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At any time without objection . So 

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ordered , I also ask that our members 

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and witnesses be mindful of our three 

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city commandments . We start on time 

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check . Uh We use language that the 

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average American can understand . So 

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please uh limit the use of acronyms and 

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jargon if you can and we will enforce 

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the five minute rule , which also 

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includes uh witnesses responses . So 

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we'll do my best to keep this moving uh 

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with that good morning everyone . And 

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thank you for being here today for uh 

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our hearing on the Department of 

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Defense's cyberspace activities . We 

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ask a lot from the department in this 

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space from securely operating networks 

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and inherently insecure weapon systems 

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to assisting small and large businesses 

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with their interaction with the defense 

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industrial base . However , more 

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important than anything else is how 

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prepared and capable we are to hold our 

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adversaries at risk . I've repeatedly 

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expressed my concerns about the 

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department's pace for growing and 

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modernizing the ships , the aircraft 

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and the weapons that are required for a 

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potential fight with China . If we 

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accept that we need more time to build 

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the platforms required for a kinetic 

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conflict . It's my genuine belief that 

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our ability to robustly use information 

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and cyber operations should provide us 

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with the opportunity to buy time to 

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maneuver for our kinetic forces . While 

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there have been some signs of progress 

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such as the first delivery of a budget 

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built through the cyber com commanders 

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enhanced budgetary authority . There 

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are still wide gaps in where we are 

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today and where we need to be very soon . 

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There are chronic issues such as force 

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readiness , lack of sufficient 

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intelligence support to space 

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operations and the shortcomings in 

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agile acquisition of cyber capabilities 

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that continue to plague the cyber force . 

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These problems aren't new and it's 

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actually remarkable how much effort 

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Congress has expended on pulling and 

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pushing the department to embrace the 

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promise of cyber operations . Since 

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2013 , Congress has tried to address 

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force design and readiness through 24 

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different people pieces of legislation 

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24 over that same period , we've tried 

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to address the civilian and military 

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cyber workforce dilemma 45 times . 

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Cyber comm acquisition matters 12 times 

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and defense industrial based cyber 

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security 42 times . And the list goes 

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on more frustrating is that the 

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country's collective capabilities and 

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readiness are seemingly no better off 

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because of it . In the words of Albert 

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Einstein , insanity is doing the same 

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thing over and over again and expecting 

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different outcomes . So I look forward 

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to hearing why I am not insane from our 

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witnesses . Dr John Plum , serving as 

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both the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

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for space policy and the principal 

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Cyber advisor , as well as General Paul 

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Nason , the seasoned commander of us 

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Cyber command . And with that , I will 

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recognize the ranking member . Thank 

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you , Mr Chairman and thank you to our 

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witnesses for appearing before us today 

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and the men and women you represent . 

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Thank you General Paul Acai for meeting 

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yesterday and for your uh ideas on uh 

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recruitment uh as well as your 

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suggestions on how we can continue to 

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keep our nation safe from cyberattacks . 

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Our adversaries continue to use 

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cyberspace to conduct malicious 

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activities against the United States , 

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its allies and its interests . These 

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include Iran , Russia and China . I 

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applaud the Department of Defense and 

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us cyber command for the progress 

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that's been made in recent years . 

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Certainly , the change in posture in 

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the past five years has been quite 

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remarkable as we as we have 

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transitioned to a posture of defend 

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forward , but we certainly still have 

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work to do . China aggressively uses 

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cyberspace to obtain economic advantage 

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and gather sensitive information also . 

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Unfortunately , the C C P has been the 

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prime mover of a lot of trade secret 

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theft IP theft , which I'm particularly 

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aware of . Given that companies in my 

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district in Silicon Valley have been 

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the targets . Russia continues to 

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engage in malicious activities to 

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achieve its ends . And the governments 

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of Iran and North Korea , as well as 

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malicious and profit , profit motivated 

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actors continue to act to further their 

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own interests . Our cyber forces are 

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engaged every day in the whole of 

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government effort to defend the country 

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and given our decentralization and our 

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focus on privacy . This task is harder 

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for us than for many other nations . 

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With these growing threats , then must 

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come increased attention . I appreciate 

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that . Uh We are going to be supporting 

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the cyber command in this president's 

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budget especially in areas of force 

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readiness training and support for 

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partners and allies in efforts such as 

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hunt forward . The committee is 

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tracking challenges associated with 

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growing retaining and training , 

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training the force . And I want to make 

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sure we can continue to discuss that 

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effort in greater detail and look 

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forward to some creative ideas you may 

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have of how our committee can help the 

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recruitment of first class talent in 

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technology . As I said to the general , 

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I want to make sure that some of the 

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most talented folks aren't just going 

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to do IP OS and make become 

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multimillionaires but also serving the 

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country . I also hear , hope to hear 

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about the command's service like 

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authorities including enhanced budget 

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control . Thank you . And with that Mr 

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Chair chairman , thank you for 

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convening the hearing and I yield back . 

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Doctor Plum , you are recognized for 

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five minutes . Well , thank you , 

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Chairman Gallagher , thanks uh ranking 

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member , Kana and distinguished members 

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of the committee . Good morning . 

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Thanks for inviting me to testify on 

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the defense department's Cyber Posture . 

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I'm honored to appear alongside uh 

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general as Secretary Austin said from 

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his first days in office , the People's 

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Republic of China is the department's 

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facing challenge while Russia remains 

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an acute threat . This is as true in 

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cyberspace as it is in any other war 

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fighting domain for decades . China has 

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used its cyber capabilities to steal 

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sensitive information , intellectual 

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property and research from us , public 

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and private sector institutions 

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including the defense industrial base . 

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Today in competition , Chinese cyber 

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intrusions are the most prolific in the 

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world in crisis . PRC leaders believe 

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that achieving information dominance 

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will enable them to seize and keep the 

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strategic initiative disrupt our 

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ability to mobilize , to project and 

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sustain the joint force and to ensure 

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the prc's desired end . State . Russia 

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engages in persistent malicious cyber 

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activities to support its global 

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espionage campaigns , steal 

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intellectual property , disrupt 

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critical infrastructure and promote 

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disinformation . Russia has also 

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demonstrated that it views cyber as a 

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key component of its war time strategy 

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at the outset of its full scale 

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invasion of Ukraine . In early 2022 , 

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Russia conducted cyber operations 

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against VIASAT A US satellite company 

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to degrade the command and control of 

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the Ukrainian forces and enable Russian 

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maneuvers . Other persistent threats 

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arise from North Korea , from Iran and 

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from transnational criminal 

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organizations together . Our 

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adversaries use cyberspace to conduct 

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operations against the Department of 

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Defense Information Network , the do 

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and the US homeland . They do this to 

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weaken our allies and partners and to 

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undermine us interests Since 2018 , the 

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department has recognized that it is 

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not enough to maintain a defensive 

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posture while preparing for conflict . 

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We also must defend forward to meet our 

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adversaries and disrupt their efforts 

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in competition . That is the day to day 

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struggle today . The department 

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campaigns in and through cyberspace to 

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sow doubt among our competitors . We 

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conduct intelligence driven , hunt 

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forward operations to generate insights 

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into our competitors tactics while 

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defending us allies and partner 

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computer networks and we disrupt 

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malicious cyber actors through 

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offensive operations . The department 

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is also prioritizing capacity building 

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efforts for our allies and partners who 

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serve as a strategic advantage and a 

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force multiplier that our adversaries 

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can never hope to match . The 

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president's fiscal year 2024 budget 

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request prioritizes investments in all 

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aspects of cyberspace , our people , 

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our organization , our operations , our 

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intelligence and our capabilities . The 

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request includes 13.5 billion for 

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cyberspace activities which is an 

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increase of 1.8 billion from the 

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enacted level of an FY 23 . These 

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investments will enhance the 

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department's cyber security . They'll 

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increase capacity for cyberspace 

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operations . They will advance research 

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and development activities for new 

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cyber capabilities . The budget 

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requests $7.4 billion for cyberspace 

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operations including nearly three 

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billion for us . Cyber command . These 

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resources will go directly to 

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supporting our cyber mission , forces 

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protecting the homeland and addressing 

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the threats posed by our adversaries in 

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cyberspace . And I'll , I'll just say , 

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uh Chairman Gallagher I do think we are 

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better off and we are getting better 

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every day and I think the help from the 

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Congress and this continued investments , 

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uh We're more prepared , we're more 

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effective and we're integrating cyber 

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more and more into our operations . 

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Operating in cyberspace today is an 

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essential part of the department's 

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ability to deter aggression and ensure 

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our nation's security . Our adversaries 

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continue to extend and evolve their 

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cyber capabilities . They're exercising 

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them in both competition and conflict 

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to degrade our advantages and increase 

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their own . The department is committed 

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to strengthening both our defensive and 

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offensive cyber capabilities and to 

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maturing our cyber forces in 

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partnership with this committee . So 

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thank you for your tireless support of 

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the department and I look forward to 

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your questions . Thank you , General 

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Noone is recognized for five minutes , 

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Chairman Gallagher , ranking member and 

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distinguished members of the committee . 

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I'm honored to testify beside assistant 

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secretary , Doctor John Plum . Joining 

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me today is Commands Major Cheryl Lyon , 

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the US . Cyber Command and NSA senior 

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enlisted leader . We're honored to 

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represent the military and civilian 

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members of us . Cyber command in the 

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contested cyberspace domain . US . 

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Cyber Command acts against foreign 

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adversaries that threaten our nation 

279
00:10:01,780 --> 00:10:03,836
through malicious cyber activity and 

280
00:10:03,836 --> 00:10:06,090
enables actions by our federal private 

281
00:10:06,099 --> 00:10:08,919
and allied partners . Last fall . A 

282
00:10:08,929 --> 00:10:11,150
combined us Cyber Command NSA Election 

283
00:10:11,159 --> 00:10:13,103
Security Group countered malicious 

284
00:10:13,103 --> 00:10:15,159
cyber actors and oversaw measures to 

285
00:10:15,159 --> 00:10:17,048
enable the Department of Homeland 

286
00:10:17,048 --> 00:10:18,881
Security and the FBI among other 

287
00:10:18,881 --> 00:10:21,048
domestic partners to defend the recent 

288
00:10:21,048 --> 00:10:23,719
midterm elections . The 2022 election 

289
00:10:23,729 --> 00:10:25,630
cycle proceeded from primaries to 

290
00:10:25,640 --> 00:10:27,599
certifications without significant 

291
00:10:27,609 --> 00:10:31,000
impacts due in part to our effort going 

292
00:10:31,010 --> 00:10:33,400
forward success for us . Cyber Command 

293
00:10:33,460 --> 00:10:35,293
will be measured how effectively 

294
00:10:35,293 --> 00:10:37,016
foreign adversarial actors are 

295
00:10:37,016 --> 00:10:38,738
prevented from achieving their 

296
00:10:38,738 --> 00:10:40,793
strategic objectives . Last year saw 

297
00:10:40,793 --> 00:10:42,880
significant maturation for us Cyber 

298
00:10:42,890 --> 00:10:44,909
command but our work is not done 

299
00:10:45,580 --> 00:10:47,869
In 2023 . We must continue to focus on 

300
00:10:47,880 --> 00:10:49,880
our people , our partners and our 

301
00:10:49,890 --> 00:10:52,112
ability to deliver decisive advantage . 

302
00:10:52,219 --> 00:10:54,441
We must improve readiness , bolster our 

303
00:10:54,441 --> 00:10:56,386
reliance . I'm sorry , bolster our 

304
00:10:56,386 --> 00:10:58,441
resilience and maintain a culture of 

305
00:10:58,441 --> 00:11:00,275
continuous improvement . We will 

306
00:11:00,275 --> 00:11:02,108
continue to deliver war fighting 

307
00:11:02,108 --> 00:11:02,020
advantage for the joint force and 

308
00:11:02,030 --> 00:11:04,030
allied partners through competition 

309
00:11:04,030 --> 00:11:06,409
crisis and conflict . We are doing so 

310
00:11:06,419 --> 00:11:08,640
by executing our unique authorities to 

311
00:11:08,650 --> 00:11:10,594
build and sustain campaigns in and 

312
00:11:10,594 --> 00:11:12,761
through cyberspace and the information 

313
00:11:12,761 --> 00:11:14,872
environment . Through these efforts , 

314
00:11:14,872 --> 00:11:16,817
we seek to counter adversaries and 

315
00:11:16,817 --> 00:11:19,880
competition to deter conflict and to 

316
00:11:19,890 --> 00:11:22,169
prevail against aggression , aligning 

317
00:11:22,179 --> 00:11:24,346
efforts of both us . Cyber Command and 

318
00:11:24,346 --> 00:11:26,346
NSA is essential to achieving these 

319
00:11:26,346 --> 00:11:28,457
goals and is in the best interests of 

320
00:11:28,457 --> 00:11:30,568
the nation and national security . It 

321
00:11:30,568 --> 00:11:32,623
all starts with people , the men and 

322
00:11:32,623 --> 00:11:34,735
women of us , Cyber Command , working 

323
00:11:34,735 --> 00:11:36,957
with NSA and partners here and abroad . 

324
00:11:36,957 --> 00:11:39,123
We win with people , the men and women 

325
00:11:39,123 --> 00:11:38,960
of the United States . Cyber Command 

326
00:11:38,969 --> 00:11:41,025
are grateful for the support of this 

327
00:11:41,025 --> 00:11:43,247
committee and Congress has given to our 

328
00:11:43,247 --> 00:11:45,358
command . I look forward to answering 

329
00:11:45,358 --> 00:11:47,080
your questions that was a very 

330
00:11:47,080 --> 00:11:50,590
efficient opening statement . Uh We 

331
00:11:50,599 --> 00:11:53,049
will now move into the Q and a portion 

332
00:11:53,250 --> 00:11:56,309
of the hearing . Uh , Doctor Plum last 

333
00:11:56,320 --> 00:11:58,119
year's N D A A authorized a new 

334
00:11:58,130 --> 00:12:00,074
Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

335
00:12:00,074 --> 00:12:02,469
cyberspace policy . I'm , I'm confident 

336
00:12:02,479 --> 00:12:04,859
that the Senate is , uh , ready to 

337
00:12:04,869 --> 00:12:07,380
rapidly confirm a nominee . Um , have 

338
00:12:07,390 --> 00:12:09,612
many conversations to that effect . Can 

339
00:12:09,612 --> 00:12:11,779
you explain why we're not seeing one ? 

340
00:12:12,989 --> 00:12:16,280
Uh Yes , sir . So , uh , the department 

341
00:12:16,289 --> 00:12:18,919
is , uh , has taken the language from 

342
00:12:18,929 --> 00:12:21,719
the 23 N D A A and we are trying to 

343
00:12:21,729 --> 00:12:24,007
make sure that we create a S D . Cyber , 

344
00:12:24,007 --> 00:12:26,440
uh , in a deliberate , uh manner that 

345
00:12:26,450 --> 00:12:28,859
has the most positive effect . Uh So 

346
00:12:28,869 --> 00:12:30,813
what we are doing is following the 

347
00:12:30,813 --> 00:12:33,036
template that was used to create , uh , 

348
00:12:33,036 --> 00:12:35,147
my current position A S D for Space , 

349
00:12:35,147 --> 00:12:37,940
uh , which is putting a F F R DC , uh 

350
00:12:37,950 --> 00:12:41,169
on contract to , uh , examine what's 

351
00:12:41,179 --> 00:12:43,012
the proper structure . Are there 

352
00:12:43,012 --> 00:12:45,235
different , different pieces required ? 

353
00:12:45,235 --> 00:12:47,290
What things should be in this , uh , 

354
00:12:47,290 --> 00:12:49,123
Cyber A S D ship and not , we're 

355
00:12:49,123 --> 00:12:50,901
looking at , uh , components of 

356
00:12:50,901 --> 00:12:52,846
electronic warfare , components of 

357
00:12:52,846 --> 00:12:54,735
information warfare , what should 

358
00:12:54,735 --> 00:12:57,068
belong , uh , that is on contract . Now , 

359
00:12:57,068 --> 00:12:59,570
we expect , uh , that , that study 

360
00:12:59,580 --> 00:13:02,669
should be done , uh around September . 

361
00:13:02,799 --> 00:13:04,966
Uh , but we are moving forward on it . 

362
00:13:04,966 --> 00:13:06,910
We just wanna do it right . So the 

363
00:13:06,910 --> 00:13:09,077
earliest , uh , time in which we'd see 

364
00:13:09,077 --> 00:13:11,243
a nominee would be after the report in 

365
00:13:11,243 --> 00:13:15,039
September , I to be totally fair . That 

366
00:13:15,049 --> 00:13:18,090
is uh , above my pay grade , but that's 

367
00:13:18,099 --> 00:13:20,210
what I would anticipate . Yes , sir . 

368
00:13:20,210 --> 00:13:23,789
Ok . Um , that's disappointing . Um , 

369
00:13:24,750 --> 00:13:27,280
we sat down a few weeks ago and , uh , 

370
00:13:27,289 --> 00:13:29,456
you talked about just the , the number 

371
00:13:29,456 --> 00:13:31,511
of reports that are , are foisted on 

372
00:13:31,511 --> 00:13:33,845
you by Congress . Um , on one level . I , 

373
00:13:33,845 --> 00:13:35,900
I agree . I think we , we insert far 

374
00:13:35,900 --> 00:13:38,067
too many , uh , reporting requirements 

375
00:13:38,067 --> 00:13:41,150
into the N D A and , um , uh , and it 

376
00:13:41,159 --> 00:13:43,215
just sort of grows and grows without 

377
00:13:43,215 --> 00:13:45,159
sort of cleaning out the number of 

378
00:13:45,159 --> 00:13:47,326
reports that don't actually get read . 

379
00:13:47,326 --> 00:13:49,381
Um , on the other hand , we do it to 

380
00:13:49,381 --> 00:13:51,437
draw attention to significant issues 

381
00:13:51,437 --> 00:13:53,437
that we think are important without 

382
00:13:53,437 --> 00:13:55,381
actually having to micromanage the 

383
00:13:55,381 --> 00:13:57,859
department in with statutory language . 

