1
00:00:03,350 --> 00:00:05,610
Let me call a hearing to order . Good 

2
00:00:05,610 --> 00:00:07,832
morning . And the committee meets today 

3
00:00:07,832 --> 00:00:09,760
to receive testimony from General 

4
00:00:09,770 --> 00:00:12,330
Michael Eric Guerilla , commander of 

5
00:00:12,330 --> 00:00:14,441
the United States Central Command and 

6
00:00:14,441 --> 00:00:16,608
General Michael Langley , commander of 

7
00:00:16,608 --> 00:00:18,552
the United States Africa Command . 

8
00:00:18,552 --> 00:00:20,774
Thank you both for your service and I'm 

9
00:00:20,774 --> 00:00:22,886
grateful to the men and women serving 

10
00:00:22,886 --> 00:00:25,108
under your commands . While Centcom has 

11
00:00:25,108 --> 00:00:26,886
many responsibilities , the top 

12
00:00:26,886 --> 00:00:29,052
priority remains deterring the Iranian 

13
00:00:29,052 --> 00:00:31,650
regime's destructive and destabilizing 

14
00:00:31,650 --> 00:00:34,460
activities without undue provocation . 

15
00:00:34,470 --> 00:00:36,880
This is a complicated and urgent 

16
00:00:36,880 --> 00:00:39,590
mission . Iran is conducting malign 

17
00:00:39,590 --> 00:00:41,820
activities across multiple arenas 

18
00:00:41,820 --> 00:00:44,240
including continuing its own nuclear 

19
00:00:44,240 --> 00:00:46,370
development , launching drone and 

20
00:00:46,370 --> 00:00:48,481
missile attacks on neighboring states 

21
00:00:48,481 --> 00:00:51,330
supporting proxy groups violently 

22
00:00:51,330 --> 00:00:53,610
repressing its own citizens and 

23
00:00:53,610 --> 00:00:55,554
deepening a military alliance with 

24
00:00:55,554 --> 00:00:57,800
Russia and these threats are likely to 

25
00:00:57,800 --> 00:01:01,160
increase in an unexpected turn . Last 

26
00:01:01,160 --> 00:01:03,490
week , Saudi Arabia and Iran announced 

27
00:01:03,490 --> 00:01:05,712
they have restored diplomatic relations 

28
00:01:05,712 --> 00:01:08,330
in a deal brokered by China . Press 

29
00:01:08,330 --> 00:01:10,441
reports indicate the key parts of the 

30
00:01:10,441 --> 00:01:12,441
agreement were committed by Iran to 

31
00:01:12,441 --> 00:01:14,840
stop further attacks on Saudi Arabia 

32
00:01:15,000 --> 00:01:17,230
and cut back on support for Iranian 

33
00:01:17,230 --> 00:01:19,286
linked groups that have targeted the 

34
00:01:19,286 --> 00:01:21,174
kingdom . The two nations plan to 

35
00:01:21,174 --> 00:01:23,397
reopen their embassies and re implement 

36
00:01:23,397 --> 00:01:25,680
a security pact to cooperate on several 

37
00:01:25,690 --> 00:01:28,450
issues to benefit their mutual national 

38
00:01:28,450 --> 00:01:31,380
security . As the New York Times stated , 

39
00:01:31,380 --> 00:01:34,270
the deal is quote a shift that left 

40
00:01:34,270 --> 00:01:36,460
head spinning and capitals around the 

41
00:01:36,460 --> 00:01:38,870
globe . General Carella , given the 

42
00:01:38,870 --> 00:01:41,690
unpredictability of the Iranian regime , 

43
00:01:41,700 --> 00:01:43,867
I would like your thoughts on how best 

44
00:01:43,867 --> 00:01:45,922
to respond to its malign behavior in 

45
00:01:45,922 --> 00:01:48,050
the region , taking into account the 

46
00:01:48,050 --> 00:01:50,260
new dynamic of their restoration of 

47
00:01:50,260 --> 00:01:52,720
relations with Saudi Arabia . What 

48
00:01:52,720 --> 00:01:54,942
opportunities do we have to collaborate 

49
00:01:54,942 --> 00:01:57,164
with our allies and partners to counter 

50
00:01:57,164 --> 00:01:59,410
drone and missile attacks ? And how can 

51
00:01:59,410 --> 00:02:01,730
we address Iran's closer alignment with 

52
00:02:01,730 --> 00:02:04,090
Russia and China ? Turning to 

53
00:02:04,090 --> 00:02:05,812
Afghanistan . Although we have 

54
00:02:06,120 --> 00:02:08,390
transitioned to all forces out of the 

55
00:02:08,390 --> 00:02:10,580
country , the Biden administration has 

56
00:02:10,580 --> 00:02:12,691
maintained its commitment to ensuring 

57
00:02:12,691 --> 00:02:14,858
that Afghanistan cannot be used as the 

58
00:02:14,858 --> 00:02:17,550
base for Isis Al Qaeda or other 

59
00:02:17,550 --> 00:02:20,410
terrorist groups to conduct attacks 

60
00:02:20,410 --> 00:02:22,743
against the United States or its allies . 

61
00:02:22,743 --> 00:02:24,577
I would ask for an update on our 

62
00:02:24,577 --> 00:02:26,632
posture and capabilities and whether 

63
00:02:26,632 --> 00:02:28,632
additional regional agreements have 

64
00:02:28,632 --> 00:02:30,688
been reached to ensure we maintain a 

65
00:02:30,688 --> 00:02:32,760
robust regional counterterrorism 

66
00:02:32,770 --> 00:02:35,030
architecture to address the threats 

67
00:02:35,030 --> 00:02:37,940
from these groups . General Langley 

68
00:02:37,950 --> 00:02:40,590
Africom area of responsibility is 

69
00:02:40,590 --> 00:02:42,757
becoming increasingly important in the 

70
00:02:42,757 --> 00:02:44,757
United States strategic competition 

71
00:02:44,757 --> 00:02:46,920
with China and Russia . Many African 

72
00:02:46,920 --> 00:02:49,610
countries have longstanding military 

73
00:02:49,610 --> 00:02:51,960
ties with Russia and even deeper 

74
00:02:51,960 --> 00:02:54,460
economic ties with China . As the 

75
00:02:54,460 --> 00:02:56,470
United States manages relationships 

76
00:02:56,470 --> 00:02:58,450
across the continent , we must be 

77
00:02:58,450 --> 00:03:00,830
mindful of these pre existing ties and 

78
00:03:00,830 --> 00:03:03,820
avoid taking a with us or against this 

79
00:03:03,820 --> 00:03:06,390
approach or we will risk alienating the 

80
00:03:06,390 --> 00:03:09,030
very nations we seek to engage with . I 

81
00:03:09,030 --> 00:03:11,252
would welcome your thoughts on how best 

82
00:03:11,252 --> 00:03:13,030
to calibrate the US approach to 

83
00:03:13,030 --> 00:03:15,252
strategic competition in light of these 

84
00:03:15,252 --> 00:03:17,310
factors . The security situation in 

85
00:03:17,320 --> 00:03:19,700
East Africa remains dangerously 

86
00:03:19,710 --> 00:03:23,060
unstable since last fall , roughly 500 

87
00:03:23,070 --> 00:03:25,120
U S service members have been 

88
00:03:25,120 --> 00:03:27,720
redeployed to Somalia to support the 

89
00:03:27,720 --> 00:03:29,776
Somali government's fight against Al 

90
00:03:29,776 --> 00:03:32,120
Shabaab . One of Al Qaeda's most 

91
00:03:32,120 --> 00:03:35,400
powerful global affiliates are renewed 

92
00:03:35,400 --> 00:03:37,567
presence is an effort to stabilize the 

93
00:03:37,567 --> 00:03:39,456
Somali government and train their 

94
00:03:39,456 --> 00:03:41,233
forces . After our departure in 

95
00:03:41,233 --> 00:03:44,050
December 2020 allowed Al Shabaab to 

96
00:03:44,050 --> 00:03:46,640
grow in size and strength . I hope you 

97
00:03:46,640 --> 00:03:48,807
will share your views on the status of 

98
00:03:48,807 --> 00:03:51,029
our engagement with Somali partners and 

99
00:03:51,029 --> 00:03:53,029
the whole of government strategy to 

100
00:03:53,029 --> 00:03:55,029
ensure battlefield successes can be 

101
00:03:55,029 --> 00:03:57,251
effectively translated into longer term 

102
00:03:57,251 --> 00:03:59,360
gains . Finally , the security 

103
00:03:59,360 --> 00:04:01,920
situation in West Africa also continues 

104
00:04:01,920 --> 00:04:04,130
to decline . Violent extremist 

105
00:04:04,130 --> 00:04:06,130
operations have expanded across the 

106
00:04:06,130 --> 00:04:08,440
Saar hell including pushing down into 

107
00:04:08,440 --> 00:04:10,440
the Littoral states in the Gulf of 

108
00:04:10,440 --> 00:04:12,650
Guinea . At the same time , Russia and 

109
00:04:12,650 --> 00:04:14,650
China are seeking to increase their 

110
00:04:14,650 --> 00:04:16,817
engagement in this region . The Wagner 

111
00:04:16,817 --> 00:04:18,928
group continues to seek opportunities 

112
00:04:18,928 --> 00:04:20,983
to exploit instability in the region 

113
00:04:20,983 --> 00:04:22,928
and China has made no secret about 

114
00:04:22,928 --> 00:04:25,450
exploring basing operations on the West 

115
00:04:25,460 --> 00:04:28,220
African coast . Both countries are also 

116
00:04:28,220 --> 00:04:29,887
investing in natural resource 

117
00:04:29,887 --> 00:04:32,620
extraction across the continent often 

118
00:04:32,620 --> 00:04:34,509
at great expense to the long term 

119
00:04:34,509 --> 00:04:36,910
health of African partners , ecosystems 

120
00:04:36,910 --> 00:04:39,360
and economies given these challenges 

121
00:04:39,360 --> 00:04:41,640
general and I would like to hear how 

122
00:04:41,640 --> 00:04:43,620
Africom is seeking to engage with 

123
00:04:43,620 --> 00:04:45,564
partners in Africa to expose these 

124
00:04:45,564 --> 00:04:48,240
harmful and manipulative practices . I 

125
00:04:48,240 --> 00:04:50,073
want to thank you again and look 

126
00:04:50,073 --> 00:04:51,907
forward to your testimonies as a 

127
00:04:51,907 --> 00:04:54,018
reminder of for my colleagues , there 

128
00:04:54,018 --> 00:04:56,073
will be a closed session immediately 

129
00:04:56,073 --> 00:04:58,296
following this hearing in room S V C to 

130
00:04:58,296 --> 00:05:00,296
17 . Now let me turn to the ranking 

131
00:05:00,296 --> 00:05:02,462
members , Senator worker . Thank you , 

132
00:05:02,462 --> 00:05:04,462
Mr Chairman . I'd like to thank our 

133
00:05:04,462 --> 00:05:04,440
witnesses for being here . In recent 

134
00:05:04,440 --> 00:05:06,496
weeks . The committee has heard from 

135
00:05:06,496 --> 00:05:08,718
top military and civilian leaders about 

136
00:05:08,718 --> 00:05:10,718
the significant security challenges 

137
00:05:10,718 --> 00:05:12,940
facing our nation . Our top adversaries 

138
00:05:12,940 --> 00:05:15,180
including China and Russia are testing 

139
00:05:15,180 --> 00:05:17,300
American resolve , not just in East 

140
00:05:17,310 --> 00:05:19,950
Asia and Europe , but also across the 

141
00:05:19,950 --> 00:05:23,130
Middle East , South Asia and Africa in 

142
00:05:23,130 --> 00:05:25,297
the Middle East , Russia and Iran grow 

143
00:05:25,297 --> 00:05:27,910
closer . Recently , Iran agreed to 

144
00:05:27,910 --> 00:05:30,930
purchase 24 advance subs 35 fighter 

145
00:05:30,930 --> 00:05:34,300
jets today , Russia is deploying 

146
00:05:34,310 --> 00:05:37,650
Iranian drones to kill Ukrainians . 

147
00:05:37,660 --> 00:05:40,030
Meanwhile , China works to displace the 

148
00:05:40,030 --> 00:05:43,060
United States as the partner of choice 

149
00:05:43,070 --> 00:05:45,750
for many of our longtime friends in the 

150
00:05:45,750 --> 00:05:47,940
region . The Chinese Communist Party 

151
00:05:47,940 --> 00:05:51,340
offers more streamlined arms sales and 

152
00:05:51,340 --> 00:05:53,980
Huawei five G networks that would 

153
00:05:53,980 --> 00:05:56,190
undermine our operational security in 

154
00:05:56,190 --> 00:05:58,079
the Middle East . In Africa . The 

155
00:05:58,079 --> 00:06:01,100
Russian mercenary group Wagner does 

156
00:06:01,710 --> 00:06:05,490
Wagner does Putin's bidding . They sow 

157
00:06:05,500 --> 00:06:07,500
instability across the continent by 

158
00:06:07,500 --> 00:06:09,950
supporting coups , spreading lies , 

159
00:06:09,960 --> 00:06:13,250
they use exploitative practices to get 

160
00:06:13,250 --> 00:06:15,139
critical minerals . They pressure 

161
00:06:15,139 --> 00:06:17,250
African governments to move away from 

162
00:06:17,250 --> 00:06:19,306
the West at the same time . China is 

163
00:06:19,306 --> 00:06:21,083
using economic coercion to gain 

164
00:06:21,083 --> 00:06:23,880
leverage and expand its military 

165
00:06:23,880 --> 00:06:26,660
footprint and basing Something former 

166
00:06:26,660 --> 00:06:28,660
Africom Commander , General Stephen 

167
00:06:28,660 --> 00:06:30,827
Townsend called his # one Global Power 

168
00:06:30,827 --> 00:06:34,120
Competition Concern . We are right to 

169
00:06:34,120 --> 00:06:36,342
focus on the growing Russia and Chinese 

170
00:06:36,342 --> 00:06:38,720
threats but we cannot take our eyes off 

171
00:06:38,720 --> 00:06:40,810
the other security challenges coming 

172
00:06:40,810 --> 00:06:42,921
from the Middle East , South Asia and 

173
00:06:42,921 --> 00:06:46,680
Africa in Afghanistan . The disastrous 

174
00:06:46,680 --> 00:06:49,210
withdrawal of us troops nearly two 

175
00:06:49,210 --> 00:06:52,270
years ago left a security vacuum . The 

176
00:06:52,270 --> 00:06:56,150
Taliban Al Qaeda and Isis have filled 

177
00:06:57,380 --> 00:06:59,380
the Biden administration assured us 

178
00:06:59,380 --> 00:07:01,436
that the Department of Defense would 

179
00:07:01,436 --> 00:07:03,602
conduct counterterrorism operations in 

180
00:07:03,602 --> 00:07:05,547
Afghanistan even without a limited 

181
00:07:05,547 --> 00:07:07,769
number of us troops on the ground . But 

182
00:07:07,769 --> 00:07:09,824
the United States has only conducted 

183
00:07:09,824 --> 00:07:12,590
one strike in more than a year . The 

184
00:07:12,590 --> 00:07:15,180
withdrawal from Afghanistan and Bolden 

185
00:07:15,180 --> 00:07:17,402
Isis and Al Qaeda affiliates around the 

186
00:07:17,402 --> 00:07:19,513
world , not just in Afghanistan , the 

187
00:07:19,513 --> 00:07:21,820
terrorist threat is real and growing as 

188
00:07:21,820 --> 00:07:23,987
a result of the Biden administration's 

189
00:07:23,987 --> 00:07:26,209
policies , the world's number one state 

190
00:07:26,209 --> 00:07:29,420
sponsor of terrorism . Iran Presents an 

191
00:07:29,420 --> 00:07:32,250
increasing threat to our personnel and 

192
00:07:32,250 --> 00:07:34,194
partners in the region . President 

193
00:07:34,194 --> 00:07:36,417
Biden should have focused on countering 

194
00:07:36,417 --> 00:07:38,990
Iran's missile program and its support 

195
00:07:38,990 --> 00:07:41,260
for terrorism . Instead , he focused on 

196
00:07:41,260 --> 00:07:44,440
returning to the flawed 

197
00:07:44,450 --> 00:07:47,670
2015 nuclear agreement in the 

198
00:07:47,670 --> 00:07:50,870
process . This administration has given 

199
00:07:50,870 --> 00:07:52,870
them practically everything and got 

200
00:07:52,870 --> 00:07:55,210
absolutely nothing . According to the 

201
00:07:55,210 --> 00:07:57,380
Department of Defense , Iran could now 

202
00:07:57,380 --> 00:07:59,640
produce enough fissile material for a 

203
00:07:59,640 --> 00:08:01,830
bomb within just 12 days and its 

204
00:08:01,830 --> 00:08:05,090
proxies are on the March nationwide . 

205
00:08:05,100 --> 00:08:07,211
These facts make it clear , continued 

206
00:08:07,211 --> 00:08:09,378
significant real growth in the defense 

207
00:08:09,378 --> 00:08:12,210
budget . Top line above inflation 

208
00:08:12,220 --> 00:08:14,350
remains essential to our national 

209
00:08:14,350 --> 00:08:17,170
security . I'll be looking closely to 

210
00:08:17,170 --> 00:08:19,003
ensure our security assistance , 

211
00:08:19,003 --> 00:08:20,781
funding remains strong in these 

212
00:08:20,781 --> 00:08:23,210
theaters and that our counterterrorism 

213
00:08:23,210 --> 00:08:25,540
and contingency forces are fully 

214
00:08:25,540 --> 00:08:27,650
resourced . This includes additional 

215
00:08:27,660 --> 00:08:31,100
force protection measures in both 

216
00:08:31,100 --> 00:08:33,320
theaters , particularly to protect 

217
00:08:33,320 --> 00:08:37,200
against more complex Iranian backed 

218
00:08:37,210 --> 00:08:39,410
attacks . I would also note that the 

219
00:08:39,410 --> 00:08:41,810
budget zeroing out of LPD amphibious 

220
00:08:41,810 --> 00:08:45,780
ships is the exact wrong move when we 

221
00:08:45,780 --> 00:08:47,947
did not even have the capacity to send 

222
00:08:47,947 --> 00:08:50,700
one amphibious ship to Turkey to help 

223
00:08:50,710 --> 00:08:52,880
with their earthquake . Finally , I'm 

224
00:08:52,880 --> 00:08:54,658
interested in how the Office of 

225
00:08:54,658 --> 00:08:57,250
Strategic Capital might be leveraged to 

226
00:08:57,250 --> 00:08:59,260
push back against the CCP in these 

227
00:08:59,260 --> 00:09:01,427
theaters and elsewhere as they seek to 

228
00:09:01,427 --> 00:09:03,920
buy ports and raw materials across the 

229
00:09:03,920 --> 00:09:06,220
globe . I thank our witnesses and look 

230
00:09:06,220 --> 00:09:08,498
forward to their testimony . Thank you , 

231
00:09:08,498 --> 00:09:10,498
Mr Chairman . Thank you very much , 

232
00:09:10,498 --> 00:09:12,831
Senator Worker General Carillo . Please , 

233
00:09:13,020 --> 00:09:15,353
Chairman Reed , ranking member , wicker , 

234
00:09:15,353 --> 00:09:17,576
ladies and gentlemen of the committee . 

235
00:09:17,576 --> 00:09:19,520
I'm joined today by command master 

236
00:09:19,520 --> 00:09:21,631
chief Derrick Walters , the command , 

237
00:09:21,631 --> 00:09:23,742
senior enlisted leader of U S Central 

238
00:09:23,742 --> 00:09:25,853
Command , on behalf of the soldiers , 

239
00:09:25,853 --> 00:09:27,798
sailors , airmen , marines , coast 

240
00:09:27,798 --> 00:09:29,964
guardsmen and guardians who serve this 

241
00:09:29,964 --> 00:09:32,076
command , the central region and this 

242
00:09:32,076 --> 00:09:33,909
nation every day . Thank you for 

243
00:09:33,909 --> 00:09:35,964
allowing me to testify regarding the 

244
00:09:35,964 --> 00:09:37,687
posture of U S Central command 

245
00:09:37,687 --> 00:09:37,680
alongside my ranger buddy . Mike 

246
00:09:37,680 --> 00:09:40,590
Langley . Centcom serves as the 

247
00:09:40,590 --> 00:09:42,534
security integrator for an area of 

248
00:09:42,534 --> 00:09:44,970
responsibility that encompasses 21 

249
00:09:44,970 --> 00:09:47,870
nations , almost 600 million people and 

250
00:09:47,870 --> 00:09:50,250
serves as the strategic nexus of the 

251
00:09:50,250 --> 00:09:52,194
world's most important quarters of 

252
00:09:52,194 --> 00:09:54,790
trade . I'm now 11 months into command . 

253
00:09:54,800 --> 00:09:56,856
In that time , I've made 14 trips to 

254
00:09:56,856 --> 00:09:58,800
the region . And those visits have 

255
00:09:58,800 --> 00:10:00,911
allowed me first person insights that 

256
00:10:00,911 --> 00:10:03,022
have informed my strategic approach , 

257
00:10:03,022 --> 00:10:05,356
which is best summarized in three words , 

258
00:10:05,356 --> 00:10:07,580
people , partners and innovation , 

259
00:10:08,140 --> 00:10:10,251
people are our greatest asset and our 

260
00:10:10,251 --> 00:10:12,307
most critical resource , our service 

261
00:10:12,307 --> 00:10:14,307
members and civilians in the United 

262
00:10:14,307 --> 00:10:16,251
States and across the region , our 

263
00:10:16,251 --> 00:10:18,510
nation's best . I know this body keeps 

264
00:10:18,510 --> 00:10:20,677
them top of mind that right now in the 

265
00:10:20,677 --> 00:10:22,900
Centcom region , thousands of troops 

266
00:10:22,900 --> 00:10:25,090
are in harm's way are people who are 

267
00:10:25,090 --> 00:10:27,312
closest to the problem . Understand the 

268
00:10:27,312 --> 00:10:29,368
opportunities available to solve the 

269
00:10:29,368 --> 00:10:31,590
region's most complex challenges . That 

270
00:10:31,590 --> 00:10:33,534
is why we relies so heavily on our 

271
00:10:33,534 --> 00:10:35,312
partners . Our partners are the 

272
00:10:35,312 --> 00:10:37,479
nation's comparative advantage against 

273
00:10:37,479 --> 00:10:39,479
competitors like China and Russia . 

274
00:10:39,479 --> 00:10:41,780
Across Centcom , we cultivate deep 

275
00:10:41,790 --> 00:10:43,957
abiding partnerships that can serve as 

276
00:10:43,957 --> 00:10:45,901
a hedge against the threats in the 

277
00:10:45,901 --> 00:10:47,957
region while deterring Iran from its 

278
00:10:47,957 --> 00:10:50,179
most destructive behavior . We have the 

279
00:10:50,179 --> 00:10:52,068
kind of relationships that elicit 

280
00:10:52,068 --> 00:10:54,123
candid sometimes tough conversations 

281
00:10:54,123 --> 00:10:56,234
that result in solutions . These kind 

282
00:10:56,234 --> 00:10:58,457
of relationships make us the partner of 

283
00:10:58,457 --> 00:11:00,568
choice in the region . And a critical 

284
00:11:00,568 --> 00:11:02,401
component of that partnership is 

285
00:11:02,401 --> 00:11:04,457
innovation , innovation of thought , 

286
00:11:04,457 --> 00:11:06,568
innovation of process , innovation of 

287
00:11:06,568 --> 00:11:09,360
concept and technology extends the 

288
00:11:09,360 --> 00:11:11,540
value of the partnerships . Innovation 

289
00:11:11,540 --> 00:11:13,970
allows us to move faster , operate more 

290
00:11:13,970 --> 00:11:15,859
efficiently and increase progress 

291
00:11:15,859 --> 00:11:18,030
across all operational efforts . This 

292
00:11:18,030 --> 00:11:20,197
is more important now than any time in 

293
00:11:20,197 --> 00:11:22,220
our history . 40 years ago , the 

294
00:11:22,220 --> 00:11:24,109
Department of Defense established 

295
00:11:24,109 --> 00:11:26,331
Centcom to counter the malign influence 

296
00:11:26,331 --> 00:11:28,442
of a revolutionary regime that seized 

297
00:11:28,442 --> 00:11:30,553
power in Tehran and to compete with a 

298
00:11:30,553 --> 00:11:32,720
great power in the region . The Soviet 

299
00:11:32,720 --> 00:11:34,609
Union , the organizations charter 

300
00:11:34,609 --> 00:11:36,960
directed by this body was it to direct 

301
00:11:36,960 --> 00:11:38,904
and enable military operations and 

302
00:11:38,904 --> 00:11:41,071
activities with allies and partners to 

303
00:11:41,071 --> 00:11:43,238
increase regional stability in support 

304
00:11:43,238 --> 00:11:45,460
of enduring us interests . That mission 

305
00:11:45,460 --> 00:11:47,571
remains essentially unchanged to this 

306
00:11:47,571 --> 00:11:49,970
day , Iran still remains the focus . We 

307
00:11:49,970 --> 00:11:52,081
now battle filing extremist groups to 

308
00:11:52,081 --> 00:11:54,137
threaten the region and beyond . The 

309
00:11:54,137 --> 00:11:56,137
Soviet Union has been replaced with 

310
00:11:56,137 --> 00:11:57,803
China and Russia as strategic 

311
00:11:57,803 --> 00:12:00,026
competitors with these challenges . The 

312
00:12:00,026 --> 00:12:02,192
Centcom region holds the greatest risk 

313
00:12:02,192 --> 00:12:04,081
of derailing the national defense 

314
00:12:04,081 --> 00:12:05,581
strategy with a flashpoint 

315
00:12:05,581 --> 00:12:07,748
international incident that may demand 

316
00:12:07,748 --> 00:12:09,803
a response using unplanned resources 

317
00:12:09,803 --> 00:12:12,460
and attention . So today , Centcom 

318
00:12:12,460 --> 00:12:15,020
priorities are to deter Iran counter 

319
00:12:15,020 --> 00:12:17,076
violence extremist organizations and 

320
00:12:17,076 --> 00:12:19,131
compete strategically with China and 

321
00:12:19,131 --> 00:12:21,450
Russia . Four decades after Centcom 

322
00:12:21,460 --> 00:12:23,738
four decades after Centcom's formation , 

323
00:12:23,738 --> 00:12:25,904
Iran remains the primary destabilizing 

324
00:12:25,904 --> 00:12:27,900
element in the region . We've seen 

325
00:12:27,900 --> 00:12:29,900
rapid advances in Iranian military 

326
00:12:29,900 --> 00:12:33,310
capability over time . The Iran of 2023 

327
00:12:33,320 --> 00:12:36,480
is not the Iran of 1983 . In fact , 

328
00:12:36,480 --> 00:12:38,450
today , Iran is exponentially more 

329
00:12:38,450 --> 00:12:40,617
capable than they were just five years 

330
00:12:40,617 --> 00:12:42,740
ago . Today , Iran possesses the 

331
00:12:42,740 --> 00:12:44,573
largest and most diverse missile 

332
00:12:44,573 --> 00:12:46,740
arsenal in the Middle East , thousands 

333
00:12:46,740 --> 00:12:48,962
of ballistic and cruise missiles , many 

334
00:12:48,962 --> 00:12:50,962
capable of striking anywhere in the 

335
00:12:50,962 --> 00:12:53,073
Middle East . Iran also maintains the 

336
00:12:53,073 --> 00:12:55,296
largest and most capable U A V force in 

337
00:12:55,296 --> 00:12:57,890
the region . The regime continues to 

338
00:12:57,890 --> 00:12:59,834
enrich in stockpile of uranium far 

339
00:12:59,834 --> 00:13:02,057
above what is needed for commercial use 

340
00:13:02,057 --> 00:13:03,946
and Tehran can enrich uranium far 

341
00:13:03,946 --> 00:13:06,279
faster than it could even two years ago . 

342
00:13:06,279 --> 00:13:08,334
And Iran with a nuclear weapon would 

343
00:13:08,334 --> 00:13:10,390
change the Middle East overnight and 

344
00:13:10,390 --> 00:13:12,370
forever Iran's vast and deeply 

345
00:13:12,370 --> 00:13:14,037
resourced proxy forces spread 

346
00:13:14,037 --> 00:13:16,148
instability throughout the region and 

347
00:13:16,148 --> 00:13:18,430
threaten our regional partners . As 

348
00:13:18,430 --> 00:13:20,708
Iran continued to stabilize the region , 

349
00:13:20,708 --> 00:13:22,763
we continue to fight against violent 

350
00:13:22,763 --> 00:13:25,480
extremist organizations in Syria . We 

351
00:13:25,480 --> 00:13:27,424
put pressure on Isis alongside our 

352
00:13:27,424 --> 00:13:29,730
Syrian Democratic Forces . Partners in 

353
00:13:29,730 --> 00:13:32,340
Iraq , we advise assist and enable the 

354
00:13:32,340 --> 00:13:34,640
Iraqi security forces in their fight 

355
00:13:34,650 --> 00:13:37,110
against Isis while Isis is 

356
00:13:37,110 --> 00:13:39,166
significantly degraded in Iraq . And 

357
00:13:39,166 --> 00:13:40,943
Syria , the group maintains the 

358
00:13:40,943 --> 00:13:43,166
capability to conduct operations within 

359
00:13:43,166 --> 00:13:45,388
the region and has the desire to strike 

360
00:13:45,388 --> 00:13:47,443
outside of it . Our progress in Iraq 

361
00:13:47,443 --> 00:13:49,554
and Syria contrasts with the security 

362
00:13:49,554 --> 00:13:52,140
situation in Afghanistan in Afghanistan . 

363
00:13:52,140 --> 00:13:54,029
The Taliban's hold on security is 

364
00:13:54,029 --> 00:13:56,251
maintained through ideology , continued 

365
00:13:56,251 --> 00:13:58,251
humanitarian aid and the persistent 

366
00:13:58,251 --> 00:14:00,140
abuse of human rights to dissuade 

367
00:14:00,140 --> 00:14:01,900
unrest , extremist groups the 

368
00:14:01,900 --> 00:14:04,320
opportunity and Isis Khorasan grows 

369
00:14:04,320 --> 00:14:06,610
embolden seeking to expand its ranks 

370
00:14:06,610 --> 00:14:08,832
and inspire , enable and direct attacks 

371
00:14:08,832 --> 00:14:10,832
in the region and beyond . With the 

372
00:14:10,832 --> 00:14:13,054
ultimate goal to strike on the American 

373
00:14:13,054 --> 00:14:14,999
homeland amidst these challenges . 

374
00:14:14,999 --> 00:14:16,777
Strategic competition is deeply 

375
00:14:16,777 --> 00:14:18,888
manifest in the region . The People's 

376
00:14:18,888 --> 00:14:21,110
Republic of China has chosen to compete 

377
00:14:21,110 --> 00:14:23,332
in the region . The PRC is aggressively 

378
00:14:23,332 --> 00:14:25,499
expanding its diplomatic informational 

379
00:14:25,499 --> 00:14:27,610
military and economic outreach across 

380
00:14:27,610 --> 00:14:29,910
the region . China dependent upon the 

381
00:14:29,910 --> 00:14:32,220
region for half of its imported oil is 

382
00:14:32,220 --> 00:14:33,998
also moving beyond energy based 

383
00:14:33,998 --> 00:14:36,220
investments to encompass physical and 

384
00:14:36,220 --> 00:14:38,400
telecommunication infrastructure that 

385
00:14:38,400 --> 00:14:40,678
advances its Belt and Road initiatives . 

386
00:14:40,960 --> 00:14:42,960
Over half the oil . And more than a 

387
00:14:42,960 --> 00:14:45,071
third of all the natural gas imported 

388
00:14:45,071 --> 00:14:46,849
by China is supplied by Centcom 

389
00:14:46,849 --> 00:14:49,016
countries . 19 of 21 Centcom countries 

390
00:14:49,016 --> 00:14:51,182
have signed a Belt and Road initiative 

391
00:14:51,182 --> 00:14:53,410
with China . We are in a race to 

392
00:14:53,420 --> 00:14:55,364
integrate with our partners before 

393
00:14:55,364 --> 00:14:57,531
China can fully penetrate the region . 

394
00:14:57,810 --> 00:15:00,032
Russia looks to expand its influence in 

395
00:15:00,032 --> 00:15:02,199
Syria , seeking permanent basing their 

396
00:15:02,199 --> 00:15:04,199
and undermining our efforts towards 

397
00:15:04,199 --> 00:15:06,366
stability and security in the region . 

398
00:15:06,366 --> 00:15:08,588
The U S Central Command juts up against 

399
00:15:08,588 --> 00:15:10,699
Russia with a border 6.5 times longer 

400
00:15:10,699 --> 00:15:12,699
than the Russian border with NATO . 

401
00:15:12,699 --> 00:15:14,810
Putin seeks to take advantage of this 

402
00:15:14,810 --> 00:15:16,977
proximity with a foothold of influence 

403
00:15:16,977 --> 00:15:18,643
in the Central Asian States , 

404
00:15:18,643 --> 00:15:20,754
leveraging historical relations and a 

405
00:15:20,754 --> 00:15:22,921
perceived decline in U S engagement to 

406
00:15:22,921 --> 00:15:22,890
challenge our influence in that 

407
00:15:22,890 --> 00:15:24,890
critical part of the world with all 

408
00:15:24,890 --> 00:15:26,946
these challenges and opportunities . 

409
00:15:26,946 --> 00:15:29,112
The Centcom region looks to the United 

410
00:15:29,112 --> 00:15:31,168
States for assurances our commitment 

411
00:15:31,168 --> 00:15:33,001
for Centcom . That commitment is 

412
00:15:33,001 --> 00:15:35,057
unwavering in closing . Let me thank 

413
00:15:35,057 --> 00:15:37,057
you for your support to our service 

414
00:15:37,057 --> 00:15:39,112
members . I would also like to thank 

415
00:15:39,112 --> 00:15:38,970
the soldiers , sailors , airmen , 

416
00:15:38,970 --> 00:15:41,192
marines , coast guardsmen and guardians 

417
00:15:41,192 --> 00:15:43,414
who serve and sacrifice and Centcom and 

418
00:15:43,414 --> 00:15:45,637
all those who have done so for the last 

419
00:15:45,637 --> 00:15:47,803
40 years . It is the greatest honor of 

420
00:15:47,803 --> 00:15:49,803
my lifetime to be their commander . 

421
00:15:49,803 --> 00:15:49,620
Thank you . Thank you , General 

422
00:15:49,620 --> 00:15:51,620
Carillon General Langley , please . 

423
00:15:53,520 --> 00:15:56,260
Chairman Reed , ranking member wicker 

424
00:15:56,920 --> 00:15:59,310
distinguished committee members is 

425
00:15:59,310 --> 00:16:01,421
honored to appear before you today to 

426
00:16:01,421 --> 00:16:03,588
testify on the state of affairs of the 

427
00:16:03,588 --> 00:16:05,870
United States Africa command . I'm 

428
00:16:05,870 --> 00:16:08,490
proud to testify along my good friend , 

429
00:16:08,490 --> 00:16:10,850
General Eric Gorilla , the commander of 

430
00:16:10,850 --> 00:16:13,860
the United States Central Command . Now 

431
00:16:13,860 --> 00:16:16,700
I assume command last August . And 

432
00:16:16,700 --> 00:16:20,100
since then , I embarked upon a campaign 

433
00:16:20,100 --> 00:16:23,130
of learning over the last seven months 

434
00:16:23,130 --> 00:16:25,560
to inform our discussion here . Today , 

435
00:16:25,570 --> 00:16:27,681
I undertook this campaign of learning 

436
00:16:27,681 --> 00:16:29,514
to fulfill my commitment to this 

437
00:16:29,514 --> 00:16:31,292
Congress to complete a holistic 

438
00:16:31,292 --> 00:16:34,950
assessment upon confirmation . I made 

439
00:16:34,950 --> 00:16:37,360
that assessment and I will continue it 

440
00:16:37,360 --> 00:16:40,150
throughout my tenure of command Up 

441
00:16:40,150 --> 00:16:42,490
Front . I Wanna Make one Thing Crystal 

442
00:16:42,490 --> 00:16:45,200
Clear . The team of service members and 

443
00:16:45,200 --> 00:16:47,270
civilians at Africom is a talent and 

444
00:16:47,270 --> 00:16:50,430
dedicated body . I am honored to serve 

445
00:16:50,430 --> 00:16:53,460
among them . I'm joined here today by 

446
00:16:53,460 --> 00:16:55,516
my State Department , Foreign policy 

447
00:16:55,516 --> 00:16:57,470
advisor , Mr Phil Nelson , who 

448
00:16:57,470 --> 00:16:59,526
represents the exceptionally skilled 

449
00:16:59,526 --> 00:17:01,700
diplomatic team embedded in our 

450
00:17:01,700 --> 00:17:05,240
headquarters . Our , our entire 

451
00:17:05,240 --> 00:17:09,150
team is laser focus on implementing our 

452
00:17:09,150 --> 00:17:11,610
whole of government approach with our 

453
00:17:11,610 --> 00:17:13,832
partners from the Department of State , 

454
00:17:13,832 --> 00:17:16,550
U S A I D , the Intelligence community 

455
00:17:16,560 --> 00:17:19,250
and other us government organizations . 

