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General Carb and Admiral Hill for your 

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many years of service to this country . 

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What you do every single day may not be 

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known by every American , but you keep 

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every American safe . Thank you . 

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We appreciate you appearing before us 

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today and we look forward to hearing 

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from each of you as we continue to 

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develop and field integrated air and 

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missile defense capabilities . It's 

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important to recognize that the threat 

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landscape has evolved significantly 

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since the inception of our missile 

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defense programs . This evolution of 

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adversary missile and offensive strike 

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technology including hypersonic weapons 

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and unmanned aerial systems 

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increasingly holds at risk , not only 

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our military installations but also 

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civilian populations and critical 

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infrastructure as you know , for many 

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years . Now , this subcommittee has 

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strongly advocated for getting more 

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capability on Guam and getting it there 

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as fast as we can . I look forward to 

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hearing more about the department's 

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plan for the defense of Guam and how 

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the investments proposed by this budget 

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would strengthen the missile defense of 

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the island , the incursion of the 

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Japanese . Excuse me , the incursion of 

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the Chinese spy balloon earlier this 

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year also highlights the need for 

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increased domain awareness . We cannot 

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intercept what we cannot see and track . 

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It's critical that we continue to 

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invest in terrestrial over the horizon 

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radars and space , space missile 

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warning and missile tracking systems 

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including the hypersonic ballistic 

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tracking space sensor or H BT S . 

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Si look forward to hearing more from 

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our witnesses about these issues and 

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about how the F Y 24 would impact their 

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mission . Thank you , Mr Chairman 

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Secretary Plum . Are you leading off ? 

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Yes , sir . So thank you uh Chairman 

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King , ranking member Fisher , 

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distinguished members of the committee . 

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Thank you for this opportunity to 

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testify today on uh the fiscal year 24 

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missile defense budget and I am honored 

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to appear alongside my colleagues here , 

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General Van Huk and uh Vice Admiral 

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Hill and Lieutenant General Carb . And 

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if it is all of your last uh hearing , 

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then I I just , I I have really 

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appreciated working with all of you . 

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Look how , look how sad they are , sir . 

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Uh Today , our competitors are using 

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advanced offensive missile capabilities 

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as a principle means to execute their 

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war fighting strategies . We know China 

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is our department's pacing challenge . 

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China has accelerated its efforts to 

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develop test and field thousands of 

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missile systems across all classes and 

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ranges . Russia remains our acute 

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threat . Russia has conducted thousands 

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of missile and drone strikes to 

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terrorize the civilian population of 

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Ukraine and degrade Ukraine's war 

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fighting capability . Iran has launched 

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missile attacks into neighboring states 

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and provided rockets and drones to non 

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state actors who in turn , use them to 

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target us , forces and partners . And 

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of course , they've also provided us 

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systems to Russia which is using them 

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in the , in the battle in Ukraine . And 

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North Korea continues to conduct ICBM 

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and other missile tests to threaten and 

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coerce its neighbors given these 

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threats , missile defense has never 

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been more important . The 2022 missile 

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defense review was released in 

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unclassified form last fall and this 

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review updated us policy to reflect the 

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current security environment with 

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three kind of large updates . One 

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emphasizing that we will stay ahead of 

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the North Korean missile threat to the 

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homeland through a comprehensive 

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missile defeat approach which will be 

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complemented by the credible threat of 

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direct cost imposition . Second , it 

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makes crystal clear that an attack on 

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Guam or any other US territory by any 

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adversary will be considered a direct 

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attack on the United States and it will 

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be met with an appropriate response . 

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We are committed to the missile defense 

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of Guam to simultaneously protect us 

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civilians , us forces and our ability 

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to project power in the region . And 

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third to deter attempts by adversaries 

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to stay under the nuclear threshold and 

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achieve strategic results with 

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conventional capabilities . The US is 

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pursuing active and passive measures to 

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decrease the risk of adversary cruise 

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missile strikes against critical assets 

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in the homeland . The president's 

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budget invests 29.8 billion in missile 

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defeat and defense capabilities this is 

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an increase of nearly three billion 

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over the last year . Well , this year , 

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actually F Y 23 specific to missile 

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defense . This includes 3.3 billion for 

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the ground based mid course defense 

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including 2.2 billion for the next 

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generation interceptor , 1.5 billion 

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for the defense of Guam . Nearly five 

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billion uh for a missile warning 

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missile track both the new P LEO 

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constellation and the next generation 

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overhead persistent infrared 

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architecture . 2.2 billion for S M 

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three thadd and pack three interceptors . 

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Nearly 1.5 billion to counter lower 

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tier missile threats and hundreds of 

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millions of dollars for over the 

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horizon , radars , hypersonic defense 

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and directed energy development . 

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Finally , the F Y 24 budget continues 

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to prioritize us , support to allies 

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and partners . The US does not face 

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missile threats on our own missile 

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defense cooperation , strengthens our 

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common protection , enhances deterrence 

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and provides assurance that bolsters 

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the cohesion of our alliances . So the 

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president's budget makes significant 

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investments in missile defense . Those 

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missile defenses are foundational to 

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integrated deterrents . I'd just like 

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to thank the committee for your 

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tireless support of the department and 

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US national security and for your 

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support of the president's budget . And 

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I look forward to your questions , Hill , 

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uh Chairman King , a ranking member of 

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Fisher , distinguished members of the 

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subcommittee . Uh Thank you for the 

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opportunity to discuss missile defense 

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today . I'd like to take a quick moment 

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to thank the uh women and men of the 

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missile defense agency for the hard 

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work they do every day delivering 

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capabilities to the services to meet 

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joint uh command command requirements 

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to counter ballistic maneuvering and 

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hypersonic missile threats . Uh If I 

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were to summarize missile threat , it's 

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three things . It's large numbers , 

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it's high speed and heavy maneuver . 

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Those are the challenges right now and 

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they are the challenges for the future . 

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MD is requesting as mentioned 2.9 

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billion to continue our mission of 

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meeting these threats . And I'm gonna 

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talk to you about three priorities . 

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The first is homeland ballistic missile 

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defense . And then I will talk about 

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the defense of Guam and hypersonic 

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defense . The first priority of 

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homeland ballistic missile defense 

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which includes Alaska and Hawaii . The 

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ground based Midco defense system has 

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protected the homeland from rogue 

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nation ballistic missile attacks . 

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Since 2004 , our current focus is on 

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new capabilities to counter the limited 

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but advancing North Korean long range 

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ballistic missile threat . The GMB 

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system is undergoing a service life 

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extension program to improve 

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reliability and extend the GB I fleet , 

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the ground based interceptors beyond 

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2030 these upgrades mitigate the risk 

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until the nation feels the next 

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generation interceptor which is on 

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track for first in placement no later 

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than the end of 2028 N G I development 

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is executing to deliver advanced 

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interceptors featuring multiple kill 

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vehicle technology which we will add to 

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the current fleet of interceptors at 

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Fort Greely , Alaska and Denberg Space 

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Force Base in California . Finally , we 

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are on track for operational acceptance 

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of the long range discrimination radar 

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in clear Alaska next year , this 

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advanced radar will ensure a stronger 

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homeland defense posture against long 

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range missiles to achieve priority to 

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the defense of Guam . Also part of the 

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homeland . The department is developing 

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an integrated air missile defense 

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system to defend against diverse 

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missile threats . Working with the 

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services and other stakeholders we are 

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driving to meet in Pecos requirement 

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for a persistent 360 degree layered 

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defense capability on the island 

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against simultaneous raids of cruise 

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ballistic maneuvering and hypersonic 

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missile threats . We are delivering 

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operational capability and phases to 

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meet these clear war fighting needs for 

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the third priority . Hypersonic defense . 

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We have integrated tracking 

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capabilities into existing space , 

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ground and sea base radars . That 

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capability is here today . Today's 

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sensor architecture and command and 

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control can track hypersonic threats to 

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support warning and domain awareness 

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aegis ships equipped with a sea based 

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terminal capability can engage some 

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hypersonic threats in the terminal 

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phase . Today , due to the global 

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maneuver capabilities of hypersonic 

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missiles . A space based tracking and 

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targeting capability is a clear need . 

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In collaboration with the space force . 

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The missile defense agency is 

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developing the hypersonic ballistic 

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tracking space sensor . Later this year , 

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H BT S S will start on orbit operations 

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to demonstrate unique tracking and 

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targeting to support hypersonic 

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engagements H BT S S will participate 

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in flight tests and real world threat 

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collections . Throughout F Y 24 the 

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capability will be proliferated and 

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operated by the Space Force . We 

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continue to work closely with the Navy 

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to upgrade sea base terminal defenses 

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to counter more advanced maneuvering 

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and hypersonic threats . And based on 

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threat evolution , we will deliver the 

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next S BT incremental upgrade in 2025 . 

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A sea based terminal is the only active 

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defense available today to counter 

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hypersonic missile threats . In order 

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to expand the battle space against 

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hypersonic threats . We have initiated 

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the AEGIS glide phase interceptor 

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program . GP I leverages proven AEGIS 

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weapons system engage on remote network 

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sensors to provide the depth of fire 

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needed to thin the raid for terminal 

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defenses . One final regional defense 

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note , we continue ship upgrades and S 

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M three block one B and two A missile 

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deliveries and have made significant 

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progress with the shore site in Poland 

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which is on track for operational 

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acceptance at the end of this fiscal 

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year . Also , we are working towards 

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fielding Thaad and Patriot integration 

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enhancements that were successfully 

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delivered to the United States Forces 

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of Korea to other thadd batteries to 

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expand engagement , battle space 

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against shorter range threats . 

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Chairman King , ranking member Fisher , 

279
00:09:46,309 --> 00:09:48,531
members of the subcommittee . Thank you 

280
00:09:48,531 --> 00:09:50,587
and I look forward to answering your 

281
00:09:50,587 --> 00:09:52,420
questions . It has been an honor 

282
00:09:52,420 --> 00:09:54,642
serving as the director of MD A . Thank 

283
00:09:54,642 --> 00:09:56,809
you very much Admiral General Ben hurt 

284
00:09:57,919 --> 00:10:00,030
Chairman King , ranking member Fisher 

285
00:10:00,030 --> 00:10:01,863
and distinguished members of the 

286
00:10:01,863 --> 00:10:03,697
subcommittee . Thank you for the 

287
00:10:03,697 --> 00:10:05,641
opportunity to appear today and to 

288
00:10:05,641 --> 00:10:07,586
represent the men and women of the 

289
00:10:07,586 --> 00:10:09,641
United States , Northern Command and 

290
00:10:09,641 --> 00:10:09,219
North American Aerospace Defense 

291
00:10:09,229 --> 00:10:11,809
Command . To address today's strategic 

292
00:10:11,820 --> 00:10:13,876
environment for nearly three years , 

293
00:10:13,876 --> 00:10:15,987
I've focused on four key priorities , 

294
00:10:15,987 --> 00:10:18,760
domain awareness or the ability to see 

295
00:10:18,770 --> 00:10:20,770
and detect potential threats in all 

296
00:10:20,770 --> 00:10:22,992
domains , information dominance , which 

297
00:10:22,992 --> 00:10:25,309
is the use of artificial intelligence 

298
00:10:25,320 --> 00:10:27,460
and machine learning to process data 

299
00:10:27,469 --> 00:10:29,710
more rapidly for strategic advantage , 

300
00:10:29,719 --> 00:10:31,719
decision superiority , which is the 

301
00:10:31,719 --> 00:10:33,830
dissemination of data and information 

302
00:10:33,830 --> 00:10:36,052
to the right leader at the right time , 

303
00:10:36,052 --> 00:10:37,997
from the tactical to the strategic 

304
00:10:37,997 --> 00:10:39,608
level . And finally , global 

305
00:10:39,608 --> 00:10:41,441
integration . Addressing today's 

306
00:10:41,441 --> 00:10:43,330
environment with a global and all 

307
00:10:43,330 --> 00:10:45,108
domain approach , vice legacy , 

308
00:10:45,108 --> 00:10:47,330
regional policies and practices . Those 

309
00:10:47,330 --> 00:10:49,052
priorities are critical to the 

310
00:10:49,052 --> 00:10:51,275
successfully defending the homeland and 

311
00:10:51,275 --> 00:10:53,497
providing our national leaders with the 

312
00:10:53,497 --> 00:10:55,719
only thing I can never give them enough 

313
00:10:55,719 --> 00:10:57,719
of . And that's time time to create 

314
00:10:57,719 --> 00:10:59,663
deterrence options and if required 

315
00:10:59,663 --> 00:11:01,775
defend and defeat options , I believe 

316
00:11:01,775 --> 00:11:03,997
the greatest risk for the United States 

317
00:11:03,997 --> 00:11:06,108
stems from our inability to change at 

318
00:11:06,108 --> 00:11:07,997
the pace required by the changing 

319
00:11:07,997 --> 00:11:09,830
strategic environment . Homeland 

320
00:11:09,830 --> 00:11:12,052
defense must be recognized as essential 

321
00:11:12,052 --> 00:11:14,108
to contingency plans at home and for 

322
00:11:14,108 --> 00:11:16,108
power projection abroad . And it is 

323
00:11:16,108 --> 00:11:17,941
vital that all military planning 

324
00:11:17,941 --> 00:11:19,941
account for that in reality , in an 

325
00:11:19,941 --> 00:11:21,830
area of incredible innovation and 

326
00:11:21,830 --> 00:11:24,108
technological achievement , inflexible , 

327
00:11:24,108 --> 00:11:25,830
outdated processes are greater 

328
00:11:25,830 --> 00:11:27,997
impediment to success than many of our 

329
00:11:27,997 --> 00:11:30,250
competitors . Advancements . I'd like 

330
00:11:30,260 --> 00:11:31,982
to highlight two areas for the 

331
00:11:31,982 --> 00:11:34,204
subcommittee . First . Today , I remain 

332
00:11:34,204 --> 00:11:36,371
confident in our current capability to 

333
00:11:36,371 --> 00:11:38,760
defend the homeland against a limited D 

334
00:11:38,770 --> 00:11:40,992
Pr K ballistic missile threat . Looking 

335
00:11:40,992 --> 00:11:43,048
forward , I'm concerned about future 

336
00:11:43,048 --> 00:11:45,159
capacity and capability to respond to 

337
00:11:45,159 --> 00:11:47,250
advancing D PR K ballistic missile 

338
00:11:47,260 --> 00:11:49,316
threats , making it crucial to field 

339
00:11:49,316 --> 00:11:51,649
the next generation interceptor on time , 

340
00:11:51,649 --> 00:11:54,469
if not faster . Second Russia and the 

341
00:11:54,479 --> 00:11:56,820
PR C continued to aggressively pursue 

342
00:11:56,830 --> 00:11:58,552
and field a number of advanced 

343
00:11:58,552 --> 00:12:00,441
capabilities including hypersonic 

344
00:12:00,441 --> 00:12:02,890
weapons and delivery platforms designed 

345
00:12:02,900 --> 00:12:05,020
to evade detection across multiple 

346
00:12:05,030 --> 00:12:07,141
domains to strike targets anywhere on 

347
00:12:07,141 --> 00:12:09,179
the globe including North America . 