384
00:13:57,869 --> 00:14:01,760
Um And the best way to avoid reports 

385
00:14:01,770 --> 00:14:03,469
is to provide us quick but 

386
00:14:03,479 --> 00:14:05,700
comprehensive answers to the questions 

387
00:14:05,710 --> 00:14:07,821
that we're asking the department . Do 

388
00:14:07,821 --> 00:14:09,821
you happen to know how many reports 

389
00:14:09,821 --> 00:14:11,766
that are related to cyber that the 

390
00:14:11,766 --> 00:14:13,932
Department of Defense is delinquent on 

391
00:14:13,932 --> 00:14:16,869
right now ? I don't have an exact 

392
00:14:16,880 --> 00:14:19,102
number , I'd imagine . It's around 10 , 

393
00:14:19,229 --> 00:14:22,229
it's 15 reports , 15 . So I , I just 

394
00:14:22,239 --> 00:14:24,128
would submit , there's gotta be a 

395
00:14:24,128 --> 00:14:26,295
better way we can get answers to these 

396
00:14:26,295 --> 00:14:28,350
questions and I'm happy to work with 

397
00:14:28,350 --> 00:14:30,406
you and your team uh to come up with 

398
00:14:30,406 --> 00:14:32,461
that uh solution because the current 

399
00:14:32,461 --> 00:14:34,572
posture in , in my , in my uh view is 

400
00:14:34,572 --> 00:14:36,461
unacceptable . Um And speaking of 

401
00:14:36,461 --> 00:14:38,572
reports , we , we uh you produced the 

402
00:14:38,572 --> 00:14:40,979
2022 Cyber Posture review that was a 

403
00:14:40,989 --> 00:14:43,156
congressionally mandated document to , 

404
00:14:43,156 --> 00:14:45,211
to be produced every four years . Uh 

405
00:14:45,211 --> 00:14:47,156
three years ago , we said that the 

406
00:14:47,156 --> 00:14:49,322
Cyber Posture review needed to include 

407
00:14:49,322 --> 00:14:51,433
an assessment quote and an assessment 

408
00:14:51,433 --> 00:14:53,378
of the potential cost benefits and 

409
00:14:53,378 --> 00:14:55,433
value of any of establishing a cyber 

410
00:14:55,433 --> 00:14:57,656
force as a separate uniformed service . 

411
00:14:57,656 --> 00:14:59,878
Yet , when we got the document , it did 

412
00:14:59,878 --> 00:15:01,933
not include that assessment . Why is 

413
00:15:01,933 --> 00:15:03,656
that ? Why did dod ignore that 

414
00:15:03,656 --> 00:15:05,880
requirement from Congress ? Uh So first 

415
00:15:05,890 --> 00:15:09,460
of all , no intentional uh uh 

416
00:15:09,469 --> 00:15:11,559
ignoring of any provision of the law 

417
00:15:11,570 --> 00:15:13,792
there at that oversight , I will uh dig 

418
00:15:13,792 --> 00:15:16,014
into how that happened . But I will say 

419
00:15:16,014 --> 00:15:18,070
this uh Congressman , we are working 

420
00:15:18,070 --> 00:15:20,181
hard on answering that problem . It's 

421
00:15:20,181 --> 00:15:22,403
been tested in the F Y 23 N D A as part 

422
00:15:22,403 --> 00:15:24,237
of section 15 , 33 of the fourth 

423
00:15:24,237 --> 00:15:26,348
generation study . I've been involved 

424
00:15:26,348 --> 00:15:28,514
in conversations with your uh staff on 

425
00:15:28,514 --> 00:15:31,210
making sure that that study uh what's 

426
00:15:31,219 --> 00:15:33,219
going forward . I think it's a good 

427
00:15:33,219 --> 00:15:35,441
study . I think it gives us enough time 

428
00:15:35,441 --> 00:15:35,049
to look at . And I think it's really 

429
00:15:35,059 --> 00:15:37,115
important and one of the things that 

430
00:15:37,115 --> 00:15:39,059
requires us to explore among other 

431
00:15:39,059 --> 00:15:41,003
options for fourth generation is a 

432
00:15:41,003 --> 00:15:42,837
cyber service . Get that . And I 

433
00:15:42,837 --> 00:15:45,059
understand that where you stand depends 

434
00:15:45,059 --> 00:15:47,059
on where you sit , but it's not the 

435
00:15:47,059 --> 00:15:49,281
prerogative of the department to decide 

436
00:15:49,281 --> 00:15:48,820
which part of the congressional mandate 

437
00:15:48,830 --> 00:15:51,052
you get to comply with or , hey , we'll 

438
00:15:51,052 --> 00:15:52,941
answer it or we'll answer it in a 

439
00:15:52,941 --> 00:15:55,108
different report at a different time . 

440
00:15:55,108 --> 00:15:57,274
We wanted that assessment in the Cyber 

441
00:15:57,274 --> 00:15:57,140
Posture review . So I would appreciate 

442
00:15:57,150 --> 00:15:59,372
you getting back to my team on , on why 

443
00:15:59,372 --> 00:16:01,539
that didn't happen . Uh Just so we can 

444
00:16:01,539 --> 00:16:03,650
improve this process of reporting and 

445
00:16:03,650 --> 00:16:05,872
answering uh going forward . How do you 

446
00:16:05,872 --> 00:16:08,039
think about retention ? Um It's , it's 

447
00:16:08,039 --> 00:16:10,206
my understanding that uh over the last 

448
00:16:10,206 --> 00:16:12,150
year , the office of the principal 

449
00:16:12,150 --> 00:16:14,206
Cyber advisor has had at least seven 

450
00:16:14,206 --> 00:16:16,372
civilians depart . That's about 75% of 

451
00:16:16,372 --> 00:16:18,594
the office's total civilian roster . Is 

452
00:16:18,594 --> 00:16:18,349
that a concern of yours ? How do you 

453
00:16:18,359 --> 00:16:20,929
think about improving retention ? It is 

454
00:16:20,940 --> 00:16:23,570
a concern of mine . I think uh frankly , 

455
00:16:23,580 --> 00:16:25,691
I think creation , the S D Cyber will 

456
00:16:25,691 --> 00:16:28,830
help uh solve some of that uh problem . 

457
00:16:28,840 --> 00:16:30,951
But I am digging into that in my role 

458
00:16:30,951 --> 00:16:33,190
as PC A right now and it is a issue I 

459
00:16:33,200 --> 00:16:36,520
am determined to get after . Ok . Ok . 

460
00:16:36,530 --> 00:16:38,697
I look forward to following up on that 

461
00:16:38,697 --> 00:16:40,863
and the other issues that I raised and 

462
00:16:40,863 --> 00:16:43,030
I now recognize the ranking member for 

463
00:16:43,030 --> 00:16:45,197
five minutes . You know , when I first 

464
00:16:45,197 --> 00:16:47,252
got to Washington , they said no one 

465
00:16:47,252 --> 00:16:49,419
reads . Uh in Washington more than one 

466
00:16:49,419 --> 00:16:51,586
page , the chairman is an exception to 

467
00:16:51,586 --> 00:16:53,697
that rule , but I uh I support uh the 

468
00:16:53,697 --> 00:16:55,299
effort to have reports and 

469
00:16:55,349 --> 00:16:57,349
responsiveness uh because I think 

470
00:16:57,359 --> 00:17:00,140
that's the essence of uh democracy and 

471
00:17:00,150 --> 00:17:02,372
oversight . So uh we'll look forward to 

472
00:17:02,372 --> 00:17:04,550
working with you uh on that . Uh Mr 

473
00:17:04,560 --> 00:17:07,030
Chairman , let me ask you doctor Plum 

474
00:17:07,040 --> 00:17:10,170
uh given your testimony on the C C P S 

475
00:17:10,420 --> 00:17:13,729
cyber threats . Uh How much of a threat 

476
00:17:13,739 --> 00:17:16,899
do you think tiktok poses to the United 

477
00:17:16,909 --> 00:17:18,631
States ? From a cyber security 

478
00:17:18,631 --> 00:17:22,560
perspective ? Uh Ranking member , I 

479
00:17:22,569 --> 00:17:24,736
would , I would say that when we think 

480
00:17:24,736 --> 00:17:26,736
about Tik Tok as a potential threat 

481
00:17:26,736 --> 00:17:28,770
factor , the uh things that come to 

482
00:17:28,780 --> 00:17:31,729
mind are one the scale . I mean , just 

483
00:17:31,739 --> 00:17:33,795
a tremendous number of people in the 

484
00:17:33,795 --> 00:17:36,030
United States use Tik Tok . Uh and to 

485
00:17:36,040 --> 00:17:38,619
the control that uh China may have to 

486
00:17:38,630 --> 00:17:40,741
be able to direct information through 

487
00:17:40,741 --> 00:17:42,797
it . So there's an in misinformation 

488
00:17:42,797 --> 00:17:44,963
platform . Uh and then of course , the 

489
00:17:44,963 --> 00:17:47,130
data that it can collect . So it's the 

490
00:17:47,130 --> 00:17:46,969
scale of it . I think that is 

491
00:17:46,979 --> 00:17:50,459
problematic really for us . And what do 

492
00:17:50,469 --> 00:17:52,580
you think should be done about that ? 

493
00:17:55,569 --> 00:17:58,060
Uh That's a great question . I know 

494
00:17:58,069 --> 00:18:00,449
everyone is considering it . I think we 

495
00:18:00,459 --> 00:18:02,348
need to be aware of these various 

496
00:18:02,348 --> 00:18:04,859
threats uh and be able to quantify them 

497
00:18:04,869 --> 00:18:07,202
and be able to take action against them . 

498
00:18:07,202 --> 00:18:09,091
I know that's somewhat of a vague 

499
00:18:09,091 --> 00:18:11,147
answer , sir , but I don't know if I 

500
00:18:11,147 --> 00:18:13,480
have the exact answer for you right now . 

501
00:18:13,480 --> 00:18:15,313
I might ask uh general if he has 

502
00:18:15,313 --> 00:18:17,439
thoughts on that ranking member . 

503
00:18:17,449 --> 00:18:19,770
Coming back to your question , if you 

504
00:18:19,780 --> 00:18:21,558
consider one third of the adult 

505
00:18:21,558 --> 00:18:23,558
population receives their news from 

506
00:18:23,558 --> 00:18:25,780
this app . 1/6 of our Children are 

507
00:18:25,790 --> 00:18:28,012
saying they're constantly on this app . 

508
00:18:28,012 --> 00:18:29,846
If you consider that there's 150 

509
00:18:29,846 --> 00:18:32,020
million people every single day that 

510
00:18:32,099 --> 00:18:34,540
are obviously touching this app . This 

511
00:18:34,550 --> 00:18:37,339
provides a foreign nation , a platform 

512
00:18:37,349 --> 00:18:40,219
for information operations , a platform 

513
00:18:40,229 --> 00:18:42,396
for surveillance and a concern we have 

514
00:18:42,400 --> 00:18:44,678
with regards to who controls that data . 

515
00:18:44,678 --> 00:18:47,660
The department has already as you know , 

516
00:18:47,670 --> 00:18:50,400
banned the use of that application on 

517
00:18:50,410 --> 00:18:52,243
our phones . I think the broader 

518
00:18:52,243 --> 00:18:54,243
discussion obviously rests with the 

519
00:18:54,243 --> 00:18:56,410
policy makers now , but certainly this 

520
00:18:56,410 --> 00:18:58,466
is , this is a piece that our nation 

521
00:18:58,466 --> 00:19:00,577
has to consider . There's going to be 

522
00:19:00,577 --> 00:19:00,430
other applications like this . And 

523
00:19:00,439 --> 00:19:02,550
we're going to have to have some type 

524
00:19:02,550 --> 00:19:04,489
of policy that protects both our 

525
00:19:04,500 --> 00:19:08,010
ability to obviously to see materials 

526
00:19:08,020 --> 00:19:09,631
but also protects us from an 

527
00:19:09,631 --> 00:19:11,459
adversary's ability to conduct 

528
00:19:11,469 --> 00:19:13,691
surveillance and information operations 

529
00:19:13,691 --> 00:19:15,747
against us . It would be fair to say 

530
00:19:15,747 --> 00:19:17,747
you view that tiktok as a different 

531
00:19:17,747 --> 00:19:19,580
order of threat than an American 

532
00:19:19,580 --> 00:19:21,913
company on social media . I do . I mean , 

533
00:19:21,913 --> 00:19:23,802
if you consider the fact that the 

534
00:19:23,802 --> 00:19:25,969
difference between an American company 

535
00:19:25,969 --> 00:19:28,025
and our government , there's a clear 

536
00:19:28,025 --> 00:19:30,025
separation in terms of what goes on 

537
00:19:30,025 --> 00:19:29,790
there . If you take a look at an 

538
00:19:29,800 --> 00:19:31,689
application like this , that uh a 

539
00:19:31,689 --> 00:19:33,744
nation has already said that they're 

540
00:19:33,744 --> 00:19:35,856
going to be able to touch the data at 

541
00:19:35,856 --> 00:19:38,189
any time . They want to touch this data . 

542
00:19:38,189 --> 00:19:40,356
This concerns , this concerns me . I'm 

543
00:19:40,356 --> 00:19:42,411
certainly concerns uh most people as 

544
00:19:42,411 --> 00:19:44,689
they look at this . When we , we spoke , 

545
00:19:44,689 --> 00:19:46,578
you had an interesting idea about 

546
00:19:46,578 --> 00:19:48,680
scholarship specifically uh in stem 

547
00:19:48,689 --> 00:19:51,849
fields or in fields that uh uh uh could 

548
00:19:51,859 --> 00:19:54,790
be of use in A I and quantum computing 

549
00:19:54,800 --> 00:19:57,349
for the services . Uh Could you speak 

550
00:19:57,359 --> 00:19:59,770
to that and uh provide maybe some 

551
00:19:59,780 --> 00:20:01,836
suggestions of what we could do as a 

552
00:20:01,836 --> 00:20:03,947
committee on that . One of the things 

553
00:20:03,947 --> 00:20:06,113
that uh this committee and the broader 

554
00:20:06,113 --> 00:20:08,169
congress has done is create programs 

555
00:20:08,169 --> 00:20:07,839
like scholarship for service that has 

556
00:20:07,849 --> 00:20:09,530
been tremendously helpful for 

557
00:20:09,540 --> 00:20:11,818
organizations like uh us cyber command , 

558
00:20:11,818 --> 00:20:13,873
but broader organizations within our 

559
00:20:13,873 --> 00:20:16,040
government , Artificial intelligence , 

560
00:20:16,040 --> 00:20:17,984
machine learning , as many as many 

561
00:20:17,984 --> 00:20:20,207
members have looked at and talked about 

562
00:20:20,207 --> 00:20:22,318
is the future for our nation . It's a 

563
00:20:22,318 --> 00:20:22,280
future for our economy . It's a future 

564
00:20:22,290 --> 00:20:24,489
for our national defense . So any type 

565
00:20:24,500 --> 00:20:26,500
of scholarship that would obviously 

566
00:20:26,500 --> 00:20:29,010
focus young people on this growing 

567
00:20:29,020 --> 00:20:31,187
importance of this field where they're 

568
00:20:31,187 --> 00:20:33,353
able to study it and then perhaps give 

569
00:20:33,353 --> 00:20:35,520
back to any part of the government , I 

570
00:20:35,520 --> 00:20:35,459
think is something that's honorable . 

571
00:20:35,680 --> 00:20:37,791
And I think that's something that our 

572
00:20:37,791 --> 00:20:39,958
government and certainly organizations 

573
00:20:39,958 --> 00:20:42,069
like us , Cyber Command could benefit 

574
00:20:42,069 --> 00:20:44,013
from . Thank you , Doctor Pal . My 

575
00:20:44,013 --> 00:20:45,958
final question is uh how would you 

576
00:20:45,958 --> 00:20:48,180
assess both our offensive and defensive 

577
00:20:48,180 --> 00:20:50,280
cyber capabilities uh compared to uh 

578
00:20:50,290 --> 00:20:51,520
China or Russia ? 

579
00:20:55,739 --> 00:20:59,339
I , I think we are uh uh a premier 

580
00:20:59,349 --> 00:21:01,599
cyber power . I think that the United 

581
00:21:01,609 --> 00:21:03,810
States is uh under general nasons 

582
00:21:04,219 --> 00:21:06,430
leadership in particular uh is 

583
00:21:06,439 --> 00:21:09,010
developing uh exquisite capabilities . 

584
00:21:09,020 --> 00:21:11,540
And I think uh one of our goals looking 

585
00:21:11,550 --> 00:21:13,717
forward is how do we make sure that we 

586
00:21:13,717 --> 00:21:15,883
can as uh I think the chairman said in 

587
00:21:15,883 --> 00:21:18,106
his opening remarks , work to integrate 

588
00:21:18,106 --> 00:21:20,161
these with maneuver uh to be able to 

589
00:21:20,161 --> 00:21:23,489
prevail and win the nation's wars back 

590
00:21:23,530 --> 00:21:27,390
Mr Latrell . Thank you , Mr Chairman 

591
00:21:27,400 --> 00:21:29,511
um general and doctor . Thank you for 

592
00:21:29,511 --> 00:21:31,733
your service and your continued service 

593
00:21:31,733 --> 00:21:31,719
doctor . I understand that you're a sub 

594
00:21:31,770 --> 00:21:35,380
mariner . I was indeed sir . That's um 

595
00:21:35,739 --> 00:21:37,961
you're a special breed of human being , 

596
00:21:37,961 --> 00:21:40,239
sir . God God bless you for doing that . 

