WEBVTT

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Call to order the meeting of the

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Strategic Forces subcommittee of the

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Senate Committee on armed services are

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hearing today is on the subject of the

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Space force . Uh I want to thank

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General Saltzman for being with us

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today before this committee . And the

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purpose of the hearing is to understand

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your vision and priorities for the

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Space Force as its second Chief of

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Space Operations . While the budget for

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the Department of Defense and the Space

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Force has just been released . We plan

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to have a space budget hearing which

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includes the Space Force later in May

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after we've had time to understand and

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detail the president's budget request .

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There are many uncomplicated topics

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such as missile warning and launch that

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will take time to understand and are

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not really right for this hearing today ,

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but we will take up in May instead ,

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the hearing will focus on you . General

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Saltsman . This is your opportunity to

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explain to the subcommittee into the

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public how you will train and equip the

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Space Force as the Department of

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Defense , separate military service and

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be a presenter of forces to the

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combatant commanders in order to

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accomplish their missions as assigned

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by the president . My understanding is

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that today you will explain to us , you

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are three lines of effort for our space

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force guardians , as I understand it ,

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they are to first field a combat ready

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force . Second , amplify the Guardian

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spirit and third partner with the

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interagency allies and industry to win .

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I look forward to having you explain in

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detail what each of these lines of

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effort are and give us examples and

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simple ones that we can take with us

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and explain to our constituents and the

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public the importance of the work that

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you're doing . Let me conclude that

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General Heighten said it best . There

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is no such thing as a conflict in space

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by itself . Any conflict will involve

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all domains . Although I believe it

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will start in space , the land , the

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sea , the air and space all together at

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once . I hope that today you will

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explain to us how your vision for the

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Space Force will meet . General

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heightens astute observation and enable

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our combatant commanders to accomplish

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the mission that the president has

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directed them to perform . If called

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upon . After your opening statement ,

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we will have questions at five minutes

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each . Senator Fischer . Thank you , Mr

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Chairman General Saltzman . Thank you

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for being here today and for sharing

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your perspective with this subcommittee .

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And thank you sir , for your many ,

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many years of service . You are only

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the second ever chief of Space

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Operations in a unique position to

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leave your mark on what is still

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essentially a brand new military

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service , an opportunity like this

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comes around less than once in a

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generation . And I'm sure you feel the

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gravity and the expectation of this

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every single day . I look forward to

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hearing more of your vision for this

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newest service branch specifically how

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you are forming it into a fighting

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force that is ready to prosecute war as

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part of the United States military . I

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would also like to understand how you

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are shaping the space acquisition

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enterprise to that vision enabling the

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joint force . Thank you , Mr Chairman

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General Saltzman ,

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chairman King , ranking member Fisher ,

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distinguished member of the

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subcommittee . Thank you for your

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continued support for the opportunity

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to discuss my vision and priorities for

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the United States Space Force . I've

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been listening , I've been in listening

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mode since becoming the second chief of

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Space Operations just four months ago .

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One of my first phone calls as the CSO

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was to the Commander of U S European

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Command General . Casually my first

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trip as the CSO was to Colorado Springs

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to meet in person with the Commander of

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U S Space Command General Dickinson .

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My first overseas trip was to Hawaii

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where I met with the commander of U S

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Indo Pacific Command , Admiral Aquilino .

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And during these last four months , I

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have also prioritized visiting with

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guardians performing vital missions

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around the world for the Space Force ,

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for the joint force and for the nation

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in December , I met in person with

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military space chiefs from Australia ,

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Canada , France , Germany , New Zealand ,

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and the United Kingdom and all these

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engagements . My goal was to better

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understand how the space force should

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focus its near and midterm efforts as

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we integrate our capabilities to

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address the threats and challenges .

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The themes from these engagements

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should surprise . No one . Each

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combatant commander emphasized the

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vital role space plays in strategic

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competition and integrated deterrence .

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The guardians of the space force make

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this possible and are without a doubt ,

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the brightest and boldest America has

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to offer because of these advantages

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and our shared interest in the domain ,

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us allies and international partners

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are eager for expanded collaboration

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with the Space Force , especially in

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areas that strengthen the effectiveness

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of coalition space operations and

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reinforce norms of responsible behavior .

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In short . Our mission forces people

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and partnerships make the space force

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the most formidable space organization

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on the planet China and Russia know

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this and are accelerating their efforts

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to undermine us advantages in the

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domain To meet this challenge . The

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space force will prioritize three lines

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of effort . As Senator King has already

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stated , fielding combat ready forces ,

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amplifying the guardian spirit and

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partnering to win these lines of

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efforts are designed to deliver the

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forces , personnel and partnerships

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required for the space force to

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preserve us advantages in space . And

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before I expand on the space force

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lines of effort , I'd like to update

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the subcommittee on the emerging

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threats space forces face as the

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handout I've provided indicates space

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is undeniably a contested and congested

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warfighting domain . When describing

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space threats . It's important to

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account for two kinds of threats .

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First threats from space assets and

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second threats to space assets ,

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threats from space present a growing

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danger to the joint force . Both China

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and Russia have robust space based

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capabilities that allow them to find

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target and attack U S military forces

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on land at sea and in the air . Equally

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alarming are the threats that endanger

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the satellites . The nation relies on

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for prosperity and security . Both

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China and Russia continued to develop

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field and deploy a range of weapons

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aimed at us space capabilities . The

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spectrum of threats to U S space

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capabilities include cyber warfare

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activities , electronic attack

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platforms , directed energy lasers

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designed to blind or damaged satellite

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sensors , ground orbit missiles to

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destroy satellites and space to space

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orbital engagement systems that can

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attack U S satellites in space . The

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contested space domain shapes the

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enduring purpose of the United States .

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Space Force . Congress established the

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Space force to protect U S interests in

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space . This means protecting us space

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capabilities and defending the joint

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force and the nation from space enabled

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attack . My lines of effort are

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designed to achieve this vision by

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providing the forces personnel and

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partnerships required for the space

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force to preserve us space superiority

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for the foreseeable future . My first

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priority is to build resilient ready

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combat credible space forces to do this .

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We are accelerating the pivot towards

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resilient satellite constellations ,

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ground stations , networks and data

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links . The space development agencies

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proliferated . Warfighter space

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architecture provides a prime example

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of these efforts . We are also

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emphasizing cybersecurity and preparing

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guardians to detect and defeat cyber

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attacks against our networks systems ,

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ground stations , data links and

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satellites . We are developing an

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operational test and training

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infrastructure that will be the

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backbone of Space force readiness as

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guardians prepare for a high intensity

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fight . This infrastructure will allow

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guardians to execute realistic training

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against simulated adversaries to

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validate their tactics . Space training

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and readiness command executed one such

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exercise last September with its

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inaugural Black Skies exercise focused

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on space electromagnetic warfare .

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Through these events , we are

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continuously enhancing tactics and

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operational concepts thereby creating a

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force ready for emerging threats . My

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second priority is to amplify the

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guardian spirit by embracing a modern

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talent management process that recruits

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the best talent develops and retains an

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elite workforce and empowers guardians

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to succeed . One example is our

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constructive service credit program

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that allows experienced professionals

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from key fields to directly

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commissioned into the space force at

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ranks appropriate to their civilian

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experience . The first constructive

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credit board served as a pilot program

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in 2022 recruited seven cyber

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professionals to become guardians , one

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of which was on boarded as a lieutenant

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colonel . The second board will

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incorporate intelligence professionals

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and assess 20 additional personnel over

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the last year , we have also deployed

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space centric curriculum for basic

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military training , the Reserve officer

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training corps and an officer training

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school . In addition , our partnership

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with the Johns Hopkins School of

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Advanced International Studies for

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professional military education begins

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this summer with congressional support ,

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we will improve our modern talent

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management system by integrating the

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Air Force reserve space element into

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the Space force as a single component .

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This will allow guardians to transition

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between full time and part time duty to

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pursue opportunities outside of full

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time military service and subsequently

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return to full time duty without

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barriers to reentry or detriment to

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their career . We will ensure that such

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experiences utilized in strict and and

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careful compliance with federal

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acquisition and ethics regulations and

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appropriate conflict of interest

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statutes . The single service personnel

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management system will make retaining

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highly qualified guardians easier by

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facilitating flexible career paths and

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we look forward to working with this

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subcommittee on that important

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initiative . My third and final

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priority is to strengthen partnerships .

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The Space force relies on to accomplish

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its mission . The space force will

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strive to eliminate barriers to

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collaboration including over

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classification so we can build enduring

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advantages with our partners to date .

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Personnel from over 50 countries have

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participated in training , education

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and exercise events hosted by the space

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force . We're also leveraging allies

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and partners to expand our war fighting

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capability . Recent examples include

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deploying us payloads on Norwegian and

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Japanese satellites And establishing a

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partnership with Luxembourg for

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satellite communications services . In

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total , we have more than 200 foreign

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military sales cases with over 60

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countries for a broad spectrum of space

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capabilities . Commercial partners will

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be key as we pursue emerging

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technologies like advanced power

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promotion propulsion technologies ,

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artificial intelligence and machine

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learning and in space , servicing

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assembly and manufacturing space

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systems commands commercial services

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office is building these partnerships

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to improve our ability to leverage more

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commercial off the shelf capabilities .

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In conclusion , thank you for the

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opportunity to share these priorities

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with you today . The Space Force is the

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preeminent military Space Organization

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in the world . Are adversaries seek to

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surpass the United States and challenge

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our advantage . We cannot and will not

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allow this to happen . Are guardians

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will outwork out innovate and out

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compete . Our adversaries to ensure

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that we succeed . They will do

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everything they can to deter conflict

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and maintain stability and space . I

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very much look forward to your

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questions . Thank you . Thank you very

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much , General . I want to jump on the

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comments you made about recruiting and

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particularly bringing people in mid

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career and having more flexibility

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about leaving and coming back . That's

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a , that's a creative idea . Flesh that

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out a bit . For me . It strikes me that

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that's really going to be necessary in

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today's environment , particularly in

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the technology field . Yes , sir . We

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currently don't have the ability

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because our reserves and the guard are

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in the air Force , they're in the Air

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Force Reserves in the Air National

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Guard . So we don't have an option to ,

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if you leave full time active service

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from the Space Force , we lose your

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expertise . And so we're looking for

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anything that can allow us to retain

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those people who might have priorities

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that shift , but are still willing to

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contribute to the service . Do we need

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a Space National Guard ? So I need the

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capabilities that are currently in the

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Air National Guard . I can assure you

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of that . I think there's a couple of

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different ways to do it . Um There's we ,

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we , we assessed three different

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options . We could leave things as they

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are , which I think is the worst

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solution because as General Brown

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points out as the Chief of the Air

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Force , he doesn't have organized

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trained and equipped responsibilities

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for space missions , yet he has those

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space capabilities in the Air National

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Guard . So it creates a little bit of a

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conundrum when I'm trying to figure out

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how to train forces that are aligned

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under the Air National Guard . So I

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think the status quo is the most

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untenable position , but there are

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other options and we're going through a

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series of cost estimates to figure out

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what a preferred option might be . Is

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one of them simply to sort of partner

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with the Air National Guard and have

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different units have different

13:38.857 --> 13:40.579
functions . Is that one of the

13:40.579 --> 13:42.579
possibilities rather than set up an

13:42.579 --> 13:44.690
entirely new a a space National Guard

13:44.690 --> 13:46.690
structure . Well , we are currently

13:46.690 --> 13:48.857
partnered with the current status , so

13:48.857 --> 13:51.079
we are currently partnered to make sure

13:51.079 --> 13:53.134
we can rely on the capabilities that

13:53.134 --> 13:55.357
are in the Air National Guard . It just

13:55.357 --> 13:57.579
creates a long term sustainment problem

13:57.579 --> 13:59.412
with the difference in organized

13:59.412 --> 13:58.980
trained equipped responsibilities

13:58.980 --> 14:00.980
between the Air Force and the Space

14:00.980 --> 14:03.036
force . Me back up a minute again on

14:03.036 --> 14:04.924
recruiting . How are you doing on

14:04.924 --> 14:07.147
recruiting both in terms of quality and

14:07.147 --> 14:09.258
quantity ? Some of your , some of our

14:09.258 --> 14:09.110
other services are having real problems

14:09.110 --> 14:11.332
with recruiting in this economy , house

14:11.332 --> 14:13.640
Space Force doing . Yeah , I'm almost

14:13.640 --> 14:15.862
embarrassed in front of my , appears to

14:15.862 --> 14:18.084
say it , but we're doing very well . Uh

14:18.084 --> 14:20.307
mostly associated with the fact that we

14:20.307 --> 14:22.362
have much smaller numbers to recruit

14:22.362 --> 14:24.584
and we have the ability to hand pick uh

14:24.584 --> 14:26.807
those that decide they want to join the

14:26.807 --> 14:29.029
space for us . So right now we're doing

14:29.029 --> 14:30.751
okay . The problem is gonna be

14:30.751 --> 14:32.973
sustainment over time in the quality of

14:32.973 --> 14:35.140
the applicants that we can pull in and

14:35.140 --> 14:37.307
then retaining them for long enough to

14:37.307 --> 14:39.473
really benefit from their experience .

