1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:00,000 2 00:00:04,370 --> 00:00:06,203 Call to order the meeting of the 3 00:00:06,210 --> 00:00:08,266 Strategic Forces subcommittee of the 4 00:00:08,266 --> 00:00:11,030 Senate Committee on armed services are 5 00:00:11,030 --> 00:00:13,450 hearing today is on the subject of the 6 00:00:13,450 --> 00:00:15,740 Space force . Uh I want to thank 7 00:00:15,740 --> 00:00:17,770 General Saltzman for being with us 8 00:00:17,770 --> 00:00:21,340 today before this committee . And the 9 00:00:21,340 --> 00:00:23,562 purpose of the hearing is to understand 10 00:00:23,562 --> 00:00:25,710 your vision and priorities for the 11 00:00:25,710 --> 00:00:28,200 Space Force as its second Chief of 12 00:00:28,200 --> 00:00:30,800 Space Operations . While the budget for 13 00:00:30,800 --> 00:00:33,022 the Department of Defense and the Space 14 00:00:33,022 --> 00:00:35,189 Force has just been released . We plan 15 00:00:35,189 --> 00:00:37,244 to have a space budget hearing which 16 00:00:37,244 --> 00:00:39,750 includes the Space Force later in May 17 00:00:39,760 --> 00:00:41,927 after we've had time to understand and 18 00:00:41,927 --> 00:00:44,149 detail the president's budget request . 19 00:00:44,240 --> 00:00:46,240 There are many uncomplicated topics 20 00:00:46,240 --> 00:00:48,462 such as missile warning and launch that 21 00:00:48,462 --> 00:00:50,518 will take time to understand and are 22 00:00:50,518 --> 00:00:52,851 not really right for this hearing today , 23 00:00:52,851 --> 00:00:55,460 but we will take up in May instead , 24 00:00:55,460 --> 00:00:57,682 the hearing will focus on you . General 25 00:00:57,682 --> 00:01:00,390 Saltsman . This is your opportunity to 26 00:01:00,390 --> 00:01:02,446 explain to the subcommittee into the 27 00:01:02,446 --> 00:01:04,668 public how you will train and equip the 28 00:01:04,668 --> 00:01:06,501 Space Force as the Department of 29 00:01:06,501 --> 00:01:09,140 Defense , separate military service and 30 00:01:09,140 --> 00:01:10,918 be a presenter of forces to the 31 00:01:10,918 --> 00:01:13,110 combatant commanders in order to 32 00:01:13,110 --> 00:01:15,221 accomplish their missions as assigned 33 00:01:15,221 --> 00:01:17,720 by the president . My understanding is 34 00:01:17,720 --> 00:01:19,942 that today you will explain to us , you 35 00:01:19,942 --> 00:01:22,164 are three lines of effort for our space 36 00:01:22,164 --> 00:01:24,331 force guardians , as I understand it , 37 00:01:24,331 --> 00:01:26,498 they are to first field a combat ready 38 00:01:26,498 --> 00:01:29,040 force . Second , amplify the Guardian 39 00:01:29,040 --> 00:01:31,580 spirit and third partner with the 40 00:01:31,580 --> 00:01:34,760 interagency allies and industry to win . 41 00:01:35,410 --> 00:01:37,632 I look forward to having you explain in 42 00:01:37,632 --> 00:01:39,577 detail what each of these lines of 43 00:01:39,577 --> 00:01:41,577 effort are and give us examples and 44 00:01:41,577 --> 00:01:43,632 simple ones that we can take with us 45 00:01:43,632 --> 00:01:45,854 and explain to our constituents and the 46 00:01:45,854 --> 00:01:48,021 public the importance of the work that 47 00:01:48,021 --> 00:01:50,021 you're doing . Let me conclude that 48 00:01:50,021 --> 00:01:52,132 General Heighten said it best . There 49 00:01:52,132 --> 00:01:54,354 is no such thing as a conflict in space 50 00:01:54,354 --> 00:01:57,740 by itself . Any conflict will involve 51 00:01:57,750 --> 00:01:59,910 all domains . Although I believe it 52 00:01:59,910 --> 00:02:02,850 will start in space , the land , the 53 00:02:02,850 --> 00:02:05,670 sea , the air and space all together at 54 00:02:05,670 --> 00:02:08,030 once . I hope that today you will 55 00:02:08,030 --> 00:02:10,141 explain to us how your vision for the 56 00:02:10,141 --> 00:02:11,919 Space Force will meet . General 57 00:02:11,919 --> 00:02:14,240 heightens astute observation and enable 58 00:02:14,240 --> 00:02:16,407 our combatant commanders to accomplish 59 00:02:16,407 --> 00:02:18,351 the mission that the president has 60 00:02:18,351 --> 00:02:20,520 directed them to perform . If called 61 00:02:20,520 --> 00:02:22,631 upon . After your opening statement , 62 00:02:22,631 --> 00:02:24,798 we will have questions at five minutes 63 00:02:24,798 --> 00:02:27,990 each . Senator Fischer . Thank you , Mr 64 00:02:27,990 --> 00:02:30,170 Chairman General Saltzman . Thank you 65 00:02:30,170 --> 00:02:32,320 for being here today and for sharing 66 00:02:32,320 --> 00:02:34,653 your perspective with this subcommittee . 67 00:02:34,660 --> 00:02:37,010 And thank you sir , for your many , 68 00:02:37,010 --> 00:02:39,590 many years of service . You are only 69 00:02:39,590 --> 00:02:41,590 the second ever chief of Space 70 00:02:41,590 --> 00:02:44,100 Operations in a unique position to 71 00:02:44,100 --> 00:02:46,020 leave your mark on what is still 72 00:02:46,020 --> 00:02:48,380 essentially a brand new military 73 00:02:48,380 --> 00:02:50,910 service , an opportunity like this 74 00:02:50,910 --> 00:02:54,080 comes around less than once in a 75 00:02:54,080 --> 00:02:56,440 generation . And I'm sure you feel the 76 00:02:56,440 --> 00:02:59,910 gravity and the expectation of this 77 00:02:59,920 --> 00:03:02,270 every single day . I look forward to 78 00:03:02,270 --> 00:03:04,326 hearing more of your vision for this 79 00:03:04,326 --> 00:03:06,492 newest service branch specifically how 80 00:03:06,492 --> 00:03:08,437 you are forming it into a fighting 81 00:03:08,437 --> 00:03:11,460 force that is ready to prosecute war as 82 00:03:11,460 --> 00:03:14,420 part of the United States military . I 83 00:03:14,420 --> 00:03:16,620 would also like to understand how you 84 00:03:16,620 --> 00:03:18,630 are shaping the space acquisition 85 00:03:18,630 --> 00:03:21,490 enterprise to that vision enabling the 86 00:03:21,490 --> 00:03:24,260 joint force . Thank you , Mr Chairman 87 00:03:25,340 --> 00:03:26,396 General Saltzman , 88 00:03:29,350 --> 00:03:31,572 chairman King , ranking member Fisher , 89 00:03:31,572 --> 00:03:33,480 distinguished member of the 90 00:03:33,480 --> 00:03:35,369 subcommittee . Thank you for your 91 00:03:35,369 --> 00:03:37,480 continued support for the opportunity 92 00:03:37,480 --> 00:03:39,702 to discuss my vision and priorities for 93 00:03:39,702 --> 00:03:41,758 the United States Space Force . I've 94 00:03:41,758 --> 00:03:43,980 been listening , I've been in listening 95 00:03:43,980 --> 00:03:46,202 mode since becoming the second chief of 96 00:03:46,202 --> 00:03:48,424 Space Operations just four months ago . 97 00:03:48,424 --> 00:03:50,591 One of my first phone calls as the CSO 98 00:03:50,591 --> 00:03:52,647 was to the Commander of U S European 99 00:03:52,647 --> 00:03:54,647 Command General . Casually my first 100 00:03:54,647 --> 00:03:57,030 trip as the CSO was to Colorado Springs 101 00:03:57,040 --> 00:03:59,262 to meet in person with the Commander of 102 00:03:59,262 --> 00:04:01,373 U S Space Command General Dickinson . 103 00:04:01,373 --> 00:04:03,910 My first overseas trip was to Hawaii 104 00:04:03,920 --> 00:04:06,031 where I met with the commander of U S 105 00:04:06,031 --> 00:04:08,810 Indo Pacific Command , Admiral Aquilino . 106 00:04:08,820 --> 00:04:10,931 And during these last four months , I 107 00:04:10,931 --> 00:04:12,931 have also prioritized visiting with 108 00:04:12,931 --> 00:04:14,931 guardians performing vital missions 109 00:04:14,931 --> 00:04:17,098 around the world for the Space Force , 110 00:04:17,098 --> 00:04:19,264 for the joint force and for the nation 111 00:04:19,264 --> 00:04:21,209 in December , I met in person with 112 00:04:21,209 --> 00:04:23,376 military space chiefs from Australia , 113 00:04:23,376 --> 00:04:25,709 Canada , France , Germany , New Zealand , 114 00:04:25,709 --> 00:04:27,764 and the United Kingdom and all these 115 00:04:27,764 --> 00:04:29,764 engagements . My goal was to better 116 00:04:29,764 --> 00:04:31,876 understand how the space force should 117 00:04:31,876 --> 00:04:33,987 focus its near and midterm efforts as 118 00:04:33,987 --> 00:04:35,820 we integrate our capabilities to 119 00:04:35,820 --> 00:04:37,876 address the threats and challenges . 120 00:04:37,876 --> 00:04:39,764 The themes from these engagements 121 00:04:39,764 --> 00:04:41,542 should surprise . No one . Each 122 00:04:41,542 --> 00:04:41,400 combatant commander emphasized the 123 00:04:41,410 --> 00:04:43,840 vital role space plays in strategic 124 00:04:43,840 --> 00:04:46,062 competition and integrated deterrence . 125 00:04:46,430 --> 00:04:48,541 The guardians of the space force make 126 00:04:48,541 --> 00:04:50,763 this possible and are without a doubt , 127 00:04:50,763 --> 00:04:52,874 the brightest and boldest America has 128 00:04:52,874 --> 00:04:54,930 to offer because of these advantages 129 00:04:54,930 --> 00:04:57,152 and our shared interest in the domain , 130 00:04:57,152 --> 00:04:59,208 us allies and international partners 131 00:04:59,208 --> 00:05:01,820 are eager for expanded collaboration 132 00:05:01,820 --> 00:05:03,876 with the Space Force , especially in 133 00:05:03,876 --> 00:05:06,098 areas that strengthen the effectiveness 134 00:05:06,098 --> 00:05:07,987 of coalition space operations and 135 00:05:07,987 --> 00:05:10,320 reinforce norms of responsible behavior . 136 00:05:10,640 --> 00:05:13,320 In short . Our mission forces people 137 00:05:13,320 --> 00:05:15,431 and partnerships make the space force 138 00:05:15,431 --> 00:05:17,620 the most formidable space organization 139 00:05:17,630 --> 00:05:20,860 on the planet China and Russia know 140 00:05:20,860 --> 00:05:23,082 this and are accelerating their efforts 141 00:05:23,082 --> 00:05:24,971 to undermine us advantages in the 142 00:05:24,971 --> 00:05:27,180 domain To meet this challenge . The 143 00:05:27,180 --> 00:05:29,460 space force will prioritize three lines 144 00:05:29,460 --> 00:05:31,780 of effort . As Senator King has already 145 00:05:31,780 --> 00:05:34,280 stated , fielding combat ready forces , 146 00:05:34,290 --> 00:05:36,760 amplifying the guardian spirit and 147 00:05:36,760 --> 00:05:39,540 partnering to win these lines of 148 00:05:39,540 --> 00:05:41,900 efforts are designed to deliver the 149 00:05:41,900 --> 00:05:43,940 forces , personnel and partnerships 150 00:05:43,940 --> 00:05:45,718 required for the space force to 151 00:05:45,718 --> 00:05:48,770 preserve us advantages in space . And 152 00:05:48,770 --> 00:05:50,714 before I expand on the space force 153 00:05:50,714 --> 00:05:52,770 lines of effort , I'd like to update 154 00:05:52,770 --> 00:05:54,603 the subcommittee on the emerging 155 00:05:54,603 --> 00:05:56,437 threats space forces face as the 156 00:05:56,437 --> 00:05:58,740 handout I've provided indicates space 157 00:05:58,740 --> 00:06:01,290 is undeniably a contested and congested 158 00:06:01,290 --> 00:06:03,670 warfighting domain . When describing 159 00:06:03,670 --> 00:06:05,559 space threats . It's important to 160 00:06:05,559 --> 00:06:07,503 account for two kinds of threats . 161 00:06:07,503 --> 00:06:10,530 First threats from space assets and 162 00:06:10,530 --> 00:06:12,830 second threats to space assets , 163 00:06:13,360 --> 00:06:15,416 threats from space present a growing 164 00:06:15,416 --> 00:06:17,582 danger to the joint force . Both China 165 00:06:17,582 --> 00:06:19,527 and Russia have robust space based 166 00:06:19,527 --> 00:06:21,582 capabilities that allow them to find 167 00:06:21,582 --> 00:06:24,240 target and attack U S military forces 168 00:06:24,240 --> 00:06:27,590 on land at sea and in the air . Equally 169 00:06:27,590 --> 00:06:29,757 alarming are the threats that endanger 170 00:06:29,757 --> 00:06:31,868 the satellites . The nation relies on 171 00:06:31,868 --> 00:06:33,812 for prosperity and security . Both 172 00:06:33,812 --> 00:06:35,923 China and Russia continued to develop 173 00:06:35,923 --> 00:06:38,110 field and deploy a range of weapons 174 00:06:38,120 --> 00:06:40,580 aimed at us space capabilities . The 175 00:06:40,580 --> 00:06:42,413 spectrum of threats to U S space 176 00:06:42,413 --> 00:06:44,358 capabilities include cyber warfare 177 00:06:44,358 --> 00:06:46,080 activities , electronic attack 178 00:06:46,080 --> 00:06:48,120 platforms , directed energy lasers 179 00:06:48,120 --> 00:06:50,330 designed to blind or damaged satellite 180 00:06:50,330 --> 00:06:52,840 sensors , ground orbit missiles to 181 00:06:52,840 --> 00:06:55,710 destroy satellites and space to space 182 00:06:55,720 --> 00:06:57,720 orbital engagement systems that can 183 00:06:57,720 --> 00:07:00,500 attack U S satellites in space . The 184 00:07:00,500 --> 00:07:02,389 contested space domain shapes the 185 00:07:02,389 --> 00:07:04,611 enduring purpose of the United States . 186 00:07:04,611 --> 00:07:06,778 Space Force . Congress established the 187 00:07:06,778 --> 00:07:09,000 Space force to protect U S interests in 188 00:07:09,000 --> 00:07:11,167 space . This means protecting us space 189 00:07:11,167 --> 00:07:13,260 capabilities and defending the joint 190 00:07:13,260 --> 00:07:15,490 force and the nation from space enabled 191 00:07:15,490 --> 00:07:17,620 attack . My lines of effort are 192 00:07:17,620 --> 00:07:19,564 designed to achieve this vision by 193 00:07:19,564 --> 00:07:21,509 providing the forces personnel and 194 00:07:21,509 --> 00:07:23,509 partnerships required for the space 195 00:07:23,509 --> 00:07:25,680 force to preserve us space superiority 196 00:07:25,680 --> 00:07:28,420 for the foreseeable future . My first 197 00:07:28,420 --> 00:07:30,476 priority is to build resilient ready 198 00:07:30,476 --> 00:07:33,320 combat credible space forces to do this . 