597
00:21:40,239 --> 00:21:42,183
Um My first question goes to you , 

598
00:21:42,183 --> 00:21:44,406
doctor , uh senior intelligence leaders 

599
00:21:44,406 --> 00:21:44,140
from Cyber Command have been vocal 

600
00:21:44,150 --> 00:21:46,094
recently about efforts and need to 

601
00:21:46,094 --> 00:21:48,206
establish a foundational intelligence 

602
00:21:48,206 --> 00:21:50,609
center for cyberspace . Uh no different 

603
00:21:50,619 --> 00:21:52,730
from the National Intelligence Center 

604
00:21:52,730 --> 00:21:54,563
for the Army and Office of Naval 

605
00:21:54,563 --> 00:21:56,897
Intelligence for the Navy . And in fact , 

606
00:21:56,897 --> 00:21:58,897
there's a foundational intelligence 

607
00:21:58,897 --> 00:21:57,979
center for just about every war 

608
00:21:57,989 --> 00:22:00,209
fighting domain . Can you , what 

609
00:22:00,219 --> 00:22:02,386
actions have you taken in the Pentagon 

610
00:22:02,386 --> 00:22:04,275
have specifically pushed for this 

611
00:22:04,275 --> 00:22:06,390
center if any ? Thank , thank you for 

612
00:22:06,400 --> 00:22:08,567
that question , Congressman . I , I do 

613
00:22:08,567 --> 00:22:10,733
think that it will be important for us 

614
00:22:10,733 --> 00:22:10,619
to make sure that we are able to 

615
00:22:10,630 --> 00:22:12,852
provide our operators with the right uh 

616
00:22:12,852 --> 00:22:15,060
foundational intelligence to conduct . 

617
00:22:15,069 --> 00:22:17,180
I mean , General Axon obviously has a 

618
00:22:17,180 --> 00:22:19,180
tremendous part of this . Uh We are 

619
00:22:19,180 --> 00:22:21,291
struggling with this question both in 

620
00:22:21,291 --> 00:22:23,458
the cyber security strategy , which is 

621
00:22:23,458 --> 00:22:25,569
hopefully uh be published in the near 

622
00:22:25,569 --> 00:22:27,458
future . Uh It's , it's not quite 

623
00:22:27,458 --> 00:22:27,449
through the secretary yet , but it's on 

624
00:22:27,459 --> 00:22:30,579
its way . Uh And then uh we are also 

625
00:22:30,589 --> 00:22:32,700
looking at this from a , from A S N T 

626
00:22:32,700 --> 00:22:34,811
standpoint as well . So we're kind of 

627
00:22:34,811 --> 00:22:37,089
approaching from two pieces . We don't , 

628
00:22:37,089 --> 00:22:36,609
we're not there yet . I think it's 

629
00:22:36,619 --> 00:22:38,786
pretty clear that there is uh there is 

630
00:22:38,786 --> 00:22:40,897
a signal that this is a thing we need 

631
00:22:40,897 --> 00:22:43,063
to be working on Anderson . If there's 

632
00:22:43,063 --> 00:22:45,175
a roadblock that we can assist with , 

633
00:22:45,175 --> 00:22:44,140
it seems to make sense and be 

634
00:22:44,150 --> 00:22:46,372
advantageous for something like this to 

635
00:22:46,372 --> 00:22:48,483
be stood up . So please let us know . 

636
00:22:48,483 --> 00:22:50,706
Yes , sir . Uh General , do you think T 

637
00:22:50,706 --> 00:22:52,761
C two , the joint all Domain command 

638
00:22:52,770 --> 00:22:55,260
and control two should be a part or 

639
00:22:55,270 --> 00:22:57,849
under the purview of Cyber comm ? Well , 

640
00:22:57,859 --> 00:22:59,970
certainly Congressman , this is under 

641
00:22:59,970 --> 00:23:01,803
the purview of the Department of 

642
00:23:01,803 --> 00:23:04,026
Defense right now where we add to it is 

643
00:23:04,026 --> 00:23:06,137
obviously the cyber security piece of 

644
00:23:06,137 --> 00:23:06,130
what gets done . This is a broader 

645
00:23:06,239 --> 00:23:08,339
element of command and control and 

646
00:23:08,349 --> 00:23:10,182
ability to fuse intelligence and 

647
00:23:10,182 --> 00:23:12,460
operations that extends even beyond us . 

648
00:23:12,460 --> 00:23:14,460
Cyber cramp , we have a significant 

649
00:23:14,460 --> 00:23:16,682
role ensuring that what we develop as a 

650
00:23:16,682 --> 00:23:18,682
department is secure and is able to 

651
00:23:18,682 --> 00:23:20,627
function in the future , seem like 

652
00:23:20,627 --> 00:23:22,793
there's redundancy . Does it seem like 

653
00:23:22,793 --> 00:23:24,905
if it was to split or come together , 

654
00:23:24,905 --> 00:23:27,219
would it be more effective and 

655
00:23:27,229 --> 00:23:30,119
efficient in your opinion ? So as we 

656
00:23:30,130 --> 00:23:32,297
move forward , I think as we move from 

657
00:23:32,297 --> 00:23:34,241
design to actually the operational 

658
00:23:34,241 --> 00:23:36,186
piece that I think the question is 

659
00:23:36,186 --> 00:23:38,352
where does it reside ? Uh right now in 

660
00:23:38,352 --> 00:23:40,519
the design phase , I think it's , it's 

661
00:23:40,519 --> 00:23:40,050
appropriate within the Department of 

662
00:23:40,060 --> 00:23:42,060
Defense and uh within the office of 

663
00:23:42,060 --> 00:23:44,004
Secretary of Defense and certainly 

664
00:23:44,004 --> 00:23:46,171
within the joint off as they move this 

665
00:23:46,171 --> 00:23:47,949
forward . So migration would be 

666
00:23:47,949 --> 00:23:50,004
beneficial in the future . It likely 

667
00:23:50,004 --> 00:23:49,545
will . And I think we'll learn a lot as 

668
00:23:49,555 --> 00:23:51,499
we start to implement this in , in 

669
00:23:51,499 --> 00:23:53,611
different places like the Shriver War 

670
00:23:53,611 --> 00:23:55,499
games and blue flag and , and the 

671
00:23:55,499 --> 00:23:57,499
National Training Center . Uh , but 

672
00:23:57,499 --> 00:23:59,611
we'll have a better feel for where it 

673
00:23:59,611 --> 00:23:58,954
actually needs to reside in the future . 

674
00:23:58,964 --> 00:24:02,119
I think congressman . Ok . Mm . 

675
00:24:02,859 --> 00:24:05,369
Can you tell me how much China Russia 

676
00:24:05,380 --> 00:24:07,547
North Korea Iran individually spend on 

677
00:24:07,547 --> 00:24:10,380
cybersecurity , cyber infrastructure in 

678
00:24:10,390 --> 00:24:13,109
this past year . I'd have to take that 

679
00:24:13,119 --> 00:24:15,063
for the record congressman . But I 

680
00:24:15,063 --> 00:24:17,175
would tell you that one of the things 

681
00:24:17,175 --> 00:24:19,230
that we do see is a rise in both the 

682
00:24:19,230 --> 00:24:21,008
scope and sophistication of our 

683
00:24:21,008 --> 00:24:22,952
adversaries both in terms of their 

684
00:24:22,952 --> 00:24:25,175
ability to conduct cyber intrusions and 

685
00:24:25,175 --> 00:24:27,175
attacks and their ability to defend 

686
00:24:27,175 --> 00:24:29,609
their data . It , it seems to me . Um 

687
00:24:29,619 --> 00:24:31,786
And both of you can appreciate this as 

688
00:24:31,786 --> 00:24:33,786
well as the other uniformed men and 

689
00:24:33,786 --> 00:24:35,897
women in the room . And my colleagues 

690
00:24:35,897 --> 00:24:38,119
on the on the panel with me is that the 

691
00:24:38,119 --> 00:24:40,063
cyberspace is the next frontier of 

692
00:24:40,063 --> 00:24:42,119
warfare . No more bombs , planes and 

693
00:24:42,119 --> 00:24:44,063
guns . Uh The it'll be a push of a 

694
00:24:44,063 --> 00:24:47,140
button . Um In my opinion is how we 

695
00:24:47,150 --> 00:24:49,410
will be fighting these fronts . I think 

696
00:24:49,420 --> 00:24:52,280
China is projected to spend 31 billion 

697
00:24:52,640 --> 00:24:55,369
by 26 . And yet , I think what are we 

698
00:24:55,380 --> 00:24:58,770
spending 13 ? And I think my , my 

699
00:24:58,780 --> 00:25:01,369
statement for the record would be we 

700
00:25:01,380 --> 00:25:05,219
need to be spending more on cyber risk , 

701
00:25:05,229 --> 00:25:07,229
cyber threat , cyber control on our 

702
00:25:07,229 --> 00:25:10,449
side . Given the advancements of the 

703
00:25:10,459 --> 00:25:12,459
nefarious actors around the globe . 

704
00:25:12,459 --> 00:25:14,570
Would you agree with that statement ? 

705
00:25:14,570 --> 00:25:16,403
So congressman uh as a combatant 

706
00:25:16,403 --> 00:25:18,348
commander , I would probably never 

707
00:25:18,348 --> 00:25:20,403
disagree with uh more resources . Uh 

708
00:25:20,403 --> 00:25:22,515
But what I would say is that um as we 

709
00:25:22,515 --> 00:25:24,403
take a look at the future and you 

710
00:25:24,403 --> 00:25:26,515
highlighted this , this is the future 

711
00:25:26,515 --> 00:25:28,681
of where we need to be able to operate 

712
00:25:28,681 --> 00:25:30,792
in all domains . We're seeing this in 

713
00:25:30,792 --> 00:25:33,015
Russia , Ukraine right now . How do you 

714
00:25:33,015 --> 00:25:35,237
combine what we do non kinetically with 

715
00:25:35,237 --> 00:25:35,160
what goes on kinetically , there will 

716
00:25:35,170 --> 00:25:37,339
always be a fight on the ground or the 

717
00:25:37,349 --> 00:25:39,420
air or the sea , but there also is 

718
00:25:39,430 --> 00:25:41,430
going to be a fight that's going to 

719
00:25:41,430 --> 00:25:43,486
take place in cyberspace and space . 

720
00:25:43,486 --> 00:25:45,486
And that's one of the things that I 

721
00:25:45,486 --> 00:25:45,349
think Russia Ukraine has demonstrated 

722
00:25:45,359 --> 00:25:47,650
to us , ok ? I I appreciate you saying 

723
00:25:47,660 --> 00:25:49,660
that and I , and I hope you're well 

724
00:25:49,660 --> 00:25:51,882
aware that if inevitably with something 

725
00:25:51,882 --> 00:25:53,938
clacks off , it'll be you all , they 

726
00:25:53,938 --> 00:25:56,216
most likely will be on the front lines . 

727
00:25:56,216 --> 00:25:58,382
So again , thank you , sir , Mr Lolo , 

728
00:25:59,079 --> 00:26:00,968
chairman . Uh Thanks so much , uh 

729
00:26:00,968 --> 00:26:03,023
Gentlemen , thanks so much for being 

730
00:26:03,023 --> 00:26:03,010
here and for your staff uh for 

731
00:26:03,020 --> 00:26:05,242
participating today . Uh Gentlemen , as 

732
00:26:05,242 --> 00:26:07,409
you both know , in 2018 the US . Cyber 

733
00:26:07,409 --> 00:26:09,489
command was elevated to a unified 

734
00:26:09,500 --> 00:26:11,250
combatant command having been 

735
00:26:11,260 --> 00:26:13,482
previously operating under us Strategic 

736
00:26:13,482 --> 00:26:16,459
Command since 2009 . Uh Cyber is a 

737
00:26:16,469 --> 00:26:18,810
fairly recent complex and critical 

738
00:26:18,819 --> 00:26:20,930
strength and vulnerability uh for the 

739
00:26:20,930 --> 00:26:23,439
US and Space Force is also a very 

740
00:26:23,449 --> 00:26:25,560
recent addition as well , having been 

741
00:26:25,560 --> 00:26:27,449
established in 2019 . And while I 

742
00:26:27,449 --> 00:26:29,171
understand the complexities of 

743
00:26:29,171 --> 00:26:31,005
establishing and ironing out the 

744
00:26:31,005 --> 00:26:32,949
nuances of these new commands . Uh 

745
00:26:32,949 --> 00:26:35,060
Doctor Plum and prior statements made 

746
00:26:35,060 --> 00:26:37,171
to our colleagues in the senate . You 

747
00:26:37,171 --> 00:26:39,060
heard and personally spoke to the 

748
00:26:39,060 --> 00:26:41,116
criticality of legislation for Space 

749
00:26:41,116 --> 00:26:43,282
Force specifically , section 16 oh two 

750
00:26:43,282 --> 00:26:45,199
of the fiscal year 20 22 National 

751
00:26:45,209 --> 00:26:47,030
Defense Authorization Act which 

752
00:26:47,040 --> 00:26:48,707
designates the Chief of Space 

753
00:26:48,707 --> 00:26:51,310
Operations as the Quote force design 

754
00:26:51,319 --> 00:26:53,650
architect and quote for space . Uh So 

755
00:26:53,660 --> 00:26:55,882
my question , Doctor is , should such a 

756
00:26:55,882 --> 00:26:57,549
designation be considered for 

757
00:26:57,549 --> 00:26:59,780
cyberspace as a war fighting domain on 

758
00:26:59,790 --> 00:27:03,770
par with space ? Uh Congressman 

759
00:27:03,780 --> 00:27:05,947
to make sure I understand the question 

760
00:27:05,947 --> 00:27:08,169
you're asking if we need a , uh , cyber 

761
00:27:08,169 --> 00:27:12,119
warfare architect . I guess 

762
00:27:12,130 --> 00:27:14,869
I'd have to think through what that 

763
00:27:15,680 --> 00:27:19,670
would mean . Uh I feel like it would be 

764
00:27:19,680 --> 00:27:21,680
General Nakai and his head is cyber 

765
00:27:21,680 --> 00:27:25,189
command . Uh I , I guess I just , uh , 

766
00:27:25,199 --> 00:27:27,310
that's a new question for me . I'd be 

767
00:27:27,310 --> 00:27:29,310
happy to take that for , uh , for a 

768
00:27:29,310 --> 00:27:29,229
look up . I'm not , I think the 

769
00:27:29,239 --> 00:27:31,350
fundamental question would be , would 

770
00:27:31,350 --> 00:27:33,517
it change anything or would we already 

771
00:27:33,517 --> 00:27:35,739
be doing it ? And then we are we on the 

772
00:27:35,739 --> 00:27:37,906
right track right now , I think we are 

773
00:27:37,906 --> 00:27:40,128
on the right track . We're investing in 

774
00:27:40,128 --> 00:27:40,010
our joint cyber warfare architecture uh 

775
00:27:40,020 --> 00:27:42,242
in this budget and have continued to do 

776
00:27:42,242 --> 00:27:44,409
so and making sure that's modernized . 

777
00:27:44,409 --> 00:27:46,409
And I , I I feel like we are on the 

778
00:27:46,409 --> 00:27:46,260
right track . The general may have some 

779
00:27:46,270 --> 00:27:48,381
pieces to add , but I , I think we're 

780
00:27:48,381 --> 00:27:50,548
going in the right direction . I'm not 

781
00:27:50,548 --> 00:27:52,770
sure that that designation would change 

782
00:27:52,770 --> 00:27:52,150
that at all . So Congressman , you had 

783
00:27:52,160 --> 00:27:54,382
a very important day 2018 . We not only 

784
00:27:54,382 --> 00:27:56,382
the fact that us , Cyber command is 

785
00:27:56,382 --> 00:27:58,438
elevated a strategic or to combatant 

786
00:27:58,438 --> 00:28:00,660
command , but the fact that authorities 

787
00:28:00,660 --> 00:28:02,771
policies and capability come together 

788
00:28:02,771 --> 00:28:04,716
in 18 , we demonstrate that in the 

789
00:28:04,716 --> 00:28:06,827
defense of the 2018 midterm elections 

790
00:28:06,827 --> 00:28:08,549
and then as you see everything 

791
00:28:08,549 --> 00:28:10,493
afterwards , whether or not it was 

792
00:28:10,493 --> 00:28:12,438
ransomware , whether or not it was 

793
00:28:12,438 --> 00:28:14,438
actions against other adversaries , 

794
00:28:14,438 --> 00:28:14,314
whether or not it's election security . 

795
00:28:14,599 --> 00:28:16,655
This is the key starting point . And 

796
00:28:16,660 --> 00:28:18,959
the one of the big things that we were , 

797
00:28:18,969 --> 00:28:21,136
the beneficiaries was this committee's 

798
00:28:21,136 --> 00:28:24,770
decision in the FY 2019 NDA 

799
00:28:24,930 --> 00:28:26,986
to call Cyber a traditional military 

800
00:28:26,986 --> 00:28:28,986
activity that allowed us to conduct 

801
00:28:28,986 --> 00:28:31,097
operations like hunt for operations . 

802
00:28:31,119 --> 00:28:33,230
This tremendously important . I think 

803
00:28:33,230 --> 00:28:35,397
what you're also talking about is that 

804
00:28:35,397 --> 00:28:37,508
the work isn't done . And so when you 

805
00:28:37,508 --> 00:28:39,508
think about Cyber , we need to make 

806
00:28:39,508 --> 00:28:41,675
sure that a simulation capability much 

807
00:28:41,675 --> 00:28:43,508
in the same way we have in other 

808
00:28:43,508 --> 00:28:45,786
domains is re resonant within cyber to , 

809
00:28:45,786 --> 00:28:47,563
to include and to reinforce the 

810
00:28:47,563 --> 00:28:49,786
advances we've already made . Thank you 

811
00:28:49,786 --> 00:28:51,563
and , and , and following up on 

812
00:28:51,563 --> 00:28:53,786
organizationally how we're proceeding . 

813
00:28:53,786 --> 00:28:55,675
Uh Doctor Plum to you , the , the 

814
00:28:55,675 --> 00:28:55,479
Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

815
00:28:55,489 --> 00:28:57,569
Special Operations and low intensity 

816
00:28:57,579 --> 00:28:59,969
conflict is responsible for information 

817
00:28:59,979 --> 00:29:01,770
operations . But the Assistant 

818
00:29:01,780 --> 00:29:03,969
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy 

819
00:29:03,979 --> 00:29:05,650
is responsible for cyberspace 

820
00:29:05,660 --> 00:29:07,716
operations . So my question is , can 

821
00:29:07,716 --> 00:29:09,827
you explain the logic as to why these 

822
00:29:09,827 --> 00:29:12,049
two separate chains are established for 

823
00:29:12,049 --> 00:29:13,569
operations within the same 

824
00:29:13,579 --> 00:29:15,135
informational environment ? 