348
00:12:09,469 --> 00:12:11,302
Hypersonic weapons are extremely 

349
00:12:11,302 --> 00:12:13,413
difficult to detect and counter given 

350
00:12:13,413 --> 00:12:15,469
the weapon speed , maneuverability , 

351
00:12:15,469 --> 00:12:17,359
low flight path and unpredictable 

352
00:12:17,369 --> 00:12:19,669
trajectories , hypersonic weapons 

353
00:12:19,679 --> 00:12:21,735
challenge Norad's ability to provide 

354
00:12:21,735 --> 00:12:23,846
threat warning and attack assessments 

355
00:12:23,846 --> 00:12:25,790
for Canada and the United States . 

356
00:12:25,790 --> 00:12:27,790
Finally , I'd like to recognize the 

357
00:12:27,790 --> 00:12:29,846
tremendous work done by Vice Admiral 

358
00:12:29,846 --> 00:12:32,068
Hill in the missile defense agency . In 

359
00:12:32,068 --> 00:12:34,123
my view , the missile defense agency 

360
00:12:34,123 --> 00:12:36,179
should be the department's technical 

361
00:12:36,179 --> 00:12:38,290
integrator to best leverage , ongoing 

362
00:12:38,290 --> 00:12:40,512
multi domain design and experimentation 

363
00:12:40,512 --> 00:12:42,679
efforts against current future air and 

364
00:12:42,679 --> 00:12:44,346
missile threats regardless of 

365
00:12:44,346 --> 00:12:46,568
geographical area . It's clear that the 

366
00:12:46,568 --> 00:12:48,568
missile threats we face at home and 

367
00:12:48,568 --> 00:12:50,790
abroad will only continue to grow . And 

368
00:12:50,790 --> 00:12:50,340
I've been fortunate to work together 

369
00:12:50,349 --> 00:12:52,516
with a great partner like Vice Admiral 

370
00:12:52,516 --> 00:12:54,719
Hill in the ongoing efforts to outpace 

371
00:12:54,729 --> 00:12:56,896
those threats . I look forward to your 

372
00:12:56,896 --> 00:12:59,118
questions . Thank you , General General 

373
00:12:59,118 --> 00:13:01,869
Carb , Chairman King , ranking member 

374
00:13:01,880 --> 00:13:03,991
Fisher , distinguished members of the 

375
00:13:03,991 --> 00:13:05,991
subcommittee . I'm honored to again 

376
00:13:05,991 --> 00:13:08,158
testify before you and to represent an 

377
00:13:08,158 --> 00:13:09,713
incredible people . First , 

378
00:13:09,713 --> 00:13:11,602
organization of 2600 soldiers and 

379
00:13:11,602 --> 00:13:14,830
civilians across 13 time zones in 19 

380
00:13:14,840 --> 00:13:17,409
dispersed locations every day . These 

381
00:13:17,419 --> 00:13:19,820
amazing professionals provide space , 

382
00:13:19,969 --> 00:13:21,859
high altitude and missile defense 

383
00:13:21,869 --> 00:13:24,250
forces and capabilities to the army and 

384
00:13:24,260 --> 00:13:26,260
joint war fighters . First , let me 

385
00:13:26,260 --> 00:13:28,260
express my sincere appreciation for 

386
00:13:28,270 --> 00:13:30,469
your steadfast support of our people 

387
00:13:30,479 --> 00:13:32,479
and their families . I serve as the 

388
00:13:32,479 --> 00:13:34,701
commanding general of the US Army Space 

389
00:13:34,701 --> 00:13:36,590
and missile defense command , the 

390
00:13:36,590 --> 00:13:38,479
commander of the joint functional 

391
00:13:38,479 --> 00:13:40,312
component command for integrated 

392
00:13:40,312 --> 00:13:42,312
missile defense . And as the army's 

393
00:13:42,312 --> 00:13:44,423
proponent for air and missile defense 

394
00:13:44,423 --> 00:13:46,757
or A MD , I provide us Northern Command , 

395
00:13:46,757 --> 00:13:48,923
the soldiers who stand ready to defend 

396
00:13:48,923 --> 00:13:50,757
our nation from intercontinental 

397
00:13:50,757 --> 00:13:52,979
ballistic missile attack , serve as the 

398
00:13:52,979 --> 00:13:54,979
army service component commander to 

399
00:13:54,979 --> 00:13:57,146
both us strategic command and us space 

400
00:13:57,146 --> 00:13:59,257
command . And I am the chief of staff 

401
00:13:59,257 --> 00:14:00,923
of the army's a MD enterprise 

402
00:14:00,923 --> 00:14:03,090
integrator . I'd like to first discuss 

403
00:14:03,090 --> 00:14:05,368
the threats that confront us worldwide . 

404
00:14:05,368 --> 00:14:06,979
In Europe . We see daily the 

405
00:14:06,979 --> 00:14:09,146
continuation of the largest employment 

406
00:14:09,146 --> 00:14:11,257
of offensive missiles since world war 

407
00:14:11,257 --> 00:14:13,423
II and the unprecedented use of attack 

408
00:14:13,423 --> 00:14:15,646
U A V S in Russia's nearly 15 month war 

409
00:14:15,646 --> 00:14:18,400
against Ukraine in the Pacific against 

410
00:14:18,409 --> 00:14:20,576
the backdrop of multiple missile tests 

411
00:14:20,576 --> 00:14:23,229
by the D pr K in China . Threats of 

412
00:14:23,239 --> 00:14:25,919
regional and trans regional complex 

413
00:14:25,929 --> 00:14:29,210
missile attacks still loom in the . 

414
00:14:30,070 --> 00:14:32,109
Our adversaries continue to attack 

415
00:14:32,119 --> 00:14:34,320
partner nations and us forces using 

416
00:14:34,330 --> 00:14:37,510
missiles , uavs and rockets , artillery 

417
00:14:37,520 --> 00:14:39,429
and mortars . I have been an air 

418
00:14:39,440 --> 00:14:41,840
defender for 36 years stationed and 

419
00:14:41,849 --> 00:14:44,549
deployed in the European Pacific and 

420
00:14:44,559 --> 00:14:46,503
Middle Eastern theaters and I have 

421
00:14:46,503 --> 00:14:48,710
never seen adversary threat activity 

422
00:14:48,719 --> 00:14:51,590
whether that be test or operational use 

423
00:14:51,599 --> 00:14:54,440
as great as I see it today . Adversary 

424
00:14:54,450 --> 00:14:56,672
actions in the space domain are equally 

425
00:14:56,672 --> 00:14:58,561
as aggressive as they continue to 

426
00:14:58,561 --> 00:15:00,506
challenge us across multiple space 

427
00:15:00,506 --> 00:15:02,394
enabled mission areas critical to 

428
00:15:02,394 --> 00:15:04,672
supporting our missile defense mission , 

429
00:15:04,672 --> 00:15:06,617
to address these threats . We must 

430
00:15:06,617 --> 00:15:08,839
strengthen our capabilities to deny our 

431
00:15:08,839 --> 00:15:11,061
adversaries the benefit of aggression . 

432
00:15:11,061 --> 00:15:12,783
We must continue investment in 

433
00:15:12,783 --> 00:15:15,006
sustainment of combat , ready , capable 

434
00:15:15,006 --> 00:15:17,061
and lethal space and air and missile 

435
00:15:17,061 --> 00:15:19,283
defense capabilities . Fortunately , we 

436
00:15:19,283 --> 00:15:21,339
do not face these threats alone . We 

437
00:15:21,339 --> 00:15:23,561
have allies and partners who contribute 

438
00:15:23,561 --> 00:15:23,010
significantly to the air and missile 

439
00:15:23,020 --> 00:15:25,020
defense and space missions . Please 

440
00:15:25,020 --> 00:15:26,964
allow me to briefly outline just a 

441
00:15:26,964 --> 00:15:29,020
couple of milestones accomplished by 

442
00:15:29,020 --> 00:15:31,187
our space and missile defense soldiers 

443
00:15:31,187 --> 00:15:33,187
and civilians . This past year , we 

444
00:15:33,187 --> 00:15:35,298
have partnered with us , army Special 

445
00:15:35,298 --> 00:15:37,353
Operations command and us army cyber 

446
00:15:37,353 --> 00:15:39,576
command to create a space cyber special 

447
00:15:39,576 --> 00:15:41,687
operations triad to provide deterrent 

448
00:15:41,687 --> 00:15:43,520
and response options through the 

449
00:15:43,520 --> 00:15:45,131
integrated use of our unique 

450
00:15:45,131 --> 00:15:47,020
capabilities . We've continued to 

451
00:15:47,020 --> 00:15:48,909
mature the triad through multiple 

452
00:15:48,909 --> 00:15:51,131
exercises to include the army's project 

453
00:15:51,131 --> 00:15:52,964
convergence . 22 us Army Special 

454
00:15:52,964 --> 00:15:55,131
Operations Command Capability exercise 

455
00:15:55,131 --> 00:15:56,909
which was held just last week . 

456
00:15:57,630 --> 00:15:59,463
Recently , we reached a historic 

457
00:15:59,463 --> 00:16:01,686
milestone in the air defense enterprise 

458
00:16:01,686 --> 00:16:03,852
with the full rate production decision 

459
00:16:03,852 --> 00:16:05,797
for the integrated air and missile 

460
00:16:05,797 --> 00:16:07,963
defense battle command system I B CS . 

461
00:16:07,963 --> 00:16:10,130
This any sensor best shooter construct 

462
00:16:10,130 --> 00:16:11,963
allows us to integrate the right 

463
00:16:11,963 --> 00:16:13,963
quantity and mix of air and missile 

464
00:16:13,963 --> 00:16:15,741
defense capabilities across all 

465
00:16:15,741 --> 00:16:18,159
echelons , building an effective tiered 

466
00:16:18,169 --> 00:16:20,225
and layered defense . And we need to 

467
00:16:20,225 --> 00:16:22,719
rightly add incredible soldiers to the 

468
00:16:22,729 --> 00:16:25,250
any sensor best shooter construct . As 

469
00:16:25,260 --> 00:16:27,427
these men and women will play the most 

470
00:16:27,427 --> 00:16:29,482
critical role in this transformative 

471
00:16:29,482 --> 00:16:31,538
capability . This is the linchpin of 

472
00:16:31,538 --> 00:16:33,482
the army's broader air and missile 

473
00:16:33,482 --> 00:16:35,593
defense modernization efforts crucial 

474
00:16:35,593 --> 00:16:37,427
to enhancing our air and missile 

475
00:16:37,427 --> 00:16:39,371
defense capabilities well into the 

476
00:16:39,371 --> 00:16:41,539
future in closing and on a personal 

477
00:16:41,549 --> 00:16:43,771
note , this will be my last opportunity 

478
00:16:43,771 --> 00:16:45,993
to address the distinguished members of 

479
00:16:45,993 --> 00:16:48,327
this subcommittee . And I want to again , 

480
00:16:48,327 --> 00:16:50,160
thank you for your support . I'm 

481
00:16:50,160 --> 00:16:52,382
confident in the direction and momentum 

482
00:16:52,382 --> 00:16:54,493
of the army's air and missile defense 

483
00:16:54,493 --> 00:16:56,660
and space enterprises . I look forward 

484
00:16:56,660 --> 00:16:56,380
to addressing your questions . Thank 

485
00:16:56,390 --> 00:16:59,799
you . Thank you . I'm gonna , I'm gonna 

486
00:16:59,809 --> 00:17:02,031
start with a sort of odd first question 

487
00:17:02,031 --> 00:17:04,819
because my problem , Secretary Plum is , 

488
00:17:04,829 --> 00:17:07,051
I don't know who to address my question 

489
00:17:07,051 --> 00:17:09,273
to . And does that suggest that we need 

490
00:17:09,910 --> 00:17:12,800
a more integrated central 

491
00:17:12,810 --> 00:17:16,109
functionality ? Here ? We have three 

492
00:17:16,119 --> 00:17:18,119
people in front of us , all of whom 

493
00:17:18,119 --> 00:17:20,341
have different responsibilities . Maybe 

494
00:17:20,341 --> 00:17:22,619
Admiral Hill , you're nodding . I mean , 

495
00:17:22,619 --> 00:17:24,619
I , I , I just wonder if we need to 

496
00:17:24,619 --> 00:17:26,119
need to clean up the , the 

497
00:17:26,119 --> 00:17:28,341
organizational chart a bit . It bothers 

498
00:17:28,341 --> 00:17:30,452
me that we've got missile defense and 

499
00:17:30,452 --> 00:17:32,452
then you're the operational piece , 

500
00:17:32,452 --> 00:17:34,675
generally , you're , you're in , in the 

501
00:17:34,675 --> 00:17:34,449
middle of it . Uh , for homeland 

502
00:17:34,459 --> 00:17:37,459
defense is , do we have the proper 

503
00:17:37,469 --> 00:17:40,329
organization to allow , uh , uh 

504
00:17:40,339 --> 00:17:43,310
sufficient timely response and 

505
00:17:43,319 --> 00:17:46,270
deterrence frankly , who wants to take 

506
00:17:46,280 --> 00:17:48,660
the question ? I'm happy to start , 

507
00:17:48,670 --> 00:17:50,781
Senator . I , I do think we do have a 

508
00:17:50,781 --> 00:17:52,948
good organizational structure here and 

509
00:17:52,948 --> 00:17:55,170
I think , uh what you're seeing is that 

510
00:17:55,170 --> 00:17:57,392
missile defense kind of runs throughout 

511
00:17:57,392 --> 00:17:59,392
our forces , right ? The Navy needs 

512
00:17:59,392 --> 00:18:01,226
missile defense , the army needs 

513
00:18:01,226 --> 00:18:01,030
missile defense , the homeland needs 

514
00:18:01,040 --> 00:18:03,160
missile defense . And so , and of 

515
00:18:03,170 --> 00:18:05,114
course , the Pentagon has multiple 

516
00:18:05,114 --> 00:18:07,226
layers , but I actually think this is 

517
00:18:07,226 --> 00:18:09,448
structured quite well . I think we have 

518
00:18:09,448 --> 00:18:11,614
good working relationships and I think 

519
00:18:11,614 --> 00:18:13,837
we're making significant progress . You 

520
00:18:13,837 --> 00:18:13,449
don't think we need a kind of combatant 

521
00:18:13,459 --> 00:18:15,880
command that would centralize these 

522
00:18:16,170 --> 00:18:19,589
functions . Well , since you asked , uh 

523
00:18:19,599 --> 00:18:22,180
so the U C P change uh of course , we 

524
00:18:22,189 --> 00:18:24,300
have north com will do defense of the 

525
00:18:24,300 --> 00:18:26,356
homeland . And so General Van he can 

526
00:18:26,356 --> 00:18:28,522
speak to that much better than I can . 

