WEBVTT 00:00.860 --> 00:03.220 Good afternoon , everyone . It's my 00:03.220 --> 00:05.680 pleasure to introduce Dr Mara Karlin 00:05.680 --> 00:07.680 performing the duties of the deputy 00:07.680 --> 00:09.736 undersecretary of defense for policy 00:09.736 --> 00:11.736 who will provide some brief remarks 00:11.736 --> 00:13.513 about the Aucas optimal pathway 00:13.513 --> 00:15.791 announced by President Biden yesterday . 00:15.791 --> 00:17.958 This is a trilateral commitments based 00:17.958 --> 00:19.958 phase plan for Australia to acquire 00:19.958 --> 00:22.013 conventionally armed nuclear powered 00:22.013 --> 00:24.236 submarines . Please note Dr Carlin will 00:24.236 --> 00:26.069 have time uh for a few questions 00:26.069 --> 00:28.124 afterwards and then must depart . Um 00:28.250 --> 00:30.194 I'd ask that you please limit your 00:30.194 --> 00:32.194 questions to Aucas given that's her 00:32.194 --> 00:34.194 focus here today . And then after a 00:34.194 --> 00:36.139 brief pause , I'll stick around to 00:36.139 --> 00:38.083 provide some non Aucas updates and 00:38.083 --> 00:40.306 answer questions as well . So thank you 00:40.306 --> 00:42.528 for your assistance on this , Dr Carlin 00:42.528 --> 00:41.930 over to you , ma'am . Alright , thanks 00:41.930 --> 00:44.041 so much . Good afternoon . It's great 00:44.041 --> 00:46.152 to see all yesterday . You heard from 00:46.152 --> 00:47.986 President Biden , Prime Minister 00:47.986 --> 00:50.097 Albanese and Prime Minister Son ac on 00:50.097 --> 00:52.263 the agreement for Australia to acquire 00:52.263 --> 00:54.430 a conventionally armed nuclear powered 00:54.430 --> 00:56.430 submarine capability through the 00:56.440 --> 00:58.800 Australia United Kingdom , United 00:58.800 --> 01:01.022 States enhanced security partnership or 01:01.022 --> 01:03.950 Aucas . Yesterday concluded our 18 01:03.950 --> 01:05.740 month thorough and expert led 01:05.740 --> 01:08.150 consultation period to identify the 01:08.150 --> 01:10.170 optimal pathway for Australia to 01:10.170 --> 01:12.281 acquire this capability while setting 01:12.281 --> 01:14.337 the highest nuclear nonproliferation 01:14.337 --> 01:16.392 standard . This plan will deliver on 01:16.392 --> 01:18.337 that commitment and lift all three 01:18.337 --> 01:20.559 nations submarine industrial base is an 01:20.559 --> 01:22.448 undersea capabilities , enhancing 01:22.448 --> 01:24.559 deterrence and promoting stability in 01:24.559 --> 01:26.670 the Indo Pacific . For the last seven 01:26.670 --> 01:28.614 decades , our three countries have 01:28.614 --> 01:30.726 stood shoulder to shoulder along with 01:30.726 --> 01:32.948 our allies and partners to help sustain 01:32.948 --> 01:35.281 peace and stability in the Indo Pacific , 01:35.281 --> 01:37.392 the optimal pathway will sustain that 01:37.392 --> 01:39.559 in the decisive decades ahead . As the 01:39.559 --> 01:41.781 national security strategy and national 01:41.781 --> 01:43.837 defense strategy describe the United 01:43.837 --> 01:45.900 States must pursue a free open and 01:45.900 --> 01:47.990 secure world to protect our national 01:47.990 --> 01:50.101 interests and those of our allies and 01:50.101 --> 01:52.101 our partners . August advances this 01:52.101 --> 01:53.768 goal by building our military 01:53.768 --> 01:55.823 capabilities and those of two of our 01:55.823 --> 01:57.823 very closest allies enabling closer 01:57.823 --> 02:00.260 military planning and cooperation . It 02:00.260 --> 02:02.400 is a generational opportunity to 02:02.400 --> 02:04.456 enhance the national security of all 02:04.456 --> 02:06.678 three nations . As the president shared 02:06.678 --> 02:08.844 in his remarks yesterday , the optimal 02:08.844 --> 02:11.011 pathway will deliver deterrence across 02:11.011 --> 02:13.178 several phases . Under the first phase 02:13.178 --> 02:15.178 of the optimal pathway , the United 02:15.178 --> 02:17.122 States and the United Kingdom will 02:17.122 --> 02:19.178 immediately increase sport visits of 02:19.178 --> 02:21.233 conventionally armed nuclear-powered 02:21.233 --> 02:23.344 submarines in Australia . And then as 02:23.344 --> 02:25.233 early as 2027 will begin rotating 02:25.233 --> 02:27.122 through Australia under submarine 02:27.122 --> 02:29.344 rotational force west . This deployment 02:29.344 --> 02:31.400 will ensure Australian personnel can 02:31.400 --> 02:33.567 continue familiarizing themselves with 02:33.567 --> 02:35.622 how these vessels operate , how they 02:35.622 --> 02:37.789 are properly maintained and how we can 02:37.789 --> 02:39.844 continue safely operating together . 02:39.844 --> 02:41.511 The increased presence of U S 02:41.511 --> 02:43.400 submarines will buttress regional 02:43.400 --> 02:45.122 stability and support the safe 02:45.122 --> 02:47.233 development of Australian stewardship 02:47.233 --> 02:49.233 of its own sovereign conventionally 02:49.233 --> 02:51.011 armed nuclear powered submarine 02:51.011 --> 02:53.067 enterprise . In the next phase , the 02:53.067 --> 02:55.067 United States intends to sell three 02:55.067 --> 02:57.233 Virginia class submarines to Australia 02:57.233 --> 02:59.122 in the twenties thirties with the 02:59.122 --> 03:01.122 potential to sell up to two more if 03:01.122 --> 03:03.178 needed . This will provide Australia 03:03.178 --> 03:05.178 with a conventionally armed nuclear 03:05.178 --> 03:07.289 powered submarine capability prior to 03:07.289 --> 03:09.289 their enduring sovereign capability 03:09.289 --> 03:11.233 coming online , you will see three 03:11.233 --> 03:13.233 allied and highly interoperable SSN 03:13.233 --> 03:15.400 fleets operating in the Indo Pacific . 03:15.670 --> 03:17.892 The final phase will be our support for 03:17.892 --> 03:20.260 what we call SSN August and next 03:20.260 --> 03:22.482 generation conventionally armed nuclear 03:22.482 --> 03:24.204 powered submarine designed and 03:24.204 --> 03:26.560 constructed by Australia and the UK and 03:26.560 --> 03:28.300 incorporating cutting edge us 03:28.300 --> 03:30.467 technologies in the propulsion plant , 03:30.467 --> 03:32.522 combat control and weapons systems . 