199 00:07:33,330 --> 00:07:35,441 We are accelerating the pivot towards 200 00:07:35,441 --> 00:07:37,540 resilient satellite constellations , 201 00:07:37,550 --> 00:07:40,200 ground stations , networks and data 202 00:07:40,200 --> 00:07:42,760 links . The space development agencies 203 00:07:42,760 --> 00:07:44,538 proliferated . Warfighter space 204 00:07:44,538 --> 00:07:46,880 architecture provides a prime example 205 00:07:46,880 --> 00:07:48,910 of these efforts . We are also 206 00:07:48,910 --> 00:07:51,132 emphasizing cybersecurity and preparing 207 00:07:51,132 --> 00:07:53,480 guardians to detect and defeat cyber 208 00:07:53,480 --> 00:07:56,060 attacks against our networks systems , 209 00:07:56,070 --> 00:07:58,350 ground stations , data links and 210 00:07:58,350 --> 00:08:00,680 satellites . We are developing an 211 00:08:00,690 --> 00:08:02,357 operational test and training 212 00:08:02,357 --> 00:08:04,134 infrastructure that will be the 213 00:08:04,134 --> 00:08:06,190 backbone of Space force readiness as 214 00:08:06,190 --> 00:08:08,357 guardians prepare for a high intensity 215 00:08:08,357 --> 00:08:10,550 fight . This infrastructure will allow 216 00:08:10,550 --> 00:08:12,920 guardians to execute realistic training 217 00:08:12,930 --> 00:08:14,763 against simulated adversaries to 218 00:08:14,763 --> 00:08:17,250 validate their tactics . Space training 219 00:08:17,250 --> 00:08:19,472 and readiness command executed one such 220 00:08:19,472 --> 00:08:21,306 exercise last September with its 221 00:08:21,306 --> 00:08:23,540 inaugural Black Skies exercise focused 222 00:08:23,540 --> 00:08:25,590 on space electromagnetic warfare . 223 00:08:26,300 --> 00:08:27,967 Through these events , we are 224 00:08:27,967 --> 00:08:29,911 continuously enhancing tactics and 225 00:08:29,911 --> 00:08:32,133 operational concepts thereby creating a 226 00:08:32,133 --> 00:08:34,920 force ready for emerging threats . My 227 00:08:34,920 --> 00:08:36,809 second priority is to amplify the 228 00:08:36,809 --> 00:08:38,920 guardian spirit by embracing a modern 229 00:08:38,920 --> 00:08:41,142 talent management process that recruits 230 00:08:41,142 --> 00:08:43,590 the best talent develops and retains an 231 00:08:43,590 --> 00:08:46,130 elite workforce and empowers guardians 232 00:08:46,130 --> 00:08:48,470 to succeed . One example is our 233 00:08:48,470 --> 00:08:50,690 constructive service credit program 234 00:08:50,700 --> 00:08:52,811 that allows experienced professionals 235 00:08:52,811 --> 00:08:54,570 from key fields to directly 236 00:08:54,570 --> 00:08:56,860 commissioned into the space force at 237 00:08:56,860 --> 00:08:58,860 ranks appropriate to their civilian 238 00:08:58,860 --> 00:09:00,860 experience . The first constructive 239 00:09:00,860 --> 00:09:03,027 credit board served as a pilot program 240 00:09:03,027 --> 00:09:05,830 in 2022 recruited seven cyber 241 00:09:05,830 --> 00:09:08,220 professionals to become guardians , one 242 00:09:08,220 --> 00:09:10,442 of which was on boarded as a lieutenant 243 00:09:10,442 --> 00:09:12,220 colonel . The second board will 244 00:09:12,220 --> 00:09:14,387 incorporate intelligence professionals 245 00:09:14,387 --> 00:09:17,170 and assess 20 additional personnel over 246 00:09:17,170 --> 00:09:19,281 the last year , we have also deployed 247 00:09:19,281 --> 00:09:21,226 space centric curriculum for basic 248 00:09:21,226 --> 00:09:23,448 military training , the Reserve officer 249 00:09:23,448 --> 00:09:25,614 training corps and an officer training 250 00:09:25,614 --> 00:09:27,830 school . In addition , our partnership 251 00:09:27,830 --> 00:09:29,663 with the Johns Hopkins School of 252 00:09:29,663 --> 00:09:31,608 Advanced International Studies for 253 00:09:31,608 --> 00:09:33,774 professional military education begins 254 00:09:33,774 --> 00:09:36,680 this summer with congressional support , 255 00:09:36,680 --> 00:09:38,569 we will improve our modern talent 256 00:09:38,569 --> 00:09:40,624 management system by integrating the 257 00:09:40,624 --> 00:09:42,680 Air Force reserve space element into 258 00:09:42,680 --> 00:09:44,902 the Space force as a single component . 259 00:09:44,902 --> 00:09:47,124 This will allow guardians to transition 260 00:09:47,124 --> 00:09:49,600 between full time and part time duty to 261 00:09:49,610 --> 00:09:52,050 pursue opportunities outside of full 262 00:09:52,050 --> 00:09:54,410 time military service and subsequently 263 00:09:54,410 --> 00:09:56,320 return to full time duty without 264 00:09:56,320 --> 00:09:58,460 barriers to reentry or detriment to 265 00:09:58,460 --> 00:10:00,780 their career . We will ensure that such 266 00:10:00,780 --> 00:10:02,947 experiences utilized in strict and and 267 00:10:02,947 --> 00:10:04,724 careful compliance with federal 268 00:10:04,724 --> 00:10:06,891 acquisition and ethics regulations and 269 00:10:06,891 --> 00:10:08,724 appropriate conflict of interest 270 00:10:08,724 --> 00:10:10,947 statutes . The single service personnel 271 00:10:10,947 --> 00:10:13,058 management system will make retaining 272 00:10:13,058 --> 00:10:15,113 highly qualified guardians easier by 273 00:10:15,113 --> 00:10:17,470 facilitating flexible career paths and 274 00:10:17,470 --> 00:10:19,526 we look forward to working with this 275 00:10:19,526 --> 00:10:21,248 subcommittee on that important 276 00:10:21,248 --> 00:10:23,026 initiative . My third and final 277 00:10:23,026 --> 00:10:25,303 priority is to strengthen partnerships . 278 00:10:25,303 --> 00:10:27,526 The Space force relies on to accomplish 279 00:10:27,526 --> 00:10:29,470 its mission . The space force will 280 00:10:29,470 --> 00:10:29,410 strive to eliminate barriers to 281 00:10:29,410 --> 00:10:31,090 collaboration including over 282 00:10:31,090 --> 00:10:33,580 classification so we can build enduring 283 00:10:33,580 --> 00:10:35,940 advantages with our partners to date . 284 00:10:35,940 --> 00:10:38,290 Personnel from over 50 countries have 285 00:10:38,290 --> 00:10:40,570 participated in training , education 286 00:10:40,580 --> 00:10:42,880 and exercise events hosted by the space 287 00:10:42,880 --> 00:10:45,140 force . We're also leveraging allies 288 00:10:45,140 --> 00:10:47,362 and partners to expand our war fighting 289 00:10:47,362 --> 00:10:49,418 capability . Recent examples include 290 00:10:49,418 --> 00:10:51,720 deploying us payloads on Norwegian and 291 00:10:51,720 --> 00:10:54,050 Japanese satellites And establishing a 292 00:10:54,050 --> 00:10:55,828 partnership with Luxembourg for 293 00:10:55,828 --> 00:10:58,250 satellite communications services . In 294 00:10:58,250 --> 00:11:00,890 total , we have more than 200 foreign 295 00:11:00,890 --> 00:11:03,390 military sales cases with over 60 296 00:11:03,390 --> 00:11:05,710 countries for a broad spectrum of space 297 00:11:05,710 --> 00:11:08,130 capabilities . Commercial partners will 298 00:11:08,130 --> 00:11:09,741 be key as we pursue emerging 299 00:11:09,741 --> 00:11:11,574 technologies like advanced power 300 00:11:11,574 --> 00:11:13,610 promotion propulsion technologies , 301 00:11:13,620 --> 00:11:15,620 artificial intelligence and machine 302 00:11:15,620 --> 00:11:17,590 learning and in space , servicing 303 00:11:17,590 --> 00:11:20,830 assembly and manufacturing space 304 00:11:20,830 --> 00:11:22,960 systems commands commercial services 305 00:11:22,960 --> 00:11:25,071 office is building these partnerships 306 00:11:25,071 --> 00:11:27,293 to improve our ability to leverage more 307 00:11:27,293 --> 00:11:29,516 commercial off the shelf capabilities . 308 00:11:29,760 --> 00:11:31,730 In conclusion , thank you for the 309 00:11:31,730 --> 00:11:33,841 opportunity to share these priorities 310 00:11:33,841 --> 00:11:36,063 with you today . The Space Force is the 311 00:11:36,063 --> 00:11:38,230 preeminent military Space Organization 312 00:11:38,230 --> 00:11:40,397 in the world . Are adversaries seek to 313 00:11:40,397 --> 00:11:42,619 surpass the United States and challenge 314 00:11:42,619 --> 00:11:44,786 our advantage . We cannot and will not 315 00:11:44,786 --> 00:11:46,841 allow this to happen . Are guardians 316 00:11:46,841 --> 00:11:48,730 will outwork out innovate and out 317 00:11:48,730 --> 00:11:50,730 compete . Our adversaries to ensure 318 00:11:50,730 --> 00:11:52,452 that we succeed . They will do 319 00:11:52,452 --> 00:11:54,563 everything they can to deter conflict 320 00:11:54,563 --> 00:11:56,619 and maintain stability and space . I 321 00:11:56,619 --> 00:11:58,341 very much look forward to your 322 00:11:58,341 --> 00:12:00,508 questions . Thank you . Thank you very 323 00:12:00,508 --> 00:12:02,980 much , General . I want to jump on the 324 00:12:02,990 --> 00:12:05,157 comments you made about recruiting and 325 00:12:05,157 --> 00:12:07,157 particularly bringing people in mid 326 00:12:07,157 --> 00:12:09,101 career and having more flexibility 327 00:12:09,101 --> 00:12:11,268 about leaving and coming back . That's 328 00:12:11,268 --> 00:12:13,880 a , that's a creative idea . Flesh that 329 00:12:13,880 --> 00:12:16,102 out a bit . For me . It strikes me that 330 00:12:16,102 --> 00:12:18,269 that's really going to be necessary in 331 00:12:18,269 --> 00:12:20,380 today's environment , particularly in 332 00:12:20,380 --> 00:12:23,650 the technology field . Yes , sir . We 333 00:12:23,650 --> 00:12:25,483 currently don't have the ability 334 00:12:25,483 --> 00:12:27,650 because our reserves and the guard are 335 00:12:27,650 --> 00:12:29,761 in the air Force , they're in the Air 336 00:12:29,761 --> 00:12:31,706 Force Reserves in the Air National 337 00:12:31,706 --> 00:12:33,928 Guard . So we don't have an option to , 338 00:12:33,928 --> 00:12:36,039 if you leave full time active service 339 00:12:36,039 --> 00:12:38,039 from the Space Force , we lose your 340 00:12:38,039 --> 00:12:40,094 expertise . And so we're looking for 341 00:12:40,094 --> 00:12:42,150 anything that can allow us to retain 342 00:12:42,150 --> 00:12:42,130 those people who might have priorities 343 00:12:42,140 --> 00:12:44,251 that shift , but are still willing to 344 00:12:44,251 --> 00:12:46,418 contribute to the service . Do we need 345 00:12:46,418 --> 00:12:49,440 a Space National Guard ? So I need the 346 00:12:49,440 --> 00:12:51,607 capabilities that are currently in the 347 00:12:51,607 --> 00:12:53,718 Air National Guard . I can assure you 348 00:12:53,718 --> 00:12:55,829 of that . I think there's a couple of 349 00:12:55,829 --> 00:12:58,162 different ways to do it . Um There's we , 350 00:12:58,162 --> 00:12:59,996 we , we assessed three different 351 00:12:59,996 --> 00:13:02,218 options . We could leave things as they 352 00:13:02,218 --> 00:13:04,051 are , which I think is the worst 353 00:13:04,051 --> 00:13:05,940 solution because as General Brown 354 00:13:05,940 --> 00:13:07,884 points out as the Chief of the Air 355 00:13:07,884 --> 00:13:09,920 Force , he doesn't have organized 356 00:13:09,920 --> 00:13:12,031 trained and equipped responsibilities 357 00:13:12,031 --> 00:13:14,142 for space missions , yet he has those 358 00:13:14,142 --> 00:13:16,309 space capabilities in the Air National 359 00:13:16,309 --> 00:13:18,531 Guard . So it creates a little bit of a 360 00:13:18,531 --> 00:13:20,753 conundrum when I'm trying to figure out 361 00:13:20,753 --> 00:13:20,690 how to train forces that are aligned 362 00:13:20,690 --> 00:13:22,690 under the Air National Guard . So I 363 00:13:22,690 --> 00:13:24,523 think the status quo is the most 364 00:13:24,523 --> 00:13:26,468 untenable position , but there are 365 00:13:26,468 --> 00:13:28,690 other options and we're going through a 366 00:13:28,690 --> 00:13:30,857 series of cost estimates to figure out 367 00:13:30,857 --> 00:13:32,968 what a preferred option might be . Is 368 00:13:32,968 --> 00:13:35,079 one of them simply to sort of partner 369 00:13:35,079 --> 00:13:37,134 with the Air National Guard and have 370 00:13:37,134 --> 00:13:38,857 different units have different 371 00:13:38,857 --> 00:13:40,579 functions . Is that one of the 372 00:13:40,579 --> 00:13:42,579 possibilities rather than set up an 373 00:13:42,579 --> 00:13:44,690 entirely new a a space National Guard 374 00:13:44,690 --> 00:13:46,690 structure . Well , we are currently 375 00:13:46,690 --> 00:13:48,857 partnered with the current status , so 376 00:13:48,857 --> 00:13:51,079 we are currently partnered to make sure 377 00:13:51,079 --> 00:13:53,134 we can rely on the capabilities that 378 00:13:53,134 --> 00:13:55,357 are in the Air National Guard . It just 379 00:13:55,357 --> 00:13:57,579 creates a long term sustainment problem 380 00:13:57,579 --> 00:13:59,412 with the difference in organized 381 00:13:59,412 --> 00:13:58,980 trained equipped responsibilities 382 00:13:58,980 --> 00:14:00,980 between the Air Force and the Space 383 00:14:00,980 --> 00:14:03,036 force . Me back up a minute again on 384 00:14:03,036 --> 00:14:04,924 recruiting . How are you doing on 385 00:14:04,924 --> 00:14:07,147 recruiting both in terms of quality and 386 00:14:07,147 --> 00:14:09,258 quantity ? Some of your , some of our 387 00:14:09,258 --> 00:14:09,110 other services are having real problems 388 00:14:09,110 --> 00:14:11,332 with recruiting in this economy , house 389 00:14:11,332 --> 00:14:13,640 Space Force doing . Yeah , I'm almost 390 00:14:13,640 --> 00:14:15,862 embarrassed in front of my , appears to 391 00:14:15,862 --> 00:14:18,084 say it , but we're doing very well . Uh 392 00:14:18,084 --> 00:14:20,307 mostly associated with the fact that we 393 00:14:20,307 --> 00:14:22,362 have much smaller numbers to recruit 394 00:14:22,362 --> 00:14:24,584 and we have the ability to hand pick uh 395 00:14:24,584 --> 00:14:26,807 those that decide they want to join the 396 00:14:26,807 --> 00:14:29,029 space for us . So right now we're doing 397 00:14:29,029 --> 00:14:30,751 okay . The problem is gonna be 398 00:14:30,751 --> 00:14:32,973 sustainment over time in the quality of 399 00:14:32,973 --> 00:14:35,140 the applicants that we can pull in and 400 00:14:35,140 --> 00:14:37,307 then retaining them for long enough to 401 00:14:37,307 --> 00:14:39,473 really benefit from their experience . 402 00:14:39,473 --> 00:14:41,473 Um Turning to you mentioned several 403 00:14:41,473 --> 00:14:43,529 times in your testimony , commercial 404 00:14:43,529 --> 00:14:45,640 assets , commercial space assets . We 405 00:14:45,640 --> 00:14:48,090 know that Russia is trying to jam or 406 00:14:48,090 --> 00:14:50,201 otherwise damage the Starlink network 407 00:14:50,210 --> 00:14:54,040 which is assisting in Ukraine is 408 00:14:54,040 --> 00:14:57,460 that precedent making it more difficult 409 00:14:57,460 --> 00:14:59,870 to partner with commercial satellite 410 00:14:59,870 --> 00:15:01,700 users . One of the , one of the 411 00:15:01,710 --> 00:15:04,260 strategies is proliferation and using , 412 00:15:04,270 --> 00:15:07,910 using commercial satellites is that 413 00:15:07,920 --> 00:15:10,350 our what's been the reaction to what's 414 00:15:10,350 --> 00:15:12,628 been going on with Starlink in Ukraine ? 