527
00:18:28,522 --> 00:18:31,150
Uh And uh the U C P change uh that has 

528
00:18:31,160 --> 00:18:34,530
just been signed uh will transfer uh I 

529
00:18:34,569 --> 00:18:38,290
MD to space command uh which makes 

530
00:18:38,300 --> 00:18:40,467
sense because we'd already transferred 

531
00:18:40,467 --> 00:18:42,633
all the sensors to space command . And 

532
00:18:42,633 --> 00:18:44,800
so that aligns missile defense sensors 

533
00:18:44,800 --> 00:18:46,856
and space domain awareness , sensors 

534
00:18:46,856 --> 00:18:49,078
are often the same sensor and it's good 

535
00:18:49,078 --> 00:18:50,967
to have a kind of a global sensor 

536
00:18:50,967 --> 00:18:53,189
management piece there too . So I think 

537
00:18:53,189 --> 00:18:55,244
you know , but every , every , every 

538
00:18:55,244 --> 00:18:57,467
combatant commander with the geographic 

539
00:18:57,467 --> 00:18:56,849
responsibility still has missile 

540
00:18:56,859 --> 00:18:58,970
defense responsibilities . Well , all 

541
00:18:58,970 --> 00:19:00,970
right , let me go back to my , what 

542
00:19:00,970 --> 00:19:03,081
would have been my first question and 

543
00:19:03,081 --> 00:19:05,303
I'll , uh , I guess I'll ask it of , of 

544
00:19:05,303 --> 00:19:09,160
uh Admiral Hill , uh GB I Patriot 

545
00:19:09,170 --> 00:19:12,640
do all are all or any of those systems 

546
00:19:12,650 --> 00:19:15,180
uh effective against a Sonic missile ? 

547
00:19:17,280 --> 00:19:19,502
Thanks . Thanks for the question . Um I 

548
00:19:19,502 --> 00:19:21,949
would say that we have um capability 

549
00:19:21,959 --> 00:19:24,790
within Patriot . Uh It is not uh it was 

550
00:19:24,800 --> 00:19:26,856
not a requirement that flowed to the 

551
00:19:26,856 --> 00:19:28,744
system , but it's got the natural 

552
00:19:28,744 --> 00:19:30,911
ability to do it because it's a , it's 

553
00:19:30,911 --> 00:19:30,859
a cruise missile killer . And if you 

554
00:19:30,869 --> 00:19:33,147
have a fast maneuvering cruise missile , 

555
00:19:33,147 --> 00:19:35,258
it can bite off part of that threat . 

556
00:19:35,258 --> 00:19:37,202
Uh When you look at the S M six uh 

557
00:19:37,202 --> 00:19:39,229
within uh has been dealing with 

558
00:19:39,239 --> 00:19:41,810
maneuvering low on the deck uh threats 

559
00:19:41,819 --> 00:19:44,449
uh for years , I would say decades and 

560
00:19:44,459 --> 00:19:46,515
taking that missile with its ability 

561
00:19:46,515 --> 00:19:48,626
and going after hypersonic makes good 

562
00:19:48,626 --> 00:19:50,792
sense , which is why we use it for sea 

563
00:19:50,792 --> 00:19:52,848
base terminal that operates right on 

564
00:19:52,848 --> 00:19:54,903
the edge of the atmosphere . It's an 

565
00:19:54,903 --> 00:19:56,959
energetic missile . It's got a great 

566
00:19:56,959 --> 00:19:59,181
hit to kill uh record behind it . Uh We 

567
00:19:59,181 --> 00:20:01,070
haven't tested against hypersonic 

568
00:20:01,070 --> 00:20:03,126
threats , but I believe there's like 

569
00:20:03,126 --> 00:20:05,181
Patriot and like just there's likely 

570
00:20:05,181 --> 00:20:07,292
some capability that can be leveraged 

571
00:20:07,292 --> 00:20:09,180
there . Um 

572
00:20:12,310 --> 00:20:14,199
Why not more emphasis on directed 

573
00:20:14,199 --> 00:20:16,839
energy ? A missile ? A bullet on a 

574
00:20:16,849 --> 00:20:18,905
bullet is an expensive proposition . 

575
00:20:18,905 --> 00:20:20,793
How much ? Well , let me ask that 

576
00:20:20,793 --> 00:20:22,682
question , how much is a , uh , a 

577
00:20:22,682 --> 00:20:25,359
single thad bullet ? I'll , I'll give 

578
00:20:25,369 --> 00:20:27,800
you a range between patriot up to uh S 

579
00:20:27,810 --> 00:20:29,977
M three and they range everywhere from 

580
00:20:29,977 --> 00:20:32,088
four million , up to 10 million or so 

581
00:20:32,088 --> 00:20:34,199
per shot , per shot . Yes , sir . And 

582
00:20:34,199 --> 00:20:36,310
then I'll also , uh , just to kind of 

583
00:20:36,310 --> 00:20:38,532
follow up on direct energy , you know , 

584
00:20:38,532 --> 00:20:40,643
to be effective , you have to be on a 

585
00:20:40,643 --> 00:20:42,643
target for some period of time with 

586
00:20:42,643 --> 00:20:45,219
high energy , right ? Uh Today , that 

587
00:20:45,229 --> 00:20:48,390
high energy uh is scaling its way there . 

588
00:20:48,500 --> 00:20:50,722
It's also got to be on a platform where 

589
00:20:50,722 --> 00:20:52,833
it can be transported uh that scaling 

590
00:20:52,833 --> 00:20:55,056
effort to draw down the amount of power 

591
00:20:55,056 --> 00:20:57,430
usage and the space and weight that 

592
00:20:57,439 --> 00:20:59,790
that work is being done today . Uh But 

593
00:20:59,800 --> 00:21:02,022
when you done with a sense of urgency , 

594
00:21:02,022 --> 00:21:04,078
I've been asking these questions for 

595
00:21:04,078 --> 00:21:06,022
about five years and I don't get a 

596
00:21:06,022 --> 00:21:07,744
sense of urgency in the in the 

597
00:21:07,744 --> 00:21:09,689
department on on directed energy , 

598
00:21:09,689 --> 00:21:12,469
which to me is clearly preferable to a 

599
00:21:12,479 --> 00:21:15,150
$4 million bullet . Yes , sir . And I 

600
00:21:15,160 --> 00:21:17,216
agree and I think the department has 

601
00:21:17,216 --> 00:21:19,382
done great work by consolidating those 

602
00:21:19,382 --> 00:21:21,604
efforts to specifically talk to scaling 

603
00:21:21,604 --> 00:21:23,827
in terms of power , uh power out of the 

604
00:21:23,827 --> 00:21:26,060
laser . Uh what it takes to put that 

605
00:21:26,069 --> 00:21:28,125
laser on the target . But let's talk 

606
00:21:28,125 --> 00:21:30,347
about the target for a second , right ? 

607
00:21:30,347 --> 00:21:32,458
We're using them now generally for uh 

608
00:21:32,458 --> 00:21:34,760
unmanned air vehicles , right , smaller 

609
00:21:34,770 --> 00:21:36,937
loitering uh kind of vehicles when you 

610
00:21:36,937 --> 00:21:38,937
talk about very fast moving targets 

611
00:21:38,937 --> 00:21:41,048
that were designed to operate in very 

612
00:21:41,048 --> 00:21:43,270
high heat environments and you're gonna 

613
00:21:43,270 --> 00:21:45,381
try to take them out with high heat . 

614
00:21:45,381 --> 00:21:47,714
That's a really tough equation to close . 

615
00:21:47,714 --> 00:21:50,680
Um So more investment is required more 

616
00:21:50,689 --> 00:21:52,745
uh focus on getting to those areas , 

617
00:21:52,745 --> 00:21:54,411
but it is , it is science and 

618
00:21:54,411 --> 00:21:56,522
engineering right now . That's , that 

619
00:21:56,522 --> 00:21:56,469
just happens to be where we are today , 

620
00:21:56,479 --> 00:21:58,423
sir . Thank you , Senator Fisher . 

621
00:21:59,130 --> 00:22:01,489
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Uh Doctor 

622
00:22:01,500 --> 00:22:03,540
Plum . How does the budget request 

623
00:22:03,550 --> 00:22:06,719
support the development and fielding of 

624
00:22:06,729 --> 00:22:08,896
an integrated air and missile dispense 

625
00:22:08,896 --> 00:22:12,119
system for Guam ? Uh 

626
00:22:12,609 --> 00:22:15,439
Thank you , Senator . There's a $1.5 

627
00:22:15,449 --> 00:22:17,780
billion in the budget for F Y 24 

628
00:22:17,790 --> 00:22:20,500
between I think roughly 900 million in 

629
00:22:20,510 --> 00:22:22,510
MD A and 600 million for the army , 

630
00:22:22,510 --> 00:22:24,732
although I may have those reversed . Uh 

631
00:22:24,732 --> 00:22:27,066
But there's a lot of money towards that . 

632
00:22:27,066 --> 00:22:29,066
Uh And we are working to try to get 

633
00:22:29,066 --> 00:22:31,288
initial capability there and then build 

634
00:22:31,288 --> 00:22:33,399
out on that . And I actually think uh 

635
00:22:33,399 --> 00:22:33,349
well , actually , frankly , I think 

636
00:22:33,359 --> 00:22:35,415
Admiral Hill might have something to 

637
00:22:35,415 --> 00:22:37,526
add on the , the sequencing of that . 

638
00:22:37,526 --> 00:22:39,526
But the goal is how fast can we get 

639
00:22:39,526 --> 00:22:41,692
some capability then build out on it ? 

640
00:22:41,692 --> 00:22:41,510
And of course , the challenge of 360 

641
00:22:41,520 --> 00:22:43,576
degrees against all the different uh 

642
00:22:43,576 --> 00:22:45,800
types of missile threats is a new one 

643
00:22:45,810 --> 00:22:48,630
for that sizable area . Admiral Hill in 

644
00:22:48,640 --> 00:22:50,751
this setting . Uh What can you add to 

645
00:22:50,751 --> 00:22:52,918
that and , and the progress that we're 

646
00:22:52,920 --> 00:22:56,319
making . And um if you can , um 

647
00:22:56,569 --> 00:22:58,513
some of the challenges that , that 

648
00:22:58,513 --> 00:23:00,680
you're facing on deployment . Uh Yes , 

649
00:23:00,680 --> 00:23:02,625
ma'am . First , I'll say we have a 

650
00:23:02,625 --> 00:23:04,569
great partnership with the army in 

651
00:23:04,569 --> 00:23:06,791
terms of the system development , great 

652
00:23:06,791 --> 00:23:08,902
partnership with the Navy in terms of 

653
00:23:08,902 --> 00:23:10,902
identifying the sites on where this 

654
00:23:10,902 --> 00:23:12,847
equipment would go . And we have a 

655
00:23:12,847 --> 00:23:15,069
really tough customer named a Laino who 

656
00:23:15,069 --> 00:23:17,619
uh constantly uh drives us to get there 

657
00:23:17,630 --> 00:23:19,519
as early as we can and he removes 

658
00:23:19,519 --> 00:23:21,741
barriers for us to do that . One of the 

659
00:23:21,741 --> 00:23:23,797
hardest things we're doing right now 

660
00:23:23,797 --> 00:23:26,339
this year in 23 is site selection and 

661
00:23:26,349 --> 00:23:28,460
the start of the environmental impact 

662
00:23:28,460 --> 00:23:30,890
surveys , you have to do that . Um We 

663
00:23:30,900 --> 00:23:32,956
have the sites selected . Uh we know 

664
00:23:32,956 --> 00:23:35,067
that once we go to those sites and do 

665
00:23:35,067 --> 00:23:37,122
more work that we may not be able to 

666
00:23:37,122 --> 00:23:39,344
land on all those sites . Uh There's uh 

667
00:23:39,344 --> 00:23:41,567
a dozen or so sites uh about uh half of 

668
00:23:41,567 --> 00:23:43,678
those are for MD A and the other half 

669
00:23:43,678 --> 00:23:45,733
army , that's a real challenge . But 

670
00:23:45,733 --> 00:23:48,067
the good news is while we're doing that , 

671
00:23:48,067 --> 00:23:49,733
we haven't slowed down on the 

672
00:23:49,733 --> 00:23:51,844
development . The army is moving very 

673
00:23:51,844 --> 00:23:54,011
quickly . The I B CS system . Uh MD is 

674
00:23:54,011 --> 00:23:56,122
moving very quickly on the capability 

675
00:23:56,122 --> 00:23:55,800
and we're doing something different 

676
00:23:55,810 --> 00:23:57,890
with , it's not a consolidated deck 

677
00:23:57,900 --> 00:24:00,122
house like you see on a ship , it's not 

678
00:24:00,122 --> 00:24:02,344
radars overlooking the launcher so they 

679
00:24:02,344 --> 00:24:04,344
can immediately capture the missile 

680
00:24:04,344 --> 00:24:06,456
upon launch , the radars are external 

681
00:24:06,456 --> 00:24:08,678
to get to the 360 degree coverage along 

682
00:24:08,678 --> 00:24:10,844
with the army radar systems associated 

683
00:24:10,844 --> 00:24:12,511
with I B CS . So it's a tough 

684
00:24:12,511 --> 00:24:14,622
engineering challenge just because of 

685
00:24:14,622 --> 00:24:17,069
uh the physical lay down and the land 

686
00:24:17,079 --> 00:24:18,912
use and the environmental impact 

687
00:24:18,912 --> 00:24:21,135
surveys are definitely challenged . But 

688
00:24:21,135 --> 00:24:23,246
we're gonna come through those within 

689
00:24:23,246 --> 00:24:22,459
the next couple of years and you'll 

690
00:24:22,469 --> 00:24:24,691
start to see the capability land on the 

691
00:24:24,691 --> 00:24:26,525
island progressively . And I owe 

692
00:24:26,525 --> 00:24:28,640
Admiral Alino a year by year status 

693
00:24:28,650 --> 00:24:30,428
update on where we are with the 

694
00:24:30,428 --> 00:24:32,594
integration and the operations of that 

695
00:24:32,594 --> 00:24:34,594
material . Thank you . Uh Secretary 

696
00:24:34,594 --> 00:24:38,339
Plum Section 16 60 of the F Y 2023 

697
00:24:38,420 --> 00:24:41,150
N D A A required the secretary to 

698
00:24:41,160 --> 00:24:43,439
designate a senior , a single senior 

699
00:24:43,449 --> 00:24:45,729
official to be responsible for the Miss 

700
00:24:45,739 --> 00:24:48,250
missile defense of Guam . How close is 

701
00:24:48,260 --> 00:24:49,927
the department to making that 

702
00:24:49,927 --> 00:24:52,369
designation ? Uh Senator , we're pretty 

703
00:24:52,380 --> 00:24:54,269
close . We already held a missile 

704
00:24:54,269 --> 00:24:56,380
defense executive board that's run by 

705
00:24:56,380 --> 00:24:58,547
uh under Secretary La Plante and under 

706
00:24:58,547 --> 00:25:00,769
Secretary Xu . On this issue , we still 

707
00:25:00,769 --> 00:25:02,380
have to get the , you know , 

708
00:25:02,380 --> 00:25:04,491
recommendation staffed up and through 

709
00:25:04,491 --> 00:25:06,713
the secretary , but it it is in train . 

710
00:25:07,069 --> 00:25:09,699
Ok . In general . How does the high ups 

711
00:25:09,709 --> 00:25:12,939
tempo rate for air defenders on Guam 

712
00:25:12,949 --> 00:25:15,420
impact the quality of life for soldiers 

713
00:25:15,430 --> 00:25:18,109
with uh their families that they have 

714
00:25:18,119 --> 00:25:20,410
there as well ? I 

715
00:25:22,930 --> 00:25:23,930
think it . 