825
00:29:17,569 --> 00:29:19,680
Uh Yes , thanks , Congressman . First 

826
00:29:19,680 --> 00:29:22,589
of all , uh military 

827
00:29:22,599 --> 00:29:24,766
operations , uh the chain of command , 

828
00:29:24,766 --> 00:29:26,959
of course is through uh or through the 

829
00:29:26,969 --> 00:29:29,510
secretary uh the policy oversight piece . 

830
00:29:29,520 --> 00:29:31,687
And then sometimes so for instance , A 

831
00:29:31,687 --> 00:29:33,409
S D so has some secretary like 

832
00:29:33,409 --> 00:29:35,020
authorities over SOCOM , but 

833
00:29:35,020 --> 00:29:37,242
information operations are not just the 

834
00:29:37,242 --> 00:29:39,409
purview of Cyber . Cyber is one vector 

835
00:29:39,409 --> 00:29:41,298
for information operations . It's 

836
00:29:41,298 --> 00:29:43,520
certainly not the whole piece . Uh So I 

837
00:29:43,520 --> 00:29:45,576
actually think that the split does , 

838
00:29:45,576 --> 00:29:47,798
does make sense when you take that into 

839
00:29:47,798 --> 00:29:50,131
account . Thank you . I appreciate that . 

840
00:29:50,131 --> 00:29:52,242
And uh my last question is for the uh 

841
00:29:52,242 --> 00:29:54,464
for the general uh general . How do you 

842
00:29:54,464 --> 00:29:56,687
envision the um cyber mission force and 

843
00:29:56,687 --> 00:29:58,687
the Cyber operations force maturing 

844
00:29:58,687 --> 00:30:00,298
over the next 3 to 5 years , 

845
00:30:00,298 --> 00:30:02,464
Congressman . Uh We began with the 433 

846
00:30:02,464 --> 00:30:04,709
teams . Uh The secretary in the summer 

847
00:30:04,719 --> 00:30:08,109
of 2020 authorized 14 new teams to be 

848
00:30:08,119 --> 00:30:10,569
uh to be built . Uh Congress has 

849
00:30:10,579 --> 00:30:12,635
authorized the funding for that . So 

850
00:30:12,635 --> 00:30:14,635
we're in the , the build of 14 more 

851
00:30:14,635 --> 00:30:16,746
teams . So I , I think the first part 

852
00:30:16,746 --> 00:30:18,912
of his greater capacity , uh we are on 

853
00:30:18,912 --> 00:30:21,135
a road to have more teams to be able to 

854
00:30:21,135 --> 00:30:22,968
do more missions . Secondly , is 

855
00:30:22,968 --> 00:30:25,023
clearly uh being able to play to our 

856
00:30:25,023 --> 00:30:26,968
strengths . What's our competitive 

857
00:30:26,968 --> 00:30:26,609
advantage ? Our competitive advantage 

858
00:30:26,619 --> 00:30:28,650
is information . So being able to 

859
00:30:28,660 --> 00:30:30,680
further leverage artificial 

860
00:30:30,689 --> 00:30:32,800
intelligence , machine learning . And 

861
00:30:32,800 --> 00:30:35,022
the third piece is , it's all about our 

862
00:30:35,022 --> 00:30:36,911
partnerships . This is what we've 

863
00:30:36,911 --> 00:30:38,467
learned . It's not only the 

864
00:30:38,467 --> 00:30:40,689
partnerships with the national security 

865
00:30:40,689 --> 00:30:40,479
agency but broadly . How do we partner 

866
00:30:40,489 --> 00:30:42,680
with the FBI and CIA ? How do we look 

867
00:30:42,689 --> 00:30:44,964
at a of international partners that 

868
00:30:44,974 --> 00:30:47,196
provide our nation greater capacity and 

869
00:30:47,196 --> 00:30:49,363
most importantly , perhaps , how do we 

870
00:30:49,363 --> 00:30:51,530
partner with the private sector ? This 

871
00:30:51,530 --> 00:30:53,418
is what we've learned in Russia , 

872
00:30:53,418 --> 00:30:55,585
Ukraine . The power of partnering with 

873
00:30:55,585 --> 00:30:57,752
the private sector provides our nation 

874
00:30:57,752 --> 00:30:57,474
a tremendous advantage that no other 

875
00:30:57,484 --> 00:30:59,609
nation has . Thank you . And uh I'll 

876
00:30:59,619 --> 00:31:01,730
just close by saying I joined with my 

877
00:31:01,730 --> 00:31:03,897
colleague from Texas in uh the thought 

878
00:31:03,897 --> 00:31:06,119
that you were on the front lines of our 

879
00:31:06,119 --> 00:31:08,230
next biggest battle and we appreciate 

880
00:31:08,230 --> 00:31:10,397
the work that you're doing . I yield , 

881
00:31:10,397 --> 00:31:12,397
Mr Chairman , Doctor Marine Soldier 

882
00:31:12,397 --> 00:31:16,160
mccormick . Thank you , Mr Chairman in 

883
00:31:16,170 --> 00:31:18,819
medicine . We talk about a Keto as 

884
00:31:18,829 --> 00:31:20,996
being a blind spot and business . When 

885
00:31:20,996 --> 00:31:23,051
you talk about it could be something 

886
00:31:23,051 --> 00:31:25,273
that you just get used to and , and you 

887
00:31:25,273 --> 00:31:27,496
forget that it's there and only the new 

888
00:31:27,496 --> 00:31:29,718
guy coming in can see it . Uh And , and 

889
00:31:29,718 --> 00:31:31,885
when we talk about the military and it 

890
00:31:31,885 --> 00:31:33,829
prepared preparedness . One of the 

891
00:31:33,829 --> 00:31:35,607
things that concerns me is that 

892
00:31:35,607 --> 00:31:37,607
especially in this arena because so 

893
00:31:37,607 --> 00:31:39,718
quick moving and we're watching China 

894
00:31:39,718 --> 00:31:41,829
in , in so many other ways , go after 

895
00:31:41,829 --> 00:31:43,940
our resources , go after our critical 

896
00:31:43,940 --> 00:31:46,489
alliances , um their outpace and , and 

897
00:31:46,500 --> 00:31:49,050
port production and , and valuable 

898
00:31:49,060 --> 00:31:51,227
resources , we're not gonna be able to 

899
00:31:51,227 --> 00:31:53,393
get to pretty soon . What do you think 

900
00:31:53,393 --> 00:31:55,560
that they're going to do to try to cut 

901
00:31:55,560 --> 00:31:57,616
us off ? In other words , what would 

902
00:31:57,616 --> 00:31:59,838
see , what should we be looking at as a 

903
00:31:59,838 --> 00:32:02,599
blind spot in preparedness uh to , to 

904
00:32:02,609 --> 00:32:04,939
outpace the Chinese and the Russians 

905
00:32:04,949 --> 00:32:07,359
when it comes to preparing for the next 

906
00:32:07,369 --> 00:32:08,560
battle in Cyber , 

907
00:32:11,180 --> 00:32:13,369
I'll take that . So Congressman , I 

908
00:32:13,380 --> 00:32:15,436
think it's all about information . I 

909
00:32:15,436 --> 00:32:17,324
think this is , this is where our 

910
00:32:17,324 --> 00:32:19,491
competitive advantage is today and our 

911
00:32:19,491 --> 00:32:21,491
competitive advantage in the future 

912
00:32:21,491 --> 00:32:21,199
needs to be information . How do we 

913
00:32:21,209 --> 00:32:23,153
take the information from our most 

914
00:32:23,153 --> 00:32:25,320
sensitive sources ? How do we take the 

915
00:32:25,320 --> 00:32:25,079
information from the private sector ? 

916
00:32:25,089 --> 00:32:26,978
How do we take information from a 

917
00:32:26,978 --> 00:32:29,033
series of partners ? This is what we 

918
00:32:29,033 --> 00:32:31,200
have done for many , many years . This 

919
00:32:31,200 --> 00:32:33,367
is what we've demonstrated as a , as a 

920
00:32:33,367 --> 00:32:35,533
kinetic force . This is the same power 

921
00:32:35,533 --> 00:32:37,367
that we need to continue to demo 

922
00:32:37,367 --> 00:32:39,422
demonstrate as a non kinetic force . 

923
00:32:39,422 --> 00:32:41,533
When I think about China and Russia , 

924
00:32:41,533 --> 00:32:43,756
you know , our ability to stay ahead of 

925
00:32:43,756 --> 00:32:45,422
them in areas like artificial 

926
00:32:45,422 --> 00:32:47,478
intelligence , machine learning in a 

927
00:32:47,478 --> 00:32:49,589
series of partnerships and being able 

928
00:32:49,589 --> 00:32:51,700
to leverage the private sector . This 

929
00:32:51,700 --> 00:32:53,811
is what we must continue to do that . 

930
00:32:53,811 --> 00:32:56,033
That's the blind spot we never can look 

931
00:32:56,033 --> 00:32:58,145
away from . We have to make sure that 

932
00:32:58,145 --> 00:33:00,367
we're watching this very carefully . So 

933
00:33:00,367 --> 00:32:59,900
one of the things I noticed when we 

934
00:32:59,910 --> 00:33:01,966
talk about investing in the future , 

935
00:33:01,966 --> 00:33:03,966
and I was looking at colleges , for 

936
00:33:03,966 --> 00:33:06,132
example , and how much money we as the 

937
00:33:06,132 --> 00:33:08,354
government put in about half versus the 

938
00:33:08,354 --> 00:33:07,689
civilian , which I , I really 

939
00:33:07,699 --> 00:33:09,588
appreciate your , your comment on 

940
00:33:09,588 --> 00:33:11,421
combining civilian with military 

941
00:33:11,421 --> 00:33:13,643
resources to advance our technologies . 

942
00:33:13,643 --> 00:33:15,810
Uh But one of the things that concerns 

943
00:33:15,810 --> 00:33:18,032
me is we have a lot of foreign students 

944
00:33:18,032 --> 00:33:20,255
over here that we're paying the bill on 

945
00:33:20,255 --> 00:33:22,088
uh both through the civilian and 

946
00:33:22,088 --> 00:33:24,143
government agencies to educate . And 

947
00:33:24,143 --> 00:33:26,366
then some of them are returning back to 

948
00:33:26,366 --> 00:33:26,239
China . Some of them are staying here 

949
00:33:26,250 --> 00:33:28,750
from China in America . And we've had 

950
00:33:28,760 --> 00:33:30,871
problems with this in the past as far 

951
00:33:30,871 --> 00:33:32,593
as giving up our data to other 

952
00:33:32,593 --> 00:33:34,816
countries , they're pilfering , they're 

953
00:33:34,816 --> 00:33:36,927
putting a tremendous amount just like 

954
00:33:36,927 --> 00:33:38,760
uh uh Congressman Latrell said , 

955
00:33:38,760 --> 00:33:38,170
they're putting a tremendous amount of 

956
00:33:38,180 --> 00:33:40,347
assets to develop their own . And then 

957
00:33:40,347 --> 00:33:42,458
they're coming over here in , in my , 

958
00:33:42,458 --> 00:33:44,513
in my opinion , they're stealing our 

959
00:33:44,513 --> 00:33:44,189
information and sometimes we're just 

960
00:33:44,199 --> 00:33:46,229
giving it to them uh in our highest 

961
00:33:46,239 --> 00:33:48,406
educated universities . Uh I , I was a 

962
00:33:48,406 --> 00:33:50,461
professor at Georgia Tech and we , I 

963
00:33:50,461 --> 00:33:52,461
participated in an investigation in 

964
00:33:52,461 --> 00:33:54,628
somebody who got put in jail over that 

965
00:33:54,628 --> 00:33:56,683
same exact thing . How do we protect 

966
00:33:56,683 --> 00:33:58,572
our information from , uh , being 

967
00:33:58,572 --> 00:34:00,683
stolen when we , when we do education 

968
00:34:00,683 --> 00:34:02,906
like that ? And I , I'll leave that for 

969
00:34:02,906 --> 00:34:04,850
Doctor Bloom . Uh , well , sir , I 

970
00:34:04,850 --> 00:34:07,530
guess I would say that one . I'm in 

971
00:34:07,540 --> 00:34:09,651
certainly no position to come in on , 

972
00:34:09,651 --> 00:34:11,818
uh , university hiring practices . But 

973
00:34:11,818 --> 00:34:13,762
I will say that , uh , it comes to 

974
00:34:13,762 --> 00:34:15,429
classified information or the 

975
00:34:15,429 --> 00:34:17,540
information of our defense industrial 

976
00:34:17,540 --> 00:34:16,979
base . We need to make sure we have 

977
00:34:16,989 --> 00:34:19,449
proper vetting for anyone uh to make 

978
00:34:19,459 --> 00:34:21,626
sure that they are not uh some type of 

979
00:34:21,626 --> 00:34:23,848
a threat . And it doesn't really matter 

980
00:34:23,848 --> 00:34:26,070
where they're from for that situation . 

981
00:34:26,070 --> 00:34:25,469
It really depends on if we're doing a 

982
00:34:25,479 --> 00:34:27,535
proper vetting . And then the second 

983
00:34:27,535 --> 00:34:29,535
part would be to make sure that the 

984
00:34:29,535 --> 00:34:31,590
information we are trying to protect 

985
00:34:31,590 --> 00:34:33,812
that we're doing the most modern things 

986
00:34:33,812 --> 00:34:35,979
to do . So moving towards zero trust , 

987
00:34:35,979 --> 00:34:35,340
making sure we have two factor 

988
00:34:35,350 --> 00:34:37,461
authentication or whatever the latest 

989
00:34:37,461 --> 00:34:39,517
requirements are , but just a lot of 

990
00:34:39,517 --> 00:34:41,699
cyber hygiene uh is democratized all 

991
00:34:41,709 --> 00:34:43,876
the way down to the lowest level . And 

992
00:34:43,876 --> 00:34:45,987
it's a hard problem . It's one of the 

993
00:34:45,987 --> 00:34:45,469
things the government is trying to get 

994
00:34:45,479 --> 00:34:47,649
after by sharing more information with 

995
00:34:47,659 --> 00:34:49,479
uh private industry and with 

996
00:34:49,489 --> 00:34:51,489
universities on how to protect this 

997
00:34:51,489 --> 00:34:53,600
information to make sure these things 

998
00:34:53,600 --> 00:34:55,545
don't happen at the scale you're , 

999
00:34:55,545 --> 00:34:57,767
you're suggesting ? Ok , thanks . Uh My 

1000
00:34:57,767 --> 00:34:59,989
final was just organizationally . I had 

1001
00:34:59,989 --> 00:34:59,860
somebody stop by my office and talk 

1002
00:34:59,870 --> 00:35:02,037
about a department and , and cyber and 

1003
00:35:02,037 --> 00:35:04,370
I know this has been brought up already . 

1004
00:35:04,370 --> 00:35:06,259
Uh , but do you think it would be 

1005
00:35:06,259 --> 00:35:08,370
better if it had to be folded under a 

1006
00:35:08,370 --> 00:35:08,110
department kind of like you have the 

1007
00:35:08,129 --> 00:35:10,310
Department of Navy and Marine Corps ? 

1008
00:35:10,590 --> 00:35:12,812
Uh , do you think it'd be better folded 

1009
00:35:12,812 --> 00:35:15,689
under an army or , or under space 

1010
00:35:15,699 --> 00:35:17,669
because , uh , just given its 

1011
00:35:18,110 --> 00:35:20,332
intellectual capacity is application to 

1012
00:35:20,332 --> 00:35:22,499
outer space . Now , would it be better 

1013
00:35:22,499 --> 00:35:24,666
to be folded under or a separate stand 

1014
00:35:24,666 --> 00:35:27,830
alone department ? Uh Congressman , I 

1015
00:35:27,840 --> 00:35:30,062
think you're asking uh about whether we 

1016
00:35:30,062 --> 00:35:32,173
should form a cyber service and if we 

1017
00:35:32,173 --> 00:35:34,173
did where it would nest , I guess I 

1018
00:35:34,173 --> 00:35:36,284
would say that . I think , you know , 

1019
00:35:36,284 --> 00:35:38,284
first of all , we are taking a hard 

1020
00:35:38,284 --> 00:35:38,070
look at whether she would form a cyber 

1021
00:35:38,080 --> 00:35:39,802
service to provide the best uh 

1022
00:35:39,802 --> 00:35:41,858
effective cyber operations . I think 

1023
00:35:41,858 --> 00:35:43,858
our focus should be , how do we get 

1024
00:35:43,858 --> 00:35:46,024
after the threat most effectively with 

1025
00:35:46,024 --> 00:35:48,191
these taxpayer dollars and that threat 

1026
00:35:48,191 --> 00:35:50,302
in particular is that of China ? So I 

1027
00:35:50,302 --> 00:35:52,524
think that's really how we should focus 

1028
00:35:52,524 --> 00:35:54,747
these uh our , our thoughts and our and 

1029
00:35:54,747 --> 00:35:56,858
our and our approach . So stand alone 

1030
00:35:56,858 --> 00:35:59,080
or , or fold under a certain department 

1031
00:35:59,080 --> 00:36:01,191
that already exist . I would not want 

1032
00:36:01,191 --> 00:36:01,070
to get ahead of any decision that 

1033
00:36:01,080 --> 00:36:03,247
really rests with the secretary . Just 

1034
00:36:03,247 --> 00:36:05,469
a recommendation . I was just curious . 

