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Call to order the meeting of the 

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Strategic Forces subcommittee of the 

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Senate Committee on armed services are 

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hearing today is on the subject of the 

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Space force . Uh I want to thank 

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General Saltzman for being with us 

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today before this committee . And the 

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purpose of the hearing is to understand 

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your vision and priorities for the 

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Space Force as its second Chief of 

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Space Operations . While the budget for 

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the Department of Defense and the Space 

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Force has just been released . We plan 

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to have a space budget hearing which 

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includes the Space Force later in May 

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after we've had time to understand and 

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detail the president's budget request . 

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There are many uncomplicated topics 

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such as missile warning and launch that 

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will take time to understand and are 

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not really right for this hearing today , 

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but we will take up in May instead , 

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the hearing will focus on you . General 

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Saltsman . This is your opportunity to 

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explain to the subcommittee into the 

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public how you will train and equip the 

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Space Force as the Department of 

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Defense , separate military service and 

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be a presenter of forces to the 

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combatant commanders in order to 

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accomplish their missions as assigned 

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by the president . My understanding is 

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that today you will explain to us , you 

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are three lines of effort for our space 

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force guardians , as I understand it , 

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they are to first field a combat ready 

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force . Second , amplify the Guardian 

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spirit and third partner with the 

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interagency allies and industry to win . 

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I look forward to having you explain in 

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detail what each of these lines of 

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effort are and give us examples and 

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simple ones that we can take with us 

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and explain to our constituents and the 

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public the importance of the work that 

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you're doing . Let me conclude that 

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General Heighten said it best . There 

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is no such thing as a conflict in space 

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by itself . Any conflict will involve 

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all domains . Although I believe it 

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will start in space , the land , the 

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sea , the air and space all together at 

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once . I hope that today you will 

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explain to us how your vision for the 

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Space Force will meet . General 

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heightens astute observation and enable 

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our combatant commanders to accomplish 

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the mission that the president has 

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directed them to perform . If called 

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upon . After your opening statement , 

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we will have questions at five minutes 

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each . Senator Fischer . Thank you , Mr 

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Chairman General Saltzman . Thank you 

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for being here today and for sharing 

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your perspective with this subcommittee . 

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And thank you sir , for your many , 

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many years of service . You are only 

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the second ever chief of Space 

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Operations in a unique position to 

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leave your mark on what is still 

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essentially a brand new military 

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service , an opportunity like this 

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comes around less than once in a 

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generation . And I'm sure you feel the 

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gravity and the expectation of this 

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every single day . I look forward to 

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hearing more of your vision for this 

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newest service branch specifically how 

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you are forming it into a fighting 

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force that is ready to prosecute war as 

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part of the United States military . I 

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would also like to understand how you 

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are shaping the space acquisition 

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enterprise to that vision enabling the 

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joint force . Thank you , Mr Chairman 

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General Saltzman , 

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chairman King , ranking member Fisher , 

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distinguished member of the 

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subcommittee . Thank you for your 

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continued support for the opportunity 

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to discuss my vision and priorities for 

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the United States Space Force . I've 

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been listening , I've been in listening 

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mode since becoming the second chief of 

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Space Operations just four months ago . 

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One of my first phone calls as the CSO 

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was to the Commander of U S European 

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Command General . Casually my first 

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trip as the CSO was to Colorado Springs 

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to meet in person with the Commander of 

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U S Space Command General Dickinson . 

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My first overseas trip was to Hawaii 

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where I met with the commander of U S 

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Indo Pacific Command , Admiral Aquilino . 

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And during these last four months , I 

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have also prioritized visiting with 

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guardians performing vital missions 

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around the world for the Space Force , 

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for the joint force and for the nation 

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in December , I met in person with 

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military space chiefs from Australia , 

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Canada , France , Germany , New Zealand , 

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and the United Kingdom and all these 

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engagements . My goal was to better 

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understand how the space force should 

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focus its near and midterm efforts as 

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we integrate our capabilities to 

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address the threats and challenges . 

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The themes from these engagements 

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should surprise . No one . Each 

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combatant commander emphasized the 

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vital role space plays in strategic 

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competition and integrated deterrence . 

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The guardians of the space force make 

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this possible and are without a doubt , 

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the brightest and boldest America has 

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to offer because of these advantages 

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and our shared interest in the domain , 

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us allies and international partners 

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are eager for expanded collaboration 

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with the Space Force , especially in 

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areas that strengthen the effectiveness 

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of coalition space operations and 

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reinforce norms of responsible behavior . 

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In short . Our mission forces people 

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and partnerships make the space force 

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the most formidable space organization 

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on the planet China and Russia know 

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this and are accelerating their efforts 

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to undermine us advantages in the 

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domain To meet this challenge . The 

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space force will prioritize three lines 

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of effort . As Senator King has already 

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stated , fielding combat ready forces , 

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amplifying the guardian spirit and 

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partnering to win these lines of 

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efforts are designed to deliver the 

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forces , personnel and partnerships 

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required for the space force to 

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preserve us advantages in space . And 

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before I expand on the space force 

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lines of effort , I'd like to update 

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the subcommittee on the emerging 

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threats space forces face as the 

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handout I've provided indicates space 

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is undeniably a contested and congested 

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warfighting domain . When describing 

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space threats . It's important to 

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account for two kinds of threats . 

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First threats from space assets and 

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second threats to space assets , 

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threats from space present a growing 

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danger to the joint force . Both China 

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and Russia have robust space based 

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capabilities that allow them to find 

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target and attack U S military forces 

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on land at sea and in the air . Equally 

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alarming are the threats that endanger 

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the satellites . The nation relies on 

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for prosperity and security . Both 

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China and Russia continued to develop 

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field and deploy a range of weapons 

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aimed at us space capabilities . The 

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spectrum of threats to U S space 

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capabilities include cyber warfare 

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activities , electronic attack 

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platforms , directed energy lasers 

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designed to blind or damaged satellite 

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sensors , ground orbit missiles to 

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destroy satellites and space to space 

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orbital engagement systems that can 

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attack U S satellites in space . The 

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contested space domain shapes the 

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enduring purpose of the United States . 

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Space Force . Congress established the 

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Space force to protect U S interests in 

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space . This means protecting us space 

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capabilities and defending the joint 

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force and the nation from space enabled 

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attack . My lines of effort are 

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designed to achieve this vision by 

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providing the forces personnel and 

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partnerships required for the space 

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force to preserve us space superiority 

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for the foreseeable future . My first 

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priority is to build resilient ready 

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combat credible space forces to do this . 

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We are accelerating the pivot towards 

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resilient satellite constellations , 

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ground stations , networks and data 

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links . The space development agencies 

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proliferated . Warfighter space 

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architecture provides a prime example 

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of these efforts . We are also 

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emphasizing cybersecurity and preparing 

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guardians to detect and defeat cyber 

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attacks against our networks systems , 

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ground stations , data links and 

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satellites . We are developing an 

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operational test and training 

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infrastructure that will be the 

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backbone of Space force readiness as 

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guardians prepare for a high intensity 

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fight . This infrastructure will allow 

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guardians to execute realistic training 

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against simulated adversaries to 

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validate their tactics . Space training 

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and readiness command executed one such 

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exercise last September with its 

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inaugural Black Skies exercise focused 

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on space electromagnetic warfare . 

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Through these events , we are 

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continuously enhancing tactics and 

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operational concepts thereby creating a 

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force ready for emerging threats . My 

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second priority is to amplify the 

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guardian spirit by embracing a modern 

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talent management process that recruits 

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the best talent develops and retains an 

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elite workforce and empowers guardians 

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to succeed . One example is our 

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constructive service credit program 

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that allows experienced professionals 

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from key fields to directly 

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commissioned into the space force at 

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ranks appropriate to their civilian 

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experience . The first constructive 

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credit board served as a pilot program 

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in 2022 recruited seven cyber 

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professionals to become guardians , one 

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of which was on boarded as a lieutenant 

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colonel . The second board will 

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incorporate intelligence professionals 

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and assess 20 additional personnel over 

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the last year , we have also deployed 

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space centric curriculum for basic 

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military training , the Reserve officer 

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training corps and an officer training 

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school . In addition , our partnership 

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with the Johns Hopkins School of 

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Advanced International Studies for 

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professional military education begins 

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this summer with congressional support , 

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we will improve our modern talent 

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management system by integrating the 

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Air Force reserve space element into 

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the Space force as a single component . 

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This will allow guardians to transition 

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between full time and part time duty to 

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pursue opportunities outside of full 

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time military service and subsequently 

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return to full time duty without 

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barriers to reentry or detriment to 

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their career . We will ensure that such 

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experiences utilized in strict and and 

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careful compliance with federal 

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acquisition and ethics regulations and 

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appropriate conflict of interest 

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statutes . The single service personnel 

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management system will make retaining 

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highly qualified guardians easier by 

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facilitating flexible career paths and 

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we look forward to working with this 

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subcommittee on that important 

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initiative . My third and final 

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priority is to strengthen partnerships . 

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The Space force relies on to accomplish 

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its mission . The space force will 

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strive to eliminate barriers to 

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collaboration including over 

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classification so we can build enduring 

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00:10:33,580 --> 00:10:35,940
advantages with our partners to date . 

284
00:10:35,940 --> 00:10:38,290
Personnel from over 50 countries have 

285
00:10:38,290 --> 00:10:40,570
participated in training , education 

286
00:10:40,580 --> 00:10:42,880
and exercise events hosted by the space 

287
00:10:42,880 --> 00:10:45,140
force . We're also leveraging allies 

288
00:10:45,140 --> 00:10:47,362
and partners to expand our war fighting 

289
00:10:47,362 --> 00:10:49,418
capability . Recent examples include 

290
00:10:49,418 --> 00:10:51,720
deploying us payloads on Norwegian and 

291
00:10:51,720 --> 00:10:54,050
Japanese satellites And establishing a 

292
00:10:54,050 --> 00:10:55,828
partnership with Luxembourg for 

293
00:10:55,828 --> 00:10:58,250
satellite communications services . In 

294
00:10:58,250 --> 00:11:00,890
total , we have more than 200 foreign 

295
00:11:00,890 --> 00:11:03,390
military sales cases with over 60 

296
00:11:03,390 --> 00:11:05,710
countries for a broad spectrum of space 

297
00:11:05,710 --> 00:11:08,130
capabilities . Commercial partners will 

298
00:11:08,130 --> 00:11:09,741
be key as we pursue emerging 

299
00:11:09,741 --> 00:11:11,574
technologies like advanced power 

300
00:11:11,574 --> 00:11:13,610
promotion propulsion technologies , 

301
00:11:13,620 --> 00:11:15,620
artificial intelligence and machine 

302
00:11:15,620 --> 00:11:17,590
learning and in space , servicing 

303
00:11:17,590 --> 00:11:20,830
assembly and manufacturing space 

304
00:11:20,830 --> 00:11:22,960
systems commands commercial services 

305
00:11:22,960 --> 00:11:25,071
office is building these partnerships 

306
00:11:25,071 --> 00:11:27,293
to improve our ability to leverage more 

307
00:11:27,293 --> 00:11:29,516
commercial off the shelf capabilities . 