415 00:15:12,628 --> 00:15:15,150 So commercial augmentation is important 416 00:15:15,160 --> 00:15:17,216 to the Space force for the reasons . 417 00:15:17,216 --> 00:15:18,716 You mentioned resiliency , 418 00:15:18,716 --> 00:15:20,938 diversification of our portfolio across 419 00:15:20,938 --> 00:15:23,049 a broader number of participants . If 420 00:15:23,049 --> 00:15:25,510 you will um the 421 00:15:26,280 --> 00:15:28,890 commercial augmentation Space Reserve , 422 00:15:28,890 --> 00:15:31,150 we're trying to establish what is kind 423 00:15:31,150 --> 00:15:33,206 of like a craft like if you know the 424 00:15:33,206 --> 00:15:35,261 civilian reserve air fleet that uses 425 00:15:35,261 --> 00:15:37,428 commercial capabilities were trying to 426 00:15:37,428 --> 00:15:39,483 explore , we're exploring options to 427 00:15:39,483 --> 00:15:41,483 use something along those lines . I 428 00:15:41,483 --> 00:15:43,650 think the key with commercial industry 429 00:15:43,650 --> 00:15:45,761 is to make sure that the expectations 430 00:15:45,761 --> 00:15:47,817 are managed upfront . So we're going 431 00:15:47,817 --> 00:15:50,039 through a series of plans , we're going 432 00:15:50,039 --> 00:15:52,206 through a series of of industry days . 433 00:15:52,206 --> 00:15:52,180 If you will to clarify , what are the 434 00:15:52,180 --> 00:15:54,880 policy ? What are the contractual ? 435 00:15:54,880 --> 00:15:57,240 What are the legal responsibilities and 436 00:15:57,240 --> 00:15:59,407 hurdles that we have to clear in order 437 00:15:59,407 --> 00:16:01,629 to establish this ? So the expectations 438 00:16:01,629 --> 00:16:03,550 are clear across all spectrums of 439 00:16:03,550 --> 00:16:05,772 conflict crisis , etcetera . So this is 440 00:16:05,772 --> 00:16:09,605 an evolving Kind of uh capability . It 441 00:16:09,605 --> 00:16:11,675 is , but I will tell you that we had 442 00:16:11,675 --> 00:16:13,675 significant interest . We hosted an 443 00:16:13,675 --> 00:16:15,619 industry day along these lines and 444 00:16:15,619 --> 00:16:17,397 there were 84 participants from 445 00:16:17,397 --> 00:16:19,453 commercial industry so that there is 446 00:16:19,453 --> 00:16:21,564 interest in doing this . Now in my 45 447 00:16:21,564 --> 00:16:23,508 seconds left , I'm gonna ask you a 448 00:16:23,508 --> 00:16:25,508 question that I get asked at home . 449 00:16:25,508 --> 00:16:25,235 What's the difference between space 450 00:16:25,235 --> 00:16:28,215 force and space command ? I get asked 451 00:16:28,215 --> 00:16:29,993 that at home too sometimes so I 452 00:16:29,993 --> 00:16:32,160 appreciate it . It's as simple as any 453 00:16:32,160 --> 00:16:34,104 of the combatant commands with the 454 00:16:34,104 --> 00:16:36,216 other services . If you were to think 455 00:16:36,216 --> 00:16:38,382 about us , Central Command and the U S 456 00:16:38,382 --> 00:16:40,493 Air Force or Indo Pacific Command and 457 00:16:40,493 --> 00:16:42,382 the U S Navy uh for the U S Space 458 00:16:42,382 --> 00:16:44,604 Command and U S Space Force , we simply 459 00:16:44,604 --> 00:16:46,827 have different responsibilities . Um As 460 00:16:46,827 --> 00:16:48,827 the Chief of the Space Force , I've 461 00:16:48,827 --> 00:16:50,938 responsibility organize , train equip 462 00:16:50,938 --> 00:16:50,890 and operate the forces that are then 463 00:16:50,890 --> 00:16:53,820 presented to us . Space Command who has 464 00:16:53,820 --> 00:16:55,876 the authority from the president and 465 00:16:55,876 --> 00:16:57,820 the Secretary of Defense to direct 466 00:16:57,820 --> 00:17:00,020 those operations . So you're organized 467 00:17:00,020 --> 00:17:03,130 training , equip . Space Command is , 468 00:17:03,140 --> 00:17:05,820 is operate or fight . They have the 469 00:17:05,820 --> 00:17:08,042 authority from the president to conduct 470 00:17:08,042 --> 00:17:10,098 those missions and they would direct 471 00:17:10,098 --> 00:17:11,820 our forces that are , that are 472 00:17:11,820 --> 00:17:13,653 presented to them to conduct the 473 00:17:13,653 --> 00:17:15,709 operations . Thank you . Thank you , 474 00:17:15,709 --> 00:17:17,820 General Senator Fischer . Thank you , 475 00:17:17,820 --> 00:17:19,820 Mr Chairman General as we discussed 476 00:17:19,820 --> 00:17:21,920 last year , the next Gen O P I R 477 00:17:21,930 --> 00:17:24,152 satellite program . It's one of the key 478 00:17:24,152 --> 00:17:25,986 components of our future missile 479 00:17:25,986 --> 00:17:27,810 warning architecture along with 480 00:17:27,820 --> 00:17:30,510 proliferated constellations of smaller 481 00:17:30,510 --> 00:17:32,490 satellites operating in the lower 482 00:17:32,490 --> 00:17:34,950 orbits . Uh During your nomination 483 00:17:34,950 --> 00:17:37,180 hearing , you stated that having no 484 00:17:37,180 --> 00:17:39,280 gaps in coverage for missile warning 485 00:17:39,280 --> 00:17:42,040 was a high priority . Uh The missile 486 00:17:42,040 --> 00:17:45,450 warning mission is the cornerstone of 487 00:17:45,450 --> 00:17:47,760 our strategic deterrent . You know , if 488 00:17:47,760 --> 00:17:50,800 we can't effectively respond 489 00:17:51,380 --> 00:17:55,340 if we can't detect when our adversaries 490 00:17:55,340 --> 00:17:58,400 are launching nuclear weapons , um 491 00:17:58,410 --> 00:18:01,770 We're in trouble and so it is very 492 00:18:01,770 --> 00:18:05,320 important that we continued to fund 493 00:18:05,330 --> 00:18:08,140 uh this next Gen O P I R . 494 00:18:14,990 --> 00:18:17,320 I'm concerned to see that the space 495 00:18:17,320 --> 00:18:21,100 force's fiscal year 2024 bequest 496 00:18:21,110 --> 00:18:24,970 appears to propose cutting the third G 497 00:18:24,970 --> 00:18:28,660 O next Gen O P I R satellite . Does the 498 00:18:28,660 --> 00:18:30,820 space force intend to complete that 499 00:18:30,820 --> 00:18:32,987 architecture as planned ? And if not , 500 00:18:32,987 --> 00:18:35,264 how are you going to mitigate it ? Yes , 501 00:18:35,264 --> 00:18:38,180 ma'am . Yes , ma'am . Thank you . The 502 00:18:38,190 --> 00:18:40,600 real architecture that we need is the 503 00:18:40,600 --> 00:18:43,990 one that is under that . Yes , 504 00:18:44,540 --> 00:18:47,370 it is . Can you hear me ? So the the 505 00:18:47,370 --> 00:18:49,592 architecture that we really need is one 506 00:18:49,592 --> 00:18:51,926 that's survivable in a contested domain . 507 00:18:51,926 --> 00:18:53,703 That's the proliferated leo and 508 00:18:53,703 --> 00:18:55,926 multiple orbits to include middle earth 509 00:18:55,926 --> 00:18:58,540 orbit orbits as well . Um So that's 510 00:18:58,540 --> 00:19:00,760 what the Space Development Agency and 511 00:19:00,760 --> 00:19:02,593 the swag analysis that we did is 512 00:19:02,593 --> 00:19:04,649 progressing towards . And that's the 513 00:19:04,649 --> 00:19:06,649 investment we made in fy 24 to make 514 00:19:06,649 --> 00:19:09,220 that pivot because that's a pretty big 515 00:19:09,220 --> 00:19:11,220 technical shift . We wanted to make 516 00:19:11,220 --> 00:19:13,331 sure that we for this no fail mission 517 00:19:13,331 --> 00:19:15,387 had some hedges to make sure that we 518 00:19:15,387 --> 00:19:17,664 didn't miss anything . So next gen Opr , 519 00:19:17,664 --> 00:19:19,664 we are committed to putting that on 520 00:19:19,664 --> 00:19:21,870 orbit . Uh And we felt like a two by 521 00:19:21,870 --> 00:19:24,870 two was sufficient to ensure one that 522 00:19:24,870 --> 00:19:26,870 the mission did not have any gaps . 523 00:19:26,870 --> 00:19:29,092 It's a no fail mission to that . It was 524 00:19:29,092 --> 00:19:31,037 a hedge against any technical risk 525 00:19:31,037 --> 00:19:33,400 associated with the pivot to the more 526 00:19:33,400 --> 00:19:35,344 survivable missile warning missile 527 00:19:35,344 --> 00:19:37,567 track architecture . You're saying that 528 00:19:37,567 --> 00:19:40,620 um with this pivot to the to lower 529 00:19:40,620 --> 00:19:44,160 orbits . Uh You have no plans then to 530 00:19:44,160 --> 00:19:47,650 look at the GEO . Now we , we have the 531 00:19:47,650 --> 00:19:50,900 plans with next Gen O P I R for two G O 532 00:19:50,900 --> 00:19:53,122 and two he oh that constellation we are 533 00:19:53,122 --> 00:19:55,178 still supporting in the fy 24 budget 534 00:19:55,178 --> 00:19:57,240 has those four satellites in it . 535 00:19:57,250 --> 00:19:59,380 That's the , that's the long term 536 00:19:59,390 --> 00:20:02,380 transition to the proliferated missile 537 00:20:02,380 --> 00:20:04,850 warning . But GEO satellites are too 538 00:20:04,850 --> 00:20:07,090 much of a target . So having them in 539 00:20:07,090 --> 00:20:09,312 lower than Middle Earth orbit creates a 540 00:20:09,312 --> 00:20:11,257 targeting problem for an adversary 541 00:20:11,257 --> 00:20:13,479 which actually lowers the threshold for 542 00:20:13,479 --> 00:20:15,730 attack on orbit . It's more resilient 543 00:20:15,730 --> 00:20:17,786 and it creates a level of deterrence 544 00:20:17,786 --> 00:20:19,452 because they can't attack the 545 00:20:19,452 --> 00:20:23,270 satellites . It seems like on the 546 00:20:23,280 --> 00:20:25,730 major acquisition programs that are 547 00:20:25,730 --> 00:20:29,650 executed by Space force have been late . 548 00:20:29,660 --> 00:20:33,130 Um They have cost overruns or 549 00:20:33,130 --> 00:20:35,530 both . Uh does the Space Force 550 00:20:35,530 --> 00:20:39,440 acquisition community , I guess I 551 00:20:39,440 --> 00:20:41,551 would say to you , how do you plan to 552 00:20:41,551 --> 00:20:43,850 address that ? And do you agree with my 553 00:20:43,850 --> 00:20:47,150 assessment ? Well , I've been doing in 554 00:20:47,150 --> 00:20:49,261 this business a long time and so I've 555 00:20:49,261 --> 00:20:51,261 certainly seen the same things that 556 00:20:51,261 --> 00:20:53,428 you're noting there . So I can't argue 557 00:20:53,428 --> 00:20:55,539 with the facts about cost overrunning 558 00:20:55,539 --> 00:20:57,539 schedules . What I will say is I've 559 00:20:57,539 --> 00:20:59,706 been very impressed with the way Frank 560 00:20:59,706 --> 00:21:01,817 Calve Ellie has reorganized how we're 561 00:21:01,817 --> 00:21:03,817 doing space acquisition uh with his 562 00:21:03,817 --> 00:21:05,872 appointment as the undersecretary of 563 00:21:05,872 --> 00:21:07,817 the Assistant Secretary of the Air 564 00:21:07,817 --> 00:21:10,150 Force for space acquisition integration . 565 00:21:10,150 --> 00:21:12,039 He's focused on several different 566 00:21:12,039 --> 00:21:15,170 things . Buying small satellites having 567 00:21:15,180 --> 00:21:18,310 shorter term contracts going with uh 568 00:21:18,320 --> 00:21:20,620 well developed technology so that we 569 00:21:20,620 --> 00:21:22,453 don't have as many non recurring 570 00:21:22,453 --> 00:21:25,220 engineering costs . Uh And when you say 571 00:21:25,230 --> 00:21:27,341 I'm sorry to interrupt you , but when 572 00:21:27,341 --> 00:21:30,140 you say well developed technology , um 573 00:21:30,150 --> 00:21:32,500 is that you want to make sure things 574 00:21:32,500 --> 00:21:34,780 are proven . Would you say your risk 575 00:21:34,780 --> 00:21:37,730 adverse ? Then I would say we want to 576 00:21:37,730 --> 00:21:39,841 make sure before we commit to putting 577 00:21:39,841 --> 00:21:41,952 something on orbit . If there is well 578 00:21:41,952 --> 00:21:43,841 developed technology , we want to 579 00:21:43,841 --> 00:21:45,619 leverage it to the max extent . 580 00:21:45,619 --> 00:21:47,786 Otherwise you have to build everything 581 00:21:47,786 --> 00:21:47,780 from scratch and it delays things and 582 00:21:47,780 --> 00:21:49,947 there's there's requirement shifts and 583 00:21:49,947 --> 00:21:51,947 it can get in that spiral where you 584 00:21:51,947 --> 00:21:53,669 spend more money and delay the 585 00:21:53,669 --> 00:21:55,613 timelines . So where there is well 586 00:21:55,613 --> 00:21:55,610 developed technologies , we should take 587 00:21:55,610 --> 00:21:57,610 advantage of those . And I think in 588 00:21:57,610 --> 00:21:59,721 satellite production , that's exactly 589 00:21:59,721 --> 00:22:02,850 where Mr Cavalese head is on that . And 590 00:22:02,850 --> 00:22:05,320 so while again , I can't speak to all 591 00:22:05,320 --> 00:22:07,960 the programs that have existed since 592 00:22:07,960 --> 00:22:10,238 we've been putting satellites on orbit . 593 00:22:10,238 --> 00:22:12,127 I can certainly tell you that the 594 00:22:12,127 --> 00:22:14,293 acquisition community has shifted to a 595 00:22:14,293 --> 00:22:16,404 different mindset for how it acquires 596 00:22:16,404 --> 00:22:18,182 systems . And I think the space 597 00:22:18,182 --> 00:22:20,016 development agencies acquisition 598 00:22:20,016 --> 00:22:21,960 strategy for the missile warning , 599 00:22:21,960 --> 00:22:23,738 missile tracking and space data 600 00:22:23,738 --> 00:22:25,738 transport layer is an example where 601 00:22:25,738 --> 00:22:27,738 it's going in about four years from 602 00:22:27,738 --> 00:22:29,960 order to orbit , which is substantially 603 00:22:29,960 --> 00:22:31,738 better than we've seen in other 604 00:22:31,738 --> 00:22:35,690 programs . Now , I'd like to call 605 00:22:35,690 --> 00:22:38,060 on our only subcommittee member who's 606 00:22:38,060 --> 00:22:41,810 been in space . Senator Kelly , thank 607 00:22:41,810 --> 00:22:45,150 you , Mr Chairman . Um I had a couple 608 00:22:45,160 --> 00:22:46,938 detailed questions and then the 609 00:22:46,938 --> 00:22:49,049 chairman asked both both of them . So 610 00:22:49,049 --> 00:22:51,450 I'm gonna go a little bit different , 611 00:22:52,820 --> 00:22:55,890 different approach here . So um 612 00:22:56,680 --> 00:22:59,430 to the ranking members question , you 613 00:22:59,440 --> 00:23:03,010 um talked about that . 614 00:23:03,020 --> 00:23:05,570 Uh There's a little bit of a deterrent 615 00:23:05,570 --> 00:23:08,260 by putting something at a lower orbit . 