1 00:00:00,699 --> 00:00:02,866 Uh Good afternoon , everyone . Quite a 2 00:00:02,866 --> 00:00:04,977 few things to cover at the top here . 3 00:00:04,977 --> 00:00:07,059 So I appreciate your patience in 4 00:00:07,070 --> 00:00:09,070 advance and then we'll get right to 5 00:00:09,070 --> 00:00:11,840 your questions . So first of all , 6 00:00:11,850 --> 00:00:14,239 first of all , we are aware of the 7 00:00:14,250 --> 00:00:16,659 press reports regarding a potential 8 00:00:16,670 --> 00:00:19,209 suspect in the Department of Justice's 9 00:00:19,219 --> 00:00:22,610 ongoing investigation into unauthorized 10 00:00:22,620 --> 00:00:24,920 disclosures of documents appearing to 11 00:00:24,930 --> 00:00:26,486 emanate from throughout the 12 00:00:26,486 --> 00:00:28,652 intelligence community because this is 13 00:00:28,652 --> 00:00:30,763 an ongoing criminal investigation . I 14 00:00:30,763 --> 00:00:32,874 will have to refer you to the DOJ for 15 00:00:32,874 --> 00:00:35,299 any questions . This is a law 16 00:00:35,310 --> 00:00:37,409 enforcement matter and it would be 17 00:00:37,419 --> 00:00:39,530 inappropriate for me or any other dod 18 00:00:39,530 --> 00:00:41,475 official to comment at this time . 19 00:00:41,475 --> 00:00:43,308 Certainly , when we have more to 20 00:00:43,308 --> 00:00:45,586 provide from the Department of Defense , 21 00:00:45,586 --> 00:00:47,308 we will . In the meantime , as 22 00:00:47,308 --> 00:00:49,197 Secretary Austin has stated , the 23 00:00:49,197 --> 00:00:51,363 department is taking the issue of this 24 00:00:51,363 --> 00:00:53,641 unauthorized disclosure very seriously . 25 00:00:53,641 --> 00:00:55,697 We continue to work around the clock 26 00:00:55,697 --> 00:00:57,641 along with the interagency and the 27 00:00:57,641 --> 00:00:59,475 intelligence community to better 28 00:00:59,475 --> 00:01:01,849 understand the scope scale and impact 29 00:01:01,860 --> 00:01:04,080 of these leaks . And just as we are 30 00:01:04,089 --> 00:01:06,145 limited in what we can say about the 31 00:01:06,145 --> 00:01:08,400 doj's ongoing investigation will be 32 00:01:08,500 --> 00:01:11,449 also very limited in what we can say 33 00:01:11,459 --> 00:01:13,681 about any of the documents themselves . 34 00:01:13,900 --> 00:01:16,011 And while we certainly understand the 35 00:01:16,011 --> 00:01:18,067 media's interest in asking questions 36 00:01:18,067 --> 00:01:20,289 about the contents of these documents , 37 00:01:20,289 --> 00:01:22,344 I will highlight that as a matter of 38 00:01:22,344 --> 00:01:24,233 long standing policy just because 39 00:01:24,233 --> 00:01:26,289 classified information may be posted 40 00:01:26,289 --> 00:01:28,344 online or elsewhere does not mean it 41 00:01:28,344 --> 00:01:29,844 has been declassified by a 42 00:01:29,844 --> 00:01:32,709 classification authority . And those of 43 00:01:32,720 --> 00:01:34,942 you who have been covering the Pentagon 44 00:01:34,942 --> 00:01:36,998 for a long time know that we're just 45 00:01:36,998 --> 00:01:38,776 not going to discuss or confirm 46 00:01:38,776 --> 00:01:40,664 classified information due to the 47 00:01:40,664 --> 00:01:42,776 potential impact on national security 48 00:01:42,776 --> 00:01:44,887 as well as the safety and security of 49 00:01:44,887 --> 00:01:46,998 our personnel and those of our allies 50 00:01:46,998 --> 00:01:49,276 and our partners . And for that reason , 51 00:01:49,276 --> 00:01:51,540 we will continue to encourage those of 52 00:01:51,550 --> 00:01:53,550 you who are reporting this story to 53 00:01:53,550 --> 00:01:55,717 take these latter factors into account 54 00:01:55,769 --> 00:01:57,436 and to consider the potential 55 00:01:57,436 --> 00:01:59,436 consequences of posting potentially 56 00:01:59,436 --> 00:02:01,380 sensitive documents or information 57 00:02:01,380 --> 00:02:03,599 online or elsewhere . Separately , 58 00:02:03,610 --> 00:02:05,519 Secretary Austin hosted Latvia's 59 00:02:05,529 --> 00:02:07,696 Minister of Defense in a nice today at 60 00:02:07,696 --> 00:02:09,751 the Pentagon , the leaders discussed 61 00:02:09,751 --> 00:02:11,862 the strength of the US Latvia defense 62 00:02:11,862 --> 00:02:13,869 relationship and ongoing efforts to 63 00:02:13,880 --> 00:02:16,050 support Ukraine . They also discuss 64 00:02:16,059 --> 00:02:18,059 shared security interests in Europe 65 00:02:18,059 --> 00:02:20,281 including nato's deterrence and defense 66 00:02:20,281 --> 00:02:22,392 posture ahead of the July NATO summit 67 00:02:22,392 --> 00:02:24,226 in Vilnius . The readout will be 68 00:02:24,226 --> 00:02:26,279 available later today . Staying on 69 00:02:26,289 --> 00:02:28,178 Europe for a moment . Next week , 70 00:02:28,178 --> 00:02:30,345 Secretary Austin will travel to Sweden 71 00:02:30,345 --> 00:02:32,567 to meet with his counterpart to discuss 72 00:02:32,567 --> 00:02:34,678 security related topics shared by our 73 00:02:34,678 --> 00:02:36,789 two nations from there . He'll travel 74 00:02:36,789 --> 00:02:39,011 to Germany where he and chairman of the 75 00:02:39,011 --> 00:02:41,067 Joint Chiefs of Staff General Milley 76 00:02:41,067 --> 00:02:43,289 will host an in person meeting on April 77 00:02:43,289 --> 00:02:45,511 21 of the Ukraine defense contact group 78 00:02:45,511 --> 00:02:47,733 at Ramstein Air Base . This will be the 79 00:02:47,733 --> 00:02:49,845 11 th meeting of the UDC . Since this 80 00:02:49,845 --> 00:02:51,567 vital forum was established by 81 00:02:51,567 --> 00:02:53,678 Secretary Austin . One year ago , the 82 00:02:53,678 --> 00:02:55,845 Secretary and General Milley will join 83 00:02:55,845 --> 00:02:57,622 ministers of defense and senior 84 00:02:57,622 --> 00:02:59,511 military officials from nearly 50 85 00:02:59,511 --> 00:03:01,733 nations around the world to discuss the 86 00:03:01,733 --> 00:03:03,567 ongoing crisis in Ukraine and to 87 00:03:03,567 --> 00:03:05,511 continue our close coordination in 88 00:03:05,511 --> 00:03:07,733 providing the Ukrainian people with the 89 00:03:07,733 --> 00:03:09,845 means necessary to protect themselves 90 00:03:09,845 --> 00:03:12,067 against Russia's unprovoked and illegal 91 00:03:12,067 --> 00:03:14,178 aggression . And as we've highlighted 92 00:03:14,178 --> 00:03:14,000 before , the contact group has been 93 00:03:14,009 --> 00:03:16,009 instrumental in identifying 94 00:03:16,020 --> 00:03:18,399 synchronizing and ensuring delivery of 95 00:03:18,410 --> 00:03:20,188 the military capabilities . The 96 00:03:20,188 --> 00:03:21,966 Ukrainians need to defend their 97 00:03:21,966 --> 00:03:24,089 homeland . And on a semi related note 98 00:03:24,100 --> 00:03:26,322 at the end of this month , the Arkansas 99 00:03:26,322 --> 00:03:28,378 Army National Guard's 39 th infantry 100 00:03:28,378 --> 00:03:30,433 brigade combat team will replace the 101 00:03:30,433 --> 00:03:32,869 New York Army National Guards 27 th 102 00:03:32,880 --> 00:03:35,550 infantry Brigade combat team and assume 103 00:03:35,559 --> 00:03:37,503 command of the joint multinational 104 00:03:37,503 --> 00:03:39,670 training group , Ukraine and Graf beer 105 00:03:39,670 --> 00:03:42,020 training area in Germany . The 27 th 106 00:03:42,029 --> 00:03:43,918 infantry brigade combat team took 107 00:03:43,918 --> 00:03:46,110 charge of the J M T G U during a 108 00:03:46,119 --> 00:03:48,259 transfer authority ceremony in August 109 00:03:48,270 --> 00:03:51,179 of 2022 becoming the first and only 110 00:03:51,190 --> 00:03:55,020 unit in the J M G U eight year history 111 00:03:55,169 --> 00:03:57,391 to assume the unit mission for a second 112 00:03:57,391 --> 00:03:59,613 time and we look forward to the arrival 113 00:03:59,613 --> 00:04:01,502 of the 39 the continuation of the 114 00:04:01,502 --> 00:04:03,669 important work to provide Ukraine what 115 00:04:03,669 --> 00:04:05,891 it needs in terms of training to defend 116 00:04:05,891 --> 00:04:08,058 itself . And with that , I'll be happy 117 00:04:08,058 --> 00:04:10,002 to go to your questions . We'll go 118 00:04:10,002 --> 00:04:13,360 ahead and start with a thank you 119 00:04:13,369 --> 00:04:16,140 General Rider . So can you confirm that ? 