308
00:11:29,760 --> 00:11:31,730
In conclusion , thank you for the 

309
00:11:31,730 --> 00:11:33,841
opportunity to share these priorities 

310
00:11:33,841 --> 00:11:36,063
with you today . The Space Force is the 

311
00:11:36,063 --> 00:11:38,230
preeminent military Space Organization 

312
00:11:38,230 --> 00:11:40,397
in the world . Are adversaries seek to 

313
00:11:40,397 --> 00:11:42,619
surpass the United States and challenge 

314
00:11:42,619 --> 00:11:44,786
our advantage . We cannot and will not 

315
00:11:44,786 --> 00:11:46,841
allow this to happen . Are guardians 

316
00:11:46,841 --> 00:11:48,730
will outwork out innovate and out 

317
00:11:48,730 --> 00:11:50,730
compete . Our adversaries to ensure 

318
00:11:50,730 --> 00:11:52,452
that we succeed . They will do 

319
00:11:52,452 --> 00:11:54,563
everything they can to deter conflict 

320
00:11:54,563 --> 00:11:56,619
and maintain stability and space . I 

321
00:11:56,619 --> 00:11:58,341
very much look forward to your 

322
00:11:58,341 --> 00:12:00,508
questions . Thank you . Thank you very 

323
00:12:00,508 --> 00:12:02,980
much , General . I want to jump on the 

324
00:12:02,990 --> 00:12:05,157
comments you made about recruiting and 

325
00:12:05,157 --> 00:12:07,157
particularly bringing people in mid 

326
00:12:07,157 --> 00:12:09,101
career and having more flexibility 

327
00:12:09,101 --> 00:12:11,268
about leaving and coming back . That's 

328
00:12:11,268 --> 00:12:13,880
a , that's a creative idea . Flesh that 

329
00:12:13,880 --> 00:12:16,102
out a bit . For me . It strikes me that 

330
00:12:16,102 --> 00:12:18,269
that's really going to be necessary in 

331
00:12:18,269 --> 00:12:20,380
today's environment , particularly in 

332
00:12:20,380 --> 00:12:23,650
the technology field . Yes , sir . We 

333
00:12:23,650 --> 00:12:25,483
currently don't have the ability 

334
00:12:25,483 --> 00:12:27,650
because our reserves and the guard are 

335
00:12:27,650 --> 00:12:29,761
in the air Force , they're in the Air 

336
00:12:29,761 --> 00:12:31,706
Force Reserves in the Air National 

337
00:12:31,706 --> 00:12:33,928
Guard . So we don't have an option to , 

338
00:12:33,928 --> 00:12:36,039
if you leave full time active service 

339
00:12:36,039 --> 00:12:38,039
from the Space Force , we lose your 

340
00:12:38,039 --> 00:12:40,094
expertise . And so we're looking for 

341
00:12:40,094 --> 00:12:42,150
anything that can allow us to retain 

342
00:12:42,150 --> 00:12:42,130
those people who might have priorities 

343
00:12:42,140 --> 00:12:44,251
that shift , but are still willing to 

344
00:12:44,251 --> 00:12:46,418
contribute to the service . Do we need 

345
00:12:46,418 --> 00:12:49,440
a Space National Guard ? So I need the 

346
00:12:49,440 --> 00:12:51,607
capabilities that are currently in the 

347
00:12:51,607 --> 00:12:53,718
Air National Guard . I can assure you 

348
00:12:53,718 --> 00:12:55,829
of that . I think there's a couple of 

349
00:12:55,829 --> 00:12:58,162
different ways to do it . Um There's we , 

350
00:12:58,162 --> 00:12:59,996
we , we assessed three different 

351
00:12:59,996 --> 00:13:02,218
options . We could leave things as they 

352
00:13:02,218 --> 00:13:04,051
are , which I think is the worst 

353
00:13:04,051 --> 00:13:05,940
solution because as General Brown 

354
00:13:05,940 --> 00:13:07,884
points out as the Chief of the Air 

355
00:13:07,884 --> 00:13:09,920
Force , he doesn't have organized 

356
00:13:09,920 --> 00:13:12,031
trained and equipped responsibilities 

357
00:13:12,031 --> 00:13:14,142
for space missions , yet he has those 

358
00:13:14,142 --> 00:13:16,309
space capabilities in the Air National 

359
00:13:16,309 --> 00:13:18,531
Guard . So it creates a little bit of a 

360
00:13:18,531 --> 00:13:20,753
conundrum when I'm trying to figure out 

361
00:13:20,753 --> 00:13:20,690
how to train forces that are aligned 

362
00:13:20,690 --> 00:13:22,690
under the Air National Guard . So I 

363
00:13:22,690 --> 00:13:24,523
think the status quo is the most 

364
00:13:24,523 --> 00:13:26,468
untenable position , but there are 

365
00:13:26,468 --> 00:13:28,690
other options and we're going through a 

366
00:13:28,690 --> 00:13:30,857
series of cost estimates to figure out 

367
00:13:30,857 --> 00:13:32,968
what a preferred option might be . Is 

368
00:13:32,968 --> 00:13:35,079
one of them simply to sort of partner 

369
00:13:35,079 --> 00:13:37,134
with the Air National Guard and have 

370
00:13:37,134 --> 00:13:38,857
different units have different 

371
00:13:38,857 --> 00:13:40,579
functions . Is that one of the 

372
00:13:40,579 --> 00:13:42,579
possibilities rather than set up an 

373
00:13:42,579 --> 00:13:44,690
entirely new a a space National Guard 

374
00:13:44,690 --> 00:13:46,690
structure . Well , we are currently 

375
00:13:46,690 --> 00:13:48,857
partnered with the current status , so 

376
00:13:48,857 --> 00:13:51,079
we are currently partnered to make sure 

377
00:13:51,079 --> 00:13:53,134
we can rely on the capabilities that 

378
00:13:53,134 --> 00:13:55,357
are in the Air National Guard . It just 

379
00:13:55,357 --> 00:13:57,579
creates a long term sustainment problem 

380
00:13:57,579 --> 00:13:59,412
with the difference in organized 

381
00:13:59,412 --> 00:13:58,980
trained equipped responsibilities 

382
00:13:58,980 --> 00:14:00,980
between the Air Force and the Space 

383
00:14:00,980 --> 00:14:03,036
force . Me back up a minute again on 

384
00:14:03,036 --> 00:14:04,924
recruiting . How are you doing on 

385
00:14:04,924 --> 00:14:07,147
recruiting both in terms of quality and 

386
00:14:07,147 --> 00:14:09,258
quantity ? Some of your , some of our 

387
00:14:09,258 --> 00:14:09,110
other services are having real problems 

388
00:14:09,110 --> 00:14:11,332
with recruiting in this economy , house 

389
00:14:11,332 --> 00:14:13,640
Space Force doing . Yeah , I'm almost 

390
00:14:13,640 --> 00:14:15,862
embarrassed in front of my , appears to 

391
00:14:15,862 --> 00:14:18,084
say it , but we're doing very well . Uh 

392
00:14:18,084 --> 00:14:20,307
mostly associated with the fact that we 

393
00:14:20,307 --> 00:14:22,362
have much smaller numbers to recruit 

394
00:14:22,362 --> 00:14:24,584
and we have the ability to hand pick uh 

395
00:14:24,584 --> 00:14:26,807
those that decide they want to join the 

396
00:14:26,807 --> 00:14:29,029
space for us . So right now we're doing 

397
00:14:29,029 --> 00:14:30,751
okay . The problem is gonna be 

398
00:14:30,751 --> 00:14:32,973
sustainment over time in the quality of 

399
00:14:32,973 --> 00:14:35,140
the applicants that we can pull in and 

400
00:14:35,140 --> 00:14:37,307
then retaining them for long enough to 

401
00:14:37,307 --> 00:14:39,473
really benefit from their experience . 

402
00:14:39,473 --> 00:14:41,473
Um Turning to you mentioned several 

403
00:14:41,473 --> 00:14:43,529
times in your testimony , commercial 

404
00:14:43,529 --> 00:14:45,640
assets , commercial space assets . We 

405
00:14:45,640 --> 00:14:48,090
know that Russia is trying to jam or 

406
00:14:48,090 --> 00:14:50,201
otherwise damage the Starlink network 

407
00:14:50,210 --> 00:14:54,040
which is assisting in Ukraine is 

408
00:14:54,040 --> 00:14:57,460
that precedent making it more difficult 

409
00:14:57,460 --> 00:14:59,870
to partner with commercial satellite 

410
00:14:59,870 --> 00:15:01,700
users . One of the , one of the 

411
00:15:01,710 --> 00:15:04,260
strategies is proliferation and using , 

412
00:15:04,270 --> 00:15:07,910
using commercial satellites is that 

413
00:15:07,920 --> 00:15:10,350
our what's been the reaction to what's 

414
00:15:10,350 --> 00:15:12,628
been going on with Starlink in Ukraine ? 

415
00:15:12,628 --> 00:15:15,150
So commercial augmentation is important 

416
00:15:15,160 --> 00:15:17,216
to the Space force for the reasons . 

417
00:15:17,216 --> 00:15:18,716
You mentioned resiliency , 

418
00:15:18,716 --> 00:15:20,938
diversification of our portfolio across 

419
00:15:20,938 --> 00:15:23,049
a broader number of participants . If 

420
00:15:23,049 --> 00:15:25,510
you will um the 

421
00:15:26,280 --> 00:15:28,890
commercial augmentation Space Reserve , 

422
00:15:28,890 --> 00:15:31,150
we're trying to establish what is kind 

423
00:15:31,150 --> 00:15:33,206
of like a craft like if you know the 

424
00:15:33,206 --> 00:15:35,261
civilian reserve air fleet that uses 

425
00:15:35,261 --> 00:15:37,428
commercial capabilities were trying to 

426
00:15:37,428 --> 00:15:39,483
explore , we're exploring options to 

427
00:15:39,483 --> 00:15:41,483
use something along those lines . I 

428
00:15:41,483 --> 00:15:43,650
think the key with commercial industry 

429
00:15:43,650 --> 00:15:45,761
is to make sure that the expectations 

430
00:15:45,761 --> 00:15:47,817
are managed upfront . So we're going 

431
00:15:47,817 --> 00:15:50,039
through a series of plans , we're going 

432
00:15:50,039 --> 00:15:52,206
through a series of of industry days . 

433
00:15:52,206 --> 00:15:52,180
If you will to clarify , what are the 

434
00:15:52,180 --> 00:15:54,880
policy ? What are the contractual ? 

435
00:15:54,880 --> 00:15:57,240
What are the legal responsibilities and 

436
00:15:57,240 --> 00:15:59,407
hurdles that we have to clear in order 

437
00:15:59,407 --> 00:16:01,629
to establish this ? So the expectations 

438
00:16:01,629 --> 00:16:03,550
are clear across all spectrums of 

439
00:16:03,550 --> 00:16:05,772
conflict crisis , etcetera . So this is 

440
00:16:05,772 --> 00:16:09,605
an evolving Kind of uh capability . It 

441
00:16:09,605 --> 00:16:11,675
is , but I will tell you that we had 

442
00:16:11,675 --> 00:16:13,675
significant interest . We hosted an 

443
00:16:13,675 --> 00:16:15,619
industry day along these lines and 

444
00:16:15,619 --> 00:16:17,397
there were 84 participants from 

445
00:16:17,397 --> 00:16:19,453
commercial industry so that there is 

446
00:16:19,453 --> 00:16:21,564
interest in doing this . Now in my 45 

447
00:16:21,564 --> 00:16:23,508
seconds left , I'm gonna ask you a 

448
00:16:23,508 --> 00:16:25,508
question that I get asked at home . 

449
00:16:25,508 --> 00:16:25,235
What's the difference between space 

450
00:16:25,235 --> 00:16:28,215
force and space command ? I get asked 

451
00:16:28,215 --> 00:16:29,993
that at home too sometimes so I 

452
00:16:29,993 --> 00:16:32,160
appreciate it . It's as simple as any 

453
00:16:32,160 --> 00:16:34,104
of the combatant commands with the 

454
00:16:34,104 --> 00:16:36,216
other services . If you were to think 

455
00:16:36,216 --> 00:16:38,382
about us , Central Command and the U S 

456
00:16:38,382 --> 00:16:40,493
Air Force or Indo Pacific Command and 

457
00:16:40,493 --> 00:16:42,382
the U S Navy uh for the U S Space 

458
00:16:42,382 --> 00:16:44,604
Command and U S Space Force , we simply 

459
00:16:44,604 --> 00:16:46,827
have different responsibilities . Um As 

460
00:16:46,827 --> 00:16:48,827
the Chief of the Space Force , I've 

461
00:16:48,827 --> 00:16:50,938
responsibility organize , train equip 

462
00:16:50,938 --> 00:16:50,890
and operate the forces that are then 

463
00:16:50,890 --> 00:16:53,820
presented to us . Space Command who has 

464
00:16:53,820 --> 00:16:55,876
the authority from the president and 

465
00:16:55,876 --> 00:16:57,820
the Secretary of Defense to direct 

466
00:16:57,820 --> 00:17:00,020
those operations . So you're organized 

467
00:17:00,020 --> 00:17:03,130
training , equip . Space Command is , 

468
00:17:03,140 --> 00:17:05,820
is operate or fight . They have the 

469
00:17:05,820 --> 00:17:08,042
authority from the president to conduct 

470
00:17:08,042 --> 00:17:10,098
those missions and they would direct 

471
00:17:10,098 --> 00:17:11,820
our forces that are , that are 

472
00:17:11,820 --> 00:17:13,653
presented to them to conduct the 

473
00:17:13,653 --> 00:17:15,709
operations . Thank you . Thank you , 

474
00:17:15,709 --> 00:17:17,820
General Senator Fischer . Thank you , 

475
00:17:17,820 --> 00:17:19,820
Mr Chairman General as we discussed 

476
00:17:19,820 --> 00:17:21,920
last year , the next Gen O P I R 

477
00:17:21,930 --> 00:17:24,152
satellite program . It's one of the key 

478
00:17:24,152 --> 00:17:25,986
components of our future missile 

479
00:17:25,986 --> 00:17:27,810
warning architecture along with 

480
00:17:27,820 --> 00:17:30,510
proliferated constellations of smaller 

481
00:17:30,510 --> 00:17:32,490
satellites operating in the lower 

482
00:17:32,490 --> 00:17:34,950
orbits . Uh During your nomination 

483
00:17:34,950 --> 00:17:37,180
hearing , you stated that having no 

484
00:17:37,180 --> 00:17:39,280
gaps in coverage for missile warning 

485
00:17:39,280 --> 00:17:42,040
was a high priority . Uh The missile 

486
00:17:42,040 --> 00:17:45,450
warning mission is the cornerstone of 

487
00:17:45,450 --> 00:17:47,760
our strategic deterrent . You know , if 

488
00:17:47,760 --> 00:17:50,800
we can't effectively respond 

489
00:17:51,380 --> 00:17:55,340
if we can't detect when our adversaries 

490
00:17:55,340 --> 00:17:58,400
are launching nuclear weapons , um 

491
00:17:58,410 --> 00:18:01,770
We're in trouble and so it is very 

492
00:18:01,770 --> 00:18:05,320
important that we continued to fund 

493
00:18:05,330 --> 00:18:08,140
uh this next Gen O P I R . 

494
00:18:14,990 --> 00:18:17,320
I'm concerned to see that the space 

495
00:18:17,320 --> 00:18:21,100
force's fiscal year 2024 bequest 

496
00:18:21,110 --> 00:18:24,970
appears to propose cutting the third G 

497
00:18:24,970 --> 00:18:28,660
O next Gen O P I R satellite . Does the 

498
00:18:28,660 --> 00:18:30,820
space force intend to complete that 

499
00:18:30,820 --> 00:18:32,987
architecture as planned ? And if not , 

500
00:18:32,987 --> 00:18:35,264
how are you going to mitigate it ? Yes , 

501
00:18:35,264 --> 00:18:38,180
ma'am . Yes , ma'am . Thank you . The 

502
00:18:38,190 --> 00:18:40,600
real architecture that we need is the 

503
00:18:40,600 --> 00:18:43,990
one that is under that . Yes , 

504
00:18:44,540 --> 00:18:47,370
it is . Can you hear me ? So the the 

505
00:18:47,370 --> 00:18:49,592
architecture that we really need is one 

506
00:18:49,592 --> 00:18:51,926
that's survivable in a contested domain . 

507
00:18:51,926 --> 00:18:53,703
That's the proliferated leo and 

508
00:18:53,703 --> 00:18:55,926
multiple orbits to include middle earth 

509
00:18:55,926 --> 00:18:58,540
orbit orbits as well . Um So that's 

510
00:18:58,540 --> 00:19:00,760
what the Space Development Agency and 

511
00:19:00,760 --> 00:19:02,593
the swag analysis that we did is 

512
00:19:02,593 --> 00:19:04,649
progressing towards . And that's the 

513
00:19:04,649 --> 00:19:06,649
investment we made in fy 24 to make 

514
00:19:06,649 --> 00:19:09,220
that pivot because that's a pretty big 

515
00:19:09,220 --> 00:19:11,220
technical shift . We wanted to make 

516
00:19:11,220 --> 00:19:13,331
sure that we for this no fail mission 

517
00:19:13,331 --> 00:19:15,387
had some hedges to make sure that we 

518
00:19:15,387 --> 00:19:17,664
didn't miss anything . So next gen Opr , 

519
00:19:17,664 --> 00:19:19,664
we are committed to putting that on 

520
00:19:19,664 --> 00:19:21,870
orbit . Uh And we felt like a two by 

521
00:19:21,870 --> 00:19:24,870
two was sufficient to ensure one that 

522
00:19:24,870 --> 00:19:26,870
the mission did not have any gaps . 

523
00:19:26,870 --> 00:19:29,092
It's a no fail mission to that . It was 

524
00:19:29,092 --> 00:19:31,037
a hedge against any technical risk 

525
00:19:31,037 --> 00:19:33,400
associated with the pivot to the more 

526
00:19:33,400 --> 00:19:35,344
survivable missile warning missile 

527
00:19:35,344 --> 00:19:37,567
track architecture . You're saying that 

528
00:19:37,567 --> 00:19:40,620
um with this pivot to the to lower 

529
00:19:40,620 --> 00:19:44,160
orbits . Uh You have no plans then to 

530
00:19:44,160 --> 00:19:47,650
look at the GEO . Now we , we have the 

531
00:19:47,650 --> 00:19:50,900
plans with next Gen O P I R for two G O 

532
00:19:50,900 --> 00:19:53,122
and two he oh that constellation we are 

533
00:19:53,122 --> 00:19:55,178
still supporting in the fy 24 budget 

534
00:19:55,178 --> 00:19:57,240
has those four satellites in it . 

535
00:19:57,250 --> 00:19:59,380
That's the , that's the long term 

536
00:19:59,390 --> 00:20:02,380
transition to the proliferated missile 

537
00:20:02,380 --> 00:20:04,850
warning . But GEO satellites are too 

538
00:20:04,850 --> 00:20:07,090
much of a target . So having them in 

539
00:20:07,090 --> 00:20:09,312
lower than Middle Earth orbit creates a 

540
00:20:09,312 --> 00:20:11,257
targeting problem for an adversary 

541
00:20:11,257 --> 00:20:13,479
which actually lowers the threshold for 

542
00:20:13,479 --> 00:20:15,730
attack on orbit . It's more resilient 

543
00:20:15,730 --> 00:20:17,786
and it creates a level of deterrence 

544
00:20:17,786 --> 00:20:19,452
because they can't attack the 

545
00:20:19,452 --> 00:20:23,270
satellites . It seems like on the 

546
00:20:23,280 --> 00:20:25,730
major acquisition programs that are 

547
00:20:25,730 --> 00:20:29,650
executed by Space force have been late . 