716
00:25:28,699 --> 00:25:31,719
Ok . Uh We've had uh soldiers on uh 

717
00:25:31,729 --> 00:25:34,390
Guam since 2013 . So for 10 years , 

718
00:25:34,400 --> 00:25:36,709
we've had the Thaad Battery there . Uh 

719
00:25:36,719 --> 00:25:38,886
Initially it was a year deployment and 

720
00:25:38,886 --> 00:25:41,052
then we transitioned that into a three 

721
00:25:41,052 --> 00:25:42,997
year P CS so that they could bring 

722
00:25:42,997 --> 00:25:42,880
dependents and families there . So 

723
00:25:42,890 --> 00:25:45,420
we've learned lessons from the Thaad 

724
00:25:45,489 --> 00:25:47,433
Battery being on Guam that we will 

725
00:25:47,433 --> 00:25:49,839
apply as we go forward . Uh One of the , 

726
00:25:50,140 --> 00:25:52,140
one of the critical elements is the 

727
00:25:52,140 --> 00:25:54,459
fact that the infrastructure in 

728
00:25:54,469 --> 00:25:56,247
addition to the missile defense 

729
00:25:56,247 --> 00:25:58,580
capability that we , that we will bring . 

730
00:25:58,580 --> 00:26:00,580
We also have got to ensure that the 

731
00:26:00,580 --> 00:26:02,525
infrastructure is there to support 

732
00:26:02,525 --> 00:26:04,747
soldiers and family . And that is a key 

733
00:26:04,747 --> 00:26:06,802
point that that we have brought up . 

734
00:26:06,802 --> 00:26:08,913
And I know General Flynn at is making 

735
00:26:08,913 --> 00:26:11,136
sure that he emphasizes as well . Thank 

736
00:26:11,136 --> 00:26:13,080
you as , as we move forward on the 

737
00:26:13,080 --> 00:26:15,310
timeline that that the admiral pointed 

738
00:26:15,319 --> 00:26:17,152
out , it's important to get that 

739
00:26:17,152 --> 00:26:19,660
infrastructure in place correct . Yes , 

740
00:26:19,670 --> 00:26:21,614
ma'am . And that structure will be 

741
00:26:21,614 --> 00:26:23,670
added to the army that will not come 

742
00:26:23,670 --> 00:26:25,892
from the current structure that we have 

743
00:26:25,892 --> 00:26:28,059
recognized in the temple of challenges 

744
00:26:28,059 --> 00:26:30,281
that we have within the air and missile 

745
00:26:30,281 --> 00:26:32,392
defense force today , General Van Hek 

746
00:26:32,392 --> 00:26:34,392
North com and NORAD are required to 

747
00:26:34,392 --> 00:26:36,614
track various threats to our homeland . 

748
00:26:36,614 --> 00:26:38,503
And I appreciated our discussions 

749
00:26:38,503 --> 00:26:40,670
earlier this year on some of the items 

750
00:26:40,670 --> 00:26:42,875
on your unfunded priorities list that 

751
00:26:42,885 --> 00:26:44,663
would help increase that domain 

752
00:26:44,663 --> 00:26:46,844
awareness . Are there additional 

753
00:26:46,854 --> 00:26:49,125
changes that the department can make in 

754
00:26:49,135 --> 00:26:51,964
order to field capabilities faster ? 

755
00:26:51,974 --> 00:26:54,484
For example , using digital engineering 

756
00:26:54,494 --> 00:26:56,864
during the development or increasing 

757
00:26:56,875 --> 00:27:00,660
testing uh tempo . We had 

758
00:27:00,670 --> 00:27:02,939
some good examples that you gave us 

759
00:27:02,949 --> 00:27:05,819
earlier on limits that you face . 

760
00:27:05,829 --> 00:27:08,160
Certainly , Senator , I think 

761
00:27:08,170 --> 00:27:10,569
culturally we're an industrial age 

762
00:27:10,579 --> 00:27:12,969
department transitioning into a digital 

763
00:27:12,979 --> 00:27:16,020
age . Um I recently went to a major uh 

764
00:27:16,030 --> 00:27:18,270
defense uh firm . I'll just say that 

765
00:27:18,280 --> 00:27:20,391
who's building a capability , who has 

766
00:27:20,391 --> 00:27:22,410
embraced the digital aspect of uh 

767
00:27:22,420 --> 00:27:24,930
buying down risk during uh multiple 

768
00:27:24,939 --> 00:27:26,995
portions . So I think there's things 

769
00:27:26,995 --> 00:27:29,328
that we can do in a virtual environment , 

770
00:27:29,328 --> 00:27:31,439
we can do things . Now , what I would 

771
00:27:31,439 --> 00:27:33,550
say is in parallel , not serial as we 

772
00:27:33,550 --> 00:27:35,699
develop capabilities to buy down risk 

773
00:27:35,709 --> 00:27:37,760
and to go faster in the long run . 

774
00:27:39,989 --> 00:27:42,119
Can I just have one follow up there ? 

775
00:27:42,339 --> 00:27:44,117
Uh Secretary Plum , do you have 

776
00:27:44,117 --> 00:27:46,339
anything to add to that ? You know , um 

777
00:27:46,680 --> 00:27:49,013
to me what , what the general just said , 

778
00:27:49,013 --> 00:27:51,180
it kind of shows the importance of the 

779
00:27:51,180 --> 00:27:54,119
organ organizational set up that is uh 

780
00:27:54,130 --> 00:27:56,630
currently in place with you guys here 

781
00:27:56,640 --> 00:27:59,140
at the table that , that uh Senator 

782
00:27:59,150 --> 00:28:01,680
King referred to in his uh first 

783
00:28:01,689 --> 00:28:04,489
question to you . Am I reading that 

784
00:28:04,500 --> 00:28:05,020
right ? 

785
00:28:08,880 --> 00:28:11,180
You can so you can work in parallel 

786
00:28:11,520 --> 00:28:15,319
instead of in serial or am I just gonna 

787
00:28:15,890 --> 00:28:18,329
he ? So he is my colleague here . I 

788
00:28:18,339 --> 00:28:20,640
think uh what General van he's getting 

789
00:28:20,650 --> 00:28:22,839
at is if you can uh transition to 

790
00:28:22,849 --> 00:28:25,479
digital design , you can change uh your 

791
00:28:25,489 --> 00:28:27,656
plans and your structure and even what 

792
00:28:27,656 --> 00:28:29,656
you build faster because you have a 

793
00:28:29,656 --> 00:28:31,711
much quicker feedback loop into your 

794
00:28:31,711 --> 00:28:33,822
system . And I think some of the more 

795
00:28:33,822 --> 00:28:35,822
forward leaning , uh , parts of the 

796
00:28:35,822 --> 00:28:38,045
industrial base and even the commercial 

797
00:28:38,045 --> 00:28:40,211
base have figured this out . And , you 

798
00:28:40,211 --> 00:28:42,045
know , I'm , I'm happily not the 

799
00:28:42,045 --> 00:28:43,878
acquisition person , but I fully 

800
00:28:43,878 --> 00:28:45,711
support moving faster , uh , and 

801
00:28:45,711 --> 00:28:47,656
smarter , especially when it saves 

802
00:28:47,656 --> 00:28:49,878
money and gets this capability sooner . 

803
00:28:49,878 --> 00:28:51,933
And we do as well , which I think is 

804
00:28:51,933 --> 00:28:54,156
important to be able to have , um , the 

805
00:28:54,156 --> 00:28:57,150
focus that , that General Carb has and 

806
00:28:57,160 --> 00:28:59,216
that Admiral Hill has to be able for 

807
00:28:59,216 --> 00:29:01,310
them to have that focus on , on what 

808
00:29:01,319 --> 00:29:03,729
they're trying to accomplish and get 

809
00:29:03,739 --> 00:29:06,869
done under the current organization . 

810
00:29:07,650 --> 00:29:11,079
Does that make sense ? No . Yes . 

811
00:29:11,459 --> 00:29:14,439
Thank you , Senator Brown . Thank you , 

812
00:29:14,449 --> 00:29:17,540
Mr Chairman General Van Huk . Last July , 

813
00:29:17,550 --> 00:29:19,328
you told reporters at the Aspen 

814
00:29:19,328 --> 00:29:21,550
security Forum , that arrow's formation 

815
00:29:21,650 --> 00:29:24,739
did not change how no ad did business 

816
00:29:24,750 --> 00:29:26,694
following the events involving the 

817
00:29:26,694 --> 00:29:28,694
Chinese high altitude balloon . And 

818
00:29:28,694 --> 00:29:31,199
three U A P S has no ad increased its 

819
00:29:31,209 --> 00:29:33,376
coordination with arrow . And have you 

820
00:29:33,376 --> 00:29:35,670
begun to identify a higher volume of 

821
00:29:35,680 --> 00:29:37,513
unidentified aerial phenomenon ? 

822
00:29:38,099 --> 00:29:40,266
Senator Ab Absolutely . As a matter of 

823
00:29:40,266 --> 00:29:42,910
fact , uh uh the lead of a came out to 

824
00:29:42,920 --> 00:29:45,040
NORAD North gave us a visit , uh , 

825
00:29:45,160 --> 00:29:49,099
working much closer on the challenges 

826
00:29:49,109 --> 00:29:51,369
that we face . Uh ensuring that we're 

827
00:29:51,380 --> 00:29:54,290
sharing data and information uh from 

828
00:29:54,300 --> 00:29:57,390
anything that we see or do not see , uh 

829
00:29:57,400 --> 00:29:59,233
to ensure that we pass it to the 

830
00:29:59,233 --> 00:30:01,067
organization so they can further 

831
00:30:01,067 --> 00:30:04,189
investigate it Absolutely . And um the 

832
00:30:04,199 --> 00:30:06,790
last time we had a hearing with a , we 

833
00:30:06,800 --> 00:30:09,680
discussed uh investing in over the 

834
00:30:09,689 --> 00:30:12,530
Horizon radar and other type of new 

835
00:30:12,540 --> 00:30:15,390
sensors that would help with collection . 

836
00:30:15,579 --> 00:30:17,746
Have you been consulted on any of that 

837
00:30:17,746 --> 00:30:20,099
discussion ? I've been heavily involved 

838
00:30:20,109 --> 00:30:22,220
in the discussions on over the rising 

839
00:30:22,220 --> 00:30:24,331
radar with both Canada and the United 

840
00:30:24,331 --> 00:30:26,640
States . Uh The department is funding 

841
00:30:26,650 --> 00:30:28,872
over Horizon Four for the United States 

842
00:30:28,872 --> 00:30:31,229
and Canada has announced too . Uh So , 

843
00:30:31,239 --> 00:30:33,517
absolutely yes , I'm directly involved . 

844
00:30:33,517 --> 00:30:36,280
And have you um been in the discussions 

845
00:30:36,290 --> 00:30:38,739
about the type of sensors that could be 

846
00:30:38,750 --> 00:30:42,569
used or deployed to garner information 

847
00:30:42,579 --> 00:30:44,800
specifically for the air space that we 

848
00:30:44,810 --> 00:30:47,260
don't really look , look at because 

849
00:30:47,270 --> 00:30:50,599
it's not related to missiles . I'm not 

850
00:30:50,609 --> 00:30:52,720
sure I understand that . So I uh more 

851
00:30:52,720 --> 00:30:54,720
broadly , uh I would , I would just 

852
00:30:54,720 --> 00:30:56,887
tell you that over the rising radar is 

853
00:30:56,887 --> 00:30:58,942
not the end all be all solution that 

854
00:30:58,942 --> 00:31:01,053
will give me domain awareness further 

855
00:31:01,053 --> 00:31:02,998
away from the homeland . I'm still 

856
00:31:02,998 --> 00:31:05,109
confident in my ability to detect the 

857
00:31:05,109 --> 00:31:07,053
balloons that we saw the PR C high 

858
00:31:07,053 --> 00:31:09,220
altitude balloon and the subsequent uh 

859
00:31:09,220 --> 00:31:11,387
objects that we we saw and shot down . 

860
00:31:11,387 --> 00:31:13,498
But that's not the end . All be there 

861
00:31:13,498 --> 00:31:15,665
has to be domain awareness between the 

862
00:31:15,665 --> 00:31:17,831
over the horizon radars that links the 

863
00:31:17,831 --> 00:31:20,270
data from there to an in game effector . 

864
00:31:20,280 --> 00:31:22,280
And so there needs to be additional 

865
00:31:22,280 --> 00:31:24,502
domain awareness . We need to look more 

866
00:31:24,502 --> 00:31:26,169
broadly at the rest of the uh 

867
00:31:26,169 --> 00:31:28,336
infrastructure the radars as well . Uh 

868
00:31:28,336 --> 00:31:31,069
and ensure the data from those systems 

869
00:31:31,079 --> 00:31:33,400
is incorporated in an integrated air 

870
00:31:33,410 --> 00:31:35,560
and missile defense system that can 

871
00:31:35,569 --> 00:31:37,791
lead to effectors . And I'll go back to 

872
00:31:37,791 --> 00:31:40,089
the comments of the chairman . Um I'm 

873
00:31:40,099 --> 00:31:42,270
focused not on in game kinetic kill . 

874
00:31:42,280 --> 00:31:45,010
I'm focused primarily on of the policy 

875
00:31:45,020 --> 00:31:46,890
for what we must uh have in game 

876
00:31:46,900 --> 00:31:49,609
kinetic kill , but more broadly for 

877
00:31:49,619 --> 00:31:51,841
developing capabilities such as the use 

878
00:31:51,841 --> 00:31:53,952
of the electromagnetic spectrum , non 

879
00:31:53,952 --> 00:31:56,550
kinetic effectors to deny and deceive 

880
00:31:56,560 --> 00:31:59,030
in limited area or wide area defense 

881
00:31:59,040 --> 00:32:01,219
capabilities to include the use of 

882
00:32:01,229 --> 00:32:03,260
autonomous unmanned platforms with 

883
00:32:03,270 --> 00:32:05,214
domain awareness capabilities that 

884
00:32:05,214 --> 00:32:07,270
could be maritime and airborne . And 

885
00:32:07,270 --> 00:32:10,140
are you coordinating that those 

886
00:32:10,150 --> 00:32:12,729
recommendations and those plans with 

887
00:32:12,739 --> 00:32:16,479
Arrow ? Um I not directly 

888
00:32:16,489 --> 00:32:19,280
with Arrow right now , uh Senator uh 

889
00:32:19,300 --> 00:32:21,599
into the department which I'm assuming 

890
00:32:21,609 --> 00:32:24,079
the department's gonna pull in arrow uh 

891
00:32:24,130 --> 00:32:26,380
as part of that . So right now , uh 

892
00:32:26,390 --> 00:32:28,550
we're , we're rooking the policy for 

893
00:32:28,560 --> 00:32:30,930
homeland defense . Uh I have provided 

894
00:32:30,939 --> 00:32:32,995
my commander's estimate , which is a 

895
00:32:32,995 --> 00:32:35,329
plan for that . Uh I'm also in the 

896
00:32:35,339 --> 00:32:37,349
middle of developing what I call 

897
00:32:37,359 --> 00:32:40,890
homeland defense design . 2035 which 

898
00:32:40,900 --> 00:32:43,067
gets after exactly what I talked about 

899
00:32:43,067 --> 00:32:45,178
a new way of defending the homeland . 