03:32.522 --> 03:34.522 Australia's acquisition of SSN will 03:34.522 --> 03:36.689 bolster the capabilities of one of our 03:36.689 --> 03:38.633 strongest allies by increasing the 03:38.633 --> 03:40.411 Royal Australian Navy's range , 03:40.411 --> 03:42.633 survivability and striking power . Thus 03:42.633 --> 03:44.689 strengthening deterrence in the Indo 03:44.689 --> 03:46.744 Pacific . Every phase of the optimal 03:46.744 --> 03:48.800 pathway will set the highest nuclear 03:48.800 --> 03:51.022 nonproliferation standards . Moreover , 03:51.022 --> 03:53.078 August will diversify us , posturing 03:53.078 --> 03:55.300 the Indo Pacific offering new locations 03:55.300 --> 03:57.480 from which U S forces can operate and 03:57.490 --> 03:59.546 August will strengthen us and allied 03:59.546 --> 04:01.657 submarine industrial capacity , which 04:01.657 --> 04:03.712 is key to modernizing innovating and 04:03.712 --> 04:05.823 maintaining our military and economic 04:05.823 --> 04:07.823 competitive edge today . And in the 04:07.823 --> 04:09.879 future , three highly capable allied 04:09.879 --> 04:12.101 and interoperable submarine forces will 04:12.101 --> 04:14.101 strengthen us national security and 04:14.101 --> 04:16.157 budget stability in the Indo Pacific 04:16.157 --> 04:18.046 for decades to come . We are also 04:18.046 --> 04:20.101 working to modernize our information 04:20.101 --> 04:19.710 sharing and export control systems 04:19.720 --> 04:21.776 which is necessary for the effective 04:21.776 --> 04:23.664 implementation of August . As the 04:23.664 --> 04:25.831 national defense strategy outlines the 04:25.831 --> 04:27.998 capacity to share information with key 04:27.998 --> 04:29.942 allies and partners is of critical 04:29.942 --> 04:31.942 importance to how the United States 04:31.942 --> 04:33.831 deters aggression and succeeds in 04:33.831 --> 04:35.887 contingencies . We will work closely 04:35.887 --> 04:38.053 with the the US government , including 04:38.053 --> 04:40.164 the Congress of course and the United 04:40.164 --> 04:42.053 Kingdom and Australia to identify 04:42.053 --> 04:44.276 obstacles to information sharing and to 04:44.276 --> 04:46.387 develop innovative rapid and scalable 04:46.387 --> 04:48.442 solutions to develop , to deliver on 04:48.442 --> 04:50.220 the president's vision for this 04:50.220 --> 04:52.387 historic partnership . And with that , 04:52.387 --> 04:52.005 I'd be delighted to take your questions . 04:52.025 --> 04:54.995 Thank you very much , ma'am . Go to 04:55.365 --> 04:58.460 questions . Yes , sir . Alright , ask , 04:58.560 --> 05:02.440 sorry . Have you had any direct 05:02.450 --> 05:04.590 communications with other militaries 05:04.900 --> 05:08.500 airing concerns or issues about the 05:08.500 --> 05:10.611 orcas deal ? And if so what have they 05:10.611 --> 05:14.190 been ? And also just on the selection 05:14.190 --> 05:16.340 of the Virginia class submarines that 05:16.350 --> 05:18.670 you will eventually sell to Australia ? 05:18.680 --> 05:20.930 What's the criteria for which 05:20.930 --> 05:23.097 submarines you select ? And , and when 05:23.097 --> 05:26.020 you deliver them ? I want to make sure 05:26.020 --> 05:28.020 I understand the first part of your 05:28.020 --> 05:29.798 questions when you talked about 05:29.798 --> 05:29.760 communications with militaries , are 05:29.760 --> 05:31.982 you citing specific allies , partners , 05:35.200 --> 05:38.130 any other foreign military ? Great . Uh 05:38.140 --> 05:40.251 We have had a number of conversations 05:40.251 --> 05:42.251 with our allies and our partners in 05:42.251 --> 05:44.584 civilian channels and military channels , 05:44.584 --> 05:46.251 of course , um throughout the 05:46.251 --> 05:48.529 Consultative period and then of course , 05:48.529 --> 05:50.140 in the run up to yesterday's 05:50.140 --> 05:51.862 announcement and have heard uh 05:51.862 --> 05:53.973 substantial amount of enthusiasm from 05:53.973 --> 05:56.196 them for this historic game changing uh 05:56.196 --> 05:58.362 partnership regarding engagements with 05:58.362 --> 06:00.418 the People's Republic of China , the 06:00.418 --> 06:02.473 State Department did do that . And I 06:02.473 --> 06:04.640 would refer to you , I would refer you 06:04.640 --> 06:06.529 to them for the substance of that 06:06.529 --> 06:08.696 dialogue . I would of course highlight 06:08.696 --> 06:10.918 where you've heard often from Secretary 06:10.918 --> 06:10.890 Austin , which is that open 06:10.890 --> 06:13.112 communication between our two countries 06:13.112 --> 06:15.168 is important for risk management and 06:15.168 --> 06:17.279 for understanding what one another is 06:17.279 --> 06:19.223 thinking . And then on your second 06:19.223 --> 06:21.930 question regarding Virginia , um you 06:21.930 --> 06:23.819 know why , why we chose that ? We 06:23.819 --> 06:26.041 looked at a wide number of options that 06:26.041 --> 06:27.986 has been a robust and very busy 18 06:27.986 --> 06:30.097 months of of consultations and trying 06:30.097 --> 06:32.319 to look at a wide variety of options in 06:32.319 --> 06:34.430 terms of which submarine specifically 06:34.430 --> 06:36.652 will go that will will go to rotate for 06:36.652 --> 06:38.930 submarine rotational forces West . 06:38.940 --> 06:41.051 That's really going to be figured out 06:41.051 --> 06:43.218 to our normal military processes of of 06:43.218 --> 06:42.980 such efforts . 06:48.250 --> 06:50.306 Okay , thank you very much for doing 06:50.306 --> 06:52.630 this . I have two questions about 06:52.640 --> 06:55.990 submarine rotational force West . Can 06:55.990 --> 06:58.990 you say the new rotational force will 06:59.000 --> 07:01.160 increase the total number of U S 07:01.160 --> 07:03.690 submarines operating in the western 07:03.690 --> 07:07.490 past week compared to today ? And then 07:07.490 --> 07:09.768 do you have another question ? Oh yeah . 