WEBVTT

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Come to order . The purpose of this

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hearing is to discuss the challenges

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our allies and us industry face with

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our arms exports processes and how

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those challenges can be bridged to

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ensure America remains the partner of

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choice . And the trilateral security

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partnership between Australia , the

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United Kingdom and the United States is

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successful . I now recognize myself for

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an opening statement from its

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increasingly aggressive posture in the

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water surrounding Taiwan to Chairman Xi

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stated goal to unify with Taiwan . The

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malign actions of the Chinese Communist

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Party pose a clear and present danger .

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I've seen China's tactics . First hand ,

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I recently led a congressional

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delegation to Asia where I met with our

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Indo Pacific command , the seventh

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fleet and leaders in Japan , South

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Korea and Taiwan , including President

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Tsai . After I met with President Tsai ,

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the C C P sanctioned me a badge of

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honor as far as I'm concerned in

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response to my delegation's visit in

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speaker mccarthy's meeting with

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President Tsai . The C C P launched

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more than 70 aircraft into Taiwanese

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airspace and deployed 11 war ships

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including an aircraft carrier to

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encircle the island nation . The C C P

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is testing their capabilities and

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Taiwan's vulnerabilities in preparation

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for potential invasion . This will not

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intimidate us . In fact , it only

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strengthens our resolve to foster a

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more innovative defense industrial base

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that can develop and supply weapons for

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deterrents . And if necessary for

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defense . After seeing Taiwan's defense

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capabilities , firsthand , I can say

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that they're not where they need to be

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weapons sales . I signed off on four

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years ago and the ranking member have

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yet to make it to Taiwan , President

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Tsai asked me where are my weapons ? I

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paid for them . The war in Ukraine has

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shown us that weapons are needed before ,

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not after conflict erupts now , more

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than ever , we need to work with our

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allies to counter this growing threat .

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The August partnership between

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Australia , the United Kingdom and the

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United States is just that and it will

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establish critical deterrence measures .

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However , for this trilateral

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partnership to succeed , we must reform

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prohibitive policies and complicate

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arms export rules as soon as possible

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through bipartisan legislation . It is

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this committee's responsibility to

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examine the policy and effectiveness of

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the United States government for

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military sales and the international

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traffic in arms regulations known as it ,

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the regulatory measure which controls

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the export of defense and military

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technologies from us . Defense

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companies . Last month , I held a

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classified round table with our

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partners first and then from our US

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industry representatives to discuss the

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challenges we face in the region due to

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growing C C P aggression and how best

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to address them . We heard from them

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that much more needs to be done .

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Specifically , I and our antiquated

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arms sales processes need legislative

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fixes for a to be successful . One of

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our partners dedicates 1% of their

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annual defense budget to simply

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navigate us export controls . In

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another case , it took a year and a

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half of paperwork to support the

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upgrade of a weapons system that we

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previously sold to them . Our approach

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to defense and military technology

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exports is in dire need of reform .

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This administration has failed to

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deliver . So Congress took bipartisan

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action in the last N D A A . My Taiwan

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enhanced resilience Act ensures that

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there can be creative solutions such as

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foreign military financing grants ,

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training for Taiwan forces and war

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reserve stockpiles to bolster Taiwan's

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defense chairwoman Young Kim's arms

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export delivery solutions Act mandates

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the administration to report on why our

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weapons to Taiwan are delayed and to

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provide interim capabilities in the

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face of these delays . I also include a

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provision to better bring American

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innovation into Pentagon procurements

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to address delayed weapons development

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and address high tech challenges like

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quantum computing , hypersonic and

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artificial intelligence . Rebuilding

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our arsenal of democracy will require

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new thinking and innovative dynamic

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companies . To that end , the house

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recently passed the legislation that I

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introduced with the ranking member to

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strengthen the aus partnership through

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cooperation on advanced capabilities .

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This legislation focuses on ensuring

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the state department is authorizing

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technology transfers quickly to fully

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support implementation of this

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partnership . I will continue to lead

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efforts to help ensure the successful

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implementation of AUS throughout this

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congress through additional bipartisan

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legislation . The longer outdated and

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costly regulations stand in the way a

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successful implementation , the more it

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plays into the C C P's hands and erodes

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our closest ally security . We are in a

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great power of global competition and

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for far too long at both the Department

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of Defense and State Department , it's

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been business as usual . The year long

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delays are unacceptable . We need

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results , not interagency finger

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pointing . We can no longer accept the

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status quo of an ineffective and

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outdated system . The United States

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does not seek conflict but only through

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strength . Can we provide the

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deterrents necessary to secure the

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peace in the region and around the

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globe ? History has shown that

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projecting weakness invites aggression

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and emboldens dictators and despots . I

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still believe in Ronald Reagan's policy

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of peace through strength and that was

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a doctrine that defeated the Soviet

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Union and one we must continue to

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employ to project American strength

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across the globe . The chair now

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recognizes ranking member uh Mr Meeks .

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Thank you , Mr Chairman . And first let

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me start by thanking our witnesses uh

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for appearing before this committee

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today . We so appreciate being able to

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hear from both of you on the critical

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work that the Biden administration is

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doing with our allies and partners in

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pursuit of our shared security . For

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over a year now , we have seen how the

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United States in lockstep with our

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allies and partners has come to the aid

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of the Ukrainian people who are

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defending themselves against Russia's

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brutal , unprovoked war of aggression

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with over $35 billion in military

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assistance provided . Since Russia's

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full scale invasion , the

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administration's commitment to

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Ukraine's defense and that of Europe is

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ironclad and proven like

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Russia in Europe , we are seeing

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similar aggressive behavior from China

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in the Indo Pacific . Under the under

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the direction of President Xi . The

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People's Republic of China has engaged

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in a rapid military build up and become

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more aggressive in its coercive tactics

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against Taiwan in each of the military ,

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economic and diplomatic realms . China

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has also made significant advances in

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key military capabilities such as long

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range bomber aircraft , cruise missiles

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and hypersonic . Last August

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just after I joined Speaker Pelosi on

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her historic trip to Taipei and other

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countries in the Indo Pacific . A

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record number of PR C aircraft

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violated Taiwan's air defense

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identification zone and engaged in

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increasingly provo provocative maritime

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actions in its continued support for

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Taiwan . The Biden State Department has

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approved a record number of armed cases

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for Taiwan in the last two years to

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ensure it has the capabilities to

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defend itself and to deter potential

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Chinese military action . As Secretary

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Lincoln has stated when it comes to

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Beijing , the United States will

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compete with confidence , cooperate

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where we can and contest when

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and where we must . An

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integral part of this strategy is the

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recently announced aus trilateral

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security framework between the United

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States , Australia and the United

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Kingdom , which aims to strengthen

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defense cooperation and in

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interoperability . In the Indo Pacific .

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This new security framework represents

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an important step forward for the

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United States in the Indo Pacific and

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for our shared security and countering

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China's pacing threat

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within the border of the Aus Agreement

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pillar . One will strengthen

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Australia's undersea warfare

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capabilities at a critical time to

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counter the Pr CS aggression and burden

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share in the region . Pillar two

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advances military capabilities with the

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intent of developing and enhancing

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joint capabilities among Australia ,

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the UK and the United States

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doing so , will engender greater

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cooperation and ultimately improve

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security and interoperability in the

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region . Part of pillar two's

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focus includes efforts to improve

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processes related to arms exports

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and sharing of sensitive defense

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technologies between the participants .

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Now , this must include encouraging and

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guiding our partners on how to

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strengthen their regulatory frameworks

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to enable us to share advanced defense

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technologies safely . And I

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know both agencies

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represented here by our witnesses have

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been intensely focused on this in

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recent months and I'm hoping to hear

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more about what progress has been made

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thus far and the path forward

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in short to provide for the success of

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A and for the promise of Pillar Two to

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be fully realized and implemented . We

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must get it right , especially given

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the persistent and significant threat

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the PR C poses in the Indo Pacific

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and across the globe , we are facing

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rapidly evolving threats which

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underscore the importance of

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reinforcing our alliances to safeguard

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our shared security . And I'm

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supportive of the Biden

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administration's efforts to do so in

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Europe with our NATO allies and in East

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Asia , in providing our allies as well

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as Taiwan , the capabilities not only

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to defend themselves but to deter

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potential aggression . The United

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States can and must continue to stand

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as a leader among nations leveraging

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not only our military strength but also

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our diplomatic tools that are grounded

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in our values . So we may defend our

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security , protect our interests and

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stand up for the rights and

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independence of free peoples throughout

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the world . And with that a year ,

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gentlemen , you'll back . Other members

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of the committee are reminded that

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opening statements may be submitted to

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the record . Uh I ask unanimous consent

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that the gentleman from Connecticut ,

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Mr Courtney be allowed to sit on the

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dice and participate in today's hearing .

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Uh Welcome , sir . And without

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objection so ordered , we're pleased to

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have a distinguished panel of witnesses

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before us . Uh Today , first , uh Miss

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Jessica Lewis is the Assistant

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Secretary for the Bureau of Political

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Military Affairs at the Department of

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State . And Doctor Mara Carlin is the

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Assistant Secretary of Defense for

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Strategies , plans and Capabilities at

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the Department of Defense . This

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committee recognizes the importance of

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the issues before us and are grateful

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to have both state and dod here today

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to speak with us on these important

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issues . Uh Your full statements will

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be made a part of the record . Uh And I

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now recognize Assistant Secretary Lewis

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for her opening statement . Thank you ,

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Chairman mccall ranking member , Meeks ,

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honorable members of the committee .

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Thank you for the opportunity to speak

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with you today . Almost exactly 20

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years ago , today , I started my career

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with the House Foreign Affairs

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Committee and it is an honor to be here

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again . Today . I want to recognize the

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historic work of this that this

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committee is achieving under your

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leadership on critical foreign policy

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issues , whether it is a or otherwise .

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And I'm excited to talk to you about

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the role of the state department in

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realizing a one of the Biden Harris

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administration's key national security

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initiatives . Today , I'm going to

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first provide an overview of a second

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outline our road map for realizing a

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including our aus trade authorization

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mechanism and third discuss the

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importance of export controls . I will

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also speak briefly on foreign military

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sales aus as you know involves

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two pillars , pillar one providing

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Australia with a conventionally armed

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nuclear powered submarine capability at

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the earliest possible date . And pillar

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two trilateral developing and providing

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joint advanced military capabilities

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ranging from artificial intelligence to

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hypersonic to cyber pillar two presents

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a generational opportunity to advance

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the key technologies of the future .

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With two of our closest allies but make

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no mistake . The success of A is not

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predetermined . It must be built for a

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to succeed . We need to both innovate

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boldly and to protect our technology

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from those who wish to take advantage

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of any vulnerability in our systems .

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As Australian Deputy Prime Minister

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said last week , this is a big task .