900
00:32:45,178 --> 00:32:47,233
And that's vastly different than the 

901
00:32:47,233 --> 00:32:49,456
way we do it today with fighters , tank 

902
00:32:49,456 --> 00:32:51,622
tankers , a wax those kind of things . 

903
00:32:51,622 --> 00:32:53,622
I appreciate that . And I'm looking 

904
00:32:53,622 --> 00:32:55,859
forward to that myself . Um We've heard 

905
00:32:55,869 --> 00:32:57,925
uh that our radar sites depending on 

906
00:32:57,925 --> 00:33:00,091
who you asked are based on 19 eighties 

907
00:33:00,091 --> 00:33:01,758
technology or 19 nineties era 

908
00:33:01,758 --> 00:33:04,150
technology and 19 sixties era decision 

909
00:33:04,160 --> 00:33:07,589
process . Um How I assume based on your 

910
00:33:07,599 --> 00:33:10,420
last answer that you are improving the 

911
00:33:10,430 --> 00:33:12,390
Northern war warning system and 

912
00:33:12,400 --> 00:33:14,289
bringing other critical defensive 

913
00:33:14,289 --> 00:33:16,511
infrastructure to be fully modernized . 

914
00:33:16,511 --> 00:33:18,678
So the over the horizon radars will be 

915
00:33:18,678 --> 00:33:20,678
addition to the , the north warning 

916
00:33:20,678 --> 00:33:22,844
systems . The department hasn't made a 

917
00:33:22,844 --> 00:33:25,011
decision on modernization of the north 

918
00:33:25,011 --> 00:33:26,979
warning system uh or uh further 

919
00:33:26,989 --> 00:33:30,089
replacement of uh the radars associated 

920
00:33:30,099 --> 00:33:32,099
with the north warning system . But 

921
00:33:32,099 --> 00:33:34,432
that has to be a discussion like I said , 

922
00:33:34,432 --> 00:33:36,432
00 T hr is not the end , all be all 

923
00:33:36,432 --> 00:33:38,599
solution understood . So are you gonna 

924
00:33:38,599 --> 00:33:40,655
give us recommendations for updating 

925
00:33:40,655 --> 00:33:42,821
the northern warning system uh as part 

926
00:33:42,821 --> 00:33:44,932
of the re look at homeland defense uh 

927
00:33:44,932 --> 00:33:47,210
and the policy study ongoing right now , 

928
00:33:47,210 --> 00:33:49,266
that has to absolutely be part of uh 

929
00:33:49,266 --> 00:33:51,432
the , the way forward . I look forward 

930
00:33:51,432 --> 00:33:53,377
to seeing that um Admiral Hill , I 

931
00:33:53,377 --> 00:33:55,729
still have time , right ? 30 seconds . 

932
00:33:55,739 --> 00:33:57,906
Ok . I , I , I , I didn't know if your 

933
00:33:57,906 --> 00:34:00,128
tap was hurry up . I didn't know it was 

934
00:34:00,128 --> 00:34:02,183
a hurry up tap . Ok , Admiral Hill , 

935
00:34:02,183 --> 00:34:04,072
while at the House Armed Services 

936
00:34:04,072 --> 00:34:06,017
Committee hearing in March General 

937
00:34:06,017 --> 00:34:08,183
Milley told Congresswoman Stefani that 

938
00:34:08,183 --> 00:34:10,295
he believed a potential third missile 

939
00:34:10,295 --> 00:34:10,090
defense site at Fort Drum would be 

940
00:34:10,100 --> 00:34:12,322
strategically worthwhile . Do you agree 

941
00:34:12,322 --> 00:34:14,100
with that assessment ? And what 

942
00:34:14,100 --> 00:34:16,100
advantage does this provide us when 

943
00:34:16,100 --> 00:34:18,322
dealing with a potential nuclear threat 

944
00:34:18,322 --> 00:34:20,489
from Iran ? Uh Yes , ma'am . Uh During 

945
00:34:20,489 --> 00:34:22,656
my last testimony , I did mention that 

946
00:34:22,656 --> 00:34:24,822
I support the uh the chairman's con uh 

947
00:34:24,822 --> 00:34:26,933
comments . Uh I think uh another site 

948
00:34:26,933 --> 00:34:28,989
uh you , you can never have too many 

949
00:34:28,989 --> 00:34:31,100
sensors , you can never have too many 

950
00:34:31,100 --> 00:34:33,267
uh factors uh to deal with the kind of 

951
00:34:33,267 --> 00:34:35,433
threats that we're dealing with . Um I 

952
00:34:35,433 --> 00:34:37,656
do think it's part of uh a mix of other 

953
00:34:37,656 --> 00:34:39,711
options that we can look at . And so 

954
00:34:39,711 --> 00:34:39,610
we're , we're doing a study now that we 

955
00:34:39,620 --> 00:34:41,731
owe back to the hill uh by the end of 

956
00:34:41,731 --> 00:34:43,842
June . And so we'll complete that and 

957
00:34:43,842 --> 00:34:45,898
deliver that . Ok . Uh Mr Chairman , 

958
00:34:45,898 --> 00:34:48,064
I'm gonna submit a question uh for the 

959
00:34:48,064 --> 00:34:50,120
record concerning Cyber to Secretary 

960
00:34:50,120 --> 00:34:52,679
Plum . Thank you , Senator Kramer . 

961
00:34:54,178 --> 00:34:56,345
Thank you , Mr Chairman , Vice Admiral 

962
00:34:56,345 --> 00:34:58,567
Hill . I'm gonna start with you just to 

963
00:34:58,567 --> 00:35:00,622
relieve um , General Van Huk , who's 

964
00:35:00,622 --> 00:35:02,900
thinking he's gonna ask me about parks ? 

965
00:35:02,900 --> 00:35:02,319
I know he's gonna ask me about parks . 

966
00:35:02,329 --> 00:35:04,628
He always ask me about parks . Um , so 

967
00:35:04,638 --> 00:35:07,138
I , I maybe building on what he has 

968
00:35:07,148 --> 00:35:09,204
just been talking about , maybe I'll 

969
00:35:09,204 --> 00:35:11,148
get back to him as well to , to uh 

970
00:35:11,148 --> 00:35:13,259
Senator Gillibrand , what role does 

971
00:35:13,269 --> 00:35:16,909
ground based radar play ? And 

972
00:35:16,919 --> 00:35:19,141
since I brought up ground base and what 

973
00:35:19,141 --> 00:35:21,308
about parks and what , what do you see 

974
00:35:21,308 --> 00:35:23,363
as the future for parks in , in this 

975
00:35:23,363 --> 00:35:25,308
transition , at least to , to more 

976
00:35:25,308 --> 00:35:27,530
space , space , I , I believe the parks 

977
00:35:27,530 --> 00:35:29,475
radar is owned and operated by the 

978
00:35:29,475 --> 00:35:31,641
Space Force . Um We , we did and , and 

979
00:35:31,641 --> 00:35:33,863
continue to assess the utility of it um 

980
00:35:33,863 --> 00:35:35,919
based on where our threat uh regions 

981
00:35:35,929 --> 00:35:38,320
are and our focus for our sensor 

982
00:35:38,330 --> 00:35:40,441
architecture . Uh Right now , Park is 

983
00:35:40,441 --> 00:35:42,330
not a part of the overall missile 

984
00:35:42,330 --> 00:35:44,441
defense architecture . Uh I think the 

985
00:35:44,441 --> 00:35:46,774
space force has ideas for it . I'm just , 

986
00:35:46,774 --> 00:35:48,997
I'm not familiar with them yet , so I'd 

987
00:35:48,997 --> 00:35:48,409
probably have to go back and do some . 

988
00:35:48,449 --> 00:35:50,671
So does that mean I have to ask General 

989
00:35:50,671 --> 00:35:52,893
Van ? He again , um to , to , to remind 

990
00:35:52,893 --> 00:35:54,949
us of the importance of Park's short 

991
00:35:54,949 --> 00:35:57,229
term , uh you know , midterm , maybe 

992
00:35:57,239 --> 00:36:00,709
long , long term General , there's 100 

993
00:36:00,719 --> 00:36:03,580
and $80 million there's 100 and $8 

994
00:36:03,590 --> 00:36:05,423
million in the , the president's 

995
00:36:05,423 --> 00:36:07,312
request in F Y 24 for Parks to go 

996
00:36:07,312 --> 00:36:09,257
forward . It's crucial for missile 

997
00:36:09,257 --> 00:36:12,520
warning today as we go forward . Uh And 

998
00:36:12,770 --> 00:36:14,770
uh the proliferated low earth orbit 

999
00:36:14,770 --> 00:36:16,770
capabilities come online , then I'm 

1000
00:36:16,770 --> 00:36:18,881
sure the department will reassess the 

1001
00:36:18,881 --> 00:36:20,937
need . Uh And I'm confident if uh if 

1002
00:36:20,937 --> 00:36:22,992
it's still required , the department 

1003
00:36:22,992 --> 00:36:25,239
will continue to fund it . The policy 

1004
00:36:25,250 --> 00:36:27,320
that you're visiting with uh Senator 

1005
00:36:27,330 --> 00:36:29,552
Gillibrand about , when would we expect 

1006
00:36:29,552 --> 00:36:32,560
that ? And how would that affect ? Say 

1007
00:36:32,570 --> 00:36:34,626
a budget a year from now ? Two years 

1008
00:36:34,626 --> 00:36:36,959
from now ? Um As we're , as we're 

1009
00:36:36,969 --> 00:36:39,409
trying to , you know , be , move at the 

1010
00:36:39,419 --> 00:36:42,060
pace of China ? Yeah , I defer to the 

1011
00:36:42,070 --> 00:36:44,237
department on that . I , I expect that 

1012
00:36:44,237 --> 00:36:46,639
policy within weeks to a few months . 

1013
00:36:46,649 --> 00:36:49,050
Uh and it should inform the next budget 

1014
00:36:49,060 --> 00:36:52,560
cycle . Very good . Thank you . I'll 

1015
00:36:52,570 --> 00:36:54,848
yield back Mr Chairman . Thank you all . 

1016
00:36:54,860 --> 00:36:58,209
Thank you , Senator . Um , my 

1017
00:36:58,219 --> 00:37:00,219
impression and perhaps you have the 

1018
00:37:00,219 --> 00:37:03,510
figures , Mr Secretary is that we're 

1019
00:37:03,520 --> 00:37:05,742
spending a lot more money on developing 

1020
00:37:05,742 --> 00:37:07,687
hypersonic missiles than we are in 

1021
00:37:07,687 --> 00:37:09,909
defending against hypersonic missiles . 

1022
00:37:09,909 --> 00:37:13,510
Is that true ? I don't have , I don't 

1023
00:37:13,520 --> 00:37:15,576
have hard numbers on that , sir . Uh 

1024
00:37:15,576 --> 00:37:17,909
Take that for the record , please . Yes . 

1025
00:37:17,909 --> 00:37:19,687
And , and if , if I'm correctly 

1026
00:37:19,687 --> 00:37:21,687
informed that that is the case that 

1027
00:37:21,687 --> 00:37:23,742
we're spending more . It seems to me 

1028
00:37:23,742 --> 00:37:25,576
that , that we uh we ought to be 

1029
00:37:25,576 --> 00:37:27,520
reconsidering that in terms of the 

1030
00:37:27,520 --> 00:37:29,576
importance of defense . Uh Let me go 

1031
00:37:29,576 --> 00:37:31,631
back to my question . Admiral Hill . 

1032
00:37:31,631 --> 00:37:33,798
Can , can we stop a hypersonic missile 

1033
00:37:33,798 --> 00:37:35,909
today ? You're on an aircraft carrier 

1034
00:37:35,909 --> 00:37:38,020
in the Western Pacific , a hypersonic 

1035
00:37:38,020 --> 00:37:40,020
missiles , fires coming at you 7000 

1036
00:37:40,020 --> 00:37:41,742
miles an hour . Do we have the 

1037
00:37:41,742 --> 00:37:43,853
capability to stop that missile ? You 

1038
00:37:43,853 --> 00:37:45,964
have the capability to stop it in two 

1039
00:37:45,964 --> 00:37:47,964
places . Uh One is in its ballistic 

1040
00:37:47,964 --> 00:37:50,298
flight uh and it's a hypersonic missile . 

1041
00:37:50,298 --> 00:37:52,409
Does it necessarily go into ballistic 

1042
00:37:52,409 --> 00:37:54,464
flight ? Not all of them do ? Uh but 

1043
00:37:54,464 --> 00:37:54,239
the ones that are currently uh you know , 

1044
00:37:54,250 --> 00:37:56,472
in the , currently in the theater we're 

1045
00:37:56,472 --> 00:37:58,694
talking about , uh will , will normally 

1046
00:37:58,694 --> 00:38:00,694
start with a uh a boost and then go 

1047
00:38:00,694 --> 00:38:02,806
into a glide and then to the terminal 

1048
00:38:02,806 --> 00:38:04,861
phase and in the terminal phase , it 

1049
00:38:04,861 --> 00:38:06,972
can be defeated . And do we have it , 

1050
00:38:06,972 --> 00:38:09,139
it can be defeated by a ship at sea by 

1051
00:38:09,139 --> 00:38:11,250
a destroyer uh guarding the carrier . 

1052
00:38:11,250 --> 00:38:14,389
Yes , sir . Um Why are we testing more ? 

1053
00:38:14,399 --> 00:38:16,343
I can't , I couldn't find it in my 

1054
00:38:16,343 --> 00:38:18,399
notes , but I think China is testing 

1055
00:38:18,399 --> 00:38:20,177
something like 20 times as many 

1056
00:38:20,177 --> 00:38:22,399
missiles as we are . Why , why are we ? 