14:39.473 --> 14:41.473
Um Turning to you mentioned several

14:41.473 --> 14:43.529
times in your testimony , commercial

14:43.529 --> 14:45.640
assets , commercial space assets . We

14:45.640 --> 14:48.090
know that Russia is trying to jam or

14:48.090 --> 14:50.201
otherwise damage the Starlink network

14:50.210 --> 14:54.040
which is assisting in Ukraine is

14:54.040 --> 14:57.460
that precedent making it more difficult

14:57.460 --> 14:59.870
to partner with commercial satellite

14:59.870 --> 15:01.700
users . One of the , one of the

15:01.710 --> 15:04.260
strategies is proliferation and using ,

15:04.270 --> 15:07.910
using commercial satellites is that

15:07.920 --> 15:10.350
our what's been the reaction to what's

15:10.350 --> 15:12.628
been going on with Starlink in Ukraine ?

15:12.628 --> 15:15.150
So commercial augmentation is important

15:15.160 --> 15:17.216
to the Space force for the reasons .

15:17.216 --> 15:18.716
You mentioned resiliency ,

15:18.716 --> 15:20.938
diversification of our portfolio across

15:20.938 --> 15:23.049
a broader number of participants . If

15:23.049 --> 15:25.510
you will um the

15:26.280 --> 15:28.890
commercial augmentation Space Reserve ,

15:28.890 --> 15:31.150
we're trying to establish what is kind

15:31.150 --> 15:33.206
of like a craft like if you know the

15:33.206 --> 15:35.261
civilian reserve air fleet that uses

15:35.261 --> 15:37.428
commercial capabilities were trying to

15:37.428 --> 15:39.483
explore , we're exploring options to

15:39.483 --> 15:41.483
use something along those lines . I

15:41.483 --> 15:43.650
think the key with commercial industry

15:43.650 --> 15:45.761
is to make sure that the expectations

15:45.761 --> 15:47.817
are managed upfront . So we're going

15:47.817 --> 15:50.039
through a series of plans , we're going

15:50.039 --> 15:52.206
through a series of of industry days .

15:52.206 --> 15:52.180
If you will to clarify , what are the

15:52.180 --> 15:54.880
policy ? What are the contractual ?

15:54.880 --> 15:57.240
What are the legal responsibilities and

15:57.240 --> 15:59.407
hurdles that we have to clear in order

15:59.407 --> 16:01.629
to establish this ? So the expectations

16:01.629 --> 16:03.550
are clear across all spectrums of

16:03.550 --> 16:05.772
conflict crisis , etcetera . So this is

16:05.772 --> 16:09.605
an evolving Kind of uh capability . It

16:09.605 --> 16:11.675
is , but I will tell you that we had

16:11.675 --> 16:13.675
significant interest . We hosted an

16:13.675 --> 16:15.619
industry day along these lines and

16:15.619 --> 16:17.397
there were 84 participants from

16:17.397 --> 16:19.453
commercial industry so that there is

16:19.453 --> 16:21.564
interest in doing this . Now in my 45

16:21.564 --> 16:23.508
seconds left , I'm gonna ask you a

16:23.508 --> 16:25.508
question that I get asked at home .

16:25.508 --> 16:25.235
What's the difference between space

16:25.235 --> 16:28.215
force and space command ? I get asked

16:28.215 --> 16:29.993
that at home too sometimes so I

16:29.993 --> 16:32.160
appreciate it . It's as simple as any

16:32.160 --> 16:34.104
of the combatant commands with the

16:34.104 --> 16:36.216
other services . If you were to think

16:36.216 --> 16:38.382
about us , Central Command and the U S

16:38.382 --> 16:40.493
Air Force or Indo Pacific Command and

16:40.493 --> 16:42.382
the U S Navy uh for the U S Space

16:42.382 --> 16:44.604
Command and U S Space Force , we simply

16:44.604 --> 16:46.827
have different responsibilities . Um As

16:46.827 --> 16:48.827
the Chief of the Space Force , I've

16:48.827 --> 16:50.938
responsibility organize , train equip

16:50.938 --> 16:50.890
and operate the forces that are then

16:50.890 --> 16:53.820
presented to us . Space Command who has

16:53.820 --> 16:55.876
the authority from the president and

16:55.876 --> 16:57.820
the Secretary of Defense to direct

16:57.820 --> 17:00.020
those operations . So you're organized

17:00.020 --> 17:03.130
training , equip . Space Command is ,

17:03.140 --> 17:05.820
is operate or fight . They have the

17:05.820 --> 17:08.042
authority from the president to conduct

17:08.042 --> 17:10.098
those missions and they would direct

17:10.098 --> 17:11.820
our forces that are , that are

17:11.820 --> 17:13.653
presented to them to conduct the

17:13.653 --> 17:15.709
operations . Thank you . Thank you ,

17:15.709 --> 17:17.820
General Senator Fischer . Thank you ,

17:17.820 --> 17:19.820
Mr Chairman General as we discussed

17:19.820 --> 17:21.920
last year , the next Gen O P I R

17:21.930 --> 17:24.152
satellite program . It's one of the key

17:24.152 --> 17:25.986
components of our future missile

17:25.986 --> 17:27.810
warning architecture along with

17:27.820 --> 17:30.510
proliferated constellations of smaller

17:30.510 --> 17:32.490
satellites operating in the lower

17:32.490 --> 17:34.950
orbits . Uh During your nomination

17:34.950 --> 17:37.180
hearing , you stated that having no

17:37.180 --> 17:39.280
gaps in coverage for missile warning

17:39.280 --> 17:42.040
was a high priority . Uh The missile

17:42.040 --> 17:45.450
warning mission is the cornerstone of

17:45.450 --> 17:47.760
our strategic deterrent . You know , if

17:47.760 --> 17:50.800
we can't effectively respond

17:51.380 --> 17:55.340
if we can't detect when our adversaries

17:55.340 --> 17:58.400
are launching nuclear weapons , um

17:58.410 --> 18:01.770
We're in trouble and so it is very

18:01.770 --> 18:05.320
important that we continued to fund

18:05.330 --> 18:08.140
uh this next Gen O P I R .

18:14.990 --> 18:17.320
I'm concerned to see that the space

18:17.320 --> 18:21.100
force's fiscal year 2024 bequest

18:21.110 --> 18:24.970
appears to propose cutting the third G

18:24.970 --> 18:28.660
O next Gen O P I R satellite . Does the

18:28.660 --> 18:30.820
space force intend to complete that

18:30.820 --> 18:32.987
architecture as planned ? And if not ,

18:32.987 --> 18:35.264
how are you going to mitigate it ? Yes ,

18:35.264 --> 18:38.180
ma'am . Yes , ma'am . Thank you . The

18:38.190 --> 18:40.600
real architecture that we need is the

18:40.600 --> 18:43.990
one that is under that . Yes ,

18:44.540 --> 18:47.370
it is . Can you hear me ? So the the

18:47.370 --> 18:49.592
architecture that we really need is one

18:49.592 --> 18:51.926
that's survivable in a contested domain .

18:51.926 --> 18:53.703
That's the proliferated leo and

18:53.703 --> 18:55.926
multiple orbits to include middle earth

18:55.926 --> 18:58.540
orbit orbits as well . Um So that's

18:58.540 --> 19:00.760
what the Space Development Agency and

19:00.760 --> 19:02.593
the swag analysis that we did is

19:02.593 --> 19:04.649
progressing towards . And that's the

19:04.649 --> 19:06.649
investment we made in fy 24 to make

19:06.649 --> 19:09.220
that pivot because that's a pretty big

19:09.220 --> 19:11.220
technical shift . We wanted to make

19:11.220 --> 19:13.331
sure that we for this no fail mission

19:13.331 --> 19:15.387
had some hedges to make sure that we

19:15.387 --> 19:17.664
didn't miss anything . So next gen Opr ,

19:17.664 --> 19:19.664
we are committed to putting that on

19:19.664 --> 19:21.870
orbit . Uh And we felt like a two by

19:21.870 --> 19:24.870
two was sufficient to ensure one that

19:24.870 --> 19:26.870
the mission did not have any gaps .

19:26.870 --> 19:29.092
It's a no fail mission to that . It was

19:29.092 --> 19:31.037
a hedge against any technical risk

19:31.037 --> 19:33.400
associated with the pivot to the more

19:33.400 --> 19:35.344
survivable missile warning missile

19:35.344 --> 19:37.567
track architecture . You're saying that

19:37.567 --> 19:40.620
um with this pivot to the to lower

19:40.620 --> 19:44.160
orbits . Uh You have no plans then to

19:44.160 --> 19:47.650
look at the GEO . Now we , we have the

19:47.650 --> 19:50.900
plans with next Gen O P I R for two G O

19:50.900 --> 19:53.122
and two he oh that constellation we are

19:53.122 --> 19:55.178
still supporting in the fy 24 budget

19:55.178 --> 19:57.240
has those four satellites in it .

19:57.250 --> 19:59.380
That's the , that's the long term

19:59.390 --> 20:02.380
transition to the proliferated missile

20:02.380 --> 20:04.850
warning . But GEO satellites are too

20:04.850 --> 20:07.090
much of a target . So having them in

20:07.090 --> 20:09.312
lower than Middle Earth orbit creates a

20:09.312 --> 20:11.257
targeting problem for an adversary

20:11.257 --> 20:13.479
which actually lowers the threshold for

20:13.479 --> 20:15.730
attack on orbit . It's more resilient

20:15.730 --> 20:17.786
and it creates a level of deterrence

20:17.786 --> 20:19.452
because they can't attack the

20:19.452 --> 20:23.270
satellites . It seems like on the

20:23.280 --> 20:25.730
major acquisition programs that are

20:25.730 --> 20:29.650
executed by Space force have been late .

20:29.660 --> 20:33.130
Um They have cost overruns or

20:33.130 --> 20:35.530
both . Uh does the Space Force

20:35.530 --> 20:39.440
acquisition community , I guess I

20:39.440 --> 20:41.551
would say to you , how do you plan to

20:41.551 --> 20:43.850
address that ? And do you agree with my

20:43.850 --> 20:47.150
assessment ? Well , I've been doing in

20:47.150 --> 20:49.261
this business a long time and so I've

20:49.261 --> 20:51.261
certainly seen the same things that

20:51.261 --> 20:53.428
you're noting there . So I can't argue

20:53.428 --> 20:55.539
with the facts about cost overrunning

20:55.539 --> 20:57.539
schedules . What I will say is I've

20:57.539 --> 20:59.706
been very impressed with the way Frank

20:59.706 --> 21:01.817
Calve Ellie has reorganized how we're

21:01.817 --> 21:03.817
doing space acquisition uh with his

21:03.817 --> 21:05.872
appointment as the undersecretary of

21:05.872 --> 21:07.817
the Assistant Secretary of the Air

21:07.817 --> 21:10.150
Force for space acquisition integration .

