1 00:00:00,140 --> 00:00:02,359 Thank you , Senator Scott , please . 2 00:00:03,069 --> 00:00:05,500 Thank you , Chairman . Um Thank each of 3 00:00:05,510 --> 00:00:07,732 you for being here . Thank you for what 4 00:00:07,732 --> 00:00:09,621 you do . Um The uh I just had the 5 00:00:09,621 --> 00:00:12,279 opportunity to go to Greece and Cyprus 6 00:00:12,289 --> 00:00:14,345 a couple weeks ago and that was with 7 00:00:14,345 --> 00:00:17,459 admiral and uh some other sailors . Um 8 00:00:17,469 --> 00:00:19,413 And you really have to admire what 9 00:00:19,413 --> 00:00:21,636 people are doing . Could you talk about 10 00:00:21,670 --> 00:00:23,448 Jerome ? Can you talk about the 11 00:00:23,448 --> 00:00:25,989 importance of Cyprus and the importance 12 00:00:26,000 --> 00:00:28,430 of making sure we continue to allow 13 00:00:28,440 --> 00:00:30,662 them to get the military equipment that 14 00:00:30,662 --> 00:00:34,209 they need . Um So uh the 15 00:00:34,220 --> 00:00:36,169 eastern Mediterranean in general , 16 00:00:36,180 --> 00:00:38,540 Senator , thank you for bringing it up . 17 00:00:38,549 --> 00:00:41,189 It's a , it's a complicated area and 18 00:00:41,200 --> 00:00:43,290 it's an area that has seen greatly 19 00:00:43,299 --> 00:00:46,590 increased uh competition as well as 20 00:00:46,599 --> 00:00:49,169 Russian naval presence um in , in the 21 00:00:49,180 --> 00:00:51,124 past few years . Uh you know , the 22 00:00:51,124 --> 00:00:53,069 establishment of the naval base in 23 00:00:53,069 --> 00:00:55,360 Tartus um has been an important part of 24 00:00:55,369 --> 00:00:58,529 that . Um In my NATO role , we devote a 25 00:00:58,540 --> 00:01:01,180 lot of attention to that . Um And we 26 00:01:01,189 --> 00:01:03,356 have a couple of operations , maritime 27 00:01:03,356 --> 00:01:05,578 operations and air operations that help 28 00:01:05,578 --> 00:01:07,578 us with that N M I US . Royal naval 29 00:01:07,578 --> 00:01:09,689 forces , Europe work extensively down 30 00:01:09,689 --> 00:01:12,074 there . Um um one of our requirements 31 00:01:12,084 --> 00:01:15,764 is to be able to um uh project power 32 00:01:15,775 --> 00:01:19,415 into the Eastern Med . And Cyprus is 33 00:01:19,425 --> 00:01:22,235 ideally ideally located to do that as 34 00:01:22,245 --> 00:01:24,555 you know , and , and , and , uh , and 35 00:01:24,565 --> 00:01:26,676 does figure into some of our thoughts 36 00:01:26,676 --> 00:01:28,898 in that regard , we keep , uh we keep a 37 00:01:28,898 --> 00:01:30,454 strong military to military 38 00:01:30,454 --> 00:01:32,676 relationship with , with Cyprus , sir . 39 00:01:32,676 --> 00:01:34,732 And Cyprus , it's , it's in our best 40 00:01:34,732 --> 00:01:36,732 interest if Cyprus continues to buy 41 00:01:36,732 --> 00:01:38,898 American equipment rather than rely on 42 00:01:38,898 --> 00:01:40,954 Chinese and , or Russian equipment , 43 00:01:40,954 --> 00:01:43,360 sir . Uh American equipment , sharing 44 00:01:43,370 --> 00:01:45,426 an equipment set with another nation 45 00:01:45,426 --> 00:01:47,537 creates a strategic bond as well as a 46 00:01:47,537 --> 00:01:49,703 practical bond . Uh That , that , that 47 00:01:49,703 --> 00:01:51,919 is very useful . I want to thank you 48 00:01:51,930 --> 00:01:54,300 and everybody in , in uh in Europe for 49 00:01:54,309 --> 00:01:56,476 all their efforts to make sure Ukraine 50 00:01:56,476 --> 00:01:58,989 wins . If you're talking to just 51 00:01:59,000 --> 00:02:01,222 somebody that's not very political , uh 52 00:02:01,222 --> 00:02:02,889 doesn't uh really think about 53 00:02:02,889 --> 00:02:05,056 geopolitics . What would you tell them 54 00:02:05,056 --> 00:02:06,889 is the reason why we ought to be 55 00:02:06,889 --> 00:02:09,520 involved in the Ukraine uh war with uh 56 00:02:09,789 --> 00:02:12,067 as and all the help we give them . How , 57 00:02:12,067 --> 00:02:14,233 what would you , what would your pitch 58 00:02:14,233 --> 00:02:16,289 be ? I mean , just think about for a 59 00:02:16,289 --> 00:02:18,622 second Americans are saying we've spent , 60 00:02:18,622 --> 00:02:20,678 you know , I think we've committed , 61 00:02:20,678 --> 00:02:22,845 you know , what , $100 billion plus uh 62 00:02:22,845 --> 00:02:24,956 to this and that's , that's clearly a 63 00:02:24,956 --> 00:02:24,679 lot of money . So , but how would you , 64 00:02:24,690 --> 00:02:28,679 what would you say to people ? Um Sir . 65 00:02:28,690 --> 00:02:30,589 Uh Thank you for the incredibly 66 00:02:30,600 --> 00:02:32,860 important question . Right . Um the 67 00:02:32,869 --> 00:02:35,449 first thing I , I would tell , uh , 68 00:02:35,669 --> 00:02:38,169 just one of my cousins , um , or , or 69 00:02:38,179 --> 00:02:41,529 something like that is that , um , uh , 70 00:02:41,729 --> 00:02:45,029 America does not like bullies and 71 00:02:45,039 --> 00:02:47,039 having bullies around does not help 72 00:02:47,039 --> 00:02:49,649 America . Um , and , and that's step 73 00:02:49,660 --> 00:02:52,119 one in Russia is a bully and we need to 74 00:02:52,130 --> 00:02:54,297 deal with that . We need to help those 75 00:02:54,297 --> 00:02:56,352 who stand up to bullies to deal with 76 00:02:56,352 --> 00:02:58,408 that . Um , second , uh , the United 77 00:02:58,408 --> 00:03:00,574 States doesn't let adversaries control 78 00:03:00,574 --> 00:03:03,509 things that are valuable to us and um 79 00:03:03,520 --> 00:03:05,742 that part of Europe is valuable to us . 80 00:03:05,742 --> 00:03:08,529 And so is Europe in general . Um And if 81 00:03:08,539 --> 00:03:11,929 Ukraine loses , um then more at Europe 82 00:03:11,940 --> 00:03:14,570 is in stake and we don't let that 83 00:03:14,580 --> 00:03:16,580 happen . And then finally , I'd say 84 00:03:16,580 --> 00:03:18,691 just in a self interest sense , you , 85 00:03:18,691 --> 00:03:20,858 you know , when I was a lieutenant and 86 00:03:20,858 --> 00:03:22,969 came in the army in the 19 eighties , 87 00:03:22,969 --> 00:03:25,080 we had more than 300,000 us , service 88 00:03:25,080 --> 00:03:27,302 people start stationed overseas because 89 00:03:27,302 --> 00:03:29,580 of Russia because of the Soviet threat . 90 00:03:29,580 --> 00:03:31,691 And we don't need to return to that . 91 00:03:31,691 --> 00:03:33,747 We don't need to return to that . Um 92 00:03:33,747 --> 00:03:35,802 And , and , and so Ukraine , Ukraine 93 00:03:35,802 --> 00:03:37,802 deserves help . So we don't have to 94 00:03:37,802 --> 00:03:39,913 general the , um when you look at and 95 00:03:39,913 --> 00:03:42,136 like on this chart , you see where your 96 00:03:42,136 --> 00:03:44,302 troops are , your um service , men and 97 00:03:44,302 --> 00:03:46,358 women are , are stationed . Is there 98 00:03:46,358 --> 00:03:49,360 any logic to moving um more people out 99 00:03:49,369 --> 00:03:51,979 of places like Italy and , and Germany 100 00:03:51,990 --> 00:03:55,000 closer to where uh you , there's more 101 00:03:55,009 --> 00:03:57,889 risk . Uh Thanks , Senator . Yeah . 102 00:03:57,899 --> 00:03:59,899 Yeah , of course . Of , of course , 103 00:03:59,899 --> 00:04:02,010 there is and , and we've done that as 104 00:04:02,010 --> 00:04:04,066 the risk has gone up . We've shifted 105 00:04:04,066 --> 00:04:06,177 forces on temporary deployments out , 106 00:04:06,177 --> 00:04:07,899 out to the east and all of the 107 00:04:07,899 --> 00:04:10,121 reinforcement just about that have come 108 00:04:10,121 --> 00:04:11,955 in , have gone out to the east . 109 00:04:11,955 --> 00:04:14,177 Moreover in the past , uh , in the past 110 00:04:14,177 --> 00:04:15,899 year , um , the department has 111 00:04:15,899 --> 00:04:17,955 announced the intent to station some 112 00:04:17,955 --> 00:04:20,177 new organizations in Europe . The fifth 113 00:04:20,177 --> 00:04:22,399 core headquarters for it is in Poland . 114 00:04:22,399 --> 00:04:25,200 Uh A new special logistics space has 115 00:04:25,209 --> 00:04:27,209 gone straight into Poland . We have 116 00:04:27,209 --> 00:04:29,339 shifted a combat Aviation brigade on 117 00:04:29,350 --> 00:04:32,769 rotation out to Poland . Um um We have 118 00:04:32,779 --> 00:04:34,779 a permanent rotational . We have an 119 00:04:34,779 --> 00:04:37,001 enduring rotational presence in each of 120 00:04:37,001 --> 00:04:39,168 the three Baltics . We have a division 121 00:04:39,168 --> 00:04:41,279 headquarters in a brigade combat team 122 00:04:41,279 --> 00:04:42,890 in Romania . So we've done a 123 00:04:42,890 --> 00:04:45,001 significant shift shift to the East . 124 00:04:45,001 --> 00:04:47,223 The forces that are left in places like 125 00:04:47,223 --> 00:04:48,946 Italy and Germany are are well 126 00:04:48,946 --> 00:04:52,299 positioned for deployment to um to , to 127 00:04:52,309 --> 00:04:54,420 reinforce the correct location . They 128 00:04:54,420 --> 00:04:56,679 got good readiness uh facilities , 129 00:04:56,690 --> 00:04:58,857 training facilities and stuff and they 130 00:04:58,857 --> 00:05:01,190 have good infrastructure for deployment . 131 00:05:01,190 --> 00:05:03,357 So they give us flexibility as , as we 132 00:05:03,357 --> 00:05:05,523 go forward , sir . Thank both of you . 133 00:05:05,523 --> 00:05:07,690 Thank you , Senator Scott . Uh Senator 134 00:05:07,690 --> 00:05:09,746 King , please , Senator Scott . When 135 00:05:09,746 --> 00:05:11,857 people ask me that question , why are 136 00:05:11,857 --> 00:05:14,429 we there ? My short answer is Google Su 137 00:05:14,440 --> 00:05:18,109 Dayton Land . 1938 Hitler could have 138 00:05:18,119 --> 00:05:22,100 been stopped and 55 139 00:05:22,109 --> 00:05:24,276 million lives could have been saved to 140 00:05:24,276 --> 00:05:26,053 me . That's the most compelling 141 00:05:26,053 --> 00:05:28,589 argument . If Putin is successful in 142 00:05:28,600 --> 00:05:30,822 Ukraine , then we're going to be facing 143 00:05:30,822 --> 00:05:32,878 threats in the Baltics . Poland . He 144 00:05:32,878 --> 00:05:34,767 said that he wants to rebuild the 145 00:05:34,767 --> 00:05:37,950 Soviet Union General . I just want you 146 00:05:37,959 --> 00:05:40,181 to know that the concern about tanks is 147 00:05:40,181 --> 00:05:43,359 bipartisan . Uh , I'm very frustrated 148 00:05:43,369 --> 00:05:45,258 that those tanks they ought to be 149 00:05:45,258 --> 00:05:47,380 sitting in , in Poland right now . 150 00:05:47,390 --> 00:05:50,130 Ready as soon as the training is done , 151 00:05:50,369 --> 00:05:52,480 this counter offensive that everybody 152 00:05:52,480 --> 00:05:54,480 is talking about , it's the longest 153 00:05:54,480 --> 00:05:56,591 wind up for a punch in the history of 154 00:05:56,591 --> 00:05:58,813 the world is going to be trench warfare 155 00:05:58,813 --> 00:06:00,702 and it's going to involve tanks . 156 00:06:00,702 --> 00:06:02,925 That's why the tank was invented at the 157 00:06:02,925 --> 00:06:04,925 end of World War One . If our tanks 158 00:06:04,925 --> 00:06:04,720 don't get there until August or 159 00:06:04,730 --> 00:06:06,959 September , it may well be too late . 160 00:06:07,480 --> 00:06:09,720 And so I , I just want to urge you to 161 00:06:09,730 --> 00:06:11,897 urge , I , I know it's , you've done , 162 00:06:11,897 --> 00:06:14,579 you both have done an amazing job of 163 00:06:14,589 --> 00:06:17,049 logistics and working with the 164 00:06:17,059 --> 00:06:19,109 Ukrainians and integrating and 165 00:06:19,119 --> 00:06:21,175 supplying them with what they need . 166 00:06:21,175 --> 00:06:23,209 But this , this tank story is not 167 00:06:23,220 --> 00:06:25,619 satisfactory . The decision's been made . 168 00:06:25,820 --> 00:06:28,290 Ok , then let's get ready to execute it 169 00:06:28,299 --> 00:06:30,929 and , and , uh , cut through whatever 170 00:06:30,940 --> 00:06:33,107 the red tape is . I know you got to do 171 00:06:33,107 --> 00:06:35,218 the training , but the tank should be 172 00:06:35,218 --> 00:06:37,162 sitting there on the Polish border 173 00:06:37,162 --> 00:06:39,218 ready to go . Uh , when those , when 174 00:06:39,218 --> 00:06:41,820 that training is done . Uh So I just 175 00:06:41,829 --> 00:06:43,885 hope you'll take back that this is a 176 00:06:43,885 --> 00:06:46,309 bipartisan concern on this committee , 177 00:06:46,609 --> 00:06:49,609 uh , that , that , you know , coming in 178 00:06:49,619 --> 00:06:52,119 at the end , at the , after the , the , 179 00:06:52,149 --> 00:06:55,239 uh , uh , the , the counter offensive , 180 00:06:55,250 --> 00:06:57,417 uh , is , is just that , that's , that 181 00:06:57,417 --> 00:07:00,089 will be looked on as a tragic mistake . 