1057
00:38:22,399 --> 00:38:25,790
So uh they , they seem to be uh more 

1058
00:38:25,800 --> 00:38:28,389
tolerant of failure and they learn more 

1059
00:38:28,570 --> 00:38:31,429
and we , we have to , our tests have to 

1060
00:38:31,439 --> 00:38:33,272
be perfect . Uh Talk to me about 

1061
00:38:33,272 --> 00:38:35,495
testing . Yes , sir . Uh Yeah . So , so 

1062
00:38:35,495 --> 00:38:37,717
testing is really the end of the system 

1063
00:38:37,717 --> 00:38:39,606
engineering loop , right ? You're 

1064
00:38:39,606 --> 00:38:41,383
validating that you've met your 

1065
00:38:41,383 --> 00:38:40,929
requirements through the system 

1066
00:38:40,939 --> 00:38:42,883
development . So clearly , they're 

1067
00:38:42,883 --> 00:38:45,050
moving faster than we are . Um I would 

1068
00:38:45,050 --> 00:38:47,161
say that many of the tests that we do 

1069
00:38:47,161 --> 00:38:49,830
in some of these uh more um high end uh 

1070
00:38:49,840 --> 00:38:52,007
threat areas . Uh We , we don't report 

1071
00:38:52,007 --> 00:38:54,173
out publicly because of the classified 

1072
00:38:54,173 --> 00:38:56,340
nature of them . So there , there is , 

1073
00:38:56,340 --> 00:38:58,729
um I would say a reasonable amount of 

1074
00:38:58,739 --> 00:39:00,961
testing that is occurring against those 

1075
00:39:00,961 --> 00:39:02,906
sort of advanced threats . We just 

1076
00:39:02,906 --> 00:39:05,017
don't publicize them . Well , I think 

1077
00:39:05,017 --> 00:39:07,239
it was you and your testimony that said 

1078
00:39:07,239 --> 00:39:09,239
we're not reacting fast enough that 

1079
00:39:09,239 --> 00:39:11,239
this climate is changing so rapidly 

1080
00:39:11,239 --> 00:39:13,406
that we're not . What , what should we 

1081
00:39:13,406 --> 00:39:15,517
be doing ? What can this committee do 

1082
00:39:15,517 --> 00:39:17,572
in the way of additional resources , 

1083
00:39:17,572 --> 00:39:19,628
additional organizational changes so 

1084
00:39:19,628 --> 00:39:21,850
that we're not uh continually trying to 

1085
00:39:21,850 --> 00:39:23,961
catch up because we're , we have this 

1086
00:39:23,961 --> 00:39:26,128
is a strategic change in the in the in 

1087
00:39:26,128 --> 00:39:28,449
the world that we're not adequately 

1088
00:39:28,459 --> 00:39:30,403
addressing . What do we need ? I'm 

1089
00:39:30,403 --> 00:39:32,515
talking about hypersonic . What do we 

1090
00:39:32,515 --> 00:39:34,626
need to do to be able to address that 

1091
00:39:34,626 --> 00:39:36,959
more effectively ? Yes , sir . So uh we , 

1092
00:39:36,959 --> 00:39:39,126
we have uh addressed the policy so the 

1093
00:39:39,126 --> 00:39:41,292
hypersonic defense that we do today is 

1094
00:39:41,292 --> 00:39:43,403
regional based , meaning we will take 

1095
00:39:43,403 --> 00:39:45,237
care of forward to sea bases and 

1096
00:39:45,237 --> 00:39:47,459
forward deployed army maneuver forces . 

1097
00:39:47,459 --> 00:39:49,570
That's our focus today and we want to 

1098
00:39:49,570 --> 00:39:49,570
do layer defense , which is why I'll 

1099
00:39:49,580 --> 00:39:51,524
talk about glide phase . I'll talk 

1100
00:39:51,524 --> 00:39:53,580
about kill it in the boot phase . We 

1101
00:39:53,580 --> 00:39:55,636
know how to , how to kill aircraft . 

1102
00:39:55,636 --> 00:39:57,691
And when we're down in that terminal 

1103
00:39:57,691 --> 00:39:57,360
phase , we have to have a robust 

1104
00:39:57,370 --> 00:39:59,537
capability to do that and the load out 

1105
00:39:59,537 --> 00:40:01,481
on the ships . So that's our focus 

1106
00:40:01,481 --> 00:40:03,759
today is on regional . Uh We have , we , 

1107
00:40:03,759 --> 00:40:05,870
we do not have the policy to go after 

1108
00:40:05,870 --> 00:40:07,926
the strategic hyper . So that may be 

1109
00:40:07,926 --> 00:40:10,092
where you're going . Senator , I'm not 

1110
00:40:10,092 --> 00:40:09,790
sure it's , it , it seems to me that 

1111
00:40:09,800 --> 00:40:12,360
this is a deterrence gap where we need 

1112
00:40:12,370 --> 00:40:14,259
our adversaries to know that this 

1113
00:40:14,259 --> 00:40:16,370
weapon is not going to be effective . 

1114
00:40:16,370 --> 00:40:18,592
Uh The whole idea of deterrence is that 

1115
00:40:18,592 --> 00:40:21,040
there's a level of resilience and 

1116
00:40:21,050 --> 00:40:23,161
that's what worries me is that , that 

1117
00:40:23,161 --> 00:40:25,439
by not having the defensive capability , 

1118
00:40:25,449 --> 00:40:28,110
uh you're inviting in effect a uh a 

1119
00:40:28,120 --> 00:40:31,479
strike , we do have the defensive 

1120
00:40:31,489 --> 00:40:33,767
capabilities within the sea base today . 

1121
00:40:33,767 --> 00:40:36,520
Uh I , I want to work with the army to 

1122
00:40:36,530 --> 00:40:39,260
uh build out uh the patriot capability 

1123
00:40:39,270 --> 00:40:41,381
that we talked about earlier . And to 

1124
00:40:41,381 --> 00:40:43,770
add to that capability , we have a 

1125
00:40:43,780 --> 00:40:45,669
program in place called the phase 

1126
00:40:45,669 --> 00:40:47,724
interceptor to thin the raid up in a 

1127
00:40:47,724 --> 00:40:50,058
different part of that uh flight regime . 

1128
00:40:50,058 --> 00:40:52,280
Uh Because we , we from a layer defense 

1129
00:40:52,280 --> 00:40:54,391
perspective , we want to attack every 

1130
00:40:54,391 --> 00:40:55,947
part of that trajectory and 

1131
00:40:55,947 --> 00:40:57,947
particularly where they're uh where 

1132
00:40:57,947 --> 00:40:57,459
they're vulnerable , which is an 

1133
00:40:57,520 --> 00:41:00,379
account of chaff and , and subversion 

1134
00:41:00,389 --> 00:41:02,333
and decoys and all of that kind of 

1135
00:41:02,333 --> 00:41:05,310
thing . General Car . Um Can you see a 

1136
00:41:05,320 --> 00:41:08,290
hypersonic from space single missile 

1137
00:41:09,550 --> 00:41:12,010
uh depending on the uh platform 

1138
00:41:12,020 --> 00:41:14,550
delivery systems or yes , if it's uh if 

1139
00:41:14,560 --> 00:41:17,010
it's on the uh end of a uh boosting uh 

1140
00:41:17,030 --> 00:41:19,159
missile , we will see the initial uh 

1141
00:41:19,169 --> 00:41:21,870
we'll get an initial indication of it 

1142
00:41:21,879 --> 00:41:24,489
uh of it launching . But once it starts 

1143
00:41:24,500 --> 00:41:26,333
going into its flight phase , it 

1144
00:41:26,333 --> 00:41:28,444
becomes a very uh difficult target to 

1145
00:41:28,444 --> 00:41:30,840
track uh to keep it from , to keep 

1146
00:41:30,850 --> 00:41:33,017
track custody of it really from , from 

1147
00:41:33,017 --> 00:41:34,628
birth to death as it would , 

1148
00:41:34,628 --> 00:41:36,906
particularly if it's at a low altitude . 

1149
00:41:36,906 --> 00:41:39,072
Is that correct ? Correct . This is an 

1150
00:41:39,072 --> 00:41:40,906
entirely different question . Uh 

1151
00:41:40,909 --> 00:41:42,909
Obviously , missile defense is very 

1152
00:41:42,909 --> 00:41:45,409
important to the Ukrainians . Why isn't 

1153
00:41:45,419 --> 00:41:47,770
Iron Dome being deployed to Ukraine ? 

1154
00:41:47,780 --> 00:41:48,780
Secretary Plum , 

1155
00:41:51,750 --> 00:41:53,528
we help pay for it . We've sent 

1156
00:41:53,528 --> 00:41:56,070
something like $3 billion to Israel to 

1157
00:41:56,080 --> 00:41:59,050
develop it $500 million a year . My 

1158
00:41:59,060 --> 00:42:01,239
understanding is , wouldn't this be a 

1159
00:42:01,250 --> 00:42:03,028
very important resource for the 

1160
00:42:03,028 --> 00:42:05,110
Ukrainians since their principal 

1161
00:42:05,320 --> 00:42:08,760
problem right now is air defense . So , 

1162
00:42:08,770 --> 00:42:11,010
Senator , what we are using for 

1163
00:42:11,020 --> 00:42:13,242
supplying Ukraine with missile defenses 

1164
00:42:13,242 --> 00:42:15,409
from the United States stock is things 

1165
00:42:15,409 --> 00:42:15,379
we can draw down from our own stock . 

1166
00:42:15,389 --> 00:42:17,556
Uh , you know , we've supplied patriot 

1167
00:42:17,556 --> 00:42:19,556
batteries , for example , we spread 

1168
00:42:19,556 --> 00:42:21,500
significant investments in missile 

1169
00:42:21,500 --> 00:42:21,280
defense and we've encouraged allies to 

1170
00:42:21,290 --> 00:42:23,401
do this . Understand . A patriot just 

1171
00:42:23,401 --> 00:42:25,623
took down a Russian missile yesterday , 

1172
00:42:25,623 --> 00:42:27,790
I believe . Um , it certainly has been 

1173
00:42:27,790 --> 00:42:30,012
in the news . Yes , open source . There 

1174
00:42:30,012 --> 00:42:32,068
was a patriot intercept of a Killjoy 

1175
00:42:32,068 --> 00:42:34,401
hypersonic missile in the last few days . 

1176
00:42:34,401 --> 00:42:36,568
Yes , sir . What about Iron dome ? I'm 

1177
00:42:36,568 --> 00:42:38,734
not aware of an iron dome system being 

1178
00:42:38,734 --> 00:42:40,901
offered to Ukraine , but that could be 

1179
00:42:40,901 --> 00:42:40,729
incorrect . I just don't know maybe 

1180
00:42:40,739 --> 00:42:42,961
someone else at the table , but I'm not 

1181
00:42:42,961 --> 00:42:46,610
sure any other thoughts . So , so our 

1182
00:42:46,620 --> 00:42:48,676
two iron dome batteries that we have 

1183
00:42:48,676 --> 00:42:50,842
right now , uh One uh completed its um 

1184
00:42:50,842 --> 00:42:52,842
new equipment , train new equipment 

1185
00:42:52,842 --> 00:42:54,509
fielding . It is prepared for 

1186
00:42:54,509 --> 00:42:56,398
deployment . The second one is uh 

1187
00:42:56,398 --> 00:42:58,564
wrapping up its new equipment fielding 

1188
00:42:58,564 --> 00:43:00,620
right now . So , uh so the army does 

1189
00:43:00,620 --> 00:43:00,169
have one battery available for 

1190
00:43:00,179 --> 00:43:02,840
deployment pending uh a request for it . 

1191
00:43:03,370 --> 00:43:05,580
Thank you , Secretary Rosen . 

1192
00:43:08,320 --> 00:43:10,889
I was gonna say I got , I promoted you . 

1193
00:43:10,899 --> 00:43:13,439
If I got a promotion , Senator Rose , 

1194
00:43:13,510 --> 00:43:15,788
I'm sorry . It's a , it's a flying day . 

1195
00:43:15,788 --> 00:43:17,954
So uh it's a long flight from the West 

1196
00:43:17,954 --> 00:43:20,066
Coast . Uh So there you go . Just got 

1197
00:43:20,066 --> 00:43:21,899
in . So thank you very much . Uh 

1198
00:43:21,899 --> 00:43:24,010
Chairman King ranking member Fisher . 

1199
00:43:24,010 --> 00:43:26,232
Appreciate it and appreciate all of you 

1200
00:43:26,232 --> 00:43:28,454
and uh uh for your service , everything 

1201
00:43:28,454 --> 00:43:30,566
you're doing here today . So , um I'm 

1202
00:43:30,566 --> 00:43:32,232
gonna talk a little bit about 

1203
00:43:32,232 --> 00:43:34,177
safeguarding Domain awareness . So 

1204
00:43:34,177 --> 00:43:36,288
General Van He as you well know , our 

1205
00:43:36,288 --> 00:43:38,121
adversaries continue uh to field 

1206
00:43:38,121 --> 00:43:40,177
advanced capabilities across domains 

1207
00:43:40,177 --> 00:43:42,399
that have the potential to threaten the 

1208
00:43:42,399 --> 00:43:44,621
homeland . So in light of these threats 

1209
00:43:44,621 --> 00:43:46,677
north com and no ad must ensure that 

1210
00:43:46,677 --> 00:43:48,899
the systems providing the homeland with 

1211
00:43:48,899 --> 00:43:50,788
domain awareness are survivable , 

1212
00:43:50,788 --> 00:43:52,843
adaptable and modern . In addition , 

1213
00:43:52,843 --> 00:43:54,732
these systems must be hardened as 

1214
00:43:54,732 --> 00:43:56,621
they'll be subject to an array of 

1215
00:43:56,621 --> 00:43:58,899
cyberattacks uh during any contingency . 

1216
00:43:58,899 --> 00:44:00,899
And so I'm encouraged by North cons 

1217
00:44:00,899 --> 00:44:03,010
continued efforts to modernize legacy 

1218
00:44:03,010 --> 00:44:05,121
de detection systems such as the over 

1219
00:44:05,121 --> 00:44:07,340
the horizon , radar detection alone 

1220
00:44:07,350 --> 00:44:09,899
isn't sufficient operators have to have 

1221
00:44:09,909 --> 00:44:12,076
the ability to effectively communicate 

1222
00:44:12,076 --> 00:44:13,909
the operational picture to other 

1223
00:44:13,909 --> 00:44:16,131
commands as well as to our partners and 

1224
00:44:16,131 --> 00:44:18,187
allies often under highly compressed 

1225
00:44:18,187 --> 00:44:20,919
time frames . And we see those with the 

1226
00:44:20,929 --> 00:44:23,639
hypersonic and and others . So General 

1227
00:44:23,649 --> 00:44:25,760
Van He , what steps are you taking to 

1228
00:44:25,760 --> 00:44:27,760
sufficiently harden our command and 

1229
00:44:27,760 --> 00:44:29,982
control nodes particularly in the cyber 

1230
00:44:29,982 --> 00:44:31,649
domain so that we are able to 

1231
00:44:31,649 --> 00:44:33,629
effectively share the operational 

1232
00:44:33,639 --> 00:44:37,169
picture during a potential conflict ? 