548
00:20:29,660 --> 00:20:33,130
Um They have cost overruns or 

549
00:20:33,130 --> 00:20:35,530
both . Uh does the Space Force 

550
00:20:35,530 --> 00:20:39,440
acquisition community , I guess I 

551
00:20:39,440 --> 00:20:41,551
would say to you , how do you plan to 

552
00:20:41,551 --> 00:20:43,850
address that ? And do you agree with my 

553
00:20:43,850 --> 00:20:47,150
assessment ? Well , I've been doing in 

554
00:20:47,150 --> 00:20:49,261
this business a long time and so I've 

555
00:20:49,261 --> 00:20:51,261
certainly seen the same things that 

556
00:20:51,261 --> 00:20:53,428
you're noting there . So I can't argue 

557
00:20:53,428 --> 00:20:55,539
with the facts about cost overrunning 

558
00:20:55,539 --> 00:20:57,539
schedules . What I will say is I've 

559
00:20:57,539 --> 00:20:59,706
been very impressed with the way Frank 

560
00:20:59,706 --> 00:21:01,817
Calve Ellie has reorganized how we're 

561
00:21:01,817 --> 00:21:03,817
doing space acquisition uh with his 

562
00:21:03,817 --> 00:21:05,872
appointment as the undersecretary of 

563
00:21:05,872 --> 00:21:07,817
the Assistant Secretary of the Air 

564
00:21:07,817 --> 00:21:10,150
Force for space acquisition integration . 

565
00:21:10,150 --> 00:21:12,039
He's focused on several different 

566
00:21:12,039 --> 00:21:15,170
things . Buying small satellites having 

567
00:21:15,180 --> 00:21:18,310
shorter term contracts going with uh 

568
00:21:18,320 --> 00:21:20,620
well developed technology so that we 

569
00:21:20,620 --> 00:21:22,453
don't have as many non recurring 

570
00:21:22,453 --> 00:21:25,220
engineering costs . Uh And when you say 

571
00:21:25,230 --> 00:21:27,341
I'm sorry to interrupt you , but when 

572
00:21:27,341 --> 00:21:30,140
you say well developed technology , um 

573
00:21:30,150 --> 00:21:32,500
is that you want to make sure things 

574
00:21:32,500 --> 00:21:34,780
are proven . Would you say your risk 

575
00:21:34,780 --> 00:21:37,730
adverse ? Then I would say we want to 

576
00:21:37,730 --> 00:21:39,841
make sure before we commit to putting 

577
00:21:39,841 --> 00:21:41,952
something on orbit . If there is well 

578
00:21:41,952 --> 00:21:43,841
developed technology , we want to 

579
00:21:43,841 --> 00:21:45,619
leverage it to the max extent . 

580
00:21:45,619 --> 00:21:47,786
Otherwise you have to build everything 

581
00:21:47,786 --> 00:21:47,780
from scratch and it delays things and 

582
00:21:47,780 --> 00:21:49,947
there's there's requirement shifts and 

583
00:21:49,947 --> 00:21:51,947
it can get in that spiral where you 

584
00:21:51,947 --> 00:21:53,669
spend more money and delay the 

585
00:21:53,669 --> 00:21:55,613
timelines . So where there is well 

586
00:21:55,613 --> 00:21:55,610
developed technologies , we should take 

587
00:21:55,610 --> 00:21:57,610
advantage of those . And I think in 

588
00:21:57,610 --> 00:21:59,721
satellite production , that's exactly 

589
00:21:59,721 --> 00:22:02,850
where Mr Cavalese head is on that . And 

590
00:22:02,850 --> 00:22:05,320
so while again , I can't speak to all 

591
00:22:05,320 --> 00:22:07,960
the programs that have existed since 

592
00:22:07,960 --> 00:22:10,238
we've been putting satellites on orbit . 

593
00:22:10,238 --> 00:22:12,127
I can certainly tell you that the 

594
00:22:12,127 --> 00:22:14,293
acquisition community has shifted to a 

595
00:22:14,293 --> 00:22:16,404
different mindset for how it acquires 

596
00:22:16,404 --> 00:22:18,182
systems . And I think the space 

597
00:22:18,182 --> 00:22:20,016
development agencies acquisition 

598
00:22:20,016 --> 00:22:21,960
strategy for the missile warning , 

599
00:22:21,960 --> 00:22:23,738
missile tracking and space data 

600
00:22:23,738 --> 00:22:25,738
transport layer is an example where 

601
00:22:25,738 --> 00:22:27,738
it's going in about four years from 

602
00:22:27,738 --> 00:22:29,960
order to orbit , which is substantially 

603
00:22:29,960 --> 00:22:31,738
better than we've seen in other 

604
00:22:31,738 --> 00:22:35,690
programs . Now , I'd like to call 

605
00:22:35,690 --> 00:22:38,060
on our only subcommittee member who's 

606
00:22:38,060 --> 00:22:41,810
been in space . Senator Kelly , thank 

607
00:22:41,810 --> 00:22:45,150
you , Mr Chairman . Um I had a couple 

608
00:22:45,160 --> 00:22:46,938
detailed questions and then the 

609
00:22:46,938 --> 00:22:49,049
chairman asked both both of them . So 

610
00:22:49,049 --> 00:22:51,450
I'm gonna go a little bit different , 

611
00:22:52,820 --> 00:22:55,890
different approach here . So um 

612
00:22:56,680 --> 00:22:59,430
to the ranking members question , you 

613
00:22:59,440 --> 00:23:03,010
um talked about that . 

614
00:23:03,020 --> 00:23:05,570
Uh There's a little bit of a deterrent 

615
00:23:05,570 --> 00:23:08,260
by putting something at a lower orbit . 

616
00:23:08,270 --> 00:23:11,840
I think you said , why is , why is that , 

617
00:23:11,850 --> 00:23:15,400
why is , is it more likely 

618
00:23:16,020 --> 00:23:19,050
that an adversary goes , goes after 

619
00:23:19,050 --> 00:23:21,640
something at GEO than it is if they are 

620
00:23:21,640 --> 00:23:24,200
at a floor orbit , 

621
00:23:25,920 --> 00:23:27,753
if this sounds at all , like I'm 

622
00:23:27,753 --> 00:23:29,920
lecturing an astronaut , I promise I'm 

623
00:23:29,920 --> 00:23:32,170
not . So the , it's more than just the 

624
00:23:32,170 --> 00:23:34,710
orbital regime in low earth orbit to 

625
00:23:34,710 --> 00:23:36,932
provide the coverage , you have to have 

626
00:23:36,932 --> 00:23:39,410
a vastly greater number of satellites , 

627
00:23:39,420 --> 00:23:42,090
dozens instead of from GEO , you can 

628
00:23:42,090 --> 00:23:44,257
have a single orbit that would look at 

629
00:23:44,257 --> 00:23:46,450
a third of the earth . So by going to 

630
00:23:46,450 --> 00:23:48,394
the low earth orbit , we're buying 

631
00:23:48,394 --> 00:23:50,520
smaller satellites and more of more 

632
00:23:50,520 --> 00:23:52,840
satellites creates a tart , which one 

633
00:23:52,840 --> 00:23:54,784
do you want to shoot down that you 

634
00:23:54,784 --> 00:23:56,840
think is going to be the problem for 

635
00:23:56,840 --> 00:23:58,562
the mission . It's just , it's 

636
00:23:58,562 --> 00:24:00,673
proliferated . Leo so more they gotta 

637
00:24:00,673 --> 00:24:02,951
shoot , shoot more rounds , a lot more , 

638
00:24:02,951 --> 00:24:05,118
take out the capability . So much more 

639
00:24:05,118 --> 00:24:07,229
that I think the escalatory threshold 

640
00:24:07,229 --> 00:24:09,118
is raised to the point where they 

641
00:24:09,118 --> 00:24:08,580
probably wouldn't , wouldn't do it . 

642
00:24:08,680 --> 00:24:11,550
Okay . Okay . That's helpful general 

643
00:24:12,970 --> 00:24:16,490
of the N Roo Air Force Space Force 

644
00:24:16,490 --> 00:24:20,320
satellites . Um that we put into orbit . 

645
00:24:20,330 --> 00:24:23,870
Um What percentage of those is space 

646
00:24:23,870 --> 00:24:27,280
force responsible for the , you know , 

647
00:24:27,280 --> 00:24:29,430
the contracting , the the management 

648
00:24:29,430 --> 00:24:32,490
management of the , you know , the 

649
00:24:32,490 --> 00:24:34,630
operations to get these two , they're 

650
00:24:34,630 --> 00:24:38,190
targeted orbit compared to the N R 

651
00:24:38,190 --> 00:24:40,500
O . Well , yeah , like what percentage 

652
00:24:40,500 --> 00:24:43,950
do you have , sir ? I let me get back 

653
00:24:43,950 --> 00:24:46,930
to you with but the N R O N R O has a 

654
00:24:46,930 --> 00:24:48,763
number of constellations for its 

655
00:24:48,763 --> 00:24:51,050
mission set . We have , I'm trying to 

656
00:24:51,050 --> 00:24:53,272
think if there's any examples , we have 

657
00:24:53,272 --> 00:24:55,217
the vast majority of Department of 

658
00:24:55,217 --> 00:24:57,272
Defense satellites have now migrated 

659
00:24:57,272 --> 00:24:59,050
those missions . Not all of the 

660
00:24:59,050 --> 00:24:58,750
Department of Defense Defense 

661
00:24:58,750 --> 00:25:00,861
Satellites . I always hesitate to say 

662
00:25:00,861 --> 00:25:04,310
all . But um but I'm struggling to 

663
00:25:04,310 --> 00:25:07,060
think of an example and , and how many 

664
00:25:07,070 --> 00:25:10,270
launch providers do you have that you 

665
00:25:10,270 --> 00:25:12,550
contract with currently to get those 

666
00:25:12,550 --> 00:25:15,610
satellites into orbit to ? And those 

667
00:25:15,610 --> 00:25:19,610
are uh U L A and SpaceX and 

668
00:25:19,620 --> 00:25:21,731
actually for demos and other things , 

669
00:25:21,731 --> 00:25:24,940
we've contracted other uh providers as 

670
00:25:24,940 --> 00:25:26,996
well . I can get you the full number 

671
00:25:26,996 --> 00:25:30,700
and , and uh to date while you've been 

672
00:25:30,710 --> 00:25:32,877
involved with this . So we're seeing , 

673
00:25:32,877 --> 00:25:34,821
you know , typical kind of success 

674
00:25:34,821 --> 00:25:36,766
rates and safety records from both 

675
00:25:36,766 --> 00:25:39,840
companies and no 

676
00:25:39,840 --> 00:25:43,490
identifiable , you know , problems um 

677
00:25:44,470 --> 00:25:48,370
with that you , that you feel puts our 

678
00:25:48,380 --> 00:25:52,360
satellites at risk . I mean , it's been 

679
00:25:52,360 --> 00:25:55,420
a while since we've had an accident . I 

680
00:25:55,420 --> 00:25:57,587
mean , I saw one a long time ago and N 

681
00:25:57,587 --> 00:25:59,809
R O satellite actually that happened to 

682
00:25:59,809 --> 00:26:01,920
be down at the Kennedy Space Center . 

683
00:26:01,920 --> 00:26:01,790
Watch this thing blow up right after 

684
00:26:01,790 --> 00:26:04,360
liftoff was on console that happened in 

685
00:26:04,360 --> 00:26:06,304
California just walked out of crew 

686
00:26:06,304 --> 00:26:08,200
quarters . Saw this wasn't even 

687
00:26:08,200 --> 00:26:10,311
expecting it , saw this rocket launch 

688
00:26:10,311 --> 00:26:12,820
and then explode about 15 seconds later . 

689
00:26:13,210 --> 00:26:15,377
You never want to see . Yeah . So it's 

690
00:26:15,377 --> 00:26:17,543
great that we've , we've gotten better 

691
00:26:17,543 --> 00:26:20,220
at this and , you know , SpaceX has a , 

692
00:26:21,440 --> 00:26:23,718
I'd say a pretty remarkable , you know , 

693
00:26:23,718 --> 00:26:26,190
record of success . Um You L A as well , 

694
00:26:26,200 --> 00:26:28,200
we just need to keep that going . I 

695
00:26:28,200 --> 00:26:31,780
think it's important to be , um , you 

696
00:26:31,780 --> 00:26:33,891
know , just constantly trying to look 

697
00:26:33,891 --> 00:26:36,002
ahead and seeing what that next , you 

698
00:26:36,002 --> 00:26:38,058
know , failure mode is and make sure 

699
00:26:38,058 --> 00:26:40,169
you have the workforce that is really 

700
00:26:40,169 --> 00:26:42,280
tracking this stuff closely because , 

701
00:26:42,280 --> 00:26:44,447
you know , some of these assets are in 

702
00:26:44,447 --> 00:26:46,558
the billions , billions of dollars as 

703
00:26:46,558 --> 00:26:49,320
you know , general . So , um I've got 

704
00:26:49,320 --> 00:26:51,542
another question . Um well , actually I 

705
00:26:51,542 --> 00:26:53,709
do have about 50 seconds . So let me , 

706
00:26:53,709 --> 00:26:55,876
so space force has been around now for 

707
00:26:55,876 --> 00:26:59,800
a couple of years . Um I think maybe 

708
00:26:59,800 --> 00:27:01,800
three years that right , over three 

709
00:27:01,800 --> 00:27:03,960
years and some of the guardians 

710
00:27:03,960 --> 00:27:06,080
incurred about a two year commitment 

711
00:27:06,090 --> 00:27:08,140
when they transferred from the Air 

712
00:27:08,140 --> 00:27:11,620
Force or from another service . They're 

713
00:27:11,620 --> 00:27:14,310
coming up on the end of that time . Are 

714
00:27:14,310 --> 00:27:16,390
you seeing a good , you know , 

715
00:27:16,400 --> 00:27:18,960
reenlistment rate for the enlisted 

716
00:27:18,960 --> 00:27:21,016
ranks and officers that are going to 

717
00:27:21,016 --> 00:27:23,290
stay on ? I think the day the , the 

718
00:27:23,290 --> 00:27:25,457
final assessment is still out a little 

719
00:27:25,457 --> 00:27:27,623
bit because we wanna see , I wanna see 

720
00:27:27,623 --> 00:27:29,846
it all play out the full cycle play out 

721
00:27:29,846 --> 00:27:29,480
before I really commit to this . But 

722
00:27:29,490 --> 00:27:31,790
I'm encouraged so far and I think we're 

723
00:27:31,790 --> 00:27:33,901
providing the kind of challenges that 

724
00:27:33,901 --> 00:27:36,012
the workforce is looking for . And so 

725
00:27:36,012 --> 00:27:38,123
I'm still hopeful that we're gonna be 

726
00:27:38,123 --> 00:27:40,068
at good retention numbers , but we 

727
00:27:40,068 --> 00:27:42,179
probably need to let this full summer 

728
00:27:42,179 --> 00:27:44,401
cycle play out before we judge . Okay . 