07:09.768 --> 07:11.990 Then the secondary . Can you tell us uh 07:11.990 --> 07:13.990 can you talk a little bit about the 07:13.990 --> 07:17.300 advantage of having locational presence 07:17.310 --> 07:20.130 of the U S submarine outside of the 07:20.130 --> 07:22.750 second island chain in terms of 07:22.750 --> 07:25.100 deterring Chinese aggression in the 07:25.100 --> 07:29.090 region ? Alright , on 07:29.090 --> 07:32.170 that first one , uh having three allies 07:32.180 --> 07:36.080 operating capable submarines around the 07:36.080 --> 07:38.450 Indo Pacific is really critical for 07:38.450 --> 07:40.790 security and stability . And I think 07:40.790 --> 07:42.957 that really tracks nicely to your next 07:42.957 --> 07:45.234 question , which look to be very clear , 07:45.234 --> 07:47.346 August is not about any one country , 07:47.346 --> 07:49.346 it is about the need for security , 07:49.346 --> 07:51.401 stability and prosperity in the Indo 07:51.401 --> 07:53.346 Pacific and our three countries of 07:53.346 --> 07:55.234 course , have a robust history of 07:55.234 --> 07:57.179 collab Creating together . This is 07:57.179 --> 07:59.234 going to take us to another level of 07:59.234 --> 08:01.290 interoperability . I would highlight 08:01.290 --> 08:03.123 the significance of sharing this 08:03.123 --> 08:05.234 information with Australia as you all 08:05.234 --> 08:07.457 probably know the last time we did . So 08:07.457 --> 08:09.700 it was 1958 . So it's really a sign of 08:09.700 --> 08:12.500 just how close this relationship is for 08:12.500 --> 08:14.611 that to really occur in a responsible 08:14.611 --> 08:16.611 way . It's important that Australia 08:16.611 --> 08:18.611 developed stewardship practices and 08:18.611 --> 08:20.833 that's why we have developed this multi 08:20.833 --> 08:22.889 phased mutual commitments approach . 08:23.620 --> 08:26.500 Thank you . Let's go to Will . Thank 08:26.500 --> 08:28.900 you . Um just regarding the the 08:28.900 --> 08:31.067 Virginia class submarines that um that 08:31.067 --> 08:33.289 Australia will purchase in the twenties 08:33.289 --> 08:35.289 thirties has , has a specific model 08:35.289 --> 08:37.511 been selected . Um Or is that something 08:37.511 --> 08:36.600 that's a little bit down the road and 08:36.610 --> 08:38.388 will basically be what's on the 08:38.388 --> 08:40.443 production line for that ? The US is 08:40.443 --> 08:42.666 purchasing at that point , will they be 08:42.666 --> 08:44.666 equipped with the V P M to increase 08:44.666 --> 08:46.666 missile capacity or is it something 08:46.666 --> 08:48.888 tailored to Australia specifically ? So 08:48.888 --> 08:50.999 first of all , it's worth noting that 08:50.999 --> 08:53.110 Australia will get these subs in just 08:53.110 --> 08:55.221 about a decade that is frankly faster 08:55.221 --> 08:57.221 than I suspect a lot of folks might 08:57.221 --> 08:59.277 have expected when this whole effort 08:59.277 --> 09:01.500 was announced just 18 months ago . Um 09:01.500 --> 09:03.790 Australia will be purchasing a mix of 09:03.800 --> 09:06.060 new , new submarines and old submarines 09:06.070 --> 09:08.181 and right now , it looks like it will 09:08.181 --> 09:10.181 be two with the potential to have . 09:10.181 --> 09:12.292 Excuse me , it will be three with the 09:12.292 --> 09:14.514 potential for two more if needed . As I 09:14.514 --> 09:17.110 noted earlier , the cohort of folks 09:17.110 --> 09:19.110 looked at a wide range of different 09:19.110 --> 09:21.170 options and really came , came down 09:21.170 --> 09:23.392 with Virginia is the right is the right 09:23.392 --> 09:25.337 approach . Uh and Virginia payload 09:25.337 --> 09:27.337 module will not be a part of it . I 09:27.337 --> 09:29.392 think the three countries saw that , 09:29.392 --> 09:31.559 that , that , that didn't make sense . 09:31.559 --> 09:31.510 Uh As you no doubt know , well , of 09:31.510 --> 09:33.677 course , these submarines are going to 09:33.677 --> 09:35.899 be especially special though because of 09:35.899 --> 09:38.010 their stealth , their range and their 09:38.010 --> 09:40.232 endurance . So they really will will be 09:40.232 --> 09:42.121 kind of a meaningful , meaningful 09:42.121 --> 09:44.232 deterrent in the region . Let's go to 09:44.232 --> 09:47.640 Jim . Hi . It's good to see you . 09:47.650 --> 09:50.600 Um on the info sharing . Going back to 09:50.600 --> 09:52.822 the question you answered just , just a 09:52.822 --> 09:55.150 little bit before . Is that , is that a 09:55.150 --> 09:57.460 real showstopper ? I mean , these these 09:57.460 --> 09:59.970 countries are all five I participants . 09:59.980 --> 10:02.450 You don't really anticipate that being 10:02.450 --> 10:05.360 a problem with the info sharing with 10:05.360 --> 10:07.830 Australia . Do you , you know Jim , 10:07.840 --> 10:10.062 allies and partners are at the heart of 10:10.062 --> 10:12.062 the National Defense strategy right 10:12.062 --> 10:14.284 there . Center of gravity for realizing 10:14.284 --> 10:16.396 that 2022 national defense strategy . 10:16.396 --> 10:18.229 And we know we have to lower the 10:18.229 --> 10:20.229 barriers to working with them . And 10:20.229 --> 10:22.451 information is just a piece of it . You 10:22.451 --> 10:24.673 are exactly right that these are two of 10:24.673 --> 10:26.673 our very closest allies who we have 10:26.673 --> 10:28.673 stood shoulder to shoulder with for 10:28.673 --> 10:30.618 much of the last 100 years or so . 10:30.618 --> 10:32.729 Nevertheless , nevertheless , we have 10:32.729 --> 10:34.840 processes that have to be figured out 10:34.840 --> 10:37.007 and to ensure that both pillars of our 10:37.007 --> 10:39.118 right , there are two pillars today , 10:39.118 --> 10:41.062 we're very focused on pillar one , 10:41.062 --> 10:43.173 which is the the conventionally armed 10:43.173 --> 10:45.007 nuclear powered submarines . But 10:45.007 --> 10:44.585 there's also pillar to write this 10:44.585 --> 10:46.696 cooperation , advanced capabilities . 10:46.696 --> 10:48.955 We know for that to be realized , we're 10:48.955 --> 10:51.615 going to need very clear , transparent , 10:51.615 --> 10:53.965 robust information sharing practices . 