120 00:04:16,709 --> 00:04:19,260 Airman first class Jack Tara , a member 121 00:04:19,269 --> 00:04:21,491 of the Massachusetts Air National Guard 122 00:04:21,491 --> 00:04:23,709 is a person of interest in this leaked 123 00:04:23,720 --> 00:04:25,942 documents case and I have several other 124 00:04:25,942 --> 00:04:28,089 questions . Um So first of all , as I 125 00:04:28,100 --> 00:04:29,878 mentioned , there is an ongoing 126 00:04:29,878 --> 00:04:32,044 criminal investigation and so anything 127 00:04:32,044 --> 00:04:34,211 related to that , I'm going to need to 128 00:04:34,211 --> 00:04:36,322 refer you to the DOJ or the FBI . Can 129 00:04:36,322 --> 00:04:38,378 you speak at all to if anyone in the 130 00:04:38,378 --> 00:04:40,489 Department of Defense has reached out 131 00:04:40,489 --> 00:04:42,600 to this airman , do you know where he 132 00:04:42,600 --> 00:04:44,378 is ? There are reports that law 133 00:04:44,378 --> 00:04:46,267 enforcement is closing in on this 134 00:04:46,267 --> 00:04:48,433 airman's location ? So has anyone been 135 00:04:48,433 --> 00:04:51,299 able to reach out to him again , Tara , 136 00:04:51,309 --> 00:04:53,531 I appreciate the question , but again , 137 00:04:53,531 --> 00:04:55,198 given that this is an ongoing 138 00:04:55,198 --> 00:04:57,198 investigation , I'm not going to be 139 00:04:57,198 --> 00:04:59,420 able to talk about the investigation or 140 00:04:59,420 --> 00:05:01,365 any potential doj actions . So I'd 141 00:05:01,365 --> 00:05:03,420 refer you to them . Ok . In the days 142 00:05:03,420 --> 00:05:05,476 after the leaks came to light , what 143 00:05:05,476 --> 00:05:07,365 steps has dod taken to reduce the 144 00:05:07,365 --> 00:05:09,940 number of people who have access to not 145 00:05:09,950 --> 00:05:12,329 only these classified briefings but the 146 00:05:12,339 --> 00:05:14,640 classified material in general ? Sure . 147 00:05:14,649 --> 00:05:16,980 Um So we continue to review a variety 148 00:05:16,989 --> 00:05:18,899 of factors as it relates to 149 00:05:18,910 --> 00:05:21,209 safeguarding classified materials . 150 00:05:21,220 --> 00:05:24,079 This includes examining and updating 151 00:05:24,089 --> 00:05:26,309 distribution lists , assessing how and 152 00:05:26,320 --> 00:05:29,049 where intelligence products are shared 153 00:05:29,059 --> 00:05:31,369 in a variety of other steps . I would 154 00:05:31,380 --> 00:05:33,436 say though , that it is important to 155 00:05:33,436 --> 00:05:36,559 understand that we do have stringent 156 00:05:36,570 --> 00:05:39,839 guidelines in place for safeguarding 157 00:05:39,850 --> 00:05:42,017 classified and sensitive information . 158 00:05:42,040 --> 00:05:45,239 This was a deliberate criminal act , a 159 00:05:45,250 --> 00:05:48,390 violation of those guidelines . And so 160 00:05:48,399 --> 00:05:50,399 again , I think that's important to 161 00:05:50,399 --> 00:05:52,566 understand that we will continue to do 162 00:05:52,566 --> 00:05:54,788 everything we can to ensure that people 163 00:05:54,788 --> 00:05:57,010 who have a need to know when it comes 164 00:05:57,019 --> 00:05:58,963 to this kind of information , have 165 00:05:58,963 --> 00:06:01,130 access to that . We're always going to 166 00:06:01,130 --> 00:06:04,019 learn from every situation . But again , 167 00:06:04,029 --> 00:06:06,140 this is something that we'll continue 168 00:06:06,140 --> 00:06:08,251 to look at . But you are taking steps 169 00:06:08,251 --> 00:06:10,660 to tighten that I guess population who 170 00:06:10,670 --> 00:06:12,614 might have access to this level of 171 00:06:12,614 --> 00:06:14,559 information that that's accurate . 172 00:06:14,559 --> 00:06:16,559 Again , we continue to review those 173 00:06:16,559 --> 00:06:18,781 distribution lists , update them , make 174 00:06:18,781 --> 00:06:18,739 sure there's a need to know . But again , 175 00:06:18,750 --> 00:06:21,410 let me just emphasize my point that 176 00:06:21,420 --> 00:06:24,480 this was a , we have rules in place 177 00:06:24,489 --> 00:06:26,322 each of us signs a nondisclosure 178 00:06:26,322 --> 00:06:28,589 agreement , anybody that has a , has a 179 00:06:28,600 --> 00:06:31,470 security clearance . And so all 180 00:06:31,480 --> 00:06:33,480 indications are , again , this is a 181 00:06:33,480 --> 00:06:35,591 criminal act , a willful violation of 182 00:06:35,591 --> 00:06:37,758 those . And again , another reason why 183 00:06:37,758 --> 00:06:39,758 we're continuing to investigate and 184 00:06:39,758 --> 00:06:41,702 support doj's investigation . Last 185 00:06:41,702 --> 00:06:44,100 question , do you have a sense that 186 00:06:44,109 --> 00:06:46,579 this is just the act of one individual ? 187 00:06:46,589 --> 00:06:50,250 And even if so wouldn't members of his 188 00:06:50,260 --> 00:06:51,927 chain of command also be held 189 00:06:51,927 --> 00:06:54,149 accountable for this lost information . 190 00:06:54,149 --> 00:06:56,204 Again , I don't want to speculate or 191 00:06:56,204 --> 00:06:58,482 get ahead of the D O J's investigation , 192 00:06:58,482 --> 00:07:00,816 we need to allow that to run its course . 193 00:07:00,816 --> 00:07:02,927 And so I'd refer you to them . Let me 194 00:07:02,927 --> 00:07:04,982 go ahead and go to board and they'll 195 00:07:04,982 --> 00:07:07,204 come back to Jen . Yeah , Pat . There's 196 00:07:07,204 --> 00:07:09,371 two questions . One just uh to clarify 197 00:07:09,371 --> 00:07:13,309 in , in dod s efforts to change the way 198 00:07:13,320 --> 00:07:15,487 you do business in terms of protecting 199 00:07:15,487 --> 00:07:17,598 classified information apart from the 200 00:07:17,598 --> 00:07:20,200 stuff that you do already , is that dod 201 00:07:20,269 --> 00:07:22,899 led or is that joint staff led ? Who's 202 00:07:22,910 --> 00:07:25,529 kind of directing ? What on that ? And 203 00:07:25,540 --> 00:07:27,096 the second question is just 204 00:07:27,096 --> 00:07:28,929 hypothetically , I know you like 205 00:07:28,929 --> 00:07:31,559 hypotheticals , if somebody was to be 206 00:07:31,570 --> 00:07:34,019 charged , what would determine whether 207 00:07:34,029 --> 00:07:37,399 the military would charge and indict , 208 00:07:38,450 --> 00:07:40,617 you know , carry out the legal process 209 00:07:40,617 --> 00:07:42,783 against that person or people or doj ? 210 00:07:42,929 --> 00:07:44,929 Yeah . So on your latter question , 211 00:07:44,929 --> 00:07:47,151 you're right . I don't want to get into 212 00:07:47,151 --> 00:07:49,262 hypotheticals . I will say that , you 213 00:07:49,262 --> 00:07:51,485 know , as always , every case is judged 214 00:07:51,485 --> 00:07:53,651 on its own merits and we need to allow 215 00:07:53,651 --> 00:07:55,818 this investigation to run its course . 216 00:07:55,818 --> 00:07:57,929 And then of course , there'll be more 217 00:07:57,929 --> 00:08:00,151 to say on that on your first question . 