182 00:07:00,100 --> 00:07:02,649 Um , um , 183 00:07:05,149 --> 00:07:07,839 I learned five years ago that the 184 00:07:07,850 --> 00:07:09,980 Russians have a doctrine called 185 00:07:09,989 --> 00:07:12,809 escalate to de escalate that they will 186 00:07:12,820 --> 00:07:14,876 use tactical nuclear weapons if they 187 00:07:14,876 --> 00:07:17,399 believe that they're about to , uh , uh , 188 00:07:17,869 --> 00:07:20,036 have some kind of catastrophic loss on 189 00:07:20,036 --> 00:07:22,100 the battlefield . Uh You were asked 190 00:07:22,109 --> 00:07:24,109 earlier , but I want to put a finer 191 00:07:24,109 --> 00:07:26,640 point on the question . Uh isn't it , 192 00:07:28,950 --> 00:07:31,559 at least within the realm of the 193 00:07:31,570 --> 00:07:34,589 thinkable that Putin would use tactical 194 00:07:34,600 --> 00:07:37,079 nuclear weapons ? If indeed he felt 195 00:07:37,089 --> 00:07:39,950 that Crimea was at risk or if there is 196 00:07:39,959 --> 00:07:41,848 a significant breakthrough by the 197 00:07:41,848 --> 00:07:44,929 Ukrainians in the South and East . Uh 198 00:07:44,940 --> 00:07:47,079 Thanks Senator . Um 199 00:07:48,059 --> 00:07:51,709 It has certainly been mentioned by 200 00:07:51,760 --> 00:07:54,540 members of the Russian government as 201 00:07:54,549 --> 00:07:57,429 well as by observers on the Russian 202 00:07:57,440 --> 00:07:59,769 political scene . That is the potential 203 00:07:59,779 --> 00:08:01,835 or the possibility for using nuclear 204 00:08:01,835 --> 00:08:03,835 weapons . And this is part of their 205 00:08:03,835 --> 00:08:05,835 military doctrine going back before 206 00:08:05,835 --> 00:08:07,946 this invasion . Yes , sir . The exact 207 00:08:07,946 --> 00:08:10,001 conditions under which they would do 208 00:08:10,001 --> 00:08:13,519 that . Um I , I think are not 209 00:08:13,529 --> 00:08:16,390 completely known and might not be 210 00:08:16,549 --> 00:08:18,716 completely known to them . They , they 211 00:08:18,716 --> 00:08:20,882 might look good on paper but then when 212 00:08:20,882 --> 00:08:22,993 the moment comes , um , it , it might 213 00:08:22,993 --> 00:08:25,216 be harder to decide . Um , we have some 214 00:08:25,216 --> 00:08:27,327 insights into it , Senator , that I'd 215 00:08:27,327 --> 00:08:29,438 be of course , uh eager to share with 216 00:08:29,438 --> 00:08:31,605 you in , in in closed session . Um But 217 00:08:31,605 --> 00:08:33,827 again , as I said , a few moments ago , 218 00:08:33,827 --> 00:08:35,605 our deterrence , our escalation 219 00:08:35,605 --> 00:08:35,260 management so far as well as our 220 00:08:35,270 --> 00:08:37,609 deterrents have held very well so far 221 00:08:37,619 --> 00:08:39,841 and I feel comfortable where , where we 222 00:08:39,841 --> 00:08:41,841 are . Right . Terrance is the key . 223 00:08:41,841 --> 00:08:41,770 They have to understand that there will 224 00:08:41,780 --> 00:08:44,489 be a response that would be very costly 225 00:08:44,500 --> 00:08:46,609 to them . Deterrence is the heart of 226 00:08:46,619 --> 00:08:48,508 our , as you know , of our entire 227 00:08:48,508 --> 00:08:51,919 military strategy . Um Iron dome 228 00:08:51,929 --> 00:08:54,280 wouldn't iron dome help ? Why don't we 229 00:08:54,289 --> 00:08:57,969 have iron dome in Ukraine ? Uh 230 00:08:57,979 --> 00:09:01,619 Sir , I iron dome clearly could help . 231 00:09:01,630 --> 00:09:05,140 Um um and uh the things that we have 232 00:09:05,150 --> 00:09:08,479 provide help also , I agree , but iron 233 00:09:08,489 --> 00:09:10,711 dome seem to be particularly calibrated 234 00:09:10,711 --> 00:09:13,549 to the kind of low level attacks that 235 00:09:13,559 --> 00:09:16,479 are coming in by drones and , and , and 236 00:09:16,489 --> 00:09:18,799 missiles . Yeah , I I I can't speak to 237 00:09:18,809 --> 00:09:20,976 exactly why Iron Dome in particular is 238 00:09:20,976 --> 00:09:22,976 not there , sir . If I , if I could 239 00:09:22,976 --> 00:09:25,031 defer that to the working group that 240 00:09:25,031 --> 00:09:27,198 develops those solutions , I I would , 241 00:09:27,198 --> 00:09:26,859 if you could take that for the record , 242 00:09:26,869 --> 00:09:29,147 I would really like to know because we , 243 00:09:29,147 --> 00:09:30,813 we certainly help to fund the 244 00:09:30,813 --> 00:09:32,869 development of iron dome . And uh it 245 00:09:32,869 --> 00:09:35,091 just seems to me that it , it , it fits 246 00:09:35,091 --> 00:09:37,229 in this situation and we , and we've 247 00:09:37,239 --> 00:09:40,070 moved patriots in and , and uh as , as 248 00:09:40,080 --> 00:09:42,739 you mentioned earlier , uh air defense 249 00:09:42,750 --> 00:09:45,200 is one of the most crucial uh things 250 00:09:45,210 --> 00:09:47,440 that the Ukrainians need . So I would 251 00:09:47,450 --> 00:09:49,561 like if you could take for the record 252 00:09:49,561 --> 00:09:52,669 of uh some thoughts on how we could uh 253 00:09:52,679 --> 00:09:55,760 move forward with uh with iron dome . I 254 00:09:56,070 --> 00:09:58,320 will . Senator , thanks . And uh you 255 00:09:58,330 --> 00:10:00,441 talked about China , it seems to me , 256 00:10:00,441 --> 00:10:02,608 China can play either a useful role or 257 00:10:02,608 --> 00:10:05,309 a destructive role and the , the jury 258 00:10:05,320 --> 00:10:07,376 is out on which direction we've seen 259 00:10:07,376 --> 00:10:09,542 some hopeful dip , diplomatic moves in 260 00:10:09,542 --> 00:10:12,450 the last 24 hours . But if they start 261 00:10:12,460 --> 00:10:14,750 supplying significant material to the 262 00:10:14,760 --> 00:10:17,159 Russians , that also could tip the 263 00:10:17,169 --> 00:10:19,336 balance in the wrong direction , would 264 00:10:19,336 --> 00:10:21,502 you agree to that ? I absolutely agree 265 00:10:21,502 --> 00:10:23,725 with that . Senator . Thank you . Thank 266 00:10:23,725 --> 00:10:25,947 you , Mr Chairman . Thank you , Senator 267 00:10:25,947 --> 00:10:28,479 King . Uh I believe Senator , but thank 268 00:10:28,489 --> 00:10:31,239 you . Thank you Mr Chairman . And again , 269 00:10:31,250 --> 00:10:33,361 thank you both for your service . And 270 00:10:33,361 --> 00:10:35,583 um , it's great to have a former deputy 271 00:10:35,583 --> 00:10:37,806 Commanding general of the 82nd Airborne 272 00:10:37,806 --> 00:10:39,750 Division before the committee . So 273 00:10:39,750 --> 00:10:41,972 thank you for your service , especially 274 00:10:41,972 --> 00:10:44,194 in North Carolina . Uh General . I have 275 00:10:44,194 --> 00:10:46,417 a few questions . I'd like to ask about 276 00:10:46,417 --> 00:10:48,583 our foreign military sales process and 277 00:10:48,583 --> 00:10:50,472 I've asked these questions , um , 278 00:10:50,472 --> 00:10:52,583 similar questions of other geographic 279 00:10:52,583 --> 00:10:54,750 combatant commanders and I'm hoping to 280 00:10:54,750 --> 00:10:56,972 finish this up with , with you . Um , I 281 00:10:56,972 --> 00:10:59,083 appreciate on the first part just yes 282 00:10:59,083 --> 00:11:01,760 or no on each one and then at the end , 283 00:11:01,770 --> 00:11:03,992 I'll have opportunity for you to expand 284 00:11:03,992 --> 00:11:06,239 if you would . Uh So is the current 285 00:11:06,250 --> 00:11:09,109 foreign military sales process ? Is it 286 00:11:09,119 --> 00:11:11,580 fast and flexible enough to meet our 287 00:11:11,590 --> 00:11:13,880 foreign partners , security needs in 288 00:11:13,890 --> 00:11:15,849 your area of responsibility . No , 289 00:11:15,880 --> 00:11:19,710 Senator does the transfer of us 290 00:11:19,719 --> 00:11:21,849 defense articles build our partner's 291 00:11:21,859 --> 00:11:23,748 capacity to provide for their own 292 00:11:23,748 --> 00:11:26,489 defense . Absolutely . Senator , does 293 00:11:26,500 --> 00:11:29,909 the F MS increase the interoperability 294 00:11:29,919 --> 00:11:31,808 between the US military and those 295 00:11:31,808 --> 00:11:34,141 countries ? We sell defense articles to ? 296 00:11:34,549 --> 00:11:36,716 Absolutely , Senator , it's one of the 297 00:11:36,716 --> 00:11:38,827 most important aspects of our foreign 298 00:11:38,827 --> 00:11:40,993 military sales . Thank you , given the 299 00:11:40,993 --> 00:11:43,659 outstanding performance of us defense 300 00:11:43,669 --> 00:11:45,900 systems in Ukraine versus the 301 00:11:45,909 --> 00:11:47,798 lackluster performance of Russian 302 00:11:47,798 --> 00:11:50,320 systems . Are you seeing an increase in 303 00:11:50,330 --> 00:11:53,070 F MS requests from our European allies 304 00:11:53,080 --> 00:11:55,159 and partners ? Without a doubt , 305 00:11:55,169 --> 00:11:57,960 Senator , there is an enormous appetite 306 00:11:57,969 --> 00:12:00,549 around the world for us . Armaments 307 00:12:00,559 --> 00:12:03,039 right now . Thank you . And what 308 00:12:03,049 --> 00:12:05,216 particular systems are in demand right 309 00:12:05,216 --> 00:12:07,429 now are the ones that have been on 310 00:12:07,440 --> 00:12:10,270 display ? Uh the system , the Gimler 311 00:12:10,280 --> 00:12:14,190 rockets , um uh uh radar systems . 312 00:12:14,200 --> 00:12:17,989 Um the Patriot 313 00:12:18,000 --> 00:12:20,409 missile system is in high demand , but 314 00:12:20,419 --> 00:12:22,650 I would point out that just about all 315 00:12:22,659 --> 00:12:25,869 us armaments are looked upon around the 316 00:12:25,880 --> 00:12:29,250 world um with uh with uh with great 317 00:12:29,260 --> 00:12:31,260 desire , there's great appetite for 318 00:12:31,260 --> 00:12:33,371 them . Thank you , general . And from 319 00:12:33,371 --> 00:12:35,093 your view , how are these F MS 320 00:12:35,093 --> 00:12:36,816 challenges impacting strategic 321 00:12:36,816 --> 00:12:38,871 competition with China and Russia on 322 00:12:38,871 --> 00:12:41,979 the European continent ? Well sir , uh 323 00:12:41,989 --> 00:12:45,320 in Europe specifically , um 324 00:12:45,710 --> 00:12:48,030 they , they , they don't impact too 325 00:12:48,039 --> 00:12:50,229 much because the Chinese and the 326 00:12:50,239 --> 00:12:52,295 Russians aren't selling too much war 327 00:12:52,295 --> 00:12:55,710 material inside Europe . Um clearly not 328 00:12:55,719 --> 00:12:57,941 to NATO for example . And in fact , our 329 00:12:57,941 --> 00:13:00,163 European allies with our assistance are 330 00:13:00,163 --> 00:13:02,163 in the process of divesting their , 331 00:13:02,163 --> 00:13:04,909 their Soviet era stuff . Um However , 332 00:13:04,919 --> 00:13:06,869 as you may know , I used to be the 333 00:13:06,880 --> 00:13:08,769 commander of us , army Europe and 334 00:13:08,769 --> 00:13:11,260 Africa in places like Africa . It's 335 00:13:11,270 --> 00:13:13,437 very difficult for us to compete if it 336 00:13:13,437 --> 00:13:15,809 takes us a long time to deliver a set 337 00:13:15,820 --> 00:13:18,429 of Humvees to a nation . Um but it 338 00:13:18,440 --> 00:13:21,265 takes China , you know , six months to 339 00:13:21,275 --> 00:13:23,275 put them on a boat and roll them in 340 00:13:23,275 --> 00:13:25,164 there . It gets , it gets hard to 341 00:13:25,164 --> 00:13:27,331 compete in that regard . So speed is , 342 00:13:27,331 --> 00:13:29,594 I think your point speed in foreign 343 00:13:29,604 --> 00:13:32,354 military sales is an essential part of , 344 00:13:32,364 --> 00:13:34,724 of delivering the influence that we 345 00:13:34,734 --> 00:13:36,678 seek when we conduct those sales . 