616 00:23:08,270 --> 00:23:11,840 I think you said , why is , why is that , 617 00:23:11,850 --> 00:23:15,400 why is , is it more likely 618 00:23:16,020 --> 00:23:19,050 that an adversary goes , goes after 619 00:23:19,050 --> 00:23:21,640 something at GEO than it is if they are 620 00:23:21,640 --> 00:23:24,200 at a floor orbit , 621 00:23:25,920 --> 00:23:27,753 if this sounds at all , like I'm 622 00:23:27,753 --> 00:23:29,920 lecturing an astronaut , I promise I'm 623 00:23:29,920 --> 00:23:32,170 not . So the , it's more than just the 624 00:23:32,170 --> 00:23:34,710 orbital regime in low earth orbit to 625 00:23:34,710 --> 00:23:36,932 provide the coverage , you have to have 626 00:23:36,932 --> 00:23:39,410 a vastly greater number of satellites , 627 00:23:39,420 --> 00:23:42,090 dozens instead of from GEO , you can 628 00:23:42,090 --> 00:23:44,257 have a single orbit that would look at 629 00:23:44,257 --> 00:23:46,450 a third of the earth . So by going to 630 00:23:46,450 --> 00:23:48,394 the low earth orbit , we're buying 631 00:23:48,394 --> 00:23:50,520 smaller satellites and more of more 632 00:23:50,520 --> 00:23:52,840 satellites creates a tart , which one 633 00:23:52,840 --> 00:23:54,784 do you want to shoot down that you 634 00:23:54,784 --> 00:23:56,840 think is going to be the problem for 635 00:23:56,840 --> 00:23:58,562 the mission . It's just , it's 636 00:23:58,562 --> 00:24:00,673 proliferated . Leo so more they gotta 637 00:24:00,673 --> 00:24:02,951 shoot , shoot more rounds , a lot more , 638 00:24:02,951 --> 00:24:05,118 take out the capability . So much more 639 00:24:05,118 --> 00:24:07,229 that I think the escalatory threshold 640 00:24:07,229 --> 00:24:09,118 is raised to the point where they 641 00:24:09,118 --> 00:24:08,580 probably wouldn't , wouldn't do it . 642 00:24:08,680 --> 00:24:11,550 Okay . Okay . That's helpful general 643 00:24:12,970 --> 00:24:16,490 of the N Roo Air Force Space Force 644 00:24:16,490 --> 00:24:20,320 satellites . Um that we put into orbit . 645 00:24:20,330 --> 00:24:23,870 Um What percentage of those is space 646 00:24:23,870 --> 00:24:27,280 force responsible for the , you know , 647 00:24:27,280 --> 00:24:29,430 the contracting , the the management 648 00:24:29,430 --> 00:24:32,490 management of the , you know , the 649 00:24:32,490 --> 00:24:34,630 operations to get these two , they're 650 00:24:34,630 --> 00:24:38,190 targeted orbit compared to the N R 651 00:24:38,190 --> 00:24:40,500 O . Well , yeah , like what percentage 652 00:24:40,500 --> 00:24:43,950 do you have , sir ? I let me get back 653 00:24:43,950 --> 00:24:46,930 to you with but the N R O N R O has a 654 00:24:46,930 --> 00:24:48,763 number of constellations for its 655 00:24:48,763 --> 00:24:51,050 mission set . We have , I'm trying to 656 00:24:51,050 --> 00:24:53,272 think if there's any examples , we have 657 00:24:53,272 --> 00:24:55,217 the vast majority of Department of 658 00:24:55,217 --> 00:24:57,272 Defense satellites have now migrated 659 00:24:57,272 --> 00:24:59,050 those missions . Not all of the 660 00:24:59,050 --> 00:24:58,750 Department of Defense Defense 661 00:24:58,750 --> 00:25:00,861 Satellites . I always hesitate to say 662 00:25:00,861 --> 00:25:04,310 all . But um but I'm struggling to 663 00:25:04,310 --> 00:25:07,060 think of an example and , and how many 664 00:25:07,070 --> 00:25:10,270 launch providers do you have that you 665 00:25:10,270 --> 00:25:12,550 contract with currently to get those 666 00:25:12,550 --> 00:25:15,610 satellites into orbit to ? And those 667 00:25:15,610 --> 00:25:19,610 are uh U L A and SpaceX and 668 00:25:19,620 --> 00:25:21,731 actually for demos and other things , 669 00:25:21,731 --> 00:25:24,940 we've contracted other uh providers as 670 00:25:24,940 --> 00:25:26,996 well . I can get you the full number 671 00:25:26,996 --> 00:25:30,700 and , and uh to date while you've been 672 00:25:30,710 --> 00:25:32,877 involved with this . So we're seeing , 673 00:25:32,877 --> 00:25:34,821 you know , typical kind of success 674 00:25:34,821 --> 00:25:36,766 rates and safety records from both 675 00:25:36,766 --> 00:25:39,840 companies and no 676 00:25:39,840 --> 00:25:43,490 identifiable , you know , problems um 677 00:25:44,470 --> 00:25:48,370 with that you , that you feel puts our 678 00:25:48,380 --> 00:25:52,360 satellites at risk . I mean , it's been 679 00:25:52,360 --> 00:25:55,420 a while since we've had an accident . I 680 00:25:55,420 --> 00:25:57,587 mean , I saw one a long time ago and N 681 00:25:57,587 --> 00:25:59,809 R O satellite actually that happened to 682 00:25:59,809 --> 00:26:01,920 be down at the Kennedy Space Center . 683 00:26:01,920 --> 00:26:01,790 Watch this thing blow up right after 684 00:26:01,790 --> 00:26:04,360 liftoff was on console that happened in 685 00:26:04,360 --> 00:26:06,304 California just walked out of crew 686 00:26:06,304 --> 00:26:08,200 quarters . Saw this wasn't even 687 00:26:08,200 --> 00:26:10,311 expecting it , saw this rocket launch 688 00:26:10,311 --> 00:26:12,820 and then explode about 15 seconds later . 689 00:26:13,210 --> 00:26:15,377 You never want to see . Yeah . So it's 690 00:26:15,377 --> 00:26:17,543 great that we've , we've gotten better 691 00:26:17,543 --> 00:26:20,220 at this and , you know , SpaceX has a , 692 00:26:21,440 --> 00:26:23,718 I'd say a pretty remarkable , you know , 693 00:26:23,718 --> 00:26:26,190 record of success . Um You L A as well , 694 00:26:26,200 --> 00:26:28,200 we just need to keep that going . I 695 00:26:28,200 --> 00:26:31,780 think it's important to be , um , you 696 00:26:31,780 --> 00:26:33,891 know , just constantly trying to look 697 00:26:33,891 --> 00:26:36,002 ahead and seeing what that next , you 698 00:26:36,002 --> 00:26:38,058 know , failure mode is and make sure 699 00:26:38,058 --> 00:26:40,169 you have the workforce that is really 700 00:26:40,169 --> 00:26:42,280 tracking this stuff closely because , 701 00:26:42,280 --> 00:26:44,447 you know , some of these assets are in 702 00:26:44,447 --> 00:26:46,558 the billions , billions of dollars as 703 00:26:46,558 --> 00:26:49,320 you know , general . So , um I've got 704 00:26:49,320 --> 00:26:51,542 another question . Um well , actually I 705 00:26:51,542 --> 00:26:53,709 do have about 50 seconds . So let me , 706 00:26:53,709 --> 00:26:55,876 so space force has been around now for 707 00:26:55,876 --> 00:26:59,800 a couple of years . Um I think maybe 708 00:26:59,800 --> 00:27:01,800 three years that right , over three 709 00:27:01,800 --> 00:27:03,960 years and some of the guardians 710 00:27:03,960 --> 00:27:06,080 incurred about a two year commitment 711 00:27:06,090 --> 00:27:08,140 when they transferred from the Air 712 00:27:08,140 --> 00:27:11,620 Force or from another service . They're 713 00:27:11,620 --> 00:27:14,310 coming up on the end of that time . Are 714 00:27:14,310 --> 00:27:16,390 you seeing a good , you know , 715 00:27:16,400 --> 00:27:18,960 reenlistment rate for the enlisted 716 00:27:18,960 --> 00:27:21,016 ranks and officers that are going to 717 00:27:21,016 --> 00:27:23,290 stay on ? I think the day the , the 718 00:27:23,290 --> 00:27:25,457 final assessment is still out a little 719 00:27:25,457 --> 00:27:27,623 bit because we wanna see , I wanna see 720 00:27:27,623 --> 00:27:29,846 it all play out the full cycle play out 721 00:27:29,846 --> 00:27:29,480 before I really commit to this . But 722 00:27:29,490 --> 00:27:31,790 I'm encouraged so far and I think we're 723 00:27:31,790 --> 00:27:33,901 providing the kind of challenges that 724 00:27:33,901 --> 00:27:36,012 the workforce is looking for . And so 725 00:27:36,012 --> 00:27:38,123 I'm still hopeful that we're gonna be 726 00:27:38,123 --> 00:27:40,068 at good retention numbers , but we 727 00:27:40,068 --> 00:27:42,179 probably need to let this full summer 728 00:27:42,179 --> 00:27:44,401 cycle play out before we judge . Okay . 729 00:27:44,401 --> 00:27:46,401 Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman 730 00:27:46,401 --> 00:27:48,410 Senator Tuberville . Thank you , Mr 731 00:27:48,410 --> 00:27:50,770 Chairman . Um You know , you've been in , 732 00:27:50,780 --> 00:27:53,250 you've been in your position now . What ? 733 00:27:53,260 --> 00:27:55,149 Less than a year , correct ? Four 734 00:27:55,149 --> 00:27:58,140 months , four months , Give us your 735 00:27:58,140 --> 00:28:01,830 number one priority for space force . I 736 00:28:01,830 --> 00:28:03,886 need to make sure that the Guardians 737 00:28:03,886 --> 00:28:05,886 are ready to meet the threat . I've 738 00:28:05,886 --> 00:28:07,941 said this from day one , the systems 739 00:28:07,941 --> 00:28:10,163 that were buying our exquisite . I want 740 00:28:10,163 --> 00:28:12,219 to make sure that the guardians have 741 00:28:12,219 --> 00:28:13,997 the training and the ability to 742 00:28:13,997 --> 00:28:16,108 practice their trade , craft reps and 743 00:28:16,108 --> 00:28:18,108 sets . I call it , we've got to get 744 00:28:18,108 --> 00:28:20,274 those into the guardian's so that they 745 00:28:20,274 --> 00:28:22,274 validate their tactics and they are 746 00:28:22,274 --> 00:28:24,052 trained to meet any adversarial 747 00:28:24,052 --> 00:28:26,108 challenge that's thrown at them . So 748 00:28:26,108 --> 00:28:28,219 it's more training and people than it 749 00:28:28,219 --> 00:28:29,941 is anything . There's a lot of 750 00:28:29,941 --> 00:28:32,163 challenges . That's what I'm focused on 751 00:28:32,163 --> 00:28:31,920 right now because I think it was the 752 00:28:31,920 --> 00:28:34,800 biggest gap from converting . I like to 753 00:28:34,800 --> 00:28:36,856 use the example that we're trying to 754 00:28:36,856 --> 00:28:38,856 turn a merchant marine into the U S 755 00:28:38,856 --> 00:28:41,450 Navy right , we , we have to convert 756 00:28:41,460 --> 00:28:43,571 this uh space force that we had for a 757 00:28:43,571 --> 00:28:45,516 benign environment into one that's 758 00:28:45,516 --> 00:28:47,682 contesting the domain . Is this a slow 759 00:28:47,682 --> 00:28:50,730 process ? Uh Sometimes it's slower than 760 00:28:50,730 --> 00:28:53,320 I'd like , but I like our progress . Uh 761 00:28:53,330 --> 00:28:55,497 So I need to buy them the simulators , 762 00:28:55,497 --> 00:28:57,663 the virtual ranges that takes a little 763 00:28:57,663 --> 00:28:59,441 bit of time . But we're already 764 00:28:59,441 --> 00:29:01,552 building a new force generation model 765 00:29:01,552 --> 00:29:03,663 so that we've , we've established the 766 00:29:03,663 --> 00:29:05,441 time to do the training , we've 767 00:29:05,441 --> 00:29:05,390 established the new training 768 00:29:05,390 --> 00:29:07,446 requirements and now we just have to 769 00:29:07,446 --> 00:29:11,100 get after it . So space com has an RDT 770 00:29:11,100 --> 00:29:14,640 and e budget of 19.2 billion And a 771 00:29:14,640 --> 00:29:17,260 proposed procurement budget of only 4.7 772 00:29:17,260 --> 00:29:18,927 billion . What's driving that 773 00:29:18,927 --> 00:29:21,280 difference ? And uh you see that change 774 00:29:21,280 --> 00:29:23,391 in the next few years , sir , this is 775 00:29:23,391 --> 00:29:25,730 just , this is the way the space force 776 00:29:25,740 --> 00:29:27,907 has to do its business because so much 777 00:29:27,907 --> 00:29:30,360 of our effort is spent in developing 778 00:29:30,580 --> 00:29:32,636 the satellites . And we don't have a 779 00:29:32,636 --> 00:29:34,802 lot of , we don't have to put a lot of 780 00:29:34,802 --> 00:29:36,969 satellites on orbit traditionally . So 781 00:29:36,969 --> 00:29:39,136 there's less procurement than there is 782 00:29:39,136 --> 00:29:41,302 R D T and E . And so I think it's just 783 00:29:41,302 --> 00:29:43,413 the nature of the space business that 784 00:29:43,413 --> 00:29:45,524 we are front loaded a little bit in , 785 00:29:45,524 --> 00:29:47,691 in terms of procurement to R D T and E 786 00:29:47,691 --> 00:29:49,858 balance relative to what you might see 787 00:29:49,858 --> 00:29:51,969 in some of the other services that by 788 00:29:51,969 --> 00:29:53,969 so many versions of that thing that 789 00:29:53,969 --> 00:29:55,969 they do R D T and E for fighters or 790 00:29:55,969 --> 00:29:58,191 tanks or the like . And so even when we 791 00:29:58,191 --> 00:30:00,247 go to a proliferated constellation , 792 00:30:00,247 --> 00:30:02,247 our numbers will be so much smaller 793 00:30:02,247 --> 00:30:04,247 than , than what the other services 794 00:30:04,247 --> 00:30:06,247 have to buy . Yeah , in your mind , 795 00:30:06,247 --> 00:30:08,413 what cybersecurity standards , minimum 796 00:30:08,413 --> 00:30:10,524 do you think new commercial satellite 797 00:30:10,524 --> 00:30:12,830 should have ? Uh I'm worried about the 798 00:30:12,830 --> 00:30:15,930 ground infrastructure uh and how and 799 00:30:15,930 --> 00:30:17,930 how the links are protected to make 800 00:30:17,930 --> 00:30:19,819 sure that we have access to those 801 00:30:19,819 --> 00:30:22,041 capabilities that are put on orbit . So 802 00:30:22,041 --> 00:30:24,263 in , in commercial terms , I'm a little 803 00:30:24,263 --> 00:30:26,374 less worried about the on orbit cyber 804 00:30:26,374 --> 00:30:28,430 protections as , as much as I am the 805 00:30:28,430 --> 00:30:30,374 ground network . And I think those 806 00:30:30,374 --> 00:30:32,374 cyber protection standards are well 807 00:30:32,374 --> 00:30:34,097 understood and we can hold the 808 00:30:34,097 --> 00:30:36,152 commercial providers accountable for 809 00:30:36,152 --> 00:30:39,170 putting cyber uh defense capabilities 810 00:30:39,180 --> 00:30:42,380 onto the ground networks . I've had 811 00:30:42,380 --> 00:30:46,190 several private companies 812 00:30:46,190 --> 00:30:48,246 come by my office saying they have a 813 00:30:48,246 --> 00:30:50,730 great idea how to take space debris 814 00:30:51,840 --> 00:30:55,090 down . Have you talked to quite a few 815 00:30:55,090 --> 00:30:58,430 of those ? I have , what do you 816 00:30:58,430 --> 00:31:01,760 think ? I think ? Well , we privatize 817 00:31:01,760 --> 00:31:05,130 it in the , at the end of the day . I 818 00:31:05,130 --> 00:31:07,241 think there's a lot of different ways 819 00:31:07,241 --> 00:31:09,297 to go after that sort of problem . I 820 00:31:09,297 --> 00:31:10,908 haven't seen uh demonstrated 821 00:31:10,908 --> 00:31:13,130 capabilities and I'm always thinking in 822 00:31:13,130 --> 00:31:15,352 terms of , you know , it's one thing to 823 00:31:15,352 --> 00:31:17,186 have a pitch that says we can do 824 00:31:17,186 --> 00:31:19,130 something that's another to have a 825 00:31:19,130 --> 00:31:21,186 demonstrated capability . Um I'll be 826 00:31:21,186 --> 00:31:23,241 honest , we do a lot of , of serious 827 00:31:23,241 --> 00:31:25,463 effort making sure we understand what's 828 00:31:25,463 --> 00:31:27,463 on orbit and preventing debris from 829 00:31:27,463 --> 00:31:29,630 hitting each other or , or things that 830 00:31:29,630 --> 00:31:31,741 we care about right now . I would say 831 00:31:31,741 --> 00:31:33,797 this isn't my number one challenge . 