729
00:27:44,401 --> 00:27:46,401
Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman 

730
00:27:46,401 --> 00:27:48,410
Senator Tuberville . Thank you , Mr 

731
00:27:48,410 --> 00:27:50,770
Chairman . Um You know , you've been in , 

732
00:27:50,780 --> 00:27:53,250
you've been in your position now . What ? 

733
00:27:53,260 --> 00:27:55,149
Less than a year , correct ? Four 

734
00:27:55,149 --> 00:27:58,140
months , four months , Give us your 

735
00:27:58,140 --> 00:28:01,830
number one priority for space force . I 

736
00:28:01,830 --> 00:28:03,886
need to make sure that the Guardians 

737
00:28:03,886 --> 00:28:05,886
are ready to meet the threat . I've 

738
00:28:05,886 --> 00:28:07,941
said this from day one , the systems 

739
00:28:07,941 --> 00:28:10,163
that were buying our exquisite . I want 

740
00:28:10,163 --> 00:28:12,219
to make sure that the guardians have 

741
00:28:12,219 --> 00:28:13,997
the training and the ability to 

742
00:28:13,997 --> 00:28:16,108
practice their trade , craft reps and 

743
00:28:16,108 --> 00:28:18,108
sets . I call it , we've got to get 

744
00:28:18,108 --> 00:28:20,274
those into the guardian's so that they 

745
00:28:20,274 --> 00:28:22,274
validate their tactics and they are 

746
00:28:22,274 --> 00:28:24,052
trained to meet any adversarial 

747
00:28:24,052 --> 00:28:26,108
challenge that's thrown at them . So 

748
00:28:26,108 --> 00:28:28,219
it's more training and people than it 

749
00:28:28,219 --> 00:28:29,941
is anything . There's a lot of 

750
00:28:29,941 --> 00:28:32,163
challenges . That's what I'm focused on 

751
00:28:32,163 --> 00:28:31,920
right now because I think it was the 

752
00:28:31,920 --> 00:28:34,800
biggest gap from converting . I like to 

753
00:28:34,800 --> 00:28:36,856
use the example that we're trying to 

754
00:28:36,856 --> 00:28:38,856
turn a merchant marine into the U S 

755
00:28:38,856 --> 00:28:41,450
Navy right , we , we have to convert 

756
00:28:41,460 --> 00:28:43,571
this uh space force that we had for a 

757
00:28:43,571 --> 00:28:45,516
benign environment into one that's 

758
00:28:45,516 --> 00:28:47,682
contesting the domain . Is this a slow 

759
00:28:47,682 --> 00:28:50,730
process ? Uh Sometimes it's slower than 

760
00:28:50,730 --> 00:28:53,320
I'd like , but I like our progress . Uh 

761
00:28:53,330 --> 00:28:55,497
So I need to buy them the simulators , 

762
00:28:55,497 --> 00:28:57,663
the virtual ranges that takes a little 

763
00:28:57,663 --> 00:28:59,441
bit of time . But we're already 

764
00:28:59,441 --> 00:29:01,552
building a new force generation model 

765
00:29:01,552 --> 00:29:03,663
so that we've , we've established the 

766
00:29:03,663 --> 00:29:05,441
time to do the training , we've 

767
00:29:05,441 --> 00:29:05,390
established the new training 

768
00:29:05,390 --> 00:29:07,446
requirements and now we just have to 

769
00:29:07,446 --> 00:29:11,100
get after it . So space com has an RDT 

770
00:29:11,100 --> 00:29:14,640
and e budget of 19.2 billion And a 

771
00:29:14,640 --> 00:29:17,260
proposed procurement budget of only 4.7 

772
00:29:17,260 --> 00:29:18,927
billion . What's driving that 

773
00:29:18,927 --> 00:29:21,280
difference ? And uh you see that change 

774
00:29:21,280 --> 00:29:23,391
in the next few years , sir , this is 

775
00:29:23,391 --> 00:29:25,730
just , this is the way the space force 

776
00:29:25,740 --> 00:29:27,907
has to do its business because so much 

777
00:29:27,907 --> 00:29:30,360
of our effort is spent in developing 

778
00:29:30,580 --> 00:29:32,636
the satellites . And we don't have a 

779
00:29:32,636 --> 00:29:34,802
lot of , we don't have to put a lot of 

780
00:29:34,802 --> 00:29:36,969
satellites on orbit traditionally . So 

781
00:29:36,969 --> 00:29:39,136
there's less procurement than there is 

782
00:29:39,136 --> 00:29:41,302
R D T and E . And so I think it's just 

783
00:29:41,302 --> 00:29:43,413
the nature of the space business that 

784
00:29:43,413 --> 00:29:45,524
we are front loaded a little bit in , 

785
00:29:45,524 --> 00:29:47,691
in terms of procurement to R D T and E 

786
00:29:47,691 --> 00:29:49,858
balance relative to what you might see 

787
00:29:49,858 --> 00:29:51,969
in some of the other services that by 

788
00:29:51,969 --> 00:29:53,969
so many versions of that thing that 

789
00:29:53,969 --> 00:29:55,969
they do R D T and E for fighters or 

790
00:29:55,969 --> 00:29:58,191
tanks or the like . And so even when we 

791
00:29:58,191 --> 00:30:00,247
go to a proliferated constellation , 

792
00:30:00,247 --> 00:30:02,247
our numbers will be so much smaller 

793
00:30:02,247 --> 00:30:04,247
than , than what the other services 

794
00:30:04,247 --> 00:30:06,247
have to buy . Yeah , in your mind , 

795
00:30:06,247 --> 00:30:08,413
what cybersecurity standards , minimum 

796
00:30:08,413 --> 00:30:10,524
do you think new commercial satellite 

797
00:30:10,524 --> 00:30:12,830
should have ? Uh I'm worried about the 

798
00:30:12,830 --> 00:30:15,930
ground infrastructure uh and how and 

799
00:30:15,930 --> 00:30:17,930
how the links are protected to make 

800
00:30:17,930 --> 00:30:19,819
sure that we have access to those 

801
00:30:19,819 --> 00:30:22,041
capabilities that are put on orbit . So 

802
00:30:22,041 --> 00:30:24,263
in , in commercial terms , I'm a little 

803
00:30:24,263 --> 00:30:26,374
less worried about the on orbit cyber 

804
00:30:26,374 --> 00:30:28,430
protections as , as much as I am the 

805
00:30:28,430 --> 00:30:30,374
ground network . And I think those 

806
00:30:30,374 --> 00:30:32,374
cyber protection standards are well 

807
00:30:32,374 --> 00:30:34,097
understood and we can hold the 

808
00:30:34,097 --> 00:30:36,152
commercial providers accountable for 

809
00:30:36,152 --> 00:30:39,170
putting cyber uh defense capabilities 

810
00:30:39,180 --> 00:30:42,380
onto the ground networks . I've had 

811
00:30:42,380 --> 00:30:46,190
several private companies 

812
00:30:46,190 --> 00:30:48,246
come by my office saying they have a 

813
00:30:48,246 --> 00:30:50,730
great idea how to take space debris 

814
00:30:51,840 --> 00:30:55,090
down . Have you talked to quite a few 

815
00:30:55,090 --> 00:30:58,430
of those ? I have , what do you 

816
00:30:58,430 --> 00:31:01,760
think ? I think ? Well , we privatize 

817
00:31:01,760 --> 00:31:05,130
it in the , at the end of the day . I 

818
00:31:05,130 --> 00:31:07,241
think there's a lot of different ways 

819
00:31:07,241 --> 00:31:09,297
to go after that sort of problem . I 

820
00:31:09,297 --> 00:31:10,908
haven't seen uh demonstrated 

821
00:31:10,908 --> 00:31:13,130
capabilities and I'm always thinking in 

822
00:31:13,130 --> 00:31:15,352
terms of , you know , it's one thing to 

823
00:31:15,352 --> 00:31:17,186
have a pitch that says we can do 

824
00:31:17,186 --> 00:31:19,130
something that's another to have a 

825
00:31:19,130 --> 00:31:21,186
demonstrated capability . Um I'll be 

826
00:31:21,186 --> 00:31:23,241
honest , we do a lot of , of serious 

827
00:31:23,241 --> 00:31:25,463
effort making sure we understand what's 

828
00:31:25,463 --> 00:31:27,463
on orbit and preventing debris from 

829
00:31:27,463 --> 00:31:29,630
hitting each other or , or things that 

830
00:31:29,630 --> 00:31:31,741
we care about right now . I would say 

831
00:31:31,741 --> 00:31:33,797
this isn't my number one challenge . 

832
00:31:33,797 --> 00:31:35,797
But if somebody feels like they can 

833
00:31:35,797 --> 00:31:37,963
demonstrate a capability , cleaning up 

834
00:31:37,963 --> 00:31:40,130
debris is , is an important concept as 

835
00:31:40,130 --> 00:31:42,352
well . It's gonna get worse and worse . 

836
00:31:42,352 --> 00:31:44,574
Right . It's not gonna , it's not gonna 

837
00:31:44,574 --> 00:31:46,610
clean itself up . A lot of people 

838
00:31:46,610 --> 00:31:48,777
believe that conflict with China could 

839
00:31:48,777 --> 00:31:50,888
very well start in space . What might 

840
00:31:50,888 --> 00:31:54,830
that look like ? One day the , 

841
00:31:54,840 --> 00:31:56,840
the Chinese and the Russians have , 

842
00:31:56,840 --> 00:31:59,062
have gone to school on us over the last 

843
00:31:59,062 --> 00:32:01,284
20 years and they know that we've built 

844
00:32:01,284 --> 00:32:03,284
a joint force structure that relies 

845
00:32:03,284 --> 00:32:05,340
heavily on the assumption that space 

846
00:32:05,340 --> 00:32:07,396
capabilities will be there . Whether 

847
00:32:07,396 --> 00:32:09,673
it's a precision navigation and timing , 

848
00:32:09,673 --> 00:32:11,896
whether it's satellite communications , 

849
00:32:11,896 --> 00:32:14,007
the missile warning that we , we rely 

850
00:32:14,007 --> 00:32:16,173
on and the intelligence , surveillance 

851
00:32:16,173 --> 00:32:18,284
and reconnaissance , persistence that 

852
00:32:18,284 --> 00:32:20,451
we have with space capabilities , they 

853
00:32:20,451 --> 00:32:22,562
know we rely on that . And so if they 

854
00:32:22,562 --> 00:32:24,618
can blind us , if they can interfere 

855
00:32:24,618 --> 00:32:26,840
with those capabilities or God forbid , 

856
00:32:26,840 --> 00:32:28,840
destroy them completely , they know 

857
00:32:28,840 --> 00:32:31,007
that that will diminish our advantages 

858
00:32:31,007 --> 00:32:33,229
and , and put the joint force at risk . 

859
00:32:33,229 --> 00:32:35,396
Uh So I can see , interfering with , I 

860
00:32:35,396 --> 00:32:37,700
can see blinding , I can see some of 

861
00:32:37,700 --> 00:32:40,450
those gray area kinds of attacks on our 

862
00:32:40,450 --> 00:32:42,506
capabilities to try to put us behind 

863
00:32:42,506 --> 00:32:45,020
the eight ball . That balloon wasn't in 

864
00:32:45,020 --> 00:32:47,530
your purview , was it ? No , sir . 

865
00:32:47,810 --> 00:32:50,500
60,000 ft when they call it near space , 

866
00:32:50,500 --> 00:32:52,278
but I like to call it far air . 

867
00:32:57,470 --> 00:33:00,480
Thank you , Senator Rosen . 

868
00:33:01,930 --> 00:33:04,260
Well , thank you , Chairman King and 

869
00:33:04,270 --> 00:33:06,980
ranking member Fisher . Uh Good to be 

870
00:33:06,980 --> 00:33:09,370
here today and holding this hearing and 

871
00:33:09,370 --> 00:33:11,620
General Saltzman . Thank you so much 

872
00:33:11,630 --> 00:33:14,130
for everything you're doing and I know 

873
00:33:14,130 --> 00:33:16,470
everyone's been talking about workforce 

874
00:33:16,470 --> 00:33:18,192
is key . We need a pipeline of 

875
00:33:18,192 --> 00:33:20,350
qualified individuals . Um going 

876
00:33:20,350 --> 00:33:22,350
forward , you're just young , three 

877
00:33:22,350 --> 00:33:24,610
years old trying to get this workforce 

878
00:33:24,610 --> 00:33:26,832
and especially like you said , research 

879
00:33:26,832 --> 00:33:30,620
and development critical um to protect 

880
00:33:30,620 --> 00:33:32,731
our country and our families from the 

881
00:33:32,731 --> 00:33:34,731
threat we feel from space . So stem 

882
00:33:34,731 --> 00:33:36,953
education , I talk about an awful lot , 

883
00:33:36,953 --> 00:33:39,120
but I really believe that investing in 

884
00:33:39,120 --> 00:33:41,120
stem education is just essential to 

885
00:33:41,120 --> 00:33:43,120
matching our adversaries increasing 

886
00:33:43,120 --> 00:33:45,342
capabilities as you have alluded to and 

887
00:33:45,342 --> 00:33:47,564
also to addressing all of our tech work 

888
00:33:47,564 --> 00:33:49,787
force shortages . So General Saltzman , 

889
00:33:49,787 --> 00:33:51,787
during your confirmation hearing in 

890
00:33:51,787 --> 00:33:53,953
September , you highlighted that space 

891
00:33:53,953 --> 00:33:55,898
force has established a university 

892
00:33:55,898 --> 00:33:57,898
partnership program partnering with 

893
00:33:57,898 --> 00:33:59,842
universities across the country to 

894
00:33:59,842 --> 00:34:01,842
provide stem students with research 

895
00:34:01,842 --> 00:34:03,898
opportunities and increased guardian 

896
00:34:03,898 --> 00:34:06,750
retention . And so how is space force 

897
00:34:06,750 --> 00:34:08,750
growth and retention benefited from 

898
00:34:08,750 --> 00:34:10,806
this program ? I'm really excited to 

899
00:34:10,806 --> 00:34:13,139
hear about that . And what can Congress ? 