456
00:17:19,260 --> 00:17:21,540
We campaign with our allies and 

457
00:17:21,540 --> 00:17:23,780
partners to advance mutual interests 

458
00:17:23,780 --> 00:17:26,500
and to promote stability and prosperity 

459
00:17:26,510 --> 00:17:29,230
on the African continent . You should 

460
00:17:29,230 --> 00:17:31,452
be proud of their efforts . I certainly 

461
00:17:31,452 --> 00:17:35,140
am now . Africa is a vast and 

462
00:17:35,140 --> 00:17:37,570
dynamic continent of sovereign nations 

463
00:17:37,580 --> 00:17:39,691
collectively and individually , these 

464
00:17:39,691 --> 00:17:41,636
nations are increasingly important 

465
00:17:41,636 --> 00:17:44,920
players on the global stage . As such 

466
00:17:44,930 --> 00:17:47,270
Africom contribution to American 

467
00:17:47,280 --> 00:17:50,010
security must be viewed through a 

468
00:17:50,010 --> 00:17:52,850
global lens . Threats once contained on 

469
00:17:52,850 --> 00:17:54,950
the continent of transforming into 

470
00:17:54,950 --> 00:17:58,070
worldwide threats , terrorism , 

471
00:17:58,450 --> 00:18:02,350
poverty , food insecurity , climate 

472
00:18:02,350 --> 00:18:05,790
change and mass migration . Shadow 

473
00:18:05,790 --> 00:18:08,650
African lives . They sowed the seeds 

474
00:18:08,650 --> 00:18:10,372
about an extremist and Russian 

475
00:18:10,372 --> 00:18:12,810
exploitation . The Kremlin's invasion 

476
00:18:12,810 --> 00:18:14,754
of Ukraine has aggravated the food 

477
00:18:14,754 --> 00:18:17,030
insecurity crisis in Africa by blocking 

478
00:18:17,030 --> 00:18:19,070
vital food shipments to the same 

479
00:18:19,070 --> 00:18:21,950
nations that feel the deepest impact of 

480
00:18:21,950 --> 00:18:25,510
climate change . Russia's Wagner 

481
00:18:25,520 --> 00:18:29,190
mercenaries turned chaos into cash . It 

482
00:18:29,190 --> 00:18:31,490
destabilizes entire regions across 

483
00:18:31,490 --> 00:18:33,660
Africa and cuts at the American 

484
00:18:33,660 --> 00:18:36,740
interests worldwide . The expansion of 

485
00:18:36,740 --> 00:18:38,962
the Middle East based violent extremist 

486
00:18:38,962 --> 00:18:40,907
groups such as Isis and Al Qaeda , 

487
00:18:40,907 --> 00:18:43,040
including the biggest franchise . Al 

488
00:18:43,040 --> 00:18:45,470
Shabaab threatens American lives . 

489
00:18:46,570 --> 00:18:48,640
Solutions to these colossal problems 

490
00:18:48,640 --> 00:18:52,250
must be a shared burden . African 

491
00:18:52,250 --> 00:18:54,440
nations need to be at the helm of a 

492
00:18:54,440 --> 00:18:56,329
concerted international effort to 

493
00:18:56,329 --> 00:18:58,300
produce sustainable results , 

494
00:18:58,310 --> 00:19:01,890
sustainable outcomes , assisting 

495
00:19:01,890 --> 00:19:03,834
African nations to achieving their 

496
00:19:03,834 --> 00:19:05,557
goals while advancing American 

497
00:19:05,557 --> 00:19:07,501
interests can only be accomplished 

498
00:19:07,501 --> 00:19:09,360
through a synchronized whole of 

499
00:19:09,360 --> 00:19:11,510
government approach , whole of 

500
00:19:11,510 --> 00:19:14,440
government strategy . We call it the 3D 

501
00:19:14,440 --> 00:19:16,530
approach which is a toolkit of 

502
00:19:16,530 --> 00:19:18,641
diplomacy , development and defense , 

503
00:19:19,220 --> 00:19:22,310
but one tool does not succeed without 

504
00:19:22,310 --> 00:19:25,350
the whole kit . So I will advocate for 

505
00:19:25,350 --> 00:19:27,570
my state department and U S A I D 

506
00:19:27,570 --> 00:19:29,930
partners to receive the resources they 

507
00:19:29,930 --> 00:19:31,600
need to succeed . 

508
00:19:35,290 --> 00:19:37,160
Now , Africa faces many other 

509
00:19:37,160 --> 00:19:39,220
challenges , how we're putting the 

510
00:19:39,220 --> 00:19:41,331
African needs at the forefront of our 

511
00:19:41,331 --> 00:19:43,442
campaign , reinforced by multilateral 

512
00:19:43,442 --> 00:19:45,442
and hold government engagement will 

513
00:19:45,442 --> 00:19:47,580
help Africom and our partners work 

514
00:19:47,580 --> 00:19:50,910
towards a sustainable peace , stability 

515
00:19:51,160 --> 00:19:52,160
and prosperity . 

516
00:19:54,880 --> 00:19:57,480
Chairman Reed , ranking member with 

517
00:19:57,490 --> 00:20:00,780
Waker and distinguished members of this 

518
00:20:00,780 --> 00:20:02,780
committee . Thank you for having me 

519
00:20:02,780 --> 00:20:04,780
here today . I look forward to your 

520
00:20:04,780 --> 00:20:06,669
questions . Thank you very much , 

521
00:20:06,669 --> 00:20:09,070
General Langley . Um General Coral , 

522
00:20:09,070 --> 00:20:11,610
you've rightly emphasized the critical 

523
00:20:11,610 --> 00:20:13,810
importance of leveraging allies and 

524
00:20:13,810 --> 00:20:16,590
partners to counter threats from Iran 

525
00:20:16,600 --> 00:20:19,530
and Iranian linked groups . And does 

526
00:20:19,530 --> 00:20:23,240
our posture change with respect to the 

527
00:20:23,240 --> 00:20:25,410
new agreement between Saudi Arabia and 

528
00:20:25,410 --> 00:20:28,880
Iran and how will impact our allies in 

529
00:20:28,880 --> 00:20:31,770
the region and across the globe ? Thank 

530
00:20:31,770 --> 00:20:33,603
you , Chairman , appreciate that 

531
00:20:33,603 --> 00:20:35,659
question . So this agreement between 

532
00:20:35,659 --> 00:20:37,290
Iran and Saudi Arabia is the 

533
00:20:37,290 --> 00:20:39,346
culmination really of three years of 

534
00:20:39,346 --> 00:20:41,568
discussions that have been going on but 

535
00:20:41,568 --> 00:20:43,790
just recently by , by China and I would 

536
00:20:43,790 --> 00:20:47,260
say an agreement is not implementation 

537
00:20:47,270 --> 00:20:49,510
while these discussions were going on 

538
00:20:49,520 --> 00:20:51,187
in the last 90 days , we have 

539
00:20:51,187 --> 00:20:53,730
interdicted five major weapons 

540
00:20:53,730 --> 00:20:56,050
shipments coming from Iran to Yemen , 

541
00:20:56,450 --> 00:20:58,339
which those weapons are then used 

542
00:20:58,339 --> 00:21:00,339
against Saudi Arabia . One of those 

543
00:21:00,339 --> 00:21:02,117
shipments included components , 

544
00:21:02,117 --> 00:21:04,460
inertial navigation systems for short 

545
00:21:04,460 --> 00:21:07,210
range ballistic missiles . So again , I 

546
00:21:07,210 --> 00:21:08,877
think the implementation is a 

547
00:21:08,877 --> 00:21:11,690
completely different matter on this . 

548
00:21:12,270 --> 00:21:15,320
Will China be held accountable by the 

549
00:21:15,320 --> 00:21:19,300
Saudis if they cannot limit 

550
00:21:19,310 --> 00:21:22,070
attacks against the kingdom and weapon 

551
00:21:22,070 --> 00:21:24,810
transfers as you describe . So I think 

552
00:21:24,810 --> 00:21:27,270
that remains to be seen , Chairman . Um 

553
00:21:27,280 --> 00:21:29,620
what is concerning on this is China's 

554
00:21:29,620 --> 00:21:32,150
penetration into the region In the 

555
00:21:32,160 --> 00:21:34,216
national instruments of power . They 

556
00:21:34,216 --> 00:21:36,160
already have their economic in the 

557
00:21:36,160 --> 00:21:38,104
region , their information , their 

558
00:21:38,104 --> 00:21:40,216
military with an increase in sales of 

559
00:21:40,216 --> 00:21:42,620
at least 80% over the last 10 years in 

560
00:21:42,620 --> 00:21:44,780
terms of their uh foreign military 

561
00:21:44,780 --> 00:21:46,836
sales . And now we're seeing for the 

562
00:21:46,836 --> 00:21:49,002
first time , really their diplomatic . 

563
00:21:49,002 --> 00:21:51,058
Thank you , General Langley . You've 

564
00:21:51,058 --> 00:21:53,280
mentioned President at the Wagner group 

565
00:21:53,280 --> 00:21:56,370
in uh Africa and their 

566
00:21:56,380 --> 00:21:59,720
behavior , which is contrary to 

567
00:21:59,730 --> 00:22:03,640
uh any decency at all in the 

568
00:22:03,640 --> 00:22:04,330
world . 

569
00:22:07,280 --> 00:22:09,600
How are we trying through the 

570
00:22:09,600 --> 00:22:13,170
information domain to expose them and 

571
00:22:13,180 --> 00:22:16,530
what they're doing and also obviously 

572
00:22:16,530 --> 00:22:18,586
expose the Russian government that's 

573
00:22:18,586 --> 00:22:20,641
supporting them and , and sponsoring 

574
00:22:20,641 --> 00:22:24,540
them chairman 

575
00:22:24,540 --> 00:22:26,940
from the male to male perspective in 

576
00:22:26,940 --> 00:22:29,680
engagement with our partners . We do 

577
00:22:29,680 --> 00:22:32,360
use uh information 

578
00:22:32,370 --> 00:22:35,960
operations to affect and address 

579
00:22:35,960 --> 00:22:38,610
the negative sentiment in their message 

580
00:22:38,620 --> 00:22:40,880
that destabilizes the countries in 

581
00:22:40,880 --> 00:22:44,090
which uh they messed themselves and 

582
00:22:44,100 --> 00:22:46,590
especially in Mali , that is very , has 

583
00:22:46,590 --> 00:22:49,230
been very much present that they have 

584
00:22:49,240 --> 00:22:51,480
destabilizing activities . But it's 

585
00:22:51,480 --> 00:22:54,430
been really uh is reinforced by the U N 

586
00:22:54,430 --> 00:22:57,170
force , their uh illuminating and 

587
00:22:57,170 --> 00:22:59,770
amplifying some of the atrocities uh 

588
00:22:59,770 --> 00:23:02,310
that the Wagner group is , is uh guilty 

589
00:23:02,310 --> 00:23:05,330
of . So there in lies the whole of 

590
00:23:05,330 --> 00:23:07,497
government approach since I don't have 

591
00:23:07,497 --> 00:23:10,280
mil to mil uh because of sanctions at 

592
00:23:10,280 --> 00:23:12,447
this point . But we still have a whole 

593
00:23:12,447 --> 00:23:14,613
government approach that can take that 

594
00:23:14,613 --> 00:23:16,336
mantle and still be able to do 

595
00:23:16,336 --> 00:23:18,760
information operations . Thank you . Uh 

596
00:23:18,770 --> 00:23:21,690
General Carella . Uh We spoke about 

597
00:23:21,690 --> 00:23:23,940
China , we also speak about Russia , 

598
00:23:23,950 --> 00:23:27,870
the aid that Iran is giving to 

599
00:23:27,870 --> 00:23:30,300
Russia now in the Ukraine fight and 

600
00:23:30,300 --> 00:23:32,270
what would presumably be the 

601
00:23:32,280 --> 00:23:34,650
reciprocation by the Russians in many 

602
00:23:34,650 --> 00:23:37,210
different ways ? Uh Is another factor 

603
00:23:37,210 --> 00:23:40,260
that has recently emerged . 

604
00:23:40,270 --> 00:23:43,730
Uh What's your response to that ? 

605
00:23:43,740 --> 00:23:47,240
What advice can you give to us and how 

606
00:23:47,240 --> 00:23:50,500
can we limit this uh the impact of this 

607
00:23:50,500 --> 00:23:52,740
arrangement ? Chairman ? Thank you for 

608
00:23:52,740 --> 00:23:54,796
the question on that . So it is very 

609
00:23:54,796 --> 00:23:56,962
concerning any time we see adversaries 

610
00:23:56,962 --> 00:23:59,184
working together , we do know that they 

611
00:23:59,184 --> 00:24:01,690
have shipped hundreds of their advanced 

612
00:24:01,700 --> 00:24:04,180
unmanned aerial vehicles to the Ukraine . 

613
00:24:04,180 --> 00:24:06,291
These are the same ones that have hit 

614
00:24:06,291 --> 00:24:08,513
our service members in both Iraq and in 

615
00:24:08,513 --> 00:24:10,830
Syria . They are improving upon them 

616
00:24:10,830 --> 00:24:12,997
based on what they are learning inside 

617
00:24:12,997 --> 00:24:15,060
the Ukraine . Um I am concerned then 

618
00:24:15,060 --> 00:24:17,171
with the support that Russia can give 

619
00:24:17,171 --> 00:24:19,171
back . As you know , the Iran state 

620
00:24:19,171 --> 00:24:22,130
media announced um the approval of , I 

621
00:24:22,140 --> 00:24:24,196
don't know the exact number yet will 

622
00:24:24,196 --> 00:24:26,418
come out of the agreement , but the S U 

623
00:24:26,418 --> 00:24:28,990
35 with is 1/4 gen plus fighter which 

624
00:24:28,990 --> 00:24:31,212
has a lot of our partners in the region 

625
00:24:31,212 --> 00:24:35,200
concerned as well . Uh And um what 

626
00:24:35,200 --> 00:24:38,250
types of steps are you contemplating or 

627
00:24:38,250 --> 00:24:41,610
we should be contemplating to try to um 

628
00:24:41,620 --> 00:24:45,360
disrupt or diminish this 

629
00:24:45,360 --> 00:24:47,770
threat ? That's emerging uh chairman , 

630
00:24:47,770 --> 00:24:49,659
I think this will take a whole of 

631
00:24:49,659 --> 00:24:51,770
government approach to include all of 

632
00:24:51,770 --> 00:24:53,826
the instruments of national power on 

633
00:24:53,826 --> 00:24:55,937
this to be able to prevent that . And 

634
00:24:55,937 --> 00:24:58,450
uh with respect to the Iranian nuclear 

635
00:24:58,450 --> 00:25:01,580
program , uh they've made significant 

636
00:25:01,590 --> 00:25:04,870
steps since the termination of J C P O 

637
00:25:04,870 --> 00:25:07,440
A . Uh Is there any indication that 

638
00:25:07,440 --> 00:25:10,680
either Russia or China would encourage 

639
00:25:10,680 --> 00:25:12,680
them , sponsor them or on the other 

640
00:25:12,680 --> 00:25:15,310
hand , discourage them from moving 

641
00:25:15,310 --> 00:25:17,421
further . And chairman , I'll be able 

642
00:25:17,421 --> 00:25:19,477
to talk about that in the classified 

643
00:25:19,477 --> 00:25:21,532
session immediately following this . 

644
00:25:21,532 --> 00:25:23,643
Thank you very much , General . Thank 

645
00:25:23,643 --> 00:25:25,810
you both and again , thank the men and 

646
00:25:25,810 --> 00:25:27,977
women and glad to see the master chief 

647
00:25:27,977 --> 00:25:30,190
is here . Uh So you're well supervised 

648
00:25:30,190 --> 00:25:33,210
general gorilla . Thank you very much 

649
00:25:33,220 --> 00:25:35,442
center worker , please . Thank you , Mr 

650
00:25:35,442 --> 00:25:37,331
Chairman . Let's stay with Iran , 

651
00:25:37,331 --> 00:25:39,330
General Kurilla . Um 

652
00:25:40,930 --> 00:25:43,800
You can tell us in a non classified 

653
00:25:43,800 --> 00:25:46,790
setting , can't you whether the threat 

654
00:25:46,800 --> 00:25:50,750
from Iran has grown stronger 

655
00:25:50,760 --> 00:25:54,490
or lesser in the past two years ? 

656
00:25:55,200 --> 00:25:57,422
Um Iran's malign behavior has increased 

657
00:25:57,422 --> 00:25:59,700
in the last two years , Senator ? Okay . 

658
00:25:59,700 --> 00:26:03,700
And uh what do you need from the 

659
00:26:03,710 --> 00:26:06,880
Congress of the United States to meet 

660
00:26:06,890 --> 00:26:09,110
this threat ? So as we look at the 

661
00:26:09,110 --> 00:26:11,110
threat , mainly that we face as the 

662
00:26:11,110 --> 00:26:12,999
ballistic missile and their U A V 

663
00:26:12,999 --> 00:26:15,166
threat in the region , one of the ways 

664
00:26:15,166 --> 00:26:17,332
that we are countering that is through 

665
00:26:17,332 --> 00:26:19,443
regional um agreements and a regional 

666
00:26:19,443 --> 00:26:21,277
architecture as we go towards an 

667
00:26:21,277 --> 00:26:23,388
integrated air and missile defense in 

668
00:26:23,388 --> 00:26:25,554
the region , we are making progress on 

669
00:26:25,554 --> 00:26:27,332
that . Um So what we need is to 

670
00:26:27,332 --> 00:26:29,443
continue to re sourcing and I want to 

671
00:26:29,443 --> 00:26:31,610
make sure that I have a sufficient and 

672
00:26:31,610 --> 00:26:33,940
sustainable um posture in in Centcom so 

673
00:26:33,940 --> 00:26:35,996
that I can accomplish the missions I 

674
00:26:35,996 --> 00:26:38,107
have been given um to make sure I can 

675
00:26:38,107 --> 00:26:40,218
mitigate the risk if there's one area 

676
00:26:40,218 --> 00:26:42,107
in the world , I believe that can 

677
00:26:42,107 --> 00:26:44,273
derail the national defense strategy . 

678
00:26:44,273 --> 00:26:46,496
Is the it is that currently the Centcom 

679
00:26:46,496 --> 00:26:49,610
hor so the resources to help you 

680
00:26:49,610 --> 00:26:52,220
facilitate these agreements , it is the 

681
00:26:52,220 --> 00:26:55,690
resources . Okay . Uh Well , help us be 

682
00:26:55,690 --> 00:26:59,430
specific about that . Now , um after 

683
00:26:59,430 --> 00:27:02,910
the disastrous Afghan um 

684
00:27:02,980 --> 00:27:06,710
withdrawal departments assure this 

685
00:27:06,710 --> 00:27:09,480
committee that countering terrorist 

686
00:27:09,480 --> 00:27:11,702
groups would still be possible over the 

687
00:27:11,702 --> 00:27:13,813
horizon . We've only done that once . 

688
00:27:13,813 --> 00:27:16,430
Is that correct ? Senator ? We actually 

689
00:27:16,430 --> 00:27:19,380
all kinetic , all finishes in the 

690
00:27:19,390 --> 00:27:21,820
methodology of fine fix and finish on 

691
00:27:21,820 --> 00:27:23,931
terror , counterterrorism targets are 

692
00:27:23,931 --> 00:27:26,098
not kinetic . There's two that are non 

693
00:27:26,098 --> 00:27:28,153
kinetic that we disrupted . And I'll 

694
00:27:28,153 --> 00:27:30,264
talk about that in a class classified 

695
00:27:30,264 --> 00:27:32,487
study that involved over five combatant 

696
00:27:32,487 --> 00:27:34,653
commanders to disrupt those finishes . 

697
00:27:35,330 --> 00:27:38,130
Um Okay . So two non kinetic and one 

698
00:27:38,130 --> 00:27:40,640
kinetic . Do you think we should be 

699
00:27:40,640 --> 00:27:42,960
doing more of those ? Um It is 

700
00:27:42,960 --> 00:27:45,071
difficult right now , as I said in my 

701
00:27:45,071 --> 00:27:46,849
confirmation hearing , it is uh 

702
00:27:46,849 --> 00:27:48,960
difficult but not impossible . One of 

703
00:27:48,960 --> 00:27:51,071
the things that we're trying to do is 

704
00:27:51,071 --> 00:27:53,238
increase our intelligence surveillance 

705
00:27:53,238 --> 00:27:55,349
reconnaissance over that with putting 

706
00:27:55,349 --> 00:27:57,293
investment into long duration high 

707
00:27:57,293 --> 00:27:59,404
altitude alternative , airborne I S R 

708
00:27:59,404 --> 00:28:01,293
that can go up for days and weeks 

709
00:28:01,293 --> 00:28:03,404
because right now I'm spending 80% of 

710
00:28:03,404 --> 00:28:05,571
my time transiting um to the region to 

711
00:28:05,571 --> 00:28:07,849
be able to collect over the top . Okay , 

712
00:28:07,849 --> 00:28:11,760
General Langley . Um , tell us what 

713
00:28:11,770 --> 00:28:14,950
China is doing . How far along are they 

714
00:28:14,950 --> 00:28:18,660
on their base in Djibouti ? And 

715
00:28:18,660 --> 00:28:22,200
where do you think they might uh 

716
00:28:22,210 --> 00:28:24,910
likely be making their uh strongest 

717
00:28:24,920 --> 00:28:28,090
effort for a military base in West 

718
00:28:28,090 --> 00:28:28,690
Africa ? 

719
00:28:32,350 --> 00:28:34,572
Thank you , Senator for that question . 

720
00:28:34,572 --> 00:28:38,210
Uh China's aspirations especially at 

721
00:28:38,210 --> 00:28:40,380
door lay . Uh They're , they're , 

722
00:28:40,390 --> 00:28:42,750
they're coming across a thinly veiled 

723
00:28:42,750 --> 00:28:45,480
front that is all for goodwill . But we 

724
00:28:45,480 --> 00:28:47,313
know that they're establishing , 

725
00:28:47,313 --> 00:28:49,147
especially with the destroyer to 

726
00:28:49,147 --> 00:28:52,680
visited . Uh Door Lay last March shows 

727
00:28:52,680 --> 00:28:55,320
that they have indications that tell us , 

728
00:28:55,330 --> 00:28:57,552
tell us where that is . The door lay is 

729
00:28:57,552 --> 00:29:00,870
in Djibouti . I'm sorry . Um um So we 

730
00:29:00,870 --> 00:29:03,440
can remember , uh their aspirations are 

731
00:29:03,440 --> 00:29:06,150
pretty clear . Uh That's a strategic 

732
00:29:06,160 --> 00:29:08,570
line of communication , especially as 

733
00:29:08,570 --> 00:29:12,310
it embarks upon uh the Suez Canal and 

734
00:29:12,310 --> 00:29:15,680
the mandeb , if they wanted to fully 

735
00:29:15,680 --> 00:29:18,840
militarize that door is of 

736
00:29:18,840 --> 00:29:20,850
concern there saying it's all about 

737
00:29:20,850 --> 00:29:24,090
goodwill . But , but I think the other 

738
00:29:24,100 --> 00:29:26,870
um they do have other aspirations and 

739
00:29:26,870 --> 00:29:29,290
in closed session , uh ranking member , 

740
00:29:29,290 --> 00:29:31,401
I know that I can be able to lay that 

741
00:29:31,401 --> 00:29:33,900
out . Where on where in West Africa is 

742
00:29:33,900 --> 00:29:36,011
their next military base aspiration ? 

743
00:29:36,011 --> 00:29:38,340
Okay . But tell us then if you can , I 

744
00:29:38,340 --> 00:29:42,170
think , and I think you can um how that 

745
00:29:42,170 --> 00:29:45,540
would affect our security um 

746
00:29:45,550 --> 00:29:49,240
as Americans and particularly in North 

747
00:29:49,240 --> 00:29:52,080
America . If the Chinese are able to 

748
00:29:52,080 --> 00:29:55,970
establish a base in West Africa , it 

749
00:29:55,970 --> 00:29:57,914
would , it would put uh they would 

750
00:29:57,914 --> 00:29:59,970
change the whole calculus of the geo 

751
00:29:59,970 --> 00:30:03,740
strategic uh global campaign plans of 

752
00:30:03,740 --> 00:30:05,851
protecting the homeland . Uh It would 

753
00:30:05,851 --> 00:30:07,850
shorten their , if they built any 

754
00:30:07,860 --> 00:30:10,540
capacity on the West coast , geo 

755
00:30:10,540 --> 00:30:12,429
strategically will put them at an 

756
00:30:12,429 --> 00:30:14,429
advantage . Right now . We have the 

757
00:30:14,429 --> 00:30:16,540
decisive advantage . They cannot . Uh 

758
00:30:16,540 --> 00:30:18,596
we can't let them have a base on the 

759
00:30:18,596 --> 00:30:20,762
West Coast because it would change the 

760
00:30:20,762 --> 00:30:22,873
dynamics . Thank you . Thank you , Mr 

761
00:30:22,873 --> 00:30:25,040
Chairman . Thank you very much . Thank 

762
00:30:25,040 --> 00:30:26,929
you , Senator Workers , Senator , 

763
00:30:26,929 --> 00:30:29,040
please . Thank you , General Carrillo 

764
00:30:29,040 --> 00:30:31,207
and Langley . Thank you both for being 

765
00:30:31,207 --> 00:30:33,373
here this morning . General Carrillo . 

766
00:30:33,373 --> 00:30:35,373
I want to pick up on a conversation 

767
00:30:35,373 --> 00:30:37,540
that we had um when we met a couple of 

768
00:30:37,540 --> 00:30:39,373
weeks ago and I appreciated that 

769
00:30:39,373 --> 00:30:41,540
opportunity . But one of the things we 

770
00:30:41,540 --> 00:30:43,651
talked about was the situation in the 

771
00:30:43,651 --> 00:30:45,818
Isis detainee camps in Syria . And can 

772
00:30:45,818 --> 00:30:47,707
you give us an update on what the 

773
00:30:47,707 --> 00:30:49,873
current conditions are and what you're 

774
00:30:49,873 --> 00:30:52,240
doing in Centcom to help stabilize 

775
00:30:52,260 --> 00:30:54,260
what's happening there and what you 

776
00:30:54,260 --> 00:30:56,660
need from us in order to , for us to be 

777
00:30:56,660 --> 00:30:58,940
more successful there . Thanks Senator . 

778
00:30:58,940 --> 00:31:01,670
So I've been to Syria six times . Um I 

779
00:31:01,670 --> 00:31:04,510
was in Syria last week . Um So as we 

780
00:31:04,510 --> 00:31:07,470
look at Isis in Syria , um it is three 

781
00:31:07,470 --> 00:31:09,692
categories . The first category is Isis 

782
00:31:09,692 --> 00:31:11,859
at large . That is the ones that we're 

783
00:31:11,859 --> 00:31:13,803
fighting right now with our Syrian 

784
00:31:13,803 --> 00:31:13,760
Democratic partners . And I think we 

785
00:31:13,760 --> 00:31:16,590
have contained ISIS , but the ideology 

786
00:31:16,590 --> 00:31:19,340
is uncontained and unconstrained . The 

787
00:31:19,340 --> 00:31:21,562
second category is what you referred to 

788
00:31:21,562 --> 00:31:23,770
as the ISIS in detention . I refer to 

789
00:31:23,770 --> 00:31:25,770
them as an ISIS Army in detention . 

790
00:31:25,770 --> 00:31:28,510
There were over 10,000 ISIS detainees 

791
00:31:28,510 --> 00:31:31,390
spread across 26 different prisons in 

792
00:31:31,390 --> 00:31:33,870
northeast Syria . I went inside the 

793
00:31:33,870 --> 00:31:36,360
Hasakah prison last Thursday . That is 

794
00:31:36,360 --> 00:31:39,660
the same prison that January of 22 last 

795
00:31:39,660 --> 00:31:42,770
year . Um There was 4400 ISIS detainees 

796
00:31:42,770 --> 00:31:45,350
in there . Um They broke out over 1000 

797
00:31:45,350 --> 00:31:47,640
made it outside the walls . And in a 10 

798
00:31:47,640 --> 00:31:49,751
day battle that involved both our U S 

799
00:31:49,751 --> 00:31:51,450
forces , Air Power and Syrian 

800
00:31:51,450 --> 00:31:53,339
Democratic Forces . Over 400 were 

801
00:31:53,339 --> 00:31:55,330
killed , some escaped , the exact 

802
00:31:55,330 --> 00:31:57,900
number unknown . Um And then the rest 

803
00:31:57,900 --> 00:32:00,560
were captured , but 121 of our SDF 

804
00:32:00,560 --> 00:32:02,610
partners were killed in that prison 

805
00:32:02,610 --> 00:32:04,730
breakout . Um What we are doing 

806
00:32:04,730 --> 00:32:06,563
specifically about the detention 

807
00:32:06,563 --> 00:32:08,286
facilities is we are trying to 

808
00:32:08,286 --> 00:32:10,508
consolidate them . Now , this this body 

809
00:32:10,508 --> 00:32:12,341
provided funding for us to build 

810
00:32:12,341 --> 00:32:14,008
another prison which we think 

811
00:32:14,008 --> 00:32:16,063
consolidate the vast majority of the 

812
00:32:16,063 --> 00:32:18,174
rest of the prisoners . We also train 

813
00:32:18,174 --> 00:32:19,952
the guards um that are on these 

814
00:32:19,952 --> 00:32:22,119
detention facilities and the CTF funds 

815
00:32:22,119 --> 00:32:24,660
help facilitate that . And lastly that 

816
00:32:24,660 --> 00:32:27,240
the last category is uh the potential 

817
00:32:27,240 --> 00:32:29,300
next generation of ISIS . I had an 

818
00:32:29,300 --> 00:32:31,710
opportunity to go into the Al rose camp 

819
00:32:31,720 --> 00:32:34,620
and into alcohol inside and talk to 

820
00:32:34,620 --> 00:32:37,810
residents . I met um I talked to uh 

821
00:32:37,820 --> 00:32:40,190
women from 16 different countries . Um 

822
00:32:40,190 --> 00:32:42,310
last week inside the camp to include 

823
00:32:42,310 --> 00:32:44,670
the woman from Alabama . Um And then I 

824
00:32:44,670 --> 00:32:46,837
also went inside the Al Hol camp and I 

825
00:32:46,837 --> 00:32:49,003
met three teenagers who had been there 

826
00:32:49,003 --> 00:32:50,892
for six years . And remember Isis 

827
00:32:50,892 --> 00:32:53,290
really didn't come to Al Hol until 

828
00:32:53,300 --> 00:32:55,690
about late 2018 . These were people 

829
00:32:55,690 --> 00:32:57,634
that went there to escape Isis and 

830
00:32:57,634 --> 00:32:59,801
escaped the regime . And then with the 

831
00:32:59,801 --> 00:33:02,890
fall of Isis territorial Calif um in 

832
00:33:02,900 --> 00:33:05,080
really March of 2019 , it swelled from 

833
00:33:05,080 --> 00:33:08,110
about 35,000 to 70,000 . And currently 

834
00:33:08,110 --> 00:33:11,190
right now , there's about 51,000 Inside 

835
00:33:11,190 --> 00:33:13,890
of alcohol . Over 30,000 of them are 

836
00:33:13,890 --> 00:33:16,720
Children and they're at risk from uh 

837
00:33:16,730 --> 00:33:19,530
radicalization . About 50% of the camp 

838
00:33:19,530 --> 00:33:21,641
holds some of the spouses , some form 

839
00:33:21,641 --> 00:33:23,530
of ideology according to the camp 

840
00:33:23,530 --> 00:33:25,586
guards , the camp administrators and 

841
00:33:25,586 --> 00:33:27,641
the residents and the other half are 

842
00:33:27,641 --> 00:33:29,863
trying to escape ISIS really the only , 

843
00:33:29,863 --> 00:33:31,974
the only role there is that we can do 

844
00:33:31,974 --> 00:33:31,730
is there's no military solution . It's 

845
00:33:31,730 --> 00:33:34,640
the repatriation , rehabilitation and 

846
00:33:34,640 --> 00:33:36,751
reintegration back into the society . 

847
00:33:36,751 --> 00:33:38,973
And are we having any luck getting some 

848
00:33:38,973 --> 00:33:41,029
of the countries to repatriate those 

849
00:33:41,029 --> 00:33:43,362
detainees who came from their countries ? 

850
00:33:43,362 --> 00:33:45,529
Absolutely , ma'am . So we've actually 

851
00:33:45,529 --> 00:33:47,418
had more success in the first two 

852
00:33:47,418 --> 00:33:47,040
months of this year than the last six 

853
00:33:47,040 --> 00:33:49,460
months of last year . About half of 

854
00:33:49,460 --> 00:33:52,820
those um I D P s that are in Al Hol are 

855
00:33:52,820 --> 00:33:54,980
from Iraq and we work with our Iraqi 

856
00:33:54,980 --> 00:33:56,702
security partners in the Iraqi 

857
00:33:56,702 --> 00:33:58,924
government to repatriate them . They've 

858
00:33:58,924 --> 00:34:01,036
done 1200 in the last two months . At 

859
00:34:01,036 --> 00:34:02,980
that pace , it would be about four 

860
00:34:02,980 --> 00:34:05,147
years to get everybody back . So we're 

861
00:34:05,147 --> 00:34:07,036
working with them on how they can 

862
00:34:07,036 --> 00:34:09,258
increase the throughput . But right now 

863
00:34:09,258 --> 00:34:11,313
it's their ability to go through the 

864
00:34:11,313 --> 00:34:11,120
Jeddah one camp , which is south of 

865
00:34:11,120 --> 00:34:13,176
Mosul as they bring them back . What 

866
00:34:13,176 --> 00:34:15,342
they don't want to do is just move one 

867
00:34:15,342 --> 00:34:17,398
I DP camp to another . So there were 

868
00:34:17,398 --> 00:34:19,453
working through that process . Thank 

869
00:34:19,453 --> 00:34:21,564
you . Well , I hope you will let this 

870
00:34:21,564 --> 00:34:23,731
committee know if there are additional 

871
00:34:23,731 --> 00:34:25,787
resources or other supports that you 

872
00:34:25,787 --> 00:34:27,953
need . Um General Langley , the map of 

873
00:34:27,953 --> 00:34:30,570
Africa shows where the Wagner group is 

874
00:34:30,580 --> 00:34:34,060
operating but it doesn't speak to the 

875
00:34:34,060 --> 00:34:36,870
success or not that they're having with 

876
00:34:36,870 --> 00:34:38,981
recruitment . Can you speak to that ? 

877
00:34:38,981 --> 00:34:41,840
And , and maybe um Senator Reid ask 

878
00:34:41,840 --> 00:34:45,160
about the success of information or 

879
00:34:45,160 --> 00:34:47,860
disinformation efforts that they have 

880
00:34:47,860 --> 00:34:50,082
underway . Can you also talk about what 

881
00:34:50,082 --> 00:34:52,082
we're doing to respond to that in a 

882
00:34:52,082 --> 00:34:55,270
little more detail . Senator 1st and 

883
00:34:55,270 --> 00:34:59,020
foremost , let me talk about Wagner's 

884
00:34:59,020 --> 00:35:02,770
intentions . They're all about power 

885
00:35:02,770 --> 00:35:06,190
and profit . If they're going to give a 

886
00:35:06,200 --> 00:35:09,280
false offering of security , it's only 

887
00:35:09,280 --> 00:35:11,558
for the elites in a particular country . 