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The barriers in both systems are vast

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and complex . There is no silver bullet

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as such to implement A we are

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innovating within our existing

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regulatory system while simultaneously

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pursuing broad changes through

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legislation and international

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agreements . The road map consists of

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three steps . First , the Aus trade

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authorization mechanism known as Adam

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legislative changes and international

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consultations . First , the Department

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of State will implement a novel use of

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our existing authorities . The AUS

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trade authorization mechanism will

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provide an interim solution expediting

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and optimizing technology sharing and

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defense trade among only the Aus

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partners . Second and simultaneously ,

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the administration plans to consult

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closely with Congress and propose

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legislative changes to meet the

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ambitions of August . To that end , we

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will seek legislation to clear a path

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to new exemptions for much of our

15:46.239 --> 15:48.890
defense trade with the UK and Australia .

15:49.539 --> 15:51.609
Under this legislative proposal , a

15:51.799 --> 15:53.919
partners will have many transfers

15:53.929 --> 15:56.450
pre-approved and not subject to case by

15:56.460 --> 15:58.909
case review . Third , the

15:58.919 --> 16:00.919
administration will also be seeking

16:00.919 --> 16:03.219
commitments from our partners on shared

16:03.229 --> 16:05.229
standards for protection of defense

16:05.229 --> 16:07.989
information and material . Let me walk

16:08.000 --> 16:10.000
you through the first piece of this

16:10.000 --> 16:11.760
road map . The state aus trade

16:11.770 --> 16:14.270
authorization mechanism . Under this

16:14.280 --> 16:16.447
authorization , the Governments of the

16:16.447 --> 16:18.613
United States , the United Kingdom and

16:18.613 --> 16:20.780
Australia will work together to create

16:20.780 --> 16:23.250
seamless , secure and speedy defense

16:23.260 --> 16:26.020
trade between and among partners .

16:26.130 --> 16:28.186
While also safeguarding our national

16:28.186 --> 16:30.130
security , we will define the AUS

16:30.140 --> 16:32.390
authorizations by three overlapping

16:32.400 --> 16:35.669
criteria which are first a list of the

16:35.679 --> 16:37.623
project areas that fall within the

16:37.623 --> 16:40.169
scope of a second , a list of the

16:40.179 --> 16:42.419
technologies that cannot receive this

16:42.700 --> 16:45.030
preferential treatment . And third a

16:45.039 --> 16:47.039
list of the approved communities or

16:47.039 --> 16:49.150
entities within each country that are

16:49.150 --> 16:50.928
going to receive or access this

16:50.928 --> 16:53.559
technology , all transfers under this

16:53.570 --> 16:55.792
authorization could proceed without any

16:55.792 --> 16:57.848
further need for an authorization or

16:57.848 --> 16:59.959
license while maintaining the records

16:59.959 --> 17:02.460
necessary to conduct compliance . While

17:02.469 --> 17:04.900
state is clearing a path to to new

17:04.910 --> 17:06.854
exemptions , we are simultaneously

17:06.854 --> 17:09.077
moving forward with broader legislation

17:09.077 --> 17:11.188
and international action to develop a

17:11.188 --> 17:13.243
collective approach that streamlines

17:13.243 --> 17:15.466
defense trade with Australia and the UK

17:15.466 --> 17:17.632
while also protecting our technology .

17:17.632 --> 17:19.910
And as we follow through on the vision ,

17:19.910 --> 17:22.077
President Biden set out , it will also

17:22.077 --> 17:23.743
be crucial to maintain strong

17:23.743 --> 17:25.466
protections to ensure that the

17:25.466 --> 17:27.568
technological momentum our three

17:27.578 --> 17:30.298
countries achieve remains secure .

17:30.709 --> 17:32.880
Export controls have only grown more

17:32.890 --> 17:35.099
important during this era of strategic

17:35.109 --> 17:37.689
competition . For years . We have seen

17:37.699 --> 17:39.900
widespread evidence that our strategic

17:39.910 --> 17:42.369
competitors including the People's

17:42.380 --> 17:44.739
Republic of China , Russia . And then

17:44.750 --> 17:46.959
in addition , North Korea and Iran are

17:46.969 --> 17:49.589
seeking to obtain and exploit our

17:49.680 --> 17:52.130
advanced military and civilian

17:52.140 --> 17:55.510
technologies in this moment , we need

17:55.520 --> 17:57.709
to do all we can to move faster on a

17:58.229 --> 18:00.359
and also make sure that we have a

18:00.369 --> 18:03.219
calibrated expose uh approach to export

18:03.229 --> 18:05.660
controls . Finally , I would like to

18:05.670 --> 18:07.969
speak briefly about what we are doing

18:07.979 --> 18:10.250
to improve the speed of our foreign

18:10.260 --> 18:13.780
military sales writ large . Um We call

18:13.790 --> 18:16.260
this the F MS process and we're working

18:16.270 --> 18:18.369
to deliver efficiencies both in the

18:18.380 --> 18:21.229
context of A and for our security

18:21.239 --> 18:23.709
partnerships across the globe . Us

18:23.719 --> 18:25.830
government stakeholders including the

18:25.830 --> 18:27.997
Departments of State Defense and the N

18:27.997 --> 18:30.729
S C are all identifying efficiencies in

18:30.739 --> 18:32.850
the foreign military sales process to

18:32.859 --> 18:35.459
optimize defense trade . The state

18:35.469 --> 18:37.729
department has identified 10 areas for

18:37.739 --> 18:40.030
improvement to the F MS process and we

18:40.040 --> 18:42.151
would be , we would be happy to brief

18:42.151 --> 18:44.318
you further on these recommendations .

18:44.439 --> 18:48.069
In closing , I'd like to reiterate that

18:48.079 --> 18:50.130
for a to succeed . We need to

18:50.140 --> 18:51.862
facilitate the flow of defense

18:51.869 --> 18:53.980
technologies and know how between our

18:53.980 --> 18:55.813
three nations while safeguarding

18:55.813 --> 18:58.036
against hostile actors who would damage

18:58.036 --> 18:59.890
this collaboration and our

18:59.900 --> 19:02.530
competitiveness . We are confident that

19:02.540 --> 19:04.707
we will succeed and we look forward to

19:04.707 --> 19:06.929
working with Congress to achieve this .

19:06.929 --> 19:09.096
Thank you . And I look forward to your

19:09.096 --> 19:11.429
questions . Thank you , Secretary Lewis ,

19:11.429 --> 19:13.429
I now recognize Assistant Secretary

19:13.429 --> 19:13.359
Colin for her opening statement ,

19:13.939 --> 19:15.883
Chairman mccall , ranking member ,

19:15.883 --> 19:17.939
Meeks , distinguished members of the

19:17.939 --> 19:19.606
committee . Thank you for the

19:19.606 --> 19:21.772
opportunity to speak with you today on

19:21.772 --> 19:23.772
the August partnership . A partners

19:23.772 --> 19:25.995
took a monumental step forward in March

19:25.995 --> 19:28.106
when we announced the optimal pathway

19:28.106 --> 19:30.272
for Australia to acquire and develop a

19:30.272 --> 19:32.328
conventionally armed nuclear powered

19:32.328 --> 19:34.439
submarine capability that strengthens

19:34.439 --> 19:36.550
the global non proliferation regime .

19:36.550 --> 19:38.661
But that is only one part of August .

19:38.661 --> 19:40.717
We are actively pursuing cooperation

19:40.717 --> 19:42.550
under Aus on a range of advanced

19:42.550 --> 19:44.930
capabilities , sending a strong message

19:44.939 --> 19:47.170
to the world in favor of a free and

19:47.180 --> 19:49.959
open Indo Pacific . Today . I hope to

19:49.969 --> 19:52.199
reinforce three main topics as they

19:52.209 --> 19:54.939
relate to Aus . First , how Aus fits

19:54.949 --> 19:57.390
into the 2022 national defense strategy ?

19:57.670 --> 19:59.448
Second , how we are seizing the

19:59.448 --> 20:01.337
generational opportunity that Aus

20:01.337 --> 20:03.459
presents ? And third , why we need to

20:03.469 --> 20:05.469
expand defense cooperation with our

20:05.469 --> 20:07.890
closest allies and partners in framing

20:07.900 --> 20:10.050
the security environment . The 2022

20:10.060 --> 20:12.282
national defense strategy describes the

20:12.282 --> 20:14.449
People's Republic of China as our most

20:14.449 --> 20:16.616
consequential strategic competitor for

20:16.616 --> 20:18.838
the coming decades . And it underscores

20:18.838 --> 20:21.079
how new and fast evolving technologies

20:21.089 --> 20:23.500
are complicating escalation dynamics .

20:23.869 --> 20:26.091
The national defense strategy describes

20:26.091 --> 20:28.091
integrated deterrence as a holistic

20:28.091 --> 20:30.091
response to the strategies that our

20:30.091 --> 20:32.147
competitors are pursuing and directs

20:32.147 --> 20:34.369
the use of campaigning to gain military

20:34.369 --> 20:36.536
advantage . It calls on the Department

20:36.536 --> 20:38.758
of Defense to build enduring advantages

20:38.758 --> 20:40.980
across the defense ecosystem , to shore

20:40.980 --> 20:42.869
up our foundations for integrated

20:42.869 --> 20:44.813
deterrent and campaigning . And it

20:44.813 --> 20:46.758
describes allies and partners as a

20:46.758 --> 20:48.813
center of gravity for the strategy .