900
00:34:13,139 --> 00:34:15,250
What can we do better to support this 

901
00:34:15,250 --> 00:34:17,361
program specifically ? And maybe some 

902
00:34:17,361 --> 00:34:19,306
national security folks focus stem 

903
00:34:19,306 --> 00:34:21,194
education initiatives at American 

904
00:34:21,194 --> 00:34:25,130
Universities uh Generally . Thank you 

905
00:34:25,130 --> 00:34:27,297
for that because any opportunity I get 

906
00:34:27,297 --> 00:34:29,408
to talk about how great our guardians 

907
00:34:29,408 --> 00:34:31,630
are I'll take full advantage of it . Um 

908
00:34:31,630 --> 00:34:33,797
you would be really impressed with the 

909
00:34:33,797 --> 00:34:35,963
quality of the people that are joining 

910
00:34:35,963 --> 00:34:38,186
the space force . Um the average age of 

911
00:34:38,186 --> 00:34:40,450
our enlists are enlisted , uh members 

912
00:34:40,460 --> 00:34:43,330
is 22 . That's a relatively high number 

913
00:34:43,330 --> 00:34:45,441
relative , you know , considering the 

914
00:34:45,441 --> 00:34:47,663
other services , uh we have an educated 

915
00:34:47,663 --> 00:34:49,910
workforce , very educated . Uh We , we 

916
00:34:49,910 --> 00:34:51,910
have the luxury of hand picking the 

917
00:34:51,910 --> 00:34:54,132
best and brightest of a large applicant 

918
00:34:54,132 --> 00:34:56,243
applicant pool that wants to join the 

919
00:34:56,243 --> 00:34:58,132
Space Force . And so we're really 

920
00:34:58,132 --> 00:35:00,188
benefiting one from the fact that we 

921
00:35:00,188 --> 00:35:02,299
are kind of small and we can take the 

922
00:35:02,299 --> 00:35:04,243
cream of the crop if you will . Uh 

923
00:35:04,243 --> 00:35:06,243
we're looking for diversity , we're 

924
00:35:06,243 --> 00:35:08,466
looking for high quality stem education 

925
00:35:08,466 --> 00:35:10,688
and , and going to the areas that maybe 

926
00:35:10,688 --> 00:35:12,910
you don't have a chance to uh to get to 

927
00:35:12,910 --> 00:35:15,420
uh in some of the other services . Uh 

928
00:35:15,430 --> 00:35:17,500
remarkable set of opportunities that 

929
00:35:17,500 --> 00:35:19,500
we've taken full advantage of every 

930
00:35:19,500 --> 00:35:21,611
time I go out in the field , I'm just 

931
00:35:21,611 --> 00:35:23,333
impressed with the quality and 

932
00:35:23,333 --> 00:35:25,389
capabilities of the guardians that I 

933
00:35:25,389 --> 00:35:27,333
see doing the job . We should help 

934
00:35:27,333 --> 00:35:29,444
expand these programs to make , it'll 

935
00:35:29,444 --> 00:35:31,611
make your job a little better . Well , 

936
00:35:31,611 --> 00:35:33,611
as long as you expand the number of 

937
00:35:33,611 --> 00:35:35,944
people that helped me select , you know , 

938
00:35:35,944 --> 00:35:39,300
so I think there were 42,000 hits of 

939
00:35:39,310 --> 00:35:41,421
interest to join the space for us and 

940
00:35:41,421 --> 00:35:43,710
we have about 1000 slots . So calling 

941
00:35:43,710 --> 00:35:45,932
that down to who's eligible , who can , 

942
00:35:45,932 --> 00:35:48,154
who can meet the requirements and , you 

943
00:35:48,154 --> 00:35:50,210
know , there's a lot of effort there 

944
00:35:50,210 --> 00:35:52,266
too . So I'm real happy with the way 

945
00:35:52,266 --> 00:35:54,488
the recruiting team has done . I'm real 

946
00:35:54,488 --> 00:35:54,390
happy with the standards that we've 

947
00:35:54,390 --> 00:35:56,223
said , I'm really happy with the 

948
00:35:56,223 --> 00:35:58,390
quality of Guardians were getting in . 

949
00:35:58,390 --> 00:36:00,557
That's great because , um , as Senator 

950
00:36:00,557 --> 00:36:02,668
Tuberville talked about cyber attacks 

951
00:36:02,668 --> 00:36:04,779
in space and so we're fighting Domain 

952
00:36:04,779 --> 00:36:08,130
and , and , uh , cyber is really 

953
00:36:08,140 --> 00:36:11,320
probably , uh more effective there or 

954
00:36:11,320 --> 00:36:13,209
as effective there as it would be 

955
00:36:13,209 --> 00:36:16,020
anywhere else . And uh last week , we 

956
00:36:16,020 --> 00:36:18,290
discussed with General Dickinson during 

957
00:36:18,290 --> 00:36:20,400
Space Command's posture hearing that 

958
00:36:20,410 --> 00:36:22,740
both Russia and China are developing , 

959
00:36:22,740 --> 00:36:24,820
rapidly investing in developing and 

960
00:36:24,820 --> 00:36:27,870
fielding these technologies that will 

961
00:36:27,880 --> 00:36:30,430
provide timely and uh that will 

962
00:36:30,430 --> 00:36:32,780
threaten us . And so we need to be sure 

963
00:36:32,780 --> 00:36:34,780
that we're stopping that . So these 

964
00:36:34,780 --> 00:36:36,891
sophisticated cyber attacks are going 

965
00:36:36,891 --> 00:36:39,169
to include the threat of stealing data , 

966
00:36:39,169 --> 00:36:41,169
jamming satellite signals , hacking 

967
00:36:41,169 --> 00:36:43,002
satellites , disrupting internet 

968
00:36:43,002 --> 00:36:45,002
services . I know the proliferation 

969
00:36:45,002 --> 00:36:47,169
concept is really good because there's 

970
00:36:47,169 --> 00:36:49,113
just so many it makes it not worth 

971
00:36:49,113 --> 00:36:51,058
their while . Uh so that resilient 

972
00:36:51,058 --> 00:36:53,113
space architecture , particularly in 

973
00:36:53,113 --> 00:36:55,169
low earth orbit as you've alluded to 

974
00:36:55,169 --> 00:36:57,224
really important . And so what other 

975
00:36:57,224 --> 00:36:59,224
kinds of things besides um what you 

976
00:36:59,224 --> 00:37:01,391
mentioned to Senator Kelly and Senator 

977
00:37:01,391 --> 00:37:03,580
Tub Tub er Ville , um how are you 

978
00:37:03,580 --> 00:37:05,747
keeping our most advanced space assets 

979
00:37:05,747 --> 00:37:07,969
safe from cyber attacks by Russia China 

980
00:37:07,969 --> 00:37:09,747
and others and increasing their 

981
00:37:09,747 --> 00:37:11,691
resiliency ? I like I like to talk 

982
00:37:11,691 --> 00:37:13,802
about two particular areas that we're 

983
00:37:13,802 --> 00:37:15,524
doing first is I want to avoid 

984
00:37:15,524 --> 00:37:17,691
operational surprise . That's , that's 

985
00:37:17,691 --> 00:37:20,480
a tenant in my maybe theory of success 

986
00:37:20,480 --> 00:37:22,369
if you will for the space force's 

987
00:37:22,369 --> 00:37:25,010
primary missions and by um avoiding 

988
00:37:25,010 --> 00:37:27,232
operational surprise , what I mean is , 

989
00:37:27,232 --> 00:37:29,399
do we have all the sensors and all the 

990
00:37:29,399 --> 00:37:31,510
right places to see what's going on ? 

991
00:37:31,510 --> 00:37:34,060
And that's cyber and space ? Um Do we , 

992
00:37:34,060 --> 00:37:36,380
do we recognize hostile activities , 

993
00:37:36,380 --> 00:37:38,491
aggressive activities , irresponsible 

994
00:37:38,491 --> 00:37:40,547
activities , the minute they occur , 

995
00:37:40,547 --> 00:37:42,880
can we attribute them to the bad actors ? 

996
00:37:42,880 --> 00:37:44,658
That's the kind of avoidance of 

997
00:37:44,658 --> 00:37:46,769
operational surprise that I'm talking 

998
00:37:46,769 --> 00:37:48,936
about . And then secondly , we have to 

999
00:37:48,936 --> 00:37:51,269
establish norms of responsible behavior . 

1000
00:37:51,269 --> 00:37:51,160
What are the norms of behavior that are 

1001
00:37:51,160 --> 00:37:54,060
acceptable ? Uh And , and developing a 

1002
00:37:54,060 --> 00:37:56,300
coalition of like minded space nations 

1003
00:37:56,300 --> 00:37:58,850
that supports those norms of behavior 

1004
00:37:58,850 --> 00:38:01,072
is a powerful motivator to do the right 

1005
00:38:01,072 --> 00:38:02,961
things and call out irresponsible 

1006
00:38:02,961 --> 00:38:05,420
behavior . All of that I think protects 

1007
00:38:05,420 --> 00:38:08,010
our capable . That's great . I know my 

1008
00:38:08,010 --> 00:38:10,190
time's up but my next question was on 

1009
00:38:10,190 --> 00:38:12,412
international partnerships and how this 

1010
00:38:12,412 --> 00:38:14,523
potential rates that will take it off 

1011
00:38:14,523 --> 00:38:16,246
the record , this hunt forward 

1012
00:38:16,246 --> 00:38:18,023
operations to avoid operational 

1013
00:38:18,023 --> 00:38:20,134
surprise with our allies and partners 

1014
00:38:20,134 --> 00:38:22,190
around the globe . Uh We will submit 

1015
00:38:22,190 --> 00:38:24,134
that for the record , but you were 

1016
00:38:24,134 --> 00:38:26,246
leading me right there . So thank you 

1017
00:38:26,246 --> 00:38:28,400
very much . I yield back general . 

1018
00:38:28,400 --> 00:38:30,622
There's one member of this subcommittee 

1019
00:38:30,622 --> 00:38:32,733
who probably had more than more to do 

1020
00:38:32,733 --> 00:38:35,620
with the founding of the Space Force 

1021
00:38:35,630 --> 00:38:38,410
vote early and vocal supporter and that 

1022
00:38:38,410 --> 00:38:41,210
Senator Cramer Senator Cramer . Thank 

1023
00:38:41,210 --> 00:38:44,030
you , Mr Chairman , ranking member and 

1024
00:38:44,040 --> 00:38:46,490
general . Good to see you again . Um I 

1025
00:38:46,490 --> 00:38:49,230
don't think you were lecturing , uh , 

1026
00:38:49,240 --> 00:38:51,462
Senator Kelly at all . He asked you the 

1027
00:38:51,462 --> 00:38:53,351
easiest question he could and you 

1028
00:38:53,351 --> 00:38:55,351
answered it brilliantly and I think 

1029
00:38:55,351 --> 00:38:58,340
that the issue of redundancy as a tool , 

1030
00:38:58,340 --> 00:39:00,507
that sort of answers , Senator Rosen's 

1031
00:39:00,507 --> 00:39:02,507
question in terms of how you secure 

1032
00:39:02,507 --> 00:39:04,840
them as well as how well they work as a , 

1033
00:39:04,840 --> 00:39:07,062
as a kill web if you will versus a kill 

1034
00:39:07,062 --> 00:39:09,396
chain . So , um I didn't think you were , 

1035
00:39:09,396 --> 00:39:11,618
I thought it was , it was brilliant . I 

1036
00:39:11,618 --> 00:39:13,729
also think you're too humble . You're 

1037
00:39:13,729 --> 00:39:15,673
you brag about the guardians , but 

1038
00:39:15,673 --> 00:39:17,784
let's face it . You're , you're , you 

1039
00:39:17,784 --> 00:39:19,840
seem to be the employer of choice in 

1040
00:39:19,840 --> 00:39:19,680
the service . You , you have that 

1041
00:39:19,680 --> 00:39:21,847
luxury and it's because I think of the 

1042
00:39:21,847 --> 00:39:23,958
mission , I think because it's , it's 

1043
00:39:23,958 --> 00:39:26,124
an important mission that particularly 

1044
00:39:26,124 --> 00:39:28,230
younger people realize and , and 

1045
00:39:28,230 --> 00:39:30,460
they're attracted to it and it gets to 

1046
00:39:30,460 --> 00:39:32,682
stretch them . And so my hope Jackie is 

1047
00:39:32,682 --> 00:39:34,738
that the Air Force , the , the space 

1048
00:39:34,738 --> 00:39:36,238
force is so cool . It just 

1049
00:39:36,238 --> 00:39:38,016
automatically creates more stem 

1050
00:39:38,016 --> 00:39:40,016
students because they all want to , 

1051
00:39:40,016 --> 00:39:42,071
they all want to be part of the next 

1052
00:39:42,071 --> 00:39:44,238
big thing . Um I want to get into some 

1053
00:39:44,238 --> 00:39:46,460
issue , you know , Senator Fisher asked 

1054
00:39:46,460 --> 00:39:49,080
you about um the gap issue with , with 

1055
00:39:49,080 --> 00:39:51,302
regard to eyes in the sky and whatnot . 

1056
00:39:51,302 --> 00:39:53,413
We , we did see a little bit of a gap 

1057
00:39:53,413 --> 00:39:55,469
in , in defense when we learned that 

1058
00:39:55,469 --> 00:39:57,524
our radars couldn't see everything , 

1059
00:39:57,524 --> 00:39:59,469
they could only see what they were 

1060
00:39:59,469 --> 00:40:01,413
tuned to c and so in terms of like 

1061
00:40:01,413 --> 00:40:03,469
parks radar as an example and we see 

1062
00:40:03,469 --> 00:40:05,524
some money coming for , for that , I 

1063
00:40:05,524 --> 00:40:07,524
would presume that means it will be 

1064
00:40:07,524 --> 00:40:09,636
upgraded , it'll be modernized as you 

1065
00:40:09,636 --> 00:40:11,747
know , it's a high priority for , for 

1066
00:40:11,747 --> 00:40:13,691
me , since we have one that's that 

1067
00:40:13,691 --> 00:40:15,636
you're the landlord of up in North 

1068
00:40:15,636 --> 00:40:17,747
Dakota , maybe , maybe speak a little 

1069
00:40:17,747 --> 00:40:19,969
bit too to the role of the park's radar 

1070
00:40:19,969 --> 00:40:22,024
and modernization and , and how that 

1071
00:40:22,024 --> 00:40:24,247
will help you and the other , the joint 

1072
00:40:24,247 --> 00:40:26,302
force in terms of particularly early 

1073
00:40:26,302 --> 00:40:28,524
warning . Well , it's a two part answer 

1074
00:40:28,524 --> 00:40:31,020
because , you know , um I don't wanna 

1075
00:40:31,020 --> 00:40:34,230
be too distracted by the balloon um 

1076
00:40:34,240 --> 00:40:37,090
issue because that's not where those 

1077
00:40:37,090 --> 00:40:40,620
radars are looking . Um It's , uh you 

1078
00:40:40,620 --> 00:40:42,731
could , you could easily build radars 

1079
00:40:42,731 --> 00:40:44,676
that would look in that area , but 

1080
00:40:44,676 --> 00:40:46,731
that's not our mission . The mission 

1081
00:40:46,731 --> 00:40:46,680
that's being done North Dakota and the 

1082
00:40:46,680 --> 00:40:49,440
other ground based radars is to fold 

1083
00:40:49,450 --> 00:40:51,339
its missile warning and its space 

1084
00:40:51,339 --> 00:40:54,150
surveillance uh primarily and , and 

1085
00:40:54,150 --> 00:40:56,372
those radars are really good at those , 

1086
00:40:56,372 --> 00:40:59,270
those jobs . Uh So the real , the real 

1087
00:40:59,270 --> 00:41:02,450
challenge is how do I go to a 

1088
00:41:02,460 --> 00:41:05,090
rapid assessment and decision quality 

1089
00:41:05,090 --> 00:41:07,034
information of the data that those 

1090
00:41:07,034 --> 00:41:09,450
radars are pulling in ? And so that's , 

1091
00:41:09,450 --> 00:41:11,561
that's my responsibility is to figure 

1092
00:41:11,561 --> 00:41:13,783
out how to take all that massive amount 

1093
00:41:13,783 --> 00:41:15,783
of data in and quickly turn it into 

1094
00:41:15,783 --> 00:41:18,020
decision making information . So we've 

1095
00:41:18,020 --> 00:41:20,430
got some work to do there , but it's , 

1096
00:41:20,440 --> 00:41:22,551
it's more associated with the latency 

1097
00:41:22,551 --> 00:41:24,662
of the data . Then , you know , I can 

1098
00:41:24,662 --> 00:41:26,718
tell you where something was , but I 

1099
00:41:26,718 --> 00:41:28,940
can't tell you where it is precisely at 

1100
00:41:28,940 --> 00:41:28,650
that moment . And we're getting better 

1101
00:41:28,650 --> 00:41:31,830
and better at that . Um , with regard 

1102
00:41:31,830 --> 00:41:33,663
to some of the issues that we've 

1103
00:41:33,663 --> 00:41:35,774
already talked about the partnerships 

1104
00:41:35,774 --> 00:41:37,774
that , that you started out talking 

1105
00:41:37,774 --> 00:41:39,774
about . Senator Rosen , asked about 

1106
00:41:39,774 --> 00:41:41,774
academic partnerships , alliances , 

1107
00:41:41,774 --> 00:41:43,997
obviously commercial partnerships . One 

1108
00:41:43,997 --> 00:41:43,500
of the things when we stood up the 

1109
00:41:43,500 --> 00:41:45,389
space force and , and we had this 

1110
00:41:45,389 --> 00:41:47,480
discussion many times and your 

1111
00:41:47,480 --> 00:41:49,591
predecessor certainly grabbed onto it 

1112
00:41:49,591 --> 00:41:51,813
and that is making sure it's lean agile 

1113
00:41:51,813 --> 00:41:54,036
fast . How many times we hear generally 

1114
00:41:54,036 --> 00:41:56,910
stay lean agile fast ? Do you feel like 

1115
00:41:56,910 --> 00:41:59,140
you're still lean agile and fast ? Um 

1116
00:41:59,150 --> 00:42:01,670
is , does the budget help you be more 

1117
00:42:01,670 --> 00:42:03,837
lean agile and fast ? And I don't mean 

1118
00:42:03,837 --> 00:42:06,003
cheap , I mean , lean agile and fast . 