21:10.150 --> 21:12.039
He's focused on several different

21:12.039 --> 21:15.170
things . Buying small satellites having

21:15.180 --> 21:18.310
shorter term contracts going with uh

21:18.320 --> 21:20.620
well developed technology so that we

21:20.620 --> 21:22.453
don't have as many non recurring

21:22.453 --> 21:25.220
engineering costs . Uh And when you say

21:25.230 --> 21:27.341
I'm sorry to interrupt you , but when

21:27.341 --> 21:30.140
you say well developed technology , um

21:30.150 --> 21:32.500
is that you want to make sure things

21:32.500 --> 21:34.780
are proven . Would you say your risk

21:34.780 --> 21:37.730
adverse ? Then I would say we want to

21:37.730 --> 21:39.841
make sure before we commit to putting

21:39.841 --> 21:41.952
something on orbit . If there is well

21:41.952 --> 21:43.841
developed technology , we want to

21:43.841 --> 21:45.619
leverage it to the max extent .

21:45.619 --> 21:47.786
Otherwise you have to build everything

21:47.786 --> 21:47.780
from scratch and it delays things and

21:47.780 --> 21:49.947
there's there's requirement shifts and

21:49.947 --> 21:51.947
it can get in that spiral where you

21:51.947 --> 21:53.669
spend more money and delay the

21:53.669 --> 21:55.613
timelines . So where there is well

21:55.613 --> 21:55.610
developed technologies , we should take

21:55.610 --> 21:57.610
advantage of those . And I think in

21:57.610 --> 21:59.721
satellite production , that's exactly

21:59.721 --> 22:02.850
where Mr Cavalese head is on that . And

22:02.850 --> 22:05.320
so while again , I can't speak to all

22:05.320 --> 22:07.960
the programs that have existed since

22:07.960 --> 22:10.238
we've been putting satellites on orbit .

22:10.238 --> 22:12.127
I can certainly tell you that the

22:12.127 --> 22:14.293
acquisition community has shifted to a

22:14.293 --> 22:16.404
different mindset for how it acquires

22:16.404 --> 22:18.182
systems . And I think the space

22:18.182 --> 22:20.016
development agencies acquisition

22:20.016 --> 22:21.960
strategy for the missile warning ,

22:21.960 --> 22:23.738
missile tracking and space data

22:23.738 --> 22:25.738
transport layer is an example where

22:25.738 --> 22:27.738
it's going in about four years from

22:27.738 --> 22:29.960
order to orbit , which is substantially

22:29.960 --> 22:31.738
better than we've seen in other

22:31.738 --> 22:35.690
programs . Now , I'd like to call

22:35.690 --> 22:38.060
on our only subcommittee member who's

22:38.060 --> 22:41.810
been in space . Senator Kelly , thank

22:41.810 --> 22:45.150
you , Mr Chairman . Um I had a couple

22:45.160 --> 22:46.938
detailed questions and then the

22:46.938 --> 22:49.049
chairman asked both both of them . So

22:49.049 --> 22:51.450
I'm gonna go a little bit different ,

22:52.820 --> 22:55.890
different approach here . So um

22:56.680 --> 22:59.430
to the ranking members question , you

22:59.440 --> 23:03.010
um talked about that .

23:03.020 --> 23:05.570
Uh There's a little bit of a deterrent

23:05.570 --> 23:08.260
by putting something at a lower orbit .

23:08.270 --> 23:11.840
I think you said , why is , why is that ,

23:11.850 --> 23:15.400
why is , is it more likely

23:16.020 --> 23:19.050
that an adversary goes , goes after

23:19.050 --> 23:21.640
something at GEO than it is if they are

23:21.640 --> 23:24.200
at a floor orbit ,

23:25.920 --> 23:27.753
if this sounds at all , like I'm

23:27.753 --> 23:29.920
lecturing an astronaut , I promise I'm

23:29.920 --> 23:32.170
not . So the , it's more than just the

23:32.170 --> 23:34.710
orbital regime in low earth orbit to

23:34.710 --> 23:36.932
provide the coverage , you have to have

23:36.932 --> 23:39.410
a vastly greater number of satellites ,

23:39.420 --> 23:42.090
dozens instead of from GEO , you can

23:42.090 --> 23:44.257
have a single orbit that would look at

23:44.257 --> 23:46.450
a third of the earth . So by going to

23:46.450 --> 23:48.394
the low earth orbit , we're buying

23:48.394 --> 23:50.520
smaller satellites and more of more

23:50.520 --> 23:52.840
satellites creates a tart , which one

23:52.840 --> 23:54.784
do you want to shoot down that you

23:54.784 --> 23:56.840
think is going to be the problem for

23:56.840 --> 23:58.562
the mission . It's just , it's

23:58.562 --> 24:00.673
proliferated . Leo so more they gotta

24:00.673 --> 24:02.951
shoot , shoot more rounds , a lot more ,

24:02.951 --> 24:05.118
take out the capability . So much more

24:05.118 --> 24:07.229
that I think the escalatory threshold

24:07.229 --> 24:09.118
is raised to the point where they

24:09.118 --> 24:08.580
probably wouldn't , wouldn't do it .

24:08.680 --> 24:11.550
Okay . Okay . That's helpful general

24:12.970 --> 24:16.490
of the N Roo Air Force Space Force

24:16.490 --> 24:20.320
satellites . Um that we put into orbit .

24:20.330 --> 24:23.870
Um What percentage of those is space

24:23.870 --> 24:27.280
force responsible for the , you know ,

24:27.280 --> 24:29.430
the contracting , the the management

24:29.430 --> 24:32.490
management of the , you know , the

24:32.490 --> 24:34.630
operations to get these two , they're

24:34.630 --> 24:38.190
targeted orbit compared to the N R

24:38.190 --> 24:40.500
O . Well , yeah , like what percentage

24:40.500 --> 24:43.950
do you have , sir ? I let me get back

24:43.950 --> 24:46.930
to you with but the N R O N R O has a

24:46.930 --> 24:48.763
number of constellations for its

24:48.763 --> 24:51.050
mission set . We have , I'm trying to

24:51.050 --> 24:53.272
think if there's any examples , we have

24:53.272 --> 24:55.217
the vast majority of Department of

24:55.217 --> 24:57.272
Defense satellites have now migrated

24:57.272 --> 24:59.050
those missions . Not all of the

24:59.050 --> 24:58.750
Department of Defense Defense

24:58.750 --> 25:00.861
Satellites . I always hesitate to say

25:00.861 --> 25:04.310
all . But um but I'm struggling to

25:04.310 --> 25:07.060
think of an example and , and how many

25:07.070 --> 25:10.270
launch providers do you have that you

25:10.270 --> 25:12.550
contract with currently to get those

25:12.550 --> 25:15.610
satellites into orbit to ? And those

25:15.610 --> 25:19.610
are uh U L A and SpaceX and

25:19.620 --> 25:21.731
actually for demos and other things ,

25:21.731 --> 25:24.940
we've contracted other uh providers as

25:24.940 --> 25:26.996
well . I can get you the full number

25:26.996 --> 25:30.700
and , and uh to date while you've been

25:30.710 --> 25:32.877
involved with this . So we're seeing ,

25:32.877 --> 25:34.821
you know , typical kind of success

25:34.821 --> 25:36.766
rates and safety records from both

25:36.766 --> 25:39.840
companies and no

25:39.840 --> 25:43.490
identifiable , you know , problems um

25:44.470 --> 25:48.370
with that you , that you feel puts our

25:48.380 --> 25:52.360
satellites at risk . I mean , it's been

25:52.360 --> 25:55.420
a while since we've had an accident . I

25:55.420 --> 25:57.587
mean , I saw one a long time ago and N

25:57.587 --> 25:59.809
R O satellite actually that happened to

25:59.809 --> 26:01.920
be down at the Kennedy Space Center .

26:01.920 --> 26:01.790
Watch this thing blow up right after

26:01.790 --> 26:04.360
liftoff was on console that happened in

26:04.360 --> 26:06.304
California just walked out of crew

26:06.304 --> 26:08.200
quarters . Saw this wasn't even

26:08.200 --> 26:10.311
expecting it , saw this rocket launch

26:10.311 --> 26:12.820
and then explode about 15 seconds later .

26:13.210 --> 26:15.377
You never want to see . Yeah . So it's

26:15.377 --> 26:17.543
great that we've , we've gotten better

26:17.543 --> 26:20.220
at this and , you know , SpaceX has a ,

26:21.440 --> 26:23.718
I'd say a pretty remarkable , you know ,

26:23.718 --> 26:26.190
record of success . Um You L A as well ,

26:26.200 --> 26:28.200
we just need to keep that going . I

26:28.200 --> 26:31.780
think it's important to be , um , you

26:31.780 --> 26:33.891
know , just constantly trying to look

26:33.891 --> 26:36.002
ahead and seeing what that next , you

26:36.002 --> 26:38.058
know , failure mode is and make sure

26:38.058 --> 26:40.169
you have the workforce that is really

26:40.169 --> 26:42.280
tracking this stuff closely because ,

26:42.280 --> 26:44.447
you know , some of these assets are in

26:44.447 --> 26:46.558
the billions , billions of dollars as

26:46.558 --> 26:49.320
you know , general . So , um I've got

26:49.320 --> 26:51.542
another question . Um well , actually I

26:51.542 --> 26:53.709
do have about 50 seconds . So let me ,

26:53.709 --> 26:55.876
so space force has been around now for

26:55.876 --> 26:59.800
a couple of years . Um I think maybe

26:59.800 --> 27:01.800
three years that right , over three

27:01.800 --> 27:03.960
years and some of the guardians

27:03.960 --> 27:06.080
incurred about a two year commitment

27:06.090 --> 27:08.140
when they transferred from the Air

27:08.140 --> 27:11.620
Force or from another service . They're

27:11.620 --> 27:14.310
coming up on the end of that time . Are

27:14.310 --> 27:16.390
you seeing a good , you know ,

27:16.400 --> 27:18.960
reenlistment rate for the enlisted

27:18.960 --> 27:21.016
ranks and officers that are going to

27:21.016 --> 27:23.290
stay on ? I think the day the , the

27:23.290 --> 27:25.457
final assessment is still out a little

27:25.457 --> 27:27.623
bit because we wanna see , I wanna see

27:27.623 --> 27:29.846
it all play out the full cycle play out

27:29.846 --> 27:29.480
before I really commit to this . But

27:29.490 --> 27:31.790
I'm encouraged so far and I think we're

27:31.790 --> 27:33.901
providing the kind of challenges that

27:33.901 --> 27:36.012
the workforce is looking for . And so

27:36.012 --> 27:38.123
I'm still hopeful that we're gonna be

27:38.123 --> 27:40.068
at good retention numbers , but we

27:40.068 --> 27:42.179
probably need to let this full summer

27:42.179 --> 27:44.401
cycle play out before we judge . Okay .

27:44.401 --> 27:46.401
Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman

27:46.401 --> 27:48.410
Senator Tuberville . Thank you , Mr

27:48.410 --> 27:50.770
Chairman . Um You know , you've been in ,

27:50.780 --> 27:53.250
you've been in your position now . What ?