888
00:35:11,558 --> 00:35:15,270
We're seeing that in Mali Bargainer 

889
00:35:15,270 --> 00:35:18,740
failed in Mozambique , they tried to 

890
00:35:18,740 --> 00:35:20,690
entrance upon him and uh that 

891
00:35:20,690 --> 00:35:24,140
government albeit developing uh did not 

892
00:35:24,140 --> 00:35:26,140
like that false value proposition . 

893
00:35:26,720 --> 00:35:29,350
They have continuing actions in uh in 

894
00:35:29,350 --> 00:35:31,628
the car , the Central African Republic . 

895
00:35:31,628 --> 00:35:34,510
Uh and that , well , in that , in that 

896
00:35:34,510 --> 00:35:37,160
vein , I think uh central African 

897
00:35:37,160 --> 00:35:39,382
Republic is kind of getting fed up . So 

898
00:35:39,382 --> 00:35:41,660
there is no recruiting going on . It's 

899
00:35:41,670 --> 00:35:44,380
all about profit making their way to 

900
00:35:44,380 --> 00:35:46,880
gold mines , diamond mines or rare 

901
00:35:46,890 --> 00:35:50,480
mineral mines . That's extension of the 

902
00:35:50,480 --> 00:35:53,780
Russian Federation . Thank you . I will 

903
00:35:53,790 --> 00:35:56,012
submit a question for the record on the 

904
00:35:56,012 --> 00:35:59,290
disinformation efforts . Thank you , 

905
00:35:59,290 --> 00:36:01,457
Santa Shane , Senate Fisher , please . 

906
00:36:01,457 --> 00:36:03,457
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you 

907
00:36:03,457 --> 00:36:05,679
both for being here today and thank you 

908
00:36:05,679 --> 00:36:07,568
for your service to our country . 

909
00:36:07,568 --> 00:36:10,720
General Carola . Um How long would it 

910
00:36:10,720 --> 00:36:12,930
take ? ISIS came to generate the 

911
00:36:12,930 --> 00:36:15,380
capability to conduct external 

912
00:36:15,380 --> 00:36:19,190
operations specifically ? Isis 

913
00:36:19,190 --> 00:36:22,480
coarsen Senator . Um It is my 

914
00:36:22,480 --> 00:36:24,950
commanders estimate that they can do an 

915
00:36:24,950 --> 00:36:26,890
external operation against us or 

916
00:36:26,890 --> 00:36:30,660
western interests um abroad in under 

917
00:36:30,660 --> 00:36:32,960
six months with little to no warning . 

918
00:36:32,970 --> 00:36:35,081
I'll in a classified session . I will 

919
00:36:35,081 --> 00:36:37,303
talk about why I make that assessment . 

920
00:36:37,303 --> 00:36:39,414
It is much harder for them to be able 

921
00:36:39,414 --> 00:36:41,303
to do that against the homeland . 

922
00:36:42,050 --> 00:36:44,540
Senator Wicker talked to you quite a 

923
00:36:44,540 --> 00:36:46,930
bit about over the horizon in our 

924
00:36:46,930 --> 00:36:50,060
capabilities that we have uh 

925
00:36:50,070 --> 00:36:53,460
there or don't have there in 

926
00:36:53,460 --> 00:36:57,410
Afghanistan . Uh Do you , do you think 

927
00:36:57,410 --> 00:37:00,440
that you need any additional resources 

928
00:37:00,450 --> 00:37:03,980
in our upcoming budget to 

929
00:37:03,980 --> 00:37:06,420
increase or improve those capabilities ? 

930
00:37:06,430 --> 00:37:08,890
So we have been funded like I said for 

931
00:37:08,890 --> 00:37:10,946
some alternative airborne I S R that 

932
00:37:10,946 --> 00:37:13,112
will help us get longer duration . But 

933
00:37:13,112 --> 00:37:15,840
it's not just about um I S R , we're 

934
00:37:15,840 --> 00:37:18,007
also increasing our other intelligence 

935
00:37:18,007 --> 00:37:20,007
efforts to get penetration into the 

936
00:37:20,007 --> 00:37:22,420
networks that we want . Um a part that 

937
00:37:22,420 --> 00:37:24,420
goes unseen . A lot of times is the 

938
00:37:24,420 --> 00:37:26,620
analytical backside . These are the 

939
00:37:26,630 --> 00:37:28,408
analysts , the linguist and the 

940
00:37:28,408 --> 00:37:30,770
production capability that help us make 

941
00:37:30,770 --> 00:37:32,826
the decisions . And there has been a 

942
00:37:32,826 --> 00:37:35,048
significant decrease shifted from the N 

943
00:37:35,048 --> 00:37:36,937
D s to go against higher priority 

944
00:37:36,937 --> 00:37:39,103
targets . But I would like to see , to 

945
00:37:39,103 --> 00:37:41,326
make sure that we don't lose so much of 

946
00:37:41,326 --> 00:37:41,250
that capability that we cannot see the 

947
00:37:41,250 --> 00:37:44,610
threat because knowing that threat is 

948
00:37:44,610 --> 00:37:47,390
obviously very important . Um as you , 

949
00:37:47,390 --> 00:37:51,330
as you stated , for the , the 

950
00:37:51,330 --> 00:37:54,280
existence that we still see in , in 

951
00:37:54,280 --> 00:37:56,870
Afghanistan of the terrorist groups 

952
00:37:56,870 --> 00:38:00,710
that are there ? Thank you . Um 

953
00:38:00,720 --> 00:38:04,460
Have you requested authority to conduct 

954
00:38:04,470 --> 00:38:07,600
any strikes in Afghanistan against the 

955
00:38:07,610 --> 00:38:11,090
um ISIS K targets that , that have been 

956
00:38:11,090 --> 00:38:14,700
identified ? So , in a classified study , 

957
00:38:14,700 --> 00:38:16,811
ma'am , I can talk about where we are 

958
00:38:16,811 --> 00:38:18,978
in terms of the fine fix and finish on 

959
00:38:18,978 --> 00:38:21,144
them . Okay . Do you still have a need 

960
00:38:21,144 --> 00:38:23,144
for munitions that can hit hard and 

961
00:38:23,144 --> 00:38:25,311
deeply buried targets ? I do , ma'am . 

962
00:38:25,690 --> 00:38:28,170
Um Do you have specific requests in 

963
00:38:28,170 --> 00:38:30,660
that area that was in my unfunded 

964
00:38:30,660 --> 00:38:32,771
priority list last year ? Do you plan 

965
00:38:32,771 --> 00:38:35,390
to include it this year ? It depends on 

966
00:38:35,390 --> 00:38:38,910
the , the full funding ma'am . Would it 

967
00:38:38,910 --> 00:38:41,610
be your recommendation in your best 

968
00:38:41,610 --> 00:38:43,777
military advice to this committee that 

969
00:38:43,777 --> 00:38:46,054
it would be that it should be included . 

970
00:38:46,054 --> 00:38:49,460
So we , we did receive funding um for 

971
00:38:49,470 --> 00:38:52,680
in my fy 23 to include the additional 

972
00:38:52,680 --> 00:38:54,990
procurement of the , it's the massive 

973
00:38:54,990 --> 00:38:57,046
ordinated ordinance penetrator which 

974
00:38:57,046 --> 00:38:59,046
goes against hard and deeply buried 

975
00:38:59,046 --> 00:39:02,020
targets which are growing in number 

976
00:39:02,030 --> 00:39:04,308
with our adversaries . Is that correct ? 

977
00:39:04,308 --> 00:39:07,330
That is correct , ma'am . What's uh 

978
00:39:07,340 --> 00:39:09,840
what's your assessment of Iran and 

979
00:39:09,840 --> 00:39:12,440
Saudi Arabia reestablishing diplomatic 

980
00:39:12,440 --> 00:39:14,551
ties ? You talked about that a little 

981
00:39:14,551 --> 00:39:17,370
bit , but how does that affect our mil 

982
00:39:17,370 --> 00:39:19,630
to mil relationships that we have with 

983
00:39:19,630 --> 00:39:22,690
Saudi Arabia ? We have very strong mil 

984
00:39:22,690 --> 00:39:24,960
to mil relationship with Saudi Arabia . 

985
00:39:24,970 --> 00:39:28,860
Um I think this agreement is um again , 

986
00:39:28,860 --> 00:39:30,804
is a , is the culmination of three 

987
00:39:30,804 --> 00:39:32,971
years of talks between them . The more 

988
00:39:32,971 --> 00:39:35,027
concerning part is that China is the 

989
00:39:35,027 --> 00:39:37,810
one that was mediating this as we , as 

990
00:39:37,810 --> 00:39:40,720
we look at Iran and their proxies 

991
00:39:40,730 --> 00:39:44,510
throughout set com A A O R . 

992
00:39:45,460 --> 00:39:48,270
Do they continue to pose a significant 

993
00:39:48,270 --> 00:39:50,900
threat to our partners and to our own 

994
00:39:50,900 --> 00:39:52,956
forces in the region ? And what more 

995
00:39:52,956 --> 00:39:56,360
can be done to deter Iran from those 

996
00:39:56,360 --> 00:39:58,800
malign activities ? So we see Iran as 

997
00:39:58,800 --> 00:40:01,078
the largest malign actor in the region . 

998
00:40:01,090 --> 00:40:03,830
Less than 60 hours ago , we had rockets 

999
00:40:03,830 --> 00:40:05,941
attacked from Iranian aligned militia 

1000
00:40:05,941 --> 00:40:08,274
group against one of our bases in Syria . 

1001
00:40:08,380 --> 00:40:10,830
What more can be done ? So , one of the 

1002
00:40:10,830 --> 00:40:12,997
things that we are doing is increasing 

1003
00:40:12,997 --> 00:40:15,163
our defensive posture in these areas . 

1004
00:40:15,163 --> 00:40:16,997
And I want to thank the services 

1005
00:40:16,997 --> 00:40:18,608
providing um capability . So 

1006
00:40:18,608 --> 00:40:20,830
particularly the army has given us some 

1007
00:40:20,830 --> 00:40:22,719
tremendous capability in terms of 

1008
00:40:22,719 --> 00:40:24,663
counter us um and encounter rocket 

1009
00:40:24,663 --> 00:40:28,440
mortar at our bases forward with 

1010
00:40:28,440 --> 00:40:31,040
Syria and Iraq . What do you assess to 

1011
00:40:31,040 --> 00:40:33,220
be the situation in Syria right now ? 

1012
00:40:33,220 --> 00:40:37,000
And have you , have you seen any change 

1013
00:40:37,000 --> 00:40:40,420
in Russia's present presence in , in 

1014
00:40:40,420 --> 00:40:44,010
Syria or has that remain 

1015
00:40:44,020 --> 00:40:47,800
pretty steady since their invasion of 

1016
00:40:47,810 --> 00:40:50,320
Ukraine ? So Senator Syria is very 

1017
00:40:50,320 --> 00:40:52,431
important to Russia . They have taken 

1018
00:40:52,431 --> 00:40:54,542
very little out of Russia since their 

1019
00:40:54,542 --> 00:40:56,764
invasion . They've taken a small number 

1020
00:40:56,764 --> 00:40:58,487
of forces , some munitions but 

1021
00:40:58,487 --> 00:41:00,598
generally has stayed about the same . 

1022
00:41:00,598 --> 00:41:02,376
What we are seeing though is an 

1023
00:41:02,376 --> 00:41:04,598
increase recently in the unprofessional 

1024
00:41:04,598 --> 00:41:06,764
and unsafe behavior of the Russian Air 

1025
00:41:06,764 --> 00:41:08,931
Force in the , in the region . Can you 

1026
00:41:08,931 --> 00:41:11,660
give us an example of that here ? I can 

1027
00:41:11,660 --> 00:41:15,130
so they , they fly over our bases um 

1028
00:41:15,140 --> 00:41:17,890
with ground attack aircraft with , with 

1029
00:41:17,890 --> 00:41:20,310
weapons on them um , in an attempt to 

1030
00:41:20,310 --> 00:41:22,510
try and be provocative , but really 

1031
00:41:22,510 --> 00:41:24,732
it's unsafe , unprofessional , not what 

1032
00:41:24,732 --> 00:41:26,954
we expect of a professional air force . 

1033
00:41:26,954 --> 00:41:29,010
They want to try and renegotiate the 

1034
00:41:29,010 --> 00:41:30,899
deconfliction protocols that they 

1035
00:41:30,899 --> 00:41:33,066
violate every day . This is not , this 

1036
00:41:33,066 --> 00:41:35,399
is not new Russian behavior , is it sir ? 

1037
00:41:35,399 --> 00:41:37,720
Especially with regard to the drone 

1038
00:41:37,720 --> 00:41:39,900
incident that we recently have seen . 

1039
00:41:39,910 --> 00:41:41,799
It's not new , but we have seen a 

1040
00:41:41,799 --> 00:41:44,170
significant spike since about one march 

1041
00:41:44,180 --> 00:41:46,720
in Syria . Okay . Thank you . Thank you , 

1042
00:41:46,720 --> 00:41:49,140
ma'am . Thank you Senator Fischer , are 

1043
00:41:49,140 --> 00:41:51,473
Senator Gillibrand , please ? Thank you , 

1044
00:41:51,473 --> 00:41:53,418
Mr Chairman . I'd like to continue 

1045
00:41:53,418 --> 00:41:55,640
Senator Fisher's line of questions with 

1046
00:41:55,640 --> 00:41:57,862
regard to Iran . Um If this was a three 

1047
00:41:57,862 --> 00:42:00,010
year of talks , how recent was China 

1048
00:42:00,010 --> 00:42:03,210
engaged in those talks ? My 

1049
00:42:03,210 --> 00:42:05,266
understanding is in the last several 

1050
00:42:05,266 --> 00:42:07,377
months . Well , obviously that raises 

1051
00:42:07,377 --> 00:42:10,160
serious concerns because um I just took , 

1052
00:42:10,170 --> 00:42:13,810
I just joined a delegation to visit the 

1053
00:42:13,820 --> 00:42:15,800
Abraham Accords countries and the 

1054
00:42:15,800 --> 00:42:17,911
interest of those countries . U A E , 

1055
00:42:17,911 --> 00:42:20,660
Bahrain Morocco and Israel is to 

1056
00:42:20,660 --> 00:42:22,604
broaden and strengthen the Abraham 

1057
00:42:22,604 --> 00:42:24,850
Accords and they were hopeful that they 

1058
00:42:24,850 --> 00:42:27,470
could engage Saudi Arabia in that 

1059
00:42:27,470 --> 00:42:30,800
context . Um This seems to me that that 

1060
00:42:30,800 --> 00:42:32,911
would make that extremely problematic 

1061
00:42:32,911 --> 00:42:35,770
because if China is involved , um it 

1062
00:42:35,770 --> 00:42:38,290
would be very difficult to have um the 

1063
00:42:38,290 --> 00:42:40,880
kind of technology uh shared in the 

1064
00:42:40,880 --> 00:42:42,824
Abraham Accords if they are now in 

1065
00:42:42,824 --> 00:42:45,470
alliance with China . And second , if 

1066
00:42:45,470 --> 00:42:48,530
they are in an alliance with Iran , the 

1067
00:42:48,530 --> 00:42:50,690
whole point of the Abraham Accords is 

1068
00:42:50,690 --> 00:42:53,780
to counter Iran's malign threats . So 

1069
00:42:53,780 --> 00:42:55,800
does this make the possibility of 

1070
00:42:55,800 --> 00:42:57,744
extending or expanding the Abraham 

1071
00:42:57,744 --> 00:43:00,190
Accords impossible ? And what do you 

1072
00:43:00,200 --> 00:43:02,760
recommend that this committee due to 

1073
00:43:02,760 --> 00:43:05,120
focus on how we create more regional 

1074
00:43:05,130 --> 00:43:07,620
alliances ? So , so ma'am , I , I 

1075
00:43:07,620 --> 00:43:09,509
believe this is a the talks about 

1076
00:43:09,509 --> 00:43:11,676
opening diplomatic relations . So much 

1077
00:43:11,676 --> 00:43:13,620
of this is not an alliance between 

1078
00:43:13,620 --> 00:43:15,676
Saudi Arabia and Iran . Um they have 

1079
00:43:15,676 --> 00:43:17,731
had diplomatic relations in the past 

1080
00:43:17,731 --> 00:43:19,898
while they were still shooting at each 

1081
00:43:19,898 --> 00:43:19,180
other in the past . So this is really 

1082
00:43:19,180 --> 00:43:21,560
about opening embassies and opening 

1083
00:43:21,560 --> 00:43:23,671
diplomatic relations when they closed 

1084
00:43:23,671 --> 00:43:27,000
the embassies back in 2016 . Um What , 

1085
00:43:27,000 --> 00:43:29,111
what this does do though is that with 

1086
00:43:29,111 --> 00:43:31,111
China that the most concerning part 

1087
00:43:31,111 --> 00:43:33,111
about this is that China is the one 

1088
00:43:33,111 --> 00:43:35,167
brokering this because it shows that 

1089
00:43:35,167 --> 00:43:37,389
they are bringing the diplomatic aspect 

1090
00:43:37,389 --> 00:43:37,340
of their national instruments of power . 

1091
00:43:37,340 --> 00:43:39,380
And what we see with China on the 

1092
00:43:39,380 --> 00:43:41,269
military side is that they have a 

1093
00:43:41,269 --> 00:43:43,500
significant increase in bringing their 

1094
00:43:43,500 --> 00:43:45,500
equipment into the region and their 

1095
00:43:45,500 --> 00:43:47,611
their foreign military sales . And if 

1096
00:43:47,611 --> 00:43:49,667
there's Chinese equipment there , we 

1097
00:43:49,667 --> 00:43:51,833
can not integrated with us equipment . 

1098
00:43:51,833 --> 00:43:54,056
And so as we try and build the regional 

1099
00:43:54,056 --> 00:43:56,167
partnerships and we've been there for 

1100
00:43:56,167 --> 00:43:58,389
the last 75 years when we try and build 

1101
00:43:58,389 --> 00:43:58,360
these regional partnerships , you want 

1102
00:43:58,360 --> 00:44:00,250
to be able to integrate with your 

1103
00:44:00,250 --> 00:44:02,083
partner . And if there's Chinese 

1104
00:44:02,083 --> 00:44:04,194
equipment there , we are not going to 

1105
00:44:04,194 --> 00:44:06,361
be able to integrate it . Understood . 

1106
00:44:06,361 --> 00:44:06,150
Can you in this setting , give us more 

1107
00:44:06,150 --> 00:44:08,330
detail on where China has integrated 

1108
00:44:08,330 --> 00:44:10,950
its equipment in the region . China has 

1109
00:44:10,960 --> 00:44:12,904
sold equipment all over the region 

1110
00:44:13,290 --> 00:44:15,346
inside the Middle East and I can , I 

1111
00:44:15,346 --> 00:44:17,457
can take that for the record and give 

1112
00:44:17,457 --> 00:44:19,457
you a specific follow up for that , 

1113
00:44:19,457 --> 00:44:21,623
ma'am . And then do you have a focused 

1114
00:44:21,623 --> 00:44:23,790
plan on what to do about that ? So one 

1115
00:44:23,790 --> 00:44:25,957
of this is to increase our partnership 

1116
00:44:25,957 --> 00:44:25,600
with these elements . So again , this , 

1117
00:44:25,820 --> 00:44:27,764
this is a race to integrate before 

1118
00:44:27,764 --> 00:44:29,730
China can penetrate and would you 

1119
00:44:29,730 --> 00:44:31,841
recommend expanding and deepening the 

1120
00:44:31,841 --> 00:44:33,952
Abraham Accords ? I would ma'am thank 

1121
00:44:33,952 --> 00:44:37,450
you um with regard to Afghanistan . 

1122
00:44:37,460 --> 00:44:39,930
Um I'd like an update on what we are 

1123
00:44:39,930 --> 00:44:42,220
doing to get our partners out and 

1124
00:44:42,220 --> 00:44:45,050
whether those operations are continuing . 

1125
00:44:45,060 --> 00:44:48,230
Um And what are the barriers that 

1126
00:44:48,230 --> 00:44:50,330
you're facing currently ? So , ma'am 

1127
00:44:50,330 --> 00:44:52,163
the getting the partners out the 

1128
00:44:52,163 --> 00:44:54,219
special immigrant visas um that is a 

1129
00:44:54,219 --> 00:44:56,441
state department run program , but from 

1130
00:44:56,441 --> 00:44:58,552
the U S , from the military side , um 

1131
00:44:58,552 --> 00:45:00,608
we are responsible for bringing them 

1132
00:45:00,608 --> 00:45:02,774
into a place called campus Sayliyah in 

1133
00:45:02,774 --> 00:45:05,130
Qatar . We currently have about 2600 

1134
00:45:05,130 --> 00:45:07,440
there . Right now . We provide the in 

1135
00:45:07,440 --> 00:45:09,551
processing the security and the basic 

1136
00:45:09,551 --> 00:45:11,670
life support . The state department 

1137
00:45:11,670 --> 00:45:14,410
runs the actual immigrant visa side . 

1138
00:45:14,420 --> 00:45:16,960
They're averaging about 60 days there 

1139
00:45:16,970 --> 00:45:19,270
before they are moved on . And my 

1140
00:45:19,270 --> 00:45:21,492
understanding right now in the pipeline 

1141
00:45:21,492 --> 00:45:23,830
is about 85,000 special immigrant visas , 

1142
00:45:23,830 --> 00:45:25,552
but I would defer to the State 

1143
00:45:25,552 --> 00:45:27,552
Department on the exact number . Um 

1144
00:45:27,552 --> 00:45:30,250
Again , with regard to Iran , we know 

1145
00:45:30,250 --> 00:45:32,250
that Russia and Iran have escalated 

1146
00:45:32,250 --> 00:45:34,250
their military cooperation over the 

1147
00:45:34,250 --> 00:45:36,472
last year . How is Centcom coordinating 

1148
00:45:36,472 --> 00:45:38,417
with you ? Calm to ensure that our 

1149
00:45:38,417 --> 00:45:40,528
forces are able to respond to threats 

1150
00:45:40,528 --> 00:45:42,028
that touched both areas of 

1151
00:45:42,028 --> 00:45:44,250
responsibilities . So I talked to Chris 

1152
00:45:44,250 --> 00:45:45,972
casually often the , the Eucom 

1153
00:45:45,972 --> 00:45:48,194
commander in the sack year . Um We have 

1154
00:45:48,194 --> 00:45:50,417
done several operations that I can talk 

1155
00:45:50,417 --> 00:45:52,639
about in a classified setting to create 

1156
00:45:52,639 --> 00:45:54,694
additional dilemmas for Russia . And 

1157
00:45:54,694 --> 00:45:56,750
then my last question for you sir is 

1158
00:45:56,750 --> 00:45:58,639
you activated the U S Space Force 

1159
00:45:58,639 --> 00:46:00,806
Central which is responsible for space 

1160
00:46:00,806 --> 00:46:02,917
operations within the Centcom area of 

1161
00:46:02,917 --> 00:46:04,528
responsibility . How are you 

1162
00:46:04,528 --> 00:46:06,528
incorporating the Space Domain into 

1163
00:46:06,528 --> 00:46:08,472
planning and training so that your 

1164
00:46:08,472 --> 00:46:10,639
subordinate commanders can effectively 

1165
00:46:10,639 --> 00:46:12,861
integrate space into their operations ? 

1166
00:46:12,861 --> 00:46:15,083
We we think this is a very big positive 

1167
00:46:15,083 --> 00:46:17,306
of actually having a component of Space 

1168
00:46:17,306 --> 00:46:19,528
Force . Space has always played a large 

1169
00:46:19,528 --> 00:46:21,694
role in the Centcom A R but now I have 

1170
00:46:21,694 --> 00:46:23,917
a commander that sits at the table that 

1171
00:46:23,917 --> 00:46:25,639
is able to then integrate more 

1172
00:46:25,639 --> 00:46:27,861
effectively because he has a , he has a 

1173
00:46:27,861 --> 00:46:30,194
seat at the table to be able to do that . 

1174
00:46:30,194 --> 00:46:32,417
And he actually just finished a a large 

1175
00:46:32,417 --> 00:46:32,150
with all the combatant commands in the 

1176
00:46:32,150 --> 00:46:34,317
region to talk about the lessons we've 

1177
00:46:34,317 --> 00:46:36,261
learned over the last , you know , 

1178
00:46:36,261 --> 00:46:38,261
decade of doing space operations in 

1179
00:46:38,261 --> 00:46:40,483
Centcom . Thank you , General Langley . 

1180
00:46:40,483 --> 00:46:42,261
Um despite the size and growing 

1181
00:46:42,261 --> 00:46:44,428
importance of the continent , the 21st 

1182
00:46:44,428 --> 00:46:46,539
century wars in Centcom , the Russian 

1183
00:46:46,539 --> 00:46:45,950
invasion of Ukraine and the strategic 

1184
00:46:45,950 --> 00:46:48,490
competition with China have dominated 

1185
00:46:48,490 --> 00:46:50,601
much of our focus on this committee . 

1186
00:46:50,601 --> 00:46:52,910
What might we be missing about Africa 

1187
00:46:52,910 --> 00:46:54,966
that you think this committee should 

1188
00:46:54,966 --> 00:46:58,390
take note of in the coming years ? So I 

1189
00:46:58,390 --> 00:47:00,760
would say just aspirations of China , 

1190
00:47:00,770 --> 00:47:03,570
uh the aspirations of China's threefold , 

1191
00:47:03,580 --> 00:47:05,580
one from the geopolitical , they're 

1192
00:47:05,580 --> 00:47:07,524
trying to change the international 

1193
00:47:07,524 --> 00:47:09,524
norms and they're using some of the 

1194
00:47:09,524 --> 00:47:11,358
African countries within the U N 

1195
00:47:11,358 --> 00:47:13,247
construct . Whether it be General 

1196
00:47:13,247 --> 00:47:15,680
Assembly or , or the Security uh 

1197
00:47:15,690 --> 00:47:18,070
Security Council trying to affect votes 

1198
00:47:18,080 --> 00:47:20,302
to change those international norms and 

1199
00:47:20,302 --> 00:47:22,302
international system at large . And 

1200
00:47:22,302 --> 00:47:24,920
then there's a geo strategic operation , 

1201
00:47:24,920 --> 00:47:28,100
their aspirations for military bases on 

1202
00:47:28,100 --> 00:47:30,820
the continent of Africa . Um just talk 

1203
00:47:30,820 --> 00:47:32,820
to my African partners . They don't 

1204
00:47:32,820 --> 00:47:34,876
want to be military militarized in a 

1205
00:47:34,876 --> 00:47:36,931
strategic sense . And the last piece 

1206
00:47:36,931 --> 00:47:40,480
senator is um geo economic . Our 

1207
00:47:40,480 --> 00:47:43,600
future , our future economy is 

1208
00:47:43,600 --> 00:47:45,544
dependent upon a number of rare of 

1209
00:47:45,544 --> 00:47:47,890
minerals . And also some of our clean 

1210
00:47:47,890 --> 00:47:50,640
energy technologies uh depend upon the 

1211
00:47:50,640 --> 00:47:53,030
rare earth minerals . About 30 to 40% 

1212
00:47:53,030 --> 00:47:55,910
of those minerals are on the continent 

1213
00:47:55,910 --> 00:47:58,410
of Africa . Uh That's , that's forward 

1214
00:47:58,410 --> 00:48:00,710
thinking by the PRC . They're trying to 

1215
00:48:00,710 --> 00:48:03,510
harvest and leverage upon that um 

1216
00:48:03,520 --> 00:48:07,460
through uh shaky deals , engaging with 

1217
00:48:07,460 --> 00:48:09,460
some of these countries so they can 

1218
00:48:09,460 --> 00:48:11,627
corner the market if you will . That's 

1219
00:48:11,627 --> 00:48:13,682
what I'm concerned about . Senator . 

1220
00:48:13,682 --> 00:48:13,640
Thank you . Thank you , Senator , 

1221
00:48:13,640 --> 00:48:15,640
gentlemen , Senator Cotton . Please 

1222
00:48:15,640 --> 00:48:17,918
welcome , gentlemen , General Carrillo . 

1223
00:48:17,918 --> 00:48:19,862
I want to return to your answer to 

1224
00:48:19,862 --> 00:48:21,862
Senator Fischer about the threat of 

1225
00:48:21,862 --> 00:48:23,807
terrorist attacks originating from 

1226
00:48:23,807 --> 00:48:26,029
Afghanistan . Uh If I heard you right , 

1227
00:48:26,029 --> 00:48:28,196
you said you believe that such attacks 

1228
00:48:28,196 --> 00:48:30,640
could occur in a mere six months out of 

1229
00:48:30,640 --> 00:48:33,960
Afghanistan against American citizens 

1230
00:48:33,970 --> 00:48:37,030
or allies or partners in Eurasia . Is 

1231
00:48:37,030 --> 00:48:39,460
that right ? Uh Senator I said abroad 

1232
00:48:39,470 --> 00:48:41,526
which I would also include Europe in 

1233
00:48:41,526 --> 00:48:44,900
that Eurasia , but you said less than 

1234
00:48:45,170 --> 00:48:47,170
more than that against the American 

1235
00:48:47,170 --> 00:48:49,337
homeland . It would it would be harder 

1236
00:48:49,337 --> 00:48:51,114
for them to do that against the 

1237
00:48:51,114 --> 00:48:53,114
American homeland . If you , if you 

1238
00:48:53,114 --> 00:48:55,114
assess six months against Europe or 

1239
00:48:55,114 --> 00:48:57,226
Asia , what would you access would be 

1240
00:48:57,226 --> 00:48:59,448
the timeline against homeland ? I think 

1241
00:48:59,448 --> 00:49:01,559
it's hard to put a timeline on that . 

1242
00:49:01,559 --> 00:49:00,970
But again , I , I assess that they 

1243
00:49:00,970 --> 00:49:03,240
could in , in as little as six months 

1244
00:49:03,240 --> 00:49:05,462
with little to no warning and I'll talk 

1245
00:49:05,462 --> 00:49:07,629
about that in the closed session as to 

1246
00:49:07,629 --> 00:49:09,740
why I assess that . How likely do you 

1247
00:49:09,740 --> 00:49:11,907
think a terrorist attack on the United 

1248
00:49:11,907 --> 00:49:13,629
States or one of our allies is 

1249
00:49:13,629 --> 00:49:15,796
originating from Afghanistan ? I think 

1250
00:49:15,796 --> 00:49:17,796
it is a higher probability overseas 

1251
00:49:17,796 --> 00:49:20,170
than it is in the homeland . When you 

1252
00:49:20,170 --> 00:49:22,337
add up all the troops you have in your 

1253
00:49:22,337 --> 00:49:24,337
area of responsibility and American 

1254
00:49:24,337 --> 00:49:26,503
citizens who are there for business or 

1255
00:49:26,503 --> 00:49:29,310
tourism or pilgrimages on any given day . 

1256
00:49:29,320 --> 00:49:31,376
What are we talking about ? Probably 

1257
00:49:31,376 --> 00:49:33,320
hundreds of thousands , right . At 

1258
00:49:33,320 --> 00:49:35,431
least so hundreds of thousands within 

1259
00:49:35,431 --> 00:49:37,542
range of a terrorist attack . In your 

1260
00:49:37,542 --> 00:49:39,598
assessment in a mere six months from 

1261
00:49:39,598 --> 00:49:43,260
Afghanistan . Okay . I want to turn 

1262
00:49:43,260 --> 00:49:47,170
to Iran . Yes , 

1263
00:49:47,170 --> 00:49:50,900
I do assess , I want to turn to Iran . 

1264
00:49:52,580 --> 00:49:54,636
You said in your written statement , 

1265
00:49:54,636 --> 00:49:56,636
they can produce sufficient fissile 

1266
00:49:56,636 --> 00:49:58,747
material for a nuclear weapon in less 

1267
00:49:58,747 --> 00:50:00,580
than 14 days . You also say that 

1268
00:50:00,580 --> 00:50:02,747
deterring Iran is arguably more urgent 

1269
00:50:02,747 --> 00:50:04,913
now than any time since Khan's history 

1270
00:50:04,913 --> 00:50:07,136
due to one they're cutting edge missile 

1271
00:50:07,136 --> 00:50:09,080
and you have the capability and to 

1272
00:50:09,080 --> 00:50:11,024
their uranium enrichment program . 

1273
00:50:11,024 --> 00:50:10,790
That's correct . That is correct , 

1274
00:50:10,790 --> 00:50:14,660
senator . Um Yet you also say Iran 

1275
00:50:14,660 --> 00:50:17,060
is undeterred from its malign 

1276
00:50:17,060 --> 00:50:19,116
activities . So that's not good that 

1277
00:50:19,116 --> 00:50:21,338
it's more urgent to deter them than any 

1278
00:50:21,338 --> 00:50:23,560
time in Central Command's history , but 

1279
00:50:23,560 --> 00:50:26,600
they're undeterred . Um Why are , why 

1280
00:50:26,600 --> 00:50:29,210
is there on undeterred right now ? 

1281
00:50:29,220 --> 00:50:31,276
Currently , right now we see them at 

1282
00:50:31,276 --> 00:50:33,387
their malign activity is increasing . 

1283
00:50:33,387 --> 00:50:35,600
Um We see them again in the last 90 

1284
00:50:35,600 --> 00:50:37,711
days . We have um some of the highest 

1285
00:50:37,711 --> 00:50:39,767
numbers of our advanced conventional 

1286
00:50:39,767 --> 00:50:41,878
weapons and munitions that we've seen 

1287
00:50:41,878 --> 00:50:44,100
going from Iran to Yemen . We see their 

1288
00:50:44,100 --> 00:50:46,211
attacks on our U S forces in Iraq and 

1289
00:50:46,211 --> 00:50:48,378
Syria increasing and we see the threat 

1290
00:50:48,378 --> 00:50:50,322
streams that I can talk about in a 

1291
00:50:50,322 --> 00:50:52,489
higher classification . I mean , those 

1292
00:50:52,489 --> 00:50:54,489
are more the results of the lack of 

1293
00:50:54,489 --> 00:50:56,656
deterrence against Iran . Do they feel 

1294
00:50:56,656 --> 00:50:58,822
undeterred because they feel safe that 

1295
00:50:58,822 --> 00:51:00,656
neither the United States or our 

1296
00:51:00,656 --> 00:51:02,711
partners are gonna threaten anything 

1297
00:51:02,711 --> 00:51:04,767
that they hold dear ? Um I can't say 

1298
00:51:04,767 --> 00:51:06,878
the exact reason why they feel that , 

1299
00:51:06,878 --> 00:51:08,878
but I know right now when I look at 

1300
00:51:08,878 --> 00:51:08,430
them , I believe they're undeterred . I 

1301
00:51:08,430 --> 00:51:10,652
mean , there , there is a history right 

1302
00:51:10,652 --> 00:51:12,819
throughout your statement , uh there's 

1303
00:51:12,819 --> 00:51:15,041
a history of Iran being deterred by the 

1304
00:51:15,041 --> 00:51:17,097
credible threat of military force or 

1305
00:51:17,097 --> 00:51:19,263
actual military force . That's right , 

1306
00:51:19,263 --> 00:51:21,374
isn't it ? I think that deterrence is 

1307
00:51:21,374 --> 00:51:23,486
always temporal . Um So you can deter 

1308
00:51:23,486 --> 00:51:23,150
for a period of time and then it will 

1309
00:51:23,150 --> 00:51:25,120
wane . I do believe the Soleimani 

1310
00:51:25,120 --> 00:51:28,060
strike was a deterrence . We go back 

1311
00:51:28,060 --> 00:51:30,282
much further than that . Iran waged war 

1312
00:51:30,282 --> 00:51:32,338
with Iraq for eight years and Ronald 

1313
00:51:32,338 --> 00:51:34,282
Reagan sank half their navy in the 

1314
00:51:34,282 --> 00:51:36,282
spring of 1988 . And surprisingly , 

1315
00:51:36,282 --> 00:51:38,560
that war ended just a few months later . 

1316
00:51:38,560 --> 00:51:40,616
And Iran also stopped its enrichment 

1317
00:51:40,616 --> 00:51:42,560
program in 2003 , after the United 

1318
00:51:42,560 --> 00:51:44,282
States had invaded and toppled 

1319
00:51:44,282 --> 00:51:46,338
governments on both its east and its 

1320
00:51:46,338 --> 00:51:48,504
Western border . And then as you say , 

1321
00:51:48,504 --> 00:51:50,449
Uh , they took only very tentative 

1322
00:51:50,449 --> 00:51:52,782
steps towards higher enrichment in 2019 . 