10:54.105 --> 10:56.105 It's a great case study . These are 10:56.105 --> 10:58.272 exactly the right to allies to make it 10:58.272 --> 11:00.383 real . And we look forward to working 11:00.383 --> 11:02.327 with our colleagues around the U S 11:02.327 --> 11:04.605 government , including the Congress to , 11:04.605 --> 11:06.716 to make that a reality . We have time 11:06.716 --> 11:08.980 for just a couple more . Joe . 11:11.420 --> 11:14.830 Hi , thanks for doing this um told 11:14.830 --> 11:16.997 defense news . Um just to follow up on 11:16.997 --> 11:19.274 Jim's question . I mean , what are the , 11:19.274 --> 11:21.497 can you drill down a little bit to talk 11:21.497 --> 11:23.830 about ? What are the specific obstacles ? 11:23.830 --> 11:26.052 Do you have a sense ? I mean , after 18 11:26.052 --> 11:28.108 months , do you have a sense of what 11:28.108 --> 11:30.770 some of the the pieces of it are ? Um 11:30.780 --> 11:33.160 And what kind of information sharing um 11:33.170 --> 11:36.690 needs to get changed ? You know , Joe , 11:36.690 --> 11:38.746 we've spent a lot of time over these 11:38.746 --> 11:40.801 last 18 months , figuring out how we 11:40.801 --> 11:42.746 can ensure that we deliver on this 11:42.746 --> 11:44.960 historic game changing pledge by the 11:44.970 --> 11:46.970 three heads of state . And so we've 11:46.970 --> 11:49.026 looked hard at the different changes 11:49.026 --> 11:51.248 that might need to happen . But I would 11:51.248 --> 11:53.303 say that there's probably more to be 11:53.303 --> 11:55.248 done along those lines . But I can 11:55.248 --> 11:57.990 assure you that we will do all we can 11:58.000 --> 12:00.445 to both deliver on the submarines and 12:00.445 --> 12:02.667 to deliver on the advanced capabilities 12:02.667 --> 12:04.278 piece . We are in very close 12:04.278 --> 12:06.501 consultation with our colleagues at the 12:06.501 --> 12:08.556 State Department on the guitar piece 12:08.556 --> 12:10.278 specifically and also with our 12:10.278 --> 12:12.334 colleagues in , in Congress . But on 12:12.334 --> 12:14.278 the whole , I think we've all been 12:14.278 --> 12:16.112 pleased to see robust bipartisan 12:16.112 --> 12:18.223 support for making this a reality and 12:18.223 --> 12:19.945 really recognizing the sort of 12:19.945 --> 12:22.056 generational leap that we see in this 12:22.056 --> 12:25.120 alliance . Okay , thank you very much , 12:25.120 --> 12:27.176 ma'am . Appreciate your time today . 12:43.530 --> 12:45.641 All right . Thank you all very much . 12:45.641 --> 12:47.752 Just a few things at the top and then 12:47.752 --> 12:50.250 I'll get right to your questions . Uh 12:50.260 --> 12:52.560 So first of all , um I would like to 12:52.570 --> 12:55.480 highlight us European command's 12:55.490 --> 12:57.434 statement released earlier today , 12:57.434 --> 13:00.160 confirming that two Russian S U 27 13:00.170 --> 13:02.020 aircraft conducted unsafe and 13:02.030 --> 13:04.200 unprofessional and unprofessional 13:04.200 --> 13:06.740 intercept with a U S Air Force 13:06.740 --> 13:08.518 Intelligence , surveillance and 13:08.518 --> 13:10.407 reconnaissance , unmanned MQ nine 13:10.407 --> 13:12.500 aircraft that was operating within 13:12.500 --> 13:14.611 international airspace over the Black 13:14.611 --> 13:17.950 Sea today to recap at approximately 703 13:17.950 --> 13:20.140 AM central European time . One of the 13:20.140 --> 13:22.440 Russian S U 27 aircraft struck the 13:22.440 --> 13:25.190 propeller of the MQ nine causing us 13:25.190 --> 13:27.190 forces to have to bring the MQ nine 13:27.190 --> 13:29.530 down in international waters several 13:29.530 --> 13:31.752 times before the collision . The S U 20 13:31.752 --> 13:33.697 seven's dumped fuel on and flew in 13:33.697 --> 13:36.040 front of the MQ nine in a reckless and 13:36.040 --> 13:38.500 unprofessional manner . This incident 13:38.500 --> 13:40.556 demonstrates a lack of competence in 13:40.556 --> 13:42.167 addition to being unsafe and 13:42.167 --> 13:44.270 unprofessional us . Air forces in 13:44.270 --> 13:46.530 Europe air forces , Africa routinely 13:46.530 --> 13:48.530 fly aircraft throughout Europe over 13:48.530 --> 13:50.474 sovereign territory and throughout 13:50.474 --> 13:52.641 international airspace in coordination 13:52.641 --> 13:54.419 with applicable host nation and 13:54.419 --> 13:56.252 international laws . In order to 13:56.252 --> 13:58.474 bolster collective European defense and 13:58.474 --> 14:00.363 security . These missions support 14:00.363 --> 14:02.086 allied partner and us national 14:02.086 --> 14:04.210 objectives . As the US Air forces in 14:04.210 --> 14:06.266 Europe air forces , Africa commander 14:06.266 --> 14:08.060 emphasized in European command 14:08.060 --> 14:09.950 statement , quote , us and allied 14:09.950 --> 14:12.006 aircraft will continue to operate in 14:12.006 --> 14:14.117 international airspace and we call on 14:14.117 --> 14:16.061 the Russians to conduct themselves 14:16.061 --> 14:18.890 professionally and safely . In separate 14:18.890 --> 14:20.890 news Secretary , Austin concluded a 14:20.890 --> 14:22.890 successful visit to the Middle East 14:22.890 --> 14:24.834 region last week where he met with 14:24.834 --> 14:26.890 leaders in Jordan's Iraq , Egypt and 14:26.890 --> 14:28.890 Israel . The weeklong trip served a 14:28.890 --> 14:30.723 deep in defense partnerships and 14:30.723 --> 14:32.946 enabled the exchange of views on shared 14:32.946 --> 14:35.279 regional and global security challenges . 14:35.279 --> 14:37.446 Specific topics of discussion included 14:37.446 --> 14:39.650 ongoing coalition led defeat ISIS 14:39.650 --> 14:42.030 operations in Iraq and Syria . The 14:42.030 --> 14:44.086 concerning range of threats posed by 14:44.086 --> 14:45.919 Iran including its destabilizing 14:45.919 --> 14:47.974 regional activities and provision of 14:47.974 --> 14:50.086 unmanned aerial systems to Russia for 14:50.086 --> 14:52.086 use in their unprovoked war against 14:52.086 --> 14:54.141 Ukraine and implementing commitments 14:54.141 --> 14:56.308 made by Israeli and Palestinian senior 14:56.308 --> 14:58.197 officials in Aqaba Jordan and the 14:58.197 --> 15:00.419 importance of deescalating violence and 15:00.419 --> 15:02.530 restoring calm in the West Bank . The 15:02.530 --> 15:04.641 secretary also had the opportunity to 15:04.641 --> 15:06.863 talk to a number of U S service members 15:06.863 --> 15:08.919 currently serving in the U S Central 15:08.919 --> 15:10.863 command area of responsibility and 15:10.863 --> 15:13.086 thank them and their families for their 15:13.086 --> 15:14.974 commitment to mission service and 15:14.974 --> 15:17.197 safeguarding our nation . And finally , 15:17.197 --> 15:19.252 Secretary Austin and chairman of the 15:19.252 --> 15:21.308 Joint Chiefs of Staff General Milley 15:21.308 --> 15:23.197 will host the 10th meeting of the 15:23.197 --> 15:25.474 Ukraine defense contact group tomorrow . 