20:48.813 --> 20:50.702
What is needed now more than ever

20:50.702 --> 20:52.925
before is an approach that enhances our

20:52.925 --> 20:55.036
caucus partners conventional military

20:55.036 --> 20:57.147
capabilities , open support to a more

20:57.147 --> 20:59.091
integrated defense industrial base

20:59.170 --> 21:01.380
increases information sharing and

21:01.390 --> 21:03.446
implements cooperative policies that

21:03.449 --> 21:05.505
reflect the concepts laid out in the

21:05.505 --> 21:07.393
national security strategy . What

21:07.393 --> 21:09.979
cannot be overstated is this ? We

21:09.989 --> 21:12.199
cannot do this alone and our AUC

21:12.219 --> 21:14.219
partners stand shoulder to shoulder

21:14.219 --> 21:16.441
with the United States as they have for

21:16.441 --> 21:18.810
many decades . As President Biden and

21:18.819 --> 21:20.819
Secretary Austin have said AUS is a

21:20.819 --> 21:22.986
generational opportunity and I want to

21:22.986 --> 21:24.930
thank this committee for its broad

21:24.930 --> 21:26.875
bipartisan support . Your work and

21:26.875 --> 21:28.708
support is vital to making Aus a

21:28.708 --> 21:31.170
success together with our partners . We

21:31.180 --> 21:33.013
have identified several advanced

21:33.013 --> 21:35.180
capability opportunities in areas that

21:35.180 --> 21:37.347
range from artificial intelligence and

21:37.347 --> 21:40.329
quantum to hypersonic . Over time . The

21:40.339 --> 21:42.117
work we do will advance our own

21:42.117 --> 21:44.260
capabilities as well as our partners

21:44.390 --> 21:46.279
and will enable us to address the

21:46.279 --> 21:48.334
challenges that we will collectively

21:48.334 --> 21:50.446
face . We have reached a point in the

21:50.446 --> 21:52.223
global security environment and

21:52.223 --> 21:54.446
technology landscape where there is not

21:54.446 --> 21:56.446
only a benefit but an imperative to

21:56.446 --> 21:58.557
expand our defense technology sharing

21:58.557 --> 22:00.790
practices . August is the beginning of

22:00.800 --> 22:02.578
a path that will lead to a more

22:02.578 --> 22:05.359
integrated and open defense ecosystem

22:05.540 --> 22:07.707
that balances the threats of strategic

22:07.707 --> 22:09.929
competition by harnessing the strengths

22:09.929 --> 22:12.229
of our collective capabilities . The US

22:12.239 --> 22:14.350
network of alliances and partnerships

22:14.350 --> 22:16.017
is a strategic advantage that

22:16.017 --> 22:17.729
competitors cannot match and

22:17.739 --> 22:19.939
maintaining . This requires an active

22:19.949 --> 22:22.116
whole of government approach . We have

22:22.116 --> 22:23.949
supported our Ukrainian partners

22:23.949 --> 22:26.171
against Russia's illegal and unprovoked

22:26.171 --> 22:28.282
invasion of Ukraine without putting a

22:28.282 --> 22:30.393
single US service member on the front

22:30.393 --> 22:32.560
lines of that conflict as our response

22:32.560 --> 22:34.671
to Russia's invasion has proven , has

22:34.671 --> 22:36.838
proven we must maintain the ability to

22:36.838 --> 22:38.727
cut off bad actors from dangerous

22:38.727 --> 22:40.505
capabilities , but we must also

22:40.505 --> 22:42.671
maintain the tools and vision to share

22:42.671 --> 22:44.671
and collaborate with our allies and

22:44.671 --> 22:46.449
partners preparation for future

22:46.449 --> 22:48.282
conflicts or deterring them from

22:48.282 --> 22:50.282
occurring in the first place , will

22:50.282 --> 22:52.171
rely on our ability to expand and

22:52.171 --> 22:54.227
enhance military partnerships before

22:54.227 --> 22:56.459
any shots are fired . American business

22:56.469 --> 22:58.302
is one of the strongest and most

22:58.302 --> 23:00.136
resilient assets in the National

23:00.136 --> 23:02.469
toolkit . We need to widen the aperture ,

23:02.469 --> 23:04.802
foster collaborative defense innovation ,

23:04.802 --> 23:06.969
advance military interoperability with

23:06.969 --> 23:09.025
our allies and partners and leverage

23:09.025 --> 23:11.025
our collective strengths as a force

23:11.025 --> 23:13.191
multiplier , Aucas has provided a lens

23:13.191 --> 23:15.260
into not only what military

23:15.270 --> 23:17.489
capabilities our closest allies need

23:17.660 --> 23:20.069
but also what barriers exist that

23:20.079 --> 23:21.912
hamper pursuit of our integrated

23:21.912 --> 23:24.023
national security strategy and how we

23:24.023 --> 23:26.190
need to adapt our approach to meet our

23:26.190 --> 23:28.357
national security objectives . To that

23:28.357 --> 23:30.579
end the administration plans to consult

23:30.579 --> 23:32.412
closely with Congress to propose

23:32.412 --> 23:34.468
legislative changes that would allow

23:34.468 --> 23:36.357
increased exemptions to licensing

23:36.357 --> 23:38.135
requirements for a partners and

23:38.135 --> 23:40.190
expanded to permit transfers of both

23:40.190 --> 23:42.190
unclassified and classified defense

23:42.190 --> 23:44.349
articles and services . This bold

23:44.359 --> 23:46.479
approach is critical to ensuring the

23:46.489 --> 23:49.189
AUC partnership continues to innovate

23:49.199 --> 23:51.390
and to progress to meet the challenges

23:51.400 --> 23:53.729
of the global security environment . Mr

23:53.739 --> 23:55.795
Chairman , ranking member , Meek and

23:55.795 --> 23:58.072
distinguished members of the committee .

23:58.072 --> 24:00.183
Thank you for the opportunity to meet

24:00.183 --> 24:00.119
with you today and I look forward to

24:00.130 --> 24:02.297
answering any questions you may have .

24:02.297 --> 24:04.519
Thank you , Secretary uh Carlin . I now

24:04.519 --> 24:06.519
recognize myself for questions . Um

24:06.519 --> 24:08.829
First , uh we look forward to more of

24:08.839 --> 24:11.660
these conversations with you . Uh

24:11.670 --> 24:14.729
Obviously , this is very uh important .

24:15.160 --> 24:17.630
Uh We need more speed in the process ,

24:17.640 --> 24:21.219
I think I well intended , but we need

24:21.229 --> 24:23.500
exemptions , not just with pillar one ,

24:23.510 --> 24:25.621
dealing with nuclear submarines , but

24:25.621 --> 24:29.130
also with pillar two . Um If we're

24:29.140 --> 24:31.251
going to take the threat from China ,

24:31.251 --> 24:35.030
uh seriously . And I've been um many um

24:35.420 --> 24:38.459
both private sector and our partners

24:38.469 --> 24:40.989
including Australia have told me how

24:41.000 --> 24:44.420
important this these exemptions are to

24:44.430 --> 24:47.069
speed up the process . Um My first

24:47.079 --> 24:49.135
question is uh you know , pillar one

24:49.135 --> 24:51.619
has the exemptions as you know , pillar

24:51.630 --> 24:53.686
two does not , how would you plan to

24:53.686 --> 24:56.359
implement uh these exemptions to pillar

24:56.369 --> 24:59.540
two ? Uh Secretary Lewis . Thank you

24:59.550 --> 25:02.109
for that question , Mr Chairman . And

25:02.119 --> 25:04.939
um I agree with you that I think that

25:04.949 --> 25:07.219
um it's very important that we focus on

25:07.229 --> 25:10.750
Pillar Two to create a speedy um

25:10.760 --> 25:13.579
safe and secure way to move forward

25:13.589 --> 25:16.109
with this defense trade uh between the

25:16.119 --> 25:18.989
three countries . Um So let me talk

25:19.000 --> 25:22.550
both um about uh the interim period and

25:22.560 --> 25:25.250
then on the legislative front , um

25:25.260 --> 25:28.189
we're really looking for uh new

25:28.199 --> 25:31.910
exemptions . And the idea is that

25:31.920 --> 25:35.310
um if we know what is included under

25:35.319 --> 25:38.609
the A program , if we know technologies

25:38.619 --> 25:40.841
that cannot be included something , for

25:40.841 --> 25:43.063
example , that might be prohibited by a

25:43.063 --> 25:46.069
treaty . Um and we know who's receiving

25:46.079 --> 25:49.180
it . Um , then we'll be able to , in

25:49.189 --> 25:52.739
essence preapprove and have , um ,

25:52.750 --> 25:55.869
these transfers move forward without

25:55.880 --> 25:58.319
needing a license on the front end .

25:58.619 --> 26:00.599
And I think when we talk about

26:00.609 --> 26:03.329
exemptions , that's fundamentally what

26:03.339 --> 26:05.770
we're all trying to get at . So we'd be

26:05.780 --> 26:08.869
looking at a preapproval not case by

26:08.880 --> 26:12.869
case process . Um , we also are

26:12.880 --> 26:15.739
going to be looking at , um , moving

26:15.750 --> 26:18.400
forward with , uh , third party

26:18.410 --> 26:21.660
transfers , um , a blanket exemption

26:21.670 --> 26:24.199
under a , um , and what that means is

26:24.209 --> 26:26.719
for items that are us defense articles

26:26.729 --> 26:29.180
that are controlled by one country that

26:29.189 --> 26:31.359
they can be moved to another country

26:31.369 --> 26:34.719
within a without needing authorization .

26:35.050 --> 26:37.839
Um , so all of these are the pieces ,

26:37.849 --> 26:40.127
um , that we want to move forward with .

26:40.127 --> 26:42.238
We have this interim proposal so that

26:42.238 --> 26:44.182
we can get moving right now on the

26:44.182 --> 26:46.349
legislative side . We and I agree with

26:46.349 --> 26:48.571
you completely that we need , uh , more

26:48.571 --> 26:50.793
of these . Um , and we want to come and

26:50.793 --> 26:52.905
sit down and work with you and , uh ,

26:52.905 --> 26:54.960
your excellent staff on getting that

26:54.960 --> 26:57.238
legislative language . Exactly . Right .

26:57.238 --> 26:59.016
And I think codifying will give

26:59.016 --> 27:01.182
certainty to our partners and also our

27:01.182 --> 27:03.550
contractors , uh , as well . I look

27:03.560 --> 27:05.338
forward to seeing your proposal

27:05.338 --> 27:07.338
legislation . We'd like to move . I

27:07.338 --> 27:09.560
think time is of the essence here . And

27:09.560 --> 27:11.727
so I look forward to working with both

27:11.727 --> 27:14.004
of you , Miss Carlin . Do you have any ,

27:14.004 --> 27:13.849
anything to add to that ? So , I would ,

27:13.859 --> 27:15.970
I would just add , this is a historic

27:15.970 --> 27:17.803
opportunity . So it does require

27:17.803 --> 27:19.748
historic change . And so as we are

27:19.748 --> 27:21.803
pursuing this legislative proposal ,

27:21.803 --> 27:23.970
we'd like to consult very closely with

27:23.970 --> 27:25.970
all of you on how best to make that

27:25.970 --> 27:28.081
happen . But this really is a notable

27:28.081 --> 27:30.137
moment for ensuring that we can have

27:30.137 --> 27:32.074
stability and security in such a

27:32.084 --> 27:34.195
critical region of the Indo Pacific .

27:34.195 --> 27:36.251
Yeah , thank you . And we'll , we'll

27:36.251 --> 27:38.300
obviously consult with our uh armed

27:38.310 --> 27:40.459
services committee uh colleagues as

27:40.469 --> 27:43.560
well . Um Let me ask you , uh perhaps

27:43.569 --> 27:45.819
both of you . Uh uh as I mentioned ,

27:45.829 --> 27:48.939
when I was in Taiwan , president asked

27:48.949 --> 27:52.949
me , where are my weapons ? Um I

27:52.959 --> 27:55.530
didn't have a good answer and she said ,

27:55.540 --> 27:58.589
I , you know , I , I paid for them . Um

27:59.410 --> 28:02.349
and you see the threat as they circle

28:02.359 --> 28:05.359
the island in a very aggressive way .

28:05.699 --> 28:07.866
Uh the ranking member and I signed off

28:07.866 --> 28:11.599
on 22 weapons systems . And as I

28:11.609 --> 28:15.150
look at the list , the earliest

28:15.160 --> 28:17.750
they , that any can be delivered is by

28:17.760 --> 28:21.750
2025 and some as late

28:21.760 --> 28:23.510
as 2029 .