1035
00:36:05,469 --> 00:36:07,691
Ok . Thank you for that yield gentleman 

1036
00:36:07,691 --> 00:36:09,913
from Massachusetts , Mr Keating . Thank 

1037
00:36:09,913 --> 00:36:12,136
you . Mr Chairman . Uh , thank you very 

1038
00:36:12,136 --> 00:36:11,840
much for being here this morning . Uh 

1039
00:36:11,860 --> 00:36:14,600
General NACA , uh , last year . Uh , 

1040
00:36:14,620 --> 00:36:17,830
you briefed us about , uh , your hunt 

1041
00:36:17,840 --> 00:36:20,300
forward efforts in Ukraine , uh in 

1042
00:36:20,310 --> 00:36:22,421
advance of the Russian invasion . And 

1043
00:36:22,421 --> 00:36:24,643
now looking back , uh , having a little 

1044
00:36:24,643 --> 00:36:26,532
period of time to look back . How 

1045
00:36:26,532 --> 00:36:28,643
successful do you think those efforts 

1046
00:36:28,643 --> 00:36:30,588
have been to date ? And how do you 

1047
00:36:30,588 --> 00:36:32,866
gauge the success in Russia countering , 

1048
00:36:32,866 --> 00:36:35,143
uh , what you're doing in that respect ? 

1049
00:36:35,143 --> 00:36:37,032
And is there anything at all that 

1050
00:36:37,032 --> 00:36:38,754
surprised you ? Uh , with this 

1051
00:36:38,754 --> 00:36:41,139
experience , Congressman , if I might 

1052
00:36:41,149 --> 00:36:42,982
just take a step back , hunt for 

1053
00:36:42,982 --> 00:36:45,300
operations began in 2018 as we started 

1054
00:36:45,310 --> 00:36:47,310
to think about how do we secure our 

1055
00:36:47,310 --> 00:36:49,310
nation's elections ? And one of the 

1056
00:36:49,310 --> 00:36:51,739
bright ideas from a young captain said , 

1057
00:36:51,750 --> 00:36:53,917
hey , why don't we send a team of 8 to 

1058
00:36:53,917 --> 00:36:56,139
10 military members to a country at 

1059
00:36:56,149 --> 00:36:58,316
their request , hunt on their networks 

1060
00:36:58,316 --> 00:36:59,927
with them and share all that 

1061
00:36:59,927 --> 00:37:02,149
information , not only with the country 

1062
00:37:02,149 --> 00:37:04,371
but broadly with industry . So industry 

1063
00:37:04,371 --> 00:37:06,538
can see what's going on . Well , since 

1064
00:37:06,538 --> 00:37:08,371
that time , we have conducted 47 

1065
00:37:08,371 --> 00:37:10,093
missions in 22 countries on 70 

1066
00:37:10,093 --> 00:37:12,093
different networks . Four of them , 

1067
00:37:12,093 --> 00:37:14,093
four of them have been in Ukraine , 

1068
00:37:14,093 --> 00:37:16,250
those four operations to include the 

1069
00:37:16,260 --> 00:37:18,929
operation that took place 70 days prior 

1070
00:37:18,939 --> 00:37:20,661
to the invasion , I think were 

1071
00:37:20,661 --> 00:37:22,770
extremely successful . Not only were 

1072
00:37:22,780 --> 00:37:24,947
able to identify the trade craft , not 

1073
00:37:24,947 --> 00:37:27,058
only we were able to identify some of 

1074
00:37:27,058 --> 00:37:28,947
the malware , but we were able to 

1075
00:37:28,947 --> 00:37:31,449
reassure a partner that we were going 

1076
00:37:31,459 --> 00:37:33,570
to provide support . And I think that 

1077
00:37:33,570 --> 00:37:35,570
amongst all of the different things 

1078
00:37:35,570 --> 00:37:37,348
that has occurred in incredibly 

1079
00:37:37,348 --> 00:37:39,181
important , nothing did anything 

1080
00:37:39,181 --> 00:37:41,292
surprise you would jump out at you in 

1081
00:37:41,292 --> 00:37:43,403
that experience . So , uh I would say 

1082
00:37:43,403 --> 00:37:45,348
just in general , surprises , uh , 

1083
00:37:45,348 --> 00:37:47,515
surprises with regards to our hunt for 

1084
00:37:47,515 --> 00:37:49,626
operations is just how impactful they 

1085
00:37:49,626 --> 00:37:51,681
have become and how popular they are 

1086
00:37:51,681 --> 00:37:53,737
with a series of different nations , 

1087
00:37:53,737 --> 00:37:55,737
every country that that I meet with 

1088
00:37:55,737 --> 00:37:57,626
says , hey , can we do a hunt for 

1089
00:37:57,626 --> 00:37:59,903
operation with you ? And so I think to , 

1090
00:37:59,903 --> 00:37:59,635
to the congressman's point about the 

1091
00:37:59,645 --> 00:38:01,756
future structure and what does the US 

1092
00:38:01,756 --> 00:38:04,089
cyber look like uh in the years to come ? 

1093
00:38:04,089 --> 00:38:06,145
I think there is going to be a large 

1094
00:38:06,145 --> 00:38:06,129
component that's going to be doing , 

1095
00:38:06,139 --> 00:38:08,306
doing these type of operation . Yeah , 

1096
00:38:08,306 --> 00:38:10,528
I I've been very impressed just from my 

1097
00:38:10,528 --> 00:38:12,639
vantage point because that was one of 

1098
00:38:12,639 --> 00:38:14,750
our greatest concerns entering this . 

1099
00:38:14,750 --> 00:38:16,972
Uh just what you know , Russia might do 

1100
00:38:16,972 --> 00:38:19,139
and what efforts would be available to 

1101
00:38:19,139 --> 00:38:21,139
Ukraine to counter it . And I think 

1102
00:38:21,139 --> 00:38:23,361
that work uh that you described is , is 

1103
00:38:23,361 --> 00:38:25,195
critical and will continue to be 

1104
00:38:25,195 --> 00:38:27,417
critical in that regard . Congressman . 

1105
00:38:27,417 --> 00:38:29,528
Can I , can I just add one comment to 

1106
00:38:29,528 --> 00:38:29,280
that ? You asked me about surprises ? 

1107
00:38:29,290 --> 00:38:31,512
Uh And I think I , I'm not sure if this 

1108
00:38:31,512 --> 00:38:33,679
fits in that category , but one of the 

1109
00:38:33,679 --> 00:38:35,901
things that's communicated to me by the 

1110
00:38:35,901 --> 00:38:37,901
young men and women that lead these 

1111
00:38:37,901 --> 00:38:40,012
teams to include the marine major who 

1112
00:38:40,012 --> 00:38:42,123
uh led the team into Kiev is the fact 

1113
00:38:42,123 --> 00:38:44,346
that she told me that when I got on the 

1114
00:38:44,346 --> 00:38:46,457
ground , I was meeting with three and 

1115
00:38:46,457 --> 00:38:45,959
four star generals , sometimes the 

1116
00:38:45,969 --> 00:38:48,300
Minister of Defense , sometimes , uh 

1117
00:38:48,310 --> 00:38:50,421
you know , significant players in the 

1118
00:38:50,421 --> 00:38:52,421
uh in the government that were well 

1119
00:38:52,421 --> 00:38:54,421
above my pay grade . And uh it just 

1120
00:38:54,421 --> 00:38:56,088
goes to speak to the , to the 

1121
00:38:56,088 --> 00:38:58,254
leadership and the capabilities of the 

1122
00:38:58,254 --> 00:39:00,421
people that lead these teams and how , 

1123
00:39:00,421 --> 00:39:02,310
how they really first foresaw the 

1124
00:39:02,310 --> 00:39:02,090
difficulty that Russia could have 

1125
00:39:02,100 --> 00:39:04,211
imposed there . Uh I'm just following 

1126
00:39:04,211 --> 00:39:06,378
up on an earlier theme that I've had . 

1127
00:39:06,378 --> 00:39:09,179
Um uh Doctor Craig Martel , who's the 

1128
00:39:09,189 --> 00:39:11,245
dod s first chief , Digital Art , uh 

1129
00:39:11,245 --> 00:39:13,370
Artificial Intelligence Officer , uh 

1130
00:39:13,379 --> 00:39:16,139
briefed us uh earlier this year uh 

1131
00:39:16,169 --> 00:39:19,469
about workforce issues . Uh and how 

1132
00:39:19,479 --> 00:39:21,646
we're currently leveraging or planning 

1133
00:39:21,646 --> 00:39:23,535
to leverage aspects of artificial 

1134
00:39:23,535 --> 00:39:25,590
intelligence as a core competency of 

1135
00:39:25,590 --> 00:39:27,646
the cyber mission force to help them 

1136
00:39:27,646 --> 00:39:29,757
execute their offensive and defensive 

1137
00:39:29,757 --> 00:39:31,923
missions . Uh You know , if you aren't 

1138
00:39:31,923 --> 00:39:34,035
already , how are you integrating A I 

1139
00:39:34,035 --> 00:39:35,812
and , and this kind of training 

1140
00:39:35,812 --> 00:39:38,110
pipeline into the cyber force ? Is it , 

1141
00:39:38,120 --> 00:39:40,342
are you engaging because some of the uh 

1142
00:39:40,399 --> 00:39:42,621
existing relationships and partnerships 

1143
00:39:42,621 --> 00:39:44,621
have have in the private side , has 

1144
00:39:44,621 --> 00:39:46,955
that been something that's been helpful , 

1145
00:39:46,955 --> 00:39:49,177
Congressman ? Let me , let me uh tackle 

1146
00:39:49,177 --> 00:39:48,810
that in a , a couple of different ways . 

1147
00:39:48,820 --> 00:39:50,780
First of all that , uh to better 

1148
00:39:50,790 --> 00:39:52,846
understand where the talent exists , 

1149
00:39:52,846 --> 00:39:55,068
you have to go to where the talent is , 

1150
00:39:55,068 --> 00:39:57,068
you know , is , is , you know , oc- 

1151
00:39:57,068 --> 00:39:59,290
occupying space right now and that's in 

1152
00:39:59,290 --> 00:40:01,457
our academic institution . So us Cyber 

1153
00:40:01,457 --> 00:40:03,401
command a little over a year ago , 

1154
00:40:03,401 --> 00:40:05,512
started the academic network to reach 

1155
00:40:05,512 --> 00:40:07,068
out to a series of 100 plus 

1156
00:40:07,068 --> 00:40:09,179
universities within the United States 

1157
00:40:09,179 --> 00:40:11,346
to talk about what we do and encourage 

1158
00:40:11,346 --> 00:40:13,568
people to consider government service . 

1159
00:40:13,568 --> 00:40:15,846
The second piece is we've taken a very , 

1160
00:40:15,846 --> 00:40:15,149
very hard look at artificial 

1161
00:40:15,159 --> 00:40:17,310
intelligence and machine learning to 

1162
00:40:17,320 --> 00:40:19,542
look at the , you know , the defense of 

1163
00:40:19,542 --> 00:40:21,431
the dod information network every 

1164
00:40:21,431 --> 00:40:23,431
single day as Mr Martel noted out , 

1165
00:40:23,431 --> 00:40:25,487
talked about was the fact that , you 

1166
00:40:25,487 --> 00:40:27,542
know , we have to have an ability to 

1167
00:40:27,542 --> 00:40:29,709
defend our networks , our data and our 

1168
00:40:29,709 --> 00:40:31,820
weapon systems . A I and M L is doing 

1169
00:40:31,820 --> 00:40:34,042
that in some part today . And the third 

1170
00:40:34,042 --> 00:40:36,209
part is that uh we need a broader base 

1171
00:40:36,209 --> 00:40:38,209
of this expertise to the Chairman's 

1172
00:40:38,209 --> 00:40:40,459
point . Uh A number of different uh um 

1173
00:40:40,469 --> 00:40:42,639
measures have been passed in the N D A 

1174
00:40:42,649 --> 00:40:44,705
s for this command . One of the ones 

1175
00:40:44,705 --> 00:40:46,593
that uh that has been very , very 

1176
00:40:46,593 --> 00:40:48,816
helpful is cyber accepted service which 

1177
00:40:48,816 --> 00:40:51,840
is 97% now of our civilian population 

1178
00:40:52,040 --> 00:40:54,649
uh are utilizing , it provides us extra 

1179
00:40:54,659 --> 00:40:57,239
uh pays and uh and uh abilities to 

1180
00:40:57,250 --> 00:40:59,417
attract top talent . And the other one 

1181
00:40:59,417 --> 00:41:01,306
that we're looking at very , very 

1182
00:41:01,306 --> 00:41:03,472
carefully was passed in the 21 N D A A 

1183
00:41:03,472 --> 00:41:05,694
which is section 17 oh eight to look at 

1184
00:41:05,694 --> 00:41:07,750
a series of very high tech personnel 

1185
00:41:07,750 --> 00:41:09,972
that can come into our command . We are 

1186
00:41:09,972 --> 00:41:12,083
now targeting four that we anticipate 

1187
00:41:12,083 --> 00:41:11,600
to hire off that those are with 

1188
00:41:11,610 --> 00:41:13,832
increased pays that allow us to , to go 

1189
00:41:13,832 --> 00:41:15,888
after the talent that's necessary to 

1190
00:41:15,888 --> 00:41:17,832
bring that to our command . Well , 

1191
00:41:17,832 --> 00:41:17,689
thank you . And , uh , uh , in my own 

1192
00:41:17,699 --> 00:41:20,090
district , uh , with the Navy , uh , an 

1193
00:41:20,100 --> 00:41:22,044
undersea warfare institute and the 

1194
00:41:22,044 --> 00:41:24,267
University of Massachusetts , they have 

1195
00:41:24,267 --> 00:41:26,322
models and curriculum that are right 

1196
00:41:26,322 --> 00:41:28,489
there . So , uh , I'd like to see that 

1197
00:41:28,489 --> 00:41:30,544
continue . I yield back the pride of 

1198
00:41:30,544 --> 00:41:32,544
Texas path , Allen . I think it was 

1199
00:41:32,544 --> 00:41:32,350
German Mr Plum , which branch of the 

1200
00:41:32,360 --> 00:41:34,249
military is in charge of maritime 

1201
00:41:34,249 --> 00:41:37,469
domain , uh , the United States Navy . 

1202
00:41:37,689 --> 00:41:41,419
Ok . How about land ? Your army Air 

1203
00:41:41,850 --> 00:41:45,169
Air Force , Cyber . Uh 

1204
00:41:47,800 --> 00:41:49,689
I mean , that's , that's what I'm 

1205
00:41:49,689 --> 00:41:51,744
talking about . We're here today and 

1206
00:41:51,744 --> 00:41:53,744
we're talking about Cyber being the 

1207
00:41:53,744 --> 00:41:55,911
fastest growing domain and , and , and 

1208
00:41:55,911 --> 00:41:58,022
it's , uh , it bothers me that , uh , 

1209
00:41:58,022 --> 00:42:00,244
not only do we not know who's in charge 

1210
00:42:00,244 --> 00:42:02,467
it seems . But , uh , I don't , I don't 

1211
00:42:02,467 --> 00:42:04,669
know , we , we need a leader uh for 

1212
00:42:04,679 --> 00:42:06,790
this because as we just said , we , I 

1213
00:42:06,790 --> 00:42:08,846
heard my colleague say next frontier 

1214
00:42:08,846 --> 00:42:11,012
and it's gonna be the front lines of , 

1215
00:42:11,012 --> 00:42:13,012
of the next conflict . And when you 

1216
00:42:13,012 --> 00:42:15,250
think about the , how inexpensive it is 

1217
00:42:15,540 --> 00:42:17,596
relative to the potential impact and 

1218
00:42:17,596 --> 00:42:20,370
damage that Cyber can do today , it , 

1219
00:42:20,379 --> 00:42:22,800
it kind of harkens for me . Billy 

1220
00:42:22,810 --> 00:42:25,110
Mitchell comes to mind uh General Billy 

1221
00:42:25,120 --> 00:42:27,790
Mitchell who rang the alarm in the 19 

1222
00:42:27,800 --> 00:42:30,469
twenties about the importance of air 

1223
00:42:31,110 --> 00:42:33,110
and got court martialed for it . Uh 

1224
00:42:33,110 --> 00:42:35,399
because he saw the future . We can't 

1225
00:42:35,409 --> 00:42:37,465
fight the war today . We gotta fight 

1226
00:42:37,465 --> 00:42:39,687
the war tomorrow and prepare for that . 

1227
00:42:39,687 --> 00:42:41,853
And it seems to me , you know , when I 

1228
00:42:41,853 --> 00:42:44,076
look at cyber comms mission statement , 

1229
00:42:44,076 --> 00:42:46,187
it includes one defend the Department 

1230
00:42:46,187 --> 00:42:48,419
of Defense Information Network , two , 

1231
00:42:48,600 --> 00:42:50,544
strengthen the nation's ability to 

1232
00:42:50,544 --> 00:42:52,822
withstand and respond to cyber attacks . 

1233
00:42:52,822 --> 00:42:54,878
And then three conduct full spectrum 

1234
00:42:54,878 --> 00:42:58,100
cyber operations to assist combat 

1235
00:42:58,110 --> 00:43:00,580
commanders and the joint force . And 

1236
00:43:00,590 --> 00:43:02,534
that reads well on paper . But the 

1237
00:43:02,534 --> 00:43:04,646
third one is the one that concerns me 

1238
00:43:04,646 --> 00:43:04,610
because , you know , the navy is gonna 

1239
00:43:04,620 --> 00:43:07,379
be concerned about uh the sea with a 

1240
00:43:07,389 --> 00:43:09,500
side of Cyber and the Air force , you 

1241
00:43:09,500 --> 00:43:11,667
know , air with a side of Cyber army , 

1242
00:43:11,667 --> 00:43:13,833
land side of Cyber . Uh And you know , 

1243
00:43:13,833 --> 00:43:16,810
I I would really , I strongly feel that 

1244
00:43:16,820 --> 00:43:19,770
we should be creating 1/7 branch and 

1245
00:43:19,780 --> 00:43:23,020
making Cyber uh Cyber service and 

1246
00:43:23,030 --> 00:43:25,197
general , I know that you don't talk , 

1247
00:43:25,197 --> 00:43:27,363
uh particularly policy is , you know , 

1248
00:43:27,469 --> 00:43:29,191
our job and here's just one to 

1249
00:43:29,191 --> 00:43:32,729
implement it . But uh would you accept 

1250
00:43:32,739 --> 00:43:34,729
command of a Cyber servicer ? 

