , 603 00:22:53,139 --> 00:22:55,306 we're continuing to do everything that 604 00:22:55,306 --> 00:22:57,306 we can to ensure that we're meeting 605 00:22:57,306 --> 00:22:59,028 Ukraine's needs , whether it's 606 00:22:59,028 --> 00:23:01,139 ammunition , whether it's air defense 607 00:23:01,139 --> 00:23:03,250 armor . Uh You know , you've heard us 608 00:23:03,250 --> 00:23:04,917 talk extensively about that . 609 00:23:04,917 --> 00:23:06,917 Tomorrow's discussion , of course , 610 00:23:06,917 --> 00:23:08,972 will be another opportunity to bring 611 00:23:08,972 --> 00:23:11,194 the international community together to 612 00:23:11,194 --> 00:23:13,417 focus on Ukraine's most urgent needs to 613 00:23:13,417 --> 00:23:15,694 include ammunition . And so , uh again , 614 00:23:15,694 --> 00:23:17,750 that will continue to be our focus . 615 00:23:17,750 --> 00:23:19,972 And , and you've heard Secretary Austin 616 00:23:19,972 --> 00:23:22,139 and others say that we're committed to 617 00:23:22,139 --> 00:23:22,030 making sure that they have what they 618 00:23:22,030 --> 00:23:23,363 need to be successful . 619 00:23:25,980 --> 00:23:28,240 Thanks . Is there an assessment that 620 00:23:28,240 --> 00:23:30,462 the Pentagon has on why they're running 621 00:23:30,462 --> 00:23:32,351 out of ammunition ? Is it because 622 00:23:32,351 --> 00:23:34,573 they're just expanding it too fast , is 623 00:23:34,573 --> 00:23:34,540 not making it to the battlefield in 624 00:23:34,540 --> 00:23:36,960 time ? What's your ? Yeah , really ? So 625 00:23:36,960 --> 00:23:39,127 I'd have to refer to the Ukrainians to 626 00:23:39,127 --> 00:23:41,390 talk about their specific efforts to 627 00:23:41,390 --> 00:23:43,730 supply their individual units . Again , 628 00:23:43,740 --> 00:23:45,796 we're working very closely with them 629 00:23:45,796 --> 00:23:47,907 and our international partners to get 630 00:23:47,907 --> 00:23:49,962 them what they need . Um And , and I 631 00:23:49,962 --> 00:23:52,018 think it's also important to kind of 632 00:23:52,018 --> 00:23:53,851 take a step back and look at the 633 00:23:53,851 --> 00:23:55,740 progress that has been made while 634 00:23:55,740 --> 00:23:57,851 recognizing the fact that there still 635 00:23:57,851 --> 00:23:59,962 is a tough fight ahead , particularly 636 00:23:59,962 --> 00:23:59,910 as we go into the spring and summer . 637 00:23:59,910 --> 00:24:02,021 And so are our focus again , is going 638 00:24:02,021 --> 00:24:04,132 to be working with National Armaments 639 00:24:04,132 --> 00:24:06,188 directors with the Ukrainians to get 640 00:24:06,188 --> 00:24:08,299 them the ammunition they need and get 641 00:24:08,299 --> 00:24:10,521 that to the front line units as quickly 642 00:24:10,521 --> 00:24:12,577 as possible . Let me go back over to 643 00:24:12,577 --> 00:24:12,100 the side of the room . Yes , sir . 644 00:24:15,390 --> 00:24:17,446 Thank you . Can you guide us through 645 00:24:17,446 --> 00:24:19,668 the timeline of the MQ nine intercept ? 646 00:24:19,668 --> 00:24:21,890 Uh We have that the aircraft was struck 647 00:24:21,890 --> 00:24:24,112 at 703 eastern time . But how long were 648 00:24:24,112 --> 00:24:25,779 the Sukhois with the aircraft 649 00:24:25,779 --> 00:24:27,890 beforehand ? And were there any radio 650 00:24:27,890 --> 00:24:29,834 calls between radio communications 651 00:24:29,834 --> 00:24:31,890 either from the Russians or from the 652 00:24:31,890 --> 00:24:34,720 United States ? Yeah . So on the latter 653 00:24:34,720 --> 00:24:36,887 part of your question , no , none that 654 00:24:36,887 --> 00:24:40,770 I'm aware of . Um and uh I would ask 655 00:24:40,770 --> 00:24:42,881 you that you go back and confirm this 656 00:24:42,881 --> 00:24:44,770 with Yukon but , but based on the 657 00:24:44,770 --> 00:24:46,992 information I have here , it seems like 658 00:24:46,992 --> 00:24:49,350 uh approximately 659 00:24:50,810 --> 00:24:53,910 30 to 40 minutes . Uh they were flying 660 00:24:53,920 --> 00:24:56,900 in the vicinity of this MQ nine . Uh 661 00:24:56,900 --> 00:25:00,840 and then at 703 is when the um 662 00:25:00,850 --> 00:25:03,430 73 A M central European time is when 663 00:25:03,430 --> 00:25:06,520 they collided , causing it to crash . 