28:25.680 --> 28:27.959
And I'd like to enter these into the

28:27.969 --> 28:30.290
record if I may with without objection .

28:31.319 --> 28:34.280
But um why is this taking so long ?

28:36.040 --> 28:39.479
Um Let me start . Um And we agree that

28:39.489 --> 28:43.209
there is urgency to make sure um that

28:43.219 --> 28:46.630
Taiwan is prepared um as part of

28:46.640 --> 28:50.589
deterrence uh to keep China from

28:50.599 --> 28:53.280
moving forward . Um Let me take a

28:53.290 --> 28:56.155
moment and talk about uh the way that

28:56.165 --> 28:58.276
the arms sales process works as , you

28:58.276 --> 29:01.084
know , once you clear a sale , um ,

29:01.094 --> 29:03.614
which we have sent up here , um , it

29:03.625 --> 29:06.234
then goes on contract and only once it

29:06.244 --> 29:08.864
is on contract and Taiwan , in this

29:08.875 --> 29:11.535
case has paid for it does production

29:11.545 --> 29:14.810
start . Um , and so , um , I don't have

29:14.819 --> 29:16.819
the exact list but I'm , I'm fairly

29:16.819 --> 29:19.260
sure I'm correct that , um , we are now

29:19.270 --> 29:22.449
in the point where we are looking at um

29:22.459 --> 29:24.449
the production timeline for those

29:24.459 --> 29:26.829
weapons to be built . Um Let me say a

29:26.839 --> 29:28.849
couple of things about that . Uh We

29:28.859 --> 29:31.560
agree that the defense industrial base

29:31.569 --> 29:33.680
needs to work together with us in the

29:33.680 --> 29:35.569
Department of Defense to speed up

29:35.569 --> 29:37.458
industrial production . This is a

29:37.458 --> 29:39.458
worldwide problem , not just Taiwan

29:39.458 --> 29:41.458
specific . Um And the Department of

29:41.458 --> 29:43.569
Defense has taken um urgent steps led

29:43.569 --> 29:46.119
by the Deputy Secretary on this issue .

29:46.500 --> 29:49.560
Um when it comes to Taiwan specifically ,

29:49.680 --> 29:53.489
um I think as you know , um since 2017 ,

29:53.500 --> 29:57.300
we have sent up um billions of dollars

29:57.310 --> 29:59.619
in arms sales to be authorized through

29:59.630 --> 30:02.160
this committee . Um And in addition ,

30:02.170 --> 30:04.339
over the past year , we've signed off

30:04.349 --> 30:07.260
on more arms sales to Taiwan than in

30:07.270 --> 30:09.459
the previous decade . Now , we need to

30:09.469 --> 30:11.469
work on them , getting produced and

30:11.469 --> 30:13.760
getting to Taiwan quickly . And I would

30:13.770 --> 30:16.040
just say time is yes , since I , I

30:16.219 --> 30:18.275
think they're gonna try to influence

30:18.275 --> 30:20.386
the election presidential election in

30:20.386 --> 30:22.441
Taiwan . If they fail , then they're

30:22.441 --> 30:24.275
gonna be looking at some sort of

30:24.275 --> 30:26.552
blockade event . And so , uh , my , um ,

30:26.552 --> 30:29.650
question is , um , and I asked the

30:29.660 --> 30:32.150
secretary this question , can we

30:32.219 --> 30:35.859
redirect some of our weapon sales

30:36.229 --> 30:38.239
from one country and send it into

30:38.250 --> 30:40.589
Taiwan ? And then secondly , why can't

30:40.599 --> 30:43.800
we do third party sales of some of

30:43.810 --> 30:45.588
these weapon systems that other

30:45.588 --> 30:47.949
countries have ? And we would simply

30:47.959 --> 30:49.848
give them permission to put these

30:49.848 --> 30:52.589
weapons in country . Well , I think we

30:52.599 --> 30:55.290
need to look at all available options .

30:55.300 --> 30:57.022
Um , obviously for third party

30:57.022 --> 30:59.133
transfers , one country would have to

30:59.133 --> 31:01.300
agree to transfer those weapons . Um ,

31:01.300 --> 31:03.522
but I think you're right to , to ask us

31:03.522 --> 31:05.633
to take a look at all of those , um ,

31:05.633 --> 31:07.744
including some of the new authorities

31:07.744 --> 31:07.709
that were included in the bill that I

31:07.719 --> 31:10.329
know that you offered as well . Thank

31:10.339 --> 31:12.450
you . I , I , I'd like to speed it up

31:12.450 --> 31:14.561
and Miss Lin uh car . Do you have any

31:14.561 --> 31:16.617
uh additional thoughts ? Thank you .

31:16.617 --> 31:18.783
Well , I'd first of all , just like to

31:18.783 --> 31:18.229
thank Congress for the Taiwan Enhanced

31:18.239 --> 31:20.295
Resilience Act . I think that's been

31:20.295 --> 31:22.017
really important and shows the

31:22.017 --> 31:24.128
bipartisan support for this important

31:24.128 --> 31:25.906
effort . Um Having appropriated

31:25.906 --> 31:28.128
resources can make that uh a little bit

31:28.128 --> 31:27.949
easier . Of course , in terms of being

31:27.959 --> 31:30.079
manifested . Uh I would also like to

31:30.089 --> 31:31.978
note as Assistant Secretary Lewis

31:31.978 --> 31:34.089
briefly highlighted , um , our deputy

31:34.089 --> 31:36.030
secretary um , has directed the

31:36.040 --> 31:38.250
department to find ways to accelerate

31:38.260 --> 31:40.149
and bolster Taiwan's self defense

31:40.149 --> 31:42.371
capabilities to strengthen cross strait

31:42.371 --> 31:44.427
deterrent . Looking at both material

31:44.427 --> 31:46.593
and non material capabilities and it's

31:46.593 --> 31:48.649
focused , it's a senior level effort

31:48.649 --> 31:50.760
and it's across the entire department

31:50.760 --> 31:52.895
to ensure that this critical issue is

31:52.905 --> 31:55.127
getting the resources and the attention

31:55.127 --> 31:57.238
that it needs . Well , I know you did

31:57.238 --> 31:59.405
an F M F and thank you for that . Uh I

31:59.405 --> 32:01.516
will be talking to the Senate Foreign

32:01.516 --> 32:03.627
Relations Committee about um and also

32:03.627 --> 32:05.572
the Appropriations Committee about

32:05.572 --> 32:07.627
appropriating our authorization . Uh

32:07.627 --> 32:09.627
With that , I recognize the ranking

32:09.627 --> 32:11.461
member Mr Meeks . Thank you , Mr

32:11.461 --> 32:13.238
Chairman and thank you for your

32:13.439 --> 32:16.260
testimony . Uh And I think that uh we

32:16.270 --> 32:18.492
have on this committee tried to work in

32:18.492 --> 32:22.189
a bipartisan way uh understanding uh uh

32:22.199 --> 32:24.849
the , the , the need and the expediency

32:24.859 --> 32:27.449
of trying to make sure that our allies

32:27.650 --> 32:29.539
uh uh are working , we're working

32:29.539 --> 32:31.761
collected together as we saw take place

32:31.761 --> 32:33.761
at the , at the G7 . And one of the

32:33.761 --> 32:36.039
things that I've been trying to figure ,

32:36.039 --> 32:38.261
you know , um was been asking her a lot

32:38.261 --> 32:40.483
because why does , and I listen to your

32:40.483 --> 32:42.650
explanation , why does it take so long

32:42.650 --> 32:44.872
to have the production lines done ? And

32:44.872 --> 32:47.094
I , I hear what you're saying and , and

32:47.094 --> 32:49.317
when I talk to a number of those in the

32:49.317 --> 32:51.483
industry that sells it just , it takes

32:51.483 --> 32:53.539
time , it takes time for them to get

32:53.539 --> 32:55.650
the employees back online and to what

32:55.650 --> 32:57.983
it takes to produce and just , you know ,

32:57.983 --> 33:00.094
there's no way they tell me that they

33:00.094 --> 33:02.545
can uh expedite , you know , quicker

33:02.555 --> 33:04.722
than they've been doing . I don't know

33:04.722 --> 33:06.833
whether there's something that we can

33:06.833 --> 33:08.999
do to engage to help them in , in that

33:08.999 --> 33:08.675
manner or not , but that's what they're

33:08.685 --> 33:10.796
telling me . They're telling me it is

33:10.796 --> 33:12.963
just difficult once it is authorized ,

33:12.963 --> 33:14.852
once we go through the steps that

33:14.852 --> 33:16.963
you've enunciated here , uh , it just

33:16.963 --> 33:18.741
takes that amount of time to do

33:18.741 --> 33:21.074
business to , to , to align it together .

33:21.074 --> 33:23.241
Do you find that to be the case also ?

33:23.241 --> 33:25.463
Um Well , let me start by saying , I do

33:25.463 --> 33:27.685
think we are having a couple of factors

33:27.685 --> 33:29.629
happening at the same time . One ,

33:29.629 --> 33:31.796
we're seeing a significant increase in

33:31.796 --> 33:33.963
demand for defense articles around the

33:33.963 --> 33:36.185
world . Both obviously not just because

33:36.185 --> 33:38.018
of the Ukraine War in addition ,

33:38.018 --> 33:40.018
because of the challenges um in the

33:40.018 --> 33:42.349
Indo Pacific . Um And so there is an

33:42.359 --> 33:44.796
increased demand that also coincided

33:44.806 --> 33:46.917
with COVID . It coincided with supply

33:46.917 --> 33:49.166
chain issues . I do think however ,

33:49.176 --> 33:51.287
that there are steps that we can take

33:51.287 --> 33:53.686
working with industry . Um Sometimes

33:53.696 --> 33:55.807
it's a matter and , and doctor Carlin

33:55.807 --> 33:58.029
may have more of this on finding a part

33:58.029 --> 34:00.029
um from a sub sub supplier that had

34:00.029 --> 34:01.974
been shut down that we need to get

34:01.974 --> 34:04.196
moving again . Sometimes it's investing

34:04.196 --> 34:06.085
a little money up front so that a

34:06.085 --> 34:08.085
production line can get started . I

34:08.085 --> 34:10.196
think there are a whole host of steps

34:10.196 --> 34:12.363
that we can take with industry as they

34:12.363 --> 34:14.585
look at the challenges that they have .