27:53.260 --> 27:55.149
Less than a year , correct ? Four

27:55.149 --> 27:58.140
months , four months , Give us your

27:58.140 --> 28:01.830
number one priority for space force . I

28:01.830 --> 28:03.886
need to make sure that the Guardians

28:03.886 --> 28:05.886
are ready to meet the threat . I've

28:05.886 --> 28:07.941
said this from day one , the systems

28:07.941 --> 28:10.163
that were buying our exquisite . I want

28:10.163 --> 28:12.219
to make sure that the guardians have

28:12.219 --> 28:13.997
the training and the ability to

28:13.997 --> 28:16.108
practice their trade , craft reps and

28:16.108 --> 28:18.108
sets . I call it , we've got to get

28:18.108 --> 28:20.274
those into the guardian's so that they

28:20.274 --> 28:22.274
validate their tactics and they are

28:22.274 --> 28:24.052
trained to meet any adversarial

28:24.052 --> 28:26.108
challenge that's thrown at them . So

28:26.108 --> 28:28.219
it's more training and people than it

28:28.219 --> 28:29.941
is anything . There's a lot of

28:29.941 --> 28:32.163
challenges . That's what I'm focused on

28:32.163 --> 28:31.920
right now because I think it was the

28:31.920 --> 28:34.800
biggest gap from converting . I like to

28:34.800 --> 28:36.856
use the example that we're trying to

28:36.856 --> 28:38.856
turn a merchant marine into the U S

28:38.856 --> 28:41.450
Navy right , we , we have to convert

28:41.460 --> 28:43.571
this uh space force that we had for a

28:43.571 --> 28:45.516
benign environment into one that's

28:45.516 --> 28:47.682
contesting the domain . Is this a slow

28:47.682 --> 28:50.730
process ? Uh Sometimes it's slower than

28:50.730 --> 28:53.320
I'd like , but I like our progress . Uh

28:53.330 --> 28:55.497
So I need to buy them the simulators ,

28:55.497 --> 28:57.663
the virtual ranges that takes a little

28:57.663 --> 28:59.441
bit of time . But we're already

28:59.441 --> 29:01.552
building a new force generation model

29:01.552 --> 29:03.663
so that we've , we've established the

29:03.663 --> 29:05.441
time to do the training , we've

29:05.441 --> 29:05.390
established the new training

29:05.390 --> 29:07.446
requirements and now we just have to

29:07.446 --> 29:11.100
get after it . So space com has an RDT

29:11.100 --> 29:14.640
and e budget of 19.2 billion And a

29:14.640 --> 29:17.260
proposed procurement budget of only 4.7

29:17.260 --> 29:18.927
billion . What's driving that

29:18.927 --> 29:21.280
difference ? And uh you see that change

29:21.280 --> 29:23.391
in the next few years , sir , this is

29:23.391 --> 29:25.730
just , this is the way the space force

29:25.740 --> 29:27.907
has to do its business because so much

29:27.907 --> 29:30.360
of our effort is spent in developing

29:30.580 --> 29:32.636
the satellites . And we don't have a

29:32.636 --> 29:34.802
lot of , we don't have to put a lot of

29:34.802 --> 29:36.969
satellites on orbit traditionally . So

29:36.969 --> 29:39.136
there's less procurement than there is

29:39.136 --> 29:41.302
R D T and E . And so I think it's just

29:41.302 --> 29:43.413
the nature of the space business that

29:43.413 --> 29:45.524
we are front loaded a little bit in ,

29:45.524 --> 29:47.691
in terms of procurement to R D T and E

29:47.691 --> 29:49.858
balance relative to what you might see

29:49.858 --> 29:51.969
in some of the other services that by

29:51.969 --> 29:53.969
so many versions of that thing that

29:53.969 --> 29:55.969
they do R D T and E for fighters or

29:55.969 --> 29:58.191
tanks or the like . And so even when we

29:58.191 --> 30:00.247
go to a proliferated constellation ,

30:00.247 --> 30:02.247
our numbers will be so much smaller

30:02.247 --> 30:04.247
than , than what the other services

30:04.247 --> 30:06.247
have to buy . Yeah , in your mind ,

30:06.247 --> 30:08.413
what cybersecurity standards , minimum

30:08.413 --> 30:10.524
do you think new commercial satellite

30:10.524 --> 30:12.830
should have ? Uh I'm worried about the

30:12.830 --> 30:15.930
ground infrastructure uh and how and

30:15.930 --> 30:17.930
how the links are protected to make

30:17.930 --> 30:19.819
sure that we have access to those

30:19.819 --> 30:22.041
capabilities that are put on orbit . So

30:22.041 --> 30:24.263
in , in commercial terms , I'm a little

30:24.263 --> 30:26.374
less worried about the on orbit cyber

30:26.374 --> 30:28.430
protections as , as much as I am the

30:28.430 --> 30:30.374
ground network . And I think those

30:30.374 --> 30:32.374
cyber protection standards are well

30:32.374 --> 30:34.097
understood and we can hold the

30:34.097 --> 30:36.152
commercial providers accountable for

30:36.152 --> 30:39.170
putting cyber uh defense capabilities

30:39.180 --> 30:42.380
onto the ground networks . I've had

30:42.380 --> 30:46.190
several private companies

30:46.190 --> 30:48.246
come by my office saying they have a

30:48.246 --> 30:50.730
great idea how to take space debris

30:51.840 --> 30:55.090
down . Have you talked to quite a few

30:55.090 --> 30:58.430
of those ? I have , what do you

30:58.430 --> 31:01.760
think ? I think ? Well , we privatize

31:01.760 --> 31:05.130
it in the , at the end of the day . I

31:05.130 --> 31:07.241
think there's a lot of different ways

31:07.241 --> 31:09.297
to go after that sort of problem . I

31:09.297 --> 31:10.908
haven't seen uh demonstrated

31:10.908 --> 31:13.130
capabilities and I'm always thinking in

31:13.130 --> 31:15.352
terms of , you know , it's one thing to

31:15.352 --> 31:17.186
have a pitch that says we can do

31:17.186 --> 31:19.130
something that's another to have a

31:19.130 --> 31:21.186
demonstrated capability . Um I'll be

31:21.186 --> 31:23.241
honest , we do a lot of , of serious

31:23.241 --> 31:25.463
effort making sure we understand what's

31:25.463 --> 31:27.463
on orbit and preventing debris from

31:27.463 --> 31:29.630
hitting each other or , or things that

31:29.630 --> 31:31.741
we care about right now . I would say

31:31.741 --> 31:33.797
this isn't my number one challenge .

31:33.797 --> 31:35.797
But if somebody feels like they can

31:35.797 --> 31:37.963
demonstrate a capability , cleaning up

31:37.963 --> 31:40.130
debris is , is an important concept as

31:40.130 --> 31:42.352
well . It's gonna get worse and worse .

31:42.352 --> 31:44.574
Right . It's not gonna , it's not gonna

31:44.574 --> 31:46.610
clean itself up . A lot of people

31:46.610 --> 31:48.777
believe that conflict with China could

31:48.777 --> 31:50.888
very well start in space . What might

31:50.888 --> 31:54.830
that look like ? One day the ,

31:54.840 --> 31:56.840
the Chinese and the Russians have ,

31:56.840 --> 31:59.062
have gone to school on us over the last

31:59.062 --> 32:01.284
20 years and they know that we've built

32:01.284 --> 32:03.284
a joint force structure that relies

32:03.284 --> 32:05.340
heavily on the assumption that space

32:05.340 --> 32:07.396
capabilities will be there . Whether

32:07.396 --> 32:09.673
it's a precision navigation and timing ,

32:09.673 --> 32:11.896
whether it's satellite communications ,

32:11.896 --> 32:14.007
the missile warning that we , we rely

32:14.007 --> 32:16.173
on and the intelligence , surveillance

32:16.173 --> 32:18.284
and reconnaissance , persistence that

32:18.284 --> 32:20.451
we have with space capabilities , they

32:20.451 --> 32:22.562
know we rely on that . And so if they

32:22.562 --> 32:24.618
can blind us , if they can interfere

32:24.618 --> 32:26.840
with those capabilities or God forbid ,

32:26.840 --> 32:28.840
destroy them completely , they know

32:28.840 --> 32:31.007
that that will diminish our advantages

32:31.007 --> 32:33.229
and , and put the joint force at risk .

32:33.229 --> 32:35.396
Uh So I can see , interfering with , I

32:35.396 --> 32:37.700
can see blinding , I can see some of

32:37.700 --> 32:40.450
those gray area kinds of attacks on our

32:40.450 --> 32:42.506
capabilities to try to put us behind

32:42.506 --> 32:45.020
the eight ball . That balloon wasn't in

32:45.020 --> 32:47.530
your purview , was it ? No , sir .

32:47.810 --> 32:50.500
60,000 ft when they call it near space ,

32:50.500 --> 32:52.278
but I like to call it far air .

32:57.470 --> 33:00.480
Thank you , Senator Rosen .

33:01.930 --> 33:04.260
Well , thank you , Chairman King and

33:04.270 --> 33:06.980
ranking member Fisher . Uh Good to be

33:06.980 --> 33:09.370
here today and holding this hearing and

33:09.370 --> 33:11.620
General Saltzman . Thank you so much

33:11.630 --> 33:14.130
for everything you're doing and I know

33:14.130 --> 33:16.470
everyone's been talking about workforce

33:16.470 --> 33:18.192
is key . We need a pipeline of

33:18.192 --> 33:20.350
qualified individuals . Um going

33:20.350 --> 33:22.350
forward , you're just young , three

33:22.350 --> 33:24.610
years old trying to get this workforce

33:24.610 --> 33:26.832
and especially like you said , research

33:26.832 --> 33:30.620
and development critical um to protect

33:30.620 --> 33:32.731
our country and our families from the

33:32.731 --> 33:34.731
threat we feel from space . So stem

33:34.731 --> 33:36.953
education , I talk about an awful lot ,

33:36.953 --> 33:39.120
but I really believe that investing in

33:39.120 --> 33:41.120
stem education is just essential to

33:41.120 --> 33:43.120
matching our adversaries increasing

33:43.120 --> 33:45.342
capabilities as you have alluded to and

33:45.342 --> 33:47.564
also to addressing all of our tech work

33:47.564 --> 33:49.787
force shortages . So General Saltzman ,

33:49.787 --> 33:51.787
during your confirmation hearing in

33:51.787 --> 33:53.953
September , you highlighted that space

33:53.953 --> 33:55.898
force has established a university

33:55.898 --> 33:57.898
partnership program partnering with

33:57.898 --> 33:59.842
universities across the country to

33:59.842 --> 34:01.842
provide stem students with research

34:01.842 --> 34:03.898
opportunities and increased guardian

34:03.898 --> 34:06.750
retention . And so how is space force

34:06.750 --> 34:08.750
growth and retention benefited from

34:08.750 --> 34:10.806
this program ? I'm really excited to

34:10.806 --> 34:13.139
hear about that . And what can Congress ?