15:25.474 --> 15:27.530 The meeting will be hosted virtually 15:27.530 --> 15:29.752 here in the Pentagon and will allow for 15:29.752 --> 15:29.530 the secretary , the chairman and senior 15:29.530 --> 15:31.641 defense leaders from around the world 15:31.641 --> 15:33.752 to discuss ongoing efforts to provide 15:33.752 --> 15:35.919 Ukraine with the means and resources . 15:35.919 --> 15:38.086 It needs to defend itself from Russian 15:38.086 --> 15:40.252 aggression . Additional information on 15:40.252 --> 15:42.419 tomorrow's meeting will be forthcoming 15:42.419 --> 15:44.252 and with that , I will take your 15:44.252 --> 15:43.710 questions . We'll start with the 15:43.710 --> 15:47.200 Reuters Bill Secretary or anyone else 15:47.200 --> 15:49.850 in the U S military reached out to his 15:49.850 --> 15:51.906 Russian counterpart or anyone else's 15:51.906 --> 15:53.950 counterparts from Russia . And 15:53.960 --> 15:56.290 regarding the MQ nine , uh you know 15:56.290 --> 15:58.620 what detail a little bit more , what 15:58.620 --> 16:00.787 its mission was and where it was being 16:00.787 --> 16:03.250 piloted from . Yeah , sure . Um So in 16:03.250 --> 16:06.360 terms of Secretary Austin , talking to 16:06.360 --> 16:08.490 his counterpart , not at this time to 16:08.490 --> 16:11.830 my knowledge . Uh D O D officials have 16:11.830 --> 16:14.370 not spoken specifically to Russian 16:14.370 --> 16:16.703 authorities on this particular incident . 16:16.703 --> 16:18.870 I do know that the State Department is 16:18.870 --> 16:21.092 raising our concerns about the incident 16:21.092 --> 16:23.259 directly with the Russian government . 16:23.259 --> 16:23.250 So I'd prefer you to them for details 16:23.250 --> 16:26.220 on that . Um In terms of the mission of 16:26.220 --> 16:28.387 the MQ nine , as I mentioned , it's an 16:28.387 --> 16:31.420 I S AR platform . Um you know , these , 16:31.430 --> 16:33.652 these aircraft had been flying over the 16:33.652 --> 16:35.541 Black Sea region for some time to 16:35.541 --> 16:37.541 include before the current conflict 16:37.541 --> 16:39.652 started . It is an important and busy 16:39.652 --> 16:41.763 international waterway . Uh And so it 16:41.763 --> 16:44.210 is not an uncommon mission for us to be 16:44.210 --> 16:45.543 flying in international 16:45.543 --> 16:48.650 airspace 16:50.530 --> 16:53.880 company aircraft or , and when was this 16:53.880 --> 16:55.936 aircraft armed ? Uh So I'm not gonna 16:55.936 --> 16:58.670 get into the specific uh profile of 16:58.670 --> 17:00.837 this particular aircraft as you know , 17:00.837 --> 17:03.059 the MQ nine does have the ability to be 17:03.059 --> 17:05.810 armed . Um It was again conducting an I 17:05.810 --> 17:08.710 S our mission in international airspace , 17:08.720 --> 17:10.887 uh something that we've been doing for 17:10.887 --> 17:14.450 some time uh in terms of the types of 17:14.460 --> 17:16.460 tactics , techniques and procedures 17:16.460 --> 17:18.627 that we take to protect our aircraft . 17:18.627 --> 17:20.960 I'm not going to get into the specifics . 17:20.960 --> 17:22.904 I think the key point here is that 17:22.904 --> 17:25.016 while intercepts in and of themselves 17:25.016 --> 17:27.016 are not that uncommon . Uh the fact 17:27.016 --> 17:29.127 that this type of behavior from these 17:29.127 --> 17:31.127 Russian pilots that is uncommon and 17:31.127 --> 17:33.349 unfortunate and unsafe . And so again , 17:33.349 --> 17:35.516 would echo General hackers call on the 17:35.516 --> 17:38.240 Russians to continue to fly safely . 17:38.250 --> 17:39.330 Thank you , Liz . 17:42.520 --> 17:45.760 Was this collision itself an accident 17:45.770 --> 17:47.860 on Russia's behalf ? And is the U S 17:47.860 --> 17:51.630 responding as such ? You know , we 17:51.630 --> 17:54.570 are continuing to assess exactly what 17:54.570 --> 17:57.660 happened . But I think based on the 17:57.670 --> 17:59.726 actions of the Russian pilots , it's 17:59.726 --> 18:01.226 clear that it was unsafe , 18:01.226 --> 18:04.020 unprofessional . Um And I think the 18:04.020 --> 18:06.620 actions speak for themselves . What we , 18:06.620 --> 18:09.400 what we saw again , we're fighter 18:09.400 --> 18:12.120 aircraft dumping fuel in front of this 18:12.130 --> 18:15.760 uh U A V . Uh and then getting so close 18:15.770 --> 18:17.670 to the aircraft that had actually 18:17.680 --> 18:20.310 damaged the propeller on the MQ nine , 18:20.600 --> 18:23.430 we , we assess that it likely caused 18:23.440 --> 18:25.607 some damage to the Russian aircraft as 18:25.607 --> 18:28.500 well . Um To our knowledge , we know 18:28.500 --> 18:30.650 that the aircraft , uh the Russian 18:30.650 --> 18:33.220 aircraft did land . I'm not gonna go 18:33.220 --> 18:36.630 into where they landed . Um But again , 18:36.630 --> 18:39.320 it just demonstrative of very 18:39.320 --> 18:41.431 unprofessional , unsafe airmanship on 18:41.431 --> 18:43.730 the part of these pilots . One more 18:43.730 --> 18:46.470 question . Sorry . Um Will the US try 18:46.470 --> 18:49.260 to recover this drone ? So I'm not , I 18:49.260 --> 18:51.093 don't have anything right now to 18:51.093 --> 18:53.427 provide in terms of recovery operations , 18:53.427 --> 18:55.538 if we have any updates to provide and 18:55.538 --> 18:55.140 we'll be sure to do that . Thanks , 18:55.650 --> 18:59.310 David . Is there video 18:59.390 --> 19:01.390 of the incident ? Are you going to 19:01.400 --> 19:05.300 release the video ? Um Where 19:05.310 --> 19:07.366 in the Black Sea did it happen ? How 19:07.366 --> 19:11.100 close to Russian airspace ? And 19:11.110 --> 19:14.660 um did you say that this particular 19:14.660 --> 19:17.850 Reaper was unarmed ? Again , I didn't 19:17.850 --> 19:20.360 say whether it was or was not . I'm not 19:20.360 --> 19:22.193 going to get into the particular 19:22.193 --> 19:24.304 mission profile of this aircraft . It 19:24.304 --> 19:27.530 was conducting an AN I S our mission um 19:28.510 --> 19:30.820 in terms of the specifics David , I'm 19:30.820 --> 19:32.987 not gonna at this point be able to get 19:32.987 --> 19:35.153 more specific other than the Black Sea 19:35.153 --> 19:37.487 region in international airspace . Well , 19:37.487 --> 19:41.080 well clear of , of any type of um yeah , 19:41.090 --> 19:43.540 it was international airspace . Um And 19:43.540 --> 19:45.484 I'm sorry , the other part of your 19:45.484 --> 19:47.318 question ? Yes . So we are going 19:47.318 --> 19:49.373 through the declassification process 19:49.373 --> 19:51.540 now . Uh and we'll keep you updated on 19:51.540 --> 19:53.262 that front in terms of imagery 19:53.262 --> 19:55.550 associated with this incident . Trust . 19:57.100 --> 19:59.200 I'm laser focused on your question . 19:59.210 --> 20:01.410 That was just a very quick one . you 20:01.410 --> 20:03.299 haven't said reaper , but he said 20:03.299 --> 20:05.466 reaper , is it accurate to say it's MQ 20:05.466 --> 20:09.330 nine , reaper ? I'm just gonna stick 20:09.330 --> 20:12.420 with MQ nine . Thanks , Joe . 20:14.900 --> 20:18.580 I thanks so much , Pat . Um The MQ 20:18.580 --> 20:21.060 nine um potentially contains some 20:21.060 --> 20:24.860 sensitive technology . Is the U S 20:24.860 --> 20:26.804 military undertaking any effort to 20:26.804 --> 20:28.920 recover the MQ nine ? Is it in the , 20:28.930 --> 20:31.097 isn't in the waters of the Black Sea ? 20:31.097 --> 20:35.000 Has Russia recovered it ? Um Is 20:35.000 --> 20:37.610 there a U S naval asset in the , in the 20:37.610 --> 20:39.443 region that could undertake that 20:39.443 --> 20:41.554 recovery ? Yeah . So , um again , I'm 20:41.554 --> 20:43.721 not going to get into the specifics of 20:43.721 --> 20:45.943 what's on this particular aircraft . Um 20:45.943 --> 20:47.832 Other than again , it's an I S AR 20:47.832 --> 20:51.060 platform uh because of the damage , we 20:51.060 --> 20:53.360 were uh in a position to have to 20:53.360 --> 20:57.060 essentially um crashing into the Black 20:57.060 --> 20:59.520 Sea . Uh to my knowledge at this point 20:59.520 --> 21:02.500 in time , uh the Russians have not 21:02.510 --> 21:04.788 recovered that aircraft . Um But again , 21:04.788 --> 21:07.940 in terms of um our recovery efforts 21:07.950 --> 21:10.172 don't have any updates to provide right 21:10.172 --> 21:12.283 now . I'd refer you to Navia in terms 21:12.283 --> 21:14.339 of what assets they may have in that 21:14.339 --> 21:17.750 region . Thank you , Janie . Thank you , 21:17.750 --> 21:20.900 General uh regarding the North Korea's 21:20.910 --> 21:24.320 summary in Ranchi strategic cruise 21:24.320 --> 21:27.710 missiles . Recently , North Korea has 21:27.720 --> 21:31.320 announced that it is possible to mount 21:31.320 --> 21:35.170 a nuclear warhead on a strategic cruise 21:35.170 --> 21:38.960 missiles . What is the readiness of the 21:38.960 --> 21:42.180 United States against the escalating 21:42.190 --> 21:45.560 provocations such as the nuclear 21:45.560 --> 21:48.970 provocation by the North Korea ? Let me 21:48.970 --> 21:51.137 just make sure I understand what's the 21:51.137 --> 21:53.137 readiness of the US to respond to a 21:53.137 --> 21:56.230 nuclear provocation by North Korea ? Um 21:56.230 --> 21:58.500 Well , I think we've been very clear uh 21:58.510 --> 22:01.970 that were North Korea to employ a 22:01.970 --> 22:04.192 nuclear weapon , it would be the end of 22:04.192 --> 22:06.880 the North Korean regime . But again , 22:06.880 --> 22:09.047 our focus continues to be working very 22:09.047 --> 22:10.824 closely with our allies and our 22:10.824 --> 22:12.602 partners in the region to deter 22:12.602 --> 22:14.769 aggression uh to preserve security and 22:14.769 --> 22:16.991 stability in the region . And that will 22:16.991 --> 22:19.213 continue to be our , our focus . You go 22:19.213 --> 22:20.730 to Carla just a real quick 22:20.730 --> 22:23.240 clarification . What did the fighter 22:23.240 --> 22:25.870 jet , what did he strike the MQ nine 22:25.870 --> 22:28.690 with ? Was it the wing ? Was it that I 22:28.700 --> 22:30.533 can't tell you specifically what 22:30.533 --> 22:33.050 portion of the aircraft ? But the fact 22:33.050 --> 22:35.780 that it essentially ran into the MQ 22:35.780 --> 22:38.002 nine ? Okay . Thank you . And then just 22:38.002 --> 22:40.224 separately on Ukraine , there's reports 22:40.224 --> 22:42.447 out there from the battlefield that the 22:42.447 --> 22:44.780 Ukrainians are running out of munitions , 22:44.780 --> 22:46.836 they're having shortages . Is that a 22:46.836 --> 22:49.058 concern for the Pentagon and what's the 22:49.058 --> 22:48.750 Pentagon doing to alleviate that 22:48.750 --> 22:50.972 problem ? Yeah . So as we've been doing 22:50.972 --> 22:53.139 since the beginning of this campaign , 22:53.139 --> 22:55.306 we're continuing to do everything that 22:55.306 --> 22:57.306 we can to ensure that we're meeting 22:57.306 --> 22:59.028 Ukraine's needs , whether it's 22:59.028 --> 23:01.139 ammunition , whether it's air defense 23:01.139 --> 23:03.250 armor . Uh You know , you've heard us 23:03.250 --> 23:04.917 talk extensively about that . 23:04.917 --> 23:06.917 Tomorrow's discussion , of course , 23:06.917 --> 23:08.972 will be another opportunity to bring 23:08.972 --> 23:11.194 the international community together to 23:11.194 --> 23:13.417 focus on Ukraine's most urgent needs to 23:13.417 --> 23:15.694 include ammunition . And so , uh again , 23:15.694 --> 23:17.750 that will continue to be our focus . 23:17.750 --> 23:19.972 And , and you've heard Secretary Austin 23:19.972 --> 23:22.139 and others say that we're committed to 23:22.139 --> 23:22.030 making sure that they have what they 23:22.030 --> 23:23.363 need to be successful . 