34:14.585 --> 34:16.640
Um you know , in terms of hiring new

34:16.640 --> 34:18.752
staff um adding actual capabilities ,

34:18.752 --> 34:20.918
which is basically what I was asking ,

34:20.918 --> 34:20.632
is there ways that y'all can work

34:20.642 --> 34:22.971
together , you know , uh to make sure

34:22.981 --> 34:25.259
that production is happening in a more ,

34:25.259 --> 34:27.370
in a more timely fashion . Let me ask

34:27.370 --> 34:29.425
uh Doctor Collin , you know , one of

34:29.425 --> 34:31.481
the concerns that I do have is , you

34:31.481 --> 34:34.560
know , I in , in the 2023 worldwide

34:34.570 --> 34:36.919
Threat Assessment . Uh The US Director

34:36.929 --> 34:39.151
of National Intelligence emphasized the

34:39.151 --> 34:41.379
threat that's posed by China's

34:41.389 --> 34:43.939
persistent efforts to acquire foreign

34:43.949 --> 34:46.116
science and technology information and

34:46.116 --> 34:49.080
expertise , especially in the defense

34:49.090 --> 34:51.879
space and emphasize the extensive use

34:51.889 --> 34:55.250
of economic espionage and cyber theft .

34:55.409 --> 34:58.199
Now I have some concerns because I

34:58.209 --> 35:01.639
don't want some of our sensitive uh uh

35:01.649 --> 35:04.120
equipment and technology and , and ,

35:04.129 --> 35:07.070
and and brain to go to , to China . Uh

35:07.080 --> 35:10.590
And so it also

35:10.600 --> 35:12.489
particularly in , in , in , in uh

35:12.489 --> 35:15.229
Australia . Uh they said that there was

35:15.239 --> 35:17.870
an area of opportunity for China uh

35:17.889 --> 35:20.800
given its location and the

35:20.810 --> 35:24.800
comparatively uh nascent regulatory

35:24.810 --> 35:27.580
architecture that Australia's

35:27.590 --> 35:30.260
Intelligence services emphasized this

35:30.270 --> 35:33.610
threat in its own 23 2023 threat

35:33.620 --> 35:35.909
assessment and its director stating

35:35.919 --> 35:37.752
that the targeting of Australian

35:37.752 --> 35:40.179
defense industry personnel having

35:40.189 --> 35:42.179
increased . And I quote since the

35:42.189 --> 35:44.699
August announcement last year , which

35:44.709 --> 35:46.653
gives me concerns and we know what

35:46.653 --> 35:48.987
China has been doing in a nefarious way .

35:48.987 --> 35:52.850
So I wanna make sure

35:52.860 --> 35:55.030
that the Australian and the UK

35:55.040 --> 35:56.762
regulatory structures that are

35:56.762 --> 35:58.429
controlling sensitive defense

35:58.429 --> 36:00.429
technologies that are comparable to

36:00.429 --> 36:02.596
what we have in the United States . It

36:02.596 --> 36:04.818
are they the same , do they differ ? Is

36:04.818 --> 36:07.040
it safe to make sure it does not get in

36:07.040 --> 36:09.250
the hands of of of , of the Chinese

36:11.520 --> 36:13.631
sir , as you know , Australia and the

36:13.631 --> 36:15.798
UK are among our closest allies in the

36:15.798 --> 36:17.742
world and they have mature defense

36:17.742 --> 36:19.742
trade control processes . We have a

36:19.742 --> 36:21.853
long history of working with them and

36:21.853 --> 36:24.020
have shared some of our most sensitive

36:24.020 --> 36:26.187
military technology to date F-35 being

36:26.187 --> 36:28.298
a great example , our F-18s as well .

36:28.298 --> 36:30.464
Uh not to mention submarine technology

36:30.464 --> 36:32.631
as it relates to August specifically ,

36:32.631 --> 36:34.798
we will work very closely with them on

36:34.804 --> 36:37.014
ensuring we have trilateral standards

36:37.024 --> 36:39.735
for secure defense trade , making sure

36:39.745 --> 36:42.715
that all of us have the technological

36:42.725 --> 36:44.705
security , legal and regulatory

36:44.715 --> 36:46.915
frameworks that are providing export

36:46.925 --> 36:49.036
controls consistent with those that ,

36:49.036 --> 36:50.981
that uh we implement in the United

36:50.981 --> 36:54.929
States as well . So thank you for that .

36:54.939 --> 36:56.760
So I , I wanna are there any

36:56.770 --> 36:58.992
improvements you think that needs to be

36:58.992 --> 37:01.214
done because you know , when we do talk

37:01.214 --> 37:03.492
to and when I do talk to our uh uh our ,

37:03.492 --> 37:05.548
our allies in Australia and the UK ,

37:05.548 --> 37:07.659
you know , sometimes we've had we had

37:07.659 --> 37:09.826
these conversations . So are there any

37:09.826 --> 37:11.770
improvements that you think in the

37:11.770 --> 37:13.881
regulatory structure are necessary to

37:13.881 --> 37:16.048
ensure appropriate protections against

37:16.048 --> 37:18.326
malign actors ? And uh and , and , and ,

37:18.326 --> 37:20.665
and what if any risk to our national

37:20.675 --> 37:22.508
security is related to sensitive

37:22.508 --> 37:24.314
defense capabilities ? If our

37:24.324 --> 37:27.064
regulatory frameworks are misaligned .

37:27.889 --> 37:30.139
Um I very much appreciate the question

37:30.149 --> 37:32.689
and I think um it is important that we

37:32.699 --> 37:36.169
take these serious issues um under

37:36.179 --> 37:38.512
consideration as we move forward with a .

37:38.899 --> 37:41.010
Um again , uh we do have full

37:41.020 --> 37:43.076
confidence that we can work with our

37:43.076 --> 37:45.242
allies to protect these technologies .

37:45.242 --> 37:47.600
What I would also say is that any time

37:47.685 --> 37:50.114
that we are putting together um a

37:50.125 --> 37:52.292
structure like we are putting together

37:52.292 --> 37:54.685
with this new Caucus authorization , we

37:54.695 --> 37:56.751
always have to come together to make

37:56.751 --> 37:58.862
sure that we are aligned , that we've

37:58.862 --> 38:01.514
crossed every T and dotted every I . Um

38:01.524 --> 38:03.746
But I am very confident that we will be

38:03.746 --> 38:05.913
able to do this , given that these are

38:05.913 --> 38:08.040
uh two of our closest allies . Thank

38:08.050 --> 38:11.209
you , chair recognizes Mr Smith . Thank

38:11.219 --> 38:13.330
you very much , Mr Chairman and thank

38:13.330 --> 38:15.386
you both for your leadership and for

38:15.386 --> 38:17.441
being here today to testify . Let me

38:17.441 --> 38:19.497
just ask um um Secretary Lewis , you

38:19.497 --> 38:21.497
pointed out that the administration

38:21.497 --> 38:23.608
will also be seeking commitments from

38:23.608 --> 38:25.760
our aus partners on shared standards

38:25.770 --> 38:27.437
for the protection of defense

38:27.437 --> 38:29.603
information and materials , consistent

38:29.603 --> 38:31.770
with the steps the United States takes

38:31.770 --> 38:33.548
to protect such information and

38:33.548 --> 38:35.770
materials . Perhaps you could elaborate

38:35.770 --> 38:37.881
on some of those steps whether or not

38:37.881 --> 38:37.449
those commitments are actually yielding

38:37.459 --> 38:39.515
fruit . And I would just point out ,

38:39.515 --> 38:41.681
you know , um for decades , the United

38:41.681 --> 38:43.737
States , as we all know , especially

38:43.737 --> 38:45.959
with dual use items , aided and abetted

38:45.959 --> 38:47.792
the Chinese Communist Party Post

38:47.792 --> 38:49.848
Tiananmen Square . We gave them just

38:49.848 --> 38:49.379
about anything they wanted and they

38:49.389 --> 38:52.219
built up a capacity and a capability

38:52.229 --> 38:54.449
courtesy of us and of course , the

38:54.459 --> 38:56.570
Europeans . So hopefully there's been

38:56.570 --> 38:58.570
lessons learned there . But when it

38:58.570 --> 39:00.792
comes to our , our two allies , our two

39:00.792 --> 39:03.015
great allies , uh we're talking about ,

39:03.015 --> 39:05.126
uh I was wondering if you could speak

39:05.126 --> 39:06.792
to the issue of yes , defense

39:06.792 --> 39:09.015
corporations are one thing and I'm sure

39:09.015 --> 39:11.237
you're looking at that very closely . I

39:11.237 --> 39:10.860
hope you're also looking at colleges

39:10.870 --> 39:12.981
and universities . I chaired a series

39:12.981 --> 39:15.419
of hearings on Confucius Institutes uh

39:15.429 --> 39:18.530
and was shocked to some extent , uh

39:18.540 --> 39:20.707
even asked the Gao to look into it and

39:20.707 --> 39:22.873
they came back and said the agreements

39:22.949 --> 39:24.782
are confidential . They wouldn ,

39:24.782 --> 39:26.893
wouldn't share what they've agreed to

39:26.893 --> 39:29.005
uh with the Chinese Communist Party .

39:29.005 --> 39:31.005
And we know it's a malign influence

39:31.005 --> 39:33.227
that they're having on college campuses

39:33.227 --> 39:35.338
and university campuses . But we also

39:35.338 --> 39:37.116
know that that gives them a , a

39:37.116 --> 39:39.171
launching pad to be eyes and ears on

39:39.171 --> 39:40.838
the spot there uh to try to ,

39:40.838 --> 39:42.838
particularly in , in colleges where

39:42.838 --> 39:44.893
there's a great deal of defense work

39:44.893 --> 39:47.227
going on . And I'm wondering , you know ,

39:47.227 --> 39:49.393
if we're doing that well in the United

39:49.393 --> 39:50.949
States to ensure that those

39:50.949 --> 39:53.171
vulnerabilities are not exploited , but

39:53.171 --> 39:55.171
also with our two partners , uh you

39:55.171 --> 39:57.338
know , in the UK . And with uh because

39:57.338 --> 39:59.338
they have Confucius Centers too and

39:59.338 --> 39:58.409
they have many of them , the whole

39:58.419 --> 40:00.586
world has them . Uh but they have many

40:00.586 --> 40:01.586
of them as well .

40:04.540 --> 40:06.596
Again , thank you for the question .

40:06.596 --> 40:08.484
And I do think you are raising an

40:08.484 --> 40:10.596
incredibly important issue , which is

40:10.596 --> 40:13.389
as we move forward with speed uh within

40:13.399 --> 40:15.580
the framework , we also need to make

40:15.590 --> 40:18.770
sure that we do it in a secure way . Um

40:18.780 --> 40:20.790
And I think you are flagging a

40:20.800 --> 40:23.050
particular challenge um when it comes

40:23.060 --> 40:25.227
to the PR C because as you point out ,

40:25.227 --> 40:27.939
we know the PR C has a long history of

40:27.949 --> 40:31.199
trying to exploit our technology um to

40:31.209 --> 40:34.360
uh take our intellectual property . Um

40:34.370 --> 40:37.330
They've looked at trying to uh get into

40:37.340 --> 40:40.620
a whole range of uh our technology and

40:40.629 --> 40:42.518
I am aware of the issues that you

40:42.518 --> 40:44.725
raised uh related to universities .