664 00:25:06,530 --> 00:25:08,000 So cost them , 665 00:25:12,180 --> 00:25:14,940 the U S forces has had to bring down 666 00:25:14,940 --> 00:25:18,680 the , the aircraft . Does that mean 667 00:25:18,680 --> 00:25:20,900 that the United States piloted it to 668 00:25:20,900 --> 00:25:23,067 the crash site or was it struck by MSL 669 00:25:23,067 --> 00:25:26,260 arms ? We brought it down ? Okay . And 670 00:25:26,260 --> 00:25:29,740 then also , um is there any U S naval 671 00:25:29,750 --> 00:25:33,300 assets currently in , in black seed ? 672 00:25:33,310 --> 00:25:36,150 Again , I'd have to refer you to NAB 673 00:25:36,150 --> 00:25:38,200 here for any details on particular 674 00:25:38,200 --> 00:25:40,280 assets in the region . Thank you , 675 00:25:40,290 --> 00:25:43,970 Laura , thanks . Um Can you talk a 676 00:25:43,970 --> 00:25:46,192 little bit more about the damage to the 677 00:25:46,192 --> 00:25:48,414 MQ nine ? Was it on flyable ? And , and 678 00:25:48,414 --> 00:25:50,526 that's why you had to bring it down . 679 00:25:50,526 --> 00:25:52,581 Um And then can you say a little bit 680 00:25:52,581 --> 00:25:54,803 more about how often this kind of thing 681 00:25:54,803 --> 00:25:56,748 happens in over the Black Sea that 682 00:25:56,748 --> 00:25:58,859 Russian aircraft harass us drones and 683 00:25:58,859 --> 00:26:01,081 other aircraft ? Yeah . So I don't have 684 00:26:01,081 --> 00:26:03,248 any statistics in front of me in terms 685 00:26:03,248 --> 00:26:05,500 of intercepts . But again , as I 686 00:26:05,500 --> 00:26:08,870 highlighted the fact that um 687 00:26:08,880 --> 00:26:11,790 intercepts of aircraft are not uncommon 688 00:26:11,790 --> 00:26:13,957 in and of themselves , it's , it's not 689 00:26:13,957 --> 00:26:16,179 obviously a daily occurrence . The vast 690 00:26:16,179 --> 00:26:19,430 majority of those intercepts are what 691 00:26:19,430 --> 00:26:21,763 we would consider safe and professional . 692 00:26:21,763 --> 00:26:23,874 Uh just wanting to see what's there , 693 00:26:23,874 --> 00:26:25,986 right , you're flying alongside it to 694 00:26:25,986 --> 00:26:28,152 uh to be able to see what's there . Um 695 00:26:28,152 --> 00:26:30,430 In this particular case though , again , 696 00:26:30,430 --> 00:26:32,486 uh they collided with the aircraft , 697 00:26:32,486 --> 00:26:35,240 damaging the propellor , essentially 698 00:26:35,250 --> 00:26:37,083 putting in a situation where was 699 00:26:37,083 --> 00:26:39,250 unflappable and uncontrollable . So we 700 00:26:39,250 --> 00:26:41,417 brought it down . Thank you , time for 701 00:26:41,417 --> 00:26:43,528 a few more to go here and then to the 702 00:26:43,528 --> 00:26:47,350 body . Aye , 703 00:26:47,350 --> 00:26:49,461 sir . Thanks . I just wanted to check 704 00:26:49,461 --> 00:26:51,830 to confirm any communication with 705 00:26:51,830 --> 00:26:53,941 allies such as Turkey about potential 706 00:26:53,941 --> 00:26:56,620 recovery of the drone . And is there 707 00:26:56,620 --> 00:26:58,731 any concern that Russia could provide 708 00:26:58,731 --> 00:27:01,010 uh the drone to Iran if it recovers it . 709 00:27:01,500 --> 00:27:03,833 Uh So that that would be a hypothetical . 