346 00:13:37,169 --> 00:13:40,750 Thank you , General uh General uh uh in 347 00:13:40,760 --> 00:13:42,816 North Carolina , we couldn't be more 348 00:13:42,816 --> 00:13:44,982 proud of the military Ocean terminal , 349 00:13:44,982 --> 00:13:47,093 Sunny Point , which I had a chance to 350 00:13:47,093 --> 00:13:48,760 visit recently . And the 5 96 351 00:13:48,760 --> 00:13:50,871 Transportation Brigade , the unit who 352 00:13:50,871 --> 00:13:52,927 oversees it in the past , there have 353 00:13:52,927 --> 00:13:54,760 been concerns about staffing and 354 00:13:54,760 --> 00:13:56,816 funding shortages at Sunny Point and 355 00:13:56,816 --> 00:13:59,330 the nation's other uh uh terminals . Um 356 00:13:59,559 --> 00:14:01,559 Can you please provide an update on 357 00:14:01,559 --> 00:14:03,726 those issues and what resources if any 358 00:14:03,726 --> 00:14:05,726 are needed to ensure these critical 359 00:14:05,726 --> 00:14:07,781 transportation nodes are prepared to 360 00:14:07,781 --> 00:14:10,000 support the nation's needs ? Uh Thank 361 00:14:10,010 --> 00:14:11,843 you uh Senator and thank you for 362 00:14:11,843 --> 00:14:13,788 visiting Matsu . Uh It is , it's a 363 00:14:13,788 --> 00:14:15,630 critical uh ammunition out load 364 00:14:15,640 --> 00:14:19,000 location for , for America . Uh And so 365 00:14:19,010 --> 00:14:22,010 as we look at both uh Matsu and Mat in 366 00:14:22,020 --> 00:14:24,590 California , we are uh working closely 367 00:14:24,599 --> 00:14:26,821 with , with the army and the Department 368 00:14:26,821 --> 00:14:29,043 of Defense to ensure that they have the 369 00:14:29,043 --> 00:14:30,988 resources they need so that we can 370 00:14:30,988 --> 00:14:33,043 protect uh and keep the capabilities 371 00:14:33,043 --> 00:14:34,766 there . As you probably know , 372 00:14:34,766 --> 00:14:37,099 infrastructure . I , I think about that , 373 00:14:37,099 --> 00:14:36,960 especially with contested logistics 374 00:14:37,210 --> 00:14:39,960 that they uh that those would be , you 375 00:14:39,969 --> 00:14:42,025 know , AAA point of interest for our 376 00:14:42,025 --> 00:14:44,136 aggressors to try to slow down . So , 377 00:14:44,136 --> 00:14:46,275 from a cyber perspective and 378 00:14:46,284 --> 00:14:48,117 infrastructure perspective , the 379 00:14:48,117 --> 00:14:50,284 birthing perspective , we want to make 380 00:14:50,284 --> 00:14:50,275 sure that they're , they're working 381 00:14:50,284 --> 00:14:52,224 well . And the 5 96 I couldn't be 382 00:14:52,234 --> 00:14:54,456 prouder of the work that they have done 383 00:14:54,456 --> 00:14:56,955 to support General Kali and the Outlo 384 00:14:56,965 --> 00:14:59,076 to Ukraine . That's a really critical 385 00:14:59,076 --> 00:15:01,494 point for us and their readiness again 386 00:15:01,505 --> 00:15:03,727 when I think about day to day readiness 387 00:15:03,727 --> 00:15:05,838 and the readiness of the future . The 388 00:15:05,838 --> 00:15:07,949 number one thing you can do for us to 389 00:15:07,949 --> 00:15:10,061 ensure our readiness is to pass an on 390 00:15:10,061 --> 00:15:12,424 time budget because that sees both time 391 00:15:12,434 --> 00:15:15,190 and money to the enemy . Thank you , 392 00:15:15,200 --> 00:15:17,367 General Chairman . Just a question . I 393 00:15:17,367 --> 00:15:19,367 didn't see the time reset . Um Do I 394 00:15:19,367 --> 00:15:21,589 have time for one more question ? Thank 395 00:15:21,589 --> 00:15:23,533 you . Uh General . Do you have any 396 00:15:23,533 --> 00:15:25,589 concerns about uh cyber attacks that 397 00:15:25,589 --> 00:15:27,700 could slow down the flow of forces or 398 00:15:27,700 --> 00:15:29,929 material and crises or conflict ? And 399 00:15:29,940 --> 00:15:32,218 if so , what's Transcom doing about it , 400 00:15:33,190 --> 00:15:35,280 Senator Cyber is one of the major 401 00:15:35,289 --> 00:15:37,511 concerns that we have because we have a 402 00:15:37,511 --> 00:15:39,678 large what we call surface attack area 403 00:15:39,678 --> 00:15:41,789 across the logistics network from end 404 00:15:41,789 --> 00:15:44,020 to end . Uh So we are looking very 405 00:15:44,030 --> 00:15:47,119 closely at cyber hardening practices , 406 00:15:47,130 --> 00:15:49,400 not just uh uh in , in the US , not 407 00:15:49,409 --> 00:15:51,298 just on the Department of Defense 408 00:15:51,298 --> 00:15:53,131 Systems , but our , our civilian 409 00:15:53,131 --> 00:15:55,242 systems within the defense industrial 410 00:15:55,242 --> 00:15:57,465 base and with our allies and partners . 411 00:15:57,465 --> 00:15:59,353 Um So it is critical that we stay 412 00:15:59,353 --> 00:16:01,409 focused on that . And we have , have 413 00:16:01,409 --> 00:16:03,520 our uh the other thing is our ability 414 00:16:03,520 --> 00:16:05,631 to command and control . We must have 415 00:16:05,631 --> 00:16:07,631 secure command and control , secure 416 00:16:07,631 --> 00:16:09,631 communications and , and updated uh 417 00:16:09,631 --> 00:16:12,094 cryptographic materials so that we can 418 00:16:12,104 --> 00:16:14,825 maintain a consistent flow of logistics 419 00:16:14,835 --> 00:16:16,835 at a time and place of our choosing 420 00:16:17,099 --> 00:16:19,321 again . Thank you both chairman . Thank 421 00:16:19,321 --> 00:16:21,543 you , Senator . But uh Senator Peters , 422 00:16:21,543 --> 00:16:23,655 please thank you , Mr Chairman and uh 423 00:16:23,655 --> 00:16:25,821 thanks to both of you for your service 424 00:16:25,821 --> 00:16:27,821 to our country . Uh General Cali uh 425 00:16:27,821 --> 00:16:30,280 nowhere in the world uh is the power of 426 00:16:30,289 --> 00:16:32,429 our alliances uh clearly more evident 427 00:16:32,440 --> 00:16:34,750 than uh what we're seeing in NATO right 428 00:16:34,760 --> 00:16:37,469 now . And through the National Guards 429 00:16:37,479 --> 00:16:39,710 Bureau's State Partnership program , 430 00:16:39,719 --> 00:16:41,830 the Michigan National Guard has 431 00:16:41,840 --> 00:16:43,784 supported the alliance through our 432 00:16:43,784 --> 00:16:46,109 partnership with Latvia for now , 433 00:16:46,119 --> 00:16:49,650 nearly 30 years . One of the advantages 434 00:16:49,659 --> 00:16:51,715 of the state partnership programs is 435 00:16:51,715 --> 00:16:54,080 that it provides NATO opportunity to 436 00:16:54,090 --> 00:16:56,960 utilize Kona based facilities for 437 00:16:56,969 --> 00:16:59,559 training purposes . A complaint that 438 00:16:59,570 --> 00:17:02,630 I've heard from other combat commanders 439 00:17:02,640 --> 00:17:04,520 is the lack of suitable training 440 00:17:04,530 --> 00:17:07,489 facilities in their A R R and how 441 00:17:07,500 --> 00:17:09,278 that's going to competent , how 442 00:17:09,278 --> 00:17:11,589 oftentimes a compliment or complicates 443 00:17:11,599 --> 00:17:14,569 partner force training . So my question 444 00:17:14,579 --> 00:17:16,357 for you is what is your current 445 00:17:16,357 --> 00:17:18,869 capacity for training in your A R and 446 00:17:18,880 --> 00:17:21,359 given the renewed focus on our NATO 447 00:17:21,739 --> 00:17:24,089 allies on defense issues , would you 448 00:17:24,099 --> 00:17:26,155 benefit from having a Conus location 449 00:17:26,155 --> 00:17:28,377 that could be used for training similar 450 00:17:28,377 --> 00:17:30,599 to what the Latvians have been doing in 451 00:17:30,599 --> 00:17:32,932 northern Michigan for many , many years ? 452 00:17:32,932 --> 00:17:35,210 Uh Thanks Senator and you know , again , 453 00:17:35,210 --> 00:17:37,377 as I mentioned a couple of moments ago 454 00:17:37,377 --> 00:17:39,432 to one of the other members . Uh the 455 00:17:39,432 --> 00:17:41,321 state partnership program is just 456 00:17:41,321 --> 00:17:43,488 invaluable to , to , to us in US . U I 457 00:17:43,488 --> 00:17:45,655 I think the other geographic combatant 458 00:17:45,655 --> 00:17:48,204 commanders share my opinion inside 459 00:17:48,214 --> 00:17:49,992 Europe . We have plenty of , of 460 00:17:49,992 --> 00:17:53,265 training capacity right now for uh for 461 00:17:53,275 --> 00:17:57,175 the US forces as well as for our allies . 462 00:17:57,185 --> 00:17:59,405 There's quite a bit in Western Europe 463 00:17:59,415 --> 00:18:01,193 of training capacity , training 464 00:18:01,193 --> 00:18:04,869 facility capacity um that that existed 465 00:18:04,880 --> 00:18:07,102 for larger armed forces during the Cold 466 00:18:07,102 --> 00:18:09,540 War in our Eastern European allies . 467 00:18:09,550 --> 00:18:11,920 However , there , there are some things 468 00:18:11,930 --> 00:18:14,208 that we need to get done . As you know , 469 00:18:14,208 --> 00:18:16,430 Latvia has been building quite a bit uh 470 00:18:16,430 --> 00:18:18,319 has been improving quite a bit um 471 00:18:18,319 --> 00:18:20,541 throughout the Baltics . It's necessary 472 00:18:20,541 --> 00:18:22,819 it's necessary for a couple of reasons , 473 00:18:22,819 --> 00:18:25,359 not , not just um for the uh the host 474 00:18:25,369 --> 00:18:27,512 nation , but because in order to 475 00:18:27,522 --> 00:18:30,032 reinforce that host nation with NATO 476 00:18:30,042 --> 00:18:32,833 forces at a time of need , those forces 477 00:18:32,843 --> 00:18:34,963 would need to continue to train in 478 00:18:34,973 --> 00:18:37,103 place in the country to maintain the 479 00:18:37,113 --> 00:18:39,262 readiness necessary . So all three of 480 00:18:39,272 --> 00:18:41,216 our Baltic , as well as our Polish 481 00:18:41,216 --> 00:18:43,328 allies are working hard on their , on 482 00:18:43,328 --> 00:18:45,550 their training areas . In that regard , 483 00:18:45,550 --> 00:18:47,682 Latvia's activities in the United 484 00:18:47,692 --> 00:18:50,142 States have been very useful to Latvia . 485 00:18:50,152 --> 00:18:52,319 They have other ones throughout Europe 486 00:18:52,319 --> 00:18:54,765 and I think a good mix . Uh uh uh It is 487 00:18:54,776 --> 00:18:56,943 a useful thing . It's a useful thing , 488 00:18:56,943 --> 00:18:58,887 especially because it's useful for 489 00:18:58,887 --> 00:19:00,998 countries like Latvia to get a chance 490 00:19:00,998 --> 00:19:03,220 to go back to the States and to , and , 491 00:19:03,220 --> 00:19:03,186 and to interact with their state 492 00:19:03,196 --> 00:19:05,307 partners on their state partners home 493 00:19:05,307 --> 00:19:07,474 ground and , and , and see the way our 494 00:19:07,474 --> 00:19:09,595 systems work there as well . Um As a 495 00:19:09,605 --> 00:19:12,586 matter of strict capacity , um not as 496 00:19:12,595 --> 00:19:14,873 necessary , but as a matter of benefit , 497 00:19:14,873 --> 00:19:17,095 it's been huge . Great . Thank you . Uh 498 00:19:17,095 --> 00:19:19,428 My next question for you , sir is uh in , 499 00:19:19,428 --> 00:19:21,206 in your opening statement , you 500 00:19:21,206 --> 00:19:23,262 mentioned uconn's efforts to conduct 501 00:19:23,262 --> 00:19:24,928 activities in the information 502 00:19:24,928 --> 00:19:26,539 environment , cyberspace and 503 00:19:26,539 --> 00:19:28,539 electromagnetic spectrum to counter 504 00:19:28,539 --> 00:19:30,869 Russian aggression and other Malign 505 00:19:30,880 --> 00:19:33,609 activities in Europe . So my question 506 00:19:33,619 --> 00:19:35,619 is as the joint force moves towards 507 00:19:35,619 --> 00:19:37,939 data centric concepts to synchronize 508 00:19:37,949 --> 00:19:40,589 common operation pictures for the joint 509 00:19:40,599 --> 00:19:43,310 force . Are you comfortable with dod's 510 00:19:43,319 --> 00:19:45,579 current platforms for management and 511 00:19:45,589 --> 00:19:48,319 the capacity to display an accurate 512 00:19:48,329 --> 00:19:50,680 common operations picture for not only 513 00:19:50,689 --> 00:19:53,939 our joint forces but for our allies and 514 00:19:53,949 --> 00:19:56,930 our partners as well . Thanks for the 515 00:19:56,939 --> 00:19:58,939 Thanks for the question , sir . I I 516 00:19:58,939 --> 00:20:00,772 don't think you'd find any of my 517 00:20:00,772 --> 00:20:02,883 combatant commander colleagues who is 518 00:20:02,883 --> 00:20:04,883 anything but eager for the advances 519 00:20:04,883 --> 00:20:06,717 that we're working on inside the 520 00:20:06,717 --> 00:20:08,939 department right now , specifically the 521 00:20:08,939 --> 00:20:11,106 to the joint all domain uh command and 522 00:20:11,106 --> 00:20:13,217 control system , which is intended to 523 00:20:13,217 --> 00:20:15,939 link any sensor to the best shooter as 524 00:20:15,949 --> 00:20:18,020 quickly as possible . In my case , 525 00:20:18,175 --> 00:20:20,734 being the commander of European command , 526 00:20:20,744 --> 00:20:22,464 as well as the allied command 527 00:20:22,474 --> 00:20:24,864 operations commander . It's imperative 528 00:20:24,875 --> 00:20:28,244 that that C two be combined , Jad C two 529 00:20:28,265 --> 00:20:30,487 so that we can share it with our allies 530 00:20:30,487 --> 00:20:32,598 in the allied space . No , sir , I am 531 00:20:32,598 --> 00:20:34,765 not satisfied we have work to do and 532 00:20:34,775 --> 00:20:36,997 I'm eager for the uh for the efforts of 533 00:20:36,997 --> 00:20:39,285 the department um to , to , to continue 534 00:20:39,295 --> 00:20:42,050 to bear fruit . Thank you , General Van . 