1119
00:42:06,003 --> 00:42:08,114
Those again , those relationships are 

1120
00:42:08,114 --> 00:42:10,170
so important . How , how valuable is 

1121
00:42:10,170 --> 00:42:12,281
that and difficult is that balance to 

1122
00:42:12,281 --> 00:42:13,892
make sure you maintain those 

1123
00:42:13,892 --> 00:42:15,892
characteristics ? Well , there's no 

1124
00:42:15,892 --> 00:42:18,114
question , we're still lean and there's 

1125
00:42:18,114 --> 00:42:20,226
no question we're going as fast as we 

1126
00:42:20,226 --> 00:42:20,130
can . You know , that's a tough 

1127
00:42:20,130 --> 00:42:22,430
standard for me to say we're fast . I'm 

1128
00:42:22,440 --> 00:42:24,329
always looking to go faster . I'm 

1129
00:42:24,329 --> 00:42:26,440
always looking to be more agile . And 

1130
00:42:26,440 --> 00:42:28,440
so I'm going to be our probably our 

1131
00:42:28,440 --> 00:42:30,662
toughest critic going forward trying to 

1132
00:42:30,662 --> 00:42:32,996
ensure that we stay as fast as possible . 

1133
00:42:32,996 --> 00:42:34,830
Um Being small does offer some 

1134
00:42:34,830 --> 00:42:36,940
advantages , we can move rapidly 

1135
00:42:36,940 --> 00:42:38,996
through a smaller bureaucracy than , 

1136
00:42:38,996 --> 00:42:40,607
than maybe some of the other 

1137
00:42:40,607 --> 00:42:42,718
organizations can . But it also comes 

1138
00:42:42,718 --> 00:42:44,773
with , you know , that means there's 

1139
00:42:44,773 --> 00:42:46,607
fewer eyes on ideas , that means 

1140
00:42:46,607 --> 00:42:48,662
there's fewer opportunities to catch 

1141
00:42:48,662 --> 00:42:48,200
mistakes , that means there's fewer 

1142
00:42:48,200 --> 00:42:50,200
opportunities . And so we've got to 

1143
00:42:50,200 --> 00:42:52,367
have good solid processes , we have to 

1144
00:42:52,367 --> 00:42:54,422
have good innovative technology that 

1145
00:42:54,422 --> 00:42:56,200
supports us . And so there's no 

1146
00:42:56,200 --> 00:42:58,200
question , we're still lean and now 

1147
00:42:58,200 --> 00:43:00,367
we're trying to become optimized based 

1148
00:43:00,367 --> 00:43:02,422
on that size to make sure that we're 

1149
00:43:02,422 --> 00:43:04,033
still producing high quality 

1150
00:43:04,033 --> 00:43:05,811
capabilities for a high quality 

1151
00:43:05,811 --> 00:43:07,644
workforce . That's a great point 

1152
00:43:07,644 --> 00:43:09,644
because because the bureaucracy can 

1153
00:43:09,644 --> 00:43:11,978
gobble you up and slow you down as well . 

1154
00:43:11,978 --> 00:43:14,089
So we , we like oversight , we're all 

1155
00:43:14,089 --> 00:43:16,200
about that , but we want you to be as 

1156
00:43:16,200 --> 00:43:18,256
agile as you need to be to , to , to 

1157
00:43:18,256 --> 00:43:20,422
keep up with the speed of China , as I 

1158
00:43:20,422 --> 00:43:22,756
like to say , which is really important . 

1159
00:43:22,756 --> 00:43:22,170
One last thing just I just want to make 

1160
00:43:22,170 --> 00:43:24,281
sure that you're , you're getting the 

1161
00:43:24,281 --> 00:43:26,530
type of um the right policies that , 

1162
00:43:26,540 --> 00:43:28,820
that don't restrict your offensive 

1163
00:43:28,820 --> 00:43:30,820
abilities . We've heard a lot about 

1164
00:43:30,820 --> 00:43:32,764
that . You've spoken to it at some 

1165
00:43:32,764 --> 00:43:34,820
points . Um Again , whether it's the 

1166
00:43:34,820 --> 00:43:36,931
budget or the administration or , you 

1167
00:43:36,931 --> 00:43:38,931
know , uh chain of command , do you 

1168
00:43:38,931 --> 00:43:40,940
feel like you , you have the right 

1169
00:43:40,950 --> 00:43:43,560
policies in place to both protect and 

1170
00:43:43,740 --> 00:43:45,851
an attack if necessary ? I can assure 

1171
00:43:45,851 --> 00:43:48,018
you there are no policies that prevent 

1172
00:43:48,018 --> 00:43:50,073
us from exploring a full spectrum of 

1173
00:43:50,073 --> 00:43:52,184
operations . Uh It's just about doing 

1174
00:43:52,184 --> 00:43:54,680
the work establishing the what I would 

1175
00:43:54,680 --> 00:43:56,920
call uh understanding of what the 

1176
00:43:56,920 --> 00:43:59,150
capabilities can and can't do . Uh And 

1177
00:43:59,150 --> 00:44:01,610
then we test and we , we learn from our 

1178
00:44:01,620 --> 00:44:04,250
experiences . Thank you . Well done . 

1179
00:44:04,260 --> 00:44:06,620
Thank you . Thank you , Senator Camera . 

1180
00:44:06,630 --> 00:44:08,852
Your lean agile fast . Reminds me of my 

1181
00:44:08,852 --> 00:44:11,019
high school football coach who said he 

1182
00:44:11,019 --> 00:44:12,852
wanted us to be mobile agile and 

1183
00:44:12,852 --> 00:44:13,920
hostile . 

1184
00:44:14,920 --> 00:44:17,670
Ah 

1185
00:44:18,230 --> 00:44:21,230
I'm not gonna go into our records , 

1186
00:44:22,830 --> 00:44:24,997
but our team motto was we're small but 

1187
00:44:24,997 --> 00:44:26,997
we're slow . That was our problem . 

1188
00:44:27,040 --> 00:44:29,560
Senator Gillibrand . Thank you , Mr 

1189
00:44:29,560 --> 00:44:32,740
Chairman . Um Your budget request this 

1190
00:44:32,740 --> 00:44:34,907
year includes a goal of increasing the 

1191
00:44:34,907 --> 00:44:37,018
number of Space Force launches as you 

1192
00:44:37,018 --> 00:44:39,129
look to maintain and modernize launch 

1193
00:44:39,129 --> 00:44:41,184
ranges and facilities and support of 

1194
00:44:41,184 --> 00:44:43,351
our space launch needs . Can you speak 

1195
00:44:43,351 --> 00:44:45,073
to how the ability to leverage 

1196
00:44:45,073 --> 00:44:47,018
commercial funding sources to grow 

1197
00:44:47,018 --> 00:44:46,850
space , transportation infrastructure 

1198
00:44:46,850 --> 00:44:49,100
and service capacity would impact the 

1199
00:44:49,100 --> 00:44:51,310
Space Force's space launch efforts ? 

1200
00:44:51,910 --> 00:44:54,500
Yes , ma'am . Thank you . Uh as we've 

1201
00:44:54,500 --> 00:44:57,810
talked before , the we've grown our 

1202
00:44:57,810 --> 00:45:00,920
capacity on our national launch ranges . 

1203
00:45:00,930 --> 00:45:03,590
National Space launch ranges . Uh from 

1204
00:45:03,590 --> 00:45:06,170
what I remember to be 10 , 12 launches 

1205
00:45:06,170 --> 00:45:08,480
to we're gonna hit getting close to 100 

1206
00:45:08,480 --> 00:45:11,460
launches a year now . Uh and , and most 

1207
00:45:11,460 --> 00:45:14,240
of that is commercial launches and so 

1208
00:45:14,240 --> 00:45:16,462
the infrastructure that we're providing 

1209
00:45:16,462 --> 00:45:18,720
is being used . Uh and it's it's it 

1210
00:45:18,720 --> 00:45:21,100
needs to be refurbished on a on a more 

1211
00:45:21,110 --> 00:45:23,560
regular basis than it did what I call 

1212
00:45:23,560 --> 00:45:26,000
the old days . And so the I think the 

1213
00:45:26,000 --> 00:45:28,056
commercial industry understands this 

1214
00:45:28,056 --> 00:45:30,111
and they're trying to figure out the 

1215
00:45:30,111 --> 00:45:32,278
best ways to help support . And now we 

1216
00:45:32,278 --> 00:45:34,389
just have to look for the contractual 

1217
00:45:34,389 --> 00:45:36,667
and legal mechanisms to make sure that , 

1218
00:45:36,667 --> 00:45:38,111
that we can maintain that 

1219
00:45:38,111 --> 00:45:40,333
infrastructure , our investments in the 

1220
00:45:40,333 --> 00:45:42,333
range of the future , start us down 

1221
00:45:42,333 --> 00:45:44,444
that path . But we've still got a lot 

1222
00:45:44,444 --> 00:45:46,444
of work to do over the fight up . I 

1223
00:45:46,444 --> 00:45:48,667
think to make sure we maintain the kind 

1224
00:45:48,667 --> 00:45:50,722
of infrastructure we need to support 

1225
00:45:50,722 --> 00:45:52,889
the commercial industry . Um As you've 

1226
00:45:52,889 --> 00:45:55,111
said , your mission is very technical . 

1227
00:45:55,111 --> 00:45:57,056
Um ensuring guardians are properly 

1228
00:45:57,056 --> 00:45:58,944
trained and able to execute their 

1229
00:45:58,944 --> 00:46:01,000
missions requires access to advanced 

1230
00:46:01,000 --> 00:46:02,944
ranges . Do you currently have the 

1231
00:46:02,944 --> 00:46:04,778
training resources ? You need to 

1232
00:46:04,778 --> 00:46:04,560
provide fully trained guardians to 

1233
00:46:04,560 --> 00:46:07,200
combatant commanders and are any 

1234
00:46:07,200 --> 00:46:09,422
additional resources required to ensure 

1235
00:46:09,422 --> 00:46:11,589
we have a space force fully capable of 

1236
00:46:11,589 --> 00:46:14,750
operating in the space domain ? I , the 

1237
00:46:14,760 --> 00:46:18,020
fy 24 budget submission includes about 

1238
00:46:18,020 --> 00:46:21,820
$340 million dedicated to operational 

1239
00:46:21,820 --> 00:46:23,876
test and training infrastructure . I 

1240
00:46:23,876 --> 00:46:25,987
think that's sufficient for this year 

1241
00:46:25,987 --> 00:46:28,153
because we've got a lot of study to do 

1242
00:46:28,153 --> 00:46:27,990
to make sure we're building the right 

1243
00:46:27,990 --> 00:46:29,934
kind of range is the right kind of 

1244
00:46:29,934 --> 00:46:32,101
simulators and we're learning as we go 

1245
00:46:32,101 --> 00:46:33,879
a little bit . Uh So I'm really 

1246
00:46:33,879 --> 00:46:35,546
comfortable with the level of 

1247
00:46:35,546 --> 00:46:37,712
investment . We're at this year for fy 

1248
00:46:37,712 --> 00:46:39,657
24 last week , you spoke about the 

1249
00:46:39,657 --> 00:46:42,000
concept of competitive endurance . From 

1250
00:46:42,000 --> 00:46:44,000
reporting , it appears to center on 

1251
00:46:44,000 --> 00:46:46,056
space Domain awareness resilience to 

1252
00:46:46,056 --> 00:46:48,111
deter attack and responsible counter 

1253
00:46:48,111 --> 00:46:50,333
space activities . Can you speak to how 

1254
00:46:50,333 --> 00:46:52,500
the space force's budget proposal will 

1255
00:46:52,500 --> 00:46:54,611
help to achieve competitive endurance 

1256
00:46:54,611 --> 00:46:54,580
through each of these three core 

1257
00:46:54,580 --> 00:46:57,460
tenants for avoiding operational 

1258
00:46:57,460 --> 00:46:59,404
surprise . That's the Space Domain 

1259
00:46:59,404 --> 00:47:01,627
Awareness tenant . And we are investing 

1260
00:47:01,627 --> 00:47:03,349
heavily in new sensors . We're 

1261
00:47:03,349 --> 00:47:05,571
investing in , in capabilities with our 

1262
00:47:05,571 --> 00:47:07,627
allies and partners to also increase 

1263
00:47:07,627 --> 00:47:09,849
the dataset associate with Space Domain 

1264
00:47:09,849 --> 00:47:11,460
Awareness . And perhaps most 

1265
00:47:11,460 --> 00:47:13,627
importantly , we're investing in space 

1266
00:47:13,627 --> 00:47:15,571
command and control capabilities , 

1267
00:47:15,571 --> 00:47:17,738
which is kind of military talk for how 

1268
00:47:17,738 --> 00:47:19,793
do you take that data in and rapidly 

1269
00:47:19,793 --> 00:47:21,849
turn it into operational decisions . 

1270
00:47:21,849 --> 00:47:23,904
And so I think we have good software 

1271
00:47:23,904 --> 00:47:25,904
investments to make sure that we're 

1272
00:47:25,904 --> 00:47:28,016
doing the decision support tools that 

1273
00:47:28,016 --> 00:47:30,238
go with that space Domain awareness and 

1274
00:47:30,238 --> 00:47:33,370
go ahead . Well , the resiliency piece 

1275
00:47:33,380 --> 00:47:35,620
is also important and and this this 

1276
00:47:35,620 --> 00:47:38,010
budget definitely invests in shifting 

1277
00:47:38,010 --> 00:47:40,288
to a more resilient space architecture . 

1278
00:47:40,288 --> 00:47:42,621
We've started that pivot now in earnest . 