710 00:27:03,833 --> 00:27:06,090 Uh again , Russia does not have the 711 00:27:06,090 --> 00:27:08,312 drone . So that would be a hypothetical 712 00:27:08,312 --> 00:27:10,660 question . Um , in terms of working 713 00:27:10,660 --> 00:27:12,882 with allies and partners , I don't have 714 00:27:12,882 --> 00:27:14,938 anything to announce here . But if , 715 00:27:14,938 --> 00:27:14,420 and when we do , we'll be sure to let 716 00:27:14,430 --> 00:27:16,597 you know . Thank you , go too fast and 717 00:27:16,597 --> 00:27:18,819 then we'll come back over here the last 718 00:27:18,819 --> 00:27:17,930 few . 719 00:27:22,830 --> 00:27:25,450 Thank you , General . So when , um , I 720 00:27:25,450 --> 00:27:27,394 know you don't wanna share lots of 721 00:27:27,394 --> 00:27:29,450 information and special intelligence 722 00:27:29,450 --> 00:27:31,561 information . But are you able to say 723 00:27:31,561 --> 00:27:33,970 whether the MQ nine was flying um near 724 00:27:33,970 --> 00:27:37,340 Ukraine or near the Crimea Peninsula ? 725 00:27:37,500 --> 00:27:40,600 And then I believe you said if I heard 726 00:27:40,610 --> 00:27:43,780 right that the Russians did not recover 727 00:27:43,780 --> 00:27:46,620 the the drone . However , have you seen 728 00:27:46,630 --> 00:27:48,760 any effort by the Russian Navy to try 729 00:27:48,760 --> 00:27:51,093 to recover the drone ? Thank you . Yeah . 730 00:27:51,093 --> 00:27:53,038 So on your ladder question there , 731 00:27:53,038 --> 00:27:55,260 Friday , I'm not going to get into that 732 00:27:55,260 --> 00:27:58,180 um in terms of where it was flying , um 733 00:27:58,190 --> 00:28:02,150 it was well clear of any territory in 734 00:28:02,150 --> 00:28:04,317 Ukraine , it was over international in 735 00:28:04,317 --> 00:28:05,928 international air space over 736 00:28:05,928 --> 00:28:07,983 international water . So thank you , 737 00:28:08,350 --> 00:28:12,310 Nancy . Thank you . Um During Secretary 738 00:28:12,310 --> 00:28:14,570 Austin's visit to Egypt , um he held 739 00:28:14,570 --> 00:28:16,792 meetings with officials even though all 740 00:28:16,792 --> 00:28:19,014 press were banned from covering it past 741 00:28:19,014 --> 00:28:21,126 defense chiefs when they've been in a 742 00:28:21,126 --> 00:28:23,126 similar situation , have refused to 743 00:28:23,126 --> 00:28:25,014 proceed . Um Given that the Biden 744 00:28:25,014 --> 00:28:27,237 administration has said that one of its 745 00:28:27,237 --> 00:28:26,460 key pillars in terms of foreign 746 00:28:26,460 --> 00:28:29,780 policies that when presented with the a 747 00:28:29,780 --> 00:28:31,947 choice between Autocrats and democracy 748 00:28:31,947 --> 00:28:34,169 that it stands with democracy . Can you 749 00:28:34,169 --> 00:28:36,336 help us understand ? Why the secretary 750 00:28:36,336 --> 00:28:38,447 decided to proceed with those trips , 751 00:28:38,447 --> 00:28:37,960 given the band and should we expect 752 00:28:37,960 --> 00:28:40,127 that going forward ? Thank you . Thank 753 00:28:40,127 --> 00:28:42,293 you . So , our relationship with Egypt 754 00:28:42,293 --> 00:28:44,516 is obviously a very important strategic 755 00:28:44,516 --> 00:28:46,320 partnership . The secretary did 756 00:28:46,320 --> 00:28:48,542 appreciate the opportunity to meet with 757 00:28:48,542 --> 00:28:50,709 his counterparts and talk about that . 758 00:28:50,709 --> 00:28:52,820 I will tell you when it comes when it 759 00:28:52,820 --> 00:28:54,764 came to the press coverage of that 760 00:28:54,764 --> 00:28:57,240 portion , having looked further into it . 