23:25.980 --> 23:28.240 Thanks . Is there an assessment that 23:28.240 --> 23:30.462 the Pentagon has on why they're running 23:30.462 --> 23:32.351 out of ammunition ? Is it because 23:32.351 --> 23:34.573 they're just expanding it too fast , is 23:34.573 --> 23:34.540 not making it to the battlefield in 23:34.540 --> 23:36.960 time ? What's your ? Yeah , really ? So 23:36.960 --> 23:39.127 I'd have to refer to the Ukrainians to 23:39.127 --> 23:41.390 talk about their specific efforts to 23:41.390 --> 23:43.730 supply their individual units . Again , 23:43.740 --> 23:45.796 we're working very closely with them 23:45.796 --> 23:47.907 and our international partners to get 23:47.907 --> 23:49.962 them what they need . Um And , and I 23:49.962 --> 23:52.018 think it's also important to kind of 23:52.018 --> 23:53.851 take a step back and look at the 23:53.851 --> 23:55.740 progress that has been made while 23:55.740 --> 23:57.851 recognizing the fact that there still 23:57.851 --> 23:59.962 is a tough fight ahead , particularly 23:59.962 --> 23:59.910 as we go into the spring and summer . 23:59.910 --> 24:02.021 And so are our focus again , is going 24:02.021 --> 24:04.132 to be working with National Armaments 24:04.132 --> 24:06.188 directors with the Ukrainians to get 24:06.188 --> 24:08.299 them the ammunition they need and get 24:08.299 --> 24:10.521 that to the front line units as quickly 24:10.521 --> 24:12.577 as possible . Let me go back over to 24:12.577 --> 24:12.100 the side of the room . Yes , sir . 24:15.390 --> 24:17.446 Thank you . Can you guide us through 24:17.446 --> 24:19.668 the timeline of the MQ nine intercept ? 24:19.668 --> 24:21.890 Uh We have that the aircraft was struck 24:21.890 --> 24:24.112 at 703 eastern time . But how long were 24:24.112 --> 24:25.779 the Sukhois with the aircraft 24:25.779 --> 24:27.890 beforehand ? And were there any radio 24:27.890 --> 24:29.834 calls between radio communications 24:29.834 --> 24:31.890 either from the Russians or from the 24:31.890 --> 24:34.720 United States ? Yeah . So on the latter 24:34.720 --> 24:36.887 part of your question , no , none that 24:36.887 --> 24:40.770 I'm aware of . Um and uh I would ask 24:40.770 --> 24:42.881 you that you go back and confirm this 24:42.881 --> 24:44.770 with Yukon but , but based on the 24:44.770 --> 24:46.992 information I have here , it seems like 24:46.992 --> 24:49.350 uh approximately 24:50.810 --> 24:53.910 30 to 40 minutes . Uh they were flying 24:53.920 --> 24:56.900 in the vicinity of this MQ nine . Uh 24:56.900 --> 25:00.840 and then at 703 is when the um 25:00.850 --> 25:03.430 73 A M central European time is when 25:03.430 --> 25:06.520 they collided , causing it to crash . 25:06.530 --> 25:08.000 So cost them , 25:12.180 --> 25:14.940 the U S forces has had to bring down 25:14.940 --> 25:18.680 the , the aircraft . Does that mean 25:18.680 --> 25:20.900 that the United States piloted it to 25:20.900 --> 25:23.067 the crash site or was it struck by MSL 25:23.067 --> 25:26.260 arms ? We brought it down ? Okay . And 25:26.260 --> 25:29.740 then also , um is there any U S naval 25:29.750 --> 25:33.300 assets currently in , in black seed ? 25:33.310 --> 25:36.150 Again , I'd have to refer you to NAB 25:36.150 --> 25:38.200 here for any details on particular 25:38.200 --> 25:40.280 assets in the region . Thank you , 25:40.290 --> 25:43.970 Laura , thanks . Um Can you talk a 25:43.970 --> 25:46.192 little bit more about the damage to the 25:46.192 --> 25:48.414 MQ nine ? Was it on flyable ? And , and 25:48.414 --> 25:50.526 that's why you had to bring it down . 25:50.526 --> 25:52.581 Um And then can you say a little bit 25:52.581 --> 25:54.803 more about how often this kind of thing 25:54.803 --> 25:56.748 happens in over the Black Sea that 25:56.748 --> 25:58.859 Russian aircraft harass us drones and 25:58.859 --> 26:01.081 other aircraft ? Yeah . So I don't have 26:01.081 --> 26:03.248 any statistics in front of me in terms 26:03.248 --> 26:05.500 of intercepts . But again , as I 26:05.500 --> 26:08.870 highlighted the fact that um 26:08.880 --> 26:11.790 intercepts of aircraft are not uncommon 26:11.790 --> 26:13.957 in and of themselves , it's , it's not 26:13.957 --> 26:16.179 obviously a daily occurrence . The vast 26:16.179 --> 26:19.430 majority of those intercepts are what 26:19.430 --> 26:21.763 we would consider safe and professional . 26:21.763 --> 26:23.874 Uh just wanting to see what's there , 26:23.874 --> 26:25.986 right , you're flying alongside it to 26:25.986 --> 26:28.152 uh to be able to see what's there . Um 26:28.152 --> 26:30.430 In this particular case though , again , 26:30.430 --> 26:32.486 uh they collided with the aircraft , 26:32.486 --> 26:35.240 damaging the propellor , essentially 26:35.250 --> 26:37.083 putting in a situation where was 26:37.083 --> 26:39.250 unflappable and uncontrollable . So we 26:39.250 --> 26:41.417 brought it down . Thank you , time for 26:41.417 --> 26:43.528 a few more to go here and then to the 26:43.528 --> 26:47.350 body . Aye , 26:47.350 --> 26:49.461 sir . Thanks . I just wanted to check 26:49.461 --> 26:51.830 to confirm any communication with 26:51.830 --> 26:53.941 allies such as Turkey about potential 26:53.941 --> 26:56.620 recovery of the drone . And is there 26:56.620 --> 26:58.731 any concern that Russia could provide 26:58.731 --> 27:01.010 uh the drone to Iran if it recovers it . 27:01.500 --> 27:03.833 Uh So that that would be a hypothetical . 27:03.833 --> 27:06.090 Uh again , Russia does not have the 27:06.090 --> 27:08.312 drone . So that would be a hypothetical 27:08.312 --> 27:10.660 question . Um , in terms of working 27:10.660 --> 27:12.882 with allies and partners , I don't have 27:12.882 --> 27:14.938 anything to announce here . But if , 27:14.938 --> 27:14.420 and when we do , we'll be sure to let 27:14.430 --> 27:16.597 you know . Thank you , go too fast and 27:16.597 --> 27:18.819 then we'll come back over here the last 27:18.819 --> 27:17.930 few . 