1279
00:47:42,621 --> 00:47:44,843
So looking on your documents , you have 

1280
00:47:44,843 --> 00:47:46,843
this contested space document about 

1281
00:47:46,843 --> 00:47:49,700
what China is doing . Um the P R C has 

1282
00:47:49,700 --> 00:47:51,533
developed counter space and anti 

1283
00:47:51,533 --> 00:47:53,089
satellite weapons including 

1284
00:47:53,089 --> 00:47:54,922
demonstrations of anti satellite 

1285
00:47:54,922 --> 00:47:57,144
missiles um which you say are launching 

1286
00:47:57,144 --> 00:47:59,990
orbit to ground . Um and the ability to 

1287
00:48:00,000 --> 00:48:01,944
move a defunct satellite . Can you 

1288
00:48:01,944 --> 00:48:04,111
speak to our ability to defend against 

1289
00:48:04,111 --> 00:48:06,333
these counter space assets and exercise 

1290
00:48:06,333 --> 00:48:09,040
space superiority ? The transition to a 

1291
00:48:09,050 --> 00:48:11,510
proliferated Leo missile warning , 

1292
00:48:11,510 --> 00:48:14,290
missile tracking architecture includes 

1293
00:48:14,290 --> 00:48:17,590
the capacity to uh find fix and track 

1294
00:48:17,590 --> 00:48:19,812
hypersonic capabilities . So that's why 

1295
00:48:19,812 --> 00:48:21,812
that's such an important transition 

1296
00:48:21,812 --> 00:48:23,830
that we're making with regards to 

1297
00:48:23,840 --> 00:48:25,951
grappling satellites and pulling them 

1298
00:48:25,951 --> 00:48:27,951
out of orbit . Much tougher to deal 

1299
00:48:27,951 --> 00:48:29,562
with when you have less than 

1300
00:48:29,562 --> 00:48:31,729
maneuverable older legacy satellites . 

1301
00:48:31,729 --> 00:48:33,840
So again , shifting to a proliferated 

1302
00:48:33,840 --> 00:48:36,007
Leo constellation where you don't have 

1303
00:48:36,007 --> 00:48:38,062
the what general heighten called the 

1304
00:48:38,062 --> 00:48:40,173
big Juicy target sitting there at GEO 

1305
00:48:40,173 --> 00:48:42,400
uh make that a much tougher proposition 

1306
00:48:42,410 --> 00:48:44,577
for them to execute against that makes 

1307
00:48:44,577 --> 00:48:46,450
sense . Um What lessons are you 

1308
00:48:46,450 --> 00:48:48,617
learning from the war in Ukraine about 

1309
00:48:48,617 --> 00:48:50,728
the role of the , of the space domain 

1310
00:48:50,728 --> 00:48:52,783
in large scale military operations ? 

1311
00:48:52,783 --> 00:48:55,500
Well , the most important observation 

1312
00:48:55,500 --> 00:48:57,500
is that space is critical to modern 

1313
00:48:57,500 --> 00:48:59,556
warfare . Uh We've seen the Russians 

1314
00:48:59,556 --> 00:49:01,778
attacks , allied communications , we've 

1315
00:49:01,778 --> 00:49:04,000
seen cyberattacks trying to dismantle , 

1316
00:49:04,000 --> 00:49:06,222
we've seen GPS Jamming . They recognize 

1317
00:49:06,222 --> 00:49:08,278
that space is a force multiplier and 

1318
00:49:08,278 --> 00:49:10,500
they're willing to attack it . The fact 

1319
00:49:10,500 --> 00:49:12,667
that we have to defend cyber , we have 

1320
00:49:12,667 --> 00:49:14,833
to defend against cyber attacks on the 

1321
00:49:14,833 --> 00:49:16,722
ground . Networks reminds us that 

1322
00:49:16,722 --> 00:49:18,944
ground is also a part of space and that 

1323
00:49:18,944 --> 00:49:21,000
those networks are critical assets . 

1324
00:49:21,000 --> 00:49:23,222
But I think we're also seeing the power 

1325
00:49:23,222 --> 00:49:25,333
of commercial augmentation that there 

1326
00:49:25,333 --> 00:49:27,111
is a viable path for commercial 

1327
00:49:27,111 --> 00:49:29,278
augmentation to provide capabilities . 

1328
00:49:29,278 --> 00:49:31,389
And then I've been kind of harping on 

1329
00:49:31,389 --> 00:49:33,389
it through the testimony here , but 

1330
00:49:33,389 --> 00:49:35,444
proliferated Leo , that's what we're 

1331
00:49:35,444 --> 00:49:37,556
seeing used in to support Ukraine and 

1332
00:49:37,556 --> 00:49:39,667
it's turning out to be a much tougher 

1333
00:49:39,667 --> 00:49:41,889
target for the Russians to take apart . 

1334
00:49:41,889 --> 00:49:41,880
Agreed . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

1335
00:49:41,880 --> 00:49:44,100
Thank you madam ranking member . It 

1336
00:49:44,110 --> 00:49:46,760
wasn't around . Thank you , Mr Chairman 

1337
00:49:46,770 --> 00:49:48,937
General . Thank you for your service . 

1338
00:49:48,937 --> 00:49:52,560
Um There have been efforts general uh 

1339
00:49:52,570 --> 00:49:55,230
driven by political decisions regarding 

1340
00:49:55,230 --> 00:49:58,970
the shared use of the 3.123 point 45 

1341
00:49:58,970 --> 00:50:01,400
gigahertz or Essman portions of the 

1342
00:50:01,400 --> 00:50:04,000
spectrum . Can you confirm that you 

1343
00:50:04,000 --> 00:50:06,290
have systems critical to our national 

1344
00:50:06,290 --> 00:50:08,930
security that reside on this portion of 

1345
00:50:08,930 --> 00:50:12,170
the spectrum ? Yes , Senator , we have 

1346
00:50:12,180 --> 00:50:14,290
a space surveillance radar that's , 

1347
00:50:14,290 --> 00:50:16,346
that's currently in development that 

1348
00:50:16,346 --> 00:50:18,250
does occupy that's portion of the 

1349
00:50:18,250 --> 00:50:20,550
spectrum . Would it be not just radar 

1350
00:50:20,550 --> 00:50:22,717
but perhaps communications that are in 

1351
00:50:22,717 --> 00:50:25,100
that portion as well as it turns out 

1352
00:50:25,100 --> 00:50:27,520
the , the I think the key emergency 

1353
00:50:27,520 --> 00:50:29,464
kinds of communications lived just 

1354
00:50:29,464 --> 00:50:31,798
outside of that band . So as long as it , 

1355
00:50:31,798 --> 00:50:33,798
as long as we managed very narrowly 

1356
00:50:33,798 --> 00:50:35,798
that that strip we would , we would 

1357
00:50:35,798 --> 00:50:38,020
avoid those particular . Okay . So it's 

1358
00:50:38,020 --> 00:50:40,298
primarily radar , it's primarily radar , 

1359
00:50:40,298 --> 00:50:42,520
further further space force . Okay . So 

1360
00:50:42,520 --> 00:50:44,742
the communications portion is not , not 

1361
00:50:44,742 --> 00:50:46,853
part . Well , I wouldn't want to talk 

1362
00:50:46,853 --> 00:50:48,964
to the other services capability . So 

1363
00:50:48,964 --> 00:50:51,187
from a space force perspective . Okay . 

1364
00:50:51,187 --> 00:50:51,020
Thank you . Can you provide your 

1365
00:50:51,020 --> 00:50:53,020
professional military advice on how 

1366
00:50:53,020 --> 00:50:55,860
detrimental it would be to your mission 

1367
00:50:55,870 --> 00:50:57,981
and the security of our nation if you 

1368
00:50:57,981 --> 00:50:59,981
lost the use of this portion of the 

1369
00:50:59,981 --> 00:51:02,092
spectrum ? I think the most important 

1370
00:51:02,092 --> 00:51:04,314
thing I can say is I'm not exactly sure 

1371
00:51:04,314 --> 00:51:06,426
because we haven't done the technical 

1372
00:51:06,426 --> 00:51:08,481
analysis of exactly what vacating or 

1373
00:51:08,481 --> 00:51:10,703
sharing any of that spectrum would look 

1374
00:51:10,703 --> 00:51:12,870
like uh in terms of cost and technical 

1375
00:51:12,870 --> 00:51:14,926
performance . But we do have a study 

1376
00:51:14,926 --> 00:51:17,510
ongoing . Uh And so we would hope that 

1377
00:51:17,510 --> 00:51:19,677
any legislative decisions or decisions 

1378
00:51:19,677 --> 00:51:21,788
along these lines would wait for that 

1379
00:51:21,788 --> 00:51:23,843
study to come out later this fall so 

1380
00:51:23,843 --> 00:51:25,899
that we could make the decision with 

1381
00:51:25,899 --> 00:51:27,954
data informed um analysis . Have you 

1382
00:51:27,954 --> 00:51:30,066
been given the opportunity to provide 

1383
00:51:30,066 --> 00:51:32,121
your professional military advice on 

1384
00:51:32,121 --> 00:51:34,288
the D O D s use of this portion of the 

1385
00:51:34,288 --> 00:51:36,177
spectrum ? Yes , thank you . Um I 

1386
00:51:36,177 --> 00:51:38,288
presume you've expressed your concern 

1387
00:51:38,288 --> 00:51:40,770
with regard to the sale prior to the 

1388
00:51:40,770 --> 00:51:43,400
September study being completed . I 

1389
00:51:43,400 --> 00:51:45,233
have described my concern as not 

1390
00:51:45,233 --> 00:51:47,456
knowing exactly what the impact will be 

1391
00:51:47,456 --> 00:51:49,789
until I received that study . Thank you . 

1392
00:51:50,110 --> 00:51:53,020
Um I'd also like to go on record saying 

1393
00:51:53,020 --> 00:51:55,187
that I'm , I'm concerned about the D O 

1394
00:51:55,187 --> 00:51:57,298
D s approach to providing space based 

1395
00:51:57,298 --> 00:51:59,076
ground moving target indication 

1396
00:51:59,076 --> 00:52:02,490
capabilities , the G B M T I uh to 

1397
00:52:02,490 --> 00:52:04,712
warfighters following the divestment of 

1398
00:52:04,712 --> 00:52:06,460
the J stars platform . It's my 

1399
00:52:06,460 --> 00:52:08,571
understanding that this capability is 

1400
00:52:08,571 --> 00:52:10,238
being moved under the funding 

1401
00:52:10,238 --> 00:52:12,016
authorities of the intelligence 

1402
00:52:12,016 --> 00:52:14,390
community . We do not have really to 

1403
00:52:14,390 --> 00:52:16,446
get into the fine details here . But 

1404
00:52:16,446 --> 00:52:18,550
can you share with me how you are 

1405
00:52:18,550 --> 00:52:21,730
assuming that the J roc validated 

1406
00:52:21,740 --> 00:52:24,510
requirements are captured in the 

1407
00:52:24,510 --> 00:52:27,060
acquisitions process of a platform 

1408
00:52:27,070 --> 00:52:29,980
owned by the I C community because of 

1409
00:52:29,980 --> 00:52:31,924
the way the funding has , has been 

1410
00:52:31,924 --> 00:52:35,150
moved . Uh We are focusing on two areas 

1411
00:52:35,150 --> 00:52:38,040
where we think we can provide some 

1412
00:52:38,050 --> 00:52:40,161
detailed level of collaboration . The 

1413
00:52:40,161 --> 00:52:41,883
first is in milestone decision 

1414
00:52:41,883 --> 00:52:43,939
authority which still there are some 

1415
00:52:43,939 --> 00:52:46,880
decisions which reside at the OSD level 

1416
00:52:46,890 --> 00:52:49,560
uh and could be delegated to Secretary 

1417
00:52:49,560 --> 00:52:51,750
of Coal Valley . We're looking into 

1418
00:52:51,750 --> 00:52:53,639
what those options are , what the 

1419
00:52:53,639 --> 00:52:55,639
possibilities might be . That's for 

1420
00:52:55,639 --> 00:52:57,972
program management acquisition purposes . 

1421
00:52:57,972 --> 00:52:59,861
The other side is the operational 

1422
00:52:59,861 --> 00:53:01,694
concepts . This is still a D O D 

1423
00:53:01,694 --> 00:53:03,917
mission , the space Force mission to do 

1424
00:53:03,917 --> 00:53:05,972
this for the joint force . And so we 

1425
00:53:05,972 --> 00:53:08,139
have the responsibility to provide the 

1426
00:53:08,139 --> 00:53:10,306
operational concept for how this would 

1427
00:53:10,306 --> 00:53:10,300
work . And we will have to work closely 

1428
00:53:10,310 --> 00:53:12,366
with the program managers and sensor 

1429
00:53:12,366 --> 00:53:14,477
developers to make that happen with J 

1430
00:53:14,477 --> 00:53:17,300
stars . The tactical capabilities to 

1431
00:53:17,530 --> 00:53:20,360
track these moving targets was 

1432
00:53:20,360 --> 00:53:23,440
available to our , our soldiers on the 

1433
00:53:23,440 --> 00:53:25,662
ground . We just want to make sure that 

1434
00:53:25,662 --> 00:53:28,060
that same capability is still found in 

1435
00:53:28,060 --> 00:53:30,116
a space based system and that's what 

1436
00:53:30,116 --> 00:53:32,338
we're really talking about here , isn't 

1437
00:53:32,338 --> 00:53:34,504
it ? Yes , sir . And the beauty of the 

1438
00:53:34,504 --> 00:53:36,616
sensors that are being developed , is 

1439
00:53:36,616 --> 00:53:38,727
there more survivable relative to the 

1440
00:53:38,727 --> 00:53:40,671
current threats we're facing ? And 

1441
00:53:40,671 --> 00:53:42,838
we're going to do it at a global scale 

1442
00:53:42,838 --> 00:53:44,949
as opposed to a very small AO are the 

1443
00:53:44,949 --> 00:53:47,171
way that we just don't want to get lost 

1444
00:53:47,171 --> 00:53:46,510
and that this needs to be made 

1445
00:53:46,510 --> 00:53:50,060
available for title title 10 operations . 