218 00:08:00,151 --> 00:08:02,207 Again , it's important to understand 219 00:08:02,207 --> 00:08:04,373 that this is not just about dod , this 220 00:08:04,373 --> 00:08:06,429 is about the US government , this is 221 00:08:06,429 --> 00:08:08,690 about how we protect and safeguard 222 00:08:08,700 --> 00:08:10,589 classified information . And as I 223 00:08:10,589 --> 00:08:12,367 highlighted , we do have strict 224 00:08:12,367 --> 00:08:14,720 protocols in place . So any time there 225 00:08:14,730 --> 00:08:16,786 is an incident , any time there's an 226 00:08:16,786 --> 00:08:18,897 opportunity to review that and refine 227 00:08:18,897 --> 00:08:20,841 it , we're of course going to take 228 00:08:20,841 --> 00:08:23,063 advantage of that within the Department 229 00:08:23,063 --> 00:08:25,850 of Defense . As you've heard us say , 230 00:08:25,859 --> 00:08:27,859 Secretary Austin has been convening 231 00:08:27,859 --> 00:08:30,026 daily meetings with his senior leaders 232 00:08:30,026 --> 00:08:32,137 to include the chairman to talk about 233 00:08:32,137 --> 00:08:35,599 reviewing the scope and the 234 00:08:35,609 --> 00:08:37,750 impact of this and also to look at 235 00:08:37,760 --> 00:08:39,982 mitigation measures and what we need to 236 00:08:39,982 --> 00:08:42,919 do across the Department of Defense to 237 00:08:42,929 --> 00:08:45,210 ensure that we're doing our utmost to 238 00:08:45,219 --> 00:08:47,229 reinforce existing policies , 239 00:08:47,239 --> 00:08:50,179 procedures uh and rules . Uh And if 240 00:08:50,190 --> 00:08:52,246 there are any areas where we need to 241 00:08:52,246 --> 00:08:54,468 tighten things up , we certainly will . 242 00:08:55,390 --> 00:08:57,557 That's correct . As I , as I mentioned 243 00:08:57,557 --> 00:09:00,559 to her , uh when I say Dod , I mean , 244 00:09:00,570 --> 00:09:02,626 the Department of Defense across the 245 00:09:02,630 --> 00:09:05,280 entire enterprise . Ok , Jen 246 00:09:07,510 --> 00:09:09,677 General Rider , you say that there are 247 00:09:09,677 --> 00:09:11,843 strict protocols in place and yet a 21 248 00:09:11,843 --> 00:09:14,066 year old airman was able to access some 249 00:09:14,066 --> 00:09:16,177 of the nation's top secrets . How did 250 00:09:16,177 --> 00:09:18,343 this happen ? And isn't this a massive 251 00:09:18,343 --> 00:09:20,288 security breach again ? We need to 252 00:09:20,288 --> 00:09:22,232 allow the investigation to run its 253 00:09:22,232 --> 00:09:24,288 course . We'll of course , know more 254 00:09:24,288 --> 00:09:26,399 when that is completed . So I'd refer 255 00:09:26,399 --> 00:09:28,288 you to DOJ on that . What is your 256 00:09:28,288 --> 00:09:30,510 message to anyone who might be thinking 257 00:09:30,510 --> 00:09:32,621 of leaking these kind of documents in 258 00:09:32,621 --> 00:09:35,200 the future ? Look again , we have 259 00:09:35,210 --> 00:09:37,989 procedures , we have protocols in place . 260 00:09:38,000 --> 00:09:40,289 We receive regular training on the 261 00:09:40,299 --> 00:09:42,830 proper handling of classified 262 00:09:42,840 --> 00:09:45,219 information . As I mentioned , we sign 263 00:09:45,229 --> 00:09:47,285 non disclosure agreements . So those 264 00:09:47,285 --> 00:09:49,507 rules are very clear and anyone who has 265 00:09:49,507 --> 00:09:51,673 a security clearance knows that anyone 266 00:09:51,673 --> 00:09:53,729 who violates those rules is doing so 267 00:09:53,729 --> 00:09:56,010 willfully , can you put into context 268 00:09:56,020 --> 00:09:58,131 the damage that has been done by this 269 00:09:58,131 --> 00:09:59,853 leak again ? Right now , we're 270 00:09:59,853 --> 00:10:02,020 continuing to assess the scope and the 271 00:10:02,020 --> 00:10:04,729 impact . And so that's work that will 272 00:10:04,739 --> 00:10:08,520 be ongoing . Tony , how 273 00:10:08,530 --> 00:10:10,697 large was the distribution network for 274 00:10:10,697 --> 00:10:12,586 these documents say prior to last 275 00:10:12,586 --> 00:10:14,863 Thursday when the disclosures came out , 276 00:10:14,863 --> 00:10:16,974 are we talking in thousands of people 277 00:10:16,974 --> 00:10:18,919 had access inside the Pentagon and 278 00:10:18,919 --> 00:10:21,086 outside the Pentagon to include Europe 279 00:10:21,086 --> 00:10:23,141 and bases around the United States . 280 00:10:23,141 --> 00:10:25,363 Yeah , Tony . So I don't , I don't have 281 00:10:25,363 --> 00:10:27,530 any numbers to provide you as , as I'm 282 00:10:27,530 --> 00:10:27,429 sure you can appreciate the Department 283 00:10:27,440 --> 00:10:29,780 of Defense and all of our components . 284 00:10:29,789 --> 00:10:32,950 It's a global enterprise doing work in 285 00:10:32,960 --> 00:10:34,738 all areas of the world . And so 286 00:10:34,738 --> 00:10:37,679 certainly we have people who have 287 00:10:37,690 --> 00:10:39,912 access to information that they need to 288 00:10:39,912 --> 00:10:41,968 do their jobs , but I don't have any 289 00:10:41,968 --> 00:10:44,023 numbers for you . And you say it was 290 00:10:44,023 --> 00:10:46,246 widespread though , versus , you know , 291 00:10:46,246 --> 00:10:48,412 outside the Pentagon to other military 292 00:10:48,412 --> 00:10:50,357 installations . Well , again , the 293 00:10:50,357 --> 00:10:52,301 Department of Defense , we conduct 294 00:10:52,301 --> 00:10:54,301 global operations . So intelligence 295 00:10:54,301 --> 00:10:56,246 products , operational information 296 00:10:56,246 --> 00:10:58,400 products are shared with dod leaders 297 00:10:58,409 --> 00:11:00,580 and personnel globally throughout the 298 00:11:00,590 --> 00:11:02,590 world , whether it's at a component 299 00:11:02,590 --> 00:11:04,868 command , whether it's in the services . 300 00:11:04,868 --> 00:11:06,812 But again , the important thing to 301 00:11:06,812 --> 00:11:09,146 understand about classified information , 302 00:11:09,146 --> 00:11:11,368 it's not uh just I wanna have access to 303 00:11:11,368 --> 00:11:13,423 it because I have a clearance , it's 304 00:11:13,423 --> 00:11:15,646 all based on need to know . Do you have 305 00:11:15,646 --> 00:11:15,559 a need to know that information and 306 00:11:15,570 --> 00:11:17,792 that typically will grant you access if 307 00:11:17,792 --> 00:11:19,903 you have the appropriate clearances . 308 00:11:19,903 --> 00:11:23,739 Thank you . Thanks , Pat . Um I'm 309 00:11:23,750 --> 00:11:26,010 still confused on the access issue . 310 00:11:26,450 --> 00:11:28,561 You said that there were changes that 311 00:11:28,561 --> 00:11:30,506 were made , but you also said that 312 00:11:30,506 --> 00:11:32,672 you're reviewing things . Can you tell 313 00:11:32,672 --> 00:11:35,580 us where are there less people who have 314 00:11:35,590 --> 00:11:37,534 access to this type of information 315 00:11:37,534 --> 00:11:41,140 today than there were a week ago ? So 316 00:11:41,150 --> 00:11:43,317 Travis again , I'm not gonna , I'm not 317 00:11:43,317 --> 00:11:45,739 going to get down to numbers again , 318 00:11:45,750 --> 00:11:48,669 reviewing distribution lists looking at 319 00:11:48,679 --> 00:11:51,390 who has a need to know , making sure 320 00:11:51,400 --> 00:11:53,344 those things are updated doing due 321 00:11:53,344 --> 00:11:55,067 diligence in the wake of these 322 00:11:55,067 --> 00:11:57,419 unauthorized disclosures . Again , 323 00:11:57,429 --> 00:11:59,596 though , I want to emphasize that this 324 00:11:59,596 --> 00:12:02,070 was a deliberate criminal act to 325 00:12:02,080 --> 00:12:04,191 violate those guidelines and rules in 326 00:12:04,191 --> 00:12:06,247 the same way that if you locked your 327 00:12:06,247 --> 00:12:08,413 front door and somebody came into your 328 00:12:08,413 --> 00:12:10,469 house and took something , you , you 329 00:12:10,469 --> 00:12:12,691 followed your procedures and you locked 330 00:12:12,691 --> 00:12:14,802 your door , but somebody went in your 331 00:12:14,802 --> 00:12:17,024 house and took something and put it out 332 00:12:17,024 --> 00:12:16,840 on the street . That's what we're 333 00:12:16,849 --> 00:12:19,182 talking about here . Let me go to Carla . 