535 00:20:42,420 --> 00:20:44,364 During your testimony to the House 536 00:20:44,364 --> 00:20:47,339 Armed Services Committee and with me in 537 00:20:47,349 --> 00:20:49,460 our discussion in my , in my office , 538 00:20:49,460 --> 00:20:51,627 you highlighted the ongoing challenges 539 00:20:51,627 --> 00:20:53,738 with contested logistics and the task 540 00:20:53,738 --> 00:20:55,627 to conduct air refueling missions 541 00:20:55,627 --> 00:20:57,800 within that contested integrated 542 00:20:57,810 --> 00:21:00,032 environment . So given these challenges 543 00:21:00,032 --> 00:21:02,209 and persistent threats , how are you 544 00:21:02,219 --> 00:21:05,219 working with the services to prioritize 545 00:21:05,489 --> 00:21:08,010 and and really replicate training 546 00:21:08,020 --> 00:21:10,979 scenarios similar to potential threats 547 00:21:10,989 --> 00:21:13,199 from China , Russia , North Korea and 548 00:21:13,209 --> 00:21:15,589 Iran ? Thank you , Senator for that 549 00:21:15,599 --> 00:21:17,849 question . Uh Contested logistics is 550 00:21:17,859 --> 00:21:20,420 first and foremost in our minds on all 551 00:21:20,430 --> 00:21:22,541 of our development , our requirements 552 00:21:22,541 --> 00:21:24,597 development and our and our exercise 553 00:21:24,597 --> 00:21:26,652 development out into the future , uh 554 00:21:26,652 --> 00:21:28,597 especially in things like a fuel , 555 00:21:28,597 --> 00:21:30,900 which is my most stressed ability . We 556 00:21:30,910 --> 00:21:33,099 are working to try to first understand 557 00:21:33,109 --> 00:21:35,220 ourselves . We are using what we just 558 00:21:35,220 --> 00:21:37,109 talked about here with T C two to 559 00:21:37,109 --> 00:21:39,387 understand where our data is . The ITV , 560 00:21:39,387 --> 00:21:41,609 to understand what is going on , what's 561 00:21:41,609 --> 00:21:43,553 in motion . And we're beginning to 562 00:21:43,553 --> 00:21:45,331 develop predictive analytics to 563 00:21:45,331 --> 00:21:47,498 understand what needs to be moved in a 564 00:21:47,498 --> 00:21:49,665 predictive manner . So we can marry up 565 00:21:49,665 --> 00:21:51,776 our scarce resources with the highest 566 00:21:51,776 --> 00:21:53,942 priority . So like we're doing today , 567 00:21:53,942 --> 00:21:56,053 uh with Ukraine being agile enough to 568 00:21:56,053 --> 00:21:58,220 change out our priorities . So I think 569 00:21:58,220 --> 00:22:00,331 about the exercise as we lay down the 570 00:22:00,331 --> 00:22:02,387 exercise , we're trying to get after 571 00:22:02,387 --> 00:22:04,553 those gaps , giving them hard problems 572 00:22:04,553 --> 00:22:06,220 to solve , you know , loss of 573 00:22:06,220 --> 00:22:08,387 commanding control , loss of precision 574 00:22:08,387 --> 00:22:10,498 navigation and timing , trying to get 575 00:22:10,498 --> 00:22:10,459 uh understanding of commanders intent 576 00:22:10,469 --> 00:22:12,302 all the way down to the tactical 577 00:22:12,302 --> 00:22:14,525 echelon . And we're doing this not just 578 00:22:14,525 --> 00:22:16,302 in Europe but across all of the 579 00:22:16,302 --> 00:22:18,413 continents . Uh And we have a heavy , 580 00:22:18,413 --> 00:22:20,469 heavy emphasis in the Indo Pacific . 581 00:22:20,469 --> 00:22:22,580 Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 582 00:22:22,580 --> 00:22:24,580 Thank you , Senator Peter , Senator 583 00:22:24,580 --> 00:22:24,459 Schmidt , please . Thank you , Mr 584 00:22:24,469 --> 00:22:28,410 Chairman . Um In 2014 , after 585 00:22:28,420 --> 00:22:31,530 Russia moved into Crimea NATO , 586 00:22:31,540 --> 00:22:33,373 countries agreed agreed to raise 587 00:22:33,373 --> 00:22:36,579 defense spending to at least 2% of 588 00:22:36,589 --> 00:22:40,390 their GDP by 2024 last 589 00:22:40,400 --> 00:22:42,678 year , eight years . After that pledge , 590 00:22:42,678 --> 00:22:45,739 only seven of the 30 NATO countries met 591 00:22:45,750 --> 00:22:48,359 that goal , prosperous nations like 592 00:22:48,369 --> 00:22:51,209 France and Germany still lag well 593 00:22:51,219 --> 00:22:54,619 behind that goal . Um And I know 594 00:22:54,630 --> 00:22:56,852 there's been some discussion about when 595 00:22:56,852 --> 00:22:58,963 we're delivering tanks . Um but we're 596 00:22:58,963 --> 00:23:01,074 talking about over the course of that 597 00:23:01,074 --> 00:23:03,241 period of time , billions and billions 598 00:23:03,241 --> 00:23:05,130 and billions of dollars from NATO 599 00:23:05,130 --> 00:23:07,352 countries that seemingly refuse to ante 600 00:23:07,352 --> 00:23:10,369 up to protect themselves . And Europe 601 00:23:10,530 --> 00:23:12,586 and so general , I want to ask you a 602 00:23:12,586 --> 00:23:15,530 question . If those additional billions 603 00:23:15,540 --> 00:23:18,199 of dollars would have been um 604 00:23:18,209 --> 00:23:20,849 designated for defense , wouldn't that 605 00:23:20,859 --> 00:23:22,748 have gone a long way in deterring 606 00:23:23,280 --> 00:23:27,130 Russian aggression , sir ? Thanks for , 607 00:23:27,140 --> 00:23:29,362 thanks for the question . Um You know , 608 00:23:29,362 --> 00:23:32,770 first of all , um , you , you , you 609 00:23:32,780 --> 00:23:34,959 would have to look pretty far to find 610 00:23:34,969 --> 00:23:37,270 somebody who were , was a bigger 611 00:23:37,280 --> 00:23:39,336 advocate than me , of all our allies 612 00:23:39,336 --> 00:23:41,002 spending 2% . In fact , in my 613 00:23:41,010 --> 00:23:43,066 confirmation hearings , I made clear 614 00:23:43,066 --> 00:23:45,880 that I consider 2% to be a floor . Um 615 00:23:45,890 --> 00:23:48,001 There , there are shopping lists that 616 00:23:48,001 --> 00:23:50,223 have to be filled out there . There are 617 00:23:50,223 --> 00:23:52,390 readiness requirements that have to be 618 00:23:52,390 --> 00:23:52,000 filled out there and they're gonna 619 00:23:52,010 --> 00:23:54,699 require money and I believe uh 2% is a 620 00:23:54,709 --> 00:23:56,895 floor , not a ceiling where we are 621 00:23:56,905 --> 00:24:00,474 right now . So in 2014 , we had an 622 00:24:00,484 --> 00:24:04,055 average spending of 1.4% of 623 00:24:04,064 --> 00:24:06,415 GDP sir , across the alliance . Now , 624 00:24:06,425 --> 00:24:09,125 we're at 1.8% which is still short . 625 00:24:09,135 --> 00:24:11,246 We've got 10 allies with the addition 626 00:24:11,246 --> 00:24:13,246 of Finland this year . We've got 10 627 00:24:13,246 --> 00:24:16,224 allies who currently spend 2% or more . 628 00:24:16,234 --> 00:24:19,724 We've got 11 allies who have a credible 629 00:24:19,734 --> 00:24:21,589 plan to get there . Some of them 630 00:24:21,599 --> 00:24:23,790 enshrined in law to get there by 24 631 00:24:23,800 --> 00:24:26,022 which was the goal . Um But that leaves 632 00:24:26,022 --> 00:24:28,189 10 . Yeah , and I , I just , I have to 633 00:24:28,189 --> 00:24:30,300 tell you , encourage them to . Yeah . 634 00:24:30,300 --> 00:24:32,411 And I know you're in kind of a unique 635 00:24:32,411 --> 00:24:34,633 position with your role . But I have to 636 00:24:34,633 --> 00:24:34,400 tell you , you know , in the United 637 00:24:34,410 --> 00:24:37,319 States , I think it's like 54% of the 638 00:24:37,329 --> 00:24:39,273 share of the GDP of all those NATO 639 00:24:39,273 --> 00:24:41,385 countries . And we provide 70% of the 640 00:24:41,385 --> 00:24:43,607 funding . I think the American taxpayer 641 00:24:43,607 --> 00:24:45,760 is getting a little weary essentially 642 00:24:45,770 --> 00:24:48,319 of subsidizing these Western democratic 643 00:24:48,329 --> 00:24:50,589 socialist states . So when they're not 644 00:24:50,599 --> 00:24:52,710 investing in their military to defend 645 00:24:52,710 --> 00:24:54,710 their backyard , they're using that 646 00:24:54,710 --> 00:24:56,932 money on social programs that we may or 647 00:24:56,932 --> 00:24:59,155 may not agree with . But yet the United 648 00:24:59,155 --> 00:25:01,210 States continues to have to hold the 649 00:25:01,210 --> 00:25:00,910 bag and we're having legitimate 650 00:25:00,920 --> 00:25:02,809 questions today about delivery of 651 00:25:02,809 --> 00:25:04,809 weapons systems . But I would argue 652 00:25:04,809 --> 00:25:07,031 that if they were actually meeting what 653 00:25:07,031 --> 00:25:08,920 they should be doing on their own 654 00:25:08,920 --> 00:25:10,976 continent , Russian aggression would 655 00:25:10,976 --> 00:25:13,198 have either been deterred or you know , 656 00:25:13,198 --> 00:25:15,420 Ukraine would have what they need . And 657 00:25:15,420 --> 00:25:17,364 I want to ask about one country in 658 00:25:17,364 --> 00:25:19,253 particular France . Um you know , 659 00:25:19,253 --> 00:25:21,760 President Macron recently visited 660 00:25:21,770 --> 00:25:25,660 communist dictator Xi and said 661 00:25:25,670 --> 00:25:28,359 that it's not in Europe's interest to 662 00:25:28,369 --> 00:25:30,489 strongly support Taiwan and stand 663 00:25:30,500 --> 00:25:32,667 allied with the United States . I find 664 00:25:32,667 --> 00:25:34,689 this comment , by the way , totally 665 00:25:34,699 --> 00:25:38,630 insane . Um Do you have a sense that 666 00:25:38,640 --> 00:25:41,369 that France is , is on their way to 667 00:25:41,380 --> 00:25:43,540 meeting their NATO obligations , this 668 00:25:43,550 --> 00:25:45,772 this amount of funding ? Because that's 669 00:25:45,772 --> 00:25:47,550 a pretty bold statement for the 670 00:25:47,550 --> 00:25:49,550 president of a country that kind of 671 00:25:49,550 --> 00:25:48,939 refuses to live up to their own 672 00:25:48,949 --> 00:25:52,790 commitments . Uh Senator , I of 673 00:25:52,800 --> 00:25:55,022 course , you know , read the , read the 674 00:25:55,022 --> 00:25:57,022 coverage of , of those comments and 675 00:25:57,022 --> 00:25:59,133 everything and uh I think I'll , I'll 676 00:25:59,133 --> 00:26:01,300 leave commentary on them to , to my uh 677 00:26:01,300 --> 00:26:03,633 uh civilian leadership . Um fair enough . 678 00:26:03,633 --> 00:26:06,709 Uh I , I am a huge advocate of burden 679 00:26:06,719 --> 00:26:08,941 sharing , sir . And I believe the plans 680 00:26:08,941 --> 00:26:10,886 that we're working on in NATO will 681 00:26:10,886 --> 00:26:12,997 create the blueprint to get to them . 682 00:26:12,997 --> 00:26:15,163 Well , that's probably a question more 683 00:26:15,163 --> 00:26:17,780 for um for Secretary Blinken . Um uh 684 00:26:18,040 --> 00:26:21,329 the general , then I want to ask you 685 00:26:21,869 --> 00:26:24,250 after the disastrous withdrawal of 686 00:26:24,260 --> 00:26:26,209 Afghanistan from Afghanistan by 687 00:26:26,219 --> 00:26:29,689 President Biden , what was left 688 00:26:29,699 --> 00:26:33,640 behind was $48 million worth of 689 00:26:33,650 --> 00:26:36,060 ammunition . 80 aircraft , 690 00:26:36,079 --> 00:26:38,599 23,000 Humvees , 691 00:26:38,660 --> 00:26:41,770 250,000 automatic rifles , 692 00:26:41,780 --> 00:26:45,609 95 drones , 42,000 pieces , 693 00:26:45,619 --> 00:26:48,319 42,000 pieces of night vision , 694 00:26:48,329 --> 00:26:51,530 surveillance , biometric and 695 00:26:51,540 --> 00:26:53,651 positioning equipment . I mean this , 696 00:26:53,651 --> 00:26:55,689 it's unbelievable and of course you 697 00:26:55,699 --> 00:26:58,069 were charged with scrambling and in , 698 00:26:58,079 --> 00:27:01,520 in saving over 19,000 people from 699 00:27:01,530 --> 00:27:03,586 perhaps one of the most embarrassing 700 00:27:03,586 --> 00:27:06,209 moments in American foreign policy 701 00:27:06,219 --> 00:27:10,010 history . My question to you is , where 702 00:27:10,020 --> 00:27:13,430 did all that equipment go ? Where is it ? 703 00:27:14,030 --> 00:27:17,469 Do we know Senator I'm not 704 00:27:17,479 --> 00:27:19,680 familiar with where the equipment is , 705 00:27:19,689 --> 00:27:21,911 but I can tell you that the Afghanistan 706 00:27:21,911 --> 00:27:23,989 retrograde presented really an 707 00:27:24,000 --> 00:27:26,699 unprecedented situation . We had a 708 00:27:26,709 --> 00:27:29,819 rapidly evolving security deterioration 709 00:27:29,829 --> 00:27:32,150 there on the ground . And I am proud of 710 00:27:32,160 --> 00:27:35,400 how the US service members were able to 711 00:27:35,410 --> 00:27:38,209 evacuate and take care of our Afghan 712 00:27:38,219 --> 00:27:40,441 citizens . No , I agree . And I applaud 713 00:27:40,441 --> 00:27:42,552 you for that . In fact , a serviceman 714 00:27:42,552 --> 00:27:44,608 from Missouri Jared Schmidt lost his 715 00:27:44,608 --> 00:27:46,663 life that day . And I don't think we 716 00:27:46,663 --> 00:27:48,886 talk about it enough . I mean , I , I , 717 00:27:48,886 --> 00:27:48,839 and I believe this would be a 718 00:27:48,849 --> 00:27:51,349 bipartisan . What happened . There is 719 00:27:51,359 --> 00:27:53,920 inexcusable and I just mentioned the 720 00:27:53,930 --> 00:27:56,189 equipment , not , not the loss of life 721 00:27:57,260 --> 00:27:59,316 to compound all of that . And I know 722 00:27:59,316 --> 00:28:01,427 you were charged with that . And just 723 00:28:01,427 --> 00:28:03,949 finally , um , well , I'm , I'm out of 724 00:28:03,959 --> 00:28:06,579 time . I just appreciate what you do , 725 00:28:07,380 --> 00:28:09,491 but the idea that we left all of that 726 00:28:09,491 --> 00:28:11,719 behind and lost those lives and there's 727 00:28:11,729 --> 00:28:13,729 not a word of it . In fact , uh , I 728 00:28:13,729 --> 00:28:15,951 guess the most recent report was trying 729 00:28:15,951 --> 00:28:18,118 to blame a , a previous administration 730 00:28:18,118 --> 00:28:17,819 and inject politics into this . It was 731 00:28:17,829 --> 00:28:19,551 just an abject failure by this 732 00:28:19,551 --> 00:28:21,551 administration and we ought to , we 733 00:28:21,551 --> 00:28:23,773 ought to get to the bottom of it . Make 734 00:28:23,773 --> 00:28:26,107 sure it never happens again . Thank you , 735 00:28:26,107 --> 00:28:25,930 Mr Chairman . Thank you , Senator 736 00:28:25,939 --> 00:28:28,630 Schmidt . Uh , Senator Kaine . Uh , 737 00:28:28,640 --> 00:28:31,140 excuse me . All right , Senator Rosen . 