34:13.139 --> 34:15.250
What can we do better to support this

34:15.250 --> 34:17.361
program specifically ? And maybe some

34:17.361 --> 34:19.306
national security folks focus stem

34:19.306 --> 34:21.194
education initiatives at American

34:21.194 --> 34:25.130
Universities uh Generally . Thank you

34:25.130 --> 34:27.297
for that because any opportunity I get

34:27.297 --> 34:29.408
to talk about how great our guardians

34:29.408 --> 34:31.630
are I'll take full advantage of it . Um

34:31.630 --> 34:33.797
you would be really impressed with the

34:33.797 --> 34:35.963
quality of the people that are joining

34:35.963 --> 34:38.186
the space force . Um the average age of

34:38.186 --> 34:40.450
our enlists are enlisted , uh members

34:40.460 --> 34:43.330
is 22 . That's a relatively high number

34:43.330 --> 34:45.441
relative , you know , considering the

34:45.441 --> 34:47.663
other services , uh we have an educated

34:47.663 --> 34:49.910
workforce , very educated . Uh We , we

34:49.910 --> 34:51.910
have the luxury of hand picking the

34:51.910 --> 34:54.132
best and brightest of a large applicant

34:54.132 --> 34:56.243
applicant pool that wants to join the

34:56.243 --> 34:58.132
Space Force . And so we're really

34:58.132 --> 35:00.188
benefiting one from the fact that we

35:00.188 --> 35:02.299
are kind of small and we can take the

35:02.299 --> 35:04.243
cream of the crop if you will . Uh

35:04.243 --> 35:06.243
we're looking for diversity , we're

35:06.243 --> 35:08.466
looking for high quality stem education

35:08.466 --> 35:10.688
and , and going to the areas that maybe

35:10.688 --> 35:12.910
you don't have a chance to uh to get to

35:12.910 --> 35:15.420
uh in some of the other services . Uh

35:15.430 --> 35:17.500
remarkable set of opportunities that

35:17.500 --> 35:19.500
we've taken full advantage of every

35:19.500 --> 35:21.611
time I go out in the field , I'm just

35:21.611 --> 35:23.333
impressed with the quality and

35:23.333 --> 35:25.389
capabilities of the guardians that I

35:25.389 --> 35:27.333
see doing the job . We should help

35:27.333 --> 35:29.444
expand these programs to make , it'll

35:29.444 --> 35:31.611
make your job a little better . Well ,

35:31.611 --> 35:33.611
as long as you expand the number of

35:33.611 --> 35:35.944
people that helped me select , you know ,

35:35.944 --> 35:39.300
so I think there were 42,000 hits of

35:39.310 --> 35:41.421
interest to join the space for us and

35:41.421 --> 35:43.710
we have about 1000 slots . So calling

35:43.710 --> 35:45.932
that down to who's eligible , who can ,

35:45.932 --> 35:48.154
who can meet the requirements and , you

35:48.154 --> 35:50.210
know , there's a lot of effort there

35:50.210 --> 35:52.266
too . So I'm real happy with the way

35:52.266 --> 35:54.488
the recruiting team has done . I'm real

35:54.488 --> 35:54.390
happy with the standards that we've

35:54.390 --> 35:56.223
said , I'm really happy with the

35:56.223 --> 35:58.390
quality of Guardians were getting in .

35:58.390 --> 36:00.557
That's great because , um , as Senator

36:00.557 --> 36:02.668
Tuberville talked about cyber attacks

36:02.668 --> 36:04.779
in space and so we're fighting Domain

36:04.779 --> 36:08.130
and , and , uh , cyber is really

36:08.140 --> 36:11.320
probably , uh more effective there or

36:11.320 --> 36:13.209
as effective there as it would be

36:13.209 --> 36:16.020
anywhere else . And uh last week , we

36:16.020 --> 36:18.290
discussed with General Dickinson during

36:18.290 --> 36:20.400
Space Command's posture hearing that

36:20.410 --> 36:22.740
both Russia and China are developing ,

36:22.740 --> 36:24.820
rapidly investing in developing and

36:24.820 --> 36:27.870
fielding these technologies that will

36:27.880 --> 36:30.430
provide timely and uh that will

36:30.430 --> 36:32.780
threaten us . And so we need to be sure

36:32.780 --> 36:34.780
that we're stopping that . So these

36:34.780 --> 36:36.891
sophisticated cyber attacks are going

36:36.891 --> 36:39.169
to include the threat of stealing data ,

36:39.169 --> 36:41.169
jamming satellite signals , hacking

36:41.169 --> 36:43.002
satellites , disrupting internet

36:43.002 --> 36:45.002
services . I know the proliferation

36:45.002 --> 36:47.169
concept is really good because there's

36:47.169 --> 36:49.113
just so many it makes it not worth

36:49.113 --> 36:51.058
their while . Uh so that resilient

36:51.058 --> 36:53.113
space architecture , particularly in

36:53.113 --> 36:55.169
low earth orbit as you've alluded to

36:55.169 --> 36:57.224
really important . And so what other

36:57.224 --> 36:59.224
kinds of things besides um what you

36:59.224 --> 37:01.391
mentioned to Senator Kelly and Senator

37:01.391 --> 37:03.580
Tub Tub er Ville , um how are you

37:03.580 --> 37:05.747
keeping our most advanced space assets

37:05.747 --> 37:07.969
safe from cyber attacks by Russia China

37:07.969 --> 37:09.747
and others and increasing their

37:09.747 --> 37:11.691
resiliency ? I like I like to talk

37:11.691 --> 37:13.802
about two particular areas that we're

37:13.802 --> 37:15.524
doing first is I want to avoid

37:15.524 --> 37:17.691
operational surprise . That's , that's

37:17.691 --> 37:20.480
a tenant in my maybe theory of success

37:20.480 --> 37:22.369
if you will for the space force's

37:22.369 --> 37:25.010
primary missions and by um avoiding

37:25.010 --> 37:27.232
operational surprise , what I mean is ,

37:27.232 --> 37:29.399
do we have all the sensors and all the

37:29.399 --> 37:31.510
right places to see what's going on ?

37:31.510 --> 37:34.060
And that's cyber and space ? Um Do we ,

37:34.060 --> 37:36.380
do we recognize hostile activities ,

37:36.380 --> 37:38.491
aggressive activities , irresponsible

37:38.491 --> 37:40.547
activities , the minute they occur ,

37:40.547 --> 37:42.880
can we attribute them to the bad actors ?

37:42.880 --> 37:44.658
That's the kind of avoidance of

37:44.658 --> 37:46.769
operational surprise that I'm talking

37:46.769 --> 37:48.936
about . And then secondly , we have to

37:48.936 --> 37:51.269
establish norms of responsible behavior .

37:51.269 --> 37:51.160
What are the norms of behavior that are

37:51.160 --> 37:54.060
acceptable ? Uh And , and developing a

37:54.060 --> 37:56.300
coalition of like minded space nations

37:56.300 --> 37:58.850
that supports those norms of behavior

37:58.850 --> 38:01.072
is a powerful motivator to do the right

38:01.072 --> 38:02.961
things and call out irresponsible

38:02.961 --> 38:05.420
behavior . All of that I think protects

38:05.420 --> 38:08.010
our capable . That's great . I know my

38:08.010 --> 38:10.190
time's up but my next question was on

38:10.190 --> 38:12.412
international partnerships and how this

38:12.412 --> 38:14.523
potential rates that will take it off

38:14.523 --> 38:16.246
the record , this hunt forward

38:16.246 --> 38:18.023
operations to avoid operational

38:18.023 --> 38:20.134
surprise with our allies and partners

38:20.134 --> 38:22.190
around the globe . Uh We will submit

38:22.190 --> 38:24.134
that for the record , but you were

38:24.134 --> 38:26.246
leading me right there . So thank you

38:26.246 --> 38:28.400
very much . I yield back general .

38:28.400 --> 38:30.622
There's one member of this subcommittee

38:30.622 --> 38:32.733
who probably had more than more to do

38:32.733 --> 38:35.620
with the founding of the Space Force

38:35.630 --> 38:38.410
vote early and vocal supporter and that

38:38.410 --> 38:41.210
Senator Cramer Senator Cramer . Thank

38:41.210 --> 38:44.030
you , Mr Chairman , ranking member and

38:44.040 --> 38:46.490
general . Good to see you again . Um I

38:46.490 --> 38:49.230
don't think you were lecturing , uh ,

38:49.240 --> 38:51.462
Senator Kelly at all . He asked you the

38:51.462 --> 38:53.351
easiest question he could and you

38:53.351 --> 38:55.351
answered it brilliantly and I think

38:55.351 --> 38:58.340
that the issue of redundancy as a tool ,

38:58.340 --> 39:00.507
that sort of answers , Senator Rosen's

39:00.507 --> 39:02.507
question in terms of how you secure

39:02.507 --> 39:04.840
them as well as how well they work as a ,

39:04.840 --> 39:07.062
as a kill web if you will versus a kill

39:07.062 --> 39:09.396
chain . So , um I didn't think you were ,

39:09.396 --> 39:11.618
I thought it was , it was brilliant . I

39:11.618 --> 39:13.729
also think you're too humble . You're

39:13.729 --> 39:15.673
you brag about the guardians , but

39:15.673 --> 39:17.784
let's face it . You're , you're , you

39:17.784 --> 39:19.840
seem to be the employer of choice in

39:19.840 --> 39:19.680
the service . You , you have that

39:19.680 --> 39:21.847
luxury and it's because I think of the

39:21.847 --> 39:23.958
mission , I think because it's , it's

39:23.958 --> 39:26.124
an important mission that particularly

39:26.124 --> 39:28.230
younger people realize and , and

39:28.230 --> 39:30.460
they're attracted to it and it gets to

39:30.460 --> 39:32.682
stretch them . And so my hope Jackie is

39:32.682 --> 39:34.738
that the Air Force , the , the space

39:34.738 --> 39:36.238
force is so cool . It just

39:36.238 --> 39:38.016
automatically creates more stem

39:38.016 --> 39:40.016
students because they all want to ,

39:40.016 --> 39:42.071
they all want to be part of the next

39:42.071 --> 39:44.238
big thing . Um I want to get into some

39:44.238 --> 39:46.460
issue , you know , Senator Fisher asked

39:46.460 --> 39:49.080
you about um the gap issue with , with

39:49.080 --> 39:51.302
regard to eyes in the sky and whatnot .

39:51.302 --> 39:53.413
We , we did see a little bit of a gap

39:53.413 --> 39:55.469
in , in defense when we learned that

39:55.469 --> 39:57.524
our radars couldn't see everything ,

39:57.524 --> 39:59.469
they could only see what they were

39:59.469 --> 40:01.413
tuned to c and so in terms of like

40:01.413 --> 40:03.469
parks radar as an example and we see

40:03.469 --> 40:05.524
some money coming for , for that , I

40:05.524 --> 40:07.524
would presume that means it will be

40:07.524 --> 40:09.636
upgraded , it'll be modernized as you

40:09.636 --> 40:11.747
know , it's a high priority for , for

40:11.747 --> 40:13.691
me , since we have one that's that

40:13.691 --> 40:15.636
you're the landlord of up in North

40:15.636 --> 40:17.747
Dakota , maybe , maybe speak a little

40:17.747 --> 40:19.969
bit too to the role of the park's radar

40:19.969 --> 40:22.024
and modernization and , and how that

40:22.024 --> 40:24.247
will help you and the other , the joint

40:24.247 --> 40:26.302
force in terms of particularly early

40:26.302 --> 40:28.524
warning . Well , it's a two part answer

40:28.524 --> 40:31.020
because , you know , um I don't wanna

40:31.020 --> 40:34.230
be too distracted by the balloon um

40:34.240 --> 40:37.090
issue because that's not where those

40:37.090 --> 40:40.620
radars are looking . Um It's , uh you

40:40.620 --> 40:42.731
could , you could easily build radars

40:42.731 --> 40:44.676
that would look in that area , but

40:44.676 --> 40:46.731
that's not our mission . The mission

40:46.731 --> 40:46.680
that's being done North Dakota and the

40:46.680 --> 40:49.440
other ground based radars is to fold

40:49.450 --> 40:51.339
its missile warning and its space

40:51.339 --> 40:54.150
surveillance uh primarily and , and

40:54.150 --> 40:56.372
those radars are really good at those ,

40:56.372 --> 40:59.270
those jobs . Uh So the real , the real

40:59.270 --> 41:02.450
challenge is how do I go to a

41:02.460 --> 41:05.090
rapid assessment and decision quality

41:05.090 --> 41:07.034
information of the data that those

41:07.034 --> 41:09.450
radars are pulling in ? And so that's ,

41:09.450 --> 41:11.561
that's my responsibility is to figure

41:11.561 --> 41:13.783
out how to take all that massive amount

41:13.783 --> 41:15.783
of data in and quickly turn it into

41:15.783 --> 41:18.020
decision making information . So we've

41:18.020 --> 41:20.430
got some work to do there , but it's ,

41:20.440 --> 41:22.551
it's more associated with the latency

41:22.551 --> 41:24.662
of the data . Then , you know , I can

41:24.662 --> 41:26.718
tell you where something was , but I

41:26.718 --> 41:28.940
can't tell you where it is precisely at

41:28.940 --> 41:28.650
that moment . And we're getting better

41:28.650 --> 41:31.830
and better at that . Um , with regard

41:31.830 --> 41:33.663
to some of the issues that we've

41:33.663 --> 41:35.774
already talked about the partnerships

41:35.774 --> 41:37.774
that , that you started out talking

41:37.774 --> 41:39.774
about . Senator Rosen , asked about

41:39.774 --> 41:41.774
academic partnerships , alliances ,

41:41.774 --> 41:43.997
obviously commercial partnerships . One

41:43.997 --> 41:43.500
of the things when we stood up the

41:43.500 --> 41:45.389
space force and , and we had this

41:45.389 --> 41:47.480
discussion many times and your

41:47.480 --> 41:49.591
predecessor certainly grabbed onto it

41:49.591 --> 41:51.813
and that is making sure it's lean agile

41:51.813 --> 41:54.036
fast . How many times we hear generally

41:54.036 --> 41:56.910
stay lean agile fast ? Do you feel like

41:56.910 --> 41:59.140
you're still lean agile and fast ? Um

41:59.150 --> 42:01.670
is , does the budget help you be more

42:01.670 --> 42:03.837
lean agile and fast ? And I don't mean

42:03.837 --> 42:06.003
cheap , I mean , lean agile and fast .