832 00:31:33,797 --> 00:31:35,797 But if somebody feels like they can 833 00:31:35,797 --> 00:31:37,963 demonstrate a capability , cleaning up 834 00:31:37,963 --> 00:31:40,130 debris is , is an important concept as 835 00:31:40,130 --> 00:31:42,352 well . It's gonna get worse and worse . 836 00:31:42,352 --> 00:31:44,574 Right . It's not gonna , it's not gonna 837 00:31:44,574 --> 00:31:46,610 clean itself up . A lot of people 838 00:31:46,610 --> 00:31:48,777 believe that conflict with China could 839 00:31:48,777 --> 00:31:50,888 very well start in space . What might 840 00:31:50,888 --> 00:31:54,830 that look like ? One day the , 841 00:31:54,840 --> 00:31:56,840 the Chinese and the Russians have , 842 00:31:56,840 --> 00:31:59,062 have gone to school on us over the last 843 00:31:59,062 --> 00:32:01,284 20 years and they know that we've built 844 00:32:01,284 --> 00:32:03,284 a joint force structure that relies 845 00:32:03,284 --> 00:32:05,340 heavily on the assumption that space 846 00:32:05,340 --> 00:32:07,396 capabilities will be there . Whether 847 00:32:07,396 --> 00:32:09,673 it's a precision navigation and timing , 848 00:32:09,673 --> 00:32:11,896 whether it's satellite communications , 849 00:32:11,896 --> 00:32:14,007 the missile warning that we , we rely 850 00:32:14,007 --> 00:32:16,173 on and the intelligence , surveillance 851 00:32:16,173 --> 00:32:18,284 and reconnaissance , persistence that 852 00:32:18,284 --> 00:32:20,451 we have with space capabilities , they 853 00:32:20,451 --> 00:32:22,562 know we rely on that . And so if they 854 00:32:22,562 --> 00:32:24,618 can blind us , if they can interfere 855 00:32:24,618 --> 00:32:26,840 with those capabilities or God forbid , 856 00:32:26,840 --> 00:32:28,840 destroy them completely , they know 857 00:32:28,840 --> 00:32:31,007 that that will diminish our advantages 858 00:32:31,007 --> 00:32:33,229 and , and put the joint force at risk . 859 00:32:33,229 --> 00:32:35,396 Uh So I can see , interfering with , I 860 00:32:35,396 --> 00:32:37,700 can see blinding , I can see some of 861 00:32:37,700 --> 00:32:40,450 those gray area kinds of attacks on our 862 00:32:40,450 --> 00:32:42,506 capabilities to try to put us behind 863 00:32:42,506 --> 00:32:45,020 the eight ball . That balloon wasn't in 864 00:32:45,020 --> 00:32:47,530 your purview , was it ? No , sir . 865 00:32:47,810 --> 00:32:50,500 60,000 ft when they call it near space , 866 00:32:50,500 --> 00:32:52,278 but I like to call it far air . 867 00:32:57,470 --> 00:33:00,480 Thank you , Senator Rosen . 868 00:33:01,930 --> 00:33:04,260 Well , thank you , Chairman King and 869 00:33:04,270 --> 00:33:06,980 ranking member Fisher . Uh Good to be 870 00:33:06,980 --> 00:33:09,370 here today and holding this hearing and 871 00:33:09,370 --> 00:33:11,620 General Saltzman . Thank you so much 872 00:33:11,630 --> 00:33:14,130 for everything you're doing and I know 873 00:33:14,130 --> 00:33:16,470 everyone's been talking about workforce 874 00:33:16,470 --> 00:33:18,192 is key . We need a pipeline of 875 00:33:18,192 --> 00:33:20,350 qualified individuals . Um going 876 00:33:20,350 --> 00:33:22,350 forward , you're just young , three 877 00:33:22,350 --> 00:33:24,610 years old trying to get this workforce 878 00:33:24,610 --> 00:33:26,832 and especially like you said , research 879 00:33:26,832 --> 00:33:30,620 and development critical um to protect 880 00:33:30,620 --> 00:33:32,731 our country and our families from the 881 00:33:32,731 --> 00:33:34,731 threat we feel from space . So stem 882 00:33:34,731 --> 00:33:36,953 education , I talk about an awful lot , 883 00:33:36,953 --> 00:33:39,120 but I really believe that investing in 884 00:33:39,120 --> 00:33:41,120 stem education is just essential to 885 00:33:41,120 --> 00:33:43,120 matching our adversaries increasing 886 00:33:43,120 --> 00:33:45,342 capabilities as you have alluded to and 887 00:33:45,342 --> 00:33:47,564 also to addressing all of our tech work 888 00:33:47,564 --> 00:33:49,787 force shortages . So General Saltzman , 889 00:33:49,787 --> 00:33:51,787 during your confirmation hearing in 890 00:33:51,787 --> 00:33:53,953 September , you highlighted that space 891 00:33:53,953 --> 00:33:55,898 force has established a university 892 00:33:55,898 --> 00:33:57,898 partnership program partnering with 893 00:33:57,898 --> 00:33:59,842 universities across the country to 894 00:33:59,842 --> 00:34:01,842 provide stem students with research 895 00:34:01,842 --> 00:34:03,898 opportunities and increased guardian 896 00:34:03,898 --> 00:34:06,750 retention . And so how is space force 897 00:34:06,750 --> 00:34:08,750 growth and retention benefited from 898 00:34:08,750 --> 00:34:10,806 this program ? I'm really excited to 899 00:34:10,806 --> 00:34:13,139 hear about that . And what can Congress ? 900 00:34:13,139 --> 00:34:15,250 What can we do better to support this 901 00:34:15,250 --> 00:34:17,361 program specifically ? And maybe some 902 00:34:17,361 --> 00:34:19,306 national security folks focus stem 903 00:34:19,306 --> 00:34:21,194 education initiatives at American 904 00:34:21,194 --> 00:34:25,130 Universities uh Generally . Thank you 905 00:34:25,130 --> 00:34:27,297 for that because any opportunity I get 906 00:34:27,297 --> 00:34:29,408 to talk about how great our guardians 907 00:34:29,408 --> 00:34:31,630 are I'll take full advantage of it . Um 908 00:34:31,630 --> 00:34:33,797 you would be really impressed with the 909 00:34:33,797 --> 00:34:35,963 quality of the people that are joining 910 00:34:35,963 --> 00:34:38,186 the space force . Um the average age of 911 00:34:38,186 --> 00:34:40,450 our enlists are enlisted , uh members 912 00:34:40,460 --> 00:34:43,330 is 22 . That's a relatively high number 913 00:34:43,330 --> 00:34:45,441 relative , you know , considering the 914 00:34:45,441 --> 00:34:47,663 other services , uh we have an educated 915 00:34:47,663 --> 00:34:49,910 workforce , very educated . Uh We , we 916 00:34:49,910 --> 00:34:51,910 have the luxury of hand picking the 917 00:34:51,910 --> 00:34:54,132 best and brightest of a large applicant 918 00:34:54,132 --> 00:34:56,243 applicant pool that wants to join the 919 00:34:56,243 --> 00:34:58,132 Space Force . And so we're really 920 00:34:58,132 --> 00:35:00,188 benefiting one from the fact that we 921 00:35:00,188 --> 00:35:02,299 are kind of small and we can take the 922 00:35:02,299 --> 00:35:04,243 cream of the crop if you will . Uh 923 00:35:04,243 --> 00:35:06,243 we're looking for diversity , we're 924 00:35:06,243 --> 00:35:08,466 looking for high quality stem education 925 00:35:08,466 --> 00:35:10,688 and , and going to the areas that maybe 926 00:35:10,688 --> 00:35:12,910 you don't have a chance to uh to get to 927 00:35:12,910 --> 00:35:15,420 uh in some of the other services . Uh 928 00:35:15,430 --> 00:35:17,500 remarkable set of opportunities that 929 00:35:17,500 --> 00:35:19,500 we've taken full advantage of every 930 00:35:19,500 --> 00:35:21,611 time I go out in the field , I'm just 931 00:35:21,611 --> 00:35:23,333 impressed with the quality and 932 00:35:23,333 --> 00:35:25,389 capabilities of the guardians that I 933 00:35:25,389 --> 00:35:27,333 see doing the job . We should help 934 00:35:27,333 --> 00:35:29,444 expand these programs to make , it'll 935 00:35:29,444 --> 00:35:31,611 make your job a little better . Well , 936 00:35:31,611 --> 00:35:33,611 as long as you expand the number of 937 00:35:33,611 --> 00:35:35,944 people that helped me select , you know , 938 00:35:35,944 --> 00:35:39,300 so I think there were 42,000 hits of 939 00:35:39,310 --> 00:35:41,421 interest to join the space for us and 940 00:35:41,421 --> 00:35:43,710 we have about 1000 slots . So calling 941 00:35:43,710 --> 00:35:45,932 that down to who's eligible , who can , 942 00:35:45,932 --> 00:35:48,154 who can meet the requirements and , you 943 00:35:48,154 --> 00:35:50,210 know , there's a lot of effort there 944 00:35:50,210 --> 00:35:52,266 too . So I'm real happy with the way 945 00:35:52,266 --> 00:35:54,488 the recruiting team has done . I'm real 946 00:35:54,488 --> 00:35:54,390 happy with the standards that we've 947 00:35:54,390 --> 00:35:56,223 said , I'm really happy with the 948 00:35:56,223 --> 00:35:58,390 quality of Guardians were getting in . 949 00:35:58,390 --> 00:36:00,557 That's great because , um , as Senator 950 00:36:00,557 --> 00:36:02,668 Tuberville talked about cyber attacks 951 00:36:02,668 --> 00:36:04,779 in space and so we're fighting Domain 952 00:36:04,779 --> 00:36:08,130 and , and , uh , cyber is really 953 00:36:08,140 --> 00:36:11,320 probably , uh more effective there or 954 00:36:11,320 --> 00:36:13,209 as effective there as it would be 955 00:36:13,209 --> 00:36:16,020 anywhere else . And uh last week , we 956 00:36:16,020 --> 00:36:18,290 discussed with General Dickinson during 957 00:36:18,290 --> 00:36:20,400 Space Command's posture hearing that 958 00:36:20,410 --> 00:36:22,740 both Russia and China are developing , 959 00:36:22,740 --> 00:36:24,820 rapidly investing in developing and 960 00:36:24,820 --> 00:36:27,870 fielding these technologies that will 961 00:36:27,880 --> 00:36:30,430 provide timely and uh that will 962 00:36:30,430 --> 00:36:32,780 threaten us . And so we need to be sure 963 00:36:32,780 --> 00:36:34,780 that we're stopping that . So these 964 00:36:34,780 --> 00:36:36,891 sophisticated cyber attacks are going 965 00:36:36,891 --> 00:36:39,169 to include the threat of stealing data , 966 00:36:39,169 --> 00:36:41,169 jamming satellite signals , hacking 967 00:36:41,169 --> 00:36:43,002 satellites , disrupting internet 968 00:36:43,002 --> 00:36:45,002 services . I know the proliferation 969 00:36:45,002 --> 00:36:47,169 concept is really good because there's 970 00:36:47,169 --> 00:36:49,113 just so many it makes it not worth 971 00:36:49,113 --> 00:36:51,058 their while . Uh so that resilient 972 00:36:51,058 --> 00:36:53,113 space architecture , particularly in 973 00:36:53,113 --> 00:36:55,169 low earth orbit as you've alluded to 974 00:36:55,169 --> 00:36:57,224 really important . And so what other 975 00:36:57,224 --> 00:36:59,224 kinds of things besides um what you 976 00:36:59,224 --> 00:37:01,391 mentioned to Senator Kelly and Senator 977 00:37:01,391 --> 00:37:03,580 Tub Tub er Ville , um how are you 978 00:37:03,580 --> 00:37:05,747 keeping our most advanced space assets 979 00:37:05,747 --> 00:37:07,969 safe from cyber attacks by Russia China 980 00:37:07,969 --> 00:37:09,747 and others and increasing their 981 00:37:09,747 --> 00:37:11,691 resiliency ? I like I like to talk 982 00:37:11,691 --> 00:37:13,802 about two particular areas that we're 983 00:37:13,802 --> 00:37:15,524 doing first is I want to avoid 984 00:37:15,524 --> 00:37:17,691 operational surprise . That's , that's 985 00:37:17,691 --> 00:37:20,480 a tenant in my maybe theory of success 986 00:37:20,480 --> 00:37:22,369 if you will for the space force's 987 00:37:22,369 --> 00:37:25,010 primary missions and by um avoiding 988 00:37:25,010 --> 00:37:27,232 operational surprise , what I mean is , 989 00:37:27,232 --> 00:37:29,399 do we have all the sensors and all the 990 00:37:29,399 --> 00:37:31,510 right places to see what's going on ? 991 00:37:31,510 --> 00:37:34,060 And that's cyber and space ? Um Do we , 992 00:37:34,060 --> 00:37:36,380 do we recognize hostile activities , 993 00:37:36,380 --> 00:37:38,491 aggressive activities , irresponsible 994 00:37:38,491 --> 00:37:40,547 activities , the minute they occur , 995 00:37:40,547 --> 00:37:42,880 can we attribute them to the bad actors ? 996 00:37:42,880 --> 00:37:44,658 That's the kind of avoidance of 997 00:37:44,658 --> 00:37:46,769 operational surprise that I'm talking 998 00:37:46,769 --> 00:37:48,936 about . And then secondly , we have to 999 00:37:48,936 --> 00:37:51,269 establish norms of responsible behavior . 1000 00:37:51,269 --> 00:37:51,160 What are the norms of behavior that are 1001 00:37:51,160 --> 00:37:54,060 acceptable ? Uh And , and developing a 1002 00:37:54,060 --> 00:37:56,300 coalition of like minded space nations 1003 00:37:56,300 --> 00:37:58,850 that supports those norms of behavior 1004 00:37:58,850 --> 00:38:01,072 is a powerful motivator to do the right 1005 00:38:01,072 --> 00:38:02,961 things and call out irresponsible 1006 00:38:02,961 --> 00:38:05,420 behavior . All of that I think protects 1007 00:38:05,420 --> 00:38:08,010 our capable . That's great . I know my 1008 00:38:08,010 --> 00:38:10,190 time's up but my next question was on 1009 00:38:10,190 --> 00:38:12,412 international partnerships and how this 1010 00:38:12,412 --> 00:38:14,523 potential rates that will take it off 1011 00:38:14,523 --> 00:38:16,246 the record , this hunt forward 1012 00:38:16,246 --> 00:38:18,023 operations to avoid operational 1013 00:38:18,023 --> 00:38:20,134 surprise with our allies and partners 1014 00:38:20,134 --> 00:38:22,190 around the globe . Uh We will submit 1015 00:38:22,190 --> 00:38:24,134 that for the record , but you were 1016 00:38:24,134 --> 00:38:26,246 leading me right there . So thank you 1017 00:38:26,246 --> 00:38:28,400 very much . I yield back general . 