738 00:28:31,329 --> 00:28:34,420 Thank you . Thank you , Chairman Reid . 739 00:28:34,430 --> 00:28:36,652 I appreciate you holding this hearing . 740 00:28:36,652 --> 00:28:38,708 I'd also like to thank General Scali 741 00:28:38,708 --> 00:28:40,763 and Van for testifying today and for 742 00:28:40,763 --> 00:28:43,260 your service to our country . We really 743 00:28:43,270 --> 00:28:46,780 appreciate you . And , um , General 744 00:28:47,099 --> 00:28:49,043 Cali , I want to talk a little bit 745 00:28:49,043 --> 00:28:51,155 about Ukraine , obviously , with both 746 00:28:51,155 --> 00:28:52,988 of you and a potential Ukrainian 747 00:28:52,988 --> 00:28:55,043 counter offensive because Russia has 748 00:28:55,043 --> 00:28:56,988 committed significant manpower and 749 00:28:56,988 --> 00:28:58,988 equipment to launch off offenses in 750 00:28:58,988 --> 00:29:01,210 Ukraine this past winter , we know that 751 00:29:01,210 --> 00:29:03,432 their gains have been limited and their 752 00:29:03,432 --> 00:29:05,939 losses we also know have seemed to be 753 00:29:05,949 --> 00:29:08,260 significant . Nonetheless , the defense 754 00:29:08,270 --> 00:29:10,270 of these towns has not come without 755 00:29:10,270 --> 00:29:12,859 cost to Ukraine . And so my colleagues 756 00:29:12,869 --> 00:29:14,591 have been asking about sending 757 00:29:14,591 --> 00:29:16,813 equipment to Ukraine . Uh talking about 758 00:29:16,813 --> 00:29:18,813 the counter offensive . You've been 759 00:29:18,813 --> 00:29:20,980 speaking about that and I just want to 760 00:29:20,980 --> 00:29:23,202 build upon that for a moment . So let's 761 00:29:23,202 --> 00:29:25,536 just include drones in the conversation . 762 00:29:25,536 --> 00:29:27,591 Right ? So what's your assessment of 763 00:29:27,591 --> 00:29:29,425 the use and effectiveness in the 764 00:29:29,425 --> 00:29:31,536 Ukrainian conflict of the short range 765 00:29:31,536 --> 00:29:33,647 drones ? The one way attack anti tank 766 00:29:33,647 --> 00:29:35,591 munitions that are being used . Um 767 00:29:35,591 --> 00:29:38,810 Right now . And could you also speak to 768 00:29:38,819 --> 00:29:40,763 what uh what lessons we've learned 769 00:29:40,763 --> 00:29:42,819 about these kinds of weapons for our 770 00:29:42,819 --> 00:29:45,660 own force going on in the future and 771 00:29:45,670 --> 00:29:49,560 our defense industrial base ? Thank 772 00:29:49,569 --> 00:29:51,736 you , Senator . That's , that has been 773 00:29:51,736 --> 00:29:53,479 one of the uh one of the most 774 00:29:53,489 --> 00:29:56,339 interesting developments uh in this 775 00:29:56,410 --> 00:29:59,180 conflict . Um We , it was prefigured a 776 00:29:59,189 --> 00:30:01,119 little bit during the Azerbaijan 777 00:30:01,130 --> 00:30:03,439 Armenia war two years ago when 778 00:30:03,449 --> 00:30:05,959 Azerbaijan used uh unmanned aerial 779 00:30:05,969 --> 00:30:08,949 vehicles extremely effectively . Um uh 780 00:30:08,959 --> 00:30:11,660 Both sides are using them very 781 00:30:11,670 --> 00:30:14,869 extensively . Uh Both sides are using 782 00:30:14,880 --> 00:30:17,219 surveillance drones as well as armed 783 00:30:17,229 --> 00:30:19,930 drones as well as one way attack drones . 784 00:30:19,939 --> 00:30:22,810 Um They meet uh varying degrees of 785 00:30:22,819 --> 00:30:26,349 success . Um They can be shot down . Um 786 00:30:26,359 --> 00:30:28,581 They can be shot down with small arms , 787 00:30:28,581 --> 00:30:30,748 they can be shot down with uh standard 788 00:30:30,748 --> 00:30:32,915 machine guns , they can mostly be shot 789 00:30:32,915 --> 00:30:34,970 down with missiles as well . Um They 790 00:30:34,970 --> 00:30:36,359 can also be stopped with 791 00:30:36,359 --> 00:30:38,743 electromagnetic interference and we see 792 00:30:38,753 --> 00:30:41,633 that going both ways . Um And those uh 793 00:30:41,642 --> 00:30:43,753 that's providing a very good learning 794 00:30:43,753 --> 00:30:46,672 experience for us as we consult with 795 00:30:46,682 --> 00:30:48,849 the Ukrainians and we're incorporating 796 00:30:48,849 --> 00:30:51,115 those through our services and through 797 00:30:51,125 --> 00:30:53,485 our commands . Um We're incorporating 798 00:30:53,495 --> 00:30:55,717 those lessons to stay ahead of that E M 799 00:30:55,717 --> 00:30:58,105 I interference , especially um some of 800 00:30:58,115 --> 00:31:00,282 them have been proven very effective . 801 00:31:00,282 --> 00:31:03,145 Um And uh as weapons and some of them 802 00:31:03,156 --> 00:31:05,212 have proven pretty effective . Uh We 803 00:31:05,212 --> 00:31:07,323 have been in an era of improvement uh 804 00:31:07,323 --> 00:31:09,556 uh cycle uh with regard to us supply 805 00:31:09,566 --> 00:31:11,780 drones , ma'am . Well , that's great . 806 00:31:11,790 --> 00:31:13,846 And I'm glad to uh see , I'd like to 807 00:31:13,846 --> 00:31:15,846 follow up with you on being sure we 808 00:31:15,846 --> 00:31:18,012 have enough R and D and enough dollars 809 00:31:18,012 --> 00:31:20,012 and programs there for public uh uh 810 00:31:20,012 --> 00:31:22,310 partnerships wherever that is with the 811 00:31:22,319 --> 00:31:24,579 Department of Defense to expand . Um 812 00:31:24,589 --> 00:31:26,390 these U A S programs are really 813 00:31:26,400 --> 00:31:28,400 important and that leads me into my 814 00:31:28,400 --> 00:31:30,567 next question about defense innovation 815 00:31:30,567 --> 00:31:32,469 because in 2021 NATO launched the 816 00:31:32,479 --> 00:31:34,719 Defense Innovation Accelerator for the 817 00:31:34,729 --> 00:31:37,140 North Atlantic . Uh We call it Diana . 818 00:31:37,290 --> 00:31:39,512 And the goal of Diana is to sharpen our 819 00:31:39,512 --> 00:31:41,679 technological edge by working with the 820 00:31:41,679 --> 00:31:43,734 private sector to integrate emerging 821 00:31:43,734 --> 00:31:46,780 dual use technologies and rapidly scale 822 00:31:46,790 --> 00:31:48,846 these innovations because things are 823 00:31:48,846 --> 00:31:51,012 happening right as we speak , right on 824 00:31:51,012 --> 00:31:53,410 the battlefield , lives are being lost . 825 00:31:53,420 --> 00:31:55,476 And maybe these can help save that . 826 00:31:55,476 --> 00:31:57,587 And so the US government doesn't have 827 00:31:57,587 --> 00:31:59,753 the authority to contribute to R and D 828 00:31:59,753 --> 00:32:01,920 initiatives which receive funding from 829 00:32:01,920 --> 00:32:03,920 other nations . So we would need to 830 00:32:03,920 --> 00:32:06,142 provide specific authority to allow the 831 00:32:06,142 --> 00:32:08,309 US to make contributions to NATO Diana 832 00:32:08,309 --> 00:32:10,253 by this October for us to have the 833 00:32:10,253 --> 00:32:12,420 opportunity to be a full participant . 834 00:32:12,579 --> 00:32:14,739 So General Cali again , would you 835 00:32:14,750 --> 00:32:16,510 support Congress providing the 836 00:32:16,520 --> 00:32:18,989 authority for us to contribute to Diana 837 00:32:19,000 --> 00:32:21,167 and and really be that innovator ? And 838 00:32:21,167 --> 00:32:23,389 can you speak of the value for us to be 839 00:32:23,389 --> 00:32:25,550 part of this uh group with the entire 840 00:32:25,560 --> 00:32:28,069 NATO alliance ? Uh A as you know , 841 00:32:28,079 --> 00:32:31,130 Senator uh Diana is emerging right now . 842 00:32:31,140 --> 00:32:34,270 So so far , they've got uh about fif 54 843 00:32:34,280 --> 00:32:36,391 initiatives that they're working on . 844 00:32:36,391 --> 00:32:38,729 But the budget is , is fairly small um 845 00:32:38,859 --> 00:32:41,250 defense innovation and then procurement 846 00:32:41,260 --> 00:32:43,427 is national business for the most part 847 00:32:43,427 --> 00:32:46,270 in NATO , but especially for um allies 848 00:32:46,280 --> 00:32:49,420 with without significant uh defense 849 00:32:49,430 --> 00:32:51,209 budget bases . It's useful to 850 00:32:51,219 --> 00:32:52,885 collaborate . I think the US 851 00:32:52,895 --> 00:32:55,173 collaboration with them is great and I , 852 00:32:55,173 --> 00:32:57,284 I , I would advocate such authority , 853 00:32:57,284 --> 00:32:59,228 ma'am . Well , thank you . And I'm 854 00:32:59,228 --> 00:33:01,339 going to build on that too because we 855 00:33:01,339 --> 00:33:01,275 know things are happening uh 856 00:33:01,285 --> 00:33:04,244 technologically faster than we can keep 857 00:33:04,255 --> 00:33:06,564 up oftentimes . And so as the war in 858 00:33:06,574 --> 00:33:08,685 Ukraine obviously has progressed , uh 859 00:33:08,685 --> 00:33:10,463 we've seen proliferation of the 860 00:33:10,463 --> 00:33:12,630 relatively cheap , easy to use all the 861 00:33:12,630 --> 00:33:14,796 commercial drones that are out there , 862 00:33:14,796 --> 00:33:16,907 you can just buy them off . Um on any 863 00:33:16,907 --> 00:33:19,074 internet website , right ? Uh For both 864 00:33:19,074 --> 00:33:20,963 intelligence and recognizance for 865 00:33:20,963 --> 00:33:23,018 surveillance and uh kinetic missions 866 00:33:23,018 --> 00:33:25,530 can , can you maybe expand on us 867 00:33:25,540 --> 00:33:27,979 working again in whatever sectors we 868 00:33:27,989 --> 00:33:30,239 can here pro uh public private to 869 00:33:30,250 --> 00:33:32,250 deliver advanced capabilities using 870 00:33:32,250 --> 00:33:34,250 some of these technologies that are 871 00:33:34,250 --> 00:33:36,583 emerging in the private sector . Uh Yes , 872 00:33:36,583 --> 00:33:38,528 ma'am . Absolutely . I , I , I , I 873 00:33:38,528 --> 00:33:40,670 would advocate a , any way for us to 874 00:33:40,680 --> 00:33:43,770 innovate quicker and uh adopt things 875 00:33:43,780 --> 00:33:46,060 more quickly . Um , you know , with 876 00:33:46,069 --> 00:33:47,958 regard to the commercial drones , 877 00:33:47,958 --> 00:33:50,180 they've been , they've been very , very 878 00:33:50,180 --> 00:33:52,569 present on the battlefield in Ukraine . 879 00:33:52,729 --> 00:33:55,189 They tend to have a fairly limited life 880 00:33:55,199 --> 00:33:57,089 span . However , um , it's , it's 881 00:33:57,099 --> 00:33:59,210 harder to find commercial drones that 882 00:33:59,210 --> 00:34:01,530 are uh , uh adequately hardened against 883 00:34:01,540 --> 00:34:03,484 electromagnetic interference , for 884 00:34:03,484 --> 00:34:05,596 example , but they've been enormously 885 00:34:05,596 --> 00:34:07,540 effective at the , at the , at the 886 00:34:07,540 --> 00:34:09,540 lowest levels for squads and things 887 00:34:09,540 --> 00:34:11,818 like that , uh , to spot things . Well , 888 00:34:11,818 --> 00:34:13,818 thank you . I appreciate it . We'll 889 00:34:13,818 --> 00:34:13,739 follow up with you on all of these . 890 00:34:13,750 --> 00:34:15,750 Thank you . Thank you . Thank you , 891 00:34:15,750 --> 00:34:17,806 Senator Rosen . Uh , Senator Kaine , 892 00:34:17,806 --> 00:34:20,009 please . Thank you , Mr Chair and to , 893 00:34:20,019 --> 00:34:21,908 to each of our witnesses for your 894 00:34:21,908 --> 00:34:24,108 service . I so appreciate it . General 895 00:34:24,118 --> 00:34:26,668 Cali . I wanna sort of flag an issue 896 00:34:26,678 --> 00:34:28,956 that I don't really want you to answer . 897 00:34:28,958 --> 00:34:31,291 Uh , it may be an appropriate , uh , it , 898 00:34:31,291 --> 00:34:33,014 it could be appropriate in the 899 00:34:33,014 --> 00:34:35,180 follow-up uh session that we will have 900 00:34:35,180 --> 00:34:37,180 that will be classified . But , but 901 00:34:37,180 --> 00:34:39,402 here's a concern um , in my time on the 902 00:34:39,402 --> 00:34:41,569 committee and particularly in the last 903 00:34:41,569 --> 00:34:43,680 couple of years , I've sometimes been 904 00:34:43,680 --> 00:34:45,625 struck by blue sky scenarios being 905 00:34:45,625 --> 00:34:47,402 painted that turn out not to be 906 00:34:47,402 --> 00:34:49,402 accurate . Um , a blue sky scenario 907 00:34:49,402 --> 00:34:51,236 about the capacity of the Afghan 908 00:34:51,236 --> 00:34:53,870 security force in the aftermath of the 909 00:34:53,879 --> 00:34:55,823 withdrawal turned out to be vastly 910 00:34:55,823 --> 00:34:58,046 overstated and , and there was somewhat 911 00:34:58,046 --> 00:35:00,520 of an overestimation of the likelihood 912 00:35:00,530 --> 00:35:02,641 of Russia being dominant in the early 913 00:35:02,641 --> 00:35:04,641 days of the Ukraine investigation . 