1251
00:43:36,570 --> 00:43:39,179
So congressman , uh I I would offer 

1252
00:43:39,189 --> 00:43:41,300
that , you know , that is obviously , 

1253
00:43:41,300 --> 00:43:43,522
as you said , a policy decision . But , 

1254
00:43:43,522 --> 00:43:45,745
but let me just uh provide a thought on 

1255
00:43:45,745 --> 00:43:47,911
this in terms of how we , how we model 

1256
00:43:47,911 --> 00:43:50,245
ourselves . And uh I think as you asked , 

1257
00:43:50,245 --> 00:43:52,467
a number of different uh who is , who's 

1258
00:43:52,467 --> 00:43:54,356
in charge of special operations . 

1259
00:43:54,356 --> 00:43:56,540
Special operations is not in , not run 

1260
00:43:56,550 --> 00:43:58,899
by any specific service yet . It is the 

1261
00:43:58,909 --> 00:44:01,199
lead service and capability that our 

1262
00:44:01,209 --> 00:44:03,042
nation has . That's what we have 

1263
00:44:03,042 --> 00:44:05,376
modeled ourselves at us . Cyber command . 

1264
00:44:05,376 --> 00:44:07,560
This idea of having special and unique 

1265
00:44:07,570 --> 00:44:09,626
authorities that we're able to train 

1266
00:44:09,626 --> 00:44:11,919
and man and equip our force and agility 

1267
00:44:11,929 --> 00:44:13,979
to maneuver . Uh And I think that 

1268
00:44:13,989 --> 00:44:16,679
that's uh from my perspective of having 

1269
00:44:16,689 --> 00:44:18,578
uh commanded now for five years , 

1270
00:44:18,578 --> 00:44:20,578
that's a really good uh place where 

1271
00:44:20,578 --> 00:44:22,800
we're emulating towards and making sure 

1272
00:44:22,800 --> 00:44:24,911
that our focus is on doing operations 

1273
00:44:24,911 --> 00:44:27,078
against our adversaries and continuing 

1274
00:44:27,078 --> 00:44:29,133
to build our capability . Well , you 

1275
00:44:29,133 --> 00:44:31,300
know , general , you seen earlier that 

1276
00:44:31,300 --> 00:44:33,522
there are always going to be a land and 

1277
00:44:33,522 --> 00:44:35,578
there's air and then space and , you 

1278
00:44:35,578 --> 00:44:37,467
know , we made a space service uh 

1279
00:44:37,467 --> 00:44:39,522
because it's ever changing and , and 

1280
00:44:39,522 --> 00:44:41,689
evolving . And I was , I'm glad we did 

1281
00:44:41,689 --> 00:44:41,600
because of that importance , but I , I 

1282
00:44:41,610 --> 00:44:43,499
really would argue that we should 

1283
00:44:43,499 --> 00:44:45,388
consider , strongly consider , we 

1284
00:44:45,388 --> 00:44:47,388
didn't get a report for it . Uh But 

1285
00:44:47,388 --> 00:44:49,332
strongly consider cyber is its own 

1286
00:44:49,332 --> 00:44:52,189
service and we have 800 over $800 

1287
00:44:52,199 --> 00:44:55,229
billion budget and 13.5 billion is 

1288
00:44:55,239 --> 00:44:58,310
going to cyber less than 2% . So it's 

1289
00:44:58,320 --> 00:45:00,560
one thing that I , I really want to 

1290
00:45:00,570 --> 00:45:02,792
ring the alarm bells and I think that's 

1291
00:45:02,792 --> 00:45:04,903
something that we should be seriously 

1292
00:45:04,903 --> 00:45:07,181
considering . Thank you , Mr Jerry Kim . 

1293
00:45:07,181 --> 00:45:10,310
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Um Thank you 

1294
00:45:10,320 --> 00:45:12,320
to the two of you for coming on out 

1295
00:45:12,320 --> 00:45:14,542
here and , and talking to us about this 

1296
00:45:14,542 --> 00:45:16,876
uh general , I wanted to start with you . 

1297
00:45:16,876 --> 00:45:18,876
Um over the last couple of months , 

1298
00:45:18,876 --> 00:45:20,653
I've been engaged with a lot of 

1299
00:45:20,653 --> 00:45:22,653
ambassadors and other interlocutors 

1300
00:45:22,653 --> 00:45:24,653
from partner nations of ours in the 

1301
00:45:24,653 --> 00:45:26,764
Indo Pacific . Talking about what are 

1302
00:45:26,764 --> 00:45:28,931
some areas of cooperation we can focus 

1303
00:45:28,931 --> 00:45:31,110
on ? I think coalition building is so 

1304
00:45:31,120 --> 00:45:32,898
critical , especially given the 

1305
00:45:32,898 --> 00:45:34,842
challenges we face there . And one 

1306
00:45:34,842 --> 00:45:36,842
thing that keeps coming up over and 

1307
00:45:36,842 --> 00:45:39,300
over and over again is their concerns 

1308
00:45:39,310 --> 00:45:41,477
about their capabilities when it comes 

1309
00:45:41,477 --> 00:45:43,643
cyber security and whether or not that 

1310
00:45:43,643 --> 00:45:45,754
is at the level that is needed . This 

1311
00:45:45,754 --> 00:45:47,977
is something that I feel like would not 

1312
00:45:47,977 --> 00:45:49,810
only help them in terms of their 

1313
00:45:49,810 --> 00:45:51,840
capabilities and their ability to 

1314
00:45:51,850 --> 00:45:53,961
prevent vulnerabilities , but also in 

1315
00:45:53,969 --> 00:45:56,136
terms of our ability to work with them 

1316
00:45:56,136 --> 00:45:58,358
and engage whether that's intel sharing 

1317
00:45:58,358 --> 00:46:00,691
or other capacities there . But you see , 

1318
00:46:00,691 --> 00:46:02,858
you know , major partners of ours like 

1319
00:46:02,858 --> 00:46:04,858
Japan having significant challenges 

1320
00:46:04,858 --> 00:46:06,969
across their society when it comes to 

1321
00:46:06,969 --> 00:46:09,080
this , a lot of the ASEAN nations and 

1322
00:46:09,080 --> 00:46:11,247
others . So I I guess I just wanted to 

1323
00:46:11,247 --> 00:46:14,070
ask you if you would support or if you 

1324
00:46:14,080 --> 00:46:16,280
think it would be a good thing for us 

1325
00:46:16,290 --> 00:46:19,270
to do to , to try to increase our 

1326
00:46:19,280 --> 00:46:21,739
engagement , our efforts to be able to 

1327
00:46:21,750 --> 00:46:24,129
lift up their baseline of cyber 

1328
00:46:24,139 --> 00:46:26,750
security capabilities in the in the 

1329
00:46:26,760 --> 00:46:28,871
Indo Pacific . Is that something that 

1330
00:46:28,871 --> 00:46:30,816
you think would be valuable here ? 

1331
00:46:30,816 --> 00:46:32,927
Congressman ? I certainly do think it 

1332
00:46:32,927 --> 00:46:35,149
would be a value . And we're doing that 

1333
00:46:35,149 --> 00:46:37,371
right now . I just returned from , uh , 

1334
00:46:37,371 --> 00:46:39,427
an 11 day tour of uh many nations to 

1335
00:46:39,427 --> 00:46:41,649
include several of them in the , in the 

1336
00:46:41,649 --> 00:46:43,927
Indo Pacific region . And you're right , 

1337
00:46:43,927 --> 00:46:43,709
the number one topic that they , they 

1338
00:46:43,719 --> 00:46:45,830
talk about is how do we work together 

1339
00:46:45,830 --> 00:46:47,941
with cyber security ? This is the way 

1340
00:46:47,941 --> 00:46:50,163
that we're doing a US . Cyber command . 

1341
00:46:50,163 --> 00:46:52,275
First of all , uh through a series of 

1342
00:46:52,275 --> 00:46:54,441
exercises . So Cyber flag is our major 

1343
00:46:54,441 --> 00:46:56,719
exercise that takes place every summer . 

1344
00:46:56,719 --> 00:46:58,663
This summer , we will have over 30 

1345
00:46:58,663 --> 00:47:00,497
nations from around the world to 

1346
00:47:00,497 --> 00:47:02,497
participate with us . Secondly , is 

1347
00:47:02,497 --> 00:47:04,719
through bilateral arrangements where we 

1348
00:47:04,719 --> 00:47:06,775
go and work with the force to ensure 

1349
00:47:06,775 --> 00:47:08,719
that they develop the capacity and 

1350
00:47:08,719 --> 00:47:11,052
capability to defend their own networks . 

1351
00:47:11,052 --> 00:47:13,275
And the last piece , which is , I think 

1352
00:47:13,275 --> 00:47:15,441
just a , a uh incredible success story 

1353
00:47:15,441 --> 00:47:17,497
for the Department of Defense is the 

1354
00:47:17,497 --> 00:47:19,441
State Partnership program that the 

1355
00:47:19,441 --> 00:47:21,560
National Guard runs , that provides a 

1356
00:47:21,570 --> 00:47:24,600
continuous ability for us within the 

1357
00:47:24,610 --> 00:47:26,721
department to have relationships , to 

1358
00:47:26,721 --> 00:47:28,943
have exercises , to have an exchange of 

1359
00:47:28,943 --> 00:47:31,022
ideas with , with the nation . The 

1360
00:47:31,032 --> 00:47:33,199
state Partnership program that was run 

1361
00:47:33,199 --> 00:47:35,310
by California and , and it was run by 

1362
00:47:35,310 --> 00:47:37,254
California with Ukraine is a great 

1363
00:47:37,254 --> 00:47:39,421
example of this . This is the platform 

1364
00:47:39,421 --> 00:47:39,042
that we've been using . Do you feel 

1365
00:47:39,052 --> 00:47:41,242
like there's so that , that's really 

1366
00:47:41,252 --> 00:47:43,474
good to hear about the different facets 

1367
00:47:43,474 --> 00:47:45,474
in which this is happening . Do you 

1368
00:47:45,474 --> 00:47:47,585
think that there's room to scale this 

1369
00:47:47,585 --> 00:47:49,808
up and room to be able to increase this 

1370
00:47:49,808 --> 00:47:49,552
capability and this kind of engagement ? 

1371
00:47:49,812 --> 00:47:51,701
I do and I I'm seeing get already 

1372
00:47:51,701 --> 00:47:53,534
through our operations with hunt 

1373
00:47:53,534 --> 00:47:55,534
forward where we've had a number of 

1374
00:47:55,534 --> 00:47:57,590
different nations within the Pacific 

1375
00:47:57,590 --> 00:47:59,590
have , have asked us , uh , and the 

1376
00:47:59,590 --> 00:48:01,756
department has agreed for us to deploy 

1377
00:48:01,756 --> 00:48:03,868
to those uh areas to do that . Doctor 

1378
00:48:03,868 --> 00:48:02,825
Plum , what are , what are your 

1379
00:48:02,835 --> 00:48:04,875
thoughts on this right now ? Uh 

1380
00:48:04,885 --> 00:48:07,385
Congressman fully uh agree with your 

1381
00:48:07,395 --> 00:48:09,562
concerns and with general statements , 

1382
00:48:09,562 --> 00:48:12,370
we are working on this . Uh And your 

1383
00:48:12,379 --> 00:48:14,546
point is exactly right , which is that 

1384
00:48:14,546 --> 00:48:16,657
the more we can build the capacity of 

1385
00:48:16,657 --> 00:48:18,570
our allies and partners to defend 

1386
00:48:18,580 --> 00:48:20,747
themselves , then the more capacity we 

1387
00:48:20,747 --> 00:48:22,850
have to get after the adversary uh 

1388
00:48:22,860 --> 00:48:26,489
under the theory of a fixed number of 

1389
00:48:26,500 --> 00:48:28,611
resources , even if that number keeps 

1390
00:48:28,611 --> 00:48:30,722
going up . So it's , it's a strategic 

1391
00:48:30,722 --> 00:48:32,944
advantage to us to be able to do this . 

1392
00:48:32,944 --> 00:48:34,944
And the other part is , and this is 

1393
00:48:34,944 --> 00:48:36,944
really important , sir . It doesn't 

1394
00:48:36,944 --> 00:48:38,889
just unlock cyber cooperation . It 

1395
00:48:38,889 --> 00:48:38,850
unlocks all sorts of other parts of 

1396
00:48:38,860 --> 00:48:41,027
deeper cooperation . Uh The foundation 

1397
00:48:41,027 --> 00:48:43,290
of which is decent cyber security 

1398
00:48:43,300 --> 00:48:45,356
processes so that information can be 

1399
00:48:45,356 --> 00:48:47,189
protected , so we can share more 

1400
00:48:47,189 --> 00:48:48,911
information with those parts . 

1401
00:48:48,911 --> 00:48:48,860
Absolutely essential . I I just think 

1402
00:48:48,870 --> 00:48:50,981
this could be such a good win , win . 

1403
00:48:50,981 --> 00:48:52,926
It could really help us build just 

1404
00:48:52,926 --> 00:48:54,703
these deeper lateral horizontal 

1405
00:48:54,703 --> 00:48:56,592
connections uh while also sort of 

1406
00:48:56,592 --> 00:48:58,759
hardening uh some of the , again , the 

1407
00:48:58,759 --> 00:49:00,981
vulnerabilities that we face in that uh 

1408
00:49:00,981 --> 00:49:03,148
in that region which we know are , are 

1409
00:49:03,148 --> 00:49:05,314
immense there . And , and in general , 

1410
00:49:05,314 --> 00:49:07,481
I , I appreciate that you talked about 

1411
00:49:07,481 --> 00:49:09,759
some of those different facets because , 

1412
00:49:09,759 --> 00:49:09,110
you know , that reserve components , 

1413
00:49:09,120 --> 00:49:11,009
you know , specifically our , our 

1414
00:49:11,009 --> 00:49:13,009
National Guard members , they build 

1415
00:49:13,009 --> 00:49:15,009
incredible cyber capabilities , you 

1416
00:49:15,009 --> 00:49:16,953
know , in my , uh and , and one of 

1417
00:49:16,953 --> 00:49:18,731
those Guard programs that State 

1418
00:49:18,731 --> 00:49:20,509
Partnership program , uh that's 

1419
00:49:20,509 --> 00:49:22,342
something that's been incredibly 

1420
00:49:22,342 --> 00:49:24,564
fruitful . You know , we have the 140th 

1421
00:49:24,564 --> 00:49:26,564
Air National Guard Cyber Operations 

1422
00:49:26,564 --> 00:49:26,239
Squadron at joint base Maguire , 

1423
00:49:26,439 --> 00:49:28,560
Lakehurst in my district . And , you 

1424
00:49:28,570 --> 00:49:30,681
know , looking at their ability to be 

1425
00:49:30,681 --> 00:49:32,903
able to partner with these nations , it 

1426
00:49:32,903 --> 00:49:35,126
seems like that's essential . So I know 

1427
00:49:35,126 --> 00:49:35,000
you kind of raised that earlier , but 

1428
00:49:35,010 --> 00:49:37,232
it sounds like that's something as well 

1429
00:49:37,232 --> 00:49:39,454
that we can continue to , to push on in 

1430
00:49:39,454 --> 00:49:41,677
terms of thinking about how to surge up 

1431
00:49:41,677 --> 00:49:43,954
these types of efforts . Is that right ? 

1432
00:49:43,954 --> 00:49:45,788
Congressman , the uh Minister of 

1433
00:49:45,788 --> 00:49:47,899
Defense from Albania came to visit us 

1434
00:49:47,899 --> 00:49:49,954
Cyber Command . And one of the first 

1435
00:49:49,954 --> 00:49:52,177
things that he did was to recognize the 

1436
00:49:52,177 --> 00:49:54,343
New Jersey National Guard for the work 

1437
00:49:54,343 --> 00:49:56,566
that was done on a hunt for operation . 

1438
00:49:56,566 --> 00:49:58,621
He told us that he knew that he knew 

1439
00:49:58,621 --> 00:49:58,350
the captain and the lieutenant colonel 

1440
00:49:58,360 --> 00:50:00,416
that was leading those teams to , to 

1441
00:50:00,416 --> 00:50:02,638
help his nation as , as they came under 

1442
00:50:02,638 --> 00:50:04,638
cyberattack . This is a really good 

1443
00:50:04,638 --> 00:50:06,860
example . Of building partnerships in a 

1444
00:50:06,860 --> 00:50:06,159
way that we should be doing in the 

1445
00:50:06,169 --> 00:50:08,336
future . Well , I look forward to work 

1446
00:50:08,336 --> 00:50:10,558
with you . Thank you , Mr Gates . Thank 

1447
00:50:10,558 --> 00:50:12,780
you , Mr Chairman . Uh It's good to see 

1448
00:50:12,780 --> 00:50:14,780
you again . General Xi . I remember 

1449
00:50:14,780 --> 00:50:16,780
back in the nineties when President 

1450
00:50:16,780 --> 00:50:19,709
Bill Clinton said that we were at risk 

1451
00:50:19,719 --> 00:50:22,669
of a space arms race and our country 

1452
00:50:22,679 --> 00:50:24,729
put a bit of a pause on some of our 

1453
00:50:24,739 --> 00:50:28,060
space work And the governing theory was , 

1454
00:50:28,070 --> 00:50:30,639
if we paused , we could slow down and 

1455
00:50:30,649 --> 00:50:33,590
make space more of a safe domain and 

1456
00:50:33,600 --> 00:50:35,433
not a contested domain . And the 

1457
00:50:35,433 --> 00:50:37,544
reality we know as we sit here now is 

1458
00:50:37,544 --> 00:50:39,600
while we may have paused during some 

1459
00:50:39,600 --> 00:50:41,656
years . In the 90s , our adversaries 

1460
00:50:41,656 --> 00:50:44,310
did not Russia , China , Iran , they 

1461
00:50:44,320 --> 00:50:46,598
all became more capable in this regard . 