1018 00:38:28,400 --> 00:38:30,622 There's one member of this subcommittee 1019 00:38:30,622 --> 00:38:32,733 who probably had more than more to do 1020 00:38:32,733 --> 00:38:35,620 with the founding of the Space Force 1021 00:38:35,630 --> 00:38:38,410 vote early and vocal supporter and that 1022 00:38:38,410 --> 00:38:41,210 Senator Cramer Senator Cramer . Thank 1023 00:38:41,210 --> 00:38:44,030 you , Mr Chairman , ranking member and 1024 00:38:44,040 --> 00:38:46,490 general . Good to see you again . Um I 1025 00:38:46,490 --> 00:38:49,230 don't think you were lecturing , uh , 1026 00:38:49,240 --> 00:38:51,462 Senator Kelly at all . He asked you the 1027 00:38:51,462 --> 00:38:53,351 easiest question he could and you 1028 00:38:53,351 --> 00:38:55,351 answered it brilliantly and I think 1029 00:38:55,351 --> 00:38:58,340 that the issue of redundancy as a tool , 1030 00:38:58,340 --> 00:39:00,507 that sort of answers , Senator Rosen's 1031 00:39:00,507 --> 00:39:02,507 question in terms of how you secure 1032 00:39:02,507 --> 00:39:04,840 them as well as how well they work as a , 1033 00:39:04,840 --> 00:39:07,062 as a kill web if you will versus a kill 1034 00:39:07,062 --> 00:39:09,396 chain . So , um I didn't think you were , 1035 00:39:09,396 --> 00:39:11,618 I thought it was , it was brilliant . I 1036 00:39:11,618 --> 00:39:13,729 also think you're too humble . You're 1037 00:39:13,729 --> 00:39:15,673 you brag about the guardians , but 1038 00:39:15,673 --> 00:39:17,784 let's face it . You're , you're , you 1039 00:39:17,784 --> 00:39:19,840 seem to be the employer of choice in 1040 00:39:19,840 --> 00:39:19,680 the service . You , you have that 1041 00:39:19,680 --> 00:39:21,847 luxury and it's because I think of the 1042 00:39:21,847 --> 00:39:23,958 mission , I think because it's , it's 1043 00:39:23,958 --> 00:39:26,124 an important mission that particularly 1044 00:39:26,124 --> 00:39:28,230 younger people realize and , and 1045 00:39:28,230 --> 00:39:30,460 they're attracted to it and it gets to 1046 00:39:30,460 --> 00:39:32,682 stretch them . And so my hope Jackie is 1047 00:39:32,682 --> 00:39:34,738 that the Air Force , the , the space 1048 00:39:34,738 --> 00:39:36,238 force is so cool . It just 1049 00:39:36,238 --> 00:39:38,016 automatically creates more stem 1050 00:39:38,016 --> 00:39:40,016 students because they all want to , 1051 00:39:40,016 --> 00:39:42,071 they all want to be part of the next 1052 00:39:42,071 --> 00:39:44,238 big thing . Um I want to get into some 1053 00:39:44,238 --> 00:39:46,460 issue , you know , Senator Fisher asked 1054 00:39:46,460 --> 00:39:49,080 you about um the gap issue with , with 1055 00:39:49,080 --> 00:39:51,302 regard to eyes in the sky and whatnot . 1056 00:39:51,302 --> 00:39:53,413 We , we did see a little bit of a gap 1057 00:39:53,413 --> 00:39:55,469 in , in defense when we learned that 1058 00:39:55,469 --> 00:39:57,524 our radars couldn't see everything , 1059 00:39:57,524 --> 00:39:59,469 they could only see what they were 1060 00:39:59,469 --> 00:40:01,413 tuned to c and so in terms of like 1061 00:40:01,413 --> 00:40:03,469 parks radar as an example and we see 1062 00:40:03,469 --> 00:40:05,524 some money coming for , for that , I 1063 00:40:05,524 --> 00:40:07,524 would presume that means it will be 1064 00:40:07,524 --> 00:40:09,636 upgraded , it'll be modernized as you 1065 00:40:09,636 --> 00:40:11,747 know , it's a high priority for , for 1066 00:40:11,747 --> 00:40:13,691 me , since we have one that's that 1067 00:40:13,691 --> 00:40:15,636 you're the landlord of up in North 1068 00:40:15,636 --> 00:40:17,747 Dakota , maybe , maybe speak a little 1069 00:40:17,747 --> 00:40:19,969 bit too to the role of the park's radar 1070 00:40:19,969 --> 00:40:22,024 and modernization and , and how that 1071 00:40:22,024 --> 00:40:24,247 will help you and the other , the joint 1072 00:40:24,247 --> 00:40:26,302 force in terms of particularly early 1073 00:40:26,302 --> 00:40:28,524 warning . Well , it's a two part answer 1074 00:40:28,524 --> 00:40:31,020 because , you know , um I don't wanna 1075 00:40:31,020 --> 00:40:34,230 be too distracted by the balloon um 1076 00:40:34,240 --> 00:40:37,090 issue because that's not where those 1077 00:40:37,090 --> 00:40:40,620 radars are looking . Um It's , uh you 1078 00:40:40,620 --> 00:40:42,731 could , you could easily build radars 1079 00:40:42,731 --> 00:40:44,676 that would look in that area , but 1080 00:40:44,676 --> 00:40:46,731 that's not our mission . The mission 1081 00:40:46,731 --> 00:40:46,680 that's being done North Dakota and the 1082 00:40:46,680 --> 00:40:49,440 other ground based radars is to fold 1083 00:40:49,450 --> 00:40:51,339 its missile warning and its space 1084 00:40:51,339 --> 00:40:54,150 surveillance uh primarily and , and 1085 00:40:54,150 --> 00:40:56,372 those radars are really good at those , 1086 00:40:56,372 --> 00:40:59,270 those jobs . Uh So the real , the real 1087 00:40:59,270 --> 00:41:02,450 challenge is how do I go to a 1088 00:41:02,460 --> 00:41:05,090 rapid assessment and decision quality 1089 00:41:05,090 --> 00:41:07,034 information of the data that those 1090 00:41:07,034 --> 00:41:09,450 radars are pulling in ? And so that's , 1091 00:41:09,450 --> 00:41:11,561 that's my responsibility is to figure 1092 00:41:11,561 --> 00:41:13,783 out how to take all that massive amount 1093 00:41:13,783 --> 00:41:15,783 of data in and quickly turn it into 1094 00:41:15,783 --> 00:41:18,020 decision making information . So we've 1095 00:41:18,020 --> 00:41:20,430 got some work to do there , but it's , 1096 00:41:20,440 --> 00:41:22,551 it's more associated with the latency 1097 00:41:22,551 --> 00:41:24,662 of the data . Then , you know , I can 1098 00:41:24,662 --> 00:41:26,718 tell you where something was , but I 1099 00:41:26,718 --> 00:41:28,940 can't tell you where it is precisely at 1100 00:41:28,940 --> 00:41:28,650 that moment . And we're getting better 1101 00:41:28,650 --> 00:41:31,830 and better at that . Um , with regard 1102 00:41:31,830 --> 00:41:33,663 to some of the issues that we've 1103 00:41:33,663 --> 00:41:35,774 already talked about the partnerships 1104 00:41:35,774 --> 00:41:37,774 that , that you started out talking 1105 00:41:37,774 --> 00:41:39,774 about . Senator Rosen , asked about 1106 00:41:39,774 --> 00:41:41,774 academic partnerships , alliances , 1107 00:41:41,774 --> 00:41:43,997 obviously commercial partnerships . One 1108 00:41:43,997 --> 00:41:43,500 of the things when we stood up the 1109 00:41:43,500 --> 00:41:45,389 space force and , and we had this 1110 00:41:45,389 --> 00:41:47,480 discussion many times and your 1111 00:41:47,480 --> 00:41:49,591 predecessor certainly grabbed onto it 1112 00:41:49,591 --> 00:41:51,813 and that is making sure it's lean agile 1113 00:41:51,813 --> 00:41:54,036 fast . How many times we hear generally 1114 00:41:54,036 --> 00:41:56,910 stay lean agile fast ? Do you feel like 1115 00:41:56,910 --> 00:41:59,140 you're still lean agile and fast ? Um 1116 00:41:59,150 --> 00:42:01,670 is , does the budget help you be more 1117 00:42:01,670 --> 00:42:03,837 lean agile and fast ? And I don't mean 1118 00:42:03,837 --> 00:42:06,003 cheap , I mean , lean agile and fast . 1119 00:42:06,003 --> 00:42:08,114 Those again , those relationships are 1120 00:42:08,114 --> 00:42:10,170 so important . How , how valuable is 1121 00:42:10,170 --> 00:42:12,281 that and difficult is that balance to 1122 00:42:12,281 --> 00:42:13,892 make sure you maintain those 1123 00:42:13,892 --> 00:42:15,892 characteristics ? Well , there's no 1124 00:42:15,892 --> 00:42:18,114 question , we're still lean and there's 1125 00:42:18,114 --> 00:42:20,226 no question we're going as fast as we 1126 00:42:20,226 --> 00:42:20,130 can . You know , that's a tough 1127 00:42:20,130 --> 00:42:22,430 standard for me to say we're fast . I'm 1128 00:42:22,440 --> 00:42:24,329 always looking to go faster . I'm 1129 00:42:24,329 --> 00:42:26,440 always looking to be more agile . And 1130 00:42:26,440 --> 00:42:28,440 so I'm going to be our probably our 1131 00:42:28,440 --> 00:42:30,662 toughest critic going forward trying to 1132 00:42:30,662 --> 00:42:32,996 ensure that we stay as fast as possible . 1133 00:42:32,996 --> 00:42:34,830 Um Being small does offer some 1134 00:42:34,830 --> 00:42:36,940 advantages , we can move rapidly 1135 00:42:36,940 --> 00:42:38,996 through a smaller bureaucracy than , 1136 00:42:38,996 --> 00:42:40,607 than maybe some of the other 1137 00:42:40,607 --> 00:42:42,718 organizations can . But it also comes 1138 00:42:42,718 --> 00:42:44,773 with , you know , that means there's 1139 00:42:44,773 --> 00:42:46,607 fewer eyes on ideas , that means 1140 00:42:46,607 --> 00:42:48,662 there's fewer opportunities to catch 1141 00:42:48,662 --> 00:42:48,200 mistakes , that means there's fewer 1142 00:42:48,200 --> 00:42:50,200 opportunities . And so we've got to 1143 00:42:50,200 --> 00:42:52,367 have good solid processes , we have to 1144 00:42:52,367 --> 00:42:54,422 have good innovative technology that 1145 00:42:54,422 --> 00:42:56,200 supports us . And so there's no 1146 00:42:56,200 --> 00:42:58,200 question , we're still lean and now 1147 00:42:58,200 --> 00:43:00,367 we're trying to become optimized based 1148 00:43:00,367 --> 00:43:02,422 on that size to make sure that we're 1149 00:43:02,422 --> 00:43:04,033 still producing high quality 1150 00:43:04,033 --> 00:43:05,811 capabilities for a high quality 1151 00:43:05,811 --> 00:43:07,644 workforce . That's a great point 1152 00:43:07,644 --> 00:43:09,644 because because the bureaucracy can 1153 00:43:09,644 --> 00:43:11,978 gobble you up and slow you down as well . 1154 00:43:11,978 --> 00:43:14,089 So we , we like oversight , we're all 1155 00:43:14,089 --> 00:43:16,200 about that , but we want you to be as 1156 00:43:16,200 --> 00:43:18,256 agile as you need to be to , to , to 1157 00:43:18,256 --> 00:43:20,422 keep up with the speed of China , as I 1158 00:43:20,422 --> 00:43:22,756 like to say , which is really important . 1159 00:43:22,756 --> 00:43:22,170 One last thing just I just want to make 1160 00:43:22,170 --> 00:43:24,281 sure that you're , you're getting the 1161 00:43:24,281 --> 00:43:26,530 type of um the right policies that , 1162 00:43:26,540 --> 00:43:28,820 that don't restrict your offensive 1163 00:43:28,820 --> 00:43:30,820 abilities . We've heard a lot about 1164 00:43:30,820 --> 00:43:32,764 that . You've spoken to it at some 1165 00:43:32,764 --> 00:43:34,820 points . Um Again , whether it's the 1166 00:43:34,820 --> 00:43:36,931 budget or the administration or , you 1167 00:43:36,931 --> 00:43:38,931 know , uh chain of command , do you 1168 00:43:38,931 --> 00:43:40,940 feel like you , you have the right 1169 00:43:40,950 --> 00:43:43,560 policies in place to both protect and 1170 00:43:43,740 --> 00:43:45,851 an attack if necessary ? I can assure 1171 00:43:45,851 --> 00:43:48,018 you there are no policies that prevent 1172 00:43:48,018 --> 00:43:50,073 us from exploring a full spectrum of 1173 00:43:50,073 --> 00:43:52,184 operations . Uh It's just about doing 1174 00:43:52,184 --> 00:43:54,680 the work establishing the what I would 1175 00:43:54,680 --> 00:43:56,920 call uh understanding of what the 1176 00:43:56,920 --> 00:43:59,150 capabilities can and can't do . Uh And 1177 00:43:59,150 --> 00:44:01,610 then we test and we , we learn from our 1178 00:44:01,620 --> 00:44:04,250 experiences . Thank you . Well done . 1179 00:44:04,260 --> 00:44:06,620 Thank you . Thank you , Senator Camera . 1180 00:44:06,630 --> 00:44:08,852 Your lean agile fast . Reminds me of my 1181 00:44:08,852 --> 00:44:11,019 high school football coach who said he 1182 00:44:11,019 --> 00:44:12,852 wanted us to be mobile agile and 1183 00:44:12,852 --> 00:44:13,920 hostile . 1184 00:44:14,920 --> 00:44:17,670 Ah 1185 00:44:18,230 --> 00:44:21,230 I'm not gonna go into our records , 1186 00:44:22,830 --> 00:44:24,997 but our team motto was we're small but 1187 00:44:24,997 --> 00:44:26,997 we're slow . That was our problem . 1188 00:44:27,040 --> 00:44:29,560 Senator Gillibrand . Thank you , Mr 1189 00:44:29,560 --> 00:44:32,740 Chairman . Um Your budget request this 1190 00:44:32,740 --> 00:44:34,907 year includes a goal of increasing the 1191 00:44:34,907 --> 00:44:37,018 number of Space Force launches as you 1192 00:44:37,018 --> 00:44:39,129 look to maintain and modernize launch 1193 00:44:39,129 --> 00:44:41,184 ranges and facilities and support of 1194 00:44:41,184 --> 00:44:43,351 our space launch needs . Can you speak 1195 00:44:43,351 --> 00:44:45,073 to how the ability to leverage 1196 00:44:45,073 --> 00:44:47,018 commercial funding sources to grow 1197 00:44:47,018 --> 00:44:46,850 space , transportation infrastructure 1198 00:44:46,850 --> 00:44:49,100 and service capacity would impact the 1199 00:44:49,100 --> 00:44:51,310 Space Force's space launch efforts ? 1200 00:44:51,910 --> 00:44:54,500 Yes , ma'am . Thank you . Uh as we've 1201 00:44:54,500 --> 00:44:57,810 talked before , the we've grown our 1202 00:44:57,810 --> 00:45:00,920 capacity on our national launch ranges . 1203 00:45:00,930 --> 00:45:03,590 National Space launch ranges . Uh from 1204 00:45:03,590 --> 00:45:06,170 what I remember to be 10 , 12 launches 1205 00:45:06,170 --> 00:45:08,480 to we're gonna hit getting close to 100 1206 00:45:08,480 --> 00:45:11,460 launches a year now . Uh and , and most 1207 00:45:11,460 --> 00:45:14,240 of that is commercial launches and so 1208 00:45:14,240 --> 00:45:16,462 the infrastructure that we're providing 1209 00:45:16,462 --> 00:45:18,720 is being used . Uh and it's it's it 1210 00:45:18,720 --> 00:45:21,100 needs to be refurbished on a on a more 1211 00:45:21,110 --> 00:45:23,560 regular basis than it did what I call 1212 00:45:23,560 --> 00:45:26,000 the old days . And so the I think the 1213 00:45:26,000 --> 00:45:28,056 commercial industry understands this 1214 00:45:28,056 --> 00:45:30,111 and they're trying to figure out the 1215 00:45:30,111 --> 00:45:32,278 best ways to help support . And now we 1216 00:45:32,278 --> 00:45:34,389 just have to look for the contractual 1217 00:45:34,389 --> 00:45:36,667 and legal mechanisms to make sure that , 1218 00:45:36,667 --> 00:45:38,111 that we can maintain that 1219 00:45:38,111 --> 00:45:40,333 infrastructure , our investments in the 1220 00:45:40,333 --> 00:45:42,333 range of the future , start us down 1221 00:45:42,333 --> 00:45:44,444 that path . But we've still got a lot 1222 00:45:44,444 --> 00:45:46,444 of work to do over the fight up . I 1223 00:45:46,444 --> 00:45:48,667 think to make sure we maintain the kind 1224 00:45:48,667 --> 00:45:50,722 of infrastructure we need to support 1225 00:45:50,722 --> 00:45:52,889 the commercial industry . Um As you've 1226 00:45:52,889 --> 00:45:55,111 said , your mission is very technical . 