1323
00:51:52,782 --> 00:51:54,504
And then after we killed Qasem 

1324
00:51:54,504 --> 00:51:56,727
Soleimani , they did nothing at all for 

1325
00:51:56,727 --> 00:51:59,330
most of 2020 . Is that right ? Um They , 

1326
00:51:59,340 --> 00:52:01,118
they , it was a higher level of 

1327
00:52:01,118 --> 00:52:03,840
deterrence . After that last week on 

1328
00:52:03,840 --> 00:52:06,062
the Intelligence committee , we had our 

1329
00:52:06,062 --> 00:52:08,173
annual worldwide threats briefing and 

1330
00:52:08,173 --> 00:52:10,284
the Director of National Intelligence 

1331
00:52:10,284 --> 00:52:11,951
started the killing of Mohsen 

1332
00:52:11,951 --> 00:52:14,230
Fakhrizadeh , uh notorious Iranian 

1333
00:52:14,230 --> 00:52:16,750
nuclear scientist in November 2020 as 

1334
00:52:16,750 --> 00:52:18,528
the reason Iran accelerated its 

1335
00:52:18,528 --> 00:52:20,694
enrichment program . Do you agree with 

1336
00:52:20,694 --> 00:52:22,917
that assessment ? Senator , I think any 

1337
00:52:22,917 --> 00:52:25,083
talk of the Iran nuclear program would 

1338
00:52:25,083 --> 00:52:27,083
be best in a classified setting . I 

1339
00:52:27,083 --> 00:52:29,306
pointed out there's also something that 

1340
00:52:29,306 --> 00:52:31,710
happened in November of 2020 besides 

1341
00:52:31,710 --> 00:52:33,877
the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh that 

1342
00:52:33,877 --> 00:52:36,099
might have emboldened Iran and that was 

1343
00:52:36,099 --> 00:52:39,630
the election of Joe Biden that gave the 

1344
00:52:39,630 --> 00:52:41,741
Iranians confidence that they were no 

1345
00:52:41,741 --> 00:52:43,852
longer going to be held militarily at 

1346
00:52:43,852 --> 00:52:46,019
risk . Speaking that timeframe . And I 

1347
00:52:46,019 --> 00:52:48,300
think it was December of 2020 . Uh 

1348
00:52:48,310 --> 00:52:51,060
didn't we face threats to our personnel 

1349
00:52:51,070 --> 00:52:53,126
in Iraq from militias and the former 

1350
00:52:53,126 --> 00:52:55,237
president tweeted what he called some 

1351
00:52:55,237 --> 00:52:56,903
friendly health advice to the 

1352
00:52:56,903 --> 00:52:58,959
ayatollahs that if a single American 

1353
00:52:58,959 --> 00:53:01,181
was harmed in Iraq , he would hold them 

1354
00:53:01,181 --> 00:53:03,181
responsible . I'm not familiar with 

1355
00:53:03,181 --> 00:53:05,237
that specific tweet senator that did 

1356
00:53:05,237 --> 00:53:07,459
happen . It's okay . There are a lot of 

1357
00:53:07,459 --> 00:53:07,400
them . You don't have to be familiar 

1358
00:53:07,400 --> 00:53:09,567
with every one of them . Uh , but also 

1359
00:53:09,567 --> 00:53:11,789
I don't think those attacks happen . So 

1360
00:53:11,789 --> 00:53:13,622
I think what we can learn here , 

1361
00:53:13,622 --> 00:53:15,678
whether it's from Qasem Soleimani or 

1362
00:53:15,678 --> 00:53:17,678
the tanker words or anything else , 

1363
00:53:17,678 --> 00:53:17,550
that the only thing that will deter 

1364
00:53:17,550 --> 00:53:20,880
Iran is the credible threat of military 

1365
00:53:20,880 --> 00:53:22,880
force . One final question , I know 

1366
00:53:22,880 --> 00:53:26,840
you've added Israel to your A O R . Um 

1367
00:53:26,850 --> 00:53:30,480
And you write in your statement that uh 

1368
00:53:30,490 --> 00:53:32,490
you readily partner today with Arab 

1369
00:53:32,490 --> 00:53:34,379
militaries and the Israel defense 

1370
00:53:34,379 --> 00:53:36,490
forces , like in fact , the inclusion 

1371
00:53:36,490 --> 00:53:38,601
of Israel presents many collaborative 

1372
00:53:38,601 --> 00:53:40,934
and constructive security opportunities . 

1373
00:53:40,934 --> 00:53:42,990
Um One of the opportunities I see is 

1374
00:53:42,990 --> 00:53:44,934
having Israeli Air Force personnel 

1375
00:53:44,934 --> 00:53:47,046
training Alongside American personnel 

1376
00:53:47,046 --> 00:53:49,490
on KC 46 tankers , which we expect to 

1377
00:53:49,490 --> 00:53:51,601
be providing them into the future and 

1378
00:53:51,601 --> 00:53:53,601
that's training that we can provide 

1379
00:53:53,601 --> 00:53:53,340
them . So they'll be ready to operate 

1380
00:53:53,340 --> 00:53:55,673
those aircraft as soon as they get them . 

1381
00:53:55,673 --> 00:53:57,840
Do you think that would be one of what 

1382
00:53:57,840 --> 00:53:59,451
you call a collaborative and 

1383
00:53:59,451 --> 00:54:01,507
constructive opportunity between the 

1384
00:54:01,507 --> 00:54:03,618
United States when they get closer to 

1385
00:54:03,618 --> 00:54:05,562
getting their aircraft starting to 

1386
00:54:05,562 --> 00:54:07,673
train those pilots so they can retain 

1387
00:54:07,673 --> 00:54:09,673
that training and go right into the 

1388
00:54:09,673 --> 00:54:12,007
execution of operating them . Thank you . 

1389
00:54:12,007 --> 00:54:14,062
Thank you , Senator Cotton , Senator 

1390
00:54:14,062 --> 00:54:15,896
Hirono , please . Thank you , Mr 

1391
00:54:15,896 --> 00:54:18,062
Chairman . I'd like to turn to another 

1392
00:54:18,062 --> 00:54:20,173
part of your missions in both central 

1393
00:54:20,173 --> 00:54:23,120
command and in Africa command us . 

1394
00:54:23,120 --> 00:54:25,950
Diplomatic efforts are at the 

1395
00:54:25,960 --> 00:54:28,182
diplomatic efforts are at the forefront 

1396
00:54:28,182 --> 00:54:30,127
of your missions . The military to 

1397
00:54:30,127 --> 00:54:33,230
military engagement is one very 

1398
00:54:33,230 --> 00:54:34,619
important aspect of your 

1399
00:54:34,620 --> 00:54:36,420
responsibilities , but your 

1400
00:54:36,420 --> 00:54:39,180
organizations are just one part of a 

1401
00:54:39,180 --> 00:54:41,620
whole of government approach . General 

1402
00:54:41,620 --> 00:54:44,910
Langley , I note your team's work in 

1403
00:54:44,910 --> 00:54:48,440
implementing the 2017 Women Peace and 

1404
00:54:48,440 --> 00:54:51,790
Security Act amid the many extremist 

1405
00:54:51,790 --> 00:54:53,623
threats in both of your areas of 

1406
00:54:53,623 --> 00:54:56,250
operations . It is more important than 

1407
00:54:56,250 --> 00:54:58,417
ever as far as I'm concerned , to work 

1408
00:54:58,417 --> 00:55:00,639
for equality for women and girls around 

1409
00:55:00,639 --> 00:55:02,639
the world . Generals . How are your 

1410
00:55:02,639 --> 00:55:04,583
commands supporting and protecting 

1411
00:55:04,583 --> 00:55:06,760
women and girls in your a 

1412
00:55:09,420 --> 00:55:12,290
senator ? Thanks for that question . As 

1413
00:55:12,300 --> 00:55:14,620
a women's peace and security Act passed 

1414
00:55:14,620 --> 00:55:18,430
in 2017 , I've seen 

1415
00:55:18,440 --> 00:55:21,740
from afar . Uh What Africom has started 

1416
00:55:21,740 --> 00:55:23,907
to do . We didn't wait for the plan or 

1417
00:55:23,907 --> 00:55:27,850
the construct over years . Um uh Excuse 

1418
00:55:27,850 --> 00:55:30,530
me , Africom got after it , I saw this , 

1419
00:55:30,530 --> 00:55:32,863
you know , because I was at Centcom and , 

1420
00:55:32,863 --> 00:55:35,860
and , and I was J Vai and we got out 

1421
00:55:35,860 --> 00:55:38,260
there as well at that time . But how 

1422
00:55:38,260 --> 00:55:41,710
far that Centcom that uh 

1423
00:55:41,720 --> 00:55:44,590
Centcom and Africom has gone in , in 

1424
00:55:44,590 --> 00:55:47,140
the vein of the intent of women's peace 

1425
00:55:47,140 --> 00:55:49,280
and security um Center . I'd like to 

1426
00:55:49,280 --> 00:55:52,420
just make note . Um , we have it weaved 

1427
00:55:52,420 --> 00:55:56,360
into our Africa campaign plan , uh , to 

1428
00:55:56,360 --> 00:55:59,220
effect , uh , and working with the 

1429
00:55:59,220 --> 00:56:01,770
Department of Defense to finish out the 

1430
00:56:01,770 --> 00:56:03,770
construct . But we just didn't , we 

1431
00:56:03,770 --> 00:56:05,881
didn't wait for the word to go . Um , 

1432
00:56:05,881 --> 00:56:08,103
just , just for your information , uh , 

1433
00:56:08,103 --> 00:56:10,110
Senator , uh , across the horn of 

1434
00:56:10,120 --> 00:56:14,090
Africa or JTF . Um , we 

1435
00:56:14,090 --> 00:56:16,430
have , uh , major general , uh , 

1436
00:56:16,440 --> 00:56:19,640
Charlie and she has affected that in 

1437
00:56:19,640 --> 00:56:21,870
every exercise that we do all the way 

1438
00:56:21,870 --> 00:56:25,430
down from uh from uh Djibouti down to 

1439
00:56:25,430 --> 00:56:28,910
Kenya and even her Valerie Jackson , 

1440
00:56:28,910 --> 00:56:31,077
Brigadier General United States Marine 

1441
00:56:31,077 --> 00:56:32,854
Corps , as they work with other 

1442
00:56:32,854 --> 00:56:34,890
countries , they get it . President 

1443
00:56:34,890 --> 00:56:37,690
Assam Sheikh Mohammed sees a 

1444
00:56:37,700 --> 00:56:41,040
representation of our talent base in 

1445
00:56:41,040 --> 00:56:43,660
our military and in our U S military 

1446
00:56:43,670 --> 00:56:46,030
that 50% of the talent base and women 

1447
00:56:46,040 --> 00:56:47,870
and they are showing that it's 

1448
00:56:47,870 --> 00:56:49,981
effective and it's , and for partners 

1449
00:56:49,981 --> 00:56:52,203
on the African continent , they realize 

1450
00:56:52,203 --> 00:56:54,092
that . So it's changing culture , 

1451
00:56:54,540 --> 00:56:56,596
general , I think we have to be very 

1452
00:56:56,596 --> 00:56:58,429
intentional about the support we 

1453
00:56:58,429 --> 00:57:00,207
provide women and girls because 

1454
00:57:00,207 --> 00:57:02,096
wherever there is instability and 

1455
00:57:02,096 --> 00:57:04,040
certainly both of your A R R s are 

1456
00:57:04,040 --> 00:57:05,984
characterized by what I would call 

1457
00:57:05,984 --> 00:57:05,830
instability . Women and girls are the 

1458
00:57:05,830 --> 00:57:08,520
ones who bear the brunt of the , the 

1459
00:57:08,520 --> 00:57:10,687
challenges General Langley . Would you 

1460
00:57:10,687 --> 00:57:14,120
like to add to what General Kiraly said ? 

1461
00:57:14,120 --> 00:57:16,800
Because you are doing a , I would say a 

1462
00:57:16,810 --> 00:57:20,170
pretty good job , ma'am I think , 

1463
00:57:22,480 --> 00:57:24,591
and I think you're referring to me on 

1464
00:57:24,591 --> 00:57:27,500
that so the um I value the program . 

1465
00:57:27,510 --> 00:57:29,566
I'm sorry . Yes , I was referring to 

1466
00:57:29,566 --> 00:57:33,210
your General Langley . Go ahead . Yes , 

1467
00:57:33,210 --> 00:57:37,050
Senator . And so in execution , uh 

1468
00:57:37,060 --> 00:57:40,830
as we work with even in the West uh in 

1469
00:57:40,830 --> 00:57:44,030
our exercises , we ensure uh that we , 

1470
00:57:44,040 --> 00:57:46,240
we , we do represent and within the 

1471
00:57:46,240 --> 00:57:49,020
spirit and the letter of intent of the 

1472
00:57:49,020 --> 00:57:52,600
act of WPS that we , that our partners 

1473
00:57:52,600 --> 00:57:55,200
and ensure that uh their culture is 

1474
00:57:55,200 --> 00:57:58,590
changing and women and uh and women and 

1475
00:57:58,590 --> 00:58:01,040
girls get meaningful opportunities 

1476
00:58:01,050 --> 00:58:03,170
within the overall governance and in 

1477
00:58:03,170 --> 00:58:05,580
society . Uh And that's , that's why I 

1478
00:58:05,580 --> 00:58:08,070
brought up Major General Shali as she 

1479
00:58:08,070 --> 00:58:10,070
makes her travels across , they see 

1480
00:58:10,070 --> 00:58:12,250
that America gets it and they start to 

1481
00:58:12,250 --> 00:58:14,472
get it as well . It's very compelling . 

1482
00:58:14,472 --> 00:58:17,040
Senator . Thank you , General Langley . 

1483
00:58:17,040 --> 00:58:19,262
Further question for you , you noted in 

1484
00:58:19,262 --> 00:58:22,410
your testimony , climate as a , as a 

1485
00:58:22,410 --> 00:58:25,940
challenge in Africa . Can you describe 

1486
00:58:25,940 --> 00:58:29,140
the destabilizing , destabilizing 

1487
00:58:29,150 --> 00:58:31,520
impact of climate change on African 

1488
00:58:31,520 --> 00:58:33,900
nations and what we can do to counter 

1489
00:58:34,720 --> 00:58:37,470
this impact or these impacts ? 

1490
00:58:37,480 --> 00:58:40,610
Absolutely , Senator , that's a driver 

1491
00:58:40,610 --> 00:58:43,110
of instability , especially with 

1492
00:58:43,110 --> 00:58:45,350
irregular patterns across the Sahel . 

1493
00:58:45,360 --> 00:58:47,570
We're seeing that but across the whole 

1494
00:58:47,570 --> 00:58:49,681
of government approach as I work with 

1495
00:58:49,681 --> 00:58:53,560
the U S U S A I D , um I would say just 

1496
00:58:53,560 --> 00:58:56,350
more flexibility uh trying to predict 

1497
00:58:56,350 --> 00:58:58,517
where the effects are going to go . We 

1498
00:58:58,517 --> 00:59:00,628
need to stay ahead of this and that's 

1499
00:59:00,628 --> 00:59:02,683
why administrative power is actually 

1500
00:59:02,683 --> 00:59:04,794
asking for non humanitarian action so 

1501
00:59:04,794 --> 00:59:06,739
she can move resources . So we can 

1502
00:59:06,739 --> 00:59:08,850
address the effects of climate change 

1503
00:59:08,850 --> 00:59:11,072
because it's hard to predict even the U 

1504
00:59:11,072 --> 00:59:14,130
S I D being uh being an evidence based 

1505
00:59:14,140 --> 00:59:16,550
organization can't predict where the 

1506
00:59:16,550 --> 00:59:19,150
next uh the next two years out where 

1507
00:59:19,150 --> 00:59:21,372
the next atrocity is going to happen as 

1508
00:59:21,372 --> 00:59:23,483
a result of climate change . So there 

1509
00:59:23,483 --> 00:59:25,650
needs to be a flexibility across state 

1510
00:59:25,650 --> 00:59:27,872
department and U S A I D then backed up 

1511
00:59:27,872 --> 00:59:31,330
by military , by building a capability , 

1512
00:59:31,340 --> 00:59:33,790
adaptability within our partners in the 

1513
00:59:33,790 --> 00:59:36,000
military , so they can go out and 

1514
00:59:36,010 --> 00:59:38,910
assist the affected people as a result 

1515
00:59:38,920 --> 00:59:41,550
of climate change . Thank you , Mr 

1516
00:59:41,550 --> 00:59:43,717
Chairman . I'm particularly interested 

1517
00:59:43,717 --> 00:59:45,939
in what we are doing to counter climate 

1518
00:59:45,939 --> 00:59:48,161
change impacts in , in Africa because I 

1519
00:59:48,161 --> 00:59:50,383
agree that this is a very destabilizing 

1520
00:59:50,383 --> 00:59:53,630
destabilizing situations . So I will 

1521
00:59:53,630 --> 00:59:55,830
continue to pursue inquiries along 

1522
00:59:55,830 --> 00:59:57,970
these lines . Thank you . Thank you , 

1523
00:59:57,970 --> 01:00:00,770
Senator Senator Round , please . Thank 

1524
01:00:00,770 --> 01:00:02,881
you , Mr Chairman , gentlemen , first 

1525
01:00:02,881 --> 01:00:04,714
of all , thank you both for your 

1526
01:00:04,714 --> 01:00:06,659
service to our country and to your 

1527
01:00:06,659 --> 01:00:08,826
teams as well . A question for both of 

1528
01:00:08,826 --> 01:00:11,180
you with regard to our country's 

1529
01:00:11,180 --> 01:00:13,180
refocused with regard to the threat 

1530
01:00:13,180 --> 01:00:16,390
that we see from both the the the other 

1531
01:00:16,390 --> 01:00:17,946
major powers in the world , 

1532
01:00:17,946 --> 01:00:20,650
specifically China Russia to some 

1533
01:00:20,650 --> 01:00:23,560
degree as well . What impact has that 

1534
01:00:23,560 --> 01:00:25,690
had in terms of the discussion , and 

1535
01:00:25,700 --> 01:00:28,440
and the the clear evidence that we have 

1536
01:00:28,440 --> 01:00:30,450
turned from literally more than 20 

1537
01:00:30,450 --> 01:00:33,080
years of fighting terrorism to where we 

1538
01:00:33,080 --> 01:00:35,320
are now focusing on this , this this 

1539
01:00:35,330 --> 01:00:38,210
major power competition . What's the 

1540
01:00:38,210 --> 01:00:40,970
impact in terms of the countries within 

1541
01:00:40,980 --> 01:00:43,380
your A R S ? And how are they 

1542
01:00:43,380 --> 01:00:46,790
perceiving the United states' interest 

1543
01:00:46,800 --> 01:00:49,260
in your regions of the world General 

1544
01:00:49,260 --> 01:00:51,490
Carrillo ? So Senator , we , we are 

1545
01:00:51,490 --> 01:00:53,601
concerned again , as I said , this is 

1546
01:00:53,601 --> 01:00:55,712
about a race between integration with 

1547
01:00:55,712 --> 01:00:58,110
our partners and Chinese penetration 

1548
01:00:58,120 --> 01:01:00,190
into the region . Um there's been a 

1549
01:01:00,190 --> 01:01:02,134
significant increase both in their 

1550
01:01:02,134 --> 01:01:04,970
economic 460 billion in infrastructure 

1551
01:01:04,970 --> 01:01:07,026
development in the last five years , 

1552
01:01:07,026 --> 01:01:10,460
2.6 trillion in trade . Um and really , 

1553
01:01:10,460 --> 01:01:12,627
we see their military capability where 

1554
01:01:12,627 --> 01:01:14,404
they're trying to sell military 

1555
01:01:14,404 --> 01:01:16,571
equipment and foreign military sales . 

1556
01:01:16,571 --> 01:01:18,738
Um in the last 10 years , we've seen a 

1557
01:01:18,738 --> 01:01:21,240
30% decline in the US but an 80% 

1558
01:01:21,250 --> 01:01:24,090
increase in Chinese on foreign military 

1559
01:01:24,090 --> 01:01:26,190
sales . And when they buy a Chinese 

1560
01:01:26,190 --> 01:01:28,670
system , we cannot integrate it into 

1561
01:01:28,670 --> 01:01:31,130
our systems . General Langley , 

1562
01:01:34,210 --> 01:01:37,180
Senator , uh you know , as Eric uh just 

1563
01:01:37,180 --> 01:01:39,310
alluded to , we have the same effects 

1564
01:01:39,320 --> 01:01:41,480
on the continent as well as far as 

1565
01:01:41,480 --> 01:01:44,040
investments by from a military 

1566
01:01:44,040 --> 01:01:47,300
standpoint , both both both the PRC and 

1567
01:01:47,310 --> 01:01:50,620
Russia . And uh you know how we 

1568
01:01:50,630 --> 01:01:53,060
partner uh that , that , that really 

1569
01:01:53,060 --> 01:01:56,470
segways to into the main issue as far 

1570
01:01:56,470 --> 01:01:59,830
as how , how slow are triple three 

1571
01:01:59,830 --> 01:02:03,420
program of arm train and equip our 

1572
01:02:03,420 --> 01:02:06,180
partners . So they do know that they 

1573
01:02:06,180 --> 01:02:09,240
have choices as we saw down in South 

1574
01:02:09,240 --> 01:02:11,360
Africa , they want to show the world 

1575
01:02:11,370 --> 01:02:13,481
that they have choices and that's why 

1576
01:02:13,481 --> 01:02:15,759
they had mosey to exercise . But up in , 

1577
01:02:15,759 --> 01:02:17,926
uh in , uh in our partners in the Gulf 

1578
01:02:17,926 --> 01:02:20,148
of Guinea region , they are pressurized 

1579
01:02:20,148 --> 01:02:22,610
by all kinds of , by an extremist 

1580
01:02:22,610 --> 01:02:25,420
organizations threatening their borders . 

1581
01:02:25,430 --> 01:02:27,486
And they come in , they asked them , 

1582
01:02:27,486 --> 01:02:29,652
they said , hey , General and we don't 

1583
01:02:29,652 --> 01:02:31,874
want your boots on the ground . We want 

1584
01:02:31,874 --> 01:02:34,097
your equipment , we need help so we can 

1585
01:02:34,097 --> 01:02:36,152
put up a good fight and take care of 

1586
01:02:36,152 --> 01:02:38,152
this fight . Extremist organization 

1587
01:02:38,152 --> 01:02:40,374
across all the affiliates . But as slow 

1588
01:02:40,374 --> 01:02:42,541
as our processes are with triple three 

1589
01:02:42,541 --> 01:02:44,860
and also 332 or other title 10 

1590
01:02:44,860 --> 01:02:46,780
authorities is moving too slow . 

1591
01:02:46,780 --> 01:02:48,891
Senator just moving too slow and they 

1592
01:02:48,891 --> 01:02:51,020
make the wrong decisions . Let's dive 

1593
01:02:51,020 --> 01:02:53,076
into that just a little bit more for 

1594
01:02:53,076 --> 01:02:55,020
both of you . The foreign military 

1595
01:02:55,020 --> 01:02:57,131
sales or F M S . It's a critical part 

1596
01:02:57,131 --> 01:02:59,970
of our foreign policy regards requires 

1597
01:02:59,970 --> 01:03:02,210
not just the availability but also the 

1598
01:03:02,210 --> 01:03:04,780
approval process . Could each of you 

1599
01:03:04,780 --> 01:03:07,380
share with me your opinion about the 

1600
01:03:07,380 --> 01:03:09,380
approval process and whether or not 

1601
01:03:09,380 --> 01:03:11,350
there needs to be a more expedited 

1602
01:03:11,350 --> 01:03:15,000
process in order to allow us 

1603
01:03:15,010 --> 01:03:17,110
to continue with F M s . 

1604
01:03:18,590 --> 01:03:22,560
So Senator , they say about 95% 

1605
01:03:22,560 --> 01:03:25,990
of all FMS goes according to plan 5% 

1606
01:03:25,990 --> 01:03:28,150
doesn't , 80% of those 5% are in the 

1607
01:03:28,150 --> 01:03:31,470
Centcom hor . Um The challenge we have 

1608
01:03:31,470 --> 01:03:34,910
is the time it takes to get equipment 

1609
01:03:34,920 --> 01:03:36,920
to our partners . And there's , you 

1610
01:03:36,920 --> 01:03:39,480
know , the D O D Department of State 

1611
01:03:39,480 --> 01:03:41,670
Congress and industry all have a role 

1612
01:03:41,670 --> 01:03:43,810
in that . But what China does is they 

1613
01:03:43,810 --> 01:03:45,643
come in , they open their entire 

1614
01:03:45,643 --> 01:03:47,477
catalog , they give them express 

1615
01:03:47,477 --> 01:03:49,588
shipping , they give them no end user 

1616
01:03:49,588 --> 01:03:51,866
agreement and they give them financing , 

1617
01:03:51,866 --> 01:03:54,032
which at the end of the day can end up 

1618
01:03:54,032 --> 01:03:56,310
being some type of predatory financing . 

1619
01:03:56,310 --> 01:03:58,532
But they are much faster to need in our 

1620
01:03:58,532 --> 01:04:00,588
security partners have real security 

1621
01:04:00,588 --> 01:04:02,754
needs and we are losing our ability to 

1622
01:04:02,754 --> 01:04:04,810
provide our equipment so that it can 

1623
01:04:04,810 --> 01:04:07,032
integrate into the region . They prefer 

1624
01:04:07,032 --> 01:04:09,254
to have our equipment , wouldn't they ? 

1625
01:04:09,254 --> 01:04:08,840
Absolutely . So when you buy us 

1626
01:04:08,840 --> 01:04:10,729
equipment , you buy , you get the 

1627
01:04:10,729 --> 01:04:12,800
quality , you get the training , the 

1628
01:04:12,800 --> 01:04:15,022
sustainment , the upgrades , but you're 

1629
01:04:15,022 --> 01:04:17,189
also buying into the bureaucracy right 

1630
01:04:17,189 --> 01:04:19,411
now , they just can't get it because of 

1631
01:04:19,411 --> 01:04:21,578
our bureaucratic processes is delaying 

1632
01:04:21,578 --> 01:04:23,744
the delivery of that product . If it's 

1633
01:04:23,744 --> 01:04:25,856
available , it's still a bureaucratic 

1634
01:04:25,856 --> 01:04:28,022
mess to get it . There , there is some 

1635
01:04:28,022 --> 01:04:30,189
that goes very fast and some that goes 

1636
01:04:30,189 --> 01:04:32,244
very , very slow . General Langley . 

1637
01:04:32,400 --> 01:04:35,030
Absolutely , Senator . Uh we , we see 

1638
01:04:35,030 --> 01:04:37,360
that just well along and I fully concur 

1639
01:04:37,360 --> 01:04:39,416
with Eric about our training and the 

1640
01:04:39,416 --> 01:04:42,470
capacity is more of a quality . But the 

1641
01:04:42,470 --> 01:04:44,581
sense of urgency , especially in West 

1642
01:04:44,581 --> 01:04:46,803
Africa , across the hill across Ghana , 

1643
01:04:46,803 --> 01:04:49,600
Cote , Navarro , and Benin and Togo , 

1644
01:04:49,610 --> 01:04:51,832
they need equipment , they need weapons 

1645
01:04:51,832 --> 01:04:55,830
now . So even with our significant uh 

1646
01:04:55,840 --> 01:04:58,062
security cooperation initiatives , that 

1647
01:04:58,062 --> 01:05:00,380
process is not any faster , it's 

1648
01:05:00,380 --> 01:05:03,070
designed to be faster . Uh So they make 

1649
01:05:03,070 --> 01:05:05,870
choices and they make the wrong choices 

1650
01:05:05,880 --> 01:05:09,140
in siding with going with either PRC or 

1651
01:05:09,140 --> 01:05:11,790
Russia for especially leave delayed . 

1652
01:05:11,800 --> 01:05:13,911
Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

1653
01:05:14,110 --> 01:05:16,054
Thank you , Senator around Senator 

1654
01:05:16,054 --> 01:05:17,888
Warren , please . Thank you , Mr 

1655
01:05:17,888 --> 01:05:20,054
Chairman . So the Biden administration 

1656
01:05:20,054 --> 01:05:21,721
announced last week that it's 

1657
01:05:21,721 --> 01:05:23,499
requesting $842 billion for the 

1658
01:05:23,499 --> 01:05:25,388
Pentagon budget . It's one of the 

1659
01:05:25,388 --> 01:05:27,460
largest budget requests ever . Uh 

1660
01:05:27,470 --> 01:05:29,640
Despite this already massive number 

1661
01:05:29,650 --> 01:05:32,330
every year D O D pushes to get even 

1662
01:05:32,330 --> 01:05:35,630
more money by using unfunded priority 

1663
01:05:35,630 --> 01:05:37,800
list or what I call wish lists that 

1664
01:05:37,800 --> 01:05:39,856
don't go through the other budgeting 

1665
01:05:39,856 --> 01:05:42,440
screens . The services and combatant 

1666
01:05:42,440 --> 01:05:44,730
commands asked Congress for billions 

1667
01:05:44,730 --> 01:05:47,550
more in funding for programs from these 

1668
01:05:47,550 --> 01:05:49,940
lists . Other federal agencies have to 

1669
01:05:49,940 --> 01:05:53,140
balance their must haves and their nice 

1670
01:05:53,140 --> 01:05:56,820
to haves . But D O D doesn't instead it 

1671
01:05:56,820 --> 01:05:59,240
games the system by submitting a second 

1672
01:05:59,240 --> 01:06:01,700
list of items that they want so that 

1673
01:06:01,700 --> 01:06:04,040
their budget can grow even bigger . I 

1674
01:06:04,040 --> 01:06:06,207
know that there are colleagues on both 

1675
01:06:06,207 --> 01:06:08,262
sides of the aisle who are concerned 

1676
01:06:08,262 --> 01:06:10,040
about this and want to see this 

1677
01:06:10,040 --> 01:06:12,520
practice stop . Last year . Both your 

1678
01:06:12,520 --> 01:06:15,380
predecessors at Africom and Centcom 

1679
01:06:15,390 --> 01:06:18,040
submitted these wish lists . So what 

1680
01:06:18,040 --> 01:06:20,151
I'm asking today is about whether you 

1681
01:06:20,151 --> 01:06:22,262
plan to do the same . General Langley 

1682
01:06:22,262 --> 01:06:24,180
Africom requested an additional 

1683
01:06:24,180 --> 01:06:27,730
$353.6 million 

1684
01:06:27,730 --> 01:06:33,690
africom 

1685
01:06:33,700 --> 01:06:35,811
argued that if some of these programs 

1686
01:06:35,811 --> 01:06:37,811
weren't funded , it would result in 

1687
01:06:37,811 --> 01:06:41,570
quote unacceptable risk . So my 

1688
01:06:41,570 --> 01:06:44,190
question is this year , will Africom be 

1689
01:06:44,190 --> 01:06:46,560
putting all of its priority projects if 

1690
01:06:46,560 --> 01:06:48,671
it's that important ? If it's putting 

1691
01:06:48,671 --> 01:06:50,890
us at unacceptable risk , will you put 

1692
01:06:50,890 --> 01:06:53,650
that into your base budget request ? 

1693
01:06:55,750 --> 01:06:59,460
Senator ? And just be transparent ? 

1694
01:06:59,470 --> 01:07:02,660
I will be submitting a underfunded 

1695
01:07:02,670 --> 01:07:05,200
party list . And here's why because of 

1696
01:07:05,200 --> 01:07:08,130
emergent threats when uh when President 

1697
01:07:08,130 --> 01:07:11,100
Biden directed us back in last May to 

1698
01:07:11,110 --> 01:07:13,850
return to a persistent presence in 

1699
01:07:13,850 --> 01:07:16,120
Somalia . And I took command a few 

1700
01:07:16,120 --> 01:07:18,220
months after that . And I asked him 

1701
01:07:18,220 --> 01:07:20,276
being a former programmer . I said , 

1702
01:07:20,276 --> 01:07:22,553
okay , what is the fully burdened cost ? 

1703
01:07:22,553 --> 01:07:24,553
I need to communicate to Congress , 

1704
01:07:24,553 --> 01:07:26,664
what the fully burdened cost ? I need 

1705
01:07:26,664 --> 01:07:28,942
to communicate to the department first . 

1706
01:07:28,942 --> 01:07:31,164
And , and I did that , I did that after 

1707
01:07:31,164 --> 01:07:33,370
budget submittal to from the services 

1708
01:07:33,370 --> 01:07:35,426
to the department . So that emerging 

1709
01:07:35,426 --> 01:07:38,170
cost was informed by the risk that we 

1710
01:07:38,170 --> 01:07:40,281
have . So you're telling me that this 

1711
01:07:40,281 --> 01:07:42,450
request , the ink is not dry on the 

1712
01:07:42,450 --> 01:07:45,210
budget request from Congress and from 

1713
01:07:45,210 --> 01:07:47,154
the president . And you're already 

1714
01:07:47,154 --> 01:07:49,099
saying that you know that it's not 

1715
01:07:49,099 --> 01:07:51,210
enough and I want to remind you about 

1716
01:07:51,210 --> 01:07:53,850
it emerging threats D O D already has 

1717
01:07:53,850 --> 01:07:56,310
transfer and reprogramming authorities 

1718
01:07:56,310 --> 01:07:58,540
to deal with emerging threats . You 

1719
01:07:58,540 --> 01:08:00,373
have the ability to come back to 

1720
01:08:00,373 --> 01:08:02,596
Congress if you can justify an emerging 

1721
01:08:02,596 --> 01:08:04,750
threat . We have a panel looking at 

1722
01:08:04,750 --> 01:08:06,861
whether or not there are more changes 

1723
01:08:06,861 --> 01:08:08,917
that are needed . But these unfunded 

1724
01:08:08,917 --> 01:08:11,083
priority lists are just another way to 

1725
01:08:11,083 --> 01:08:13,250
gain the system if it is a priority to 

1726
01:08:13,250 --> 01:08:15,460
cover something like this , then I I 

1727
01:08:15,460 --> 01:08:17,890
think you should be covering it . So 

1728
01:08:17,890 --> 01:08:20,112
are you telling me that the only things 

1729
01:08:20,112 --> 01:08:22,370
that will be on your unfunded priority 

1730
01:08:22,370 --> 01:08:24,592
list are things you couldn't have known 

1731
01:08:24,592 --> 01:08:26,759
about when you submitted your budget . 

1732
01:08:26,910 --> 01:08:30,690
Uh Senator I even my predecessor also 

1733
01:08:30,690 --> 01:08:33,070
put the other piece of that cost on 

1734
01:08:33,070 --> 01:08:36,960
their on I S . Are we never had enough ? 

1735
01:08:36,970 --> 01:08:39,081
I'm not hearing a yes or no . Are you 

1736
01:08:39,081 --> 01:08:41,137
telling me that your unfunded budget 

1737
01:08:41,137 --> 01:08:43,500
priority list will have nothing on it 

1738
01:08:43,510 --> 01:08:45,930
except things that you could not have 

1739
01:08:45,930 --> 01:08:47,930
known about when you submitted your 

1740
01:08:47,930 --> 01:08:49,780
budget . Uh There , there is a 

1741
01:08:49,780 --> 01:08:51,724
persistent threat that we have the 

1742
01:08:51,724 --> 01:08:54,058
account for . So on that , on that list , 

1743
01:08:54,058 --> 01:08:55,780
that's what your budget is for 

1744
01:08:55,780 --> 01:08:57,947
accounting for the persistent threat . 

1745
01:08:57,947 --> 01:09:00,169
Let me ask General Carola the same last 

1746
01:09:00,169 --> 01:09:02,224
year Centcom submitted a request for 

1747
01:09:02,224 --> 01:09:04,650
$35 million in its unfunded priority 

1748
01:09:04,650 --> 01:09:06,760
list . Are you planning to submit a 

1749
01:09:06,760 --> 01:09:09,470
wish list again this year ? Senator I 

1750
01:09:09,470 --> 01:09:11,692
am but on last year's , I'm the one who 

1751
01:09:11,692 --> 01:09:13,803
signed last year's . That was for the 

1752
01:09:13,803 --> 01:09:15,970
massive ordinance penetrator for heavy 

1753
01:09:15,970 --> 01:09:18,081
deeply buried targets . I do not have 

1754
01:09:18,081 --> 01:09:20,026
procurement dollars in my baseline 

1755
01:09:20,026 --> 01:09:22,137
budget . That is why I requested it . 