334 00:12:22,309 --> 00:12:24,476 Um just a couple questions on this and 335 00:12:24,476 --> 00:12:26,365 then I have a follow on something 336 00:12:26,365 --> 00:12:28,640 separate . Um Why did it take so long 337 00:12:28,650 --> 00:12:30,928 to brief the secretary about the leaks ? 338 00:12:30,928 --> 00:12:32,983 He said that he was briefed on April 339 00:12:32,983 --> 00:12:35,094 the sixth . Uh And would you classify 340 00:12:35,094 --> 00:12:37,260 that delay as a failure of the open 341 00:12:37,270 --> 00:12:38,992 source intelligence teams ? Uh 342 00:12:38,992 --> 00:12:41,214 Absolutely not . We were notified , you 343 00:12:41,214 --> 00:12:43,326 know , the department became aware on 344 00:12:43,326 --> 00:12:45,437 the fifth , the secretary was briefed 345 00:12:45,437 --> 00:12:47,770 hours later in the morning of the sixth . 346 00:12:47,770 --> 00:12:47,679 I I don't consider that a delay . 347 00:12:47,869 --> 00:12:49,900 Thanks to follow on that these 348 00:12:49,909 --> 00:12:52,869 documents were available long before 349 00:12:52,880 --> 00:12:54,991 April 5th and sixth . So what took so 350 00:12:54,991 --> 00:12:57,219 long for dod and the intelligence 351 00:12:57,229 --> 00:12:59,062 communities to , to locate these 352 00:12:59,062 --> 00:13:01,062 documents ? Yeah , so that's really 353 00:13:01,062 --> 00:13:03,173 something that the investigation will 354 00:13:03,173 --> 00:13:05,118 tell us . That said , I think it's 355 00:13:05,118 --> 00:13:07,229 important to remember that that dod S 356 00:13:07,229 --> 00:13:09,340 intelligence activities are primarily 357 00:13:09,340 --> 00:13:11,507 focused internationally . Uh So to the 358 00:13:11,507 --> 00:13:13,979 extent that the department collects any 359 00:13:13,989 --> 00:13:16,549 information related to us persons , for 360 00:13:16,559 --> 00:13:19,270 example , or gaming chat rooms , uh it 361 00:13:19,280 --> 00:13:20,947 would have to be conducted in 362 00:13:20,947 --> 00:13:23,058 accordance with law and policy uh and 363 00:13:23,058 --> 00:13:25,169 in a manner that protects privacy and 364 00:13:25,169 --> 00:13:27,391 civil liberties . So again , we'll know 365 00:13:27,391 --> 00:13:29,336 more uh at the culmination of this 366 00:13:29,336 --> 00:13:31,558 investigation . Thank you . Let me go . 367 00:13:31,979 --> 00:13:34,035 Just the Syria really quickly on the 368 00:13:34,035 --> 00:13:36,257 Syria attacks from March . Do we have a 369 00:13:36,257 --> 00:13:38,590 final conclusion on the TBI assessments ? 370 00:13:38,590 --> 00:13:41,849 How many US troops received TBIS as a 371 00:13:41,859 --> 00:13:44,400 result of these attacks ? And do you 372 00:13:44,409 --> 00:13:46,549 believe that the US strikes have 373 00:13:46,559 --> 00:13:49,145 happened on 23 ? The retaliatory 374 00:13:49,155 --> 00:13:51,377 strikes ? Do you believe that they have 375 00:13:51,377 --> 00:13:53,377 deterred Iranian backed groups from 376 00:13:53,377 --> 00:13:55,599 targeting us forces ? Yes . So on the , 377 00:13:55,599 --> 00:13:57,604 on the TBI , my understanding is 378 00:13:57,614 --> 00:13:59,725 Centcom has collected some additional 379 00:13:59,725 --> 00:14:01,892 information . So we'll get that to you 380 00:14:01,892 --> 00:14:05,724 and the press team here in terms of 381 00:14:05,734 --> 00:14:07,734 deterrence . Again , we're going to 382 00:14:07,734 --> 00:14:09,901 continue to do everything that we need 383 00:14:09,901 --> 00:14:11,734 to do at a time and place of our 384 00:14:11,734 --> 00:14:13,956 choosing to ensure that we're deterring 385 00:14:13,956 --> 00:14:15,956 and safeguarding our folks and I'll 386 00:14:15,956 --> 00:14:18,123 just leave it at that . Thank you . We 387 00:14:18,123 --> 00:14:22,049 go to , can you 388 00:14:22,059 --> 00:14:24,460 just tell us what the mission of the 389 00:14:24,669 --> 00:14:28,400 101st 102nd Intelligence wing for 390 00:14:28,409 --> 00:14:30,539 the Massachusetts Air National Guard 391 00:14:30,549 --> 00:14:34,419 was ? And are you going to 392 00:14:34,429 --> 00:14:38,059 release this airman's service record in 393 00:14:38,070 --> 00:14:40,619 response to , I'm sure the thousands of 394 00:14:40,630 --> 00:14:42,852 requests you've already gotten . Yeah . 395 00:14:42,852 --> 00:14:44,797 So , so David on the , the service 396 00:14:44,797 --> 00:14:47,074 record again , we'll , we'll take that . 397 00:14:47,074 --> 00:14:49,074 Uh and we'll provide an update when 398 00:14:49,074 --> 00:14:51,900 we're able to um in terms of the 102nd 399 00:14:51,929 --> 00:14:54,040 Intelligence Wing , I don't have that 400 00:14:54,040 --> 00:14:56,262 in front of me . I'm positive they have 401 00:14:56,262 --> 00:14:58,262 a website . We can quickly find the 402 00:14:58,262 --> 00:15:00,262 fact sheet up there . Uh In General 403 00:15:00,262 --> 00:15:02,373 Intelligence wings throughout the Air 404 00:15:02,373 --> 00:15:04,989 Force uh support is what you might 405 00:15:05,000 --> 00:15:06,722 imagine Air Force intelligence 406 00:15:06,722 --> 00:15:09,210 requirements worldwide to support a 407 00:15:09,219 --> 00:15:11,469 variety of types of intelligence 408 00:15:11,479 --> 00:15:13,979 missions and requirements . So which 409 00:15:13,989 --> 00:15:16,440 include active Guard and reserve 410 00:15:16,450 --> 00:15:19,880 components . So let go . Thank you so 411 00:15:19,890 --> 00:15:22,580 much General Rider . What technologies 412 00:15:22,590 --> 00:15:24,799 is the Pentagon applying right now to 413 00:15:24,809 --> 00:15:27,409 both spot leaked documents online and 414 00:15:27,419 --> 00:15:29,530 track potential indicators of leaking 415 00:15:29,530 --> 00:15:31,580 type practices ? Do you plan to be 416 00:15:31,590 --> 00:15:35,010 investing in more ? Um Again , brandy . 417 00:15:35,020 --> 00:15:37,020 So when it comes to this particular 418 00:15:37,020 --> 00:15:39,076 situation , we'll know more when the 419 00:15:39,076 --> 00:15:42,229 investigation is concluded . Um A as I 420 00:15:42,239 --> 00:15:44,469 highlighted when it comes to 421 00:15:44,479 --> 00:15:46,590 intelligence collection uh within the 422 00:15:46,590 --> 00:15:48,646 Department of Defense that's focused 423 00:15:48,646 --> 00:15:50,812 primarily in internationally . I'm not 424 00:15:50,812 --> 00:15:53,035 gonna get into the specifics of where , 425 00:15:53,035 --> 00:15:54,590 how and when we conduct our 426 00:15:54,590 --> 00:15:56,757 intelligence activities . Um But we're 427 00:15:56,757 --> 00:15:59,969 always looking at um potential gaps , 428 00:15:59,979 --> 00:16:02,320 potential uh vulnerabilities and that's 429 00:16:02,330 --> 00:16:04,330 something that will just be ongoing 430 00:16:04,330 --> 00:16:06,500 where you are using technologies right 431 00:16:06,510 --> 00:16:09,270 now to spot potential leakers of future 432 00:16:09,280 --> 00:16:12,429 documents . Um It's , you're asking me 433 00:16:12,440 --> 00:16:14,384 a hypothetical basically . Again , 434 00:16:14,384 --> 00:16:16,440 we're , we're always gonna be on the 435 00:16:16,440 --> 00:16:18,662 look out , we're always gonna be on the 436 00:16:18,662 --> 00:16:20,551 lookout for any potential insider 437 00:16:20,551 --> 00:16:22,773 threats . Um Again , we get training um 438 00:16:22,773 --> 00:16:24,829 on how to spot insider threats . But 439 00:16:24,829 --> 00:16:26,773 again , as I mentioned to Travis , 440 00:16:26,773 --> 00:16:28,884 you've locked your door , you've lent 441 00:16:28,884 --> 00:16:30,996 some keys to your friends . If one of 442 00:16:30,996 --> 00:16:33,162 those friends decides to