914 00:35:04,641 --> 00:35:06,697 Thank goodness that proved not to be 915 00:35:06,697 --> 00:35:08,808 true . But in each instance , sort of 916 00:35:08,808 --> 00:35:10,974 what we were being told , um the , the 917 00:35:10,974 --> 00:35:14,560 the capacity of uh our intelligence 918 00:35:14,570 --> 00:35:16,737 about the capacity of another military 919 00:35:16,737 --> 00:35:18,626 turned out to be overstated . The 920 00:35:18,626 --> 00:35:20,681 reason I'm just flagging this now in 921 00:35:20,681 --> 00:35:23,560 the domain is um I've been part of 922 00:35:23,570 --> 00:35:25,610 three classified briefings about 923 00:35:25,620 --> 00:35:28,399 Ukraine 12 and one in foreign relations 924 00:35:28,409 --> 00:35:31,820 on January 25th to and a s on February 925 00:35:31,830 --> 00:35:35,310 2nd and March 2nd where certain um 926 00:35:35,320 --> 00:35:38,050 predictions or assessments were made 927 00:35:38,070 --> 00:35:40,280 about Ukrainian capacities , the 928 00:35:40,290 --> 00:35:42,310 potential for the counter offensive 929 00:35:42,379 --> 00:35:44,712 when the leaked documents have come out . 930 00:35:44,712 --> 00:35:46,768 I've not looked at those documents , 931 00:35:46,768 --> 00:35:48,879 but I followed the public accounts of 932 00:35:48,879 --> 00:35:50,768 it . A lot of the accounts of the 933 00:35:50,768 --> 00:35:52,768 documents suggest internally in the 934 00:35:52,768 --> 00:35:55,989 Pentagon , maybe more skepticism than 935 00:35:56,000 --> 00:35:58,590 we were being uh messaged in the 936 00:35:58,600 --> 00:36:00,719 meetings that we had . And again , I 937 00:36:00,729 --> 00:36:02,840 don't think the right time is to talk 938 00:36:02,840 --> 00:36:05,007 about this now , but I hope during the 939 00:36:05,007 --> 00:36:07,118 next session that we have , uh we may 940 00:36:07,118 --> 00:36:09,173 dig into that a little bit because I 941 00:36:09,173 --> 00:36:11,340 wanna make sure that , that , um , the 942 00:36:11,340 --> 00:36:13,118 assessments being given to this 943 00:36:13,118 --> 00:36:15,173 committee or , uh , you know , the , 944 00:36:15,173 --> 00:36:16,896 the best , uh , current , um , 945 00:36:16,896 --> 00:36:19,360 information so that we are not led to 946 00:36:19,370 --> 00:36:21,709 believe one thing when there may be a 947 00:36:21,719 --> 00:36:24,270 lot of folks in the Pentagon thinking 948 00:36:24,280 --> 00:36:26,989 something else . And so I just , I'll 949 00:36:27,000 --> 00:36:29,439 leave that there if I could . Uh , but 950 00:36:29,449 --> 00:36:31,560 I do think it's something we ought to 951 00:36:31,560 --> 00:36:33,671 discuss in the , uh in the classified 952 00:36:33,671 --> 00:36:35,782 setting . Uh I look forward to that , 953 00:36:35,782 --> 00:36:37,893 sir . Great General Van . No , I have 954 00:36:37,893 --> 00:36:40,005 got a couple for you um in the in the 955 00:36:40,005 --> 00:36:42,227 Indo paycom , our ability to access log 956 00:36:42,227 --> 00:36:44,889 just uh to um access logistics support 957 00:36:44,899 --> 00:36:47,110 is gonna be absolutely critical . And 958 00:36:47,120 --> 00:36:49,176 there are some challenges because of 959 00:36:49,176 --> 00:36:51,176 distances across water that are not 960 00:36:51,176 --> 00:36:53,342 necessarily challenges elsewhere . How 961 00:36:53,342 --> 00:36:55,729 is Transcom considering supporting the 962 00:36:55,739 --> 00:36:58,239 joint force in a contested logistics 963 00:36:58,250 --> 00:37:00,194 environment like the Indo paycom ? 964 00:37:00,310 --> 00:37:02,532 Thank you , Senator . It's something we 965 00:37:02,532 --> 00:37:04,699 think of every day . You know , we are 966 00:37:04,699 --> 00:37:06,921 postured to operate on a global scale , 967 00:37:06,921 --> 00:37:08,866 but our adversaries are growing in 968 00:37:08,866 --> 00:37:10,754 their capabilities to disrupt the 969 00:37:10,754 --> 00:37:12,754 degrade or deny our ability and our 970 00:37:12,754 --> 00:37:14,754 freedom of maneuver that we have so 971 00:37:14,754 --> 00:37:16,977 enjoyed around the globe . In fact , as 972 00:37:16,977 --> 00:37:19,088 I think about uh European command and 973 00:37:19,088 --> 00:37:21,439 Europe , we enjoy very robust ground 974 00:37:21,449 --> 00:37:23,919 lines of communications and we're able 975 00:37:23,929 --> 00:37:26,600 to use um essentially all of them 976 00:37:26,610 --> 00:37:29,239 frankly without impedance . As I think 977 00:37:29,250 --> 00:37:31,770 about the Indo Pacific , we're going to 978 00:37:31,780 --> 00:37:35,209 be using more of fast sea lift and air 979 00:37:35,219 --> 00:37:37,330 than we would be in ground like we're 980 00:37:37,330 --> 00:37:39,386 seeing . Uh so we have to change our 981 00:37:39,386 --> 00:37:41,497 tactics , techniques and procedures . 982 00:37:41,497 --> 00:37:43,441 We're working with the services on 983 00:37:43,441 --> 00:37:45,497 their concepts to ensure that we can 984 00:37:45,497 --> 00:37:47,663 integrate end to end across the entire 985 00:37:47,663 --> 00:37:49,886 deployment distribution enterprise . So 986 00:37:49,886 --> 00:37:51,997 we can deliver where and when a Alino 987 00:37:51,997 --> 00:37:54,163 needs it . And then one other question 988 00:37:54,163 --> 00:37:56,600 in that space , um global bulk fuel . 989 00:37:56,850 --> 00:37:59,540 Um And again , in the Indo Paycom that 990 00:37:59,550 --> 00:38:01,739 could be particularly challenging . Uh 991 00:38:01,750 --> 00:38:03,639 What are you doing to do planning 992 00:38:03,639 --> 00:38:06,820 around uh fuel accessibility to Indo 993 00:38:06,969 --> 00:38:09,820 Payco missions ? Senator Us 994 00:38:09,830 --> 00:38:11,608 Transportation Command has been 995 00:38:11,608 --> 00:38:13,497 designated the single manager for 996 00:38:13,497 --> 00:38:15,719 global bulk fuel in this latest Unified 997 00:38:15,719 --> 00:38:17,774 Command plan uh that just came out . 998 00:38:17,774 --> 00:38:19,663 And so what we are doing is we're 999 00:38:19,663 --> 00:38:19,620 taking a new approach of synchronizing 1000 00:38:19,629 --> 00:38:23,040 end end fuel so that we can assuredly 1001 00:38:23,050 --> 00:38:25,320 deliver where and when we need it in a 1002 00:38:25,330 --> 00:38:27,552 contested environment . So we're taking 1003 00:38:27,552 --> 00:38:29,774 the very best of what D L A energy does 1004 00:38:29,774 --> 00:38:31,997 uh uh to combine it with what we do for 1005 00:38:31,997 --> 00:38:33,719 Global Command and control and 1006 00:38:33,719 --> 00:38:35,886 prioritization and managing uh in this 1007 00:38:35,886 --> 00:38:38,389 new environment . So we are rooking the 1008 00:38:38,399 --> 00:38:40,288 uh the posture of the fuel in the 1009 00:38:40,288 --> 00:38:42,232 Pacific that includes not only the 1010 00:38:42,232 --> 00:38:44,288 stations , the places we're going to 1011 00:38:44,288 --> 00:38:46,399 keep it both uh on the uh on land and 1012 00:38:46,399 --> 00:38:49,040 on the water as well as how we're going 1013 00:38:49,050 --> 00:38:51,600 to maneuver a fuel around that area . 1014 00:38:51,610 --> 00:38:53,666 And let me just to add to that , you 1015 00:38:53,666 --> 00:38:55,777 know , we have robust fuel capability 1016 00:38:55,777 --> 00:38:57,666 in the , in the , in the European 1017 00:38:57,666 --> 00:38:59,499 theater as we did in the central 1018 00:38:59,499 --> 00:39:01,666 command theater . Uh And so this is uh 1019 00:39:01,666 --> 00:39:03,943 you know , a concern we have right now , 1020 00:39:03,943 --> 00:39:06,054 we're getting right after it with our 1021 00:39:06,054 --> 00:39:08,166 tanker security program with movement 1022 00:39:08,166 --> 00:39:10,221 of fuel and also with our ability to 1023 00:39:10,221 --> 00:39:12,332 really look and give feasibility as a 1024 00:39:12,332 --> 00:39:14,277 real feasibility assessment on the 1025 00:39:14,277 --> 00:39:14,270 ability to do that war fight to the 1026 00:39:14,719 --> 00:39:16,941 incom commander . And I could not do it 1027 00:39:16,941 --> 00:39:18,997 without your support for the Pacific 1028 00:39:18,997 --> 00:39:21,108 Deterrence initiative which allows us 1029 00:39:21,108 --> 00:39:23,320 the additional funds to do exercising 1030 00:39:23,330 --> 00:39:25,552 and interoperability and to lay out the 1031 00:39:25,552 --> 00:39:27,663 logistics posture that we're going to 1032 00:39:27,663 --> 00:39:29,663 need in the future . Thank you both 1033 00:39:29,663 --> 00:39:31,608 very much . You back . Thank you , 1034 00:39:31,608 --> 00:39:33,608 Senator Kaine , Senator Duckworth , 1035 00:39:33,608 --> 00:39:35,830 please . Thank you . Um Good morning to 1036 00:39:35,830 --> 00:39:37,774 our witnesses , General Van Ovos . 1037 00:39:37,774 --> 00:39:40,108 Thank you for your discussion last week , 1038 00:39:40,108 --> 00:39:42,386 highlighting all the great uh Transcom . 1039 00:39:42,386 --> 00:39:44,608 All the great work Transcom is doing at 1040 00:39:44,608 --> 00:39:46,719 Scott Air Force Base in Illinois . Uh 1041 00:39:46,719 --> 00:39:48,886 Transcom is the linchpin of projecting 1042 00:39:48,886 --> 00:39:50,886 and sustaining the force key to our 1043 00:39:50,886 --> 00:39:53,052 strategic deterrent . I also recognize 1044 00:39:53,052 --> 00:39:55,274 that joint force sustainment is a whole 1045 00:39:55,274 --> 00:39:57,163 of government and whole of nation 1046 00:39:57,163 --> 00:39:59,419 effort . Transcom must coordinate and 1047 00:39:59,429 --> 00:40:01,459 balance equities across multiple 1048 00:40:01,469 --> 00:40:03,691 government agencies , numerous industry 1049 00:40:03,691 --> 00:40:05,530 partners and diverse allies and 1050 00:40:05,540 --> 00:40:07,373 partners in order to project and 1051 00:40:07,373 --> 00:40:09,739 sustain combat power . General Van , I 1052 00:40:09,750 --> 00:40:11,861 don't think enough people realize how 1053 00:40:11,861 --> 00:40:14,120 complex your mission really is and how 1054 00:40:14,129 --> 00:40:17,000 critical that message is uh um and how 1055 00:40:17,010 --> 00:40:19,979 critical the people in Transcom uh are 1056 00:40:19,989 --> 00:40:22,219 to tackle every day their everyday 1057 00:40:22,229 --> 00:40:24,229 mission . Can you speak just for an 1058 00:40:24,229 --> 00:40:26,229 example uh to the efforts that your 1059 00:40:26,229 --> 00:40:28,396 command is supporting right now , both 1060 00:40:28,396 --> 00:40:30,618 at headquarters at Scott Air Force Base 1061 00:40:30,618 --> 00:40:29,939 and around the world . Just to paint a 1062 00:40:29,949 --> 00:40:32,570 picture of how complex your mission is . 1063 00:40:32,729 --> 00:40:34,951 Thank you . And we've discussed our key 1064 00:40:34,951 --> 00:40:37,173 priority of supporting European command 1065 00:40:37,173 --> 00:40:39,007 and supporting Ukraine and their 1066 00:40:39,007 --> 00:40:41,118 defense . But beyond that , we have , 1067 00:40:41,118 --> 00:40:42,951 we have supported down the State 1068 00:40:42,951 --> 00:40:45,103 Department with Sudan with the , with 1069 00:40:45,113 --> 00:40:47,169 the support for moving the diplomats 1070 00:40:47,169 --> 00:40:49,732 out of Sudan in this recent crisis , we 1071 00:40:49,742 --> 00:40:52,683 were inside 24 hours of the devastating 1072 00:40:52,693 --> 00:40:55,482 series of earthquakes in Turkey . A our 1073 00:40:55,492 --> 00:40:58,345 ability to launch out within 24 hours , 1074 00:40:58,355 --> 00:41:00,522 the urban search and rescue teams with 1075 00:41:00,522 --> 00:41:02,355 the dogs and the cement breaking 1076 00:41:02,355 --> 00:41:04,355 equipment to get to their rescue as 1077 00:41:04,355 --> 00:41:06,825 well as deliver a 100 bed field 1078 00:41:06,835 --> 00:41:09,266 hospital . We are doing extensive 1079 00:41:09,275 --> 00:41:11,386 exercises around the globe and almost 1080 00:41:11,386 --> 00:41:13,164 every continent to increase the 1081 00:41:13,164 --> 00:41:15,219 interoperability with our allies and 1082 00:41:15,219 --> 00:41:17,331 partners and to ensure access spacing 1083 00:41:17,331 --> 00:41:19,442 and overflight and agreements that is 1084 00:41:19,442 --> 00:41:21,664 going to keep our freedom maneuver into 1085 00:41:21,664 --> 00:41:23,608 the future . We are also of course 1086 00:41:23,608 --> 00:41:25,831 doing the global bulk fuel mission . Uh 1087 00:41:25,831 --> 00:41:25,520 And of course , I can't forget our 1088 00:41:25,530 --> 00:41:27,560 families . We're moving uh 311,000 1089 00:41:27,570 --> 00:41:29,903 families a year all around the globe to , 1090 00:41:29,903 --> 00:41:31,959 to achieve our mission . Thank you . 