1756
01:09:22,137 --> 01:09:24,137
So what you're really telling me is 

1757
01:09:24,137 --> 01:09:24,020
that this unfunded priority list is 

1758
01:09:24,020 --> 01:09:26,290
just a way to say I need a bigger base 

1759
01:09:26,290 --> 01:09:28,560
budget . I don't have that color of 

1760
01:09:28,560 --> 01:09:30,838
money . Senator to ask to request that . 

1761
01:09:30,838 --> 01:09:32,560
But on what I , what I do as a 

1762
01:09:32,560 --> 01:09:34,830
commander is I mitigate risk and I go 

1763
01:09:34,830 --> 01:09:36,997
through my priorities and the missions 

1764
01:09:36,997 --> 01:09:39,052
I have and then when I have any risk 

1765
01:09:39,052 --> 01:09:41,450
left over by the law I will submit for 

1766
01:09:41,450 --> 01:09:43,500
the people . You know , look , I 

1767
01:09:43,510 --> 01:09:45,732
appreciate this . You all know , I have 

1768
01:09:45,732 --> 01:09:47,890
raised this issue before . If we're 

1769
01:09:47,890 --> 01:09:50,057
gonna have a budget , we ought to have 

1770
01:09:50,057 --> 01:09:52,279
a budget . And there's no reason that D 

1771
01:09:52,279 --> 01:09:54,334
O D shouldn't be able to work within 

1772
01:09:54,334 --> 01:09:56,279
the budgeting process . Like every 

1773
01:09:56,279 --> 01:09:58,279
other part of governor , I'm out of 

1774
01:09:58,279 --> 01:10:00,057
time on this , but I'm gonna be 

1775
01:10:00,057 --> 01:10:01,946
submitting more questions for the 

1776
01:10:01,946 --> 01:10:03,890
record . Mr Chairman on what these 

1777
01:10:03,890 --> 01:10:06,057
commands are doing to prevent civilian 

1778
01:10:06,057 --> 01:10:08,300
harm . D O D is on the right path , but 

1779
01:10:08,310 --> 01:10:10,532
I remain concerned about whether or not 

1780
01:10:10,532 --> 01:10:12,421
we're getting accurate and honest 

1781
01:10:12,421 --> 01:10:14,532
reporting . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

1782
01:10:14,532 --> 01:10:16,588
Thank you , Senator Warren , Senator 

1783
01:10:16,588 --> 01:10:18,421
Mullen , please . Thank you , Mr 

1784
01:10:18,421 --> 01:10:20,477
Chairman . Um And thank you both for 

1785
01:10:20,477 --> 01:10:22,477
being here . Uh General Gorilla . I 

1786
01:10:22,477 --> 01:10:24,532
just want to personally tell you how 

1787
01:10:24,532 --> 01:10:27,560
much I appreciate your service uh upon 

1788
01:10:27,560 --> 01:10:29,900
reading more about you was even more 

1789
01:10:29,900 --> 01:10:33,390
impressed . Uh any of us that have been 

1790
01:10:33,390 --> 01:10:35,446
in situations like you were in Mosul 

1791
01:10:35,446 --> 01:10:38,460
and uh be able to keep your head in the , 

1792
01:10:38,470 --> 01:10:41,510
in the fight uh after being shot three 

1793
01:10:41,510 --> 01:10:43,788
times and still be able to direct fire . 

1794
01:10:44,160 --> 01:10:46,550
I commend you for that . That's why it 

1795
01:10:46,550 --> 01:10:49,330
should be common everyone in front of 

1796
01:10:49,330 --> 01:10:51,386
you or behind . You knows that's not 

1797
01:10:51,386 --> 01:10:53,552
always common . So thank you for doing 

1798
01:10:53,552 --> 01:10:56,850
that . I want to talk about , about 

1799
01:10:56,850 --> 01:10:58,790
Afghanistan a little bit . Um the 

1800
01:10:58,790 --> 01:11:01,710
American withdraw from Kabul on 2021 as 

1801
01:11:01,710 --> 01:11:04,820
you know , was a complete disaster and 

1802
01:11:04,820 --> 01:11:06,931
uh and brought in systematic failures 

1803
01:11:06,931 --> 01:11:08,820
from the top down across multiple 

1804
01:11:08,820 --> 01:11:10,987
agencies , but it's not enough to just 

1805
01:11:10,987 --> 01:11:13,098
say this was a disaster and move on . 

1806
01:11:13,098 --> 01:11:15,264
Lives were lost and our posture on the 

1807
01:11:15,264 --> 01:11:17,431
world stage has been forever changed . 

1808
01:11:17,870 --> 01:11:20,510
Uh As , as you reach one year in your 

1809
01:11:20,510 --> 01:11:22,820
current position , can you explain what 

1810
01:11:22,820 --> 01:11:25,020
you've learned in the aftermath of the 

1811
01:11:25,020 --> 01:11:27,880
Afghan Afghanistan withdraw and how we , 

1812
01:11:27,890 --> 01:11:30,057
we can prevent these types of failures 

1813
01:11:30,057 --> 01:11:31,946
moving forward . Senator just for 

1814
01:11:31,946 --> 01:11:33,779
clarity , specifically about the 

1815
01:11:33,779 --> 01:11:36,350
withdrawal or overall uh lessons we 

1816
01:11:36,350 --> 01:11:38,820
learned from the withdrawal and how we 

1817
01:11:38,820 --> 01:11:40,931
can prevent this from happening again 

1818
01:11:40,931 --> 01:11:43,098
and how that's changed your position . 

1819
01:11:43,098 --> 01:11:45,264
So in terms of the actual withdrawal , 

1820
01:11:45,264 --> 01:11:47,487
um one of the top lessons we learned is 

1821
01:11:47,487 --> 01:11:49,376
the importance of partners access 

1822
01:11:49,376 --> 01:11:51,487
basing overflight , we would not have 

1823
01:11:51,487 --> 01:11:53,264
been able to execute the actual 

1824
01:11:53,264 --> 01:11:55,487
execution of the withdrawal without all 

1825
01:11:55,487 --> 01:11:57,709
of our partners that we have in the , I 

1826
01:11:57,709 --> 01:12:00,130
think executing would be hard word to 

1827
01:12:00,130 --> 01:12:02,241
say it would , it would not have been 

1828
01:12:02,241 --> 01:12:04,352
possible to the scale at which we did 

1829
01:12:04,352 --> 01:12:07,340
it without our partners who provided 

1830
01:12:07,340 --> 01:12:09,720
the access basing and overflight . I 

1831
01:12:09,720 --> 01:12:11,664
think one of the other big lessons 

1832
01:12:11,664 --> 01:12:13,664
learned initially , it was just the 

1833
01:12:13,664 --> 01:12:15,553
mission was given to Centcom , it 

1834
01:12:15,553 --> 01:12:17,887
became a five combatant command mission . 

1835
01:12:17,887 --> 01:12:19,664
Um And then also with our , our 

1836
01:12:19,664 --> 01:12:21,831
partners , bringing them all into that 

1837
01:12:21,831 --> 01:12:21,570
planning session . You think people 

1838
01:12:21,570 --> 01:12:23,626
should be held accountable from that 

1839
01:12:23,626 --> 01:12:25,792
withdrawal . I think anybody should be 

1840
01:12:25,792 --> 01:12:27,792
held accountable for if there is uh 

1841
01:12:27,792 --> 01:12:29,848
failure on something , you know , as 

1842
01:12:29,848 --> 01:12:31,792
you know , there was a tip for tat 

1843
01:12:31,792 --> 01:12:33,792
going on between a couple of people 

1844
01:12:33,792 --> 01:12:35,903
during that whole situation , General 

1845
01:12:35,903 --> 01:12:38,070
Mackenzie General Donahue , Um I found 

1846
01:12:38,070 --> 01:12:40,237
myself caught in the middle of that as 

1847
01:12:40,237 --> 01:12:39,810
we was trying to get and sets at out 

1848
01:12:39,810 --> 01:12:42,540
with the team that I was part of . At 

1849
01:12:42,540 --> 01:12:44,484
the end of the day , we did end up 

1850
01:12:44,484 --> 01:12:46,707
getting over 300 Americans out , but it 

1851
01:12:46,707 --> 01:12:48,596
wasn't from the assistance of our 

1852
01:12:48,596 --> 01:12:50,762
government . In fact , I found that it 

1853
01:12:50,762 --> 01:12:52,707
was easier to work for the Taliban 

1854
01:12:52,707 --> 01:12:54,762
because I knew the price I was gonna 

1855
01:12:54,762 --> 01:12:56,929
have to pay for each one and it was to 

1856
01:12:56,929 --> 01:12:59,096
get them out and dealing with the . Um 

1857
01:12:59,096 --> 01:13:02,140
unfortunately , us , In fact , 

1858
01:13:02,140 --> 01:13:06,020
ambassador promising that was over two . 

1859
01:13:06,020 --> 01:13:09,810
Chika Stan literally told me Mr Mullen , 

1860
01:13:09,810 --> 01:13:12,010
I was told not to assist you or your 

1861
01:13:12,010 --> 01:13:14,350
group in any way . Unfortunately , it 

1862
01:13:14,350 --> 01:13:16,600
cost the life of a three year old young 

1863
01:13:16,600 --> 01:13:20,200
girl . And uh and at the same time , 

1864
01:13:20,200 --> 01:13:22,480
I've seen no one , not a single person 

1865
01:13:22,490 --> 01:13:24,550
held accountable . In fact , general 

1866
01:13:24,550 --> 01:13:27,700
Donahue uh is now over 18th 

1867
01:13:27,700 --> 01:13:31,650
airborne . The irony of that is he's uh 

1868
01:13:31,660 --> 01:13:35,380
looking over Europe now and deterrence 

1869
01:13:35,510 --> 01:13:38,830
in Europe , Darren mckenzie retired . 

1870
01:13:39,930 --> 01:13:42,152
No one in the State department has been 

1871
01:13:42,152 --> 01:13:44,263
held accountable . What does that say 

1872
01:13:44,263 --> 01:13:46,263
to our partners , our partners that 

1873
01:13:46,263 --> 01:13:50,180
lost lives . I was with his highness 

1874
01:13:50,190 --> 01:13:53,470
and U A E and uh he was even upset 

1875
01:13:53,470 --> 01:13:57,130
about it . He said that if America is 

1876
01:13:57,130 --> 01:13:59,297
willing to walk away from the billions 

1877
01:13:59,297 --> 01:14:01,310
of dollars that they spent in 

1878
01:14:01,310 --> 01:14:03,880
Afghanistan , what does that say about 

1879
01:14:03,880 --> 01:14:06,102
our region ? And then he went on to say 

1880
01:14:06,102 --> 01:14:09,890
that I fought him . The Royal Highness 

1881
01:14:09,890 --> 01:14:12,060
fought in Afghanistan . His two sons 

1882
01:14:12,060 --> 01:14:14,570
fought in Afghanistan and every single 

1883
01:14:14,570 --> 01:14:18,080
soldier that they lost , he visited 

1884
01:14:18,080 --> 01:14:21,810
their house personally . And yet 

1885
01:14:21,820 --> 01:14:24,420
we pulled out , lost the lives of an 

1886
01:14:24,420 --> 01:14:26,587
sets that didn't have to be lost . Not 

1887
01:14:26,587 --> 01:14:28,642
to mention our 13 soldiers , Marines 

1888
01:14:29,340 --> 01:14:32,290
And No one , not a single person has 

1889
01:14:32,290 --> 01:14:35,370
been held accountable . You think 

1890
01:14:35,370 --> 01:14:38,340
that's right , Senator , if I could , I 

1891
01:14:38,340 --> 01:14:40,630
have great respect and I've known Frank 

1892
01:14:40,630 --> 01:14:43,380
mckenzie and Chris Donahue . I know I'm 

1893
01:14:43,380 --> 01:14:45,158
very familiar familiar with the 

1894
01:14:45,158 --> 01:14:46,936
relationship . Doesn't make any 

1895
01:14:46,936 --> 01:14:49,102
difference is underneath there command 

1896
01:14:49,102 --> 01:14:51,269
and no one was held accountable fact . 

1897
01:14:51,269 --> 01:14:50,960
The only person that was chastised 

1898
01:14:50,960 --> 01:14:53,127
about it was the one colonel that came 

1899
01:14:53,127 --> 01:14:54,960
out and chastised the withdrawal 

1900
01:14:54,960 --> 01:14:57,127
mechanism . And how dare him speak out 

1901
01:14:57,127 --> 01:15:00,940
negative about something . I get it . I 

1902
01:15:00,940 --> 01:15:03,162
get the chain of command . I remember I 

1903
01:15:03,162 --> 01:15:05,680
know he broke protocol . But don't you 

1904
01:15:05,680 --> 01:15:07,840
think someone you cannot sit here and 

1905
01:15:07,840 --> 01:15:09,673
tell me that that was successful 

1906
01:15:09,673 --> 01:15:11,562
withdrawal . Don't you think that 

1907
01:15:11,562 --> 01:15:13,784
someone should be held accountable . It 

1908
01:15:13,784 --> 01:15:17,450
was an absolute disaster . Sen , I 

1909
01:15:17,450 --> 01:15:19,617
served five years in Afghanistan every 

1910
01:15:19,617 --> 01:15:22,470
year from 2009 to 14 . I'm aware of it . 

1911
01:15:22,480 --> 01:15:26,290
I am , I am vested in , in there . The 

1912
01:15:26,300 --> 01:15:28,730
actual thing I was not part of the 

1913
01:15:28,740 --> 01:15:30,851
force provider , but I would say that 

1914
01:15:30,851 --> 01:15:33,150
the execution , you were there before 

1915
01:15:33,150 --> 01:15:35,420
Donahue and you came back . You know , 

1916
01:15:35,420 --> 01:15:38,330
it intimately , I'm just asking you 

1917
01:15:38,340 --> 01:15:41,640
once again , shouldn't someone be held 

1918
01:15:41,640 --> 01:15:43,640
accountable if someone's below your 

1919
01:15:43,640 --> 01:15:45,807
command and they went through this and 

1920
01:15:45,807 --> 01:15:49,260
they had an absolute disaster like this 

1921
01:15:49,940 --> 01:15:52,190
losing marines . 

1922
01:15:54,490 --> 01:15:56,601
Don't you think someone at that point 

1923
01:15:56,601 --> 01:15:58,712
be held accountable ? I think it's an 

1924
01:15:58,712 --> 01:16:00,934
absolute travesty that we lost those 13 

1925
01:16:00,934 --> 01:16:00,670
marines that abigail . But you don't 

1926
01:16:00,670 --> 01:16:02,281
think anybody should be held 

1927
01:16:02,281 --> 01:16:03,948
accountable . I don't know if 

1928
01:16:03,948 --> 01:16:05,948
accountability has been assigned to 

1929
01:16:05,948 --> 01:16:08,480
anyone . Senator . Well , you know , it 

1930
01:16:08,480 --> 01:16:10,500
hasn't . I mean , I get what you're 

1931
01:16:10,500 --> 01:16:12,722
saying , but you know , there hasn't at 

1932
01:16:12,722 --> 01:16:14,430
some point , we got our , our 

1933
01:16:14,430 --> 01:16:17,110
adversaries and our allies are both 

1934
01:16:17,110 --> 01:16:20,090
taking a look at this and we look weak 

1935
01:16:20,790 --> 01:16:23,012
and I know you're dealing with this and 

1936
01:16:23,012 --> 01:16:25,068
we are dealing with this . It's time 

1937
01:16:25,068 --> 01:16:27,123
for someone to be held accountable . 

1938
01:16:27,123 --> 01:16:29,234
And what I'm looking for is your help 

1939
01:16:29,234 --> 01:16:31,457
and your assistance in moving forward . 

1940
01:16:31,457 --> 01:16:33,623
We got to right this wrong with that . 

1941
01:16:33,623 --> 01:16:35,901
I yield back . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

1942
01:16:35,901 --> 01:16:38,100
Thank you , Senator Mullen . Um This 

1943
01:16:38,100 --> 01:16:40,100
issue of accountability is , is a 

1944
01:16:40,100 --> 01:16:43,970
serious one , but it would take in um 

1945
01:16:44,550 --> 01:16:47,500
A 20-year history of the struggle in 

1946
01:16:47,500 --> 01:16:49,730
Afghanistan . And based on the 

1947
01:16:49,740 --> 01:16:53,720
operation , um Neil was one of the most 

1948
01:16:53,720 --> 01:16:56,250
difficult operations . General Gorilla 

1949
01:16:56,260 --> 01:16:59,730
evacuating over 120,000 

1950
01:16:59,730 --> 01:17:03,720
people . Uh was something I think 

1951
01:17:03,720 --> 01:17:07,550
was remarkable . Would you 

1952
01:17:07,550 --> 01:17:10,030
conclude ? I absolutely agree again . I 

1953
01:17:10,030 --> 01:17:12,500
think the execution of the , of 

1954
01:17:12,510 --> 01:17:15,410
bringing the people out was , was done 

1955
01:17:15,410 --> 01:17:17,243
very effectively in terms of the 

1956
01:17:17,243 --> 01:17:19,354
numbers , we would not have been able 

1957
01:17:19,354 --> 01:17:21,299
to do the numbers . Thank you . Uh 

1958
01:17:21,299 --> 01:17:25,020
Senator Kelly , thank you , Mr Chairman 

1959
01:17:25,030 --> 01:17:27,500
um General Langley . Good to see you 

1960
01:17:27,500 --> 01:17:30,340
again . Thank you for being here . Um 

1961
01:17:30,350 --> 01:17:33,090
As you know , I recently returned from 

1962
01:17:33,090 --> 01:17:36,220
a bipartisan code L A Africa , we had 

1963
01:17:36,220 --> 01:17:39,860
the opportunity to travel across um the 

1964
01:17:39,860 --> 01:17:43,430
continent to Zambia , South Africa , 

1965
01:17:43,430 --> 01:17:47,170
Morocco Botswana , um Code Devore 

1966
01:17:47,840 --> 01:17:49,990
and had conversations with a lot of 

1967
01:17:49,990 --> 01:17:52,660
experts , senior leaders on a wide 

1968
01:17:52,660 --> 01:17:54,750
variety of topics that we care about 

1969
01:17:54,750 --> 01:17:57,700
including food security conservation 

1970
01:17:57,700 --> 01:18:00,470
efforts , critical minerals and defense . 

1971
01:18:01,070 --> 01:18:04,610
And while we , the United States is 

1972
01:18:04,610 --> 01:18:06,666
doing a lot of great work across the 

1973
01:18:06,666 --> 01:18:10,080
continent , I worry that it's not well 

1974
01:18:10,080 --> 01:18:13,880
known that we're providing this at the 

1975
01:18:13,880 --> 01:18:15,991
same time . It's clear that China and 

1976
01:18:15,991 --> 01:18:19,370
Russia have a lot of influence in 

1977
01:18:19,370 --> 01:18:23,040
Africa and this concerns me a 

1978
01:18:23,040 --> 01:18:25,880
lot and I know it does concern you too . 

1979
01:18:25,890 --> 01:18:28,260
I mean , Africa has strategic 

1980
01:18:28,260 --> 01:18:30,160
importance to us for a number of 

1981
01:18:30,160 --> 01:18:32,790
reasons , including that many critical 

1982
01:18:32,800 --> 01:18:36,140
minerals that our defense industry 

1983
01:18:36,150 --> 01:18:39,390
requires our mind in Africa . And this 

1984
01:18:39,390 --> 01:18:41,950
is something that China knows and they 

1985
01:18:41,950 --> 01:18:44,430
have begun to exploit . You know , last 

1986
01:18:44,430 --> 01:18:46,980
year , Senator Cotton and I introduced 

1987
01:18:46,990 --> 01:18:50,470
the Restore Act to reduce our 

1988
01:18:50,470 --> 01:18:53,880
reliance on China for these critical 

1989
01:18:53,890 --> 01:18:56,340
minerals . But the important work on 

1990
01:18:56,340 --> 01:18:58,920
securing us supply chains need to 

1991
01:18:58,920 --> 01:19:02,410
continue . So , General Langley , what 

1992
01:19:02,410 --> 01:19:04,580
are you seeing in Africa with respect 

1993
01:19:04,580 --> 01:19:08,450
to China's mining activities and their 

1994
01:19:08,460 --> 01:19:10,071
infrastructure development ? 

1995
01:19:13,570 --> 01:19:15,780
Uh First of all , Senator , thanks for 

1996
01:19:15,780 --> 01:19:18,500
that question and uh and thank you for 

1997
01:19:18,500 --> 01:19:22,300
going on the Code L uh as uh so in , in 

1998
01:19:22,300 --> 01:19:24,710
Munich and when you're on your way down 

1999
01:19:24,710 --> 01:19:26,932
there , that that really matters , that 

2000
01:19:26,932 --> 01:19:28,988
shows those are assurance actions of 

2001
01:19:28,988 --> 01:19:31,890
our nation's leadership going on to the 

2002
01:19:31,890 --> 01:19:34,150
continent and , and thank you for that 

2003
01:19:34,160 --> 01:19:36,960
and it pressurize is and , and it makes 

2004
01:19:36,970 --> 01:19:39,880
uh causes hesitation in countries that 

2005
01:19:39,880 --> 01:19:43,420
are thinking about picking the PRC or 

2006
01:19:43,420 --> 01:19:46,110
even Russia is their partner of choice 

2007
01:19:46,120 --> 01:19:48,670
because that those are the assurance 

2008
01:19:48,670 --> 01:19:51,560
actions that matter and resonate . Uh 

2009
01:19:51,570 --> 01:19:54,180
Yes , I agree . We're not telling our 

2010
01:19:54,180 --> 01:19:56,950
story well enough . And that's why I , 

2011
01:19:56,960 --> 01:19:59,182
you know , when the Code L came through 

2012
01:19:59,182 --> 01:20:01,404
right after I took command on their way 

2013
01:20:01,404 --> 01:20:03,571
to the continent , they asked what was 

2014
01:20:03,571 --> 01:20:05,682
being done on the continent . Uh show 

2015
01:20:05,682 --> 01:20:08,350
us , we , we know what the PRC is 

2016
01:20:08,350 --> 01:20:10,461
during their investments to showing , 

2017
01:20:10,461 --> 01:20:12,572
show us what we do . And that's why I 

2018
01:20:12,572 --> 01:20:14,630
provided the blue just to show our 

2019
01:20:14,630 --> 01:20:17,610
investments . So all that folds into 

2020
01:20:17,620 --> 01:20:19,453
collectively across the whole of 

2021
01:20:19,453 --> 01:20:21,620
government approach as I engage across 

2022
01:20:21,620 --> 01:20:23,850
the inter agency and also State 

2023
01:20:23,850 --> 01:20:27,400
Department U S I D , how we can be able 

2024
01:20:27,400 --> 01:20:30,650
to coalesce this into actions that 

2025
01:20:30,650 --> 01:20:32,539
resonate general . Can you talk a 

2026
01:20:32,539 --> 01:20:34,594
little bit about what China is doing 

2027
01:20:34,594 --> 01:20:36,800
and how it's impacting uh countries 

2028
01:20:36,800 --> 01:20:38,911
that we have had relationships with ? 

2029
01:20:38,911 --> 01:20:42,540
Um you know , I don't want to , you 

2030
01:20:42,540 --> 01:20:44,660
know , lead you into , but I'm really 

2031
01:20:44,660 --> 01:20:47,350
interested in the negative impact that 

2032
01:20:47,360 --> 01:20:49,249
China's mining and infrastructure 

2033
01:20:49,249 --> 01:20:51,416
activities have had on the continent . 

2034
01:20:52,000 --> 01:20:55,020
Yes , Senator . Uh so yes , as I also 

2035
01:20:55,020 --> 01:20:57,030
provided the the foreign active 

2036
01:20:57,030 --> 01:20:59,020
reliance on that on African mental 

2037
01:20:59,020 --> 01:21:01,940
stores . Uh and that is a very 

2038
01:21:01,940 --> 01:21:05,000
compelling story . So for economic 

2039
01:21:05,000 --> 01:21:08,400
reasons and also how they go 

2040
01:21:08,400 --> 01:21:11,150
about uh striking deals with some of 

2041
01:21:11,150 --> 01:21:13,570
the countries on some of our critical 

2042
01:21:13,570 --> 01:21:17,020
assets for not only for our rare earth 

2043
01:21:17,030 --> 01:21:18,919
minerals that feed into our clean 

2044
01:21:18,919 --> 01:21:21,810
energy , but also into the military 

2045
01:21:21,820 --> 01:21:24,780
side as far as our high 

2046
01:21:24,780 --> 01:21:27,590
technical type of arsenal and , and 

2047
01:21:27,590 --> 01:21:29,820
equipment , China is trying to harvest 

2048
01:21:29,820 --> 01:21:32,170
that . Uh So as they're engaging with 

2049
01:21:32,170 --> 01:21:35,160
countries uh laid out on that , on the 

2050
01:21:35,160 --> 01:21:37,340
slide , the last slide that we have on 

2051
01:21:37,340 --> 01:21:40,240
the critical reliance on foreign 

2052
01:21:40,240 --> 01:21:42,490
minerals , this is our new economy . 

2053
01:21:42,540 --> 01:21:44,920
This is gonna be a big demand as we 

2054
01:21:44,920 --> 01:21:47,830
start to modernize our forces in China 

2055
01:21:47,840 --> 01:21:49,840
realizes that . So those actions 

2056
01:21:49,840 --> 01:21:51,507
they're trying to take on the 

2057
01:21:51,507 --> 01:21:53,980
illustrated countries that we have 

2058
01:21:53,980 --> 01:21:56,810
highly it on here . So yes , it is a 

2059
01:21:56,810 --> 01:21:58,921
strategic consequence that we need to 

2060
01:21:58,921 --> 01:22:01,290
be able to face and uh and turn to 

2061
01:22:01,290 --> 01:22:03,234
these countries to ensure that the 

2062
01:22:03,234 --> 01:22:05,346
partner of choice in general . How do 

2063
01:22:05,346 --> 01:22:07,401
we do a better job telling our story 

2064
01:22:07,401 --> 01:22:07,170
because you've got China and they're 

2065
01:22:07,170 --> 01:22:08,948
making bad deals , building bad 

2066
01:22:08,948 --> 01:22:11,114
infrastructure . This isn't good for , 

2067
01:22:11,340 --> 01:22:13,396
you know , the African nations , you 

2068
01:22:13,396 --> 01:22:15,562
know , at the same time , the Russians 

2069
01:22:15,562 --> 01:22:17,673
have Bugner in there supporting , you 

2070
01:22:17,673 --> 01:22:19,451
know , essentially , you know , 

2071
01:22:19,451 --> 01:22:22,950
terrorism . Um What can we do to better 

2072
01:22:22,950 --> 01:22:25,270
tell our story on the African Continent 

2073
01:22:25,810 --> 01:22:29,110
center illuminate and amplify ? I saw a 

2074
01:22:29,110 --> 01:22:31,230
good story this morning in , in uh in 

2075
01:22:31,230 --> 01:22:34,240
the in the press about the Kenyans have 

2076
01:22:34,240 --> 01:22:36,462
gone to the street tired of some of the 

2077
01:22:36,462 --> 01:22:38,629
stuff that the PRC is doing for them , 

2078
01:22:38,629 --> 01:22:40,740
how , how they're taking advantage of 

2079
01:22:40,740 --> 01:22:44,160
their economy uh and taking advantage 

2080
01:22:44,170 --> 01:22:47,490
of their environment , news stories 

2081
01:22:47,490 --> 01:22:49,830
like that resonate , they change , they 

2082
01:22:49,830 --> 01:22:52,320
change ideas . I guarantee you the rest 

2083
01:22:52,330 --> 01:22:54,560
if it happened in Kenya is happening 

2084
01:22:54,560 --> 01:22:56,727
all across the continent of Africa and 

2085
01:22:56,727 --> 01:22:58,560
people read these stories and it 

2086
01:22:58,560 --> 01:23:00,727
resonates . People are taking action . 

2087
01:23:00,727 --> 01:23:02,949
Thank you , General and Mr Chairman . I 

2088
01:23:02,949 --> 01:23:02,690
have a couple of questions for the 

2089
01:23:02,690 --> 01:23:04,523
record . Thank you . Thank you , 

2090
01:23:04,523 --> 01:23:06,801
Senator Kelly , Senator Scott , please . 

2091
01:23:07,960 --> 01:23:11,190
Thank you chairman . The 1st 1 . I 

2092
01:23:11,190 --> 01:23:13,500
agree with uh senator mullen that we 

2093
01:23:13,500 --> 01:23:16,420
need to have some way to , you know , 

2094
01:23:16,420 --> 01:23:18,253
hold people accountable for what 

2095
01:23:18,253 --> 01:23:20,476
happened in Afghanistan . So I've had a 

2096
01:23:20,476 --> 01:23:22,364
bill that would have a bipartisan 

2097
01:23:22,364 --> 01:23:24,198
committee that would investigate 

2098
01:23:24,198 --> 01:23:26,420
exactly what happened there . I want to 

2099
01:23:26,420 --> 01:23:28,587
thank the military for what they did , 

2100
01:23:28,587 --> 01:23:30,753
but the decisions that were made don't 

2101
01:23:30,753 --> 01:23:34,160
seem to make much sense . What , what 

2102
01:23:34,160 --> 01:23:36,382
does the American public not know about 

2103
01:23:36,382 --> 01:23:39,370
China that if they knew would 

2104
01:23:39,380 --> 01:23:41,550
change ? Because I assume you spend a 

2105
01:23:41,550 --> 01:23:43,606
lot of your time thinking about what 

2106
01:23:43,606 --> 01:23:45,772
China is doing all over the world . So 

2107
01:23:45,772 --> 01:23:47,883
what does the American public need to 

2108
01:23:47,883 --> 01:23:49,994
know about China that they don't know 

2109
01:23:49,994 --> 01:23:51,994
right now that maybe would impact , 

2110
01:23:51,994 --> 01:23:53,772
would have a positive impact on 

2111
01:23:53,772 --> 01:23:55,828
impacting their ability to spend the 

2112
01:23:55,828 --> 01:23:57,994
resources to impact uh Africa anywhere 

2113
01:23:57,994 --> 01:24:00,060
in the world , for both of you , 

2114
01:24:02,090 --> 01:24:06,090
Senator . So I would go to what one 

2115
01:24:06,090 --> 01:24:08,270
of the uh chiefs of defense told me , 

2116
01:24:08,280 --> 01:24:11,740
he says you have no idea how much 

2117
01:24:11,740 --> 01:24:13,970
they've closed the gap on you and your 

2118
01:24:13,970 --> 01:24:17,150
technology . Um And this was someone 

2119
01:24:17,150 --> 01:24:19,610
who was buying Chinese equipment . Um I 

2120
01:24:19,610 --> 01:24:21,850
also think that the American public 

2121
01:24:21,850 --> 01:24:24,072
don't have an understanding of how much 

2122
01:24:24,072 --> 01:24:26,128
they have penetrated into the Middle 

2123
01:24:26,128 --> 01:24:29,480
East . Um in terms of their diplomatic , 

2124
01:24:29,490 --> 01:24:31,330
informational military and their 

2125
01:24:31,330 --> 01:24:33,330
economic uh instruments of national 

2126
01:24:33,330 --> 01:24:35,790
power , John Langley , 

2127
01:24:37,840 --> 01:24:40,400
Sarah , I agree with my good friend , 

2128
01:24:40,410 --> 01:24:43,700
Eric here . Um China 

2129
01:24:44,450 --> 01:24:47,010
we have enjoyed for a number of years , 

2130
01:24:47,010 --> 01:24:50,260
a decisive overmatch , but that gap is 

2131
01:24:50,270 --> 01:24:53,330
closing because of China's 

2132
01:24:53,340 --> 01:24:55,950
advancements or stealing a technology , 

2133
01:24:55,960 --> 01:24:59,180
you name it and how their uh the 

2134
01:24:59,190 --> 01:25:01,770
procedures they are executing to close 

2135
01:25:01,770 --> 01:25:04,480
that gap . That's what has me concerned . 

2136
01:25:04,490 --> 01:25:06,379
And even in the economic realm as 

2137
01:25:06,379 --> 01:25:08,546
they're trying to harvest a lot of the 

2138
01:25:08,546 --> 01:25:10,690
critical uh minerals on the continent 

2139
01:25:10,690 --> 01:25:14,340
of Africa , all that into them , being 

2140
01:25:14,340 --> 01:25:17,800
able to from an economic standpoint uh 

2141
01:25:17,810 --> 01:25:20,480
to actually uh try to close the gap on 

2142
01:25:20,480 --> 01:25:22,820
that decisive overmatch as well . And 

2143
01:25:22,820 --> 01:25:24,876
then also changing the international 

2144
01:25:24,876 --> 01:25:26,931
order in the international system as 

2145
01:25:26,931 --> 01:25:29,420
they try to get uh some of the African 

2146
01:25:29,430 --> 01:25:33,300
countries to vote or abstain something 

2147
01:25:33,300 --> 01:25:37,250
that is not a long uh social norm or 

2148
01:25:37,250 --> 01:25:39,580
the right , the right thing to do in 

2149
01:25:39,580 --> 01:25:42,320
voting , especially especially with uh 

2150
01:25:42,330 --> 01:25:45,090
mining or or other things that are 

2151
01:25:45,100 --> 01:25:47,530
humanity or human rights because they 

2152
01:25:47,530 --> 01:25:49,752
commit some of those atrocities back in 

2153
01:25:49,752 --> 01:25:51,974
China or some of the activities they do 

2154
01:25:51,974 --> 01:25:54,120
in Hong Kong . So just changing the 

2155
01:25:54,120 --> 01:25:56,176
economic systems . So in those three 

2156
01:25:56,176 --> 01:25:58,400
areas is where most pressing of illicit 

2157
01:25:58,400 --> 01:26:02,190
activities of the PRC . So if if 

2158
01:26:02,190 --> 01:26:05,060
elected leaders spend more time 

2159
01:26:05,060 --> 01:26:07,282
explaining exactly what China was doing 

2160
01:26:07,282 --> 01:26:09,790
with the end result that , that every 

2161
01:26:09,790 --> 01:26:12,012
American would call out China for their 

2162
01:26:12,012 --> 01:26:14,179
human rights violations or stop buying 

2163
01:26:14,179 --> 01:26:16,234
their products are not putting their 

2164
01:26:16,234 --> 01:26:18,401
devices on our phones . Would that you 

2165
01:26:18,401 --> 01:26:20,512
think that would impact their ability 

2166
01:26:20,512 --> 01:26:20,400
to , to do the bad , you know , to 

2167
01:26:20,400 --> 01:26:22,178
spend the money on the , on the 

2168
01:26:22,178 --> 01:26:24,011
resources that to counteract our 

2169
01:26:24,011 --> 01:26:26,067
military , uh not be able to go into 

2170
01:26:26,067 --> 01:26:28,240
places around the world and lend money 

2171
01:26:28,240 --> 01:26:31,570
on unreasonable , unreasonable terms . 

2172
01:26:32,290 --> 01:26:34,290
Senator , I think education is very 

2173
01:26:34,290 --> 01:26:36,401
important that people understand what 

2174
01:26:36,401 --> 01:26:39,380
China is doing and center , I think it 

2175
01:26:39,380 --> 01:26:41,547
will impose costs on them as well that 

2176
01:26:41,547 --> 01:26:44,880
they have to reckon with what is the 

2177
01:26:44,890 --> 01:26:47,057
optimal cooperation you envision among 

2178
01:26:47,057 --> 01:26:49,630
us Israel and the Arabian are Abraham 

2179
01:26:49,630 --> 01:26:51,741
Accords members . Is it air defense ? 

2180
01:26:51,741 --> 01:26:53,741
What , what do you , what would you 

2181
01:26:53,741 --> 01:26:55,852
hope out of that ? So I think there's 

2182
01:26:55,852 --> 01:26:58,019
several areas senator that we can do . 