40:45.084 --> 40:47.344
Again , I think when it comes to the

40:47.354 --> 40:50.185
question of Australia and the UK ,

40:50.475 --> 40:53.284
because these are truly our closest

40:53.294 --> 40:57.064
allies um because of the sophistication

40:57.235 --> 40:59.965
um of their systems and the way we are

40:59.975 --> 41:02.142
able to work very closely together , I

41:02.142 --> 41:04.570
am absolutely confident that we will be

41:04.580 --> 41:06.802
able to have the highest standards that

41:06.802 --> 41:08.747
you would expect to make sure that

41:08.747 --> 41:10.969
those exports and intellectual property

41:10.969 --> 41:13.136
don't end up in the wrong hands . Um I

41:13.136 --> 41:14.969
very much appreciate you raising

41:14.969 --> 41:17.024
concerns related , not just into the

41:17.024 --> 41:19.136
defense field , but as we look across

41:19.136 --> 41:20.913
um educational institutions and

41:20.913 --> 41:23.080
universities and we will be certain to

41:23.080 --> 41:24.747
take that into account . I do

41:24.747 --> 41:26.969
appreciate that very much . Let me just

41:26.969 --> 41:29.080
ask , uh do you see any enhanced role

41:29.080 --> 41:31.413
for cooperation with the quad countries ,

41:31.413 --> 41:33.636
Australia , India , Japan , of course ,

41:33.636 --> 41:35.747
us and perhaps even with the Republic

41:35.747 --> 41:37.969
of Korea . Thank you for the question .

41:37.969 --> 41:40.136
I think at this moment in time , we're

41:40.136 --> 41:42.413
very focused on getting August , right ?

41:42.413 --> 41:44.580
Um And that is the focus of what we're

41:44.580 --> 41:46.691
doing right now . Um As we progress ,

41:46.691 --> 41:48.913
we're always happy to look at ways that

41:48.913 --> 41:51.080
we can further cooperate with other um

41:51.080 --> 41:53.413
allies and partners . Thank you so much .

41:53.413 --> 41:55.358
Yield back to balance and yields .

41:55.358 --> 41:58.530
Chair recognizes Mr Sherman . Uh

41:58.540 --> 42:02.500
capitalist economy tends to move toward

42:02.510 --> 42:05.219
just in time delivery . You get , get

42:05.229 --> 42:07.340
it to your customer just when they're

42:07.340 --> 42:09.310
ready to pay for it . So with baby

42:09.320 --> 42:11.487
formula , sometimes we have a shortage

42:11.487 --> 42:13.709
with certain drugs , we have a shortage

42:13.709 --> 42:15.909
um and we're seeing a shortage in

42:15.919 --> 42:19.669
munitions as well . Um

42:20.600 --> 42:24.000
And what concerns me is that we don't

42:24.010 --> 42:26.590
have enough together with all our

42:26.600 --> 42:29.669
allies to provide enough artillery

42:29.679 --> 42:32.290
shells , et cetera to Ukraine and their

42:32.300 --> 42:35.010
ability to fire to fire artillery

42:35.020 --> 42:38.750
shells is 1/10 of

42:38.760 --> 42:41.659
what our ability is . That is to say

42:41.669 --> 42:45.399
that's a much smaller military . Um

42:46.689 --> 42:50.219
Have we do we have a system

42:50.229 --> 42:53.959
in uh defense procurement where we can

42:53.969 --> 42:57.250
pay companies not for what they deliver

42:57.260 --> 42:59.199
but for just having stand by

42:59.209 --> 43:02.389
manufacturing capacity . Ah Miss Carlin ,

43:04.510 --> 43:07.750
thank you very much . I think Russia's

43:07.760 --> 43:09.593
unprovoked and aggressive war in

43:09.593 --> 43:11.816
Ukraine has helped a whole lot of folks

43:11.816 --> 43:14.459
internalize something that we had seen

43:14.469 --> 43:17.070
in the environment . But probably

43:17.080 --> 43:19.030
hadn't appreciated to the extent

43:19.040 --> 43:21.560
possible , which is that criticality of

43:21.570 --> 43:23.792
investing in defense industrial bases ,

43:23.792 --> 43:25.848
both of our own and our allies . But

43:25.848 --> 43:28.070
more specifically , do we have a system

43:28.070 --> 43:29.737
where we pay military defense

43:29.737 --> 43:31.348
contractors to have stand by

43:31.348 --> 43:33.403
manufacturing capacity ? Well , uh I

43:33.403 --> 43:35.292
might specifically highlight that

43:35.292 --> 43:37.126
Congress has given uh I know the

43:37.126 --> 43:39.237
Department of Defense this multi year

43:39.237 --> 43:41.459
procurement authority for munitions and

43:41.459 --> 43:43.348
that , that didn't say multi year

43:43.348 --> 43:45.014
procurement . I said stand by

43:45.014 --> 43:47.205
manufacturing , you pay somebody just

43:47.215 --> 43:49.915
to be ready to produce in the future ,

43:50.245 --> 43:52.467
not for what they've produced , but for

43:52.467 --> 43:54.689
the capacity to produce . It's a yes or

43:54.689 --> 43:56.912
no question . Do you have an answer ? I

43:56.912 --> 43:58.967
just wanna ensure , I understand the

43:58.967 --> 44:01.189
the question is there any , do you have

44:01.189 --> 44:03.412
the capacity to contract with a private

44:03.412 --> 44:05.245
munitions manufacturer to say in

44:05.245 --> 44:07.245
addition to what we may pay you for

44:07.245 --> 44:09.412
what you deliver , we're gonna pay you

44:09.412 --> 44:11.356
to have a plant out somewhere that

44:11.356 --> 44:13.578
you're not even using , that's ready to

44:13.578 --> 44:15.467
go in an emergency . We have that

44:15.467 --> 44:17.689
capacity or not ? Do we use it or not ?

44:17.689 --> 44:20.023
I would like to get back to you on that .

44:20.023 --> 44:22.134
You get back to me on that if I might

44:22.134 --> 44:24.245
say that we are focused in particular

44:24.245 --> 44:26.301
because there's such , I I I , I got

44:26.301 --> 44:29.419
limited time here . Um We uh have a

44:29.429 --> 44:32.260
process for uh a approving foreign

44:32.270 --> 44:35.439
military sales and often that process

44:35.449 --> 44:37.840
is slow and we've had discussions in

44:37.850 --> 44:40.810
this committee for over 20 years on

44:40.820 --> 44:43.800
that . And uh uh

44:44.110 --> 44:46.277
Congress has passed some legislation ,

44:46.277 --> 44:48.499
I've been in draft involved in drafting

44:48.499 --> 44:50.979
it uh to speed that process forward .

44:51.469 --> 44:54.219
Uh MS Lewis are , are we in a position

44:54.229 --> 44:56.939
where if somebody applies to make a

44:56.949 --> 44:59.620
foreign military sale that that file

44:59.629 --> 45:02.590
gets dealt with immediately or is there

45:02.600 --> 45:05.110
uh literally a backlog where you gotta

45:05.120 --> 45:07.064
put that file aside because you're

45:07.064 --> 45:09.009
working on something else , Can we

45:09.009 --> 45:10.676
immediately fully staff every

45:10.676 --> 45:14.479
application ? Um You mean that the

45:14.489 --> 45:16.820
State Department for before it comes

45:16.830 --> 45:19.750
here uh at , at , at the State

45:19.760 --> 45:22.219
Department ? Yes , we are , we

45:22.229 --> 45:25.620
immediately staff once a case comes in

45:25.629 --> 45:28.000
now , that's whether it's on the the

45:28.010 --> 45:30.159
commercial side or as you were

45:30.169 --> 45:32.336
referencing the foreign military sales

45:32.336 --> 45:36.260
side . So , uh and I think this is

45:36.270 --> 45:39.159
critical because not only do we have

45:39.169 --> 45:41.280
the foreign policy implications and a

45:41.280 --> 45:43.336
relationship with the country that's

45:43.336 --> 45:46.290
applying , but every time we get a

45:46.300 --> 45:49.570
foreign military sale that builds the

45:49.580 --> 45:51.802
defense in interest infrastructure here

45:51.802 --> 45:54.320
in the United States and every time

45:54.330 --> 45:56.441
somebody is turned down by the United

45:56.441 --> 45:59.280
States and goes somewhere else that

45:59.290 --> 46:02.020
builds the military infrastructure

46:02.030 --> 46:05.179
somewhere else . Uh And that somewhere

46:05.189 --> 46:08.439
else is not fully aligned with us since

46:08.449 --> 46:11.209
we declined . Uh Do you take into

46:11.219 --> 46:13.959
consideration in saying yes or no ?

46:14.270 --> 46:17.889
What effect they saying no will have on

46:17.899 --> 46:19.677
both our infrastructure and the

46:19.677 --> 46:21.788
infrastructure of where else they may

46:21.788 --> 46:23.732
go for the military equipment . We

46:23.732 --> 46:26.010
certainly take into consideration , um ,

46:26.060 --> 46:28.393
all of the issues that were required to ,

46:28.393 --> 46:30.669
which includes a whole range of things

46:30.679 --> 46:33.620
including , um , the impact on that

46:33.629 --> 46:35.919
country , whether they're competitors ,

46:35.929 --> 46:38.469
human rights issues and all of those

46:38.479 --> 46:41.149
factors are taken into account . I just

46:41.159 --> 46:43.103
want to point out finally , burden

46:43.103 --> 46:45.326
sharing comes up . We like to set , say

46:45.326 --> 46:48.840
that we're only doing 3.5% . We mislead

46:48.850 --> 46:50.850
the American people and we say that

46:50.850 --> 46:53.090
it's well over 4% . And the difference

46:53.100 --> 46:54.933
comes from not counting veterans

46:54.933 --> 46:57.290
benefits as a cost of having a military

46:57.370 --> 46:59.610
in the private sector , any CPA who

46:59.620 --> 47:02.189
didn't treat provision for retiree

47:02.199 --> 47:04.255
benefits as a cost of doing business

47:04.255 --> 47:06.479
would be in jail . So we're spending

47:06.489 --> 47:08.711
way well into the forest . We're asking

47:08.711 --> 47:10.878
others to do twos and I'm glad Ukraine

47:10.878 --> 47:13.100
and Australia are at least meeting that

47:13.100 --> 47:15.045
standard . I yield back . Chairman

47:15.045 --> 47:17.378
yields . The chair recognizes Mr Wilson .