give the keys 443 00:16:33,162 --> 00:16:35,384 away , you know , hopefully you've been 444 00:16:35,384 --> 00:16:35,200 able to clue in on those signals . So 445 00:16:35,210 --> 00:16:37,321 we'll continue monitoring , it's lost 446 00:16:37,321 --> 00:16:39,543 on anyone in this room that this is all 447 00:16:39,543 --> 00:16:41,710 happening at the same time that Deputy 448 00:16:41,710 --> 00:16:43,877 Secretary Hicks is conducting a review 449 00:16:43,880 --> 00:16:45,713 of the Pentagon's classification 450 00:16:45,713 --> 00:16:47,210 practices and at times 451 00:16:47,219 --> 00:16:49,386 overclassification . So , can you talk 452 00:16:49,386 --> 00:16:51,441 about how this incident is informing 453 00:16:51,441 --> 00:16:54,619 that ongoing review ? Again , I think 454 00:16:54,630 --> 00:16:56,852 that there's the investigation that the 455 00:16:56,852 --> 00:16:59,200 DOJ is conducting . Uh and then you're 456 00:16:59,210 --> 00:17:01,266 talking about something separately , 457 00:17:01,266 --> 00:17:02,988 which is again , our review of 458 00:17:02,988 --> 00:17:04,989 classification requirements . Uh 459 00:17:05,000 --> 00:17:07,167 Acknowledging that where we need to be 460 00:17:07,167 --> 00:17:09,444 better in terms of , of classification . 461 00:17:09,444 --> 00:17:11,556 So having no impact on Hi , I'm gonna 462 00:17:11,556 --> 00:17:12,556 go on orange . 463 00:17:17,280 --> 00:17:19,447 I want to come back to the question of 464 00:17:19,447 --> 00:17:21,391 distribution from on two different 465 00:17:21,391 --> 00:17:23,447 questions . Given the gravity of the 466 00:17:23,447 --> 00:17:25,447 situation . Are you actively paring 467 00:17:25,447 --> 00:17:25,130 down the distribution list ? Now , is 468 00:17:25,140 --> 00:17:27,520 this a process that's moving quickly or 469 00:17:27,530 --> 00:17:29,641 is it going to take time for there to 470 00:17:29,641 --> 00:17:31,697 be meaningful substantive changes to 471 00:17:31,697 --> 00:17:33,808 the distribution ? And then is dod or 472 00:17:33,808 --> 00:17:35,863 has dod taken additional measures to 473 00:17:35,863 --> 00:17:37,752 restrict the access to classified 474 00:17:37,752 --> 00:17:39,363 information of others in the 475 00:17:39,363 --> 00:17:41,419 Massachusetts National Guard . Uh So 476 00:17:41,419 --> 00:17:43,419 Oren broadly speaking , I , I think 477 00:17:43,419 --> 00:17:43,229 I've already answered the question that 478 00:17:43,239 --> 00:17:45,630 yes , we are taking and have taken 479 00:17:45,640 --> 00:17:48,469 steps to review distribution lists uh 480 00:17:48,479 --> 00:17:51,390 and to ensure that the folks receiving 481 00:17:51,400 --> 00:17:53,819 information have a need to know . But 482 00:17:53,829 --> 00:17:57,130 again , uh to belabor the point , 483 00:17:57,430 --> 00:18:00,050 we have safeguards in place , we have 484 00:18:00,060 --> 00:18:02,540 processes , we have procedures , we'll 485 00:18:02,550 --> 00:18:04,772 continue to do due diligence as part of 486 00:18:04,772 --> 00:18:06,939 this review to ensure that we're doing 487 00:18:06,939 --> 00:18:09,750 everything we can to prevent potential 488 00:18:09,760 --> 00:18:12,038 unauthorized disclosures in the future . 489 00:18:12,038 --> 00:18:14,038 Recognizing that again , this was a 490 00:18:14,038 --> 00:18:17,449 criminal deliberate act . Thank you . I 491 00:18:17,750 --> 00:18:20,520 don't have anything on that , right ? 492 00:18:25,849 --> 00:18:27,793 Thank you very much , General . So 493 00:18:27,793 --> 00:18:29,960 please let me ask you a question about 494 00:18:29,960 --> 00:18:31,960 China . Two questions about China , 495 00:18:31,960 --> 00:18:33,738 free , free and read the room . 496 00:18:36,089 --> 00:18:39,239 Yeah . Um uh The China conducted a 497 00:18:39,250 --> 00:18:41,750 three day exercises around Taiwan and 498 00:18:41,760 --> 00:18:43,704 still continue the combat training 499 00:18:43,704 --> 00:18:46,280 around Taiwan . So do you assess China 500 00:18:46,290 --> 00:18:48,790 has over to the meeting between 501 00:18:48,800 --> 00:18:51,859 President and Speaker Mai ? Yes , 502 00:18:51,869 --> 00:18:54,869 thanks Rose . So um we 503 00:18:54,880 --> 00:18:57,189 obviously continue to monitor the 504 00:18:57,199 --> 00:18:59,469 situation in the Taiwan strait . Very 505 00:18:59,479 --> 00:19:01,819 closely as well as the Pr CS military 506 00:19:01,829 --> 00:19:05,780 exercise . You've heard other 507 00:19:05,790 --> 00:19:09,250 others say that from a US government 508 00:19:09,260 --> 00:19:11,560 perspective , these military exercises 509 00:19:11,569 --> 00:19:13,790 undermine peace and stability across 510 00:19:13,800 --> 00:19:16,650 the Taiwan Strait , which is critical 511 00:19:16,660 --> 00:19:18,827 to global prosperity . You know , they 512 00:19:18,827 --> 00:19:21,750 estimate , you know , upwards of a few 513 00:19:21,760 --> 00:19:23,760 trillion dollars of global commerce 514 00:19:23,760 --> 00:19:25,593 going through that , that strait 515 00:19:25,593 --> 00:19:27,800 regularly . Uh And , and so as we've 516 00:19:27,810 --> 00:19:30,839 said , there is no reason for Beijing 517 00:19:30,849 --> 00:19:33,770 to turn uh president size transit , 518 00:19:33,780 --> 00:19:36,002 which was consistent with long standing 519 00:19:36,002 --> 00:19:38,169 us policy into something that it's not 520 00:19:38,169 --> 00:19:40,790 or use it as a pretext to overreact . 521 00:19:41,050 --> 00:19:43,217 And so we'll continue to do everything 522 00:19:43,219 --> 00:19:45,650 we can to maintain open channels of 523 00:19:45,660 --> 00:19:49,660 communication with the PR C . And 524 00:19:49,670 --> 00:19:52,550 uh we will not be deterred . The US 525 00:19:52,560 --> 00:19:55,099 will not be deterred from operating 526 00:19:55,109 --> 00:19:57,276 safely and responsibly in the seas and 527 00:19:57,276 --> 00:19:59,819 the skies in the Western Pacific , 528 00:19:59,829 --> 00:20:01,829 consistent with international law . 529 00:20:01,949 --> 00:20:04,780 Just one quick follow up the Chinese 530 00:20:04,790 --> 00:20:07,660 military exercises humid the blockade 531 00:20:07,670 --> 00:20:10,310 of Taiwan . Are you confident that the 532 00:20:10,319 --> 00:20:12,959 US military is capable of breaking 533 00:20:12,969 --> 00:20:15,770 Chinese blockade around Taiwan ? Well , 534 00:20:15,780 --> 00:20:17,669 again , I'm not going to get into 535 00:20:17,669 --> 00:20:19,891 hypotheticals and I'm not going to talk 536 00:20:19,891 --> 00:20:23,329 about speculate on future scenarios . 537 00:20:23,339 --> 00:20:25,339 Again , we're going to work closely 538 00:20:25,339 --> 00:20:27,561 with our allies and our partners in the 539 00:20:27,561 --> 00:20:29,672 region to focus on our primary goal , 540 00:20:29,672 --> 00:20:32,180 which is peace , stability and security 541 00:20:32,189 --> 00:20:34,022 in the region . And so that will 542 00:20:34,022 --> 00:20:36,790 continue to be our primary focus . Ok . 543 00:20:36,800 --> 00:20:38,856 Let me go back over here at will and 544 00:20:38,856 --> 00:20:42,750 Laura , thank you , 545 00:20:43,359 --> 00:20:45,192 what is the scope of the leak as 546 00:20:45,192 --> 00:20:47,081 identified by dod so far ? Are we 547 00:20:47,081 --> 00:20:49,026 talking tens hundreds thousands of 548 00:20:49,026 --> 00:20:51,081 documents ? And then second , the US 549 00:20:51,089 --> 00:20:53,256 has been reviewing the authenticity of 550 00:20:53,256 --> 00:20:55,422 the documents for several days . Now , 551 00:20:55,422 --> 00:20:57,478 what has been found so far on that ? 