1227 00:45:55,111 --> 00:45:57,056 Um ensuring guardians are properly 1228 00:45:57,056 --> 00:45:58,944 trained and able to execute their 1229 00:45:58,944 --> 00:46:01,000 missions requires access to advanced 1230 00:46:01,000 --> 00:46:02,944 ranges . Do you currently have the 1231 00:46:02,944 --> 00:46:04,778 training resources ? You need to 1232 00:46:04,778 --> 00:46:04,560 provide fully trained guardians to 1233 00:46:04,560 --> 00:46:07,200 combatant commanders and are any 1234 00:46:07,200 --> 00:46:09,422 additional resources required to ensure 1235 00:46:09,422 --> 00:46:11,589 we have a space force fully capable of 1236 00:46:11,589 --> 00:46:14,750 operating in the space domain ? I , the 1237 00:46:14,760 --> 00:46:18,020 fy 24 budget submission includes about 1238 00:46:18,020 --> 00:46:21,820 $340 million dedicated to operational 1239 00:46:21,820 --> 00:46:23,876 test and training infrastructure . I 1240 00:46:23,876 --> 00:46:25,987 think that's sufficient for this year 1241 00:46:25,987 --> 00:46:28,153 because we've got a lot of study to do 1242 00:46:28,153 --> 00:46:27,990 to make sure we're building the right 1243 00:46:27,990 --> 00:46:29,934 kind of range is the right kind of 1244 00:46:29,934 --> 00:46:32,101 simulators and we're learning as we go 1245 00:46:32,101 --> 00:46:33,879 a little bit . Uh So I'm really 1246 00:46:33,879 --> 00:46:35,546 comfortable with the level of 1247 00:46:35,546 --> 00:46:37,712 investment . We're at this year for fy 1248 00:46:37,712 --> 00:46:39,657 24 last week , you spoke about the 1249 00:46:39,657 --> 00:46:42,000 concept of competitive endurance . From 1250 00:46:42,000 --> 00:46:44,000 reporting , it appears to center on 1251 00:46:44,000 --> 00:46:46,056 space Domain awareness resilience to 1252 00:46:46,056 --> 00:46:48,111 deter attack and responsible counter 1253 00:46:48,111 --> 00:46:50,333 space activities . Can you speak to how 1254 00:46:50,333 --> 00:46:52,500 the space force's budget proposal will 1255 00:46:52,500 --> 00:46:54,611 help to achieve competitive endurance 1256 00:46:54,611 --> 00:46:54,580 through each of these three core 1257 00:46:54,580 --> 00:46:57,460 tenants for avoiding operational 1258 00:46:57,460 --> 00:46:59,404 surprise . That's the Space Domain 1259 00:46:59,404 --> 00:47:01,627 Awareness tenant . And we are investing 1260 00:47:01,627 --> 00:47:03,349 heavily in new sensors . We're 1261 00:47:03,349 --> 00:47:05,571 investing in , in capabilities with our 1262 00:47:05,571 --> 00:47:07,627 allies and partners to also increase 1263 00:47:07,627 --> 00:47:09,849 the dataset associate with Space Domain 1264 00:47:09,849 --> 00:47:11,460 Awareness . And perhaps most 1265 00:47:11,460 --> 00:47:13,627 importantly , we're investing in space 1266 00:47:13,627 --> 00:47:15,571 command and control capabilities , 1267 00:47:15,571 --> 00:47:17,738 which is kind of military talk for how 1268 00:47:17,738 --> 00:47:19,793 do you take that data in and rapidly 1269 00:47:19,793 --> 00:47:21,849 turn it into operational decisions . 1270 00:47:21,849 --> 00:47:23,904 And so I think we have good software 1271 00:47:23,904 --> 00:47:25,904 investments to make sure that we're 1272 00:47:25,904 --> 00:47:28,016 doing the decision support tools that 1273 00:47:28,016 --> 00:47:30,238 go with that space Domain awareness and 1274 00:47:30,238 --> 00:47:33,370 go ahead . Well , the resiliency piece 1275 00:47:33,380 --> 00:47:35,620 is also important and and this this 1276 00:47:35,620 --> 00:47:38,010 budget definitely invests in shifting 1277 00:47:38,010 --> 00:47:40,288 to a more resilient space architecture . 1278 00:47:40,288 --> 00:47:42,621 We've started that pivot now in earnest . 1279 00:47:42,621 --> 00:47:44,843 So looking on your documents , you have 1280 00:47:44,843 --> 00:47:46,843 this contested space document about 1281 00:47:46,843 --> 00:47:49,700 what China is doing . Um the P R C has 1282 00:47:49,700 --> 00:47:51,533 developed counter space and anti 1283 00:47:51,533 --> 00:47:53,089 satellite weapons including 1284 00:47:53,089 --> 00:47:54,922 demonstrations of anti satellite 1285 00:47:54,922 --> 00:47:57,144 missiles um which you say are launching 1286 00:47:57,144 --> 00:47:59,990 orbit to ground . Um and the ability to 1287 00:48:00,000 --> 00:48:01,944 move a defunct satellite . Can you 1288 00:48:01,944 --> 00:48:04,111 speak to our ability to defend against 1289 00:48:04,111 --> 00:48:06,333 these counter space assets and exercise 1290 00:48:06,333 --> 00:48:09,040 space superiority ? The transition to a 1291 00:48:09,050 --> 00:48:11,510 proliferated Leo missile warning , 1292 00:48:11,510 --> 00:48:14,290 missile tracking architecture includes 1293 00:48:14,290 --> 00:48:17,590 the capacity to uh find fix and track 1294 00:48:17,590 --> 00:48:19,812 hypersonic capabilities . So that's why 1295 00:48:19,812 --> 00:48:21,812 that's such an important transition 1296 00:48:21,812 --> 00:48:23,830 that we're making with regards to 1297 00:48:23,840 --> 00:48:25,951 grappling satellites and pulling them 1298 00:48:25,951 --> 00:48:27,951 out of orbit . Much tougher to deal 1299 00:48:27,951 --> 00:48:29,562 with when you have less than 1300 00:48:29,562 --> 00:48:31,729 maneuverable older legacy satellites . 1301 00:48:31,729 --> 00:48:33,840 So again , shifting to a proliferated 1302 00:48:33,840 --> 00:48:36,007 Leo constellation where you don't have 1303 00:48:36,007 --> 00:48:38,062 the what general heighten called the 1304 00:48:38,062 --> 00:48:40,173 big Juicy target sitting there at GEO 1305 00:48:40,173 --> 00:48:42,400 uh make that a much tougher proposition 1306 00:48:42,410 --> 00:48:44,577 for them to execute against that makes 1307 00:48:44,577 --> 00:48:46,450 sense . Um What lessons are you 1308 00:48:46,450 --> 00:48:48,617 learning from the war in Ukraine about 1309 00:48:48,617 --> 00:48:50,728 the role of the , of the space domain 1310 00:48:50,728 --> 00:48:52,783 in large scale military operations ? 1311 00:48:52,783 --> 00:48:55,500 Well , the most important observation 1312 00:48:55,500 --> 00:48:57,500 is that space is critical to modern 1313 00:48:57,500 --> 00:48:59,556 warfare . Uh We've seen the Russians 1314 00:48:59,556 --> 00:49:01,778 attacks , allied communications , we've 1315 00:49:01,778 --> 00:49:04,000 seen cyberattacks trying to dismantle , 1316 00:49:04,000 --> 00:49:06,222 we've seen GPS Jamming . They recognize 1317 00:49:06,222 --> 00:49:08,278 that space is a force multiplier and 1318 00:49:08,278 --> 00:49:10,500 they're willing to attack it . The fact 1319 00:49:10,500 --> 00:49:12,667 that we have to defend cyber , we have 1320 00:49:12,667 --> 00:49:14,833 to defend against cyber attacks on the 1321 00:49:14,833 --> 00:49:16,722 ground . Networks reminds us that 1322 00:49:16,722 --> 00:49:18,944 ground is also a part of space and that 1323 00:49:18,944 --> 00:49:21,000 those networks are critical assets . 1324 00:49:21,000 --> 00:49:23,222 But I think we're also seeing the power 1325 00:49:23,222 --> 00:49:25,333 of commercial augmentation that there 1326 00:49:25,333 --> 00:49:27,111 is a viable path for commercial 1327 00:49:27,111 --> 00:49:29,278 augmentation to provide capabilities . 1328 00:49:29,278 --> 00:49:31,389 And then I've been kind of harping on 1329 00:49:31,389 --> 00:49:33,389 it through the testimony here , but 1330 00:49:33,389 --> 00:49:35,444 proliferated Leo , that's what we're 1331 00:49:35,444 --> 00:49:37,556 seeing used in to support Ukraine and 1332 00:49:37,556 --> 00:49:39,667 it's turning out to be a much tougher 1333 00:49:39,667 --> 00:49:41,889 target for the Russians to take apart . 1334 00:49:41,889 --> 00:49:41,880 Agreed . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 1335 00:49:41,880 --> 00:49:44,100 Thank you madam ranking member . It 1336 00:49:44,110 --> 00:49:46,760 wasn't around . Thank you , Mr Chairman 1337 00:49:46,770 --> 00:49:48,937 General . Thank you for your service . 1338 00:49:48,937 --> 00:49:52,560 Um There have been efforts general uh 1339 00:49:52,570 --> 00:49:55,230 driven by political decisions regarding 1340 00:49:55,230 --> 00:49:58,970 the shared use of the 3.123 point 45 1341 00:49:58,970 --> 00:50:01,400 gigahertz or Essman portions of the 1342 00:50:01,400 --> 00:50:04,000 spectrum . Can you confirm that you 1343 00:50:04,000 --> 00:50:06,290 have systems critical to our national 1344 00:50:06,290 --> 00:50:08,930 security that reside on this portion of 1345 00:50:08,930 --> 00:50:12,170 the spectrum ? Yes , Senator , we have 1346 00:50:12,180 --> 00:50:14,290 a space surveillance radar that's , 1347 00:50:14,290 --> 00:50:16,346 that's currently in development that 1348 00:50:16,346 --> 00:50:18,250 does occupy that's portion of the 1349 00:50:18,250 --> 00:50:20,550 spectrum . Would it be not just radar 1350 00:50:20,550 --> 00:50:22,717 but perhaps communications that are in 1351 00:50:22,717 --> 00:50:25,100 that portion as well as it turns out 1352 00:50:25,100 --> 00:50:27,520 the , the I think the key emergency 1353 00:50:27,520 --> 00:50:29,464 kinds of communications lived just 1354 00:50:29,464 --> 00:50:31,798 outside of that band . So as long as it , 1355 00:50:31,798 --> 00:50:33,798 as long as we managed very narrowly 1356 00:50:33,798 --> 00:50:35,798 that that strip we would , we would 1357 00:50:35,798 --> 00:50:38,020 avoid those particular . Okay . So it's 1358 00:50:38,020 --> 00:50:40,298 primarily radar , it's primarily radar , 1359 00:50:40,298 --> 00:50:42,520 further further space force . Okay . So 1360 00:50:42,520 --> 00:50:44,742 the communications portion is not , not 1361 00:50:44,742 --> 00:50:46,853 part . Well , I wouldn't want to talk 1362 00:50:46,853 --> 00:50:48,964 to the other services capability . So 1363 00:50:48,964 --> 00:50:51,187 from a space force perspective . Okay . 1364 00:50:51,187 --> 00:50:51,020 Thank you . Can you provide your 1365 00:50:51,020 --> 00:50:53,020 professional military advice on how 1366 00:50:53,020 --> 00:50:55,860 detrimental it would be to your mission 1367 00:50:55,870 --> 00:50:57,981 and the security of our nation if you 1368 00:50:57,981 --> 00:50:59,981 lost the use of this portion of the 1369 00:50:59,981 --> 00:51:02,092 spectrum ? I think the most important 1370 00:51:02,092 --> 00:51:04,314 thing I can say is I'm not exactly sure 1371 00:51:04,314 --> 00:51:06,426 because we haven't done the technical 1372 00:51:06,426 --> 00:51:08,481 analysis of exactly what vacating or 1373 00:51:08,481 --> 00:51:10,703 sharing any of that spectrum would look 1374 00:51:10,703 --> 00:51:12,870 like uh in terms of cost and technical 1375 00:51:12,870 --> 00:51:14,926 performance . But we do have a study 1376 00:51:14,926 --> 00:51:17,510 ongoing . Uh And so we would hope that 1377 00:51:17,510 --> 00:51:19,677 any legislative decisions or decisions 1378 00:51:19,677 --> 00:51:21,788 along these lines would wait for that 1379 00:51:21,788 --> 00:51:23,843 study to come out later this fall so 1380 00:51:23,843 --> 00:51:25,899 that we could make the decision with 1381 00:51:25,899 --> 00:51:27,954 data informed um analysis . Have you 1382 00:51:27,954 --> 00:51:30,066 been given the opportunity to provide 1383 00:51:30,066 --> 00:51:32,121 your professional military advice on 1384 00:51:32,121 --> 00:51:34,288 the D O D s use of this portion of the 1385 00:51:34,288 --> 00:51:36,177 spectrum ? Yes , thank you . Um I 1386 00:51:36,177 --> 00:51:38,288 presume you've expressed your concern 1387 00:51:38,288 --> 00:51:40,770 with regard to the sale prior to the 1388 00:51:40,770 --> 00:51:43,400 September study being completed . I 1389 00:51:43,400 --> 00:51:45,233 have described my concern as not 1390 00:51:45,233 --> 00:51:47,456 knowing exactly what the impact will be 1391 00:51:47,456 --> 00:51:49,789 until I received that study . Thank you . 1392 00:51:50,110 --> 00:51:53,020 Um I'd also like to go on record saying 1393 00:51:53,020 --> 00:51:55,187 that I'm , I'm concerned about the D O 1394 00:51:55,187 --> 00:51:57,298 D s approach to providing space based 1395 00:51:57,298 --> 00:51:59,076 ground moving target indication 1396 00:51:59,076 --> 00:52:02,490 capabilities , the G B M T I uh to 1397 00:52:02,490 --> 00:52:04,712 warfighters following the divestment of 1398 00:52:04,712 --> 00:52:06,460 the J stars platform . It's my 1399 00:52:06,460 --> 00:52:08,571 understanding that this capability is 1400 00:52:08,571 --> 00:52:10,238 being moved under the funding 1401 00:52:10,238 --> 00:52:12,016 authorities of the intelligence 1402 00:52:12,016 --> 00:52:14,390 community . We do not have really to 1403 00:52:14,390 --> 00:52:16,446 get into the fine details here . But 1404 00:52:16,446 --> 00:52:18,550 can you share with me how you are 1405 00:52:18,550 --> 00:52:21,730 assuming that the J roc validated 1406 00:52:21,740 --> 00:52:24,510 requirements are captured in the 1407 00:52:24,510 --> 00:52:27,060 acquisitions process of a platform 1408 00:52:27,070 --> 00:52:29,980 owned by the I C community because of 1409 00:52:29,980 --> 00:52:31,924 the way the funding has , has been 1410 00:52:31,924 --> 00:52:35,150 moved . Uh We are focusing on two areas 1411 00:52:35,150 --> 00:52:38,040 where we think we can provide some 1412 00:52:38,050 --> 00:52:40,161 detailed level of collaboration . The 1413 00:52:40,161 --> 00:52:41,883 first is in milestone decision 1414 00:52:41,883 --> 00:52:43,939 authority which still there are some 1415 00:52:43,939 --> 00:52:46,880 decisions which reside at the OSD level 1416 00:52:46,890 --> 00:52:49,560 uh and could be delegated to Secretary 1417 00:52:49,560 --> 00:52:51,750 of Coal Valley . We're looking into 1418 00:52:51,750 --> 00:52:53,639 what those options are , what the 1419 00:52:53,639 --> 00:52:55,639 possibilities might be . That's for 1420 00:52:55,639 --> 00:52:57,972 program management acquisition purposes . 1421 00:52:57,972 --> 00:52:59,861 The other side is the operational 1422 00:52:59,861 --> 00:53:01,694 concepts . This is still a D O D 1423 00:53:01,694 --> 00:53:03,917 mission , the space Force mission to do 1424 00:53:03,917 --> 00:53:05,972 this for the joint force . And so we 1425 00:53:05,972 --> 00:53:08,139 have the responsibility to provide the 1426 00:53:08,139 --> 00:53:10,306 operational concept for how this would 1427 00:53:10,306 --> 00:53:10,300 work . And we will have to work closely 1428 00:53:10,310 --> 00:53:12,366 with the program managers and sensor 1429 00:53:12,366 --> 00:53:14,477 developers to make that happen with J 1430 00:53:14,477 --> 00:53:17,300 stars . The tactical capabilities to 1431 00:53:17,530 --> 00:53:20,360 track these moving targets was 1432 00:53:20,360 --> 00:53:23,440 available to our , our soldiers on the 1433 00:53:23,440 --> 00:53:25,662 ground . We just want to make sure that 1434 00:53:25,662 --> 00:53:28,060 that same capability is still found in 1435 00:53:28,060 --> 00:53:30,116 a space based system and that's what 1436 00:53:30,116 --> 00:53:32,338 we're really talking about here , isn't 1437 00:53:32,338 --> 00:53:34,504 it ? Yes , sir . And the beauty of the 1438 00:53:34,504 --> 00:53:36,616 sensors that are being developed , is 1439 00:53:36,616 --> 00:53:38,727 there more survivable relative to the 1440 00:53:38,727 --> 00:53:40,671 current threats we're facing ? And 1441 00:53:40,671 --> 00:53:42,838 we're going to do it at a global scale 1442 00:53:42,838 --> 00:53:44,949 as opposed to a very small AO are the 1443 00:53:44,949 --> 00:53:47,171 way that we just don't want to get lost 1444 00:53:47,171 --> 00:53:46,510 and that this needs to be made 1445 00:53:46,510 --> 00:53:50,060 available for title title 10 operations . 