47:17.378 --> 47:19.489
Thank you very much , Mr Chairman and

47:19.489 --> 47:19.459
thank both of our witnesses for being

47:19.469 --> 47:21.850
here today . And I share the concern of

47:21.860 --> 47:24.500
Congressman Brad Sherman uh in regard

47:24.510 --> 47:27.459
to artillery shells . Uh We actually ,

47:27.469 --> 47:29.358
uh I've , it's been brought to my

47:29.358 --> 47:31.525
attention by the chairman of the Armed

47:31.525 --> 47:33.747
Services Committee , Mike Rogers , that

47:33.747 --> 47:35.969
we have nearly two million in inventory

47:35.969 --> 47:38.129
to pick them artillery shells . And

47:38.139 --> 47:41.189
these have already been , these type of

47:41.199 --> 47:44.439
weapons have already been used by Putin .

47:44.810 --> 47:48.000
And additionally , the Ukrainians also

47:48.010 --> 47:50.310
have used these weapons or artillery

47:51.090 --> 47:54.370
are very valued ally Toka has

47:54.379 --> 47:57.310
provided these shells . And so I hope

47:57.320 --> 47:59.510
uh every effort will be looking to uh

47:59.520 --> 48:01.409
providing these , we have them in

48:01.409 --> 48:04.090
inventory . In fact , they may become

48:04.100 --> 48:05.979
obsolete if we don't use them

48:06.100 --> 48:09.320
sufficiently . And a great way to uh

48:09.330 --> 48:12.050
get away with obsolescence is to

48:12.060 --> 48:15.739
provide them immediately to u uh with

48:15.750 --> 48:17.972
that in mind , I'm really grateful that

48:18.169 --> 48:19.947
uh South Carolina is playing an

48:19.947 --> 48:23.189
important role uh with the Australian

48:23.199 --> 48:25.840
United Kingdom , us trilateral security

48:25.850 --> 48:28.520
pact uh towards this acquiring nuclear

48:28.530 --> 48:30.697
powered submarines . Currently , there

48:30.697 --> 48:32.800
are four Australian naval officers

48:32.810 --> 48:34.866
training at the Navy , Nuclear Power

48:34.866 --> 48:36.889
Training Command and Nuclear Power

48:36.899 --> 48:39.489
training unit located at joint base

48:39.500 --> 48:41.889
Charleston . This training is directly

48:41.899 --> 48:44.066
advancing and improving the Australian

48:44.066 --> 48:46.439
Navy capability under the trilateral

48:46.449 --> 48:48.889
security pact by ensuring that we can

48:48.899 --> 48:51.580
train Australian Navy leaders on the

48:51.590 --> 48:53.701
nuclear capabilities that are tied to

48:53.701 --> 48:56.669
their projected submarine acquisitions .

48:56.820 --> 48:59.209
These officers will graduate next month

48:59.219 --> 49:01.750
and we look forward that more officers

49:01.760 --> 49:03.871
and enlisted personnel will be coming

49:03.871 --> 49:06.800
in the future . And Secretary uh Carlin

49:07.100 --> 49:10.199
uh uh Chairman Mike mccullin made it so

49:10.209 --> 49:12.780
clear uh and but it it just has to be

49:12.790 --> 49:15.350
stated over and over again . The delays

49:15.360 --> 49:18.290
in foreign military sales truly are

49:18.300 --> 49:20.300
putting the I believe , putting the

49:20.300 --> 49:22.540
American people at risk . We should be

49:22.550 --> 49:24.606
working for peace through strength ,

49:24.606 --> 49:27.820
not exhibiting the

49:27.830 --> 49:31.120
vulnerabilities of our allies and uh in

49:31.129 --> 49:33.620
the United States and uh in particular ,

49:33.719 --> 49:36.419
uh by having weakness of not providing

49:36.429 --> 49:38.350
the equipment . Uh And it's my

49:38.360 --> 49:41.260
understanding , it takes 18 months for

49:41.270 --> 49:44.020
a standard contract uh to be uh

49:44.030 --> 49:47.840
fulfilled . Uh To me that's just um uh

49:47.909 --> 49:51.070
put some uh our allies and all of us at

49:51.080 --> 49:53.850
such risk . Um with the tensions that

49:53.860 --> 49:55.804
we have with the Chinese Communist

49:55.804 --> 49:57.582
Party , with war criminal Putin

49:57.582 --> 50:00.929
invading Ukraine , we need to expedite .

50:00.939 --> 50:02.883
And so what , what will be done to

50:02.883 --> 50:06.699
expedite and certainly less time . It

50:06.709 --> 50:08.870
is just absolutely , that's just

50:08.879 --> 50:10.540
inexcusable . 18 months .

50:12.320 --> 50:14.439
Congressman . I completely agree with

50:14.449 --> 50:16.393
you that we have got to be able to

50:16.393 --> 50:18.560
provide the capabilities to our allies

50:18.560 --> 50:20.727
and partners as quickly as possible in

50:20.727 --> 50:22.893
support of their requirements and also

50:22.893 --> 50:22.739
in support of our national defense

50:22.750 --> 50:25.030
strategy . Last summer , Secretary

50:25.040 --> 50:27.151
Austin established a foreign Military

50:27.151 --> 50:29.270
Sales tiger team that focus on

50:29.280 --> 50:31.280
identifying efficiencies , clearing

50:31.280 --> 50:33.336
systemic issues and accelerating the

50:33.336 --> 50:35.391
responsiveness of the system to meet

50:35.391 --> 50:37.336
the capability requirements of our

50:37.336 --> 50:39.391
allies and partners . And this tiger

50:39.391 --> 50:41.391
team has focused on friction points

50:41.391 --> 50:43.502
within our process and has identified

50:43.502 --> 50:45.447
dozens of recommendations that are

50:45.447 --> 50:47.724
focused on exactly what you are saying ,

50:47.724 --> 50:49.724
sir . So we are firmly committed to

50:49.724 --> 50:51.947
making sure that we can move as quickly

50:51.947 --> 50:53.947
as possible . Some of the solutions

50:53.947 --> 50:56.002
look like actually making sure we've

50:56.002 --> 50:58.224
got a data driven approach . So we have

50:58.224 --> 51:00.169
a complete picture of where in the

51:00.169 --> 51:02.280
process , these different sales are .

51:02.280 --> 51:04.391
Some of this looks like . Um ensuring

51:04.391 --> 51:06.558
there's accountability in implementing

51:06.558 --> 51:08.558
the recommendations and making sure

51:08.558 --> 51:10.780
frankly that the most senior leaders of

51:10.780 --> 51:10.364
the department are tracking the

51:10.375 --> 51:12.695
particularly important ones . Um And so

51:12.705 --> 51:14.649
we've done a , a another number of

51:14.649 --> 51:16.872
things on that and uh our colleagues at

51:16.872 --> 51:18.927
the State Department have as well as

51:18.927 --> 51:21.149
assistant secretary . And to me , um uh

51:21.149 --> 51:23.372
chair mccall has been very creative for

51:23.372 --> 51:25.538
you . And that is that uh much of this

51:25.538 --> 51:28.290
equipment could be provided from our uh

51:28.469 --> 51:30.636
the inventories of our allies and then

51:30.636 --> 51:32.899
we backfill uh to the allies . This ,

51:32.909 --> 51:34.965
this just needs to be expedited . We

51:34.965 --> 51:36.909
see that uh with Australia uh and

51:36.919 --> 51:39.389
really the people of Taiwan at such

51:39.399 --> 51:41.290
risk . Uh It , it's been very

51:41.300 --> 51:43.411
frustrating to me as we work with the

51:43.411 --> 51:45.411
world's largest democracy , India .

51:45.411 --> 51:48.350
They found that you can have expedited

51:48.360 --> 51:52.020
military sales from Putin . And so we

51:52.030 --> 51:54.409
need to be there to get ahead of that .

51:54.649 --> 51:56.871
Uh The world's largest democracy should

51:56.871 --> 51:59.149
not be relying on war , criminal Putin .

51:59.149 --> 52:02.560
We should be providing the ability for

52:02.570 --> 52:04.792
the equipment to be provided as quickly

52:04.792 --> 52:06.737
as possible so that we can provide

52:06.737 --> 52:08.848
peace through strength to protect the

52:08.848 --> 52:10.681
United States , protect the Indo

52:10.681 --> 52:12.959
Pacific to protect the people of India ,

52:12.959 --> 52:15.840
yield back yields . Chair recognizes Mr

52:15.850 --> 52:17.794
Conway . Thank you Mr Chairman and

52:17.794 --> 52:20.780
welcome . Um I wanna ask about

52:20.790 --> 52:24.159
capability . Uh The Ukraine War

52:24.169 --> 52:27.649
has highlighted uh weaknesses and

52:27.659 --> 52:31.560
strengths in our allied capability

52:31.659 --> 52:34.750
in responding to the Russian aggression

52:34.760 --> 52:38.590
and Dera in Ukraine . Um We formed

52:38.600 --> 52:41.469
this alliance . Um

52:42.120 --> 52:45.020
And I guess I , I I want to ask you

52:45.030 --> 52:47.086
about the capability of one of those

52:47.086 --> 52:50.989
allies Australia . Um The

52:51.000 --> 52:53.222
Australian government issued a report ,

52:53.222 --> 52:55.870
the defense strategic review earlier

52:55.879 --> 52:59.159
this year and they concluded quote ,

52:59.340 --> 53:01.840
the current Australian military is no

53:01.850 --> 53:04.659
longer fit for purpose unquote .

53:05.889 --> 53:07.780
That's a stunning conclusion .

53:08.739 --> 53:11.830
Assistant Secretary Carlin , what are

53:11.840 --> 53:14.173
you , are you familiar with this report ?

53:14.280 --> 53:16.729
I am indeed . And does it concern you ?

53:17.479 --> 53:20.469
I think it is heartening that

53:20.479 --> 53:23.489
Australia's government recognizes the

53:23.500 --> 53:25.840
urgent need . Yeah , I get it . That's

53:25.850 --> 53:27.850
the State Department Line , not the

53:27.850 --> 53:30.017
defense department . Are you concerned

53:30.017 --> 53:32.072
about a report that says they're not

53:32.072 --> 53:34.183
fit for purpose ? Isn't that a pretty

53:34.183 --> 53:38.110
sweeping statement ? I think they are

53:38.120 --> 53:40.064
recognizing that they need to make

53:40.064 --> 53:42.120
important changes , that is hard and

53:42.120 --> 53:44.176
that is important and I applaud them

53:44.176 --> 53:46.231
for doing that . I would rather that

53:46.231 --> 53:48.231
they recognize the need for those .

53:48.231 --> 53:50.287
We'll note your applause . I guess .