1091 00:41:32,060 --> 00:41:33,780 Your witness testimonies both 1092 00:41:33,790 --> 00:41:35,623 underscore your combatant , your 1093 00:41:35,623 --> 00:41:37,846 combatant commands , effort to exercise 1094 00:41:37,846 --> 00:41:40,739 the joint force in uh uh 1095 00:41:41,090 --> 00:41:44,649 exercise . Defender Europe 24 general 1096 00:41:44,659 --> 00:41:47,719 uh general um defending U 24 we 1097 00:41:47,729 --> 00:41:49,951 assembled a division level formation on 1098 00:41:49,951 --> 00:41:52,173 nato's eastern flank for the first time 1099 00:41:52,173 --> 00:41:54,396 since the Cold War . And I quote , your 1100 00:41:54,396 --> 00:41:56,507 testimony , Transcom is regularly war 1101 00:41:56,507 --> 00:41:58,618 gaming with partners and stakeholders 1102 00:41:58,618 --> 00:42:00,896 to identify and close operational gaps , 1103 00:42:00,896 --> 00:42:02,951 to strengthen deterrence and develop 1104 00:42:02,951 --> 00:42:05,007 new concepts to prevail . If both of 1105 00:42:05,007 --> 00:42:07,062 you could answer this question , can 1106 00:42:07,062 --> 00:42:09,285 you explain how your combatant commands 1107 00:42:09,285 --> 00:42:11,229 have exercised with each other and 1108 00:42:11,229 --> 00:42:13,340 other combatant commands ? Um What is 1109 00:42:13,340 --> 00:42:15,562 the relationship between geographic and 1110 00:42:15,562 --> 00:42:17,618 functional combatant commands as the 1111 00:42:17,618 --> 00:42:17,159 joint force looks to exercise , 1112 00:42:17,300 --> 00:42:20,100 experiment and integrate new tools and 1113 00:42:20,110 --> 00:42:24,080 capabilities . I know I'm very macro 1114 00:42:24,090 --> 00:42:26,312 today . Thank you , Senator . No . That 1115 00:42:26,312 --> 00:42:28,534 that's a great question . Um Be because 1116 00:42:28,534 --> 00:42:30,780 it gives me an opportunity to uh to , 1117 00:42:30,790 --> 00:42:33,409 to talk a moment about transco . So 1118 00:42:33,419 --> 00:42:35,141 geographic combat commands are 1119 00:42:35,141 --> 00:42:37,141 responsible for delivering military 1120 00:42:37,141 --> 00:42:39,679 results in a specific A O R . There are 1121 00:42:39,689 --> 00:42:41,800 other commands that , that , that are 1122 00:42:41,800 --> 00:42:43,633 in charge of a specific function 1123 00:42:43,633 --> 00:42:45,800 usually globally . And General Van Ost 1124 00:42:45,800 --> 00:42:47,578 obviously does transportation . 1125 00:42:47,578 --> 00:42:51,340 Everything in us . U depends on the 1126 00:42:51,350 --> 00:42:53,949 reinforcement that Jackie's forces can 1127 00:42:53,959 --> 00:42:56,830 provide from Conus . It is remarkable . 1128 00:42:56,840 --> 00:42:59,530 We exercise it literally every day , 1129 00:42:59,540 --> 00:43:02,149 ma'am for routine movements , for 1130 00:43:02,159 --> 00:43:04,370 rotational force movements as well as 1131 00:43:04,379 --> 00:43:07,850 for exercises . Um I said in my opening 1132 00:43:07,860 --> 00:43:10,027 statement , there is literally nothing 1133 00:43:10,027 --> 00:43:12,138 in the world like us . Transportation 1134 00:43:12,138 --> 00:43:15,550 command Thanks , ma'am . Uh We are 1135 00:43:15,560 --> 00:43:18,169 participating in an extensive series of 1136 00:43:18,179 --> 00:43:20,570 exercises across the joint portfolio 1137 00:43:20,709 --> 00:43:22,376 that allow us to increase our 1138 00:43:22,376 --> 00:43:24,840 capabilities to test new concepts and 1139 00:43:24,850 --> 00:43:26,683 frankly old concepts like convoy 1140 00:43:26,683 --> 00:43:28,939 operations with not only the United 1141 00:43:28,949 --> 00:43:31,116 States and our allies and partners and 1142 00:43:31,116 --> 00:43:33,338 I I appreciate the comments for general 1143 00:43:33,338 --> 00:43:35,560 Cali functional combatant commanders do 1144 00:43:35,560 --> 00:43:37,727 bring extensive experience in , in our 1145 00:43:37,727 --> 00:43:39,671 specific areas , space , strategic 1146 00:43:39,671 --> 00:43:41,116 nuclear deterrence and in 1147 00:43:41,116 --> 00:43:43,116 transportation and it's an honor to 1148 00:43:43,116 --> 00:43:45,409 work with them . Thank you . Uh We , we 1149 00:43:45,419 --> 00:43:47,197 had a good conversation about a 1150 00:43:47,197 --> 00:43:49,780 aeromedical evaluate evacuations . Um 1151 00:43:49,790 --> 00:43:51,840 I'd like to uh uh expand on that a 1152 00:43:51,850 --> 00:43:54,280 little bit um especially uh as it 1153 00:43:54,290 --> 00:43:56,500 applies in a contested environment and 1154 00:43:56,510 --> 00:43:58,454 the vast distances of our nation's 1155 00:43:58,454 --> 00:44:00,530 joint force uh uh that we might be 1156 00:44:00,540 --> 00:44:02,596 facing in the future , especially in 1157 00:44:02,596 --> 00:44:04,818 the Indo Pacific region . Can you speak 1158 00:44:04,818 --> 00:44:06,762 to efforts currently underway at U 1159 00:44:06,762 --> 00:44:08,596 Transcom to bolster the critical 1160 00:44:08,596 --> 00:44:10,818 aeromedical evacuation capability ? And 1161 00:44:10,818 --> 00:44:12,984 also what are you doing to provide our 1162 00:44:12,984 --> 00:44:15,207 wounded service members rapid access to 1163 00:44:15,207 --> 00:44:14,790 medical care because we talked about 1164 00:44:14,800 --> 00:44:16,800 maybe they have to go some place in 1165 00:44:16,800 --> 00:44:18,911 between , especially when you're in a 1166 00:44:18,911 --> 00:44:20,744 place like uh the , the um South 1167 00:44:20,744 --> 00:44:22,856 Pacific . Uh Thank you , ma'am . This 1168 00:44:22,856 --> 00:44:24,911 is a , this is a critical question . 1169 00:44:24,911 --> 00:44:26,522 You know , we have performed 1170 00:44:26,522 --> 00:44:28,578 brilliantly over decades um with the 1171 00:44:28,578 --> 00:44:30,467 golden age , I know and countless 1172 00:44:30,467 --> 00:44:32,578 people saved . Uh ma'am , you're self 1173 00:44:32,578 --> 00:44:34,744 included . Um But you know , in a , in 1174 00:44:34,744 --> 00:44:36,911 a near peer , a global Power Contest . 1175 00:44:36,911 --> 00:44:39,244 We expect high casualty rates . In fact , 1176 00:44:39,244 --> 00:44:41,356 I expect to , to be able to , to have 1177 00:44:41,356 --> 00:44:43,578 to move the same amount of patients . I 1178 00:44:43,578 --> 00:44:45,729 moved in 2022 the entire year on a 1179 00:44:45,739 --> 00:44:48,020 weekly basis . So we've got to do 1180 00:44:48,030 --> 00:44:50,197 something differently and , and here's 1181 00:44:50,197 --> 00:44:52,141 what we're going to do . Uh We are 1182 00:44:52,141 --> 00:44:54,252 working with other partner nations to 1183 00:44:54,252 --> 00:44:56,252 try to understand what capabilities 1184 00:44:56,252 --> 00:44:58,197 that they have both in theater and 1185 00:44:58,197 --> 00:45:00,197 their movement capabilities . We're 1186 00:45:00,197 --> 00:44:59,719 working with the services on a 1187 00:44:59,729 --> 00:45:03,199 multimodal uh platform to move patients 1188 00:45:03,209 --> 00:45:05,840 um in , in , in , in mass form . Uh We 1189 00:45:05,850 --> 00:45:07,750 are working on innovative uh 1190 00:45:07,760 --> 00:45:10,389 capabilities for patient movement items . 1191 00:45:10,399 --> 00:45:12,989 Uh And we're also looking at uh ability 1192 00:45:13,000 --> 00:45:15,629 to have smaller crews of people work on 1193 00:45:15,639 --> 00:45:17,899 larger numbers of patients via using 1194 00:45:17,909 --> 00:45:19,965 wireless and talking to doctors that 1195 00:45:19,969 --> 00:45:22,025 are on the ground while we're in the 1196 00:45:22,025 --> 00:45:24,136 air . So we want to bring all of this 1197 00:45:24,136 --> 00:45:26,750 together to try to reduce the risk and 1198 00:45:26,760 --> 00:45:28,816 to your point on allies and partners 1199 00:45:28,816 --> 00:45:31,038 where there is capacity with allies and 1200 00:45:31,038 --> 00:45:32,871 partners . Uh We're looking into 1201 00:45:32,871 --> 00:45:34,760 agreements to try and ensure that 1202 00:45:34,760 --> 00:45:36,760 they'll be able to support us as an 1203 00:45:36,760 --> 00:45:38,927 interim location until we can get them 1204 00:45:38,927 --> 00:45:41,149 back to the United States . Thank you . 1205 00:45:41,149 --> 00:45:43,260 Thank you , Senator Senator Manchin , 1206 00:45:43,260 --> 00:45:45,316 please . Thank you , Senator . Thank 1207 00:45:45,316 --> 00:45:47,371 you all for your service . Everybody 1208 00:45:47,371 --> 00:45:46,939 here . I appreciate it very much . Uh 1209 00:45:46,949 --> 00:45:49,199 John , I I just had the pleasure of 1210 00:45:49,209 --> 00:45:51,320 being able to go to Ukraine and speak 1211 00:45:51,320 --> 00:45:53,320 with Zelinsky . And I was with , uh 1212 00:45:53,320 --> 00:45:55,620 Senator Kelly and , and , uh , Senator 1213 00:45:55,629 --> 00:45:57,685 Murkowski , it was a great trip . We 1214 00:45:57,685 --> 00:45:59,851 learned an awful lot about that and we 1215 00:45:59,851 --> 00:46:01,796 talked directly to them . Our main 1216 00:46:01,796 --> 00:46:03,740 concern was transparency for every 1217 00:46:03,740 --> 00:46:05,907 dollar that we're sending in for every 1218 00:46:05,907 --> 00:46:07,796 bullet that we're sending there , 1219 00:46:07,796 --> 00:46:10,018 making sure it's being accounted for it 1220 00:46:10,018 --> 00:46:09,810 and used properly . And that was our 1221 00:46:09,820 --> 00:46:11,598 biggest concern . We took it to 1222 00:46:11,598 --> 00:46:13,653 everybody we talked to in Poland and 1223 00:46:13,653 --> 00:46:15,709 also , uh you know , we , we went to 1224 00:46:15,709 --> 00:46:18,719 the staging area in Poland . Uh and 1225 00:46:18,919 --> 00:46:21,252 they told us that after it leaves there , 1226 00:46:21,560 --> 00:46:23,879 uh that the tracking is not as good 1227 00:46:24,149 --> 00:46:26,205 from once they leave it and pull and 1228 00:46:26,205 --> 00:46:28,427 put it in the theater . So we're trying 1229 00:46:28,427 --> 00:46:30,482 to work with our AM ambassador there 1230 00:46:30,482 --> 00:46:32,538 brink . She has with , with a little 1231 00:46:32,538 --> 00:46:34,510 bit of help there , some personnel 1232 00:46:34,520 --> 00:46:36,687 she'll be , she'll be able to track it 1233 00:46:36,687 --> 00:46:38,742 much better , but they're staying on 1234 00:46:38,742 --> 00:46:40,631 top of it . I left very satisfied 1235 00:46:40,631 --> 00:46:42,631 knowing that we have good grass and 1236 00:46:42,631 --> 00:46:44,800 they , knowing how sensitive this is 1237 00:46:45,290 --> 00:46:48,100 because the naysayers that we have when 1238 00:46:48,110 --> 00:46:50,221 you have them everywhere to a certain 1239 00:46:50,221 --> 00:46:52,221 extent , but they're a minority . I 1240 00:46:52,221 --> 00:46:54,277 don't want to give them any credence 1241 00:46:54,277 --> 00:46:56,499 whatsoever . Credibility that something 1242 00:46:56,499 --> 00:46:55,850 happened wrong . We shouldn't be 1243 00:46:55,860 --> 00:46:57,860 sending equipment , we shouldn't be 1244 00:46:57,860 --> 00:46:59,582 supporting and we shouldn't be 1245 00:46:59,582 --> 00:47:01,638 financing it . How do you feel about 1246 00:47:01,638 --> 00:47:03,693 that ? And , and , and you are , I'm 1247 00:47:03,693 --> 00:47:05,749 sure tracking the same thing . Thank 1248 00:47:05,749 --> 00:47:07,804 you , Senator and thank you for your 1249 00:47:07,804 --> 00:47:07,709 recent trip . And uh thanks to your 1250 00:47:07,719 --> 00:47:09,941 staff for uh sharing your , your , your 1251 00:47:09,941 --> 00:47:12,275 after action review of your trip . Also , 1252 00:47:12,275 --> 00:47:15,949 it's very useful uh uh to us . Um So I , 1253 00:47:15,959 --> 00:47:18,629 I feel confident that there has not 1254 00:47:18,639 --> 00:47:21,649 been specific illicit transfer or 1255 00:47:21,659 --> 00:47:23,770 pilfering of material . I , I believe 1256 00:47:23,770 --> 00:47:25,937 we're aware of one case reported to us 1257 00:47:25,937 --> 00:47:27,830 by the Ukrainians of a couple of 1258 00:47:27,840 --> 00:47:30,179 automatic rifles that were attempted to 1259 00:47:30,189 --> 00:47:32,245 be diverted and those guys have been 1260 00:47:32,245 --> 00:47:34,356 arrested and they , they're so by and 1261 00:47:34,356 --> 00:47:36,411 large , this is , this is a uh uh an 1262 00:47:36,411 --> 00:47:38,356 extremely strong effort that we're 1263 00:47:38,356 --> 00:47:40,078 putting out . We recognize how 1264 00:47:40,078 --> 00:47:42,245 challenging it is . However , a couple 1265 00:47:42,245 --> 00:47:44,356 of things about the way we do it . So 1266 00:47:44,356 --> 00:47:46,578 when things go to , to the staging base 1267 00:47:46,578 --> 00:47:49,425 in and Poland there , um , we inventory 1268 00:47:49,435 --> 00:47:51,324 all around that point . I saw the 1269 00:47:51,324 --> 00:47:53,435 clipboard , I saw all this pasties on 1270 00:47:53,435 --> 00:47:55,602 the board and then we ingest it into , 1271 00:47:55,602 --> 00:47:57,657 into a computer software system that 1272 00:47:57,657 --> 00:47:59,768 we've given to the Ukrainians that we 1273 00:47:59,768 --> 00:48:01,824 maintain access to . So we can track 1274 00:48:01,824 --> 00:48:03,768 their , their tracking of it where 1275 00:48:03,768 --> 00:48:05,768 they're putting the , the , the E E 1276 00:48:05,768 --> 00:48:07,768 Exactly . And you know , so it , we 1277 00:48:07,768 --> 00:48:09,879 track it . Let me just say I know our 1278 00:48:09,879 --> 00:48:11,879 time , but I , I wanna say a couple 1279 00:48:11,879 --> 00:48:13,824 things here . I truly believe that 1280 00:48:13,824 --> 00:48:16,030 we're not telling our story with the , 1281 00:48:16,040 --> 00:48:18,151 with the amount of support that we're 1282 00:48:18,151 --> 00:48:20,469 putting in and all of our , our allies , 1283 00:48:21,209 --> 00:48:23,153 there's always gonna be a hiccup , 1284 00:48:23,153 --> 00:48:25,265 something's gonna go wrong we haven't 1285 00:48:25,265 --> 00:48:26,987 built a base of how well we're 1286 00:48:26,987 --> 00:48:29,098 regulating and staying on top of this 1287 00:48:29,098 --> 00:48:31,209 and monitoring and the transparency . 