1233
00:44:37,179 --> 00:44:39,780
Senator , uh thanks for that . So I'm 

1234
00:44:39,790 --> 00:44:42,050
advocating to the department that the , 

1235
00:44:42,060 --> 00:44:44,282
the foundational infrastructure , the I 

1236
00:44:44,282 --> 00:44:47,459
T network and backbones that the data 

1237
00:44:47,469 --> 00:44:50,129
and information rides on that allows us 

1238
00:44:50,139 --> 00:44:51,810
to share data and information 

1239
00:44:51,820 --> 00:44:53,764
internally and with the allies and 

1240
00:44:53,764 --> 00:44:55,598
partners and my fellow combatant 

1241
00:44:55,598 --> 00:44:58,489
commanders is resilient uh and , and uh 

1242
00:44:58,500 --> 00:45:00,449
redundant in the way we go . The 

1243
00:45:00,459 --> 00:45:02,515
department this year has put several 

1244
00:45:02,515 --> 00:45:04,403
billion dollars into foundational 

1245
00:45:04,403 --> 00:45:06,850
infrastructure which I think is crucial 

1246
00:45:06,860 --> 00:45:08,971
as we move forward to get . After the 

1247
00:45:08,971 --> 00:45:11,082
cyber vulnerabilities that you talked 

1248
00:45:11,082 --> 00:45:13,340
to . Uh candidly my most concerning 

1249
00:45:13,350 --> 00:45:15,469
domain awareness problem is exactly 

1250
00:45:15,479 --> 00:45:17,423
that it's the limited knowledge of 

1251
00:45:17,423 --> 00:45:19,590
cyber vulnerabilities for the critical 

1252
00:45:19,590 --> 00:45:21,479
infrastructure that we rely on to 

1253
00:45:21,479 --> 00:45:23,535
project power from our homeland , to 

1254
00:45:23,535 --> 00:45:25,757
defend our homeland , to do command and 

1255
00:45:25,757 --> 00:45:27,701
control within our homeland . So I 

1256
00:45:27,701 --> 00:45:29,757
continue to advocate for that to the 

1257
00:45:29,757 --> 00:45:31,979
department . Thank you . I I appreciate 

1258
00:45:31,979 --> 00:45:34,312
that because I , I think the resiliency , 

1259
00:45:34,312 --> 00:45:36,639
redundancy and and the agility of those 

1260
00:45:36,649 --> 00:45:38,899
systems are gonna help us be successful 

1261
00:45:39,050 --> 00:45:42,679
and um uh in the technology space , of 

1262
00:45:42,689 --> 00:45:45,022
course , Admiral Hill , as you're aware , 

1263
00:45:45,022 --> 00:45:46,800
China's missile missile defense 

1264
00:45:46,800 --> 00:45:49,070
strategy heavily emphasizes developing 

1265
00:45:49,080 --> 00:45:52,479
anti access aerial denial capabilities 

1266
00:45:52,489 --> 00:45:54,656
which use the combination of ballistic 

1267
00:45:54,656 --> 00:45:56,767
and cruise missiles launched from air 

1268
00:45:56,767 --> 00:45:58,933
land and sea to target the US . And of 

1269
00:45:58,933 --> 00:46:01,100
course , our allied military assets in 

1270
00:46:01,100 --> 00:46:03,267
the Asia Pacific Theater such as those 

1271
00:46:03,267 --> 00:46:05,629
in Guam or Okinawa . So Admiral Hill 

1272
00:46:05,639 --> 00:46:07,649
with the rapid increase in China's 

1273
00:46:07,659 --> 00:46:10,070
technological advancement and missile 

1274
00:46:10,080 --> 00:46:12,939
accuracy . What kind of measures are we 

1275
00:46:12,949 --> 00:46:15,171
employing to increase the survivability 

1276
00:46:15,171 --> 00:46:17,338
of our own platforms to ensure that we 

1277
00:46:17,338 --> 00:46:19,505
can operate in and around these highly 

1278
00:46:19,505 --> 00:46:21,727
contested environments in the Pacific ? 

1279
00:46:21,899 --> 00:46:24,121
Yes , ma'am . But thanks , Senator . Um 

1280
00:46:24,121 --> 00:46:26,010
I used the aircraft carrier since 

1281
00:46:26,010 --> 00:46:27,955
Senator King , I brought that up a 

1282
00:46:27,955 --> 00:46:30,010
little bit earlier . That's where we 

1283
00:46:30,010 --> 00:46:32,429
focused our energies on increasing the 

1284
00:46:32,439 --> 00:46:34,770
ability to take on the hypersonic 

1285
00:46:34,780 --> 00:46:36,649
threat . The ships currently are 

1286
00:46:36,659 --> 00:46:38,492
outfitted with ballistic missile 

1287
00:46:38,492 --> 00:46:40,492
defense . So from a missile defense 

1288
00:46:40,492 --> 00:46:42,715
perspective , ships moving forward into 

1289
00:46:42,715 --> 00:46:44,770
the island chain have the ability to 

1290
00:46:44,770 --> 00:46:46,770
defend against ballistic missiles . 

1291
00:46:46,770 --> 00:46:46,669
They have their own capability to do 

1292
00:46:46,679 --> 00:46:48,735
self defense against cruise missiles 

1293
00:46:48,735 --> 00:46:50,846
and we have hypersonic defense . Um a 

1294
00:46:50,846 --> 00:46:52,957
ship has to worry about a lot . Uh So 

1295
00:46:52,957 --> 00:46:55,012
I'm not gonna speak for the navy . I 

1296
00:46:55,012 --> 00:46:57,123
can just speak to the missile defense 

1297
00:46:57,123 --> 00:46:56,830
missions that we provide in , in 

1298
00:46:56,840 --> 00:46:59,007
coordination with the navy uh with the 

1299
00:46:59,007 --> 00:47:01,118
army . Uh We've talked a lot about uh 

1300
00:47:01,118 --> 00:47:03,284
the maneuver force in terms of patriot 

1301
00:47:03,284 --> 00:47:06,320
that station forward . Uh defense is 

1302
00:47:06,330 --> 00:47:08,386
important if you want to , to either 

1303
00:47:08,386 --> 00:47:10,608
buy time or to ensure that you can live 

1304
00:47:10,608 --> 00:47:12,719
to fight another day . That's right . 

1305
00:47:12,719 --> 00:47:14,719
Well , thank you . And , and I know 

1306
00:47:14,719 --> 00:47:16,830
that uh uh Chairman King talked about 

1307
00:47:16,830 --> 00:47:18,997
hypersonic weapons . So Secretary Plum 

1308
00:47:18,997 --> 00:47:21,560
Russia and China , no secret , they're 

1309
00:47:21,570 --> 00:47:23,681
fielding hypersonic weapons . They're 

1310
00:47:23,681 --> 00:47:25,792
highly maneuverable vehicles that fly 

1311
00:47:25,792 --> 00:47:27,903
around more than five times the speed 

1312
00:47:27,903 --> 00:47:29,681
of sound . The weapons have the 

1313
00:47:29,681 --> 00:47:31,792
potential to overwhelm our US missile 

1314
00:47:31,792 --> 00:47:34,014
defense systems undermine our strategic 

1315
00:47:34,014 --> 00:47:36,419
deterrence . So I , I know we're not in 

1316
00:47:36,429 --> 00:47:38,820
a classified setting . So I'd like to 

1317
00:47:38,830 --> 00:47:41,052
hear a little bit about your assessment 

1318
00:47:41,052 --> 00:47:42,941
of our hypersonic missile defense 

1319
00:47:42,941 --> 00:47:44,997
programs , our space based sensors . 

1320
00:47:44,997 --> 00:47:47,274
What do we do to neutralize the threat ? 

1321
00:47:47,274 --> 00:47:49,386
And I notice as I uh read some of the 

1322
00:47:49,386 --> 00:47:52,550
background , um and , and you alluded 

1323
00:47:52,560 --> 00:47:55,030
to this earlier that um of course , we 

1324
00:47:55,040 --> 00:47:57,096
have the notification , we know much 

1325
00:47:57,096 --> 00:47:59,151
earlier on a ballistic missile where 

1326
00:47:59,151 --> 00:48:01,262
it's going and we have cannot able to 

1327
00:48:01,262 --> 00:48:03,373
track the hypersonic once it may have 

1328
00:48:03,373 --> 00:48:06,530
left its uh uh uh launch . And so 

1329
00:48:07,239 --> 00:48:10,100
that time frame of difference , and I 

1330
00:48:10,110 --> 00:48:12,388
know we're not in a classified setting , 

1331
00:48:12,388 --> 00:48:14,530
but are we able to be agile enough to 

1332
00:48:14,540 --> 00:48:17,419
track it to notify our allies and 

1333
00:48:17,429 --> 00:48:19,550
partners to make adequate decisions 

1334
00:48:19,560 --> 00:48:23,250
across the spectrum ? Uh So 

1335
00:48:23,260 --> 00:48:25,316
thanks Senator , uh just a couple of 

1336
00:48:25,316 --> 00:48:27,482
pieces . Uh If , if , if I may so just 

1337
00:48:27,482 --> 00:48:30,969
to start , um you know , five times the 

1338
00:48:30,979 --> 00:48:33,199
speed of sound is all the ballistic 

1339
00:48:33,209 --> 00:48:35,320
missiles travel pretty fast , right ? 

1340
00:48:35,320 --> 00:48:37,376
So it's not , it's not really just a 

1341
00:48:37,376 --> 00:48:39,542
speed piece . It's the maneuverability 

1342
00:48:39,542 --> 00:48:41,542
of a hypersonic weapon that bothers 

1343
00:48:41,542 --> 00:48:43,765
everyone at the table because you can't 

1344
00:48:43,765 --> 00:48:45,765
predict , you can't predict the end 

1345
00:48:45,765 --> 00:48:47,765
point by knowing the initial launch 

1346
00:48:47,765 --> 00:48:49,653
conditions . And there's a lot of 

1347
00:48:49,653 --> 00:48:49,280
ballistic missiles in the world that 

1348
00:48:49,290 --> 00:48:51,346
still maneuver at the end , but they 

1349
00:48:51,346 --> 00:48:53,401
still give you a better a bass , you 

1350
00:48:53,401 --> 00:48:53,090
kind of know about where they're going 

1351
00:48:53,100 --> 00:48:55,322
to end up if you do your math , right ? 

1352
00:48:55,322 --> 00:48:57,322
But you can't do that with a cruise 

1353
00:48:57,322 --> 00:48:59,656
missile because it can keep maneuvering . 

1354
00:48:59,656 --> 00:48:59,189
So one of the things we're really 

1355
00:48:59,199 --> 00:49:01,310
heavily investing in is a space based 

1356
00:49:01,310 --> 00:49:03,421
architecture that can uh can at least 

1357
00:49:03,421 --> 00:49:05,477
have awareness of where these things 

1358
00:49:05,477 --> 00:49:07,588
are through their flight . Uh Admiral 

1359
00:49:07,588 --> 00:49:09,699
Hill is working on something called H 

1360
00:49:09,699 --> 00:49:11,810
BT S S which I call hobbits . I don't 

1361
00:49:11,810 --> 00:49:13,977
know if anyone else does . Uh But that 

1362
00:49:13,977 --> 00:49:13,820
the idea there is to actually be able 

1363
00:49:13,830 --> 00:49:15,800
to do custody of it and be able to 

1364
00:49:15,810 --> 00:49:17,977
track a piece all the way through . So 

1365
00:49:17,977 --> 00:49:20,199
we are working on this and that's a big 

1366
00:49:20,199 --> 00:49:22,366
problem because you can't just rely on 

1367
00:49:22,366 --> 00:49:24,421
one vector or one radar face to tell 

1368
00:49:24,421 --> 00:49:26,532
you a thing is coming . And so it's a 

1369
00:49:26,532 --> 00:49:28,754
hard problem . We are working on that . 

1370
00:49:28,754 --> 00:49:28,010
So that's one piece . You gotta have 

1371
00:49:28,020 --> 00:49:30,076
that domain awareness and ability to 

1372
00:49:30,076 --> 00:49:32,131
track these things and we're working 

1373
00:49:32,131 --> 00:49:34,353
hard on that . Uh Also you have to have 

1374
00:49:34,353 --> 00:49:34,040
something to be able to actually shoot 

1375
00:49:34,050 --> 00:49:36,272
at it otherwise all you can do is watch 

1376
00:49:36,272 --> 00:49:38,439
it . And so working on , we've already 

1377
00:49:38,439 --> 00:49:40,606
talked about it turns out Patriot even 

1378
00:49:40,606 --> 00:49:42,828
has some ability against a hypersonic . 

1379
00:49:42,828 --> 00:49:44,939
But the glide phase intercept program 

1380
00:49:44,939 --> 00:49:47,272
is one thing uh that is being worked on . 

1381
00:49:47,272 --> 00:49:49,161
For example , uh Admiral Hill has 

1382
00:49:49,161 --> 00:49:51,328
already spoken at some length about uh 

1383
00:49:51,328 --> 00:49:53,550
sea base terminal mode of the S M six , 

1384
00:49:53,550 --> 00:49:53,540
which is good for uh ship defense and 

1385
00:49:53,550 --> 00:49:55,717
point defense . Uh So we're working on 

1386
00:49:55,717 --> 00:49:58,020
all these pieces together . Thank you . 

1387
00:49:58,030 --> 00:50:00,439
I see . My time is up , Senator Kelly . 

1388
00:50:00,649 --> 00:50:02,760
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you , 

1389
00:50:02,760 --> 00:50:04,871
Senator Rosen for the lead . In to my 

1390
00:50:04,871 --> 00:50:07,879
question , which is about thank you , 

1391
00:50:07,939 --> 00:50:11,719
which is about S M six . Um So 

1392
00:50:12,090 --> 00:50:15,689
uh Admiral Hill , Secretary Plum , uh 

1393
00:50:15,699 --> 00:50:19,149
the S M six uh ship launched anti air 

1394
00:50:19,159 --> 00:50:21,530
anti surface interceptor . Uh This 

1395
00:50:21,540 --> 00:50:23,651
missile is produced at Raytheon in uh 

1396
00:50:23,651 --> 00:50:25,984
Tucson Arizona , Admiral Hill last year . 

1397
00:50:25,984 --> 00:50:28,040
During this hearing , you noted that 

1398
00:50:28,040 --> 00:50:30,151
the S M six is the only weapon in the 

1399
00:50:30,151 --> 00:50:32,262
country's arsenal capable of engaging 

1400
00:50:32,262 --> 00:50:34,610
highly maneuver , maneuverable 

1401
00:50:34,620 --> 00:50:37,290
hypersonic missiles , threats , 

1402
00:50:37,300 --> 00:50:39,530
incoming threats . So , in the context 

1403
00:50:39,540 --> 00:50:41,484
of potential adversaries , can you 

1404
00:50:41,484 --> 00:50:43,919
please speak a little bit more um about 

1405
00:50:43,929 --> 00:50:46,096
how important it is for the US to have 

1406
00:50:46,096 --> 00:50:48,669
an arsenal arsenal capable of engaging 

1407
00:50:49,070 --> 00:50:51,909
highly maneuverable hypersonic threats . 