2183
01:26:58,019 --> 01:26:57,470
So the Abraham Accords are also 

2184
01:26:57,480 --> 01:26:59,536
economic and I think that's gonna be 

2185
01:26:59,536 --> 01:27:01,647
the economic benefit you get in terms 

2186
01:27:01,647 --> 01:27:04,050
of job creation also as a reduces 

2187
01:27:04,050 --> 01:27:06,050
instability and some of the Abraham 

2188
01:27:06,050 --> 01:27:08,840
Accord countries . Um we do have we 

2189
01:27:08,840 --> 01:27:11,470
talk about Middle East air defense , we 

2190
01:27:11,470 --> 01:27:13,637
talk about maritime security and cyber 

2191
01:27:13,637 --> 01:27:16,120
defense as well . John Langley , you , 

2192
01:27:16,120 --> 01:27:18,176
you talked about what's happening in 

2193
01:27:18,176 --> 01:27:21,200
Kenyan , our on top of the 

2194
01:27:21,210 --> 01:27:23,510
public being up in arms about what's 

2195
01:27:23,510 --> 01:27:25,510
going , what China is doing are the 

2196
01:27:25,510 --> 01:27:27,510
government's pushing back at all in 

2197
01:27:27,510 --> 01:27:28,000
Africa 

2198
01:27:30,920 --> 01:27:33,720
Center . That's , that's part of the 

2199
01:27:33,720 --> 01:27:37,040
problem because what they invest in and 

2200
01:27:37,040 --> 01:27:39,040
when they strike these deals , they 

2201
01:27:39,040 --> 01:27:41,480
strike the deals uh for mostly 

2202
01:27:41,480 --> 01:27:43,424
autocratic , authoritarian type of 

2203
01:27:43,424 --> 01:27:46,500
governance , those of democracies um 

2204
01:27:46,510 --> 01:27:48,732
have a voice because they know that the 

2205
01:27:48,732 --> 01:27:51,450
people are watching . Uh So I think it 

2206
01:27:51,450 --> 01:27:53,750
really matters what particular country 

2207
01:27:53,750 --> 01:27:56,250
that they're pressurizing John Carrillo . 

2208
01:27:56,250 --> 01:27:58,472
Do you have , do you have the resources 

2209
01:27:58,472 --> 01:28:00,639
and personnel that you need to conduct 

2210
01:28:00,639 --> 01:28:02,806
your counterterrorism mission ? Yeah , 

2211
01:28:02,806 --> 01:28:04,861
that's laid out the national defense 

2212
01:28:04,861 --> 01:28:06,583
strategy . So Senator , we are 

2213
01:28:06,583 --> 01:28:08,694
currently balancing the missions that 

2214
01:28:08,694 --> 01:28:10,917
we have with the resources we get . And 

2215
01:28:10,917 --> 01:28:13,139
I'm adjusting risk everyday dynamically 

2216
01:28:13,139 --> 01:28:13,010
with the resources that I have . I'm 

2217
01:28:13,010 --> 01:28:15,121
requesting the additional resources I 

2218
01:28:15,121 --> 01:28:17,288
would need um to be able to accomplish 

2219
01:28:17,288 --> 01:28:19,454
all of my tasks and what you requested 

2220
01:28:19,454 --> 01:28:21,566
is adequate . The what I've requested 

2221
01:28:21,566 --> 01:28:23,732
is adequate and then it's up to the uh 

2222
01:28:23,732 --> 01:28:25,788
the allocation of those resources in 

2223
01:28:25,788 --> 01:28:27,843
accordance with the national defense 

2224
01:28:27,843 --> 01:28:29,899
priorities . Thank you . Thank you , 

2225
01:28:29,899 --> 01:28:31,732
Chairman . Thank you very much , 

2226
01:28:31,732 --> 01:28:33,677
Senator Scott . Uh Senator Rosen , 

2227
01:28:33,677 --> 01:28:35,732
please . Thank you , Chairman Reed . 

2228
01:28:35,732 --> 01:28:37,566
Appreciate it . I appreciate you 

2229
01:28:37,566 --> 01:28:39,677
holding this hearing . And I'd really 

2230
01:28:39,677 --> 01:28:39,610
like to thank Generals Carrillo and 

2231
01:28:39,610 --> 01:28:42,310
Langley uh for your service and for 

2232
01:28:42,310 --> 01:28:44,720
being here today . And I'm just gonna 

2233
01:28:44,720 --> 01:28:46,831
kinda get right into it about Iranian 

2234
01:28:46,831 --> 01:28:48,609
aggression . Of course , top of 

2235
01:28:48,609 --> 01:28:50,720
everyone's mind . So General Carola , 

2236
01:28:50,720 --> 01:28:53,470
the Pentagon estimates that hundreds of 

2237
01:28:53,470 --> 01:28:55,470
American troops have been killed by 

2238
01:28:55,470 --> 01:28:57,470
Iranian backed militias in Iraq and 

2239
01:28:57,470 --> 01:28:59,520
Afghanistan . Yet Iran's regime has 

2240
01:28:59,520 --> 01:29:01,450
never been held accountable for 

2241
01:29:01,450 --> 01:29:03,830
orchestrating attacks against Americans , 

2242
01:29:03,840 --> 01:29:06,007
the men and women who gave their lives 

2243
01:29:06,007 --> 01:29:08,370
by the , for the taken by the state 

2244
01:29:08,370 --> 01:29:10,148
forces . There are thousands of 

2245
01:29:10,148 --> 01:29:12,314
families , they're without their loved 

2246
01:29:12,314 --> 01:29:14,537
ones as a result . And so today Iranian 

2247
01:29:14,537 --> 01:29:16,092
aligned militias , they are 

2248
01:29:16,092 --> 01:29:17,770
increasingly targeting U S 

2249
01:29:17,770 --> 01:29:20,390
installations , service members in Iraq 

2250
01:29:20,400 --> 01:29:22,400
and Syria , the Iraq . It and drone 

2251
01:29:22,400 --> 01:29:25,000
attacks on a regular basis . We know 

2252
01:29:25,000 --> 01:29:26,833
Iran , the world's leading state 

2253
01:29:26,833 --> 01:29:29,000
sponsor of terrorism threatening the U 

2254
01:29:29,000 --> 01:29:30,889
S and our allied interests in the 

2255
01:29:30,889 --> 01:29:32,833
Middle East . And around the world 

2256
01:29:32,833 --> 01:29:34,833
again , via both direct attacks and 

2257
01:29:34,833 --> 01:29:36,556
also through their support for 

2258
01:29:36,556 --> 01:29:38,611
Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic's 

2259
01:29:38,611 --> 01:29:40,667
other terrorist proxies . So , could 

2260
01:29:40,667 --> 01:29:42,500
you discuss in this setting some 

2261
01:29:42,500 --> 01:29:44,556
specific threats the Iranian aligned 

2262
01:29:44,556 --> 01:29:46,722
militia groups posed to the US and our 

2263
01:29:46,722 --> 01:29:48,940
coalition forces ? And what can we do 

2264
01:29:48,940 --> 01:29:51,410
to proactively not just defend against 

2265
01:29:51,410 --> 01:29:53,860
them ? What can we do to proactively 

2266
01:29:53,870 --> 01:29:57,190
maybe push them back ? Thanks senator 

2267
01:29:57,190 --> 01:29:59,301
for the question . So again , Iran is 

2268
01:29:59,301 --> 01:30:01,246
the number one malign actor in the 

2269
01:30:01,246 --> 01:30:03,357
Middle East . Um the latest attack we 

2270
01:30:03,357 --> 01:30:05,523
just had was less than 60 hours ago on 

2271
01:30:05,523 --> 01:30:07,690
one of our bases in Syria that we know 

2272
01:30:07,690 --> 01:30:09,912
that was Iranian aligned militia groups 

2273
01:30:09,912 --> 01:30:12,023
um that conducted this attack . Um we 

2274
01:30:12,023 --> 01:30:14,023
do see the threat that we face from 

2275
01:30:14,023 --> 01:30:17,890
them or from rockets from unmanned 

2276
01:30:17,890 --> 01:30:20,150
systems that are increasingly longer 

2277
01:30:20,150 --> 01:30:22,390
range and more accurate . Um Just in 

2278
01:30:22,390 --> 01:30:24,690
January , we had three U A V S attack 

2279
01:30:24,690 --> 01:30:26,990
our base and on Tom garrison in Syria . 

2280
01:30:27,000 --> 01:30:29,760
Um That was Iranian drones . Um That 

2281
01:30:29,760 --> 01:30:31,982
did that . So we do see that across the 

2282
01:30:31,982 --> 01:30:34,149
region and also against our allies and 

2283
01:30:34,149 --> 01:30:36,204
partners , whether that was from the 

2284
01:30:36,204 --> 01:30:38,204
Houthis coming out of Yemen against 

2285
01:30:38,204 --> 01:30:40,149
Saudi Arabia and the U A E or from 

2286
01:30:40,149 --> 01:30:42,550
Lebanese Hezbollah against Israel or 

2287
01:30:42,550 --> 01:30:44,606
from elements coming out of Iraq and 

2288
01:30:44,606 --> 01:30:46,717
Syria against Iranian aligned militia 

2289
01:30:46,717 --> 01:30:48,828
groups . What we can do is it's going 

2290
01:30:48,828 --> 01:30:50,994
to take a whole of government approach 

2291
01:30:50,994 --> 01:30:53,217
to be able to go after this problem set 

2292
01:30:53,217 --> 01:30:55,217
is , it's not just a so we can work 

2293
01:30:55,217 --> 01:30:57,383
with you on the resources . We need to 

2294
01:30:57,383 --> 01:30:59,606
take care of that because I want to get 

2295
01:30:59,606 --> 01:31:01,717
to something we talked about a little 

2296
01:31:01,717 --> 01:31:04,130
bit earlier , um task force 59 some 

2297
01:31:04,130 --> 01:31:06,297
other interesting things we're doing , 

2298
01:31:06,297 --> 01:31:08,820
but really Israel's transfer to Centcom , 

2299
01:31:09,110 --> 01:31:11,100
uh it's now within your area of 

2300
01:31:11,100 --> 01:31:13,322
responsibility and it's my sincere hope 

2301
01:31:13,322 --> 01:31:15,044
that this realignment is gonna 

2302
01:31:15,044 --> 01:31:17,267
potentially eight even greater military 

2303
01:31:17,267 --> 01:31:19,350
cooperation between the US and our 

2304
01:31:19,350 --> 01:31:22,010
shared goals as well as well as greater 

2305
01:31:22,010 --> 01:31:23,990
cooperation between our Arab and 

2306
01:31:23,990 --> 01:31:26,157
Israeli partners as we see with things 

2307
01:31:26,157 --> 01:31:28,540
like the Abraham Accords coming forward . 

2308
01:31:28,550 --> 01:31:31,230
So I know that I'm pleased to see the 

2309
01:31:31,230 --> 01:31:33,320
increasing pace of joint exercises 

2310
01:31:33,320 --> 01:31:35,730
between the US , Israel Arab partners . 

2311
01:31:35,750 --> 01:31:37,750
And so can you tell us a little bit 

2312
01:31:37,750 --> 01:31:39,639
about the progress you've made in 

2313
01:31:39,639 --> 01:31:41,639
advancing the integration of Israel 

2314
01:31:41,639 --> 01:31:43,417
into your multilateral maritime 

2315
01:31:43,417 --> 01:31:45,860
partnerships , like the very exciting 

2316
01:31:45,860 --> 01:31:47,916
task force , the development they're 

2317
01:31:47,916 --> 01:31:49,971
doing . Uh I was able to learn about 

2318
01:31:49,971 --> 01:31:52,193
them when I recently visited NAV , sent 

2319
01:31:52,193 --> 01:31:54,730
in Bahrain . So thank you , Senator . 

2320
01:31:54,730 --> 01:31:56,897
We think it's going very well with the 

2321
01:31:56,897 --> 01:31:59,063
integration of Israel into the Centcom 

2322
01:31:59,063 --> 01:32:01,250
hor including our exercises in our 

2323
01:32:01,250 --> 01:32:03,380
training as well . Um We did have a 

2324
01:32:03,380 --> 01:32:05,491
bilateral exercise called Juniper Oak 

2325
01:32:05,491 --> 01:32:07,713
that we just did in January , which was 

2326
01:32:07,713 --> 01:32:09,769
the largest exercise with 100 and 42 

2327
01:32:09,769 --> 01:32:12,102
aircraft that we participated with them . 

2328
01:32:12,102 --> 01:32:14,102
Um in January , when you talk about 

2329
01:32:14,102 --> 01:32:16,047
task force 59 that is our maritime 

2330
01:32:16,047 --> 01:32:19,170
security um Innovation um Task force is 

2331
01:32:19,170 --> 01:32:22,160
an unmanned undersea unmanned vessel 

2332
01:32:22,170 --> 01:32:24,059
task force where we basically are 

2333
01:32:24,059 --> 01:32:26,330
enhancing the manned platforms that we 

2334
01:32:26,330 --> 01:32:29,620
have . So one police car , 11 destroyer 

2335
01:32:29,620 --> 01:32:31,842
in the Red Sea is the equivalent of one 

2336
01:32:31,842 --> 01:32:33,787
police car patrolling the state of 

2337
01:32:33,787 --> 01:32:35,842
California . When we take a bunch of 

2338
01:32:35,842 --> 01:32:38,064
unmanned platforms like sale drones and 

2339
01:32:38,064 --> 01:32:40,009
other unmanned surface vessels and 

2340
01:32:40,009 --> 01:32:42,231
undersea vessels , they act as a series 

2341
01:32:42,231 --> 01:32:41,700
of indications and warnings with 

2342
01:32:41,700 --> 01:32:43,811
sensors out there in a mesh network . 

2343
01:32:43,811 --> 01:32:46,033
They can feed it back into a structured 

2344
01:32:46,033 --> 01:32:48,089
database that then we run algorithms 

2345
01:32:48,089 --> 01:32:50,256
against to help us make decisions . Is 

2346
01:32:50,256 --> 01:32:52,033
that normal behavior , abnormal 

2347
01:32:52,033 --> 01:32:54,200
behavior to then use our man platforms 

2348
01:32:54,200 --> 01:32:53,950
better to be able to get after the 

2349
01:32:53,950 --> 01:32:56,210
problem set . I'm gonna , hopefully 

2350
01:32:56,210 --> 01:32:58,640
you'll come and show us all of briefing 

2351
01:32:58,640 --> 01:33:00,529
on what you're doing there . It's 

2352
01:33:00,529 --> 01:33:02,529
pretty exciting . Um But in the few 

2353
01:33:02,529 --> 01:33:04,529
seconds I have left , we're talking 

2354
01:33:04,529 --> 01:33:06,751
about the region integrated air missile 

2355
01:33:06,751 --> 01:33:08,973
defense , naval maritime partnerships . 

2356
01:33:08,973 --> 01:33:11,300
Um How is Centcom reassuring our 

2357
01:33:11,300 --> 01:33:14,090
regional partners that the US is really 

2358
01:33:14,090 --> 01:33:16,320
committed to regional stability and 

2359
01:33:16,320 --> 01:33:18,542
security when we were there leading the 

2360
01:33:18,542 --> 01:33:20,740
Abraham Accords caucus delegation when 

2361
01:33:20,740 --> 01:33:22,851
I was there , this was the number one 

2362
01:33:22,851 --> 01:33:24,907
thing people wanted to know . Are we 

2363
01:33:24,907 --> 01:33:27,018
committed to the region ? How are you 

2364
01:33:27,018 --> 01:33:29,018
showing them that I spent 50% of my 

2365
01:33:29,018 --> 01:33:31,129
time in the region ? We have a series 

2366
01:33:31,129 --> 01:33:33,240
of exercises and training events . So 

2367
01:33:33,240 --> 01:33:35,407
um last 41 training and exercises that 

2368
01:33:35,407 --> 01:33:37,518
we do multilateral and bilateral . Um 

2369
01:33:37,518 --> 01:33:39,573
And that is the way we are trying to 

2370
01:33:39,573 --> 01:33:41,796
build up our partner capacity with them 

2371
01:33:41,796 --> 01:33:43,851
by integrating them into the systems 

2372
01:33:43,851 --> 01:33:45,907
that we have as well . Thank you . I 

2373
01:33:45,907 --> 01:33:48,073
see my time's up , Mr Chairman . Thank 

2374
01:33:48,073 --> 01:33:50,296
you very much , Senator Rosen , Senator 

2375
01:33:50,296 --> 01:33:52,351
Blood . Please . Excuse me , Senator 

2376
01:33:52,351 --> 01:33:54,184
Tuberville has arrived . Senator 

2377
01:33:54,184 --> 01:33:56,600
Tuberville . Thank you , Mr Chairman 

2378
01:33:58,900 --> 01:34:00,900
General . Thanks for being here and 

2379
01:34:00,900 --> 01:34:02,956
thanks for your service . You've got 

2380
01:34:02,956 --> 01:34:05,011
your hands full . General corella in 

2381
01:34:05,011 --> 01:34:07,670
your organization task force . 59 has 

2382
01:34:07,670 --> 01:34:09,980
had some great success building 

2383
01:34:09,990 --> 01:34:12,046
unmanned systems . I'm familiar with 

2384
01:34:12,046 --> 01:34:14,157
one of their platforms , sell drone . 

2385
01:34:14,157 --> 01:34:16,268
Uh It seems like these systems have a 

2386
01:34:16,268 --> 01:34:18,379
lot of potential for both Centcom and 

2387
01:34:18,379 --> 01:34:20,434
the Navy and it's encouraging to see 

2388
01:34:20,434 --> 01:34:22,268
your command taking advantage of 

2389
01:34:22,268 --> 01:34:24,379
cutting edge technology as commercial 

2390
01:34:24,379 --> 01:34:26,101
sector . What do you think has 

2391
01:34:26,101 --> 01:34:28,046
contributed to the success of task 

2392
01:34:28,046 --> 01:34:30,220
force ? 59 work with systems like Cell 

2393
01:34:30,220 --> 01:34:32,410
Drome . I think what's successful is 

2394
01:34:32,410 --> 01:34:35,200
the people . Um It's the people that we 

2395
01:34:35,200 --> 01:34:37,340
hire that are innovative and creative 

2396
01:34:37,340 --> 01:34:39,340
and critical thinkers . And when we 

2397
01:34:39,340 --> 01:34:41,396
push these systems into their hand , 

2398
01:34:41,396 --> 01:34:43,340
they're using them in ways that we 

2399
01:34:43,340 --> 01:34:45,451
never thought possible . A lot of the 

2400
01:34:45,451 --> 01:34:47,284
systems and the unmanned and the 

2401
01:34:47,284 --> 01:34:49,507
undersea that we use , they're used for 

2402
01:34:49,507 --> 01:34:51,673
commercial fishing . When fishermen go 

2403
01:34:51,673 --> 01:34:53,673
out , they're not going out to find 

2404
01:34:53,673 --> 01:34:55,951
fish , they're going out to catch fish . 

2405
01:34:55,951 --> 01:34:55,400
And so we use a lot of these systems 

2406
01:34:55,400 --> 01:34:57,567
with their integrated sensors . Um , I 

2407
01:34:57,567 --> 01:34:59,456
think sale drone initially was an 

2408
01:34:59,456 --> 01:35:01,567
environment was used for a maritime , 

2409
01:35:01,567 --> 01:35:05,290
um , oceanographic capabilities and 

2410
01:35:05,290 --> 01:35:07,401
we've turned that into something that 

2411
01:35:07,401 --> 01:35:09,679
can act as indications and warnings um , 

2412
01:35:09,679 --> 01:35:11,957
with the sensors that are on it . Yeah , 

2413
01:35:11,957 --> 01:35:14,234
we almost lost a couple of cell drones . 

2414
01:35:14,234 --> 01:35:16,401
I think Iran tried to load a couple on 

2415
01:35:16,401 --> 01:35:18,457
one of their ships . Was that during 

2416
01:35:18,457 --> 01:35:20,512
your , it was ? Yeah . How'd that go 

2417
01:35:20,512 --> 01:35:22,568
out ? We got them back , we got them 

2418
01:35:22,568 --> 01:35:24,568
back . Good . Well , that's good to 

2419
01:35:24,568 --> 01:35:26,690
know . At one time we had 60 balloons 

2420
01:35:26,690 --> 01:35:29,500
over Kabul Afghanistan RISR is very 

2421
01:35:29,500 --> 01:35:32,190
limited . How confident are you in the 

2422
01:35:32,190 --> 01:35:34,134
intelligence ? You have to see new 

2423
01:35:34,134 --> 01:35:37,190
threats rising from the Taliban . So 

2424
01:35:37,200 --> 01:35:39,200
currently our , our intelligence is 

2425
01:35:39,200 --> 01:35:41,144
degraded since we are no longer in 

2426
01:35:41,144 --> 01:35:43,320
Afghanistan . I believe we can see the 

2427
01:35:43,320 --> 01:35:45,542
broad contours of an attack . Sometimes 

2428
01:35:45,542 --> 01:35:47,764
we lack the granularity to see the full 

2429
01:35:47,764 --> 01:35:49,987
picture and we're working to close that 

2430
01:35:49,987 --> 01:35:52,209
gap with our alternative airborne I S R 

2431
01:35:52,209 --> 01:35:54,431
and some of our other intelligence that 

2432
01:35:54,431 --> 01:35:56,542
we're working to penetrate into those 

2433
01:35:56,542 --> 01:35:58,598
networks . It seems like uh for some 

2434
01:35:58,598 --> 01:36:00,764
reason this administration is going to 

2435
01:36:00,764 --> 01:36:03,098
accept Iran developing a nuclear weapon . 

2436
01:36:03,098 --> 01:36:05,209
If Iran does develop a nuclear weapon 

2437
01:36:05,209 --> 01:36:07,560
of mass destruction , which the United 

2438
01:36:07,560 --> 01:36:09,671
States spent trillions trying to keep 

2439
01:36:09,671 --> 01:36:11,727
out of the hands of dictators in the 

2440
01:36:11,727 --> 01:36:13,782
Middle East . How will that scramble 

2441
01:36:13,782 --> 01:36:15,640
your A O R ? It would change it 

2442
01:36:15,650 --> 01:36:18,880
overnight and forever General Langley . 

2443
01:36:19,610 --> 01:36:21,970
I'm aware of several vacancies in key 

2444
01:36:21,970 --> 01:36:24,760
diplomatic post . I was in South Africa 

2445
01:36:24,770 --> 01:36:27,980
recently . Uh China is their daily 

2446
01:36:28,510 --> 01:36:30,770
trying to move in . Uh Is that 

2447
01:36:30,770 --> 01:36:32,937
important to you ? The diplomatic post 

2448
01:36:32,937 --> 01:36:35,160
being filled ? Senator ? Absolutely . 

2449
01:36:35,160 --> 01:36:38,110
Is it builds capacity as I talk about 

2450
01:36:38,110 --> 01:36:41,760
the three D construct , having a full 

2451
01:36:41,770 --> 01:36:44,540
fledged bolstered capacity at our 

2452
01:36:44,540 --> 01:36:47,560
diplomatic post is essential . It makes 

2453
01:36:47,560 --> 01:36:49,980
a difference of us be being able to 

2454
01:36:49,990 --> 01:36:52,560
maintain our partnership and capacity . 

2455
01:36:52,570 --> 01:36:55,060
Moreover , ensuring our strategic 

2456
01:36:55,060 --> 01:36:57,116
access . Could you talk a little bit 

2457
01:36:57,116 --> 01:36:59,338
about South Africa and what you've done 

2458
01:36:59,338 --> 01:37:01,060
since you've been there , your 

2459
01:37:01,060 --> 01:37:03,227
relationship that you've made and what 

2460
01:37:03,227 --> 01:37:05,227
you see coming from China and maybe 

2461
01:37:05,227 --> 01:37:07,449
even Russia uh Senator , I haven't been 

2462
01:37:07,449 --> 01:37:09,671
to South Africa yet . Uh I will be gone 

2463
01:37:09,671 --> 01:37:11,671
there in the coming months . Uh But 

2464
01:37:11,671 --> 01:37:13,782
right now , what I'm really concerned 

2465
01:37:13,782 --> 01:37:15,838
about is uh mosey to that exercise , 

2466
01:37:15,838 --> 01:37:17,949
that naval exercise . That was just a 

2467
01:37:17,949 --> 01:37:21,120
messaging campaign by , by the Russian 

2468
01:37:21,120 --> 01:37:24,100
Federation and also by the P R C . So 

2469
01:37:24,100 --> 01:37:25,989
I've been having discussions with 

2470
01:37:25,989 --> 01:37:28,410
Ambassador Bridge 80 down there and 

2471
01:37:28,410 --> 01:37:31,120
saying , what's South Africa's story ? 

2472
01:37:31,130 --> 01:37:33,660
South Africa . They are , they have 

2473
01:37:33,660 --> 01:37:35,716
been a good partner . We're building 

2474
01:37:35,716 --> 01:37:37,882
relationships , but they don't want to 

2475
01:37:37,882 --> 01:37:40,049
be pressurized in who they choose . So 

2476
01:37:40,049 --> 01:37:41,993
I have to use assurance actions to 

2477
01:37:41,993 --> 01:37:44,160
compel them that we are the partner of 

2478
01:37:44,160 --> 01:37:46,160
choice . Don't you think it's vital 

2479
01:37:46,160 --> 01:37:48,382
that we keep China from overtaking that 

2480
01:37:48,382 --> 01:37:50,740
uh that ports there in South Africa ? 

2481
01:37:51,080 --> 01:37:53,390
Absolutely . So sir , because as we 

2482
01:37:53,390 --> 01:37:55,557
look at the cape of good hope and look 

2483
01:37:55,557 --> 01:37:58,270
at how much transit that our commerce 

2484
01:37:58,270 --> 01:38:01,450
goes across . And it's also uh it can 

2485
01:38:01,450 --> 01:38:03,450
also be a power projection point as 

2486
01:38:03,450 --> 01:38:05,660
well . So we can ill afford from a geo 

2487
01:38:05,660 --> 01:38:08,390
strategic composition allow either the 

2488
01:38:08,390 --> 01:38:11,310
PRC or even Russia to use that as a 

2489
01:38:11,310 --> 01:38:13,477
platform . Yeah , I know it's not your 

2490
01:38:13,477 --> 01:38:15,643
purview , but they're trying to do the 

2491
01:38:15,643 --> 01:38:17,699
same thing in Argentina , you know , 

2492
01:38:17,699 --> 01:38:19,754
which is the point of South of South 

2493
01:38:19,754 --> 01:38:21,921
America . And we definitely don't need 

2494
01:38:21,921 --> 01:38:24,143
to lose , lose those two point contacts 

2495
01:38:24,143 --> 01:38:26,199
in terms of navigation . Thank you . 

2496
01:38:26,199 --> 01:38:25,880
Thank you very much . Thank you , Mr 

2497
01:38:25,880 --> 01:38:27,602
Chairman . Thank you , Senator 

2498
01:38:27,602 --> 01:38:29,769
Tuberville , Senator Peters , please . 

2499
01:38:29,769 --> 01:38:31,658
Thank you , Mr Chairman General . 

2500
01:38:31,658 --> 01:38:33,910
Welcome . Good to have you here . I , 

2501
01:38:33,920 --> 01:38:36,320
along with my colleagues on the 

2502
01:38:36,320 --> 01:38:38,600
committee have worked to strengthen our 

2503
01:38:38,600 --> 01:38:41,070
partnership with , with Israel uh in 

2504
01:38:41,080 --> 01:38:43,136
particular , the , the collaboration 

2505
01:38:43,136 --> 01:38:45,358
and synergies between our two countries 

2506
01:38:45,358 --> 01:38:47,750
in the innovation space , I believe 

2507
01:38:47,750 --> 01:38:49,806
probably has never been greater . Uh 

2508
01:38:49,806 --> 01:38:51,972
And it's certainly it's an area that I 

2509
01:38:51,972 --> 01:38:54,139
believe the United States must do more 

2510
01:38:54,139 --> 01:38:56,139
to take advantage of our friendship 

2511
01:38:56,139 --> 01:38:58,194
with like minded . I guess you could 

2512
01:38:58,194 --> 01:39:00,306
call them techno democracies that are 

2513
01:39:00,306 --> 01:39:02,250
highly stated in that area . I was 

2514
01:39:02,250 --> 01:39:04,472
proud to sponsor legislation creating a 

2515
01:39:04,472 --> 01:39:07,040
US Israel Operations technology working 

2516
01:39:07,040 --> 01:39:09,790
group to help further the D O D efforts 

2517
01:39:09,790 --> 01:39:12,230
in that area . And my question for you 

2518
01:39:12,230 --> 01:39:15,350
is if you could please speak to the 

2519
01:39:15,370 --> 01:39:17,250
strategic advantage that our 

2520
01:39:17,250 --> 01:39:19,520
relationship with Israel offers in a 

2521
01:39:19,540 --> 01:39:21,690
global environment where rapid 

2522
01:39:21,690 --> 01:39:24,060
innovation and the fielding of emerging 

2523
01:39:24,060 --> 01:39:26,580
of emerging technologies rapidly is 

2524
01:39:26,580 --> 01:39:28,913
absolutely key to our national security . 

2525
01:39:29,290 --> 01:39:31,440
Thanks , Senator Israel is one of the 

2526
01:39:31,440 --> 01:39:34,650
world leaders in uh in technology , in 

2527
01:39:34,650 --> 01:39:36,872
terms of the innovation and how to take 

2528
01:39:36,872 --> 01:39:38,950
that to the uh areas of national 

2529
01:39:38,950 --> 01:39:41,070
security . Um I have been over there 

2530
01:39:41,070 --> 01:39:43,126
several times . I have seen how they 

2531
01:39:43,126 --> 01:39:45,181
are implementing that . Um I do find 

2532
01:39:45,181 --> 01:39:47,403
that the relationship that we have with 

2533
01:39:47,403 --> 01:39:49,626
them is already bearing fruits in terms 

2534
01:39:49,626 --> 01:39:51,848
of that . I look at that in the counter 

2535
01:39:51,848 --> 01:39:51,670
US field where I've been all the way 

2536
01:39:51,670 --> 01:39:53,892
down from iron dome , all the way up to 

2537
01:39:53,892 --> 01:39:56,380
uh the exo atmospheric Arrow three and 

2538
01:39:56,380 --> 01:39:58,436
it's the ability to understand their 

2539
01:39:58,436 --> 01:40:00,547
technology and be able to proliferate 

2540
01:40:00,547 --> 01:40:02,830
that as well . General at the end of 

2541
01:40:02,830 --> 01:40:04,886
this month , we will mark the eighth 

2542
01:40:04,886 --> 01:40:08,270
year of the war in , in Yemen . Uh This , 

2543
01:40:08,280 --> 01:40:10,470
this conflict has been humanitarian 

2544
01:40:10,470 --> 01:40:12,581
catastrophe for hundreds of thousands 

2545
01:40:12,581 --> 01:40:15,560
of deaths , millions displaced and tens 

2546
01:40:15,560 --> 01:40:17,560
of millions of humanity's suffering 

2547
01:40:17,560 --> 01:40:21,140
from both famine and disease . The war 

2548
01:40:21,140 --> 01:40:23,810
has been exacerbated by the role of a 

2549
01:40:23,820 --> 01:40:27,180
proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and 

2550
01:40:27,180 --> 01:40:30,510
Iran and has been the people of Yemen 

2551
01:40:30,510 --> 01:40:33,160
who unfortunately have been the victims 

2552
01:40:33,170 --> 01:40:35,300
uh and have suffered as a result of 

2553
01:40:35,300 --> 01:40:39,150
this geopolitical strategizing Congress 

2554
01:40:39,150 --> 01:40:40,983
has been active ensuring that us 

2555
01:40:40,983 --> 01:40:42,817
support is not the cause for any 

2556
01:40:42,817 --> 01:40:46,020
innocent suffering in Yemen . June 2022 

2557
01:40:46,020 --> 01:40:48,242
G O report . Regarding civilian impacts 

2558
01:40:48,242 --> 01:40:50,410
of U S military support for the Saudi 

2559
01:40:50,410 --> 01:40:52,760
Coalition provided recommendations to 

2560
01:40:52,760 --> 01:40:55,270
the D O D on measures to help mitigate 

2561
01:40:55,270 --> 01:40:57,920
civilian harm from our support . 

2562
01:40:58,180 --> 01:41:00,180
Question for you , sir is , has the 

2563
01:41:00,180 --> 01:41:02,236
department developed and implemented 

2564
01:41:02,236 --> 01:41:04,402
guidance for reporting any indications 

2565
01:41:04,402 --> 01:41:06,402
that U S made defense articles were 

2566
01:41:06,402 --> 01:41:08,850
used in Yemen by Saudi Arabia or the U 

2567
01:41:08,850 --> 01:41:11,770
A against anything other other than 

2568
01:41:11,770 --> 01:41:14,660
legitimate military targets . Senator , 

2569
01:41:14,660 --> 01:41:16,771
I'm aware of that G A report . I have 

2570
01:41:16,771 --> 01:41:19,170
read it . I've seen it . Um And my 

2571
01:41:19,170 --> 01:41:20,892
understanding right now is the 

2572
01:41:20,892 --> 01:41:22,781
department is working through any 

2573
01:41:22,781 --> 01:41:24,892
implementation instructions from it . 

2574
01:41:24,892 --> 01:41:26,837
Very good . General Langley , drug 

2575
01:41:26,837 --> 01:41:28,948
trafficking and the cartels profiting 

2576
01:41:28,948 --> 01:41:30,837
from that trade are , are without 

2577
01:41:30,837 --> 01:41:32,948
question a global threat . Africom is 

2578
01:41:32,948 --> 01:41:35,003
certainly not immune to these issues 

2579
01:41:35,003 --> 01:41:36,948
with West Africa in particular now 

2580
01:41:36,948 --> 01:41:39,730
serving as a popular vector for cartels 

2581
01:41:39,730 --> 01:41:42,200
to move products from Latin America to , 

2582
01:41:42,210 --> 01:41:45,210
to Europe . The drug trade destabilizes 

2583
01:41:45,220 --> 01:41:47,276
lawful governments undermines public 

2584
01:41:47,276 --> 01:41:50,120
safety and provides critical funding 

2585
01:41:50,120 --> 01:41:52,231
and resources for other transnational 

2586
01:41:52,231 --> 01:41:54,453
criminal organizations . So my question 

2587
01:41:54,453 --> 01:41:56,509
for you , general is what efforts is 

2588
01:41:56,509 --> 01:41:58,731
Africa making to strengthen the ability 

2589
01:41:58,731 --> 01:42:00,953
of local governments to conduct counter 

2590
01:42:00,953 --> 01:42:03,460
narcotics operations and to attack this 

2591
01:42:03,470 --> 01:42:06,500
insidious trade . Senator , thanks for 

2592
01:42:06,500 --> 01:42:09,010
asking that question because that is of 

2593
01:42:09,020 --> 01:42:11,280
particular concern with our partners . 

2594
01:42:11,290 --> 01:42:13,290
The Gulf of Guinea is like the wild 

2595
01:42:13,290 --> 01:42:15,512
wild west illicit activity , especially 

2596
01:42:15,512 --> 01:42:18,670
the drug trade to exercise is just uh 

2597
01:42:18,680 --> 01:42:20,791
just happened uh in the , in the , in 

2598
01:42:20,791 --> 01:42:23,730
the past month . Oh Bigamy Express . Oh , 

2599
01:42:23,730 --> 01:42:27,300
Bigamy Expresses . Whereas we uh had a 

2600
01:42:27,300 --> 01:42:29,467
number of countries that come together 

2601
01:42:29,467 --> 01:42:32,050
to focus on illicit activity across 

2602
01:42:32,050 --> 01:42:35,020
adult , across the Gulf . And the drug 

2603
01:42:35,020 --> 01:42:37,420
trade is one of it smuggling as another 

2604
01:42:37,430 --> 01:42:40,800
and transit , transiting citizens as 

2605
01:42:40,800 --> 01:42:44,660
well uh across the , across that 

2606
01:42:44,660 --> 01:42:47,180
region . But it's inextricably link to 

2607
01:42:47,180 --> 01:42:49,690
South America as well . So I work with 

2608
01:42:49,700 --> 01:42:52,060
General Richardson on that and I thank 

2609
01:42:52,060 --> 01:42:55,340
this congress for legislation that gave 

2610
01:42:55,340 --> 01:42:57,780
us $200 million to address this , this 

2611
01:42:57,780 --> 01:42:59,750
issue . But building partnership 

2612
01:42:59,760 --> 01:43:01,482
capacity with African nation , 

2613
01:43:01,482 --> 01:43:03,316
especially in the Gulf of Guinea 

2614
01:43:03,316 --> 01:43:05,260
addresses that issue as they build 

2615
01:43:05,260 --> 01:43:07,316
their maritime capacity . But that's 

2616
01:43:07,316 --> 01:43:09,700
also an opportunity for for another ask . 