761 00:28:57,250 --> 00:29:00,480 Uh The Egyptians loved lived up to what 762 00:29:00,480 --> 00:29:02,590 they had agreed upon . Some of the 763 00:29:02,590 --> 00:29:04,534 lessons learned out of that was in 764 00:29:04,534 --> 00:29:07,770 terms of um making sure that we were on 765 00:29:07,770 --> 00:29:09,680 the same sheet when it came to 766 00:29:09,680 --> 00:29:12,560 understanding uh press access . And so 767 00:29:12,570 --> 00:29:15,750 we will continue to work . There had 768 00:29:15,750 --> 00:29:18,530 agreed beforehand that there would be a 769 00:29:18,540 --> 00:29:21,350 ban of journalists . We did not agree 770 00:29:21,350 --> 00:29:23,517 to a ban on journalists . We we agreed 771 00:29:23,517 --> 00:29:25,739 to have official photographers , we did 772 00:29:25,739 --> 00:29:27,906 have one reporter come into one of the 773 00:29:27,906 --> 00:29:30,072 sessions , but then a portion that was 774 00:29:30,072 --> 00:29:31,961 going to be open to the press was 775 00:29:31,961 --> 00:29:33,961 subsequently not held and therefore 776 00:29:33,961 --> 00:29:36,072 there was not an opportunity to cover 777 00:29:36,072 --> 00:29:38,183 that . But again , um sometimes these 778 00:29:38,183 --> 00:29:40,183 meetings are very small . Sometimes 779 00:29:40,183 --> 00:29:42,410 there's not the opportunity for media 780 00:29:42,410 --> 00:29:44,632 to come in . But again , it's something 781 00:29:44,632 --> 00:29:46,743 that we've noted and will continue to 782 00:29:46,743 --> 00:29:48,743 work closely with governments as we 783 00:29:48,743 --> 00:29:50,688 visit to ensure that there's press 784 00:29:50,688 --> 00:29:52,188 access . Thank you , sir . 785 00:29:54,250 --> 00:29:56,560 Just regarding the budget for the last 786 00:29:56,560 --> 00:29:59,300 few years , the services have pursued a 787 00:29:59,300 --> 00:30:02,810 divest to invest strategy and Congress 788 00:30:02,810 --> 00:30:05,070 hasn't necessarily bought into that 789 00:30:05,080 --> 00:30:08,490 this year , the air force is looking to 790 00:30:08,490 --> 00:30:11,150 retire more than 300 aircraft , double 791 00:30:11,150 --> 00:30:13,380 the amount last year . Again , Congress 792 00:30:13,380 --> 00:30:15,658 last year didn't give that full amount . 793 00:30:15,658 --> 00:30:17,650 Is there a sense that things have 794 00:30:17,650 --> 00:30:19,594 changed on the hill that there's a 795 00:30:19,594 --> 00:30:21,850 willingness to approve greater 796 00:30:21,850 --> 00:30:25,010 divestment ? Where is this now becoming 797 00:30:25,010 --> 00:30:27,440 kind of a cat and mouse game of shoot 798 00:30:27,440 --> 00:30:29,551 with a higher number , knowing you're 799 00:30:29,551 --> 00:30:31,496 going to get less to try to get to 800 00:30:31,496 --> 00:30:33,607 where you want to be . Well , when it 801 00:30:33,607 --> 00:30:35,273 comes to the Air Force budget 802 00:30:35,273 --> 00:30:37,440 specifically , of course , would refer 803 00:30:37,440 --> 00:30:39,607 you to them to talk in specifics and , 804 00:30:39,607 --> 00:30:41,940 and I don't want to answer for Congress , 805 00:30:41,940 --> 00:30:44,051 what I will say uh is having observed 806 00:30:44,051 --> 00:30:46,384 this process . I do think like anything , 807 00:30:46,384 --> 00:30:48,551 there's a continuing dialogue in terms 808 00:30:48,551 --> 00:30:50,773 of what the service is required to meet 809 00:30:50,773 --> 00:30:52,829 their mission requirements and , and 810 00:30:52,829 --> 00:30:54,996 working closely with Congress and with 811 00:30:54,996 --> 00:30:57,107 the Department of Defense to identify 812 00:30:57,107 --> 00:30:59,329 what those offsets might be in order to 813 00:30:59,329 --> 00:31:01,329 ensure that we can modernize uh you 814 00:31:01,329 --> 00:31:03,384 know , throughout all the services . 815 00:31:03,384 --> 00:31:05,607 And so I think in a lot of ways as that 816 00:31:05,607 --> 00:31:07,870 communication has increased , uh you're 817 00:31:07,870 --> 00:31:09,990 seeing some of the the fruits of that 818 00:31:09,990 --> 00:31:12,046 labor , but again , I'd refer to the 819 00:31:12,046 --> 00:31:14,379 Air Force for specifics on their budget . 820 00:31:14,379 --> 00:31:16,657 Okay . Thank you very much . Everybody . 821 00:31:16,657 --> 00:31:15,860 Appreciate it .