1446 00:53:50,070 --> 00:53:52,350 These are these are direct operational 1447 00:53:52,350 --> 00:53:54,517 support activities . The mission falls 1448 00:53:54,517 --> 00:53:56,628 to the Space Force and the Department 1449 00:53:56,628 --> 00:53:58,850 Defense . Thank you . I understand that 1450 00:53:58,850 --> 00:54:01,017 there is a legislative proposal in the 1451 00:54:01,017 --> 00:54:03,239 works to integrate the reserve elements 1452 00:54:03,239 --> 00:54:05,406 of the Space force . This seems like a 1453 00:54:05,406 --> 00:54:07,461 logical move as your service matures 1454 00:54:07,461 --> 00:54:09,628 and embraces its organized trained and 1455 00:54:09,628 --> 00:54:11,294 equipped roles . It's also my 1456 00:54:11,294 --> 00:54:13,350 understanding that the Space Force's 1457 00:54:13,350 --> 00:54:15,572 residing within the Guard Element still 1458 00:54:15,572 --> 00:54:17,628 reside within the Air National Guard 1459 00:54:17,628 --> 00:54:19,739 and is organized trained and equipped 1460 00:54:19,739 --> 00:54:21,350 by the Air Force . From your 1461 00:54:21,350 --> 00:54:23,350 perspective , as the Chief of Space 1462 00:54:23,350 --> 00:54:24,961 Operations , what should the 1463 00:54:24,961 --> 00:54:27,017 subcommittee consider to provide the 1464 00:54:27,017 --> 00:54:29,239 most seamless oversight of these forces 1465 00:54:29,239 --> 00:54:31,750 as the space force matures first , let 1466 00:54:31,750 --> 00:54:34,010 me describe the reserve integration . I 1467 00:54:34,010 --> 00:54:35,732 think this is a very important 1468 00:54:35,732 --> 00:54:37,954 legislative proposal that I hope you'll 1469 00:54:37,954 --> 00:54:40,177 give due consideration to . It gives us 1470 00:54:40,177 --> 00:54:42,343 the flexibility to have both part time 1471 00:54:42,343 --> 00:54:44,399 and full time guardians in the space 1472 00:54:44,399 --> 00:54:46,566 force , which is gonna give incredible 1473 00:54:46,566 --> 00:54:48,732 career flexibility and hopefully serve 1474 00:54:48,732 --> 00:54:50,954 as an innovative way to retain the kind 1475 00:54:50,954 --> 00:54:53,066 of expertise that we know we're gonna 1476 00:54:53,066 --> 00:54:55,066 need moving forward . I think we've 1477 00:54:55,066 --> 00:54:57,066 done a much better job of capturing 1478 00:54:57,066 --> 00:54:59,288 kind of the key details that are needed 1479 00:54:59,288 --> 00:55:01,510 in legislation to to make that proposal 1480 00:55:01,510 --> 00:55:03,677 work . And I hope that we can continue 1481 00:55:03,677 --> 00:55:05,843 to work with this committee and others 1482 00:55:05,843 --> 00:55:05,680 to make that happen from the guard 1483 00:55:05,680 --> 00:55:07,791 standpoint . I've been clear from the 1484 00:55:07,791 --> 00:55:09,620 beginning that the critical 1485 00:55:09,620 --> 00:55:11,842 capabilities that are living in the Air 1486 00:55:11,842 --> 00:55:14,064 National Guard for space are must haves 1487 00:55:14,064 --> 00:55:16,176 for the Space Force . That's the most 1488 00:55:16,176 --> 00:55:18,398 important thing I don't believe because 1489 00:55:18,398 --> 00:55:20,231 of the way organized train equip 1490 00:55:20,231 --> 00:55:22,490 authorities reside with the Chief of 1491 00:55:22,500 --> 00:55:24,180 Staff of the Air Force and my 1492 00:55:24,180 --> 00:55:26,770 responsibilities that , that the 1493 00:55:26,770 --> 00:55:28,548 General Brown feels like he can 1494 00:55:28,548 --> 00:55:30,326 organize , train equipped space 1495 00:55:30,326 --> 00:55:32,381 capabilities inside the Air National 1496 00:55:32,381 --> 00:55:34,437 Guard . It creates a little bit of a 1497 00:55:34,437 --> 00:55:36,603 disconnect . And so the current status 1498 00:55:36,603 --> 00:55:38,770 quo is the , is the toughest to figure 1499 00:55:38,770 --> 00:55:38,620 out how to do properly . Other than 1500 00:55:38,620 --> 00:55:40,564 that , I think there might be some 1501 00:55:40,564 --> 00:55:42,676 options that are worth exploring that 1502 00:55:42,676 --> 00:55:45,009 are based on cost estimates in the like . 1503 00:55:45,009 --> 00:55:47,176 Thank you , Mr Chairman . I would just 1504 00:55:47,176 --> 00:55:49,231 like to commend the general . He has 1505 00:55:49,231 --> 00:55:51,610 taken a very direct and strong approach 1506 00:55:51,610 --> 00:55:53,499 with regard to advocating for our 1507 00:55:53,499 --> 00:55:55,666 airmen and guardians on the subject of 1508 00:55:55,666 --> 00:55:58,630 the missile community cancer study . Uh 1509 00:55:58,640 --> 00:56:00,862 This is a case of where they're finding 1510 00:56:00,862 --> 00:56:03,029 cancers in areas where these guys that 1511 00:56:03,029 --> 00:56:05,140 are basically working underground for 1512 00:56:05,140 --> 00:56:07,084 extended periods of time . And the 1513 00:56:07,084 --> 00:56:06,950 general has taken a very direct and 1514 00:56:06,950 --> 00:56:09,061 personal interest in seeing that this 1515 00:56:09,061 --> 00:56:11,228 be pursued and that anybody that's out 1516 00:56:11,228 --> 00:56:13,450 there , any one of these airmen or , or 1517 00:56:13,450 --> 00:56:15,760 guardians that they get help , they 1518 00:56:15,760 --> 00:56:17,982 find out and they keep track of . And I 1519 00:56:17,982 --> 00:56:20,038 just want to commend him and I would 1520 00:56:20,038 --> 00:56:21,982 hope that the committee would make 1521 00:56:21,982 --> 00:56:24,038 available time for him to be able to 1522 00:56:24,038 --> 00:56:26,093 share with us uh moving forward just 1523 00:56:26,093 --> 00:56:28,204 exactly what he has found with regard 1524 00:56:28,204 --> 00:56:30,371 to any health concerns surrounding the 1525 00:56:30,371 --> 00:56:32,538 cancers that seem to be more prevalent 1526 00:56:32,538 --> 00:56:34,427 with these folks that are working 1527 00:56:34,427 --> 00:56:36,482 underground in these missile silos . 1528 00:56:36,482 --> 00:56:38,593 Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you , 1529 00:56:38,593 --> 00:56:40,704 General uh general . Couple of follow 1530 00:56:40,704 --> 00:56:42,704 up questions several times . You've 1531 00:56:42,704 --> 00:56:45,290 mentioned the possibility of norms 1532 00:56:45,300 --> 00:56:47,950 developing international norms expand 1533 00:56:47,950 --> 00:56:49,617 on that . Is that a realistic 1534 00:56:49,617 --> 00:56:51,672 possibility will the Chinese and the 1535 00:56:51,672 --> 00:56:54,410 Russians talk about international norms 1536 00:56:54,410 --> 00:56:57,820 in space ? Unfortunately , the norms 1537 00:56:57,820 --> 00:56:59,987 that they talk about are not ones that 1538 00:56:59,987 --> 00:57:02,153 we would support and they've , they've 1539 00:57:02,153 --> 00:57:04,220 kind of shown um a propensity to not 1540 00:57:04,220 --> 00:57:06,331 support the ones we want to support . 1541 00:57:06,331 --> 00:57:08,331 This is a battle of narratives over 1542 00:57:08,331 --> 00:57:10,331 international norms . Uh What I can 1543 00:57:10,331 --> 00:57:11,998 tell you is when I talk to my 1544 00:57:11,998 --> 00:57:11,710 counterparts in the other nations , 1545 00:57:11,710 --> 00:57:14,140 they are interested in this , the 1546 00:57:14,150 --> 00:57:16,372 Secretary of Defense issued his tenants 1547 00:57:16,372 --> 00:57:18,483 for responsible behavior and us Space 1548 00:57:18,483 --> 00:57:20,706 command followed up with even some more 1549 00:57:20,706 --> 00:57:22,817 details . Those are all widely viewed 1550 00:57:22,817 --> 00:57:24,440 from my peers as helpful in 1551 00:57:24,440 --> 00:57:26,660 establishing what it means in a , in a 1552 00:57:26,670 --> 00:57:28,950 like a like minded set of nations with 1553 00:57:28,960 --> 00:57:32,370 responsible behaviors in space . Um The , 1554 00:57:32,370 --> 00:57:34,259 we have a , we have an initiative 1555 00:57:34,259 --> 00:57:36,370 called the Coalition Space Operations 1556 00:57:36,370 --> 00:57:39,200 Initiative , which is um seven 1557 00:57:39,200 --> 00:57:42,400 countries that have also detailed what 1558 00:57:42,400 --> 00:57:44,567 responsible behaviors in space means , 1559 00:57:44,567 --> 00:57:46,678 very consistent with the Secretary of 1560 00:57:46,678 --> 00:57:48,900 Defense's tenants . And so I think this 1561 00:57:48,900 --> 00:57:51,011 is kind of a widespread understanding 1562 00:57:51,011 --> 00:57:53,233 that we have to behave a certain way in 1563 00:57:53,233 --> 00:57:55,122 order to maintain a safe , secure 1564 00:57:55,122 --> 00:57:57,240 Sustainable Space Domain . Uh And I 1565 00:57:57,240 --> 00:58:00,310 believe there's widespread uh agreement 1566 00:58:00,310 --> 00:58:02,143 for that is the state department 1567 00:58:02,143 --> 00:58:04,199 engaged in this discussion as well . 1568 00:58:04,199 --> 00:58:06,330 They are , I think that would be an 1569 00:58:06,330 --> 00:58:08,920 important aspect of moving this forward . 1570 00:58:08,930 --> 00:58:11,097 Very important initiative . They are . 1571 00:58:11,097 --> 00:58:14,310 Um just to comment , you mentioned 1572 00:58:14,310 --> 00:58:17,160 cyber protection several times . It 1573 00:58:17,160 --> 00:58:19,216 seems to be the experience that most 1574 00:58:19,216 --> 00:58:22,530 major cyber attacks start with a sub , 1575 00:58:22,540 --> 00:58:24,540 not the general contractor but some 1576 00:58:24,540 --> 00:58:27,650 small company of smaller firm that's 1577 00:58:27,650 --> 00:58:29,706 working for a general contractor and 1578 00:58:29,706 --> 00:58:31,872 then they get into the system . I hope 1579 00:58:31,872 --> 00:58:33,928 that's something when you're talking 1580 00:58:33,928 --> 00:58:36,150 about the protection of your assets and 1581 00:58:36,150 --> 00:58:38,261 very rightfully , you've talked about 1582 00:58:38,261 --> 00:58:40,483 ground and space that you worry as well 1583 00:58:40,483 --> 00:58:42,650 about those small companies that might 1584 00:58:42,650 --> 00:58:44,761 act as a gateway for a cyber attack . 1585 00:58:44,970 --> 00:58:46,970 Yes , sir . I've talked to my cyber 1586 00:58:46,970 --> 00:58:49,137 defenders at length . I'm not really a 1587 00:58:49,137 --> 00:58:51,137 cyber professional myself . I don't 1588 00:58:51,137 --> 00:58:53,303 understand all the technical details , 1589 00:58:53,303 --> 00:58:53,190 but one of the most important things 1590 00:58:53,190 --> 00:58:55,190 that they start with is mapping the 1591 00:58:55,190 --> 00:58:57,023 cyber terrain . In other words , 1592 00:58:57,023 --> 00:58:59,190 understanding exactly what the network 1593 00:58:59,190 --> 00:59:01,412 looks like where it might be vulnerable 1594 00:59:01,412 --> 00:59:03,468 and how they might best sensor it to 1595 00:59:03,468 --> 00:59:05,690 rapidly detect any kind of intrusions . 1596 00:59:05,690 --> 00:59:07,746 And so to your point , understanding 1597 00:59:07,746 --> 00:59:09,857 how all of the company's fit together 1598 00:59:09,857 --> 00:59:11,912 in the cyber terrain is an important 1599 00:59:11,912 --> 00:59:14,079 foundational aspect of cyber defense . 1600 00:59:14,079 --> 00:59:16,190 Final , final question is Space force 1601 00:59:16,190 --> 00:59:19,740 in charge of defense defensive . You've 1602 00:59:19,740 --> 00:59:21,629 talked a lot about proliferated , 1603 00:59:21,629 --> 00:59:24,630 proliferated , Leo , are you also in 1604 00:59:24,630 --> 00:59:28,350 charge of developing the capability of 1605 00:59:28,360 --> 00:59:31,020 maneuver and otherwise defending our 1606 00:59:31,030 --> 00:59:33,086 space assets . Is that part of Space 1607 00:59:33,086 --> 00:59:35,300 Force's mission ? I would say it's 1608 00:59:35,300 --> 00:59:38,010 important that as we develop our D O D 1609 00:59:38,010 --> 00:59:40,177 capabilities through the space force , 1610 00:59:40,177 --> 00:59:42,399 that we make sure we're applying all of 1611 00:59:42,399 --> 00:59:44,288 the right concepts for active and 1612 00:59:44,288 --> 00:59:46,010 passive defense uh to meet the 1613 00:59:46,010 --> 00:59:47,732 requirements so that we have a 1614 00:59:47,732 --> 00:59:50,350 survivable architecture on the U S 1615 00:59:50,350 --> 00:59:52,660 worst day and that this is a relatively 1616 00:59:52,660 --> 00:59:54,771 new concern . We own space for a long 1617 00:59:54,771 --> 00:59:57,450 time . And but the Russians and the 1618 00:59:57,450 --> 00:59:59,990 Chinese have been very active in uh 1619 01:00:00,000 --> 01:00:03,080 anti satellite technology . So we need 1620 01:00:03,080 --> 01:00:05,670 to be developing counters to that in 1621 01:00:05,670 --> 01:00:07,948 order to maintain a credible deterrent . 1622 01:00:07,948 --> 01:00:10,870 Is that correct ? Absolutely . And I 1623 01:00:10,870 --> 01:00:14,000 think it's about how fast can we go 1624 01:00:14,180 --> 01:00:16,700 again . In my , my weak analogy is 1625 01:00:16,700 --> 01:00:18,811 converting the merchant marine in the 1626 01:00:18,811 --> 01:00:20,811 US Navy . We've got a little bit of 1627 01:00:20,811 --> 01:00:22,700 ways to go before we can take our 1628 01:00:22,700 --> 01:00:24,922 legacy platforms that we've got so much 1629 01:00:24,922 --> 01:00:27,033 utility out of and so much capability 1630 01:00:27,033 --> 01:00:29,089 from , but convert them to providing 1631 01:00:29,089 --> 01:00:31,200 the same or better capabilities while 1632 01:00:31,200 --> 01:00:33,256 being able to perform in a contested 1633 01:00:33,256 --> 01:00:35,311 domain . And we'll have to make that 1634 01:00:35,311 --> 01:00:37,200 transition as rapidly as possible 1635 01:00:37,200 --> 01:00:39,089 questions . Thank you very much , 1636 01:00:39,089 --> 01:00:40,811 General . This has been a very 1637 01:00:40,811 --> 01:00:42,811 illuminating hearing . I appreciate 1638 01:00:42,811 --> 01:00:44,700 your forthright responsive to our 1639 01:00:44,700 --> 01:00:46,700 responsive to our question and your 1640 01:00:46,700 --> 01:00:48,644 leadership and your long career of 1641 01:00:48,644 --> 01:00:50,700 service to the United States . Thank 1642 01:00:50,700 --> 01:00:52,644 you . Thank you , sir . Hearing is 1643 01:00:52,644 --> 01:00:51,410 adjourned .