552 00:20:57,478 --> 00:20:59,700 Yeah , thanks . So , uh so that work is 553 00:20:59,700 --> 00:21:01,811 ongoing . Well , I'm I'm not gonna be 554 00:21:01,811 --> 00:21:03,922 able to provide you with a uh overall 555 00:21:03,922 --> 00:21:05,922 number of documents . Uh We're just 556 00:21:05,922 --> 00:21:08,089 gonna continue to , to look at this uh 557 00:21:08,089 --> 00:21:10,200 as you highlight , you know , some of 558 00:21:10,200 --> 00:21:12,256 the uh initial indications were that 559 00:21:12,256 --> 00:21:14,089 some of those documents had been 560 00:21:14,089 --> 00:21:15,922 altered . Um A again for obvious 561 00:21:15,922 --> 00:21:18,069 reasons , I'm not gonna go into which 562 00:21:18,079 --> 00:21:21,079 ones were or weren't . Um But that is 563 00:21:21,089 --> 00:21:23,145 work that we continue to do . Take a 564 00:21:23,145 --> 00:21:26,949 look at . Thank you . Um Sort of as a 565 00:21:26,959 --> 00:21:28,959 follow on to Carla and Brandy's 566 00:21:28,969 --> 00:21:31,140 questions . Um Can you say whether dod 567 00:21:31,150 --> 00:21:34,479 has anyone looking at uh chat rooms on 568 00:21:34,489 --> 00:21:36,711 Discord , for example , or other social 569 00:21:36,711 --> 00:21:38,880 media platforms right now for leaked 570 00:21:38,890 --> 00:21:41,439 information and um if not should , 571 00:21:41,449 --> 00:21:43,729 should dod have these people . So , so 572 00:21:43,739 --> 00:21:47,300 Doj uh is as I understand it uh 573 00:21:47,310 --> 00:21:49,709 has , is working with Discord or 574 00:21:49,719 --> 00:21:51,775 Discord has come out publicly to say 575 00:21:51,775 --> 00:21:53,941 they are cooperating with the DOJ . Uh 576 00:21:53,941 --> 00:21:56,052 So that's really a question for , for 577 00:21:56,052 --> 00:21:58,219 DOJ to talk . Is that , is that a no , 578 00:21:58,219 --> 00:22:00,441 I think I already answered the question 579 00:22:00,441 --> 00:22:02,663 in terms of what our focus is on . It's 580 00:22:02,663 --> 00:22:04,886 primarily focused on uh international . 581 00:22:04,886 --> 00:22:07,130 Uh I'm not gonna get into the specifics 582 00:22:07,140 --> 00:22:09,569 of what intelligence activities we're 583 00:22:09,579 --> 00:22:11,801 conducting or not , other than to say , 584 00:22:11,801 --> 00:22:13,912 when we do conduct those activities , 585 00:22:13,912 --> 00:22:16,079 they're in compliance with the law and 586 00:22:16,079 --> 00:22:18,709 with policy . Ok , you go to gym and 587 00:22:18,719 --> 00:22:20,219 then come back over here . 588 00:22:22,430 --> 00:22:24,430 Thanks , general . You know , every 589 00:22:24,430 --> 00:22:26,263 time something like this happens 590 00:22:26,263 --> 00:22:28,374 there's a huge tendency to clamp down 591 00:22:28,374 --> 00:22:30,530 on everything , but that sort of ends 592 00:22:30,540 --> 00:22:32,739 up throwing the baby out with the bath 593 00:22:32,750 --> 00:22:34,806 water . If you know what I mean ? Is 594 00:22:34,806 --> 00:22:37,369 there any sort of idea in the 595 00:22:37,380 --> 00:22:41,040 department that the Intel does need to 596 00:22:41,050 --> 00:22:43,217 be shared ? It just needs to go to the 597 00:22:43,217 --> 00:22:45,439 correct people . Is there a study going 598 00:22:45,439 --> 00:22:48,709 on with that ? Yeah . So , uh thanks 599 00:22:48,719 --> 00:22:52,180 Jim . So as I mentioned , uh there have 600 00:22:52,189 --> 00:22:54,550 been uh daily meetings with the 601 00:22:54,560 --> 00:22:56,782 secretary and the senior dod leadership 602 00:22:56,782 --> 00:22:59,004 team . We're taking this very seriously 603 00:22:59,069 --> 00:23:02,079 uh to look again at the scope , the 604 00:23:02,089 --> 00:23:04,369 impact and importantly , the mitigation 605 00:23:04,380 --> 00:23:07,810 measures . I will tell you uh that 606 00:23:07,819 --> 00:23:11,530 these discussions are very um focused , 607 00:23:11,540 --> 00:23:14,189 very deliberate , um and very measured 608 00:23:14,199 --> 00:23:16,143 and sure in terms of ensuring that 609 00:23:16,143 --> 00:23:18,420 we're doing the right things uh while 610 00:23:18,430 --> 00:23:20,750 not impeding or impacting our ability 611 00:23:20,760 --> 00:23:23,038 to do our important missions worldwide . 612 00:23:23,038 --> 00:23:26,670 And so , uh you know , just to , to 613 00:23:27,109 --> 00:23:29,331 put it frankly , uh we're continuing to 614 00:23:29,331 --> 00:23:31,276 conduct our operations and provide 615 00:23:31,276 --> 00:23:33,387 people with the information they need 616 00:23:33,387 --> 00:23:35,442 uh without missing a beat . Thanks . 617 00:23:35,442 --> 00:23:37,442 All right , let me come over here . 618 00:23:37,442 --> 00:23:37,310 I'll go here and then here . Yeah , 619 00:23:37,319 --> 00:23:40,339 thanks , Pat . Would a junior service 620 00:23:40,349 --> 00:23:41,960 member like an airman in the 621 00:23:41,960 --> 00:23:44,182 Massachusetts Guard or any other junior 622 00:23:44,182 --> 00:23:46,420 service member typically have the level 623 00:23:46,430 --> 00:23:48,780 of security clearances that would allow 624 00:23:48,790 --> 00:23:51,579 them access to such uh sensitive 625 00:23:51,589 --> 00:23:54,040 information like joint staff briefing 626 00:23:54,050 --> 00:23:57,060 documents . Yeah . So , uh again , uh 627 00:23:57,069 --> 00:23:59,180 let me just preface what I'm about to 628 00:23:59,180 --> 00:24:01,125 tell you with . I'm not gonna talk 629 00:24:01,125 --> 00:24:03,347 about a particular individual . I'm not 630 00:24:03,347 --> 00:24:05,402 gonna talk about the investigation . 631 00:24:05,402 --> 00:24:07,625 I'm not gonna , again , I have to refer 632 00:24:07,625 --> 00:24:09,847 you to DOJ for that . Let's take a step 633 00:24:09,847 --> 00:24:11,902 back for a second . Let's talk about 634 00:24:11,902 --> 00:24:14,125 security clearances . When you join the 635 00:24:14,125 --> 00:24:16,347 military , depending on your position , 636 00:24:16,347 --> 00:24:18,513 you may require a security clearance . 637 00:24:18,513 --> 00:24:20,180 And if you are working in the 638 00:24:20,180 --> 00:24:22,569 intelligence community and you require 639 00:24:22,579 --> 00:24:24,801 a security clearance , you are going to 640 00:24:24,801 --> 00:24:26,746 go through the proper vetting . We 641 00:24:26,746 --> 00:24:30,050 entrust our members with a lot of 642 00:24:30,060 --> 00:24:32,780 responsibility at a very early age . 643 00:24:32,790 --> 00:24:35,800 Think about a young combat 644 00:24:36,829 --> 00:24:39,540 platoon sergeant and the , and the 645 00:24:39,550 --> 00:24:41,630 responsibility and trust that we put 646 00:24:41,640 --> 00:24:43,751 into those individuals to lead troops 647 00:24:43,751 --> 00:24:45,900 into combat . That that's just one 648 00:24:45,910 --> 00:24:48,650 example across the board . So you 649 00:24:48,660 --> 00:24:52,050 receive training and you will receive 650 00:24:52,060 --> 00:24:54,116 uh an understanding of the rules and 651 00:24:54,116 --> 00:24:56,338 requirements that come along with those 652 00:24:56,338 --> 00:24:58,560 responsibilities and you're expected to 653 00:24:58,560 --> 00:25:00,727 abide by those rules , regulations and 654 00:25:00,727 --> 00:25:02,838 responsibility . It's called military 655 00:25:02,838 --> 00:25:04,727 discipline and in certain cases , 656 00:25:04,727 --> 00:25:06,449 especially when it comes to uh 657 00:25:06,449 --> 00:25:08,393 sensitive information , it also is 658 00:25:08,393 --> 00:25:10,504 about the law . So uh I'll just leave 659 00:25:10,504 --> 00:25:14,380 it at that . Thank you 660 00:25:14,390 --> 00:25:17,050 very much . So , separate topic . Uh 661 00:25:17,060 --> 00:25:19,829 Last week , Sancom confirmed that three 662 00:25:19,839 --> 00:25:22,989 US service members were with the Y P G 663 00:25:23,000 --> 00:25:25,589 S D F ring leader