1462
00:50:46,598 --> 00:50:48,431
And so I just wanted to get your 

1463
00:50:48,489 --> 00:50:52,010
initial take on a similar call for a 

1464
00:50:52,020 --> 00:50:54,242
pause regarding A I . Right now , we've 

1465
00:50:54,242 --> 00:50:56,353
seen some of the largest tech leaders 

1466
00:50:56,353 --> 00:50:58,409
including Elon Musk sign this letter 

1467
00:50:58,409 --> 00:51:00,520
saying that the advancement of A I is 

1468
00:51:00,520 --> 00:51:02,687
such that we ought to take a pause and 

1469
00:51:02,687 --> 00:51:04,298
determine how to frame those 

1470
00:51:04,298 --> 00:51:06,409
capabilities . What's your assessment 

1471
00:51:06,409 --> 00:51:08,631
of whether or not America's adversaries 

1472
00:51:08,631 --> 00:51:12,149
would follow the lead of principally us 

1473
00:51:12,159 --> 00:51:15,500
tech companies . My sense congressman 

1474
00:51:15,510 --> 00:51:17,566
is that uh artificial intelligence , 

1475
00:51:17,566 --> 00:51:19,788
machine learning is , is something that 

1476
00:51:19,788 --> 00:51:21,621
uh is resonant today and is , is 

1477
00:51:21,621 --> 00:51:23,566
something that our adversaries are 

1478
00:51:23,566 --> 00:51:25,621
gonna continue to uh look to exploit 

1479
00:51:25,621 --> 00:51:27,843
and , and moving forward . Do you worry 

1480
00:51:27,843 --> 00:51:30,010
that if us companies take a pause that 

1481
00:51:30,010 --> 00:51:32,121
that could constrain some of the um , 

1482
00:51:32,121 --> 00:51:33,989
capability development that you 

1483
00:51:34,000 --> 00:51:36,219
testified earlier is so necessary in 

1484
00:51:36,229 --> 00:51:38,780
getting people interested and engaged 

1485
00:51:38,790 --> 00:51:41,290
in a I so congressman . I , I guess I 

1486
00:51:41,300 --> 00:51:43,411
really haven't , uh , haven't thought 

1487
00:51:43,411 --> 00:51:45,300
about that . That's uh a piece of 

1488
00:51:45,300 --> 00:51:47,522
policy that uh that I'm , I'm sure will 

1489
00:51:47,522 --> 00:51:49,522
be discussed in the future . But uh 

1490
00:51:49,522 --> 00:51:51,744
what I am focused on is how do we build 

1491
00:51:51,744 --> 00:51:53,911
a bigger pool of people that have this 

1492
00:51:53,911 --> 00:51:53,439
capability and capacity to work it ? 

1493
00:51:53,449 --> 00:51:55,171
How do we engage with academic 

1494
00:51:55,171 --> 00:51:57,338
institutions to encourage young people 

1495
00:51:57,338 --> 00:51:59,560
to study A I and machine learning . How 

1496
00:51:59,560 --> 00:52:01,782
do we get them interested in governance 

1497
00:52:01,782 --> 00:52:03,727
service ? How do we continue to to 

1498
00:52:03,727 --> 00:52:05,893
utilize this in the future ? I I fully 

1499
00:52:05,893 --> 00:52:07,782
share that vision and I think the 

1500
00:52:07,782 --> 00:52:07,750
future of the country literally may 

1501
00:52:07,760 --> 00:52:10,060
depend on it . Um But you know , and I 

1502
00:52:10,070 --> 00:52:12,850
am not an expert in A I , I'm just 

1503
00:52:12,860 --> 00:52:14,804
starting to use and understand the 

1504
00:52:14,804 --> 00:52:16,929
techno technology uh intentionally . 

1505
00:52:17,040 --> 00:52:19,949
And uh it seems to me if you've got 

1506
00:52:19,959 --> 00:52:22,770
some of the big tech influencers in our 

1507
00:52:22,780 --> 00:52:25,310
country saying whoa whoa pause , uh 

1508
00:52:25,320 --> 00:52:28,899
don't expand commercial 

1509
00:52:28,909 --> 00:52:30,879
vectors in A I that could be 

1510
00:52:30,889 --> 00:52:32,945
counterproductive to the goals . You 

1511
00:52:32,945 --> 00:52:35,056
just stated about enhanced engagement 

1512
00:52:35,056 --> 00:52:37,222
in our country . Do you , do you share 

1513
00:52:37,222 --> 00:52:39,445
that concern ? So again , Congressman , 

1514
00:52:39,445 --> 00:52:41,445
you know , my my focus right now is 

1515
00:52:41,445 --> 00:52:43,500
being able to develop the talent and 

1516
00:52:43,500 --> 00:52:45,556
the techniques and the and the trade 

1517
00:52:45,556 --> 00:52:45,540
craft as we look forward to , to 

1518
00:52:45,550 --> 00:52:47,383
utilizing this , you know , this 

1519
00:52:47,383 --> 00:52:49,439
important advantage our nation has . 

1520
00:52:49,439 --> 00:52:53,209
And , and as you look at the A I domain 

1521
00:52:53,219 --> 00:52:55,110
right now , we would , we would 

1522
00:52:55,120 --> 00:52:57,231
certainly have to concede . There are 

1523
00:52:57,231 --> 00:52:59,509
scenarios where China is ahead , right ? 

1524
00:52:59,509 --> 00:53:01,731
I , I think right now as we take a look 

1525
00:53:01,731 --> 00:53:04,009
at the A I and machine learning domain , 

1526
00:53:04,009 --> 00:53:06,231
what we need to be focused on is how do 

1527
00:53:06,231 --> 00:53:08,398
we look at it in a way that we can use 

1528
00:53:08,398 --> 00:53:10,453
it responsibly ? Uh not only for our 

1529
00:53:10,453 --> 00:53:12,453
national defense , but also for our 

1530
00:53:12,453 --> 00:53:14,620
economy at us , cyber command , we are 

1531
00:53:14,620 --> 00:53:16,787
very , very interested in , in the use 

1532
00:53:16,787 --> 00:53:16,290
of large language models and the 

1533
00:53:16,300 --> 00:53:18,522
ability . But who's ahead ? My question 

1534
00:53:18,522 --> 00:53:20,633
is who's ahead right now , the United 

1535
00:53:20,633 --> 00:53:22,967
States is ahead . You think we're ahead , 

1536
00:53:22,967 --> 00:53:25,189
we're ahead of China and A I do . And , 

1537
00:53:25,189 --> 00:53:27,411
and what's your basis for that belief ? 

1538
00:53:27,411 --> 00:53:29,689
Uh again , uh discussions with experts . 

1539
00:53:29,689 --> 00:53:29,500
But I , but I think that this is a 

1540
00:53:29,510 --> 00:53:31,770
tenuous place that we're at as well . 

1541
00:53:31,780 --> 00:53:33,891
This is being developed in the United 

1542
00:53:33,891 --> 00:53:36,113
States . This is being developed by a , 

1543
00:53:36,113 --> 00:53:36,090
you know , a series of entrepreneurs 

1544
00:53:36,100 --> 00:53:38,211
and those that are , are working it . 

1545
00:53:38,211 --> 00:53:40,211
But this isn't , we should not take 

1546
00:53:40,211 --> 00:53:42,378
this for granted that this is going to 

1547
00:53:42,378 --> 00:53:44,433
be the way of the uh in the future . 

1548
00:53:44,433 --> 00:53:46,433
And so we need to continue to uh to 

1549
00:53:46,433 --> 00:53:48,544
invest in it and work it and continue 

1550
00:53:48,544 --> 00:53:50,767
to , to utilize it . Take care , you're 

1551
00:53:50,767 --> 00:53:52,989
back . Thank you . Uh We don't have the 

1552
00:53:52,989 --> 00:53:55,156
classified room until 10 AM . It's not 

1553
00:53:55,156 --> 00:53:57,433
my intention to filibuster until 10 AM , 

1554
00:53:57,433 --> 00:53:59,433
but I do want to entertain a second 

1555
00:53:59,433 --> 00:53:59,409
round of question . If any members have , 

1556
00:53:59,419 --> 00:54:02,250
have one , I will uh start with myself . 

1557
00:54:02,260 --> 00:54:05,229
Um So , um I want you to imagine you're 

1558
00:54:05,239 --> 00:54:08,500
talking to , let's say my grandma who's 

1559
00:54:08,510 --> 00:54:10,677
a great lady , she's extremely smart , 

1560
00:54:10,677 --> 00:54:12,454
but it's fair to say she's more 

1561
00:54:12,454 --> 00:54:12,209
concerned about her great 

1562
00:54:12,219 --> 00:54:14,386
granddaughters than she is about China 

1563
00:54:14,386 --> 00:54:16,275
and cyber in terms that she could 

1564
00:54:16,275 --> 00:54:18,780
understand , explain the threat that 

1565
00:54:18,790 --> 00:54:20,846
the Chinese Communist Party poses in 

1566
00:54:20,846 --> 00:54:24,399
cyberspace . Mrs 

1567
00:54:24,409 --> 00:54:26,131
Gallagher . Good morning . I'm 

1568
00:54:26,131 --> 00:54:28,540
generally Virginia Justice is her name , 

1569
00:54:28,550 --> 00:54:30,383
Mrs Justice . Good morning . I'm 

1570
00:54:30,383 --> 00:54:32,989
General Nason . As we think about our 

1571
00:54:33,000 --> 00:54:35,120
nation . One of the things that uh I 

1572
00:54:35,129 --> 00:54:37,189
think that we should consider is the 

1573
00:54:37,199 --> 00:54:39,310
fact that our nation is a nation that 

1574
00:54:39,310 --> 00:54:41,719
has been able to have a strong economy 

1575
00:54:41,729 --> 00:54:43,729
and a strong national defense . Our 

1576
00:54:43,729 --> 00:54:45,840
strong economy is based upon the fact 

1577
00:54:45,840 --> 00:54:48,409
that we're able to develop ideas and 

1578
00:54:48,419 --> 00:54:50,879
bring those ideas to uh a number of 

1579
00:54:50,889 --> 00:54:53,780
different people and be able to uh to 

1580
00:54:53,790 --> 00:54:55,790
have business thrive on that . It's 

1581
00:54:55,790 --> 00:54:58,750
based on this idea of , you know , an 

1582
00:54:58,760 --> 00:55:00,927
idea , being able to be patented and , 

1583
00:55:00,927 --> 00:55:02,927
and then being able to be sold to a 

1584
00:55:02,927 --> 00:55:05,139
broader government . What happens if a 

1585
00:55:05,149 --> 00:55:07,469
foreign nation takes those secrets as 

1586
00:55:07,479 --> 00:55:09,701
they're being developed doesn't have to 

1587
00:55:09,701 --> 00:55:11,812
do . The research doesn't have to pay 

1588
00:55:11,812 --> 00:55:13,868
for it , in fact , can get it to the 

1589
00:55:13,868 --> 00:55:15,757
market place before we can , that 

1590
00:55:15,757 --> 00:55:17,812
affects our economy and that affects 

1591
00:55:17,812 --> 00:55:17,550
our jobs . That's what we're seeing 

1592
00:55:17,560 --> 00:55:20,149
today in many of our industries where 

1593
00:55:20,159 --> 00:55:22,270
the Chinese have had ability to steal 

1594
00:55:22,270 --> 00:55:24,500
our intellectual property to repurpose 

1595
00:55:24,510 --> 00:55:26,621
it and then to bring it to the market 

1596
00:55:26,621 --> 00:55:28,790
at a much lower cost than we can . The 

1597
00:55:28,800 --> 00:55:31,022
other thing I would say , Mr Justice is 

1598
00:55:31,022 --> 00:55:32,967
the fact that national security is 

1599
00:55:32,967 --> 00:55:35,189
important in the sense of being able to 

1600
00:55:35,189 --> 00:55:37,830
take information and secure it . One of 

1601
00:55:37,840 --> 00:55:39,896
the powers of our nation is the fact 

1602
00:55:39,896 --> 00:55:42,118
that we may not have the largest army , 

1603
00:55:42,118 --> 00:55:44,229
Navy , air Force and marines , but we 

1604
00:55:44,229 --> 00:55:46,340
have the best army , navy , air Force 

1605
00:55:46,340 --> 00:55:48,396
and marines because we can really do 

1606
00:55:48,396 --> 00:55:50,507
one thing and that's fuse information 

1607
00:55:50,507 --> 00:55:52,673
and operations . We have to be able to 

1608
00:55:52,673 --> 00:55:54,729
secure that information . And when a 

1609
00:55:54,729 --> 00:55:56,840
foreign power like China can get into 

1610
00:55:56,840 --> 00:55:59,062
our networks , our data and our weapons 

1611
00:55:59,062 --> 00:56:01,229
systems that puts our nation at risk . 

1612
00:56:01,229 --> 00:56:03,451
Now , I'm I'm asking you something even 

1613
00:56:03,451 --> 00:56:05,673
more difficult . I want you to hop into 

1614
00:56:05,673 --> 00:56:07,840
the DeLorean and I want you to go into 

1615
00:56:07,840 --> 00:56:10,007
the future . And I want you to talk to 

1616
00:56:10,007 --> 00:56:12,007
my daughter who's currently 2.5 and 

1617
00:56:12,007 --> 00:56:13,896
consider her as a , a high school 

1618
00:56:13,896 --> 00:56:15,840
senior . And I want you to sort of 

1619
00:56:15,840 --> 00:56:18,007
explain two things to her . One . What 

1620
00:56:18,007 --> 00:56:20,790
is your pitch for her ? Serving the 

1621
00:56:20,800 --> 00:56:23,989
country in some sort of cyber capacity 

1622
00:56:24,000 --> 00:56:27,050
going to work for NSA or cyber com make , 

1623
00:56:27,060 --> 00:56:29,227
make the pitch to her . And two , what 

1624
00:56:29,227 --> 00:56:32,050
is the basic uh set of , of cyber 

1625
00:56:32,060 --> 00:56:34,227
hygiene practices that she and all her 

1626
00:56:34,227 --> 00:56:36,282
friends in high school should follow 

1627
00:56:37,169 --> 00:56:39,336
Miss Gallagher . Good morning . Uh I'd 

1628
00:56:39,336 --> 00:56:41,502
like to talk to you a little bit about 

1629
00:56:41,502 --> 00:56:43,725
the future and indeed , it will be Miss 

1630
00:56:43,725 --> 00:56:45,836
Gallagher for a long time , not Mrs . 

1631
00:56:46,270 --> 00:56:48,719
Uh The future is one where I would tell 

1632
00:56:48,729 --> 00:56:50,785
you that the jobs that you see today 

1633
00:56:50,785 --> 00:56:53,118
may not exist in the jobs in the future . 

1634
00:56:53,118 --> 00:56:55,429
Uh the areas that uh that our nation is 

1635
00:56:55,439 --> 00:56:57,550
going to produce , work in the future 

1636
00:56:57,550 --> 00:56:59,661
will likely be tied to our ability to 

1637
00:56:59,661 --> 00:57:01,883
work in this domain of cyberspace . The 

1638
00:57:01,883 --> 00:57:03,995
domain that you know , very well from 

1639
00:57:03,995 --> 00:57:05,828
operating on your smartphone two 

1640
00:57:05,828 --> 00:57:07,883
decades ago , the smartphones didn't 

1641
00:57:07,883 --> 00:57:09,883
even exist and yet today , they are 

1642
00:57:09,883 --> 00:57:11,939
accounting for a good portion of our 

1643
00:57:11,939 --> 00:57:13,939
economy . So as you think about the 

1644
00:57:13,939 --> 00:57:15,995
future , one of the things that will 

1645
00:57:15,995 --> 00:57:18,328
not change is the importance of science , 

1646
00:57:18,328 --> 00:57:19,939
technology , engineering and 

1647
00:57:19,939 --> 00:57:21,995
mathematics . And as you look to the 

1648
00:57:21,995 --> 00:57:24,161
future , being able to , to specialize 

1649
00:57:24,161 --> 00:57:26,106
in one of those areas , opens up a 

1650
00:57:26,106 --> 00:57:28,328
broad opportunity for you to , to think 

1651
00:57:28,328 --> 00:57:30,439
about jobs that may not exist today . 