1288 00:48:31,209 --> 00:48:33,265 If Zelinsky said it once to me in an 1289 00:48:33,265 --> 00:48:32,729 hour and a half , we were there , he 1290 00:48:32,739 --> 00:48:35,469 said it 10 , 15 times , bring 100 1291 00:48:35,479 --> 00:48:37,590 people and observe what we're doing . 1292 00:48:37,590 --> 00:48:39,757 We're happy to share , do whatever you 1293 00:48:39,757 --> 00:48:41,979 want . And if you see something wrong , 1294 00:48:41,979 --> 00:48:44,090 let me know because we're looking for 1295 00:48:44,090 --> 00:48:46,146 it too . We're not telling that from 1296 00:48:46,146 --> 00:48:48,368 our side of it and it's not being and , 1297 00:48:48,368 --> 00:48:50,535 and , and I just think that we need to 1298 00:48:50,535 --> 00:48:52,590 get ahead of this because that way , 1299 00:48:52,590 --> 00:48:52,189 there's no saying , tell your story 1300 00:48:52,199 --> 00:48:54,310 before they tell one on you . As soon 1301 00:48:54,310 --> 00:48:56,421 as they see something wrong , they're 1302 00:48:56,421 --> 00:48:58,421 gonna blow it out of proportion and 1303 00:48:58,421 --> 00:49:00,643 there's so much good support that we're 1304 00:49:00,643 --> 00:49:02,866 giving him and so much valiant fighting 1305 00:49:02,866 --> 00:49:04,977 that they're doing . I , I just don't 1306 00:49:04,977 --> 00:49:04,820 want to lose that . Thank you for 1307 00:49:04,830 --> 00:49:06,997 giving me the opportunity to tell part 1308 00:49:06,997 --> 00:49:08,997 of the story , sir . Uh Our defense 1309 00:49:08,997 --> 00:49:10,941 attache office has been diligently 1310 00:49:10,941 --> 00:49:12,886 going , tell the press , tell your 1311 00:49:12,886 --> 00:49:12,520 press people to start putting things 1312 00:49:12,530 --> 00:49:14,697 out . Uh , uh We're happy to work with 1313 00:49:14,697 --> 00:49:16,808 them . We're happy to coordinate with 1314 00:49:16,808 --> 00:49:18,863 you all to put out what we saw first 1315 00:49:18,863 --> 00:49:21,030 hand and the confidence we had , I put 1316 00:49:21,030 --> 00:49:23,252 a statement out . I'm happy to continue 1317 00:49:23,252 --> 00:49:22,479 that . Thanks , Senator . Let me throw 1318 00:49:22,489 --> 00:49:24,489 this at you too . I'm concerned now 1319 00:49:24,489 --> 00:49:27,320 about our , our , uh , uh , our , uh 1320 00:49:27,429 --> 00:49:30,030 Baltic allies in , in Albania , 1321 00:49:30,040 --> 00:49:32,320 Bulgaria , Croatia , Montenegro , 1322 00:49:32,330 --> 00:49:34,163 Northern Macedonia , Romania and 1323 00:49:34,163 --> 00:49:36,163 Sylvania . They're all kind of tied 1324 00:49:36,163 --> 00:49:38,274 into this Turk stream . Ok . The same 1325 00:49:38,274 --> 00:49:40,608 as the north stream is tied in New York . 1326 00:49:40,608 --> 00:49:42,663 They're tied in the Turk stream . We 1327 00:49:42,663 --> 00:49:42,510 know exactly what Putin will do . He 1328 00:49:42,520 --> 00:49:44,687 used energy as a weapon . Are we doing 1329 00:49:44,687 --> 00:49:47,179 anything ? So they don't get caught and 1330 00:49:47,189 --> 00:49:49,810 the same thing that our allies did up 1331 00:49:49,820 --> 00:49:52,520 in , in Europe . Uh Sir , thanks , 1332 00:49:52,530 --> 00:49:56,120 thanks . Um So of course , the closure 1333 00:49:56,129 --> 00:49:58,350 of Nords ST and the weaning off of 1334 00:49:58,360 --> 00:50:00,527 Russian gas through much of Europe has 1335 00:50:00,527 --> 00:50:02,638 been , has been an incredible success 1336 00:50:02,638 --> 00:50:04,582 story of the last year . It is not 1337 00:50:04,582 --> 00:50:06,804 universal . However , as you , we got , 1338 00:50:06,804 --> 00:50:09,027 we got a lot of vulnerability down here 1339 00:50:09,027 --> 00:50:08,780 and he'll , he'll , he'll have the same 1340 00:50:08,790 --> 00:50:11,389 playbook and it's , it's exactly , sir . 1341 00:50:11,399 --> 00:50:13,566 It's , it's the exact same playbook so 1342 00:50:13,566 --> 00:50:15,677 we work with them to wean off it . Uh 1343 00:50:15,677 --> 00:50:17,788 We're not the lead agency on that . I 1344 00:50:17,788 --> 00:50:19,899 defer to the Secretary of State for , 1345 00:50:19,899 --> 00:50:19,455 for or the Department of State for 1346 00:50:19,465 --> 00:50:21,955 specifics on what exactly they're doing . 1347 00:50:22,024 --> 00:50:24,715 Um But , but we are operationally not 1348 00:50:24,725 --> 00:50:26,781 dependent . I'll , I'll reach out to 1349 00:50:26,781 --> 00:50:28,781 them because , uh being chair , I'm 1350 00:50:28,781 --> 00:50:31,058 chairman of the Energy Committee . Yes , 1351 00:50:31,058 --> 00:50:30,905 sir . We want to do everything we can 1352 00:50:30,915 --> 00:50:33,489 to basically back them up so they don't 1353 00:50:33,500 --> 00:50:35,556 get caught exactly like our European 1354 00:50:35,556 --> 00:50:38,060 allies did . It would be very welcome 1355 00:50:38,070 --> 00:50:39,959 by you and NATO . Can you briefly 1356 00:50:39,959 --> 00:50:42,014 comment on developments regarding uh 1357 00:50:42,014 --> 00:50:44,237 Turkey's relationship with NATO . I , I 1358 00:50:44,237 --> 00:50:46,348 just can't believe that here they are 1359 00:50:46,348 --> 00:50:48,729 holding up the Swedes . Ok . Made it 1360 00:50:48,739 --> 00:50:51,129 very difficult for the Fins and they're 1361 00:50:51,139 --> 00:50:53,139 playing footsie with the Russians . 1362 00:50:53,280 --> 00:50:56,649 Makes no sense to me at all . Uh 1363 00:50:56,659 --> 00:50:58,830 Sir , clearly there , there's a lot of 1364 00:50:58,840 --> 00:51:01,007 policy wrapped in there and , and I'll 1365 00:51:01,007 --> 00:51:02,896 defer to my , uh , to my civilian 1366 00:51:02,896 --> 00:51:05,118 leaders on , on those questions . I , I 1367 00:51:05,118 --> 00:51:07,810 would point out sir that there is a , a 1368 00:51:07,820 --> 00:51:10,080 sharp difference between our military 1369 00:51:10,090 --> 00:51:11,646 relationships and our other 1370 00:51:11,646 --> 00:51:13,646 relationships when it comes to some 1371 00:51:13,646 --> 00:51:15,812 countries . And I , I was just down in 1372 00:51:15,812 --> 00:51:17,923 Ontak with the uh Minister of Defense 1373 00:51:17,923 --> 00:51:20,034 in the Turkish chart a couple of days 1374 00:51:20,034 --> 00:51:21,590 ago looking at the uh uh uh 1375 00:51:21,590 --> 00:51:23,534 humanitarian assistance that we've 1376 00:51:23,534 --> 00:51:25,590 provided through the US and NATO for 1377 00:51:25,590 --> 00:51:28,439 the earthquake . And , um , and um , uh , 1378 00:51:28,449 --> 00:51:30,671 um , I would just point out there's a , 1379 00:51:30,671 --> 00:51:32,727 there's a pretty distinct difference 1380 00:51:32,727 --> 00:51:34,893 between , well , I mean , the military 1381 00:51:34,893 --> 00:51:34,590 relationship . I'm so sorry , Miss 1382 00:51:34,600 --> 00:51:36,709 Chairman , but they didn't , they 1383 00:51:36,719 --> 00:51:38,919 acquire the S 400 from the Russians ? 1384 00:51:39,790 --> 00:51:41,957 Oh , yes , sir . Him and they canceled 1385 00:51:41,957 --> 00:51:44,234 the F-35 . That's exactly right . Yeah . 1386 00:51:44,659 --> 00:51:46,770 Uh , ok . So you think I need to take 1387 00:51:46,770 --> 00:51:49,030 this in a different direction ? I got 1388 00:51:49,040 --> 00:51:52,449 you . I got you . I got it . I got it . 1389 00:51:52,459 --> 00:51:54,760 I will too . Thank you both and thank 1390 00:51:54,770 --> 00:51:56,548 all of you for your service . I 1391 00:51:56,548 --> 00:51:58,603 appreciate it more than , you know . 1392 00:51:58,603 --> 00:52:00,850 Thank you , uh Senator Manchin , uh uh 1393 00:52:00,860 --> 00:52:04,050 General General Van . Uh Thank you for 1394 00:52:04,060 --> 00:52:06,770 your testimony . Uh I look forward to 1395 00:52:06,780 --> 00:52:09,320 the closed session which will reconvene 1396 00:52:09,330 --> 00:52:12,929 at 12 30 in S V C 2 17 after 1397 00:52:12,939 --> 00:52:15,370 the uh address by the South Korean 1398 00:52:15,379 --> 00:52:17,969 President . Uh I'm sure one of the 1399 00:52:17,979 --> 00:52:20,090 issues that might come up is the Abra 1400 00:52:20,090 --> 00:52:22,389 Tank . I understand that there are some 1401 00:52:22,800 --> 00:52:26,229 significant uh issues uh 1402 00:52:26,239 --> 00:52:29,770 involving transferring Abram Tanks to 1403 00:52:29,780 --> 00:52:33,520 any place in the world . Uh One of 1404 00:52:33,530 --> 00:52:35,752 which I think can be publicly discussed 1405 00:52:35,752 --> 00:52:38,360 here is that it operates on something 1406 00:52:38,370 --> 00:52:41,199 closer to jet fuel than diesel , which 1407 00:52:41,209 --> 00:52:43,760 makes the creation of independent 1408 00:52:43,770 --> 00:52:45,850 supply lines by the Ukrainians 1409 00:52:45,860 --> 00:52:48,239 essential to use . There's also the 1410 00:52:48,250 --> 00:52:51,840 issue of training and the fact that uh 1411 00:52:51,969 --> 00:52:54,290 our European allies , I believe 1412 00:52:54,649 --> 00:52:57,729 thousands of tanks which are more um 1413 00:52:57,739 --> 00:53:01,510 familiar to the Ukrainian forces which 1414 00:53:01,520 --> 00:53:04,080 obviates the training issues related to 1415 00:53:04,090 --> 00:53:06,429 the Abrams tank . So I think all those 1416 00:53:06,439 --> 00:53:09,250 issues have to be explored in the 1417 00:53:09,260 --> 00:53:12,540 closed session . Um And they 1418 00:53:12,550 --> 00:53:16,330 also uh general almost uh uh a 1419 00:53:16,340 --> 00:53:18,550 real serious discussion about 1420 00:53:18,560 --> 00:53:20,727 contestant logistics , particularly in 1421 00:53:20,727 --> 00:53:23,889 the Pacific um would be appropriate . 1422 00:53:23,899 --> 00:53:26,419 So uh let me see if there's anything 1423 00:53:26,429 --> 00:53:29,739 else . Uh No , I , I believe that's uh 1424 00:53:30,040 --> 00:53:32,290 oh one other point , General Cali is 1425 00:53:32,300 --> 00:53:34,389 that there's been discussion about 1426 00:53:34,659 --> 00:53:37,949 reevaluating what you are our 1427 00:53:38,110 --> 00:53:41,550 uh plans for Europe , 1428 00:53:41,929 --> 00:53:44,929 looking at the depletion of Russian 1429 00:53:44,939 --> 00:53:46,790 forces . But I think you're also 1430 00:53:46,800 --> 00:53:48,911 considering the fact that many of our 1431 00:53:48,911 --> 00:53:52,310 NATO forces have depleted themselves of 1432 00:53:52,320 --> 00:53:55,590 equipment and other factors that have 1433 00:53:55,600 --> 00:53:58,780 to be included in the evaluation . So 1434 00:53:58,790 --> 00:54:00,901 it's not simply looking at Russia and 1435 00:54:00,901 --> 00:54:03,123 saying , well , they're much weaker now 1436 00:54:03,123 --> 00:54:05,068 than they were . Is that correct ? 1437 00:54:05,068 --> 00:54:07,290 Absolutely . And it's very difficult to 1438 00:54:07,290 --> 00:54:06,979 speak about an open session for 1439 00:54:06,989 --> 00:54:10,070 operational security reasons . Well , 1440 00:54:10,080 --> 00:54:12,136 uh , I think we've got a lot to talk 1441 00:54:12,136 --> 00:54:15,370 about . So I will , uh , adjourn this , 1442 00:54:15,379 --> 00:54:17,969 uh , open hearing and , uh , look 1443 00:54:17,979 --> 00:54:20,146 forward to seeing you at 12 30 in S BC 1444 00:54:20,146 --> 00:54:21,110 2 17 . Thank you .