2617
01:43:09,710 --> 01:43:12,850
Uh Hershel Woody Williams and even the 

2618
01:43:12,850 --> 01:43:15,490
Coast Guard . Uh when they , when they 

2619
01:43:15,500 --> 01:43:17,222
bring a cutter in , it makes a 

2620
01:43:17,222 --> 01:43:19,000
difference . Uh This is enabled 

2621
01:43:19,000 --> 01:43:21,000
diplomacy at its best if we can get 

2622
01:43:21,000 --> 01:43:23,111
assignment of another ship , I wish I 

2623
01:43:23,111 --> 01:43:25,222
had another Hershel Woody Williams to 

2624
01:43:25,222 --> 01:43:26,944
cover the other side of Africa 

2625
01:43:26,944 --> 01:43:29,167
continent , but just naval activity and 

2626
01:43:29,167 --> 01:43:32,300
bolstering our our partners ability for 

2627
01:43:32,300 --> 01:43:36,210
their maritime uh expertise uh build 

2628
01:43:36,210 --> 01:43:38,130
upon that building capability is 

2629
01:43:38,130 --> 01:43:40,320
essential going forward . Thank you . 

2630
01:43:40,670 --> 01:43:42,726
Thank you , General . Thank you , Mr 

2631
01:43:42,726 --> 01:43:44,726
Chairman . Thank you Senator Peters 

2632
01:43:44,726 --> 01:43:46,892
Center . But thank you chairman . Good 

2633
01:43:46,892 --> 01:43:48,837
morning , gentlemen . Um I want to 

2634
01:43:48,837 --> 01:43:48,650
thank you both for your , your 

2635
01:43:48,650 --> 01:43:50,317
leadership and your service , 

2636
01:43:50,317 --> 01:43:52,539
particularly commands of units in North 

2637
01:43:52,539 --> 01:43:54,872
Carolina at Fort Bragg and Camp Lejeune . 

2638
01:43:54,872 --> 01:43:57,020
So I recently returned from both of 

2639
01:43:57,020 --> 01:43:59,242
your overseas areas of responsibility . 

2640
01:43:59,242 --> 01:44:02,220
Um Common complaint from our allies and 

2641
01:44:02,220 --> 01:44:04,390
our partners is that the foreign 

2642
01:44:04,390 --> 01:44:06,710
military sales process , it's overly 

2643
01:44:06,710 --> 01:44:08,660
complicated and slow . It's just 

2644
01:44:08,670 --> 01:44:11,260
downright bureaucratic . So , in that 

2645
01:44:11,260 --> 01:44:13,482
vein , I have a series of questions and 

2646
01:44:13,482 --> 01:44:15,482
if you would just , uh if you would 

2647
01:44:15,482 --> 01:44:17,371
give me a simple yes or no to the 

2648
01:44:17,371 --> 01:44:19,538
answer and then at the end , hopefully 

2649
01:44:19,538 --> 01:44:18,860
we'll have a little more time and I'll 

2650
01:44:18,870 --> 01:44:22,760
give you some time to elaborate . Um So 

2651
01:44:22,770 --> 01:44:25,200
general gorilla is the current FMS 

2652
01:44:25,200 --> 01:44:27,320
process fast and flexible enough to 

2653
01:44:27,320 --> 01:44:29,550
meet our foreign partners security 

2654
01:44:29,550 --> 01:44:31,970
needs in your respective A R S in 

2655
01:44:34,420 --> 01:44:38,190
Africom ? No . Does the transfer of us 

2656
01:44:38,190 --> 01:44:40,190
defense products build our partners 

2657
01:44:40,190 --> 01:44:42,079
capacity to provide for their own 

2658
01:44:42,079 --> 01:44:45,820
defense and respond to threats general , 

2659
01:44:47,300 --> 01:44:50,560
yes , sir . Given the success of 

2660
01:44:50,560 --> 01:44:53,120
Western arms against Russian equipment 

2661
01:44:53,120 --> 01:44:55,550
in Ukraine . Is there an increased 

2662
01:44:55,550 --> 01:44:57,990
interest in us defense products in your 

2663
01:44:57,990 --> 01:45:00,700
A R ? There's a very strong interest in 

2664
01:45:00,700 --> 01:45:03,610
us products very strong in Africa , 

2665
01:45:03,620 --> 01:45:07,310
Africa as well ? Thank you . Is China 

2666
01:45:07,310 --> 01:45:09,210
increasing arms exports to any 

2667
01:45:09,210 --> 01:45:13,130
countries in ? Um A are general General . 

2668
01:45:14,440 --> 01:45:16,607
The center is kind of flat lined right 

2669
01:45:16,607 --> 01:45:18,730
now but they have been before , they 

2670
01:45:18,730 --> 01:45:20,952
have been before in the past . Thanks . 

2671
01:45:20,952 --> 01:45:23,174
Is the United States still the security 

2672
01:45:23,174 --> 01:45:25,286
partner of choice in your A ours . It 

2673
01:45:25,286 --> 01:45:27,452
is Senator . Absolutely Center . It is 

2674
01:45:27,452 --> 01:45:30,220
in Africa is the United States at risk 

2675
01:45:30,220 --> 01:45:32,360
of losing that security partner of 

2676
01:45:32,360 --> 01:45:34,990
choice status to either China or Russia , 

2677
01:45:35,660 --> 01:45:37,980
China is making inroads . I do not 

2678
01:45:37,980 --> 01:45:41,930
assess Russia is it is at risk 

2679
01:45:41,940 --> 01:45:45,590
center . So if you elaborate a bit , if 

2680
01:45:45,590 --> 01:45:47,980
you could each explain how FMS 

2681
01:45:47,980 --> 01:45:49,924
challenges are impacting strategic 

2682
01:45:49,924 --> 01:45:52,036
competition with China and Russia and 

2683
01:45:52,036 --> 01:45:54,258
you're A R S if you elaborate on that , 

2684
01:45:54,258 --> 01:45:56,369
please . Sure , Senator . So in the , 

2685
01:45:56,369 --> 01:45:58,480
in the Centcom hor with the number of 

2686
01:45:58,480 --> 01:46:00,313
attacks that we see in there are 

2687
01:46:00,313 --> 01:46:02,670
partners have real security needs and 

2688
01:46:02,670 --> 01:46:05,310
so they want to have the equipment they 

2689
01:46:05,310 --> 01:46:08,030
need fast . What China is able to do is 

2690
01:46:08,030 --> 01:46:10,086
come in very quickly , open up their 

2691
01:46:10,086 --> 01:46:12,197
catalog , let them pick from anything 

2692
01:46:12,197 --> 01:46:14,419
in it , very quickly deliver it . There 

2693
01:46:14,419 --> 01:46:16,419
is no end user agreement , but what 

2694
01:46:16,419 --> 01:46:18,530
they don't do is they don't follow up 

2695
01:46:18,530 --> 01:46:18,500
with it and they don't have the 

2696
01:46:18,500 --> 01:46:20,630
training , the expertise , the 

2697
01:46:20,630 --> 01:46:22,850
sustainment , the upgrades and what we 

2698
01:46:22,850 --> 01:46:25,017
do find with our partners is when they 

2699
01:46:25,017 --> 01:46:27,910
buy Chinese equipment , vast majority , 

2700
01:46:27,910 --> 01:46:30,610
it becomes a non mission capable a year 

2701
01:46:30,610 --> 01:46:32,666
or so after they have that equipment 

2702
01:46:32,666 --> 01:46:34,777
and we do see a complaint from that . 

2703
01:46:34,777 --> 01:46:36,777
They want to buy us equipment , but 

2704
01:46:36,777 --> 01:46:39,054
sometimes it is the timeline to get it . 

2705
01:46:39,054 --> 01:46:41,277
That is a , that is a hindrance and the 

2706
01:46:41,277 --> 01:46:43,332
process . Well , the process is what 

2707
01:46:43,332 --> 01:46:43,310
takes the time to do it . And there I 

2708
01:46:43,310 --> 01:46:45,532
know that the Department of Defense has 

2709
01:46:45,532 --> 01:46:47,588
a tiger team to look specifically at 

2710
01:46:47,588 --> 01:46:49,699
what the Department of Defense can do 

2711
01:46:49,699 --> 01:46:51,866
to increase its uh there's four levels 

2712
01:46:51,866 --> 01:46:51,600
Department of Defense State Congress 

2713
01:46:51,600 --> 01:46:53,544
and Industry and the Department of 

2714
01:46:53,544 --> 01:46:55,600
Defense is looking at the uh their , 

2715
01:46:55,600 --> 01:46:57,489
their lever . Thank you , General 

2716
01:46:57,489 --> 01:46:59,322
Senator I've characterized in my 

2717
01:46:59,322 --> 01:47:01,378
assessment since taking command that 

2718
01:47:01,378 --> 01:47:03,600
West Africa is at a tipping point . And 

2719
01:47:03,600 --> 01:47:06,200
what I mean is uh how these 

2720
01:47:06,210 --> 01:47:09,970
uh extremist groups , whether we're 

2721
01:47:09,970 --> 01:47:13,710
talking about Isis uh West Africa or 

2722
01:47:13,720 --> 01:47:16,770
even Jane M or Boko Haram , they're all 

2723
01:47:16,770 --> 01:47:18,937
at the door , especially at the global 

2724
01:47:18,937 --> 01:47:21,048
guinea states as I've done my travels 

2725
01:47:21,048 --> 01:47:23,270
and I was in Ghana , they said we don't 

2726
01:47:23,270 --> 01:47:25,270
want your boots on the ground , but 

2727
01:47:25,270 --> 01:47:27,326
we're like , you're equipment all we 

2728
01:47:27,326 --> 01:47:29,437
need in Ghana , all we need to affect 

2729
01:47:29,437 --> 01:47:31,381
the across initiative , which is a 

2730
01:47:31,381 --> 01:47:33,548
coalition of willing of States of Togo 

2731
01:47:33,548 --> 01:47:35,770
Benin and Cote d'ivoire . But they want 

2732
01:47:35,770 --> 01:47:37,770
equipment before they go across the 

2733
01:47:37,770 --> 01:47:40,103
line of departure . They need equipment , 

2734
01:47:40,103 --> 01:47:42,159
they want us equipment but they know 

2735
01:47:42,159 --> 01:47:43,992
how long it takes . So they're , 

2736
01:47:43,992 --> 01:47:46,103
they're , they're considering because 

2737
01:47:46,103 --> 01:47:48,326
that these affiliates are at their back 

2738
01:47:48,326 --> 01:47:50,326
door . They need something now they 

2739
01:47:50,326 --> 01:47:52,381
want to come with us , Senator , but 

2740
01:47:52,381 --> 01:47:54,492
the process is too slow and they need 

2741
01:47:54,492 --> 01:47:57,530
to be able to affect a viable offense 

2742
01:47:57,540 --> 01:48:00,030
to help cultivar , excuse me , to 

2743
01:48:00,030 --> 01:48:02,650
affect Burkina faso uh save their own 

2744
01:48:02,650 --> 01:48:05,320
country . So we're showing good what we 

2745
01:48:05,320 --> 01:48:08,280
would like to see . Uh partner led us 

2746
01:48:08,280 --> 01:48:10,447
enabled , but we need to step with the 

2747
01:48:10,447 --> 01:48:12,613
U S enabled at this point that matches 

2748
01:48:12,613 --> 01:48:14,447
uh conversations with our allies 

2749
01:48:14,447 --> 01:48:16,502
recently . Uh Can you please discuss 

2750
01:48:16,502 --> 01:48:18,391
how your requirements for special 

2751
01:48:18,391 --> 01:48:20,600
operations Forces has grown and what 

2752
01:48:20,600 --> 01:48:23,700
cuts to S O F in strength would have on 

2753
01:48:23,700 --> 01:48:26,440
your operations . Senator , I rely very 

2754
01:48:26,440 --> 01:48:28,410
heavily on our special operations 

2755
01:48:28,410 --> 01:48:30,521
forces in the Senate committee . Oh , 

2756
01:48:30,521 --> 01:48:32,743
are they are doing tremendous work ? Um 

2757
01:48:32,743 --> 01:48:35,030
Any cuts to in the Centcom region would 

2758
01:48:35,030 --> 01:48:38,220
affect me significantly ? You would 

2759
01:48:38,220 --> 01:48:40,387
take the heart out of our efforts both 

2760
01:48:40,387 --> 01:48:42,890
in the east and the west with our uh 

2761
01:48:42,900 --> 01:48:46,330
special Operations uh Forces of Africom . 

2762
01:48:47,090 --> 01:48:49,423
Thank you both chairman and you're back . 

2763
01:48:49,423 --> 01:48:51,423
Thank you very much , Senator . But 

2764
01:48:51,423 --> 01:48:53,590
Senator King , please . Thank you , Mr 

2765
01:48:53,590 --> 01:48:55,757
Chairman . Um general language . We've 

2766
01:48:55,757 --> 01:48:57,868
been having a lot of discussion today 

2767
01:48:57,868 --> 01:48:59,979
about China's activities in , in , in 

2768
01:48:59,979 --> 01:49:02,201
Africa . Is there any buyer's remorse ? 

2769
01:49:02,201 --> 01:49:04,970
China has sort of scaled back on , on 

2770
01:49:04,970 --> 01:49:07,540
Belt and Road to some extent and , and 

2771
01:49:07,540 --> 01:49:10,220
some of the debt issues are now coming 

2772
01:49:10,220 --> 01:49:13,590
to the fore . Uh Are there are the 

2773
01:49:13,590 --> 01:49:15,812
countries in Africa starting to rethink 

2774
01:49:15,812 --> 01:49:18,120
some of those commitments ? Uh Buyer's 

2775
01:49:18,120 --> 01:49:20,120
remorse is probably the best term , 

2776
01:49:21,360 --> 01:49:25,140
Senator . Great question and , and 

2777
01:49:25,140 --> 01:49:28,200
I traversed for that uh for any 

2778
01:49:28,200 --> 01:49:30,570
indicators of that . And I uh lo and 

2779
01:49:30,570 --> 01:49:32,792
behold , I saw a story this morning out 

2780
01:49:32,792 --> 01:49:35,760
of Kenya . Uh they've taken to the 

2781
01:49:35,760 --> 01:49:39,130
streets of how China has been taken 

2782
01:49:39,130 --> 01:49:41,160
advantage of them in the deals they 

2783
01:49:41,160 --> 01:49:43,640
strike . Uh there's other indicators 

2784
01:49:43,640 --> 01:49:46,500
across the continent , other stories of 

2785
01:49:46,510 --> 01:49:49,350
depth trap , uh diplomacy , 

2786
01:49:49,590 --> 01:49:52,540
I call it debt colonialism . 

2787
01:49:52,550 --> 01:49:56,220
Yeah , absolutely . Senator . So let me 

2788
01:49:56,220 --> 01:49:58,220
follow up if that's the case and it 

2789
01:49:58,220 --> 01:50:00,331
appears that it is , does this create 

2790
01:50:00,331 --> 01:50:03,830
an opening for us to be more active in 

2791
01:50:03,840 --> 01:50:06,640
uh infrastructure projects , support 

2792
01:50:06,640 --> 01:50:08,540
for , for development in these 

2793
01:50:08,540 --> 01:50:10,860
countries that , that we can come in 

2794
01:50:10,860 --> 01:50:13,140
and show that it can be done in a much 

2795
01:50:13,140 --> 01:50:16,400
more uh efficient and 

2796
01:50:16,410 --> 01:50:20,290
skilled way . Absolutely . Senator that 

2797
01:50:20,290 --> 01:50:22,290
we do have that . We see that as an 

2798
01:50:22,290 --> 01:50:24,090
opportunity as we call it a 

2799
01:50:24,100 --> 01:50:26,280
consolidated strategic opportunity and 

2800
01:50:26,280 --> 01:50:28,790
we need to match it up with key 

2801
01:50:28,800 --> 01:50:31,950
strategic activities . And whereas we 

2802
01:50:31,950 --> 01:50:34,061
can use a whole government approach , 

2803
01:50:34,061 --> 01:50:36,530
we can use prosper Africa , Digital 

2804
01:50:36,530 --> 01:50:39,070
Africa and get these programs off the 

2805
01:50:39,070 --> 01:50:41,830
ground and going . I know that uh met 

2806
01:50:41,830 --> 01:50:44,690
with uh you know , assistant Secretary 

2807
01:50:44,710 --> 01:50:47,980
Molly fee last week . And also I was 

2808
01:50:47,980 --> 01:50:50,520
over at U S A I D and they , we have a 

2809
01:50:50,520 --> 01:50:53,380
plan of action uh collectively whole of 

2810
01:50:53,380 --> 01:50:55,324
government to be able to put it in 

2811
01:50:55,324 --> 01:50:57,324
motion . You used the term whole of 

2812
01:50:57,324 --> 01:50:59,269
government and I think the private 

2813
01:50:59,269 --> 01:51:01,436
sector also has to be included in this 

2814
01:51:01,436 --> 01:51:03,602
in terms of development of resources . 

2815
01:51:03,602 --> 01:51:05,824
You used a phrase earlier that I that I 

2816
01:51:05,824 --> 01:51:08,350
noted uh about the Chinese efforts to 

2817
01:51:08,360 --> 01:51:11,190
to monopolize and get ahold of these 

2818
01:51:11,200 --> 01:51:13,290
rare earths and , and minerals . 

2819
01:51:13,300 --> 01:51:16,350
Forward thinking by the PRC . We 

2820
01:51:16,350 --> 01:51:18,128
haven't been doing that forward 

2821
01:51:18,128 --> 01:51:20,350
thinking . We've allowed them to take , 

2822
01:51:20,350 --> 01:51:22,294
to take control of , for example , 

2823
01:51:22,294 --> 01:51:24,860
lithium , an essential element for E V 

2824
01:51:24,860 --> 01:51:27,700
batteries . 87% of the process to 

2825
01:51:27,700 --> 01:51:29,922
lithium that goes into E V batteries in 

2826
01:51:29,922 --> 01:51:32,700
this country comes from China and we 

2827
01:51:32,700 --> 01:51:34,478
haven't been doing that forward 

2828
01:51:34,478 --> 01:51:36,589
thinking . I'm suggesting that that's 

2829
01:51:36,589 --> 01:51:38,533
something we should start to think 

2830
01:51:38,533 --> 01:51:40,422
about and , and uh it should be a 

2831
01:51:40,422 --> 01:51:42,589
combination of government action , but 

2832
01:51:42,589 --> 01:51:44,700
also the private sector , we don't do 

2833
01:51:44,700 --> 01:51:46,589
everything by the government here 

2834
01:51:47,230 --> 01:51:49,390
center . Uh That's , that's correct . 

2835
01:51:49,400 --> 01:51:51,289
We don't tell the good news story 

2836
01:51:51,289 --> 01:51:53,560
enough and that's why I provided uh 

2837
01:51:53,570 --> 01:51:56,870
this uh the blue chart here . Um 

2838
01:51:56,880 --> 01:52:00,330
But on legislation passed force 

2839
01:52:00,330 --> 01:52:03,410
effective such as prosper Africa , it's 

2840
01:52:03,420 --> 01:52:05,820
also a message to our private industry 

2841
01:52:05,820 --> 01:52:07,940
to invest in Africa . That's , that's 

2842
01:52:07,940 --> 01:52:09,996
what I talk about when I talk to the 

2843
01:52:09,996 --> 01:52:12,000
country teams as they are heavily 

2844
01:52:12,000 --> 01:52:13,900
recruiting back in the U S for 

2845
01:52:13,900 --> 01:52:16,640
investment in , in the African uh 

2846
01:52:16,650 --> 01:52:20,210
nations and States General uh 

2847
01:52:20,670 --> 01:52:22,726
King Abdullah was here about a month 

2848
01:52:22,726 --> 01:52:24,892
ago and he said that this was the most 

2849
01:52:24,892 --> 01:52:27,220
dangerous moment in Israeli Palestinian 

2850
01:52:27,220 --> 01:52:29,442
relations that he had seen in decades . 

2851
01:52:29,442 --> 01:52:32,720
Give me an analysis of the status of 

2852
01:52:32,720 --> 01:52:34,790
that . It seems like it's a very 

2853
01:52:34,800 --> 01:52:38,780
heightened sense of danger 

2854
01:52:38,790 --> 01:52:42,710
uh in terms of open conflict . Senator , 

2855
01:52:42,710 --> 01:52:44,654
I agree with the statement of King 

2856
01:52:44,654 --> 01:52:46,877
Abdullah on that and we watch this very 

2857
01:52:46,877 --> 01:52:48,932
closely . Um We think the conditions 

2858
01:52:48,932 --> 01:52:51,154
are there , the Tinder and the kindling 

2859
01:52:51,154 --> 01:52:53,099
is there and we don't know what it 

2860
01:52:53,099 --> 01:52:55,321
could take for what spark to be able to 

2861
01:52:55,321 --> 01:52:57,840
start a , a larger uh um conflict in 

2862
01:52:57,840 --> 01:53:01,700
the West Bank . Let me just ask a sort 

2863
01:53:01,700 --> 01:53:03,811
of parenthetical questions . Often we 

2864
01:53:03,811 --> 01:53:05,922
get the question about Iran's nuclear 

2865
01:53:05,922 --> 01:53:07,780
capacity in your , do you have a 

2866
01:53:07,780 --> 01:53:10,640
military analysis of what a strike , an 

2867
01:53:10,640 --> 01:53:12,870
air strike , a significant substantial 

2868
01:53:12,870 --> 01:53:15,730
air strike on Iran's nuclear capacity 

2869
01:53:15,730 --> 01:53:18,080
would actually what would be the impact 

2870
01:53:18,080 --> 01:53:20,460
of that on their ability to move toward 

2871
01:53:20,460 --> 01:53:22,970
a nuclear weapon ? I do Senator , but I 

2872
01:53:22,970 --> 01:53:24,748
best believe that would be in a 

2873
01:53:24,748 --> 01:53:26,970
classified setting . Okay . Thank you . 

2874
01:53:26,970 --> 01:53:30,790
Um One other question in your A O 

2875
01:53:30,790 --> 01:53:33,950
R about stability and that is Pakistan 

2876
01:53:33,960 --> 01:53:36,280
a nuclear armed country . Uh They've 

2877
01:53:36,280 --> 01:53:38,447
had a lot of political issues lately , 

2878
01:53:38,447 --> 01:53:40,750
assessment of the , of the stability 

2879
01:53:40,750 --> 01:53:43,150
and long term prospects for stability 

2880
01:53:43,150 --> 01:53:46,740
in , in Pakistan . So they have a , you 

2881
01:53:46,740 --> 01:53:48,407
know , idea with the military 

2882
01:53:48,407 --> 01:53:50,573
relationship there . Um I have a great 

2883
01:53:50,573 --> 01:53:52,796
relationship with the chief of the Army 

2884
01:53:52,796 --> 01:53:54,907
Staff General Muneer . Um I think the 

2885
01:53:54,907 --> 01:53:56,851
concerns right now in Pakistan are 

2886
01:53:56,851 --> 01:53:59,184
their budget . Um their , their , their , 

2887
01:53:59,184 --> 01:54:01,407
their financial situation , the current 

2888
01:54:01,407 --> 01:54:03,407
political situation and the counter 

2889
01:54:03,407 --> 01:54:05,518
terrorism situation . As they see the 

2890
01:54:05,518 --> 01:54:07,684
tricky Taliban Pakistani , the TTP the 

2891
01:54:07,684 --> 01:54:09,907
attacks are significantly increasing at 

2892
01:54:09,907 --> 01:54:12,073
the end of a ceasefire there . Are you 

2893
01:54:12,073 --> 01:54:12,020
confident of their nuclear security 

2894
01:54:12,020 --> 01:54:14,076
procedures ? I am confident of their 

2895
01:54:14,076 --> 01:54:16,409
nuclear security procedures . Thank you . 

2896
01:54:16,409 --> 01:54:18,520
That may be the first good news we've 

2897
01:54:18,520 --> 01:54:18,250
heard today . Thank you , General . 

2898
01:54:18,250 --> 01:54:21,070
Thank you , gentlemen . Thank you , 

2899
01:54:21,070 --> 01:54:23,550
Senator , please . Thank you , Mr 

2900
01:54:23,550 --> 01:54:25,883
Chairman . Thank you all for being here . 

2901
01:54:25,883 --> 01:54:28,050
Appreciate it . Uh I want to follow up 

2902
01:54:28,050 --> 01:54:29,939
a little bit on the question that 

2903
01:54:29,939 --> 01:54:31,939
Senator Scott asked about . I think 

2904
01:54:31,939 --> 01:54:34,050
part of our challenge right now is um 

2905
01:54:34,050 --> 01:54:36,217
you know , as the newest or one of the 

2906
01:54:36,217 --> 01:54:35,240
newest members of this committee , it 

2907
01:54:35,240 --> 01:54:37,700
has become very clear to me that China 

2908
01:54:37,700 --> 01:54:39,910
is an immediate threat , long term 

2909
01:54:39,910 --> 01:54:42,200
threat , uh intermediate threat . 

2910
01:54:42,200 --> 01:54:44,311
However , you wanna characterize that 

2911
01:54:44,311 --> 01:54:46,620
China is um should be a very , very 

2912
01:54:46,620 --> 01:54:49,100
important focus of ours . And so um one 

2913
01:54:49,100 --> 01:54:51,300
of their tools obviously that they 

2914
01:54:51,310 --> 01:54:54,320
deploy around the globe is the debt 

2915
01:54:54,320 --> 01:54:56,940
trap . And I'd like for both of you , 

2916
01:54:56,950 --> 01:55:00,730
if you could help us communicate back 

2917
01:55:00,730 --> 01:55:03,440
home uh to the folks who are wondering 

2918
01:55:03,440 --> 01:55:05,773
what are the most pressing needs of the , 

2919
01:55:05,773 --> 01:55:07,820
of the country ? What is the most 

2920
01:55:07,820 --> 01:55:09,653
concerning thing from a national 

2921
01:55:09,653 --> 01:55:11,876
security perspective ? How that affects 

2922
01:55:11,876 --> 01:55:13,987
what you guys do and what are some of 

2923
01:55:13,987 --> 01:55:13,580
the most egregious examples that you've 

2924
01:55:13,580 --> 01:55:15,690
seen in your roles ? So , Senator , 

2925
01:55:15,690 --> 01:55:18,300
thank you . What I see again is the 

2926
01:55:18,300 --> 01:55:20,830
penetration economically where they go 

2927
01:55:20,830 --> 01:55:23,470
in and they provide infrastructure with 

2928
01:55:23,470 --> 01:55:25,692
the financing that goes with it . And I 

2929
01:55:25,692 --> 01:55:27,914
can use an example in one country where 

2930
01:55:27,914 --> 01:55:29,526
they went in , they provided 

2931
01:55:29,526 --> 01:55:31,748
infrastructure and it was almost like a 

2932
01:55:31,748 --> 01:55:34,030
balloon mortgage payment in the peak of 

2933
01:55:34,030 --> 01:55:37,740
the COVID crisis overseas . At the 

2934
01:55:37,740 --> 01:55:39,796
worst point of their economy in this 

2935
01:55:39,796 --> 01:55:41,629
one country , they came and they 

2936
01:55:41,629 --> 01:55:43,684
demanded their payment . Um and that 

2937
01:55:43,684 --> 01:55:45,796
absolutely crushed that country to do 

2938
01:55:45,796 --> 01:55:47,907
that and it caused them to see um the 

2939
01:55:47,907 --> 01:55:50,129
way that China does in terms of their , 

2940
01:55:50,129 --> 01:55:52,240
their debt trap . And there's several 

2941
01:55:52,240 --> 01:55:54,462
other examples also through the Central 

2942
01:55:54,462 --> 01:55:56,573
Asian States as well . It's important 

2943
01:55:56,573 --> 01:55:58,518
to understand though what China is 

2944
01:55:58,518 --> 01:55:58,150
doing , they're doing it for their own 

2945
01:55:58,150 --> 01:56:00,372
benefit , not for the others benefits , 

2946
01:56:03,500 --> 01:56:05,710
saying the same things taking place on 

2947
01:56:05,710 --> 01:56:07,599
the continent of Africa as well . 

2948
01:56:07,599 --> 01:56:10,060
Whether in the vein of debt trap 

2949
01:56:10,060 --> 01:56:12,338
diplomacy , here's the difference that , 

2950
01:56:12,338 --> 01:56:15,740
that , that , that makes us uh a 

2951
01:56:15,740 --> 01:56:19,420
partner of choice . Uh We go of aid 

2952
01:56:19,430 --> 01:56:23,180
first financing last uh China , 

2953
01:56:23,180 --> 01:56:25,410
does it financing first in that 

2954
01:56:25,420 --> 01:56:28,460
financing is , is that puts at a 

2955
01:56:28,460 --> 01:56:30,740
disadvantage of those that are asking 

2956
01:56:30,740 --> 01:56:33,220
for the funds very few times . Will 

2957
01:56:33,220 --> 01:56:36,350
they actually uh do any type of aid ? 

2958
01:56:36,360 --> 01:56:38,730
So that's the assurance action that 

2959
01:56:38,740 --> 01:56:41,900
causes those are partner countries on 

2960
01:56:41,900 --> 01:56:44,011
the African continent . To aside with 

2961
01:56:44,011 --> 01:56:47,090
us , there's a number of uh Initial 

2962
01:56:47,090 --> 01:56:50,240
deals uh struck in the memorandum of 

2963
01:56:50,240 --> 01:56:51,990
agreement in the belt and road 

2964
01:56:51,990 --> 01:56:55,070
initiative across 40 countries across 

2965
01:56:55,070 --> 01:56:57,181
the continent of Africa . That's very 

2966
01:56:57,181 --> 01:56:59,320
compelling . It hasn't matured yet to 

2967
01:56:59,320 --> 01:57:01,376
actually show the negative effects . 

2968
01:57:01,376 --> 01:57:04,890
But uh in aggregate , we do communicate 

2969
01:57:04,900 --> 01:57:07,640
cautionary tales from signing such 

2970
01:57:07,640 --> 01:57:11,180
agreements . Um 18 months ago , Israel 

2971
01:57:11,180 --> 01:57:14,180
was integrated into centcom and I just 

2972
01:57:14,180 --> 01:57:18,080
wanted to find out how that has gone 

2973
01:57:18,090 --> 01:57:21,730
what your um as their , you know , 

2974
01:57:21,740 --> 01:57:24,030
fully integrated into , into that 

2975
01:57:24,040 --> 01:57:27,660
theater , how you view that it's going 

2976
01:57:27,660 --> 01:57:29,827
exceptionally well and we view it as a 

2977
01:57:29,827 --> 01:57:32,160
net positive center . Okay that's great . 

2978
01:57:32,160 --> 01:57:34,670
Um , I guess finally because I , I've 

2979
01:57:34,680 --> 01:57:37,240
got about a minute and a half here . Um , 

2980
01:57:39,020 --> 01:57:41,990
we talked about the debt trap but 

2981
01:57:43,100 --> 01:57:45,920
I think that , um , you know , the , 

2982
01:57:45,930 --> 01:57:48,560
the , the building of the islands in 

2983
01:57:48,560 --> 01:57:50,338
the South China Sea being fully 

2984
01:57:50,338 --> 01:57:52,980
weaponized with the spy balloon that 

2985
01:57:52,980 --> 01:57:55,760
traversed over the , you know , Alaska 

2986
01:57:55,760 --> 01:57:57,927
and the Continental United States . It 

2987
01:57:57,927 --> 01:57:59,871
has certainly raised awareness . I 

2988
01:57:59,871 --> 01:58:02,038
think at a , at a point now that we've 

2989
01:58:02,038 --> 01:58:04,150
not seen before , I think these are , 

2990
01:58:04,160 --> 01:58:06,160
these are terrible things that have 

2991
01:58:06,160 --> 01:58:08,160
happened . But I think the American 

2992
01:58:08,160 --> 01:58:11,040
people now recognize the threat that 

2993
01:58:11,040 --> 01:58:13,380
China poses to the United States . And 

2994
01:58:13,380 --> 01:58:15,390
not just um I think , you know , 

2995
01:58:15,390 --> 01:58:17,880
obviously , economically , some of the , 

2996
01:58:17,890 --> 01:58:19,990
the the theft from an intellectual 

2997
01:58:19,990 --> 01:58:21,934
property perspective has been well 

2998
01:58:21,934 --> 01:58:23,879
documented for a while . But , but 

2999
01:58:23,879 --> 01:58:25,879
clearly as they try to project that 

3000
01:58:25,879 --> 01:58:27,990
strength into the Indo Pacific in the 

3001
01:58:27,990 --> 01:58:30,101
South China Sea and those islands are 

3002
01:58:30,101 --> 01:58:32,890
fully weaponized beyond the debt trap 

3003
01:58:32,890 --> 01:58:34,980
that you um you know , illuminated . 

3004
01:58:34,980 --> 01:58:37,240
What are a couple of other examples 

3005
01:58:37,250 --> 01:58:39,620
that you see that maybe most people 

3006
01:58:39,620 --> 01:58:41,787
don't know about that , that certainly 

3007
01:58:41,787 --> 01:58:45,560
raises a lot of concerns and the 

3008
01:58:45,560 --> 01:58:47,560
alarm bells are going off about how 

3009
01:58:47,560 --> 01:58:49,350
serious China is about global 

3010
01:58:49,350 --> 01:58:50,110
domination . 