42:06.003 --> 42:08.114
Those again , those relationships are

42:08.114 --> 42:10.170
so important . How , how valuable is

42:10.170 --> 42:12.281
that and difficult is that balance to

42:12.281 --> 42:13.892
make sure you maintain those

42:13.892 --> 42:15.892
characteristics ? Well , there's no

42:15.892 --> 42:18.114
question , we're still lean and there's

42:18.114 --> 42:20.226
no question we're going as fast as we

42:20.226 --> 42:20.130
can . You know , that's a tough

42:20.130 --> 42:22.430
standard for me to say we're fast . I'm

42:22.440 --> 42:24.329
always looking to go faster . I'm

42:24.329 --> 42:26.440
always looking to be more agile . And

42:26.440 --> 42:28.440
so I'm going to be our probably our

42:28.440 --> 42:30.662
toughest critic going forward trying to

42:30.662 --> 42:32.996
ensure that we stay as fast as possible .

42:32.996 --> 42:34.830
Um Being small does offer some

42:34.830 --> 42:36.940
advantages , we can move rapidly

42:36.940 --> 42:38.996
through a smaller bureaucracy than ,

42:38.996 --> 42:40.607
than maybe some of the other

42:40.607 --> 42:42.718
organizations can . But it also comes

42:42.718 --> 42:44.773
with , you know , that means there's

42:44.773 --> 42:46.607
fewer eyes on ideas , that means

42:46.607 --> 42:48.662
there's fewer opportunities to catch

42:48.662 --> 42:48.200
mistakes , that means there's fewer

42:48.200 --> 42:50.200
opportunities . And so we've got to

42:50.200 --> 42:52.367
have good solid processes , we have to

42:52.367 --> 42:54.422
have good innovative technology that

42:54.422 --> 42:56.200
supports us . And so there's no

42:56.200 --> 42:58.200
question , we're still lean and now

42:58.200 --> 43:00.367
we're trying to become optimized based

43:00.367 --> 43:02.422
on that size to make sure that we're

43:02.422 --> 43:04.033
still producing high quality

43:04.033 --> 43:05.811
capabilities for a high quality

43:05.811 --> 43:07.644
workforce . That's a great point

43:07.644 --> 43:09.644
because because the bureaucracy can

43:09.644 --> 43:11.978
gobble you up and slow you down as well .

43:11.978 --> 43:14.089
So we , we like oversight , we're all

43:14.089 --> 43:16.200
about that , but we want you to be as

43:16.200 --> 43:18.256
agile as you need to be to , to , to

43:18.256 --> 43:20.422
keep up with the speed of China , as I

43:20.422 --> 43:22.756
like to say , which is really important .

43:22.756 --> 43:22.170
One last thing just I just want to make

43:22.170 --> 43:24.281
sure that you're , you're getting the

43:24.281 --> 43:26.530
type of um the right policies that ,

43:26.540 --> 43:28.820
that don't restrict your offensive

43:28.820 --> 43:30.820
abilities . We've heard a lot about

43:30.820 --> 43:32.764
that . You've spoken to it at some

43:32.764 --> 43:34.820
points . Um Again , whether it's the

43:34.820 --> 43:36.931
budget or the administration or , you

43:36.931 --> 43:38.931
know , uh chain of command , do you

43:38.931 --> 43:40.940
feel like you , you have the right

43:40.950 --> 43:43.560
policies in place to both protect and

43:43.740 --> 43:45.851
an attack if necessary ? I can assure

43:45.851 --> 43:48.018
you there are no policies that prevent

43:48.018 --> 43:50.073
us from exploring a full spectrum of

43:50.073 --> 43:52.184
operations . Uh It's just about doing

43:52.184 --> 43:54.680
the work establishing the what I would

43:54.680 --> 43:56.920
call uh understanding of what the

43:56.920 --> 43:59.150
capabilities can and can't do . Uh And

43:59.150 --> 44:01.610
then we test and we , we learn from our

44:01.620 --> 44:04.250
experiences . Thank you . Well done .

44:04.260 --> 44:06.620
Thank you . Thank you , Senator Camera .

44:06.630 --> 44:08.852
Your lean agile fast . Reminds me of my

44:08.852 --> 44:11.019
high school football coach who said he

44:11.019 --> 44:12.852
wanted us to be mobile agile and

44:12.852 --> 44:13.920
hostile .

44:14.920 --> 44:17.670
Ah

44:18.230 --> 44:21.230
I'm not gonna go into our records ,

44:22.830 --> 44:24.997
but our team motto was we're small but

44:24.997 --> 44:26.997
we're slow . That was our problem .

44:27.040 --> 44:29.560
Senator Gillibrand . Thank you , Mr

44:29.560 --> 44:32.740
Chairman . Um Your budget request this

44:32.740 --> 44:34.907
year includes a goal of increasing the

44:34.907 --> 44:37.018
number of Space Force launches as you

44:37.018 --> 44:39.129
look to maintain and modernize launch

44:39.129 --> 44:41.184
ranges and facilities and support of

44:41.184 --> 44:43.351
our space launch needs . Can you speak

44:43.351 --> 44:45.073
to how the ability to leverage

44:45.073 --> 44:47.018
commercial funding sources to grow

44:47.018 --> 44:46.850
space , transportation infrastructure

44:46.850 --> 44:49.100
and service capacity would impact the

44:49.100 --> 44:51.310
Space Force's space launch efforts ?

44:51.910 --> 44:54.500
Yes , ma'am . Thank you . Uh as we've

44:54.500 --> 44:57.810
talked before , the we've grown our

44:57.810 --> 45:00.920
capacity on our national launch ranges .

45:00.930 --> 45:03.590
National Space launch ranges . Uh from

45:03.590 --> 45:06.170
what I remember to be 10 , 12 launches

45:06.170 --> 45:08.480
to we're gonna hit getting close to 100

45:08.480 --> 45:11.460
launches a year now . Uh and , and most

45:11.460 --> 45:14.240
of that is commercial launches and so

45:14.240 --> 45:16.462
the infrastructure that we're providing

45:16.462 --> 45:18.720
is being used . Uh and it's it's it

45:18.720 --> 45:21.100
needs to be refurbished on a on a more

45:21.110 --> 45:23.560
regular basis than it did what I call

45:23.560 --> 45:26.000
the old days . And so the I think the

45:26.000 --> 45:28.056
commercial industry understands this

45:28.056 --> 45:30.111
and they're trying to figure out the

45:30.111 --> 45:32.278
best ways to help support . And now we

45:32.278 --> 45:34.389
just have to look for the contractual

45:34.389 --> 45:36.667
and legal mechanisms to make sure that ,

45:36.667 --> 45:38.111
that we can maintain that

45:38.111 --> 45:40.333
infrastructure , our investments in the

45:40.333 --> 45:42.333
range of the future , start us down

45:42.333 --> 45:44.444
that path . But we've still got a lot

45:44.444 --> 45:46.444
of work to do over the fight up . I

45:46.444 --> 45:48.667
think to make sure we maintain the kind

45:48.667 --> 45:50.722
of infrastructure we need to support

45:50.722 --> 45:52.889
the commercial industry . Um As you've

45:52.889 --> 45:55.111
said , your mission is very technical .

45:55.111 --> 45:57.056
Um ensuring guardians are properly

45:57.056 --> 45:58.944
trained and able to execute their

45:58.944 --> 46:01.000
missions requires access to advanced

46:01.000 --> 46:02.944
ranges . Do you currently have the

46:02.944 --> 46:04.778
training resources ? You need to

46:04.778 --> 46:04.560
provide fully trained guardians to

46:04.560 --> 46:07.200
combatant commanders and are any

46:07.200 --> 46:09.422
additional resources required to ensure

46:09.422 --> 46:11.589
we have a space force fully capable of

46:11.589 --> 46:14.750
operating in the space domain ? I , the

46:14.760 --> 46:18.020
fy 24 budget submission includes about

46:18.020 --> 46:21.820
$340 million dedicated to operational

46:21.820 --> 46:23.876
test and training infrastructure . I

46:23.876 --> 46:25.987
think that's sufficient for this year

46:25.987 --> 46:28.153
because we've got a lot of study to do

46:28.153 --> 46:27.990
to make sure we're building the right

46:27.990 --> 46:29.934
kind of range is the right kind of

46:29.934 --> 46:32.101
simulators and we're learning as we go

46:32.101 --> 46:33.879
a little bit . Uh So I'm really

46:33.879 --> 46:35.546
comfortable with the level of

46:35.546 --> 46:37.712
investment . We're at this year for fy

46:37.712 --> 46:39.657
24 last week , you spoke about the

46:39.657 --> 46:42.000
concept of competitive endurance . From

46:42.000 --> 46:44.000
reporting , it appears to center on

46:44.000 --> 46:46.056
space Domain awareness resilience to

46:46.056 --> 46:48.111
deter attack and responsible counter

46:48.111 --> 46:50.333
space activities . Can you speak to how

46:50.333 --> 46:52.500
the space force's budget proposal will

46:52.500 --> 46:54.611
help to achieve competitive endurance

46:54.611 --> 46:54.580
through each of these three core

46:54.580 --> 46:57.460
tenants for avoiding operational

46:57.460 --> 46:59.404
surprise . That's the Space Domain

46:59.404 --> 47:01.627
Awareness tenant . And we are investing

47:01.627 --> 47:03.349
heavily in new sensors . We're

47:03.349 --> 47:05.571
investing in , in capabilities with our

47:05.571 --> 47:07.627
allies and partners to also increase

47:07.627 --> 47:09.849
the dataset associate with Space Domain

47:09.849 --> 47:11.460
Awareness . And perhaps most

47:11.460 --> 47:13.627
importantly , we're investing in space

47:13.627 --> 47:15.571
command and control capabilities ,

47:15.571 --> 47:17.738
which is kind of military talk for how

47:17.738 --> 47:19.793
do you take that data in and rapidly

47:19.793 --> 47:21.849
turn it into operational decisions .

47:21.849 --> 47:23.904
And so I think we have good software

47:23.904 --> 47:25.904
investments to make sure that we're

47:25.904 --> 47:28.016
doing the decision support tools that

47:28.016 --> 47:30.238
go with that space Domain awareness and

47:30.238 --> 47:33.370
go ahead . Well , the resiliency piece

47:33.380 --> 47:35.620
is also important and and this this

47:35.620 --> 47:38.010
budget definitely invests in shifting

47:38.010 --> 47:40.288
to a more resilient space architecture .

47:40.288 --> 47:42.621
We've started that pivot now in earnest .