1446
00:53:50,070 --> 00:53:52,350
These are these are direct operational 

1447
00:53:52,350 --> 00:53:54,517
support activities . The mission falls 

1448
00:53:54,517 --> 00:53:56,628
to the Space Force and the Department 

1449
00:53:56,628 --> 00:53:58,850
Defense . Thank you . I understand that 

1450
00:53:58,850 --> 00:54:01,017
there is a legislative proposal in the 

1451
00:54:01,017 --> 00:54:03,239
works to integrate the reserve elements 

1452
00:54:03,239 --> 00:54:05,406
of the Space force . This seems like a 

1453
00:54:05,406 --> 00:54:07,461
logical move as your service matures 

1454
00:54:07,461 --> 00:54:09,628
and embraces its organized trained and 

1455
00:54:09,628 --> 00:54:11,294
equipped roles . It's also my 

1456
00:54:11,294 --> 00:54:13,350
understanding that the Space Force's 

1457
00:54:13,350 --> 00:54:15,572
residing within the Guard Element still 

1458
00:54:15,572 --> 00:54:17,628
reside within the Air National Guard 

1459
00:54:17,628 --> 00:54:19,739
and is organized trained and equipped 

1460
00:54:19,739 --> 00:54:21,350
by the Air Force . From your 

1461
00:54:21,350 --> 00:54:23,350
perspective , as the Chief of Space 

1462
00:54:23,350 --> 00:54:24,961
Operations , what should the 

1463
00:54:24,961 --> 00:54:27,017
subcommittee consider to provide the 

1464
00:54:27,017 --> 00:54:29,239
most seamless oversight of these forces 

1465
00:54:29,239 --> 00:54:31,750
as the space force matures first , let 

1466
00:54:31,750 --> 00:54:34,010
me describe the reserve integration . I 

1467
00:54:34,010 --> 00:54:35,732
think this is a very important 

1468
00:54:35,732 --> 00:54:37,954
legislative proposal that I hope you'll 

1469
00:54:37,954 --> 00:54:40,177
give due consideration to . It gives us 

1470
00:54:40,177 --> 00:54:42,343
the flexibility to have both part time 

1471
00:54:42,343 --> 00:54:44,399
and full time guardians in the space 

1472
00:54:44,399 --> 00:54:46,566
force , which is gonna give incredible 

1473
00:54:46,566 --> 00:54:48,732
career flexibility and hopefully serve 

1474
00:54:48,732 --> 00:54:50,954
as an innovative way to retain the kind 

1475
00:54:50,954 --> 00:54:53,066
of expertise that we know we're gonna 

1476
00:54:53,066 --> 00:54:55,066
need moving forward . I think we've 

1477
00:54:55,066 --> 00:54:57,066
done a much better job of capturing 

1478
00:54:57,066 --> 00:54:59,288
kind of the key details that are needed 

1479
00:54:59,288 --> 00:55:01,510
in legislation to to make that proposal 

1480
00:55:01,510 --> 00:55:03,677
work . And I hope that we can continue 

1481
00:55:03,677 --> 00:55:05,843
to work with this committee and others 

1482
00:55:05,843 --> 00:55:05,680
to make that happen from the guard 

1483
00:55:05,680 --> 00:55:07,791
standpoint . I've been clear from the 

1484
00:55:07,791 --> 00:55:09,620
beginning that the critical 

1485
00:55:09,620 --> 00:55:11,842
capabilities that are living in the Air 

1486
00:55:11,842 --> 00:55:14,064
National Guard for space are must haves 

1487
00:55:14,064 --> 00:55:16,176
for the Space Force . That's the most 

1488
00:55:16,176 --> 00:55:18,398
important thing I don't believe because 

1489
00:55:18,398 --> 00:55:20,231
of the way organized train equip 

1490
00:55:20,231 --> 00:55:22,490
authorities reside with the Chief of 

1491
00:55:22,500 --> 00:55:24,180
Staff of the Air Force and my 

1492
00:55:24,180 --> 00:55:26,770
responsibilities that , that the 

1493
00:55:26,770 --> 00:55:28,548
General Brown feels like he can 

1494
00:55:28,548 --> 00:55:30,326
organize , train equipped space 

1495
00:55:30,326 --> 00:55:32,381
capabilities inside the Air National 

1496
00:55:32,381 --> 00:55:34,437
Guard . It creates a little bit of a 

1497
00:55:34,437 --> 00:55:36,603
disconnect . And so the current status 

1498
00:55:36,603 --> 00:55:38,770
quo is the , is the toughest to figure 

1499
00:55:38,770 --> 00:55:38,620
out how to do properly . Other than 

1500
00:55:38,620 --> 00:55:40,564
that , I think there might be some 

1501
00:55:40,564 --> 00:55:42,676
options that are worth exploring that 

1502
00:55:42,676 --> 00:55:45,009
are based on cost estimates in the like . 

1503
00:55:45,009 --> 00:55:47,176
Thank you , Mr Chairman . I would just 

1504
00:55:47,176 --> 00:55:49,231
like to commend the general . He has 

1505
00:55:49,231 --> 00:55:51,610
taken a very direct and strong approach 

1506
00:55:51,610 --> 00:55:53,499
with regard to advocating for our 

1507
00:55:53,499 --> 00:55:55,666
airmen and guardians on the subject of 

1508
00:55:55,666 --> 00:55:58,630
the missile community cancer study . Uh 

1509
00:55:58,640 --> 00:56:00,862
This is a case of where they're finding 

1510
00:56:00,862 --> 00:56:03,029
cancers in areas where these guys that 

1511
00:56:03,029 --> 00:56:05,140
are basically working underground for 

1512
00:56:05,140 --> 00:56:07,084
extended periods of time . And the 

1513
00:56:07,084 --> 00:56:06,950
general has taken a very direct and 

1514
00:56:06,950 --> 00:56:09,061
personal interest in seeing that this 

1515
00:56:09,061 --> 00:56:11,228
be pursued and that anybody that's out 

1516
00:56:11,228 --> 00:56:13,450
there , any one of these airmen or , or 

1517
00:56:13,450 --> 00:56:15,760
guardians that they get help , they 

1518
00:56:15,760 --> 00:56:17,982
find out and they keep track of . And I 

1519
00:56:17,982 --> 00:56:20,038
just want to commend him and I would 

1520
00:56:20,038 --> 00:56:21,982
hope that the committee would make 

1521
00:56:21,982 --> 00:56:24,038
available time for him to be able to 

1522
00:56:24,038 --> 00:56:26,093
share with us uh moving forward just 

1523
00:56:26,093 --> 00:56:28,204
exactly what he has found with regard 

1524
00:56:28,204 --> 00:56:30,371
to any health concerns surrounding the 

1525
00:56:30,371 --> 00:56:32,538
cancers that seem to be more prevalent 

1526
00:56:32,538 --> 00:56:34,427
with these folks that are working 

1527
00:56:34,427 --> 00:56:36,482
underground in these missile silos . 

1528
00:56:36,482 --> 00:56:38,593
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you , 

1529
00:56:38,593 --> 00:56:40,704
General uh general . Couple of follow 

1530
00:56:40,704 --> 00:56:42,704
up questions several times . You've 

1531
00:56:42,704 --> 00:56:45,290
mentioned the possibility of norms 

1532
00:56:45,300 --> 00:56:47,950
developing international norms expand 

1533
00:56:47,950 --> 00:56:49,617
on that . Is that a realistic 

1534
00:56:49,617 --> 00:56:51,672
possibility will the Chinese and the 

1535
00:56:51,672 --> 00:56:54,410
Russians talk about international norms 

1536
00:56:54,410 --> 00:56:57,820
in space ? Unfortunately , the norms 

1537
00:56:57,820 --> 00:56:59,987
that they talk about are not ones that 

1538
00:56:59,987 --> 00:57:02,153
we would support and they've , they've 

1539
00:57:02,153 --> 00:57:04,220
kind of shown um a propensity to not 

1540
00:57:04,220 --> 00:57:06,331
support the ones we want to support . 

1541
00:57:06,331 --> 00:57:08,331
This is a battle of narratives over 

1542
00:57:08,331 --> 00:57:10,331
international norms . Uh What I can 

1543
00:57:10,331 --> 00:57:11,998
tell you is when I talk to my 

1544
00:57:11,998 --> 00:57:11,710
counterparts in the other nations , 

1545
00:57:11,710 --> 00:57:14,140
they are interested in this , the 

1546
00:57:14,150 --> 00:57:16,372
Secretary of Defense issued his tenants 

1547
00:57:16,372 --> 00:57:18,483
for responsible behavior and us Space 

1548
00:57:18,483 --> 00:57:20,706
command followed up with even some more 

1549
00:57:20,706 --> 00:57:22,817
details . Those are all widely viewed 

1550
00:57:22,817 --> 00:57:24,440
from my peers as helpful in 

1551
00:57:24,440 --> 00:57:26,660
establishing what it means in a , in a 

1552
00:57:26,670 --> 00:57:28,950
like a like minded set of nations with 

1553
00:57:28,960 --> 00:57:32,370
responsible behaviors in space . Um The , 

1554
00:57:32,370 --> 00:57:34,259
we have a , we have an initiative 

1555
00:57:34,259 --> 00:57:36,370
called the Coalition Space Operations 

1556
00:57:36,370 --> 00:57:39,200
Initiative , which is um seven 

1557
00:57:39,200 --> 00:57:42,400
countries that have also detailed what 

1558
00:57:42,400 --> 00:57:44,567
responsible behaviors in space means , 

1559
00:57:44,567 --> 00:57:46,678
very consistent with the Secretary of 

1560
00:57:46,678 --> 00:57:48,900
Defense's tenants . And so I think this 

1561
00:57:48,900 --> 00:57:51,011
is kind of a widespread understanding 

1562
00:57:51,011 --> 00:57:53,233
that we have to behave a certain way in 

1563
00:57:53,233 --> 00:57:55,122
order to maintain a safe , secure 

1564
00:57:55,122 --> 00:57:57,240
Sustainable Space Domain . Uh And I 

1565
00:57:57,240 --> 00:58:00,310
believe there's widespread uh agreement 

1566
00:58:00,310 --> 00:58:02,143
for that is the state department 

1567
00:58:02,143 --> 00:58:04,199
engaged in this discussion as well . 

1568
00:58:04,199 --> 00:58:06,330
They are , I think that would be an 

1569
00:58:06,330 --> 00:58:08,920
important aspect of moving this forward . 

1570
00:58:08,930 --> 00:58:11,097
Very important initiative . They are . 

1571
00:58:11,097 --> 00:58:14,310
Um just to comment , you mentioned 

1572
00:58:14,310 --> 00:58:17,160
cyber protection several times . It 

1573
00:58:17,160 --> 00:58:19,216
seems to be the experience that most 

1574
00:58:19,216 --> 00:58:22,530
major cyber attacks start with a sub , 

1575
00:58:22,540 --> 00:58:24,540
not the general contractor but some 

1576
00:58:24,540 --> 00:58:27,650
small company of smaller firm that's 

1577
00:58:27,650 --> 00:58:29,706
working for a general contractor and 

1578
00:58:29,706 --> 00:58:31,872
then they get into the system . I hope 

1579
00:58:31,872 --> 00:58:33,928
that's something when you're talking 

1580
00:58:33,928 --> 00:58:36,150
about the protection of your assets and 

1581
00:58:36,150 --> 00:58:38,261
very rightfully , you've talked about 

1582
00:58:38,261 --> 00:58:40,483
ground and space that you worry as well 

1583
00:58:40,483 --> 00:58:42,650
about those small companies that might 

1584
00:58:42,650 --> 00:58:44,761
act as a gateway for a cyber attack . 

1585
00:58:44,970 --> 00:58:46,970
Yes , sir . I've talked to my cyber 

1586
00:58:46,970 --> 00:58:49,137
defenders at length . I'm not really a 

1587
00:58:49,137 --> 00:58:51,137
cyber professional myself . I don't 

1588
00:58:51,137 --> 00:58:53,303
understand all the technical details , 

1589
00:58:53,303 --> 00:58:53,190
but one of the most important things 

1590
00:58:53,190 --> 00:58:55,190
that they start with is mapping the 

1591
00:58:55,190 --> 00:58:57,023
cyber terrain . In other words , 

1592
00:58:57,023 --> 00:58:59,190
understanding exactly what the network 

1593
00:58:59,190 --> 00:59:01,412
looks like where it might be vulnerable 

1594
00:59:01,412 --> 00:59:03,468
and how they might best sensor it to 

1595
00:59:03,468 --> 00:59:05,690
rapidly detect any kind of intrusions . 

1596
00:59:05,690 --> 00:59:07,746
And so to your point , understanding 

1597
00:59:07,746 --> 00:59:09,857
how all of the company's fit together 

1598
00:59:09,857 --> 00:59:11,912
in the cyber terrain is an important 

1599
00:59:11,912 --> 00:59:14,079
foundational aspect of cyber defense . 

1600
00:59:14,079 --> 00:59:16,190
Final , final question is Space force 

1601
00:59:16,190 --> 00:59:19,740
in charge of defense defensive . You've 

1602
00:59:19,740 --> 00:59:21,629
talked a lot about proliferated , 

1603
00:59:21,629 --> 00:59:24,630
proliferated , Leo , are you also in 

1604
00:59:24,630 --> 00:59:28,350
charge of developing the capability of 

1605
00:59:28,360 --> 00:59:31,020
maneuver and otherwise defending our 

1606
00:59:31,030 --> 00:59:33,086
space assets . Is that part of Space 

1607
00:59:33,086 --> 00:59:35,300
Force's mission ? I would say it's 

1608
00:59:35,300 --> 00:59:38,010
important that as we develop our D O D 

1609
00:59:38,010 --> 00:59:40,177
capabilities through the space force , 

1610
00:59:40,177 --> 00:59:42,399
that we make sure we're applying all of 

1611
00:59:42,399 --> 00:59:44,288
the right concepts for active and 

1612
00:59:44,288 --> 00:59:46,010
passive defense uh to meet the 

1613
00:59:46,010 --> 00:59:47,732
requirements so that we have a 

1614
00:59:47,732 --> 00:59:50,350
survivable architecture on the U S 

1615
00:59:50,350 --> 00:59:52,660
worst day and that this is a relatively 

1616
00:59:52,660 --> 00:59:54,771
new concern . We own space for a long 

1617
00:59:54,771 --> 00:59:57,450
time . And but the Russians and the 

1618
00:59:57,450 --> 00:59:59,990
Chinese have been very active in uh 

1619
01:00:00,000 --> 01:00:03,080
anti satellite technology . So we need 

1620
01:00:03,080 --> 01:00:05,670
to be developing counters to that in 

1621
01:00:05,670 --> 01:00:07,948
order to maintain a credible deterrent . 

1622
01:00:07,948 --> 01:00:10,870
Is that correct ? Absolutely . And I 

1623
01:00:10,870 --> 01:00:14,000
think it's about how fast can we go 

1624
01:00:14,180 --> 01:00:16,700
again . In my , my weak analogy is 

1625
01:00:16,700 --> 01:00:18,811
converting the merchant marine in the 

1626
01:00:18,811 --> 01:00:20,811
US Navy . We've got a little bit of 

1627
01:00:20,811 --> 01:00:22,700
ways to go before we can take our 

1628
01:00:22,700 --> 01:00:24,922
legacy platforms that we've got so much 

1629
01:00:24,922 --> 01:00:27,033
utility out of and so much capability 

1630
01:00:27,033 --> 01:00:29,089
from , but convert them to providing 

1631
01:00:29,089 --> 01:00:31,200
the same or better capabilities while 

1632
01:00:31,200 --> 01:00:33,256
being able to perform in a contested 

1633
01:00:33,256 --> 01:00:35,311
domain . And we'll have to make that 

1634
01:00:35,311 --> 01:00:37,200
transition as rapidly as possible 

1635
01:00:37,200 --> 01:00:39,089
questions . Thank you very much , 

1636
01:00:39,089 --> 01:00:40,811
General . This has been a very 

1637
01:00:40,811 --> 01:00:42,811
illuminating hearing . I appreciate 

1638
01:00:42,811 --> 01:00:44,700
your forthright responsive to our 

1639
01:00:44,700 --> 01:00:46,700
responsive to our question and your 

1640
01:00:46,700 --> 01:00:48,644
leadership and your long career of 

1641
01:00:48,644 --> 01:00:50,700
service to the United States . Thank 

1642
01:00:50,700 --> 01:00:52,644
you . Thank you , sir . Hearing is 

1643
01:00:52,644 --> 01:00:51,410
adjourned .