3011
01:58:53,800 --> 01:58:55,689
Central focuses on them trying to 

3012
01:58:55,689 --> 01:58:57,911
change the international order , trying 

3013
01:58:57,911 --> 01:59:01,640
to change the international system that 

3014
01:59:01,650 --> 01:59:03,620
uh is very compelling and how they 

3015
01:59:03,620 --> 01:59:07,330
engage with African African nations on 

3016
01:59:07,330 --> 01:59:10,430
the continent uh and how they vote uh 

3017
01:59:10,440 --> 01:59:14,260
in the U N General Assembly . Um That's , 

3018
01:59:14,270 --> 01:59:16,900
that's an indication that uh they 

3019
01:59:16,900 --> 01:59:19,930
cannot gain a strategic advantage 

3020
01:59:19,940 --> 01:59:22,520
unless it's along their norms , what 

3021
01:59:22,520 --> 01:59:24,520
they consider their norms . And the 

3022
01:59:24,520 --> 01:59:27,100
economic piece is very compelling of 

3023
01:59:27,100 --> 01:59:29,322
how they're trying to corner the market 

3024
01:59:29,322 --> 01:59:31,489
on what we call some of the rare earth 

3025
01:59:31,489 --> 01:59:33,880
minerals or even resources that are on 

3026
01:59:33,880 --> 01:59:36,213
the continent of Africa and how they're , 

3027
01:59:36,213 --> 01:59:38,790
how they're trying to strike bad deals 

3028
01:59:38,800 --> 01:59:40,911
with these countries extracting these 

3029
01:59:40,911 --> 01:59:43,070
resources without the benefit of the 

3030
01:59:43,070 --> 01:59:45,230
African nations . That's a cautionary 

3031
01:59:45,230 --> 01:59:48,400
tale that needs to be told . Sen , we 

3032
01:59:48,400 --> 01:59:50,780
see 19 of 21 countries in the San 

3033
01:59:50,780 --> 01:59:52,910
Camilo are have signed belt and road 

3034
01:59:52,920 --> 01:59:56,140
initiative agreements with China that 

3035
01:59:56,140 --> 01:59:58,690
is for China's benefit . Um we've also 

3036
01:59:58,690 --> 02:00:01,830
seen 20 of 21 countries have Huawei 

3037
02:00:01,830 --> 02:00:03,886
contracts in them . They're building 

3038
02:00:03,886 --> 02:00:05,997
smart cities and a lot of this is for 

3039
02:00:05,997 --> 02:00:07,941
Chinese advantage . Thank you , Mr 

3040
02:00:07,941 --> 02:00:10,108
Chairman . Thank you , Senator Senator 

3041
02:00:10,108 --> 02:00:11,886
Blumenthal , please . Thanks Mr 

3042
02:00:11,886 --> 02:00:13,830
Chairman . Thank you both for your 

3043
02:00:13,830 --> 02:00:16,840
extraordinary service to our nation . I 

3044
02:00:16,850 --> 02:00:18,910
want to focus on the Wagner group 

3045
02:00:20,770 --> 02:00:22,881
which I think is kind of the elephant 

3046
02:00:22,881 --> 02:00:26,390
in both of your rooms , so to speak . I 

3047
02:00:26,390 --> 02:00:28,446
am a strong supporter of designating 

3048
02:00:28,446 --> 02:00:30,730
the Wagner group as a foreign terrorist 

3049
02:00:30,730 --> 02:00:34,470
organization which will 

3050
02:00:34,480 --> 02:00:37,000
have a constructive impact . I would 

3051
02:00:37,000 --> 02:00:40,410
think in both of your commands . Uh 

3052
02:00:40,420 --> 02:00:43,310
General Langley , if I remember 

3053
02:00:43,310 --> 02:00:45,750
correctly in your testimony , you talk 

3054
02:00:45,750 --> 02:00:48,970
about the price of the Wagner group 

3055
02:00:48,980 --> 02:00:52,360
in Africa as being quote , the failure 

3056
02:00:52,360 --> 02:00:54,193
of government institutions , the 

3057
02:00:54,193 --> 02:00:56,471
withdrawal of star war security allies , 

3058
02:00:56,471 --> 02:00:58,810
the extraction of mineral wealth and 

3059
02:00:58,810 --> 02:01:01,440
long term resource concessions and debt 

3060
02:01:01,450 --> 02:01:05,020
that chip away at Africans future 

3061
02:01:05,030 --> 02:01:07,390
in Ukraine . As we well know , the 

3062
02:01:07,390 --> 02:01:11,290
Wagner group poses a very severe 

3063
02:01:11,300 --> 02:01:13,840
and immediate threat , not only a bomb 

3064
02:01:13,840 --> 02:01:16,490
mood but throughout the country . It's 

3065
02:01:16,490 --> 02:01:19,100
probably one of Putin's most effective 

3066
02:01:19,100 --> 02:01:21,660
fighting forces right now . A mercenary , 

3067
02:01:21,660 --> 02:01:25,620
murderous organization . The argument 

3068
02:01:25,620 --> 02:01:28,410
that I've heard against it is that 

3069
02:01:28,420 --> 02:01:30,520
designating Wagner's in a foreign 

3070
02:01:30,520 --> 02:01:32,840
terrorist organization complicates our 

3071
02:01:32,850 --> 02:01:36,240
interests in Africa because governments 

3072
02:01:36,240 --> 02:01:38,760
doing business with the Wagner group 

3073
02:01:38,970 --> 02:01:41,370
could suffer sanctions as a result of 

3074
02:01:42,440 --> 02:01:46,190
that business . I think that is totally 

3075
02:01:46,200 --> 02:01:50,090
a bogus argument . I see 

3076
02:01:50,090 --> 02:01:53,980
no valid reason not to designate 

3077
02:01:53,990 --> 02:01:56,323
Wagner's foreign terrorist organization . 

3078
02:01:56,323 --> 02:02:00,280
Uh Please give me your views , General 

3079
02:02:00,280 --> 02:02:02,300
Langley and then uh 

3080
02:02:03,810 --> 02:02:07,360
General Carella . Thank you , Senator 

3081
02:02:07,360 --> 02:02:10,060
for asking that question because I do 

3082
02:02:10,060 --> 02:02:12,230
need a message . Uh some of the 

3083
02:02:12,230 --> 02:02:14,174
atrocities going on with the Barna 

3084
02:02:14,174 --> 02:02:16,790
group , not only in the Central Africa 

3085
02:02:16,800 --> 02:02:20,320
Republic , but also in Mali since this 

3086
02:02:20,320 --> 02:02:23,800
past summer . Uh And uh they have been 

3087
02:02:23,800 --> 02:02:27,220
reported on by the U N multinational 

3088
02:02:27,220 --> 02:02:29,450
force there of the atrocities and 

3089
02:02:29,450 --> 02:02:31,860
egregious actions are taken on the on 

3090
02:02:31,860 --> 02:02:35,090
the public . Uh This is very serious 

3091
02:02:35,410 --> 02:02:38,590
the Wagner group , even though we know 

3092
02:02:38,600 --> 02:02:40,760
that many big ocean , everything is 

3093
02:02:40,760 --> 02:02:43,800
about power and profit , but they're 

3094
02:02:43,800 --> 02:02:45,744
inextricably linked to the Russian 

3095
02:02:45,744 --> 02:02:48,940
Federation . So the further there on 

3096
02:02:48,950 --> 02:02:51,040
the more they're on the continent 

3097
02:02:51,050 --> 02:02:54,840
preying upon fragile governance will be 

3098
02:02:54,840 --> 02:02:57,010
a problem in destabilizing across the 

3099
02:02:57,010 --> 02:02:59,450
African continent . Would you feel they 

3100
02:02:59,450 --> 02:03:01,339
should be designated as a foreign 

3101
02:03:01,339 --> 02:03:03,700
territory ? Well , so I'll just say 

3102
02:03:03,700 --> 02:03:06,670
this , um , collectible terrorist 

3103
02:03:06,670 --> 02:03:09,600
organization . Uh Senator , Senator , I 

3104
02:03:09,600 --> 02:03:11,830
think that's , uh if we have a policy 

3105
02:03:11,830 --> 02:03:13,997
representative , uh you know , I would 

3106
02:03:13,997 --> 02:03:16,108
like to stay out of that and I'd like 

3107
02:03:16,108 --> 02:03:18,330
to just , just focus on what we need as 

3108
02:03:18,330 --> 02:03:20,400
Africom to be able to do this and we 

3109
02:03:20,420 --> 02:03:22,710
doing in the information space . But 

3110
02:03:22,720 --> 02:03:25,880
across all other , uh the rest of the 

3111
02:03:25,890 --> 02:03:27,970
whole of government , we do have 

3112
02:03:27,970 --> 02:03:30,192
pressurizing things and I can take that 

3113
02:03:30,192 --> 02:03:33,530
into uh if you let me bring this up in , 

3114
02:03:33,540 --> 02:03:36,470
in closed session , of course . Uh Let 

3115
02:03:36,470 --> 02:03:39,520
me ask you both . Uh Maybe uh 

3116
02:03:40,960 --> 02:03:44,670
I can ask uh general career first . Um 

3117
02:03:45,750 --> 02:03:49,680
Israel is going through domestic unrest 

3118
02:03:49,700 --> 02:03:52,250
protests . I've been visited by a 

3119
02:03:52,250 --> 02:03:54,083
number of members of the Israeli 

3120
02:03:54,083 --> 02:03:57,460
military uh on a number of occasions . 

3121
02:03:57,470 --> 02:04:00,960
Uh Some personally who feel 

3122
02:04:00,970 --> 02:04:04,110
that this unrest is impacting their 

3123
02:04:04,110 --> 02:04:06,820
readiness . Do you have any views on 

3124
02:04:06,830 --> 02:04:09,790
that topic ? So I talked to the Israeli 

3125
02:04:09,790 --> 02:04:12,220
chief of Defense . Often I talked to 

3126
02:04:12,220 --> 02:04:14,387
him yesterday morning , what we talked 

3127
02:04:14,387 --> 02:04:16,810
about um is he's trying to ensure that 

3128
02:04:16,810 --> 02:04:18,810
his , his military stays out of the 

3129
02:04:18,810 --> 02:04:20,440
political conversation . 

3130
02:04:22,620 --> 02:04:25,790
Do you think that that uh the recent 

3131
02:04:25,790 --> 02:04:28,390
proposals for changes in their judicial 

3132
02:04:28,390 --> 02:04:31,680
system is in any way undermining their 

3133
02:04:31,680 --> 02:04:35,210
readiness or preparedness ? I think as 

3134
02:04:35,210 --> 02:04:37,321
you look at the Israeli system , they 

3135
02:04:37,321 --> 02:04:39,630
have reserve units and , and that is 

3136
02:04:39,630 --> 02:04:41,408
where we're seeing some of this 

3137
02:04:41,408 --> 02:04:43,574
manifest itself , but I do not want to 

3138
02:04:43,574 --> 02:04:45,797
make a statement really on the judicial 

3139
02:04:45,797 --> 02:04:48,019
system without knowing all the facts of 

3140
02:04:48,019 --> 02:04:50,241
what they're doing . Um , let me ask to 

3141
02:04:50,241 --> 02:04:52,186
follow up , I think it was Senator 

3142
02:04:52,186 --> 02:04:54,390
Mullen who was asking you about , uh , 

3143
02:04:54,400 --> 02:04:58,170
our Afghan at risk allies . I've been a 

3144
02:04:59,150 --> 02:05:00,872
leading advocate of the Afghan 

3145
02:05:00,872 --> 02:05:02,983
Adjustment Act . I have played a part 

3146
02:05:02,983 --> 02:05:05,430
in trying to extract the translators , 

3147
02:05:05,430 --> 02:05:09,140
guards , security personnel . My own 

3148
02:05:09,150 --> 02:05:11,300
son served there in Marine Corps 

3149
02:05:11,310 --> 02:05:13,680
actually was able to get his translator 

3150
02:05:13,690 --> 02:05:15,980
out of Afghanistan . But there are 

3151
02:05:15,980 --> 02:05:18,390
thousands still at risk targets on 

3152
02:05:18,390 --> 02:05:22,060
their backs having 

3153
02:05:22,070 --> 02:05:24,430
served there repeatedly with great 

3154
02:05:24,430 --> 02:05:27,640
distinction . Are we doing enough to 

3155
02:05:27,640 --> 02:05:29,807
get them out ? I think we have a moral 

3156
02:05:29,807 --> 02:05:32,420
obligation to get those out again . We 

3157
02:05:32,420 --> 02:05:34,587
think the numbers , you know , I would 

3158
02:05:34,587 --> 02:05:36,587
defer to the State department . The 

3159
02:05:36,587 --> 02:05:38,642
exact number on the state department 

3160
02:05:38,642 --> 02:05:40,809
works . The aspect of getting them out 

3161
02:05:40,809 --> 02:05:43,031
once they come to us and campus early , 

3162
02:05:43,031 --> 02:05:45,142
we provide the in processing security 

3163
02:05:45,142 --> 02:05:47,920
and uh basic life support for them . I 

3164
02:05:47,920 --> 02:05:49,864
agree totally . We have that moral 

3165
02:05:49,864 --> 02:05:52,880
obligation . Veterans groups agree 

3166
02:05:53,580 --> 02:05:56,910
steadfastly and passionately about it . 

3167
02:05:56,920 --> 02:05:59,230
And I'm hoping that not only will pass 

3168
02:05:59,230 --> 02:06:03,190
the Afghan Adjustment Act but also take 

3169
02:06:03,200 --> 02:06:06,160
greater measures to enable them to 

3170
02:06:06,680 --> 02:06:10,240
escape the persecution , 

3171
02:06:10,850 --> 02:06:13,990
torture and death that many of them are 

3172
02:06:13,990 --> 02:06:15,990
at risk . I do applaud our veterans 

3173
02:06:15,990 --> 02:06:17,879
groups that are doing taking that 

3174
02:06:17,879 --> 02:06:19,990
action on as well . Thank you . Thank 

3175
02:06:19,990 --> 02:06:22,650
you . Thank you , Senator . Thank you , 

3176
02:06:22,650 --> 02:06:24,872
Mr Chair and gentlemen , thank you very 

3177
02:06:24,872 --> 02:06:26,594
much for your service and your 

3178
02:06:26,594 --> 02:06:30,240
leadership , General Carola . Just a 

3179
02:06:30,250 --> 02:06:32,910
few quick questions . Um Some of this 

3180
02:06:32,910 --> 02:06:35,250
has been covered briefly by a number of 

3181
02:06:35,250 --> 02:06:38,140
other senators , but we do have the 

3182
02:06:38,140 --> 02:06:41,070
great powers that are out there very 

3183
02:06:41,080 --> 02:06:44,250
putting a lot of pressure on us in Asia 

3184
02:06:44,250 --> 02:06:46,417
and in Europe , we also have competing 

3185
02:06:46,417 --> 02:06:48,660
priorities here at home . We've got a 

3186
02:06:48,670 --> 02:06:51,240
fentaNYL crisis . We've got southern 

3187
02:06:51,240 --> 02:06:53,700
border issues and then the very 

3188
02:06:53,710 --> 02:06:57,320
sobering fiscal outlook right now . So 

3189
02:06:57,330 --> 02:07:00,650
we are entering into an area era where 

3190
02:07:00,660 --> 02:07:02,670
being able to support defense with 

3191
02:07:02,670 --> 02:07:04,781
everything we've got is really slowed 

3192
02:07:04,781 --> 02:07:07,120
down significantly . The belt is 

3193
02:07:07,120 --> 02:07:09,176
tightening and you've heard concerns 

3194
02:07:09,176 --> 02:07:12,040
today . Uh So I know that the N D s has 

3195
02:07:12,040 --> 02:07:14,410
directed the department to right size 

3196
02:07:14,410 --> 02:07:16,700
your forward military presence in your 

3197
02:07:16,700 --> 02:07:19,680
A O R . Uh And of course , doing that 

3198
02:07:19,680 --> 02:07:23,050
accepting prudent risk as necessary . 

3199
02:07:23,050 --> 02:07:26,170
So how has Centcom uh improved the 

3200
02:07:26,170 --> 02:07:29,120
economy of force in your theater ? 

3201
02:07:30,100 --> 02:07:33,590
So thank you , Senator . Um Centcom is 

3202
02:07:33,600 --> 02:07:37,040
85% smaller than at the peak in 2008 

3203
02:07:37,040 --> 02:07:38,929
that was in the midst of , of two 

3204
02:07:38,929 --> 02:07:41,290
conflicts . Um After the withdrawal 

3205
02:07:41,290 --> 02:07:43,710
from Afghanistan , even in 2022 we 

3206
02:07:43,710 --> 02:07:47,460
reduced by 15% . Um post Afghanistan 

3207
02:07:47,460 --> 02:07:50,390
withdrawal . What we require in Centcom 

3208
02:07:50,400 --> 02:07:54,050
is a sustainable and sufficient um 

3209
02:07:54,060 --> 02:07:55,770
force structure to be able to 

3210
02:07:55,770 --> 02:07:57,714
accomplish the missions we've been 

3211
02:07:57,714 --> 02:07:59,937
given again . I go back to , if there's 

3212
02:07:59,937 --> 02:08:02,900
one place that can derail the nds , it 

3213
02:08:02,900 --> 02:08:05,067
could come out of Centcom with a flash 

3214
02:08:05,067 --> 02:08:07,233
point . Yeah , I absolutely agree with 

3215
02:08:07,233 --> 02:08:10,330
that . Um , I know the President during 

3216
02:08:10,330 --> 02:08:13,710
the Afghanistan withdrawal , uh , told 

3217
02:08:13,710 --> 02:08:16,830
us that if we withdrew from Afghanistan , 

3218
02:08:16,830 --> 02:08:20,600
there would be a windfall of resources 

3219
02:08:20,610 --> 02:08:24,010
to prioritize China . So , what , what 

3220
02:08:24,020 --> 02:08:27,110
resources did this action free up in 

3221
02:08:27,110 --> 02:08:29,410
our budget ? And then how did D O D 

3222
02:08:29,410 --> 02:08:31,880
reinvest those ? I really senator would 

3223
02:08:31,890 --> 02:08:33,946
defer to O M B and the Department of 

3224
02:08:33,946 --> 02:08:36,580
Defense on any cost savings . But I 

3225
02:08:36,580 --> 02:08:39,170
believe those resources were then moved 

3226
02:08:39,650 --> 02:08:42,030
to against the higher priority of indo 

3227
02:08:42,030 --> 02:08:44,197
pay , calm and you calm . Okay . Thank 

3228
02:08:44,197 --> 02:08:46,363
you . And I would , I would be willing 

3229
02:08:46,363 --> 02:08:48,252
to bet there weren't as many cost 

3230
02:08:48,252 --> 02:08:50,252
savings maybe as , as we would have 

3231
02:08:50,252 --> 02:08:53,440
thought . Um But you different topic , 

3232
02:08:53,450 --> 02:08:55,506
but you've heard a lot of discussion 

3233
02:08:55,506 --> 02:08:58,850
about the Abraham Accords today . I 

3234
02:08:58,860 --> 02:09:01,470
also am a co chair with Senator Rosen 

3235
02:09:01,470 --> 02:09:04,090
on the Abraham Accords caucus . And I'm 

3236
02:09:04,090 --> 02:09:06,790
very proud that our legislation on air 

3237
02:09:06,790 --> 02:09:08,957
and missile defense cooperation to get 

3238
02:09:08,957 --> 02:09:11,530
passed last year in the N D A and it 

3239
02:09:11,530 --> 02:09:13,419
does help our partners with their 

3240
02:09:13,419 --> 02:09:16,410
security burden . Um So you've talked a 

3241
02:09:16,410 --> 02:09:19,940
little bit about this , but when you're 

3242
02:09:19,950 --> 02:09:21,672
implementing this or trying to 

3243
02:09:21,672 --> 02:09:24,480
implement this integration framework , 

3244
02:09:24,490 --> 02:09:26,600
what challenges are you running into 

3245
02:09:26,600 --> 02:09:29,440
now that we might be able to iron out 

3246
02:09:29,450 --> 02:09:31,930
without legislation ? And is there an 

3247
02:09:31,930 --> 02:09:34,410
area where we might need legislation , 

3248
02:09:34,440 --> 02:09:36,662
I can tell you where we are right now . 

3249
02:09:36,662 --> 02:09:38,662
We're making progress . We're going 

3250
02:09:38,662 --> 02:09:40,840
towards a shared air picture between a 

3251
02:09:40,840 --> 02:09:43,200
group of countries and the challenge we 

3252
02:09:43,200 --> 02:09:45,820
have though is if there is Chinese 

3253
02:09:45,830 --> 02:09:49,260
equipment that we cannot integrate . Um 

3254
02:09:49,260 --> 02:09:51,093
And so whether that's a radar or 

3255
02:09:51,093 --> 02:09:53,149
whether that's an actual air defense 

3256
02:09:53,149 --> 02:09:55,204
system , we can't let that touch our 

3257
02:09:55,204 --> 02:09:57,427
network based on the uh on what we know 

3258
02:09:57,427 --> 02:09:59,482
about the Chinese equipment . And so 

3259
02:09:59,482 --> 02:10:01,538
that it's just , it's not compatible 

3260
02:10:01,538 --> 02:10:03,482
with it either . So that's the one 

3261
02:10:03,482 --> 02:10:05,704
challenge that we have um to be able to 

3262
02:10:05,704 --> 02:10:05,700
do that . And so I'm not sure what 

3263
02:10:05,700 --> 02:10:07,650
legislation , the legislation that 

3264
02:10:07,650 --> 02:10:10,440
could help us potentially is . How do 

3265
02:10:10,440 --> 02:10:12,570
we get FMS faster so that they don't 

3266
02:10:12,570 --> 02:10:15,310
have to choose to buy a Chinese system ? 

3267
02:10:15,630 --> 02:10:17,741
Excellent . And , and this has been a 

3268
02:10:17,741 --> 02:10:20,510
discussion as well about FMS and 

3269
02:10:20,510 --> 02:10:22,621
whether it should be the jurisdiction 

3270
02:10:22,621 --> 02:10:25,110
of armed services or another committee 

3271
02:10:25,110 --> 02:10:27,166
here in the United States Senate and 

3272
02:10:27,166 --> 02:10:29,277
that's something for us to iron out . 

3273
02:10:29,277 --> 02:10:31,380
Um So you don't necessarily need 

3274
02:10:31,380 --> 02:10:33,050
additional authorities for 

3275
02:10:33,050 --> 02:10:35,400
implementation then that you're aware 

3276
02:10:35,400 --> 02:10:37,622
of . I believe I have all the authority 

3277
02:10:37,622 --> 02:10:39,789
I need right now . Okay . I would just 

3278
02:10:39,789 --> 02:10:41,900
encourage our partners in that region 

3279
02:10:41,900 --> 02:10:43,844
to buy American . Maybe that's the 

3280
02:10:43,844 --> 02:10:45,956
message that , that we need to send . 

3281
02:10:45,956 --> 02:10:45,530
I'd be happy if they just bought 

3282
02:10:45,530 --> 02:10:47,430
Western Western . Well , 

3283
02:10:48,190 --> 02:10:51,390
no . Excellent point . Excellent point . 

3284
02:10:51,390 --> 02:10:53,612
General . Um I do want to thank you for 

3285
02:10:53,612 --> 02:10:55,350
your tireless efforts to build 

3286
02:10:55,350 --> 02:10:57,950
partnerships in the region . I was 

3287
02:10:57,950 --> 02:11:00,590
recently on a code L where we visited 

3288
02:11:00,600 --> 02:11:02,970
Israel , the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 

3289
02:11:02,970 --> 02:11:06,840
and the U A E . And I heard over and 

3290
02:11:06,840 --> 02:11:08,900
over again , your name mentioned 

3291
02:11:08,900 --> 02:11:11,660
specifically and we described that or 

3292
02:11:11,660 --> 02:11:13,771
we have described that in the past as 

3293
02:11:13,771 --> 02:11:16,130
leadership by walking around and you 

3294
02:11:16,130 --> 02:11:18,530
did state earlier that you spend 50% of 

3295
02:11:18,530 --> 02:11:21,260
your time in the A O R and I know that 

3296
02:11:21,260 --> 02:11:23,590
that is greatly appreciated by our 

3297
02:11:23,590 --> 02:11:25,920
partners . Um So thank you for doing 

3298
02:11:25,920 --> 02:11:27,642
that . Truly . Appreciate your 

3299
02:11:27,642 --> 02:11:29,960
leadership presence is power . Um And 

3300
02:11:29,960 --> 02:11:32,016
General Langley , I know that you're 

3301
02:11:32,016 --> 02:11:34,238
out there and engaged as well . Um I do 

3302
02:11:34,238 --> 02:11:36,238
have a question I'll submit for the 

3303
02:11:36,238 --> 02:11:38,540
record for you . It deals with the 1 27 

3304
02:11:38,550 --> 02:11:40,530
Echo Program which I think is 

3305
02:11:40,530 --> 02:11:43,510
incredibly important in your region uh 

3306
02:11:43,520 --> 02:11:46,290
to maintaining stability . So , thank 

3307
02:11:46,290 --> 02:11:48,401
you , gentlemen , very much . My time 

3308
02:11:48,401 --> 02:11:50,401
is expired . Thank you , Mr Chair . 

3309
02:11:50,401 --> 02:11:52,401
Thank you , Senator Ernest . Let me 

3310
02:11:52,401 --> 02:11:54,401
note that the vote has begun uh and 

3311
02:11:54,401 --> 02:11:56,679
recognize Senator Sullivan . Thank you , 

3312
02:11:56,679 --> 02:11:58,901
Mr Chairman , gentlemen . Thank you for 

3313
02:11:58,901 --> 02:12:01,900
your service testimony today . Um 

3314
02:12:03,180 --> 02:12:06,460
Very much appreciated and in your team 

3315
02:12:06,460 --> 02:12:08,516
members behind you , I know how much 

3316
02:12:08,516 --> 02:12:10,682
they put into these kind of hearings . 

3317
02:12:10,682 --> 02:12:13,630
Um General Langley , I I wanted to 

3318
02:12:13,630 --> 02:12:16,200
begin by , also mentioned you probably 

3319
02:12:16,200 --> 02:12:18,560
getting the picture . We had a number 

3320
02:12:18,560 --> 02:12:20,950
of Senate Code L's to the region 

3321
02:12:20,960 --> 02:12:22,904
recently . I think that's actually 

3322
02:12:22,904 --> 02:12:24,960
important . I was part of the code L 

3323
02:12:24,960 --> 02:12:28,100
with Senator Rosen and seven U S 

3324
02:12:28,100 --> 02:12:30,190
senators to the Abraham Accord 

3325
02:12:30,200 --> 02:12:33,080
countries started in Morocco , really 

3326
02:12:33,080 --> 02:12:36,360
impressive ally , one of our longest 

3327
02:12:36,360 --> 02:12:39,360
standing allies anywhere in the world . 

3328
02:12:39,950 --> 02:12:43,590
Um I don't know to what 

3329
02:12:43,600 --> 02:12:47,130
specificity you can provide thoughts 

3330
02:12:47,130 --> 02:12:49,297
and maybe this is kind of even against 

3331
02:12:49,297 --> 02:12:51,408
your own interests . But it did occur 

3332
02:12:51,408 --> 02:12:53,463
to me that I think it's time to have 

3333
02:12:54,200 --> 02:12:56,720
Africom headquarters in Africa 

3334
02:12:57,830 --> 02:13:00,600
somewhere . Morocco . I think they'd be 

3335
02:13:00,600 --> 02:13:02,711
a great candidate . What do you think 

3336
02:13:02,711 --> 02:13:06,300
about that ? Senator ? This has 

3337
02:13:06,310 --> 02:13:08,477
come up numerous times in the past . I 

3338
02:13:08,477 --> 02:13:10,421
know and it's been blocked by some 

3339
02:13:10,421 --> 02:13:12,477
members of the committee and they're 

3340
02:13:12,477 --> 02:13:14,421
always like , well , we don't know 

3341
02:13:14,421 --> 02:13:13,930
where to put it . So let's keep it in 

3342
02:13:13,930 --> 02:13:16,220
Germany . That's not a good answer . 

3343
02:13:16,220 --> 02:13:18,331
Right . Come on . We don't know where 

3344
02:13:18,331 --> 02:13:20,164
to put frickin sun comes forward 

3345
02:13:20,164 --> 02:13:22,660
headquarters , but we chose cutter . So 

3346
02:13:22,670 --> 02:13:24,670
like real countries make real tough 

3347
02:13:24,670 --> 02:13:26,892
decisions . What do you think we should 

3348
02:13:26,892 --> 02:13:29,226
do ? I don't think that's a good answer , 

3349
02:13:29,226 --> 02:13:31,170
which is too tough , too many good 

3350
02:13:31,170 --> 02:13:33,503
countries . So let's keep it in Germany . 

3351
02:13:33,503 --> 02:13:36,520
What do you think ? Senator ? I see the , 

3352
02:13:36,530 --> 02:13:38,760
I will see some utility being on the 

3353
02:13:38,760 --> 02:13:41,490
continent but at this time , just with 

3354
02:13:41,500 --> 02:13:44,030
uh our processes of getting down to 

3355
02:13:44,030 --> 02:13:47,940
visit uh to numerous countries has been 

3356
02:13:47,940 --> 02:13:51,380
beneficial as far as how , how we are 

3357
02:13:51,380 --> 02:13:53,500
laid out now . I think we're right 

3358
02:13:53,500 --> 02:13:56,660
sized because when we are in um in 

3359
02:13:56,660 --> 02:13:58,549
Europe , there's other partners , 

3360
02:13:58,549 --> 02:14:01,440
they're in proximity that , that we can 

3361
02:14:01,450 --> 02:14:05,330
play headquartered in Tampa as a 

3362
02:14:05,330 --> 02:14:07,552
Ford headquarters in Qatar . What about 

3363
02:14:07,552 --> 02:14:09,330
afford headquarters for Africom 

3364
02:14:09,330 --> 02:14:13,020
somewhere ? Senator ? I can talk about 

3365
02:14:13,030 --> 02:14:15,500
that in closed session because we do 

3366
02:14:15,500 --> 02:14:17,280
have something established that 

3367
02:14:17,290 --> 02:14:20,510
construct . Let me both of you keep 

3368
02:14:20,520 --> 02:14:22,760
talking in the military loves of phrase 

3369
02:14:22,760 --> 02:14:24,871
whole of government , all instruments 

3370
02:14:24,871 --> 02:14:26,871
of power . We've been talking about 

3371
02:14:26,871 --> 02:14:29,038
critical minerals , um which is really 

3372
02:14:29,038 --> 02:14:30,704
important and big part of the 

3373
02:14:30,704 --> 02:14:34,050
discussion . How , how much sense does 

3374
02:14:34,050 --> 02:14:36,161
it make for the United States to shut 

3375
02:14:36,161 --> 02:14:38,217
down our critical mineral production 

3376
02:14:38,217 --> 02:14:40,440
capacity as the Department of Interior 

3377
02:14:40,440 --> 02:14:42,800
has done in Alaska . And then you guys 

3378
02:14:42,800 --> 02:14:44,911
come here and say , boy , oh boy , we 

3379
02:14:44,911 --> 02:14:47,030
sure gotta work on critical . Do you 

3380
02:14:47,030 --> 02:14:49,990
think that's smart like that ? We have 

3381
02:14:50,000 --> 02:14:52,400
not you guys , but other agencies 

3382
02:14:52,400 --> 02:14:54,580
literally shutting down . There's 

3383
02:14:54,580 --> 02:14:56,524
something called the Ambler Mining 

3384
02:14:56,524 --> 02:14:59,080
District in Alaska in the resource rich 

3385
02:14:59,090 --> 02:15:03,000
critical mineral areas of the world . 

3386
02:15:03,010 --> 02:15:06,470
We had a environmental impact statement 

3387
02:15:06,480 --> 02:15:09,880
E I S seven years , $10 million ready 

3388
02:15:09,880 --> 02:15:12,760
to go . And then Department of Interior 

3389
02:15:12,760 --> 02:15:16,040
came in and reverse . That said , 

3390
02:15:16,040 --> 02:15:19,710
hey America Alaska start all over . 

3391
02:15:19,720 --> 02:15:21,776
We'll keep getting critical minerals 

3392
02:15:21,776 --> 02:15:23,942
from China . Were you guys informed of 

3393
02:15:23,942 --> 02:15:25,776
that ? Were you informed of that 

3394
02:15:25,776 --> 02:15:27,887
interior making that idiotic national 

3395
02:15:27,887 --> 02:15:30,053
security decision ? You think it makes 

3396
02:15:30,053 --> 02:15:32,230
sense for us to look at areas of 

3397
02:15:32,230 --> 02:15:34,840
critical mineral capacity in Americans 

3398
02:15:34,840 --> 02:15:36,673
say , ah we're not gonna do that 

3399
02:15:36,673 --> 02:15:38,970
because lower 48 environmental groups 

3400
02:15:38,970 --> 02:15:41,026
don't like it . You think that makes 

3401
02:15:41,026 --> 02:15:42,692
sense for a national security 

3402
02:15:42,692 --> 02:15:44,803
perspective to shut down our critical 

3403
02:15:44,803 --> 02:15:47,370
mineral production when this whole 

3404
02:15:47,370 --> 02:15:49,148
hearing has been about critical 

3405
02:15:49,148 --> 02:15:51,037
minerals ? Does that make sense ? 

3406
02:15:51,037 --> 02:15:54,450
General in your personal opinion ? So 

3407
02:15:54,450 --> 02:15:56,672
I'm just here to pass a cautionary tale 

3408
02:15:56,672 --> 02:15:58,339
about China and their illicit 

3409
02:15:58,339 --> 02:16:00,580
activities on the continent of trying 

3410
02:16:00,580 --> 02:16:03,140
to corner uh critical . But if we can 

3411
02:16:03,140 --> 02:16:05,473
help one corner it by producing our own , 

3412
02:16:05,473 --> 02:16:07,696
doesn't that make sense ? Since I don't 

3413
02:16:07,696 --> 02:16:09,696
have a position on that ? Come on , 

3414
02:16:09,696 --> 02:16:11,862
general , you do have a position . You 

3415
02:16:11,862 --> 02:16:13,807
don't want to say it . What's your 

3416
02:16:13,807 --> 02:16:15,751
personal opinion on that ? Does it 

3417
02:16:15,751 --> 02:16:17,807
makes sense to produce more critical 

3418
02:16:17,807 --> 02:16:19,918
minerals in America ? If we have them 

3419
02:16:21,290 --> 02:16:23,290
center , we can discuss that in the 

3420
02:16:23,290 --> 02:16:25,512
closed session about the essentials for 

3421
02:16:25,512 --> 02:16:27,401
this is the problem . We talk all 

3422
02:16:27,401 --> 02:16:29,179
instruments of power , whole of 

3423
02:16:29,179 --> 02:16:31,300
government and we don't do it . And 

3424
02:16:31,300 --> 02:16:33,800
again , that's not you , but it's Biden , 

3425
02:16:33,810 --> 02:16:36,320
it's the administration , it's national 

3426
02:16:36,320 --> 02:16:38,940
security suicide and we do it every day . 

3427
02:16:38,950 --> 02:16:41,006
We shut down resource development in 

3428
02:16:41,006 --> 02:16:44,710
our own country . It's idiotic . That's 

3429
02:16:44,710 --> 02:16:47,430
the right answer by the way . Um Real 

3430
02:16:47,430 --> 02:16:51,320
quick , General Gorilla , you mentioned 

3431
02:16:52,290 --> 02:16:56,160
Iran taking , you know , 

3432
02:16:56,900 --> 02:16:58,670
shots at our troops . Are we 

3433
02:16:58,670 --> 02:17:00,837
retaliating against them ? I think one 

3434
02:17:00,837 --> 02:17:03,003
of the lessons we learned , You know , 

3435
02:17:03,003 --> 02:17:05,470
when they were providing very 

3436
02:17:05,470 --> 02:17:08,320
sophisticated IEDs to kill and wound 

3437
02:17:08,320 --> 02:17:12,320
thousands of Americans in the 2005 , 

3438
02:17:12,410 --> 02:17:15,640
2007 time frame . That , that was a bad 

3439
02:17:15,640 --> 02:17:18,140
signal to let them just kill our people 

3440
02:17:18,230 --> 02:17:20,452
the best and brightest in America . I'm 

3441
02:17:20,452 --> 02:17:22,760
sure you lost soldiers to the goods 

3442
02:17:22,760 --> 02:17:25,710
force I E D s and until we killed 

3443
02:17:25,710 --> 02:17:27,950
Soleimani , which I think was a really 

3444
02:17:27,950 --> 02:17:30,140
important message we weren't 

3445
02:17:30,150 --> 02:17:33,140
retaliating . So I hope either covertly 

3446
02:17:33,140 --> 02:17:35,310
or overtly when these guys are trying 

3447
02:17:35,310 --> 02:17:37,199
to kill Americans , which they're 

3448
02:17:37,199 --> 02:17:39,620
pretty good at and they do a lot that 

3449
02:17:39,620 --> 02:17:41,564
we are sending messages like , all 

3450
02:17:41,564 --> 02:17:43,398
right , you want to try and kill 

3451
02:17:43,398 --> 02:17:45,564
Americans game on what are we doing to 

3452
02:17:45,564 --> 02:17:48,260
retaliate against these guys ? Senator ? 

3453
02:17:48,260 --> 02:17:50,580
I'm prepared to retaliate overtly but 

3454
02:17:50,580 --> 02:17:54,120
also not all um responses are overt . 

3455
02:17:54,130 --> 02:17:56,270
Okay . But can you assure this 

3456
02:17:56,270 --> 02:17:58,381
committee that we're not just letting 

3457
02:17:58,381 --> 02:18:00,326
them try to attack Americans ? You 

3458
02:18:00,326 --> 02:18:03,480
already mentioned that they are senator 

3459
02:18:03,480 --> 02:18:05,424
without some form of retaliation . 

3460
02:18:05,424 --> 02:18:07,647
Senator , we have all the capability to 

3461
02:18:07,647 --> 02:18:09,813
be able to retaliate but not all , not 

3462
02:18:09,813 --> 02:18:12,700
all uh retaliations are over . Good . 

3463
02:18:12,710 --> 02:18:14,821
Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

3464
02:18:14,821 --> 02:18:16,877
Thank you Senator Sullivan and thank 

3465
02:18:16,877 --> 02:18:18,988
you gentlemen for your testimony . We 

3466
02:18:18,988 --> 02:18:21,099
have a vote on . So I would encourage 

3467
02:18:21,099 --> 02:18:23,210
all my colleagues to vote and we will 

3468
02:18:23,210 --> 02:18:26,800
Reconvene uh within about 

3469
02:18:26,800 --> 02:18:30,800
15 minutes and SVC to 17 for the 

3470
02:18:30,810 --> 02:18:33,380
closed session of this hearing . I will 

3471
02:18:33,380 --> 02:18:35,660
now adjourn the open session . Thank 

3472
02:18:35,660 --> 02:18:36,100
you , man .