47:42.621 --> 47:44.843
So looking on your documents , you have

47:44.843 --> 47:46.843
this contested space document about

47:46.843 --> 47:49.700
what China is doing . Um the P R C has

47:49.700 --> 47:51.533
developed counter space and anti

47:51.533 --> 47:53.089
satellite weapons including

47:53.089 --> 47:54.922
demonstrations of anti satellite

47:54.922 --> 47:57.144
missiles um which you say are launching

47:57.144 --> 47:59.990
orbit to ground . Um and the ability to

48:00.000 --> 48:01.944
move a defunct satellite . Can you

48:01.944 --> 48:04.111
speak to our ability to defend against

48:04.111 --> 48:06.333
these counter space assets and exercise

48:06.333 --> 48:09.040
space superiority ? The transition to a

48:09.050 --> 48:11.510
proliferated Leo missile warning ,

48:11.510 --> 48:14.290
missile tracking architecture includes

48:14.290 --> 48:17.590
the capacity to uh find fix and track

48:17.590 --> 48:19.812
hypersonic capabilities . So that's why

48:19.812 --> 48:21.812
that's such an important transition

48:21.812 --> 48:23.830
that we're making with regards to

48:23.840 --> 48:25.951
grappling satellites and pulling them

48:25.951 --> 48:27.951
out of orbit . Much tougher to deal

48:27.951 --> 48:29.562
with when you have less than

48:29.562 --> 48:31.729
maneuverable older legacy satellites .

48:31.729 --> 48:33.840
So again , shifting to a proliferated

48:33.840 --> 48:36.007
Leo constellation where you don't have

48:36.007 --> 48:38.062
the what general heighten called the

48:38.062 --> 48:40.173
big Juicy target sitting there at GEO

48:40.173 --> 48:42.400
uh make that a much tougher proposition

48:42.410 --> 48:44.577
for them to execute against that makes

48:44.577 --> 48:46.450
sense . Um What lessons are you

48:46.450 --> 48:48.617
learning from the war in Ukraine about

48:48.617 --> 48:50.728
the role of the , of the space domain

48:50.728 --> 48:52.783
in large scale military operations ?

48:52.783 --> 48:55.500
Well , the most important observation

48:55.500 --> 48:57.500
is that space is critical to modern

48:57.500 --> 48:59.556
warfare . Uh We've seen the Russians

48:59.556 --> 49:01.778
attacks , allied communications , we've

49:01.778 --> 49:04.000
seen cyberattacks trying to dismantle ,

49:04.000 --> 49:06.222
we've seen GPS Jamming . They recognize

49:06.222 --> 49:08.278
that space is a force multiplier and

49:08.278 --> 49:10.500
they're willing to attack it . The fact

49:10.500 --> 49:12.667
that we have to defend cyber , we have

49:12.667 --> 49:14.833
to defend against cyber attacks on the

49:14.833 --> 49:16.722
ground . Networks reminds us that

49:16.722 --> 49:18.944
ground is also a part of space and that

49:18.944 --> 49:21.000
those networks are critical assets .

49:21.000 --> 49:23.222
But I think we're also seeing the power

49:23.222 --> 49:25.333
of commercial augmentation that there

49:25.333 --> 49:27.111
is a viable path for commercial

49:27.111 --> 49:29.278
augmentation to provide capabilities .

49:29.278 --> 49:31.389
And then I've been kind of harping on

49:31.389 --> 49:33.389
it through the testimony here , but

49:33.389 --> 49:35.444
proliferated Leo , that's what we're

49:35.444 --> 49:37.556
seeing used in to support Ukraine and

49:37.556 --> 49:39.667
it's turning out to be a much tougher

49:39.667 --> 49:41.889
target for the Russians to take apart .

49:41.889 --> 49:41.880
Agreed . Thank you , Mr Chairman .

49:41.880 --> 49:44.100
Thank you madam ranking member . It

49:44.110 --> 49:46.760
wasn't around . Thank you , Mr Chairman

49:46.770 --> 49:48.937
General . Thank you for your service .

49:48.937 --> 49:52.560
Um There have been efforts general uh

49:52.570 --> 49:55.230
driven by political decisions regarding

49:55.230 --> 49:58.970
the shared use of the 3.123 point 45

49:58.970 --> 50:01.400
gigahertz or Essman portions of the

50:01.400 --> 50:04.000
spectrum . Can you confirm that you

50:04.000 --> 50:06.290
have systems critical to our national

50:06.290 --> 50:08.930
security that reside on this portion of

50:08.930 --> 50:12.170
the spectrum ? Yes , Senator , we have

50:12.180 --> 50:14.290
a space surveillance radar that's ,

50:14.290 --> 50:16.346
that's currently in development that

50:16.346 --> 50:18.250
does occupy that's portion of the

50:18.250 --> 50:20.550
spectrum . Would it be not just radar

50:20.550 --> 50:22.717
but perhaps communications that are in

50:22.717 --> 50:25.100
that portion as well as it turns out

50:25.100 --> 50:27.520
the , the I think the key emergency

50:27.520 --> 50:29.464
kinds of communications lived just

50:29.464 --> 50:31.798
outside of that band . So as long as it ,

50:31.798 --> 50:33.798
as long as we managed very narrowly

50:33.798 --> 50:35.798
that that strip we would , we would

50:35.798 --> 50:38.020
avoid those particular . Okay . So it's

50:38.020 --> 50:40.298
primarily radar , it's primarily radar ,

50:40.298 --> 50:42.520
further further space force . Okay . So

50:42.520 --> 50:44.742
the communications portion is not , not

50:44.742 --> 50:46.853
part . Well , I wouldn't want to talk

50:46.853 --> 50:48.964
to the other services capability . So

50:48.964 --> 50:51.187
from a space force perspective . Okay .

50:51.187 --> 50:51.020
Thank you . Can you provide your

50:51.020 --> 50:53.020
professional military advice on how

50:53.020 --> 50:55.860
detrimental it would be to your mission

50:55.870 --> 50:57.981
and the security of our nation if you

50:57.981 --> 50:59.981
lost the use of this portion of the

50:59.981 --> 51:02.092
spectrum ? I think the most important

51:02.092 --> 51:04.314
thing I can say is I'm not exactly sure

51:04.314 --> 51:06.426
because we haven't done the technical

51:06.426 --> 51:08.481
analysis of exactly what vacating or

51:08.481 --> 51:10.703
sharing any of that spectrum would look

51:10.703 --> 51:12.870
like uh in terms of cost and technical

51:12.870 --> 51:14.926
performance . But we do have a study

51:14.926 --> 51:17.510
ongoing . Uh And so we would hope that

51:17.510 --> 51:19.677
any legislative decisions or decisions

51:19.677 --> 51:21.788
along these lines would wait for that

51:21.788 --> 51:23.843
study to come out later this fall so

51:23.843 --> 51:25.899
that we could make the decision with

51:25.899 --> 51:27.954
data informed um analysis . Have you

51:27.954 --> 51:30.066
been given the opportunity to provide

51:30.066 --> 51:32.121
your professional military advice on

51:32.121 --> 51:34.288
the D O D s use of this portion of the

51:34.288 --> 51:36.177
spectrum ? Yes , thank you . Um I

51:36.177 --> 51:38.288
presume you've expressed your concern

51:38.288 --> 51:40.770
with regard to the sale prior to the

51:40.770 --> 51:43.400
September study being completed . I

51:43.400 --> 51:45.233
have described my concern as not

51:45.233 --> 51:47.456
knowing exactly what the impact will be

51:47.456 --> 51:49.789
until I received that study . Thank you .

51:50.110 --> 51:53.020
Um I'd also like to go on record saying

51:53.020 --> 51:55.187
that I'm , I'm concerned about the D O

51:55.187 --> 51:57.298
D s approach to providing space based

51:57.298 --> 51:59.076
ground moving target indication

51:59.076 --> 52:02.490
capabilities , the G B M T I uh to

52:02.490 --> 52:04.712
warfighters following the divestment of

52:04.712 --> 52:06.460
the J stars platform . It's my

52:06.460 --> 52:08.571
understanding that this capability is

52:08.571 --> 52:10.238
being moved under the funding

52:10.238 --> 52:12.016
authorities of the intelligence

52:12.016 --> 52:14.390
community . We do not have really to

52:14.390 --> 52:16.446
get into the fine details here . But

52:16.446 --> 52:18.550
can you share with me how you are

52:18.550 --> 52:21.730
assuming that the J roc validated

52:21.740 --> 52:24.510
requirements are captured in the

52:24.510 --> 52:27.060
acquisitions process of a platform

52:27.070 --> 52:29.980
owned by the I C community because of

52:29.980 --> 52:31.924
the way the funding has , has been

52:31.924 --> 52:35.150
moved . Uh We are focusing on two areas

52:35.150 --> 52:38.040
where we think we can provide some

52:38.050 --> 52:40.161
detailed level of collaboration . The

52:40.161 --> 52:41.883
first is in milestone decision

52:41.883 --> 52:43.939
authority which still there are some

52:43.939 --> 52:46.880
decisions which reside at the OSD level

52:46.890 --> 52:49.560
uh and could be delegated to Secretary

52:49.560 --> 52:51.750
of Coal Valley . We're looking into

52:51.750 --> 52:53.639
what those options are , what the

52:53.639 --> 52:55.639
possibilities might be . That's for

52:55.639 --> 52:57.972
program management acquisition purposes .

52:57.972 --> 52:59.861
The other side is the operational

52:59.861 --> 53:01.694
concepts . This is still a D O D

53:01.694 --> 53:03.917
mission , the space Force mission to do

53:03.917 --> 53:05.972
this for the joint force . And so we

53:05.972 --> 53:08.139
have the responsibility to provide the

53:08.139 --> 53:10.306
operational concept for how this would

53:10.306 --> 53:10.300
work . And we will have to work closely

53:10.310 --> 53:12.366
with the program managers and sensor

53:12.366 --> 53:14.477
developers to make that happen with J

53:14.477 --> 53:17.300
stars . The tactical capabilities to

53:17.530 --> 53:20.360
track these moving targets was

53:20.360 --> 53:23.440
available to our , our soldiers on the

53:23.440 --> 53:25.662
ground . We just want to make sure that

53:25.662 --> 53:28.060
that same capability is still found in

53:28.060 --> 53:30.116
a space based system and that's what

53:30.116 --> 53:32.338
we're really talking about here , isn't

53:32.338 --> 53:34.504
it ? Yes , sir . And the beauty of the

53:34.504 --> 53:36.616
sensors that are being developed , is

53:36.616 --> 53:38.727
there more survivable relative to the

53:38.727 --> 53:40.671
current threats we're facing ? And

53:40.671 --> 53:42.838
we're going to do it at a global scale

53:42.838 --> 53:44.949
as opposed to a very small AO are the

53:44.949 --> 53:47.171
way that we just don't want to get lost

53:47.171 --> 53:46.510
and that this needs to be made

53:46.510 --> 53:50.060
available for title title 10 operations .