Abdi when he was 664 00:25:25,599 --> 00:25:28,140 apparently targeted in an air strike in 665 00:25:28,150 --> 00:25:30,729 northern Iraq , Soleimani . Uh My 666 00:25:30,739 --> 00:25:32,628 question is , what , what was the 667 00:25:32,628 --> 00:25:35,199 mission or engagements that the US 668 00:25:35,209 --> 00:25:37,410 service members involved alongside 669 00:25:37,630 --> 00:25:39,979 Muslim Abdi in Suleiman ? And also were 670 00:25:39,989 --> 00:25:42,599 this engagements authorized or 671 00:25:42,609 --> 00:25:44,589 permitted by the Iraqi central 672 00:25:44,599 --> 00:25:46,710 government or not ? Yes . So let me , 673 00:25:46,710 --> 00:25:48,821 let me tell you what I've got on this 674 00:25:48,821 --> 00:25:52,079 custom . So uh on April 7th convoy , 675 00:25:52,089 --> 00:25:54,530 including US , personnel was fired upon 676 00:25:54,540 --> 00:25:56,900 while in transit within the Iraqi 677 00:25:56,910 --> 00:26:00,380 Kurdistan region uh in the area near 678 00:26:00,390 --> 00:26:04,160 Suleiman US forces are in 679 00:26:04,170 --> 00:26:06,392 Iraq and Syria as you know , in support 680 00:26:06,392 --> 00:26:09,319 of local partner forces in support of 681 00:26:09,329 --> 00:26:11,660 the defeat ISIS mission , the enduring 682 00:26:11,670 --> 00:26:14,150 defeat of Isis . And so in this 683 00:26:14,160 --> 00:26:16,216 particular incident , we can confirm 684 00:26:16,216 --> 00:26:18,382 that there were no casualties that the 685 00:26:18,382 --> 00:26:21,270 strike was not a near miss , it struck 686 00:26:21,280 --> 00:26:24,579 more than 100 m from the convoy and sco 687 00:26:24,890 --> 00:26:27,223 is currently investigating the incident . 688 00:26:27,223 --> 00:26:30,239 So I'd refer you to what was the 689 00:26:30,250 --> 00:26:32,472 mission of the US service members ? And 690 00:26:32,472 --> 00:26:34,528 was it was it somehow allowed they , 691 00:26:34,528 --> 00:26:37,040 they are conducting the in support of 692 00:26:37,050 --> 00:26:39,050 the defeat ISIS mission ? The Iraqi 693 00:26:39,050 --> 00:26:41,161 government was it authorized by Iraqi 694 00:26:41,161 --> 00:26:43,161 government ? Because Muslim , we're 695 00:26:43,161 --> 00:26:45,420 supporting the Iraqi security forces as 696 00:26:45,430 --> 00:26:47,486 part of the defeat ISIS mission . As 697 00:26:47,486 --> 00:26:50,229 you know , we have , we have forces in 698 00:26:50,239 --> 00:26:52,295 Iraq , they're not conducting combat 699 00:26:52,295 --> 00:26:54,517 operations , they're there advising and 700 00:26:54,517 --> 00:26:56,739 assisting the Iraqis . And then we have 701 00:26:56,739 --> 00:26:58,961 forces in Syria that are supporting the 702 00:26:58,961 --> 00:27:01,489 SDF . So again , there's a uh you know , 703 00:27:01,500 --> 00:27:03,959 an intra theater mission in terms of 704 00:27:03,969 --> 00:27:06,849 the defeat ISIS mission like a Muslim 705 00:27:06,859 --> 00:27:09,026 Abdi is in Syria , you are cooperating 706 00:27:09,026 --> 00:27:11,137 with him . Well , the O I and , and I 707 00:27:11,137 --> 00:27:12,915 need to move on , but the O I R 708 00:27:12,915 --> 00:27:15,569 headquarters is in Iraq , right ? But 709 00:27:15,579 --> 00:27:18,489 they conduct operations in support of 710 00:27:18,500 --> 00:27:21,170 defeat ISIS mission in Syria and Iraq . 711 00:27:21,180 --> 00:27:24,770 So let me go ahead . Yes , sir . If I 712 00:27:24,780 --> 00:27:26,836 may , I'd like to remain on the same 713 00:27:26,836 --> 00:27:29,058 subject . Actually , I got one question 714 00:27:29,058 --> 00:27:31,224 about this . I posed the same question 715 00:27:31,224 --> 00:27:31,130 to the State Department on Monday and I 716 00:27:31,140 --> 00:27:33,029 was referred to the Department of 717 00:27:33,029 --> 00:27:35,439 Defense . So that's why the question is 718 00:27:35,449 --> 00:27:37,510 when the US servicemen , us military 719 00:27:37,520 --> 00:27:39,742 members are riding with the head of the 720 00:27:39,742 --> 00:27:41,798 S D F . Doesn't that , isn't there a 721 00:27:41,798 --> 00:27:43,631 concern within the Department of 722 00:27:43,631 --> 00:27:45,687 Defense that those us servicemen are 723 00:27:45,687 --> 00:27:47,687 also made a legitimate target ? Not 724 00:27:47,687 --> 00:27:49,853 least one of your greatest NATO allies 725 00:27:49,853 --> 00:27:51,409 because of his decades long 726 00:27:51,409 --> 00:27:53,353 relationship with the P K K that I 727 00:27:53,353 --> 00:27:55,409 think I'm sure is very much known to 728 00:27:55,409 --> 00:27:57,631 the US intelligence community . So , so 729 00:27:57,631 --> 00:28:00,430 no S D F , we've partnered with the S D 730 00:28:00,439 --> 00:28:03,790 F since 2015 , 731 00:28:03,800 --> 00:28:06,619 2014 as part of the defeat ISIS mission . 732 00:28:06,630 --> 00:28:08,797 We have a long standing relationship . 733 00:28:08,797 --> 00:28:11,219 With them . They're not the PKK . We 734 00:28:11,229 --> 00:28:14,680 are partnered with S D F to defeat Isis . 735 00:28:14,689 --> 00:28:17,719 So no , we've been conducting partnered 736 00:28:17,729 --> 00:28:19,785 operations for a very long time . So 737 00:28:19,785 --> 00:28:21,951 let me , let me go ahead and move on . 738 00:28:23,000 --> 00:28:24,944 Yeah , we'll go to you and then to 739 00:28:24,944 --> 00:28:28,540 Megan . Thanks Pat . Just 740 00:28:28,550 --> 00:28:30,772 22 quick follow ups . The questions one 741 00:28:30,772 --> 00:28:32,890 was from in regards to the Chinese 742 00:28:32,900 --> 00:28:36,170 activities around Taiwan before they 743 00:28:36,180 --> 00:28:38,410 did the military exercises , they were 744 00:28:38,420 --> 00:28:40,760 conducting an exercise to which the 745 00:28:40,770 --> 00:28:42,881 Pentagon describes as whether they're 746 00:28:42,881 --> 00:28:44,992 in international waters . It's simply 747 00:28:44,992 --> 00:28:47,214 what we do in international waters . At 748 00:28:47,214 --> 00:28:47,160 what point does it move from being in 749 00:28:47,170 --> 00:28:50,030 international waters to an overreaction ? 750 00:28:50,500 --> 00:28:52,722 That's my first question , please . And 751 00:28:52,722 --> 00:28:54,833 my , my second one is regards to what 752 00:28:54,833 --> 00:28:57,000 you said earlier in this briefing . Uh 753 00:28:57,000 --> 00:28:59,111 even though it's the investigation is 754 00:28:59,111 --> 00:29:00,833 going on and such , but you're 755 00:29:00,833 --> 00:29:03,000 confident that uh but you said several 756 00:29:03,000 --> 00:29:05,111 times that this is a violation of law 757 00:29:05,111 --> 00:29:06,944 and as we all sign nondisclosure 758 00:29:06,944 --> 00:29:09,056 agreement , it's not me but we at the 759 00:29:09,056 --> 00:29:11,056 Pentagon . So you're confident that 760 00:29:11,056 --> 00:29:13,222 those two factors will remain when the 761 00:29:13,222 --> 00:29:15,780 investigation concludes . Yeah . So on 762 00:29:15,790 --> 00:29:17,901 your on your latter questions again , 763 00:29:17,901 --> 00:29:19,957 I'm not going to discuss the ongoing 764 00:29:19,957 --> 00:29:22,380 investigation by virtue of the fact 765 00:29:22,390 --> 00:29:26,119 that photographed documents uh of , 766 00:29:26,130 --> 00:29:29,489 of sensitive information are posted by 767 00:29:29,500 --> 00:29:33,400 default is a violation of , of uh you 768 00:29:33,410 --> 00:29:35,410 know , how to properly handle and 769 00:29:35,420 --> 00:29:37,642 safeguard sensitive information . So it 770 00:29:37,642 --> 00:29:40,920 it is a criminal act . Um And then in 771 00:29:40,930 --> 00:29:43,041 terms of your , your first question . 