27:22.830 --> 27:25.450 Thank you , General . So when , um , I 27:25.450 --> 27:27.394 know you don't wanna share lots of 27:27.394 --> 27:29.450 information and special intelligence 27:29.450 --> 27:31.561 information . But are you able to say 27:31.561 --> 27:33.970 whether the MQ nine was flying um near 27:33.970 --> 27:37.340 Ukraine or near the Crimea Peninsula ? 27:37.500 --> 27:40.600 And then I believe you said if I heard 27:40.610 --> 27:43.780 right that the Russians did not recover 27:43.780 --> 27:46.620 the the drone . However , have you seen 27:46.630 --> 27:48.760 any effort by the Russian Navy to try 27:48.760 --> 27:51.093 to recover the drone ? Thank you . Yeah . 27:51.093 --> 27:53.038 So on your ladder question there , 27:53.038 --> 27:55.260 Friday , I'm not going to get into that 27:55.260 --> 27:58.180 um in terms of where it was flying , um 27:58.190 --> 28:02.150 it was well clear of any territory in 28:02.150 --> 28:04.317 Ukraine , it was over international in 28:04.317 --> 28:05.928 international air space over 28:05.928 --> 28:07.983 international water . So thank you , 28:08.350 --> 28:12.310 Nancy . Thank you . Um During Secretary 28:12.310 --> 28:14.570 Austin's visit to Egypt , um he held 28:14.570 --> 28:16.792 meetings with officials even though all 28:16.792 --> 28:19.014 press were banned from covering it past 28:19.014 --> 28:21.126 defense chiefs when they've been in a 28:21.126 --> 28:23.126 similar situation , have refused to 28:23.126 --> 28:25.014 proceed . Um Given that the Biden 28:25.014 --> 28:27.237 administration has said that one of its 28:27.237 --> 28:26.460 key pillars in terms of foreign 28:26.460 --> 28:29.780 policies that when presented with the a 28:29.780 --> 28:31.947 choice between Autocrats and democracy 28:31.947 --> 28:34.169 that it stands with democracy . Can you 28:34.169 --> 28:36.336 help us understand ? Why the secretary 28:36.336 --> 28:38.447 decided to proceed with those trips , 28:38.447 --> 28:37.960 given the band and should we expect 28:37.960 --> 28:40.127 that going forward ? Thank you . Thank 28:40.127 --> 28:42.293 you . So , our relationship with Egypt 28:42.293 --> 28:44.516 is obviously a very important strategic 28:44.516 --> 28:46.320 partnership . The secretary did 28:46.320 --> 28:48.542 appreciate the opportunity to meet with 28:48.542 --> 28:50.709 his counterparts and talk about that . 28:50.709 --> 28:52.820 I will tell you when it comes when it 28:52.820 --> 28:54.764 came to the press coverage of that 28:54.764 --> 28:57.240 portion , having looked further into it . 28:57.250 --> 29:00.480 Uh The Egyptians loved lived up to what 29:00.480 --> 29:02.590 they had agreed upon . Some of the 29:02.590 --> 29:04.534 lessons learned out of that was in 29:04.534 --> 29:07.770 terms of um making sure that we were on 29:07.770 --> 29:09.680 the same sheet when it came to 29:09.680 --> 29:12.560 understanding uh press access . And so 29:12.570 --> 29:15.750 we will continue to work . There had 29:15.750 --> 29:18.530 agreed beforehand that there would be a 29:18.540 --> 29:21.350 ban of journalists . We did not agree 29:21.350 --> 29:23.517 to a ban on journalists . We we agreed 29:23.517 --> 29:25.739 to have official photographers , we did 29:25.739 --> 29:27.906 have one reporter come into one of the 29:27.906 --> 29:30.072 sessions , but then a portion that was 29:30.072 --> 29:31.961 going to be open to the press was 29:31.961 --> 29:33.961 subsequently not held and therefore 29:33.961 --> 29:36.072 there was not an opportunity to cover 29:36.072 --> 29:38.183 that . But again , um sometimes these 29:38.183 --> 29:40.183 meetings are very small . Sometimes 29:40.183 --> 29:42.410 there's not the opportunity for media 29:42.410 --> 29:44.632 to come in . But again , it's something 29:44.632 --> 29:46.743 that we've noted and will continue to 29:46.743 --> 29:48.743 work closely with governments as we 29:48.743 --> 29:50.688 visit to ensure that there's press 29:50.688 --> 29:52.188 access . Thank you , sir . 29:54.250 --> 29:56.560 Just regarding the budget for the last 29:56.560 --> 29:59.300 few years , the services have pursued a 29:59.300 --> 30:02.810 divest to invest strategy and Congress 30:02.810 --> 30:05.070 hasn't necessarily bought into that 30:05.080 --> 30:08.490 this year , the air force is looking to 30:08.490 --> 30:11.150 retire more than 300 aircraft , double 30:11.150 --> 30:13.380 the amount last year . Again , Congress 30:13.380 --> 30:15.658 last year didn't give that full amount . 30:15.658 --> 30:17.650 Is there a sense that things have 30:17.650 --> 30:19.594 changed on the hill that there's a 30:19.594 --> 30:21.850 willingness to approve greater 30:21.850 --> 30:25.010 divestment ? Where is this now becoming 30:25.010 --> 30:27.440 kind of a cat and mouse game of shoot 30:27.440 --> 30:29.551 with a higher number , knowing you're 30:29.551 --> 30:31.496 going to get less to try to get to 30:31.496 --> 30:33.607 where you want to be . Well , when it 30:33.607 --> 30:35.273 comes to the Air Force budget 30:35.273 --> 30:37.440 specifically , of course , would refer 30:37.440 --> 30:39.607 you to them to talk in specifics and , 30:39.607 --> 30:41.940 and I don't want to answer for Congress , 30:41.940 --> 30:44.051 what I will say uh is having observed 30:44.051 --> 30:46.384 this process . I do think like anything , 30:46.384 --> 30:48.551 there's a continuing dialogue in terms 30:48.551 --> 30:50.773 of what the service is required to meet 30:50.773 --> 30:52.829 their mission requirements and , and 30:52.829 --> 30:54.996 working closely with Congress and with 30:54.996 --> 30:57.107 the Department of Defense to identify 30:57.107 --> 30:59.329 what those offsets might be in order to 30:59.329 --> 31:01.329 ensure that we can modernize uh you 31:01.329 --> 31:03.384 know , throughout all the services . 31:03.384 --> 31:05.607 And so I think in a lot of ways as that 31:05.607 --> 31:07.870 communication has increased , uh you're 31:07.870 --> 31:09.990 seeing some of the the fruits of that 31:09.990 --> 31:12.046 labor , but again , I'd refer to the 31:12.046 --> 31:14.379 Air Force for specifics on their budget . 31:14.379 --> 31:16.657 Okay . Thank you very much . Everybody . 31:16.657 --> 31:15.860 Appreciate it .