1652
00:57:30,439 --> 00:57:32,661
But being able to think about jobs that 

1653
00:57:32,661 --> 00:57:34,772
don't exist today also means the fact 

1654
00:57:34,772 --> 00:57:34,179
that you have to be able to be 

1655
00:57:34,189 --> 00:57:36,929
responsible to operate in the domain of 

1656
00:57:36,939 --> 00:57:39,469
cyberspace today and being able to do 

1657
00:57:39,479 --> 00:57:41,479
that is understanding the fact that 

1658
00:57:41,479 --> 00:57:43,590
what you say on your phone or text on 

1659
00:57:43,590 --> 00:57:45,535
your phone or share images on your 

1660
00:57:45,535 --> 00:57:48,139
phone . Some are shared , not only with 

1661
00:57:48,149 --> 00:57:50,389
the the person that receives them , but 

1662
00:57:50,399 --> 00:57:52,621
other people that have access to it and 

1663
00:57:52,621 --> 00:57:54,790
being able to understand that , that 

1664
00:57:54,800 --> 00:57:56,850
securing that information is very 

1665
00:57:56,860 --> 00:57:58,939
important . The second piece is , is 

1666
00:57:58,949 --> 00:58:01,171
that you should also understand that um 

1667
00:58:01,370 --> 00:58:04,290
what you say in cyberspace uh perhaps 

1668
00:58:04,300 --> 00:58:06,820
may not be uh only viewed and , and 

1669
00:58:06,830 --> 00:58:08,840
heard by one person . So be very 

1670
00:58:08,850 --> 00:58:11,017
careful about what you record and what 

1671
00:58:11,017 --> 00:58:13,072
you , what you say . And I think the 

1672
00:58:13,072 --> 00:58:15,183
last piece is understanding that what 

1673
00:58:15,183 --> 00:58:17,239
you see on the internet and what you 

1674
00:58:17,239 --> 00:58:19,017
read today uh may or may not be 

1675
00:58:19,017 --> 00:58:21,459
actually uh true . And so being a 

1676
00:58:21,469 --> 00:58:24,179
discerning uh being a discerning viewer 

1677
00:58:24,189 --> 00:58:26,245
of , of what you're reading and what 

1678
00:58:26,245 --> 00:58:28,078
you're seeing is part of being a 

1679
00:58:28,078 --> 00:58:30,245
responsible person . Now , I would say 

1680
00:58:30,245 --> 00:58:32,510
the last piece of my advice is thinking 

1681
00:58:32,520 --> 00:58:34,560
about government service . There is 

1682
00:58:34,570 --> 00:58:36,570
honor in government service as your 

1683
00:58:36,570 --> 00:58:38,899
father has served , I would offer that 

1684
00:58:38,909 --> 00:58:40,965
he would probably communicate to you 

1685
00:58:40,965 --> 00:58:43,076
that the ability to give back to your 

1686
00:58:43,076 --> 00:58:46,459
nation is something that will stay with 

1687
00:58:46,469 --> 00:58:48,760
you for the rest of your life . Thank 

1688
00:58:48,770 --> 00:58:50,881
you . The good news is in this future 

1689
00:58:50,881 --> 00:58:53,103
tiktok no longer exists because we will 

1690
00:58:53,103 --> 00:58:55,437
have taken bipartisan action against it , 

1691
00:58:55,437 --> 00:58:57,381
perhaps that we were in the second 

1692
00:58:57,381 --> 00:58:59,548
administration in this future . But uh 

1693
00:58:59,548 --> 00:59:01,714
if anyone , do you have a second round 

1694
00:59:01,714 --> 00:59:05,600
of questions , Doctor Plum and uh 

1695
00:59:05,770 --> 00:59:09,729
General uh Nason , what role have 

1696
00:59:09,739 --> 00:59:13,489
tech companies played in Ukraine ? I 

1697
00:59:13,500 --> 00:59:15,722
know there's starlink . Are there other 

1698
00:59:15,722 --> 00:59:17,778
examples of tech companies that have 

1699
00:59:17,778 --> 00:59:19,833
played a role in Ukraine that you're 

1700
00:59:19,833 --> 00:59:22,260
aware of ? Something 

1701
00:59:24,370 --> 00:59:26,592
congressman ? I , I think that you've , 

1702
00:59:26,592 --> 00:59:28,592
you've highlighted one of the , the 

1703
00:59:28,592 --> 00:59:30,592
major lessons learned from Russia . 

1704
00:59:30,592 --> 00:59:32,592
Ukraine is the power of the private 

1705
00:59:32,592 --> 00:59:34,648
sector . Uh whether or not it's been 

1706
00:59:34,648 --> 00:59:36,481
Starlink , being able to provide 

1707
00:59:36,481 --> 00:59:35,969
satellite communications , whether or 

1708
00:59:35,979 --> 00:59:38,201
not it's been a , a series of different 

1709
00:59:38,201 --> 00:59:40,201
us companies that have been able to 

1710
00:59:40,201 --> 00:59:42,368
provide cyber security support such as 

1711
00:59:42,368 --> 00:59:44,590
Microsoft and Palo Alto and others . Uh 

1712
00:59:44,590 --> 00:59:47,699
This is uh this is an for us to scale . 

1713
00:59:47,850 --> 00:59:49,739
That's the lesson learned is that 

1714
00:59:49,739 --> 00:59:52,189
bringing the private sector is the 

1715
00:59:52,199 --> 00:59:54,820
opportunity for us to get to not tens 

1716
00:59:54,830 --> 00:59:57,052
of thousands , it's tens of millions if 

1717
00:59:57,052 --> 00:59:58,979
not billions of people with the 

1718
00:59:58,989 --> 01:00:01,060
information that's readily important 

1719
01:00:01,070 --> 01:00:04,510
and , and assisting Ukraine today . I 

1720
01:00:05,330 --> 01:00:07,889
so I would just add . Uh Thanks . Uh 

1721
01:00:07,899 --> 01:00:11,129
Sir , the uh one of the issues and Mr 

1722
01:00:11,139 --> 01:00:13,361
Keating uh actually spoke to it earlier 

1723
01:00:13,361 --> 01:00:15,306
about surprise or , or lessons . I 

1724
01:00:15,306 --> 01:00:18,169
think uh it's been clear that uh 

1725
01:00:18,179 --> 01:00:20,401
Ukraine has been much more resilient uh 

1726
01:00:20,401 --> 01:00:22,623
from a cyber security standpoint than I 

1727
01:00:22,623 --> 01:00:24,909
think Russia might have anticipated . A 

1728
01:00:25,000 --> 01:00:27,222
lot of that is due to help from private 

1729
01:00:27,222 --> 01:00:29,222
sector . One way of making yourself 

1730
01:00:29,222 --> 01:00:31,222
resilient is to make sure that your 

1731
01:00:31,222 --> 01:00:33,444
data can be protected and one way to do 

1732
01:00:33,444 --> 01:00:35,556
that is to move to the cloud . Uh and 

1733
01:00:35,556 --> 01:00:37,500
so individual attacks have not had 

1734
01:00:37,500 --> 01:00:39,222
perhaps the effect that Russia 

1735
01:00:39,222 --> 01:00:41,111
anticipated . Appreciate it . The 

1736
01:00:41,111 --> 01:00:43,167
reason I ask is it's become somewhat 

1737
01:00:43,167 --> 01:00:45,222
fashionable on both the far left and 

1738
01:00:45,222 --> 01:00:47,370
far right to be criticizing Silicon 

1739
01:00:47,379 --> 01:00:49,212
Valley . And I share some of the 

1740
01:00:49,212 --> 01:00:51,830
criticisms of privacy and uh issues 

1741
01:00:51,840 --> 01:00:54,580
about protecting people from kids from 

1742
01:00:54,590 --> 01:00:56,812
social media . But I also represent the 

1743
01:00:56,812 --> 01:00:59,034
area . And I fundamentally believe that 

1744
01:00:59,034 --> 01:01:00,868
it's going to be critical in our 

1745
01:01:00,868 --> 01:01:02,820
national security . I'm that uh 

1746
01:01:03,050 --> 01:01:05,500
Chairman Gallagher , his uh in his 

1747
01:01:05,510 --> 01:01:07,677
other role as chairman , he's chairman 

1748
01:01:07,677 --> 01:01:09,510
of every committee around here , 

1749
01:01:09,510 --> 01:01:11,621
chairman of the uh China committee is 

1750
01:01:11,621 --> 01:01:14,439
leading a delegation to Silicon Valley 

1751
01:01:14,449 --> 01:01:16,780
and will be engaging uh with some of 

1752
01:01:16,790 --> 01:01:18,790
these tech leaders . If you could . 

1753
01:01:18,790 --> 01:01:20,790
Just my last final question here is 

1754
01:01:20,790 --> 01:01:23,189
talk about how you see the importance 

1755
01:01:23,199 --> 01:01:25,649
of that collaboration . Uh And what 

1756
01:01:25,659 --> 01:01:27,715
you'd like to see for a 21st century 

1757
01:01:27,715 --> 01:01:29,326
national security strategy . 

1758
01:01:31,830 --> 01:01:34,270
I think the collaboration is essential . 

1759
01:01:34,340 --> 01:01:36,780
I do think uh that there is one piece 

1760
01:01:36,790 --> 01:01:38,734
that we could use your help with , 

1761
01:01:38,734 --> 01:01:40,729
which is communicating uh that 

1762
01:01:40,739 --> 01:01:42,961
technology like any other system can be 

1763
01:01:42,961 --> 01:01:45,070
used for good or for bad and making 

1764
01:01:45,080 --> 01:01:47,129
sure that as uh our , our , our 

1765
01:01:47,139 --> 01:01:49,760
brilliant men and women working in uh 

1766
01:01:49,770 --> 01:01:51,826
the tech quarter in Silicon Valley , 

1767
01:01:51,826 --> 01:01:53,937
for example , understand that they're 

1768
01:01:53,937 --> 01:01:55,937
also downsize technology and try to 

1769
01:01:55,937 --> 01:01:57,937
build and safeguards as they go , I 

1770
01:01:57,937 --> 01:01:57,770
think that would benefit us all going 

1771
01:01:57,780 --> 01:02:01,360
forward . Uh 

1772
01:02:01,679 --> 01:02:04,239
We uh you know , Congressman , I would 

1773
01:02:04,250 --> 01:02:06,472
just say that as we think about the the 

1774
01:02:06,472 --> 01:02:08,583
future here , this is , this is where 

1775
01:02:08,583 --> 01:02:10,750
we need to have the , the partnerships 

1776
01:02:10,750 --> 01:02:12,639
that are so strong , not only the 

1777
01:02:12,639 --> 01:02:14,750
partnerships of the technology that's 

1778
01:02:14,750 --> 01:02:16,861
being developed , but the talent that 

1779
01:02:16,861 --> 01:02:19,028
exists there . I'm very interested for 

1780
01:02:19,028 --> 01:02:20,972
um young people and , and even mid 

1781
01:02:20,972 --> 01:02:20,699
career people to , to come and join our 

1782
01:02:20,709 --> 01:02:22,765
force for a period of time . This is 

1783
01:02:22,765 --> 01:02:24,876
perhaps something that uh is a unique 

1784
01:02:24,876 --> 01:02:26,876
part of us . Cyber command that you 

1785
01:02:26,876 --> 01:02:29,153
would come in at the at the mid career . 

1786
01:02:29,153 --> 01:02:31,265
But that's the type of talent that we 

1787
01:02:31,265 --> 01:02:33,487
need . That's the type of engineering , 

1788
01:02:33,487 --> 01:02:35,820
know how that would uh really assist us . 

1789
01:02:35,820 --> 01:02:35,560
And so again , I think it's both the 

1790
01:02:35,570 --> 01:02:37,681
technology and the talent that exists 

1791
01:02:37,681 --> 01:02:39,848
there that , that we want to make sure 

1792
01:02:39,848 --> 01:02:41,848
is clearly partnered with us in the 

1793
01:02:41,848 --> 01:02:43,737
future . Thank you . Uh Thank the 

1794
01:02:43,737 --> 01:02:45,848
ranking member . I am very excited to 

1795
01:02:45,848 --> 01:02:47,903
visit uh his district and uh I might 

1796
01:02:47,903 --> 01:02:50,070
need your advice on how to fit in . If 

1797
01:02:50,070 --> 01:02:49,780
you , if there's any extra sort of like 

1798
01:02:49,790 --> 01:02:52,012
hoodies or all birds or ironic t-shirts 

1799
01:02:52,012 --> 01:02:54,969
I could wear , I appreciate it , Mr 

1800
01:02:54,979 --> 01:02:56,979
Latrell . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

1801
01:02:59,560 --> 01:03:01,979
When , when asked a question from my 

1802
01:03:01,989 --> 01:03:04,156
district to my constituents , ask me a 

1803
01:03:04,156 --> 01:03:06,322
question like is our military the most 

1804
01:03:06,322 --> 01:03:08,433
formidable force on the planet ? It's 

1805
01:03:08,433 --> 01:03:10,489
easy for me . To say yes , even when 

1806
01:03:10,489 --> 01:03:12,600
they talk about how aggressive Russia 

1807
01:03:12,600 --> 01:03:14,600
is and how large China is . I say , 

1808
01:03:14,600 --> 01:03:16,822
well , we're an all volunteer force and 

1809
01:03:16,822 --> 01:03:18,600
we're terrifying . Uh But I can 

1810
01:03:18,600 --> 01:03:20,822
quantify that by showing them the , the 

1811
01:03:20,822 --> 01:03:22,933
Special forces community or a handful 

1812
01:03:22,933 --> 01:03:24,933
of marines . And generally you said 

1813
01:03:24,933 --> 01:03:28,169
that um the US is leading in the cyber 

1814
01:03:28,179 --> 01:03:32,080
space . No , I think it was 16 or 17 

1815
01:03:32,090 --> 01:03:34,340
when we were the , we had the fifth 

1816
01:03:34,350 --> 01:03:37,530
fastest computer in the world 

1817
01:03:37,590 --> 01:03:40,219
titan over at uh one of the national 

1818
01:03:40,229 --> 01:03:42,285
laboratories . Are you familiar with 

1819
01:03:42,285 --> 01:03:44,899
that ? Uh I am OK . And so then right 

1820
01:03:44,909 --> 01:03:47,020
in that same time frame , we fired up 

1821
01:03:47,020 --> 01:03:49,187
summit . And if I remember correctly , 

1822
01:03:49,187 --> 01:03:51,131
summit went from petaflop to extra 

1823
01:03:51,131 --> 01:03:53,242
scale computing speeds , which pushed 

1824
01:03:53,242 --> 01:03:55,242
us into the next phase of evolution 

1825
01:03:55,242 --> 01:03:57,020
when it comes to our processing 

1826
01:03:57,020 --> 01:03:59,242
abilities , moving us closer to A I M L 

1827
01:03:59,242 --> 01:04:01,419
or quantum , which I think one of the 

1828
01:04:01,429 --> 01:04:03,651
most brilliant men in the world . So 15 

1829
01:04:03,651 --> 01:04:05,873
years ago , we said in 15 years , we're 

1830
01:04:05,873 --> 01:04:07,873
gonna be at quantum computing . And 

1831
01:04:07,873 --> 01:04:09,985
they said it again the day that I was 

1832
01:04:09,985 --> 01:04:12,207
standing there , right ? So my question 

1833
01:04:12,207 --> 01:04:11,739
is , which would this may be a 

1834
01:04:11,750 --> 01:04:15,729
classified setting question is how do I 

1835
01:04:15,739 --> 01:04:17,906
see ? How do you confirm to me because 

1836
01:04:17,906 --> 01:04:19,850
you said you talked to the subject 

1837
01:04:19,850 --> 01:04:22,017
matter experts in the space . But what 

1838
01:04:22,017 --> 01:04:21,729
does that , what does that mean ? What 

1839
01:04:21,739 --> 01:04:24,169
are they telling you ? Because to me , 

1840
01:04:24,179 --> 01:04:27,479
if China given the the time frame from 

1841
01:04:27,489 --> 01:04:29,820
them when we fired up summit should 

1842
01:04:29,830 --> 01:04:31,830
have on board or online , another 

1843
01:04:31,840 --> 01:04:34,062
computer that would have trumped us and 

1844
01:04:34,062 --> 01:04:36,469
pushed us back some . So the amount of 

1845
01:04:36,479 --> 01:04:40,320
money they're spending in that space 

1846
01:04:40,350 --> 01:04:42,870
as compared to us would make me think 

1847
01:04:42,879 --> 01:04:45,189
that they're ahead of us . So can you 

1848
01:04:45,199 --> 01:04:47,310
give me some amplifying information ? 

1849
01:04:47,310 --> 01:04:49,421
Do we need to wait till 10 if I might 

1850
01:04:49,421 --> 01:04:51,588
uh uh provide a bit of information and 

1851
01:04:51,588 --> 01:04:53,810
take also uh a portion of this in the , 

1852
01:04:53,810 --> 01:04:56,088
in the close classified spending money , 

1853
01:04:56,088 --> 01:04:58,143
doesn't necessarily mean that you're 

1854
01:04:58,143 --> 01:05:00,143
the best in what you do . And being 

1855
01:05:00,143 --> 01:04:59,620
able to integrate that kind of 

1856
01:04:59,629 --> 01:05:01,870
capability is what really matters . So 

1857
01:05:01,879 --> 01:05:03,879
being able to take , you know , the 

1858
01:05:03,879 --> 01:05:05,935
intelligence , integrate it with and 

1859
01:05:05,935 --> 01:05:07,990
maneuver force to have an outcome is 

1860
01:05:07,990 --> 01:05:10,101
where I clearly see the United States 

1861
01:05:10,101 --> 01:05:12,323
has the lead and it is , you know , not 

1862
01:05:12,323 --> 01:05:14,435
only in the fact that we can do it in 

1863
01:05:14,435 --> 01:05:16,657
the air on the ground , but also in the 

1864
01:05:16,657 --> 01:05:18,657
sea , being able to bring disparate 

1865
01:05:18,657 --> 01:05:20,879
parts of information together that mind 

1866
01:05:20,879 --> 01:05:23,101
for data that provide that key piece of 

1867
01:05:23,101 --> 01:05:25,046
information uh to a to a soldier , 

1868
01:05:25,046 --> 01:05:27,157
sailor , airman , marine on the point 

1869
01:05:27,157 --> 01:05:29,268
is what we do so well , congressman , 

1870
01:05:29,268 --> 01:05:31,379
and that's the difference in terms of 

1871
01:05:31,379 --> 01:05:33,379
what our nation can do . Yeah , but 

1872
01:05:33,379 --> 01:05:35,212
that's our military presenting a 

1873
01:05:35,212 --> 01:05:37,550
defensive posture where the Chinese 

1874
01:05:37,560 --> 01:05:39,782
government is reaching out and touching 

1875
01:05:39,782 --> 01:05:43,239
my civilians . And that's a problem . 

1876
01:05:43,919 --> 01:05:46,086
Does that make sense . Again , I think 

1877
01:05:46,086 --> 01:05:48,363
perhaps more of this we can discuss in , 

1878
01:05:48,363 --> 01:05:50,419
in closed session if you'd like fair 

1879
01:05:50,419 --> 01:05:52,641
enough . Hey , you , Baxter . Any other 

1880
01:05:52,641 --> 01:05:54,870
members ? Ok . With that , we , we will 

1881
01:05:54,879 --> 01:05:56,823
adjourn the open session and we'll 

1882
01:05:56,823 --> 01:05:59,489
reconvene , uh , the classified portion 

1883
01:05:59,810 --> 01:06:03,040
upstairs subcommittee is adjourned at 

1884
01:06:03,050 --> 01:06:05,830
10:00. OK . Give him , come for a break .