772 00:29:43,041 --> 00:29:45,152 Um I would just have to take a little 773 00:29:45,152 --> 00:29:47,041 bit of an exception of conducting 774 00:29:47,041 --> 00:29:50,959 simulated strikes against Taiwan is not 775 00:29:50,969 --> 00:29:53,900 just , that's not just operating 776 00:29:53,910 --> 00:29:55,966 peacefully in international waters . 777 00:29:55,966 --> 00:29:58,739 And so again , yes , we would call that 778 00:29:58,750 --> 00:30:02,280 an overreaction . Ok . Let me go back . 779 00:30:02,310 --> 00:30:04,477 Let me get a few more here . Let me go 780 00:30:04,477 --> 00:30:06,421 back to Kelly and then over here . 781 00:30:07,209 --> 00:30:09,579 Thank you . Um , you mentioned taking 782 00:30:09,589 --> 00:30:12,180 steps to review the distribution lists 783 00:30:12,189 --> 00:30:13,967 and ensure that folks receiving 784 00:30:13,967 --> 00:30:16,078 information have a need to know . But 785 00:30:16,078 --> 00:30:18,133 this isn't the first time you've had 786 00:30:18,133 --> 00:30:20,356 that kind of crackdown on this to limit 787 00:30:20,356 --> 00:30:22,522 who's on these distribution lists . So 788 00:30:22,522 --> 00:30:24,689 my question is , how did this happen ? 789 00:30:24,689 --> 00:30:26,911 How wasn't this solved before ? And how 790 00:30:26,911 --> 00:30:29,030 did potentially a 21 year old have a 791 00:30:29,040 --> 00:30:31,660 need to know ? Again , we need to allow 792 00:30:31,670 --> 00:30:33,559 the investigation time to run its 793 00:30:33,559 --> 00:30:36,140 course . And so again , 794 00:30:37,239 --> 00:30:39,461 defer to the Department of Justice when 795 00:30:39,461 --> 00:30:43,109 it comes to uh suspects , uh you know , 796 00:30:43,119 --> 00:30:45,709 on , on that . Um And again , look , 797 00:30:45,719 --> 00:30:48,780 this is uh something that we , that 798 00:30:48,790 --> 00:30:50,901 will continue to be important work to 799 00:30:50,901 --> 00:30:54,099 ensure that um there's an 800 00:30:54,109 --> 00:30:56,750 understanding of the rules and 801 00:30:56,760 --> 00:30:58,816 regulations . Again , we have strict 802 00:30:58,869 --> 00:31:01,060 safeguards in place 803 00:31:02,339 --> 00:31:04,390 and people are expected to abide by 804 00:31:04,400 --> 00:31:06,400 those , just leave it at that . And 805 00:31:06,400 --> 00:31:07,400 over here 806 00:31:14,280 --> 00:31:17,119 general quick one on the Syria 807 00:31:17,520 --> 00:31:20,349 strike . So just to clarify , there has 808 00:31:20,359 --> 00:31:22,470 been no attribution to who was behind 809 00:31:22,470 --> 00:31:24,692 that attack with the three . Again , my 810 00:31:24,692 --> 00:31:26,581 understanding is it's continued . 811 00:31:26,581 --> 00:31:28,979 Centcom is investigating . So I refer 812 00:31:28,989 --> 00:31:32,199 you to that yesterday , cited several 813 00:31:32,209 --> 00:31:34,265 sources including Intel officials as 814 00:31:34,270 --> 00:31:37,089 saying that they've seen Iranian 815 00:31:37,099 --> 00:31:39,060 weapons being moved into Syria 816 00:31:39,689 --> 00:31:41,839 following the following certain 817 00:31:41,939 --> 00:31:43,717 sanctions waivers following the 818 00:31:43,717 --> 00:31:47,010 earthquake has dod seen any , any 819 00:31:47,199 --> 00:31:50,239 increase or uptick in Iranian weapons 820 00:31:50,250 --> 00:31:52,306 heading for Syria . Yeah , I I don't 821 00:31:52,310 --> 00:31:54,366 have anything to provide from here . 822 00:31:54,366 --> 00:31:56,479 Other than again , we , you know , as 823 00:31:56,489 --> 00:32:00,260 evidenced by the I RGC 824 00:32:00,270 --> 00:32:03,979 aligned groups in Syria , we know that 825 00:32:03,989 --> 00:32:06,969 Iran conducts malign activities within 826 00:32:06,979 --> 00:32:09,650 Syria . So I got time for two more 827 00:32:09,660 --> 00:32:13,099 Megan and then go to and then we'll end 828 00:32:13,109 --> 00:32:16,640 on . It was um 829 00:32:16,650 --> 00:32:18,706 several media reports have said that 830 00:32:18,706 --> 00:32:20,817 the airman in question was working at 831 00:32:20,817 --> 00:32:22,594 Fort Bragg at the time that the 832 00:32:22,594 --> 00:32:24,706 documents were put online . Was he on 833 00:32:24,706 --> 00:32:26,817 title 10 orders at the time or has he 834 00:32:26,817 --> 00:32:28,983 been on title 10 orders since ? Yeah , 835 00:32:28,983 --> 00:32:30,872 thanks Megan again . I don't have 836 00:32:30,872 --> 00:32:30,739 anything to provide on that front . I 837 00:32:30,750 --> 00:32:32,806 have to refer you to doj and when we 838 00:32:32,806 --> 00:32:34,972 have more uh to provide , we certainly 839 00:32:34,972 --> 00:32:36,910 will follow up . Um Has the leak 840 00:32:36,920 --> 00:32:39,290 prompted any discussion at OS D about 841 00:32:39,609 --> 00:32:42,469 either tightening policies or bulking 842 00:32:42,479 --> 00:32:45,319 up training for or social media ? 843 00:32:45,829 --> 00:32:48,250 Again , our review is ongoing . I've 844 00:32:48,260 --> 00:32:50,427 mentioned some of the steps that we've 845 00:32:50,427 --> 00:32:52,593 taken and we're going to do everything 846 00:32:52,593 --> 00:32:54,760 that we need to do to do due diligence 847 00:32:54,760 --> 00:32:56,482 to ensure that we are properly 848 00:32:56,482 --> 00:32:58,880 safeguarding classified information . 849 00:32:59,089 --> 00:33:01,250 Again , I can't emphasize enough that 850 00:33:01,260 --> 00:33:03,482 this is something that Secretary Austin 851 00:33:03,482 --> 00:33:05,538 and the entire department are taking 852 00:33:05,538 --> 00:33:07,649 very , very seriously . We understand 853 00:33:07,649 --> 00:33:10,530 the impact that an unauthorized 854 00:33:10,540 --> 00:33:12,373 disclosure like this can have on 855 00:33:12,373 --> 00:33:14,596 national security . And so again , it's 856 00:33:14,596 --> 00:33:16,707 something that we'll continue to work 857 00:33:16,707 --> 00:33:18,707 very hard on . Thank you . We'll go 858 00:33:18,707 --> 00:33:17,500 here and then over . 859 00:33:25,819 --> 00:33:28,500 Thank you General . This morning , the 860 00:33:28,510 --> 00:33:30,790 Prime Minister of Poland gave remarks 861 00:33:32,449 --> 00:33:35,349 that were very supportive of Ukraine's 862 00:33:35,359 --> 00:33:38,839 ambition , stated ambition to join both 863 00:33:38,849 --> 00:33:42,589 the EU and NATO NATO alliance from a 864 00:33:42,599 --> 00:33:45,199 strictly military perspective . Would 865 00:33:45,209 --> 00:33:48,670 you see any benefit to 866 00:33:48,680 --> 00:33:50,939 Ukraine joining these , these two 867 00:33:50,949 --> 00:33:53,650 organizations and especially for the 868 00:33:53,790 --> 00:33:57,550 wider defensive posture there in the 869 00:33:57,560 --> 00:34:01,089 area ? So that's not really 870 00:34:01,099 --> 00:34:03,609 something for me to comment on . 871 00:34:03,619 --> 00:34:06,650 Obviously , I refer you to Ukraine to 872 00:34:06,660 --> 00:34:09,250 talk about its perspectives on joining 873 00:34:09,260 --> 00:34:11,889 NATO and the EU just leave it at that . 874 00:34:15,250 --> 00:34:17,639 The Associated Press has confirmed that 875 00:34:17,649 --> 00:34:19,205 federal agents have taken a 876 00:34:19,205 --> 00:34:21,260 Massachusetts Air National Guardsman 877 00:34:21,260 --> 00:34:23,969 into custody at this point . Could you 878 00:34:23,979 --> 00:34:26,312 speak a little bit more about this case ? 879 00:34:26,312 --> 00:34:28,600 I cannot , I again refer you to DOJ . 880 00:34:28,610 --> 00:34:31,870 It's an ongoing DOJ investigation and 881 00:34:31,879 --> 00:34:34,699 activity . So I'd refer you to them and 882 00:34:34,709 --> 00:34:37,070 again , I will say when we do have more 883 00:34:37,080 --> 00:34:40,330 to provide , uh we certainly will . Ok . 884 00:34:40,340 --> 00:34:42,118 Thank you very much . Everybody 885 00:34:42,118 --> 00:34:41,969 appreciate it .