1408
00:50:52,639 --> 00:50:54,695
Yes , sir . And it , and it's a full 

1409
00:50:54,695 --> 00:50:56,417
kill chain answer , right ? Uh 

1410
00:50:56,417 --> 00:50:58,639
Secretary Plum already talked about our 

1411
00:50:58,639 --> 00:51:00,750
ability to detect and track them . If 

1412
00:51:00,750 --> 00:51:00,689
you can't do that , you can't fire 

1413
00:51:00,699 --> 00:51:02,866
anything at it , right . Uh And it's a 

1414
00:51:02,866 --> 00:51:04,921
very complex , uh once it comes into 

1415
00:51:04,921 --> 00:51:07,088
the glide phase , it's got the ability 

1416
00:51:07,088 --> 00:51:09,310
to maneuver globally . So that's why we 

1417
00:51:09,310 --> 00:51:11,477
need to see them from space and have a 

1418
00:51:11,477 --> 00:51:13,699
total track cuss all the way to the end 

1419
00:51:13,699 --> 00:51:13,050
game . And when they dip into the 

1420
00:51:13,060 --> 00:51:15,116
atmosphere and start that maneuver , 

1421
00:51:15,116 --> 00:51:17,338
you have to have the shooting battery , 

1422
00:51:17,338 --> 00:51:19,449
whether it's a ship or some sort of a 

1423
00:51:19,449 --> 00:51:21,504
land base unit , uh that can do that 

1424
00:51:21,504 --> 00:51:23,671
fine tuned tracking in the end game to 

1425
00:51:23,671 --> 00:51:25,782
launch and control that missile . But 

1426
00:51:25,782 --> 00:51:27,949
it's important to have an arsenal of , 

1427
00:51:27,949 --> 00:51:27,399
when you say arsenal , I translate that 

1428
00:51:27,409 --> 00:51:29,520
as an inventory , uh you need a large 

1429
00:51:29,520 --> 00:51:31,631
inventory of them because again , the 

1430
00:51:31,631 --> 00:51:33,576
threat can be defined as big , big 

1431
00:51:33,576 --> 00:51:35,879
numbers , very high speed and maneuver 

1432
00:51:36,199 --> 00:51:38,421
it before we get to the procurement and 

1433
00:51:38,421 --> 00:51:40,643
the inventory numbers . Can you comment 

1434
00:51:40,643 --> 00:51:42,810
a little bit about when we get to that 

1435
00:51:42,810 --> 00:51:44,866
end game when we and maybe you can't 

1436
00:51:44,866 --> 00:51:46,699
because this is not a classified 

1437
00:51:46,699 --> 00:51:48,643
setting . But when we look at like 

1438
00:51:48,643 --> 00:51:50,643
cross range for an S M six , can it 

1439
00:51:50,643 --> 00:51:52,866
match the cross range capability of any 

1440
00:51:52,866 --> 00:51:54,810
hypersonic missile that you know , 

1441
00:51:54,810 --> 00:51:58,020
China is currently developing ? I think 

1442
00:51:58,030 --> 00:52:00,141
in this environment , I can say yes , 

1443
00:52:00,141 --> 00:52:02,308
that we are matched very well with the 

1444
00:52:02,308 --> 00:52:04,363
threat and where it is today , we're 

1445
00:52:04,363 --> 00:52:06,419
going to have to continue to improve 

1446
00:52:06,419 --> 00:52:08,586
our missile capability at some point , 

1447
00:52:08,586 --> 00:52:10,363
we will over , over match the g 

1448
00:52:10,363 --> 00:52:12,810
capability of that missile frame . And 

1449
00:52:12,820 --> 00:52:15,370
then Secretary Plum uh on the , you 

1450
00:52:15,379 --> 00:52:17,490
know , uh Admiral Hill mentioned that 

1451
00:52:17,490 --> 00:52:19,600
we would need a lot of them . Um I 

1452
00:52:19,610 --> 00:52:21,850
understand dod is requesting a multi 

1453
00:52:21,860 --> 00:52:24,610
year procurement in the next budget 

1454
00:52:24,620 --> 00:52:27,560
request to include 825 S M six missiles . 

1455
00:52:27,570 --> 00:52:29,429
Can you explain why it's such a 

1456
00:52:29,439 --> 00:52:32,590
critical request uh as we face this uh 

1457
00:52:32,600 --> 00:52:35,330
capable adversary and and why doing 

1458
00:52:35,419 --> 00:52:38,239
large lot procurements is the best way 

1459
00:52:38,250 --> 00:52:42,239
to do this . Uh Well , first 

1460
00:52:42,250 --> 00:52:44,417
of all , Senator , again , I'm not the 

1461
00:52:44,417 --> 00:52:46,694
acquisition professional at this table . 

1462
00:52:46,694 --> 00:52:48,917
Uh but I will just say that uh once you 

1463
00:52:48,917 --> 00:52:48,850
have a proven capability of being able 

1464
00:52:48,860 --> 00:52:50,860
to buy in large lots , gives you uh 

1465
00:52:50,860 --> 00:52:53,138
insight into how the miss will perform . 

1466
00:52:53,138 --> 00:52:55,193
So you , you , it , it's much better 

1467
00:52:55,193 --> 00:52:57,249
than just building a few at a time . 

1468
00:52:57,249 --> 00:52:56,510
It's a , it's a , it's a much better 

1469
00:52:56,520 --> 00:52:58,409
way to do your statistics on your 

1470
00:52:58,409 --> 00:53:00,576
manufacturing and , and how it works . 

1471
00:53:00,576 --> 00:53:02,520
And , you know , if we have a high 

1472
00:53:02,520 --> 00:53:04,687
value target and we've got an incoming 

1473
00:53:04,687 --> 00:53:06,742
hypersonic missile , I imagine the , 

1474
00:53:06,742 --> 00:53:08,909
the , you know , the ops plan there is 

1475
00:53:08,909 --> 00:53:11,076
not to just launch one of these things 

1476
00:53:11,076 --> 00:53:13,530
at it . Hence the 

1477
00:53:13,540 --> 00:53:17,530
825 number to protect 

1478
00:53:17,540 --> 00:53:19,762
that , protect the fleet . And the high 

1479
00:53:19,762 --> 00:53:21,984
value targets are in air defense . It's 

1480
00:53:21,984 --> 00:53:21,879
really an operational question because 

1481
00:53:21,889 --> 00:53:23,889
it'll vary . But uh most commanding 

1482
00:53:23,889 --> 00:53:26,111
officers of a ship , uh most commanding 

1483
00:53:26,111 --> 00:53:28,167
officers of a battery will determine 

1484
00:53:28,167 --> 00:53:30,278
what their salvo size is based on the 

1485
00:53:30,278 --> 00:53:29,419
threat and numbers that they're dealing 

1486
00:53:29,429 --> 00:53:31,318
with . Yes , sir . Thank you . Uh 

1487
00:53:31,318 --> 00:53:33,879
Another subject . So , uh the request I 

1488
00:53:33,889 --> 00:53:37,020
think is for $1.6 billion for a in 

1489
00:53:37,689 --> 00:53:40,679
fiscal year 24 which gets us 

1490
00:53:40,689 --> 00:53:44,510
27 uh S M three block one 

1491
00:53:44,520 --> 00:53:47,580
Bs and 12 S M three block two A s and 

1492
00:53:47,590 --> 00:53:50,419
develops upgrades to the system . Um 

1493
00:53:50,429 --> 00:53:52,679
The site is expected to be among the 

1494
00:53:52,689 --> 00:53:54,745
first to receive the S M three block 

1495
00:53:54,745 --> 00:53:57,129
two A . Uh And I think this is gonna be 

1496
00:53:57,139 --> 00:53:59,810
at the site in Poland is my 

1497
00:53:59,820 --> 00:54:03,149
understanding . Uh Can you provide a 

1498
00:54:03,159 --> 00:54:07,000
status of a assure um in 

1499
00:54:07,010 --> 00:54:09,121
Poland and what it will be able to do 

1500
00:54:09,121 --> 00:54:11,343
when fully operational ? Uh Yes , sir . 

1501
00:54:11,343 --> 00:54:13,566
So as in Romania operational today , uh 

1502
00:54:13,566 --> 00:54:16,070
Poland is going through uh the board of 

1503
00:54:16,080 --> 00:54:18,024
inspection survey today . So we're 

1504
00:54:18,024 --> 00:54:20,024
leveraging the navy processes there 

1505
00:54:20,024 --> 00:54:21,802
that drive us to Chief of Naval 

1506
00:54:21,802 --> 00:54:23,969
Operations acceptance uh by the end of 

1507
00:54:23,969 --> 00:54:25,969
this fiscal year . Uh it'll then go 

1508
00:54:25,969 --> 00:54:28,024
through uh European command and NATO 

1509
00:54:28,024 --> 00:54:30,247
acceptance uh throughout next year . So 

1510
00:54:30,247 --> 00:54:32,469
we're uh right now operating the site , 

1511
00:54:32,469 --> 00:54:34,247
but uh we'll come through those 

1512
00:54:34,247 --> 00:54:36,136
different certifications over the 

1513
00:54:36,136 --> 00:54:35,899
course of the next few months and it'll 

1514
00:54:35,909 --> 00:54:37,853
be fully operational . And what it 

1515
00:54:37,853 --> 00:54:39,965
provides is it completes the European 

1516
00:54:39,965 --> 00:54:42,076
phase adaptive approach phase three . 

1517
00:54:42,076 --> 00:54:43,965
Uh which means that we can defend 

1518
00:54:43,965 --> 00:54:46,187
against uh ballistic missiles from road 

1519
00:54:46,187 --> 00:54:48,187
country , road countries to protect 

1520
00:54:48,187 --> 00:54:50,298
Europe and the United States in my uh 

1521
00:54:50,298 --> 00:54:52,465
remaining 15 seconds real quick when I 

1522
00:54:52,465 --> 00:54:54,742
was over in the Middle East in January , 

1523
00:54:54,742 --> 00:54:56,687
Israel and some of our Middle East 

1524
00:54:56,687 --> 00:54:58,919
partners , um you know , made a request 

1525
00:54:58,929 --> 00:55:00,770
and looking for support for an 

1526
00:55:00,780 --> 00:55:03,389
integrated missile defense architecture 

1527
00:55:03,399 --> 00:55:06,310
in the Middle East between Israel other 

1528
00:55:06,320 --> 00:55:08,487
countries and the United States . What 

1529
00:55:08,487 --> 00:55:10,431
are your thoughts on an integrated 

1530
00:55:10,431 --> 00:55:12,653
regional missile defense for the Middle 

1531
00:55:12,653 --> 00:55:14,689
East ? Question ? For me , it'll be 

1532
00:55:14,709 --> 00:55:16,820
more of an operational question . But 

1533
00:55:16,820 --> 00:55:18,542
from a acquisition development 

1534
00:55:18,542 --> 00:55:20,765
perspective , we work very closely with 

1535
00:55:20,765 --> 00:55:22,987
Israel . Senator King mentioned that uh 

1536
00:55:22,987 --> 00:55:22,949
500 million of our budget every year 

1537
00:55:22,959 --> 00:55:24,792
goes to building out the defense 

1538
00:55:24,792 --> 00:55:26,848
capabilities . Uh for Israel focused 

1539
00:55:26,848 --> 00:55:29,139
mostly on upper tier arrow uh David 

1540
00:55:29,149 --> 00:55:32,189
Sling and Iron Dome . Um We integrate 

1541
00:55:32,199 --> 00:55:34,143
uh as far as we can integrate , uh 

1542
00:55:34,143 --> 00:55:35,866
whether it's across the sensor 

1543
00:55:35,866 --> 00:55:37,921
architecture to provide tracks or if 

1544
00:55:37,921 --> 00:55:40,088
it's a deeper set of integration as uh 

1545
00:55:40,088 --> 00:55:39,989
general Carly does uh within the army 

1546
00:55:40,000 --> 00:55:41,944
on Iron Dome . But I think there's 

1547
00:55:41,944 --> 00:55:43,944
nothing wrong with being integrated 

1548
00:55:43,944 --> 00:55:46,278
across uh you know , friends and allies . 

1549
00:55:46,278 --> 00:55:50,179
Thank you . I want , I want to 

1550
00:55:50,189 --> 00:55:52,411
thank all of you for joining us today . 

1551
00:55:52,411 --> 00:55:54,689
I have a couple of concluding thoughts . 

1552
00:55:54,689 --> 00:55:56,911
One is it , it strikes me as bothersome 

1553
00:55:56,911 --> 00:55:58,967
that all three of you are leaving at 

1554
00:55:58,967 --> 00:56:01,078
the same time . It also strikes me as 

1555
00:56:01,078 --> 00:56:03,189
bothersome that I think that chairman 

1556
00:56:03,189 --> 00:56:05,659
of the Joint Chiefs , Chief of the Navy , 

1557
00:56:06,209 --> 00:56:09,179
I believe the Air Force are also all 

1558
00:56:09,189 --> 00:56:11,467
leaving this summer . At the same time , 

1559
00:56:11,467 --> 00:56:13,689
there ought to be a staggered system so 

1560
00:56:13,689 --> 00:56:15,467
that there's continuity in this 

1561
00:56:15,467 --> 00:56:17,633
critically important function . That's 

1562
00:56:17,633 --> 00:56:19,856
not your problem . But it's one that Mr 

1563
00:56:19,856 --> 00:56:21,967
Secretary , I think we ought to think 

1564
00:56:21,967 --> 00:56:24,133
about to have the entire upper echelon 

1565
00:56:24,133 --> 00:56:26,189
of this particular critical function 

1566
00:56:26,189 --> 00:56:28,540
walking out the door , essentially 

1567
00:56:28,550 --> 00:56:30,840
within months is strikes me as not a 

1568
00:56:30,850 --> 00:56:33,080
not a good organizational structure . 

1569
00:56:33,520 --> 00:56:35,919
Uh Secondly , the three of you are in 

1570
00:56:35,929 --> 00:56:38,151
an extraordinary position to be able to 

1571
00:56:38,151 --> 00:56:39,979
give us some strong Agnes exit 

1572
00:56:39,989 --> 00:56:43,469
interview data . In other words , as 

1573
00:56:43,479 --> 00:56:45,757
you're leaving ? What would you change ? 

1574
00:56:45,840 --> 00:56:48,062
What would you suggest to the committee 

1575
00:56:48,062 --> 00:56:49,507
in terms of authorities , 

1576
00:56:49,507 --> 00:56:51,784
organizational structures , priorities ? 

1577
00:56:51,784 --> 00:56:54,050
Uh Where do you think we could improve 

1578
00:56:54,060 --> 00:56:56,870
uh this entire missile defense 

1579
00:56:56,879 --> 00:56:59,101
enterprise ? Uh As I say , all three of 

1580
00:56:59,110 --> 00:57:01,221
you are in an exceptional position to 

1581
00:57:01,221 --> 00:57:03,679
do that . And uh I , I'm not in the 

1582
00:57:03,689 --> 00:57:05,800
position of assigning homework here , 

1583
00:57:05,800 --> 00:57:07,911
but it would be very important to the 

1584
00:57:07,911 --> 00:57:10,133
committee if you could give , just give 

1585
00:57:10,133 --> 00:57:12,245
us two or three pages . Here's what , 

1586
00:57:12,245 --> 00:57:14,300
here's what I would change . Uh , as 

1587
00:57:14,300 --> 00:57:16,411
I'm going out the door to improve the 

1588
00:57:16,411 --> 00:57:18,133
functioning of this critically 

1589
00:57:18,133 --> 00:57:20,411
important , uh , part of our , uh , uh , 

1590
00:57:20,411 --> 00:57:22,356
deterrent and our National Defense 

1591
00:57:22,356 --> 00:57:24,411
Posture . So I want to thank you all 

1592
00:57:24,411 --> 00:57:26,522
again for your service . Congratulate 

1593
00:57:26,522 --> 00:57:28,133
you and look forward to your 

1594
00:57:28,133 --> 00:57:30,459
suggestions . And , uh , the only other 

1595
00:57:30,469 --> 00:57:32,691
thing I would say is do it soon . We're 

1596
00:57:32,691 --> 00:57:34,525
about to do the National Defense 

1597
00:57:34,525 --> 00:57:36,747
Authorization Act in about five weeks . 

1598
00:57:36,747 --> 00:57:39,090
Uh , and would love to have your input 

1599
00:57:39,100 --> 00:57:41,044
as the subcommittee , makes it its 

1600
00:57:41,044 --> 00:57:43,100
report to the full committee . Thank 

1601
00:57:43,100 --> 00:57:45,322
you again and , uh , thank you for your 

1602
00:57:45,322 --> 00:57:47,656
service to the country . Senator Fisher . 

1603
00:57:47,656 --> 00:57:49,711
Did you want to add any conclusion ? 

1604
00:57:49,711 --> 00:57:51,711
Well , I would say , well , said Mr 

1605
00:57:51,711 --> 00:57:53,711
Chair , thank you all . Thank you . 

1606
00:57:53,711 --> 00:57:53,929
Hearing is adjourned .