53:50.070 --> 53:52.350
These are these are direct operational

53:52.350 --> 53:54.517
support activities . The mission falls

53:54.517 --> 53:56.628
to the Space Force and the Department

53:56.628 --> 53:58.850
Defense . Thank you . I understand that

53:58.850 --> 54:01.017
there is a legislative proposal in the

54:01.017 --> 54:03.239
works to integrate the reserve elements

54:03.239 --> 54:05.406
of the Space force . This seems like a

54:05.406 --> 54:07.461
logical move as your service matures

54:07.461 --> 54:09.628
and embraces its organized trained and

54:09.628 --> 54:11.294
equipped roles . It's also my

54:11.294 --> 54:13.350
understanding that the Space Force's

54:13.350 --> 54:15.572
residing within the Guard Element still

54:15.572 --> 54:17.628
reside within the Air National Guard

54:17.628 --> 54:19.739
and is organized trained and equipped

54:19.739 --> 54:21.350
by the Air Force . From your

54:21.350 --> 54:23.350
perspective , as the Chief of Space

54:23.350 --> 54:24.961
Operations , what should the

54:24.961 --> 54:27.017
subcommittee consider to provide the

54:27.017 --> 54:29.239
most seamless oversight of these forces

54:29.239 --> 54:31.750
as the space force matures first , let

54:31.750 --> 54:34.010
me describe the reserve integration . I

54:34.010 --> 54:35.732
think this is a very important

54:35.732 --> 54:37.954
legislative proposal that I hope you'll

54:37.954 --> 54:40.177
give due consideration to . It gives us

54:40.177 --> 54:42.343
the flexibility to have both part time

54:42.343 --> 54:44.399
and full time guardians in the space

54:44.399 --> 54:46.566
force , which is gonna give incredible

54:46.566 --> 54:48.732
career flexibility and hopefully serve

54:48.732 --> 54:50.954
as an innovative way to retain the kind

54:50.954 --> 54:53.066
of expertise that we know we're gonna

54:53.066 --> 54:55.066
need moving forward . I think we've

54:55.066 --> 54:57.066
done a much better job of capturing

54:57.066 --> 54:59.288
kind of the key details that are needed

54:59.288 --> 55:01.510
in legislation to to make that proposal

55:01.510 --> 55:03.677
work . And I hope that we can continue

55:03.677 --> 55:05.843
to work with this committee and others

55:05.843 --> 55:05.680
to make that happen from the guard

55:05.680 --> 55:07.791
standpoint . I've been clear from the

55:07.791 --> 55:09.620
beginning that the critical

55:09.620 --> 55:11.842
capabilities that are living in the Air

55:11.842 --> 55:14.064
National Guard for space are must haves

55:14.064 --> 55:16.176
for the Space Force . That's the most

55:16.176 --> 55:18.398
important thing I don't believe because

55:18.398 --> 55:20.231
of the way organized train equip

55:20.231 --> 55:22.490
authorities reside with the Chief of

55:22.500 --> 55:24.180
Staff of the Air Force and my

55:24.180 --> 55:26.770
responsibilities that , that the

55:26.770 --> 55:28.548
General Brown feels like he can

55:28.548 --> 55:30.326
organize , train equipped space

55:30.326 --> 55:32.381
capabilities inside the Air National

55:32.381 --> 55:34.437
Guard . It creates a little bit of a

55:34.437 --> 55:36.603
disconnect . And so the current status

55:36.603 --> 55:38.770
quo is the , is the toughest to figure

55:38.770 --> 55:38.620
out how to do properly . Other than

55:38.620 --> 55:40.564
that , I think there might be some

55:40.564 --> 55:42.676
options that are worth exploring that

55:42.676 --> 55:45.009
are based on cost estimates in the like .

55:45.009 --> 55:47.176
Thank you , Mr Chairman . I would just

55:47.176 --> 55:49.231
like to commend the general . He has

55:49.231 --> 55:51.610
taken a very direct and strong approach

55:51.610 --> 55:53.499
with regard to advocating for our

55:53.499 --> 55:55.666
airmen and guardians on the subject of

55:55.666 --> 55:58.630
the missile community cancer study . Uh

55:58.640 --> 56:00.862
This is a case of where they're finding

56:00.862 --> 56:03.029
cancers in areas where these guys that

56:03.029 --> 56:05.140
are basically working underground for

56:05.140 --> 56:07.084
extended periods of time . And the

56:07.084 --> 56:06.950
general has taken a very direct and

56:06.950 --> 56:09.061
personal interest in seeing that this

56:09.061 --> 56:11.228
be pursued and that anybody that's out

56:11.228 --> 56:13.450
there , any one of these airmen or , or

56:13.450 --> 56:15.760
guardians that they get help , they

56:15.760 --> 56:17.982
find out and they keep track of . And I

56:17.982 --> 56:20.038
just want to commend him and I would

56:20.038 --> 56:21.982
hope that the committee would make

56:21.982 --> 56:24.038
available time for him to be able to

56:24.038 --> 56:26.093
share with us uh moving forward just

56:26.093 --> 56:28.204
exactly what he has found with regard

56:28.204 --> 56:30.371
to any health concerns surrounding the

56:30.371 --> 56:32.538
cancers that seem to be more prevalent

56:32.538 --> 56:34.427
with these folks that are working

56:34.427 --> 56:36.482
underground in these missile silos .

56:36.482 --> 56:38.593
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you ,

56:38.593 --> 56:40.704
General uh general . Couple of follow

56:40.704 --> 56:42.704
up questions several times . You've

56:42.704 --> 56:45.290
mentioned the possibility of norms

56:45.300 --> 56:47.950
developing international norms expand

56:47.950 --> 56:49.617
on that . Is that a realistic

56:49.617 --> 56:51.672
possibility will the Chinese and the

56:51.672 --> 56:54.410
Russians talk about international norms

56:54.410 --> 56:57.820
in space ? Unfortunately , the norms

56:57.820 --> 56:59.987
that they talk about are not ones that

56:59.987 --> 57:02.153
we would support and they've , they've

57:02.153 --> 57:04.220
kind of shown um a propensity to not

57:04.220 --> 57:06.331
support the ones we want to support .

57:06.331 --> 57:08.331
This is a battle of narratives over

57:08.331 --> 57:10.331
international norms . Uh What I can

57:10.331 --> 57:11.998
tell you is when I talk to my

57:11.998 --> 57:11.710
counterparts in the other nations ,

57:11.710 --> 57:14.140
they are interested in this , the

57:14.150 --> 57:16.372
Secretary of Defense issued his tenants

57:16.372 --> 57:18.483
for responsible behavior and us Space

57:18.483 --> 57:20.706
command followed up with even some more

57:20.706 --> 57:22.817
details . Those are all widely viewed

57:22.817 --> 57:24.440
from my peers as helpful in

57:24.440 --> 57:26.660
establishing what it means in a , in a

57:26.670 --> 57:28.950
like a like minded set of nations with

57:28.960 --> 57:32.370
responsible behaviors in space . Um The ,

57:32.370 --> 57:34.259
we have a , we have an initiative

57:34.259 --> 57:36.370
called the Coalition Space Operations

57:36.370 --> 57:39.200
Initiative , which is um seven

57:39.200 --> 57:42.400
countries that have also detailed what

57:42.400 --> 57:44.567
responsible behaviors in space means ,

57:44.567 --> 57:46.678
very consistent with the Secretary of

57:46.678 --> 57:48.900
Defense's tenants . And so I think this

57:48.900 --> 57:51.011
is kind of a widespread understanding

57:51.011 --> 57:53.233
that we have to behave a certain way in

57:53.233 --> 57:55.122
order to maintain a safe , secure

57:55.122 --> 57:57.240
Sustainable Space Domain . Uh And I

57:57.240 --> 58:00.310
believe there's widespread uh agreement

58:00.310 --> 58:02.143
for that is the state department

58:02.143 --> 58:04.199
engaged in this discussion as well .

58:04.199 --> 58:06.330
They are , I think that would be an

58:06.330 --> 58:08.920
important aspect of moving this forward .

58:08.930 --> 58:11.097
Very important initiative . They are .

58:11.097 --> 58:14.310
Um just to comment , you mentioned

58:14.310 --> 58:17.160
cyber protection several times . It

58:17.160 --> 58:19.216
seems to be the experience that most

58:19.216 --> 58:22.530
major cyber attacks start with a sub ,

58:22.540 --> 58:24.540
not the general contractor but some

58:24.540 --> 58:27.650
small company of smaller firm that's

58:27.650 --> 58:29.706
working for a general contractor and

58:29.706 --> 58:31.872
then they get into the system . I hope

58:31.872 --> 58:33.928
that's something when you're talking

58:33.928 --> 58:36.150
about the protection of your assets and

58:36.150 --> 58:38.261
very rightfully , you've talked about

58:38.261 --> 58:40.483
ground and space that you worry as well

58:40.483 --> 58:42.650
about those small companies that might

58:42.650 --> 58:44.761
act as a gateway for a cyber attack .

58:44.970 --> 58:46.970
Yes , sir . I've talked to my cyber

58:46.970 --> 58:49.137
defenders at length . I'm not really a

58:49.137 --> 58:51.137
cyber professional myself . I don't

58:51.137 --> 58:53.303
understand all the technical details ,

58:53.303 --> 58:53.190
but one of the most important things

58:53.190 --> 58:55.190
that they start with is mapping the

58:55.190 --> 58:57.023
cyber terrain . In other words ,

58:57.023 --> 58:59.190
understanding exactly what the network

58:59.190 --> 59:01.412
looks like where it might be vulnerable

59:01.412 --> 59:03.468
and how they might best sensor it to

59:03.468 --> 59:05.690
rapidly detect any kind of intrusions .

59:05.690 --> 59:07.746
And so to your point , understanding

59:07.746 --> 59:09.857
how all of the company's fit together

59:09.857 --> 59:11.912
in the cyber terrain is an important

59:11.912 --> 59:14.079
foundational aspect of cyber defense .

59:14.079 --> 59:16.190
Final , final question is Space force

59:16.190 --> 59:19.740
in charge of defense defensive . You've

59:19.740 --> 59:21.629
talked a lot about proliferated ,

59:21.629 --> 59:24.630
proliferated , Leo , are you also in

59:24.630 --> 59:28.350
charge of developing the capability of

59:28.360 --> 59:31.020
maneuver and otherwise defending our

59:31.030 --> 59:33.086
space assets . Is that part of Space

59:33.086 --> 59:35.300
Force's mission ? I would say it's

59:35.300 --> 59:38.010
important that as we develop our D O D

59:38.010 --> 59:40.177
capabilities through the space force ,

59:40.177 --> 59:42.399
that we make sure we're applying all of

59:42.399 --> 59:44.288
the right concepts for active and

59:44.288 --> 59:46.010
passive defense uh to meet the

59:46.010 --> 59:47.732
requirements so that we have a

59:47.732 --> 59:50.350
survivable architecture on the U S

59:50.350 --> 59:52.660
worst day and that this is a relatively

59:52.660 --> 59:54.771
new concern . We own space for a long

59:54.771 --> 59:57.450
time . And but the Russians and the

59:57.450 --> 59:59.990
Chinese have been very active in uh

01:00:00.000 --> 01:00:03.080
anti satellite technology . So we need

01:00:03.080 --> 01:00:05.670
to be developing counters to that in

01:00:05.670 --> 01:00:07.948
order to maintain a credible deterrent .

01:00:07.948 --> 01:00:10.870
Is that correct ? Absolutely . And I

01:00:10.870 --> 01:00:14.000
think it's about how fast can we go

01:00:14.180 --> 01:00:16.700
again . In my , my weak analogy is

01:00:16.700 --> 01:00:18.811
converting the merchant marine in the

01:00:18.811 --> 01:00:20.811
US Navy . We've got a little bit of

01:00:20.811 --> 01:00:22.700
ways to go before we can take our

01:00:22.700 --> 01:00:24.922
legacy platforms that we've got so much

01:00:24.922 --> 01:00:27.033
utility out of and so much capability

01:00:27.033 --> 01:00:29.089
from , but convert them to providing

01:00:29.089 --> 01:00:31.200
the same or better capabilities while

01:00:31.200 --> 01:00:33.256
being able to perform in a contested

01:00:33.256 --> 01:00:35.311
domain . And we'll have to make that

01:00:35.311 --> 01:00:37.200
transition as rapidly as possible

01:00:37.200 --> 01:00:39.089
questions . Thank you very much ,

01:00:39.089 --> 01:00:40.811
General . This has been a very

01:00:40.811 --> 01:00:42.811
illuminating hearing . I appreciate

01:00:42.811 --> 01:00:44.700
your forthright responsive to our

01:00:44.700 --> 01:00:46.700
responsive to our question and your

01:00:46.700 --> 01:00:48.644
leadership and your long career of

01:00:48.644 --> 01:00:50.700
service to the United States . Thank

01:00:50.700 --> 01:00:52.644
you . Thank you , sir . Hearing is

01:00:52.644 --> 01:00:51.410
adjourned .