53:50.287 --> 53:52.120
I'm noting my concern and asking

53:52.120 --> 53:55.189
whether as people trying to form an

53:55.199 --> 53:58.679
alliance , the depth of that concern

53:58.689 --> 54:01.189
and you're heartened . Assistant

54:01.199 --> 54:03.550
Secretary Lewis . Are you concerned at

54:03.679 --> 54:06.189
that conclusion ? And what it means in

54:06.199 --> 54:08.366
terms of what the United States has to

54:08.366 --> 54:10.255
do , working with this ally who's

54:10.255 --> 54:12.879
certainly motivated uh to make sure

54:12.889 --> 54:16.010
that they are fit for purpose . Well ,

54:16.020 --> 54:18.449
sir , I really appreciate you raising

54:18.459 --> 54:21.419
these issues . I also believe that we

54:21.429 --> 54:23.485
are going to be able to work hand in

54:23.485 --> 54:25.949
love with Australia , our experience

54:25.959 --> 54:28.015
with Australia . When we look at the

54:28.015 --> 54:30.070
capabilities that they have acquired

54:30.070 --> 54:32.181
over the years . I think you , Doctor

54:32.181 --> 54:34.515
Carlin mentioned the F-35 , for example ,

54:34.515 --> 54:36.681
they have shown us time and time again

54:36.681 --> 54:39.729
that they're able to um take a problem ,

54:39.739 --> 54:42.229
work on it and handle the most

54:42.239 --> 54:45.209
sophisticated uh technology and

54:45.219 --> 54:47.729
capabilities that uh anyone in the

54:47.739 --> 54:51.120
world has . So I remain confident and

54:51.129 --> 54:53.351
may I add one more thing ? I also think

54:53.351 --> 54:55.879
that the both pillar one and pillar two

54:55.889 --> 54:57.667
are gonna provide all of us our

54:57.667 --> 54:59.459
opportunities to strengthen our

54:59.469 --> 55:01.802
capabilities . Well , what do you think ?

55:01.802 --> 55:03.858
What do you think the phrasing means

55:03.858 --> 55:05.969
they're not fit for purpose if you're

55:05.969 --> 55:08.040
so confident ? Um I'm not able to

55:08.050 --> 55:10.383
assess exactly what that phrasing means .

55:10.383 --> 55:12.383
I think it , I assume it means that

55:12.383 --> 55:14.550
they are that the person who wrote the

55:14.550 --> 55:16.772
report is saying that they need to make

55:16.772 --> 55:18.828
improvements to be fit for purpose .

55:18.828 --> 55:21.050
Yes , they in fact identified six major

55:21.050 --> 55:23.000
areas where in where serious

55:23.010 --> 55:25.399
improvements have to be made . Uh Are

55:25.409 --> 55:27.409
you familiar with the report ? Um I

55:27.409 --> 55:29.465
have not read that particular report

55:29.465 --> 55:31.353
back to you . Assistant Secretary

55:31.353 --> 55:31.270
Carlin , you are familiar with the

55:31.280 --> 55:34.639
report . Indeed , I would say is the US

55:34.649 --> 55:36.593
military has had to make important

55:36.593 --> 55:38.649
shifts as it has moved away from the

55:38.649 --> 55:41.899
post 9 11 wars . So too do uh allies

55:41.909 --> 55:44.020
and partners , particularly those who

55:44.020 --> 55:45.742
are worried about security and

55:45.742 --> 55:47.742
stability in the end . Do you think

55:47.742 --> 55:49.631
that , let's , let's say it means

55:49.631 --> 55:51.742
something we're not fit for purpose .

55:51.742 --> 55:53.853
Is that due , do you think in part to

55:53.853 --> 55:56.840
disinvestment or lack of investment in

55:56.850 --> 55:59.830
the defense sector in Australia over

55:59.840 --> 56:02.669
the years ? I think it's probably due I

56:02.679 --> 56:04.901
would defer to them , of course , but I

56:04.901 --> 56:06.957
think it is probably due more toward

56:06.957 --> 56:08.957
them , seeing a threat picture that

56:08.957 --> 56:11.123
looks different and them putting Aus ,

56:11.123 --> 56:13.346
for example , at the heart of this DS R

56:13.346 --> 56:15.346
as you are citing is actually quite

56:15.346 --> 56:15.340
positive . It shows for example , the

56:15.350 --> 56:17.629
need to invest in really sophisticated

56:17.639 --> 56:19.620
undersea capability , which is

56:19.629 --> 56:21.709
perfectly relevant , given what that

56:21.739 --> 56:23.739
changing security environment looks

56:23.739 --> 56:25.949
like in the Indo Pacific , I I I I

56:25.959 --> 56:28.292
agree with you . I mean , I , I'm , I'm ,

56:28.292 --> 56:30.090
I believe in Australia . I want

56:30.100 --> 56:33.290
Australia to be a partner , but I also

56:33.300 --> 56:35.356
want us to recognize where there are

56:35.356 --> 56:37.578
weaknesses that have to be addressed as

56:37.578 --> 56:39.699
I started out , I I've been very

56:39.709 --> 56:42.060
involved in , in NATO and , and the

56:42.070 --> 56:45.449
European response uh to the situation

56:45.459 --> 56:48.090
in Ukraine . And we , we've got to be

56:48.100 --> 56:50.211
candid about acknowledging weaknesses

56:50.211 --> 56:53.669
to address them . Uh and that this

56:53.679 --> 56:55.770
report really caught my eye earlier

56:55.780 --> 56:57.947
this year and I just want to make sure

56:57.947 --> 57:00.058
that as we proceed , especially as we

57:00.058 --> 57:01.724
proceed to talk about nuclear

57:01.724 --> 57:03.959
submarines , that capability across the

57:03.969 --> 57:06.025
board in the Australian military has

57:06.025 --> 57:08.080
got to be upgraded if we're going to

57:08.080 --> 57:10.302
meet the threat . And I take your point

57:10.302 --> 57:12.247
that there's sort of a , a renewed

57:12.247 --> 57:14.358
appreciation of the threat assessment

57:14.358 --> 57:18.110
in the region , but we can't , we can't

57:18.520 --> 57:22.209
ignore years of neglect when they in

57:22.219 --> 57:24.219
fact occur . And , and by the way ,

57:24.219 --> 57:26.275
finally , that brings us back to the

57:26.275 --> 57:28.275
chairman's point about Taiwan . You

57:28.275 --> 57:30.570
know , we don't have to 1929 . Uh I

57:30.580 --> 57:32.969
mean , 2029 to address

57:33.840 --> 57:37.020
defense capability in Taiwan . Uh I

57:37.030 --> 57:38.919
don't think we're gonna have that

57:38.919 --> 57:40.863
luxury and that's why we've got to

57:40.863 --> 57:43.086
accelerate that timeline . I would echo

57:43.086 --> 57:44.863
how the chairman's response . I

57:44.863 --> 57:44.510
appreciate both of you being here and I

57:44.610 --> 57:46.332
back . Thank you , Mr Chairman

57:46.332 --> 57:48.332
Gentleman Yel , chair recognizes Mr

57:48.332 --> 57:50.899
Perry . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Um

57:51.250 --> 57:55.100
Secretary Carlin . Uh Look , I know

57:55.110 --> 57:57.277
we're here to talk about August and in

57:57.277 --> 57:59.499
the United States , you know , needs to

57:59.499 --> 58:03.360
be a serious , a serious force . Uh

58:03.370 --> 58:06.110
And , and , and if we're gonna lead

58:06.120 --> 58:08.342
even in that part of the world and have

58:08.342 --> 58:10.342
partners , they're gonna wanna know

58:10.342 --> 58:12.398
that we're serious as well . It's my

58:12.398 --> 58:14.120
understanding , your office is

58:14.120 --> 58:16.120
responsible for drafting a national

58:16.120 --> 58:18.231
defense strategy . Is that , am I out

58:18.231 --> 58:20.453
of line there or is that correct ? Ok .

58:20.453 --> 58:22.287
I , I thought so , you know , in

58:22.287 --> 58:24.342
another life , people like me waited

58:24.342 --> 58:26.564
for that to come out to see what was in

58:26.564 --> 58:28.676
it , to guide us , power projection ,

58:29.659 --> 58:32.469
uh planning , strategy , posture ,

58:33.189 --> 58:36.459
force array , etcetera . And I'm just

58:36.469 --> 58:38.919
thinking about when I go to the section

58:38.929 --> 58:40.889
entitled Strength Resiliency and

58:40.899 --> 58:43.600
Adaptability . The report states that

58:43.610 --> 58:45.666
climate change is one of the biggest

58:45.666 --> 58:48.510
threats to the defense ecosystem . And

58:48.520 --> 58:50.610
it goes on to say that joint forces

58:50.620 --> 58:52.731
must , the joint force must integrate

58:52.731 --> 58:54.453
climate change into its threat

58:54.453 --> 58:58.030
assessments ? Ok . Fine , so to speak .

58:58.340 --> 59:00.479
Um , we live in a world of limited

59:00.489 --> 59:02.659
resources . I'm sure you know that

59:02.669 --> 59:04.891
that's acutely . I think people in town

59:04.891 --> 59:07.002
are acutely aware of that right now .

59:07.560 --> 59:09.979
Can , can you quantify to me ?

59:11.800 --> 59:14.729
Is there some , is there some weapon

59:14.739 --> 59:18.500
that China or Russia or Iran or any of

59:18.550 --> 59:22.429
our adversaries have ? That's ,

59:22.439 --> 59:25.739
that's gonna imperil are traditional

59:25.750 --> 59:27.917
fuel sources if we just say if you and

59:27.917 --> 59:29.861
I don't know exactly what you mean

59:29.919 --> 59:32.520
because I read this climate change and

59:32.530 --> 59:34.860
integrate climate change into a threat

59:34.870 --> 59:38.800
assessment . Oh , is

59:38.810 --> 59:40.866
there , is there something they have

59:40.866 --> 59:42.977
some climate weapon that we're trying

59:42.977 --> 59:45.459
to avoid or counteract ? How do

59:45.469 --> 59:47.709
renewable fuels do any better at

59:47.719 --> 59:49.939
counteracting whatever weaponry they

59:49.949 --> 59:52.209
have whatever strategy they have than

59:52.219 --> 59:55.699
traditional fuels for instance . So

59:55.709 --> 59:57.876
what that part of the National defense

59:57.876 --> 59:59.987
strategy is trying trying to get at ,

59:59.987 --> 01:00:02.520
sir , is the operational impact of

01:00:02.530 --> 01:00:04.979
changes in weather ? So for example ,

01:00:04.989 --> 01:00:07.459
rising sea levels affects our bases

01:00:07.469 --> 01:00:09.830
that are on the water and we need to

01:00:09.840 --> 01:00:13.469
account for that . Ok . So

01:00:13.479 --> 01:00:15.646
that's it . That's the only thing that

01:00:15.646 --> 01:00:17.423
we're doing in as far as you're

01:00:17.423 --> 01:00:19.646
concerned in that space . Uh So that is

01:00:19.646 --> 01:00:22.110
that is 11 example , one example , but

01:00:22.120 --> 01:00:23.787
there are , you would , would

01:00:23.787 --> 01:00:25.620
acknowledge there are many other

01:00:25.620 --> 01:00:27.676
examples I it's trying to get at how

01:00:27.676 --> 01:00:29.731
the security environment is changing

01:00:29.731 --> 01:00:31.953
and the impact that , that is having on

01:00:31.953 --> 01:00:34.176
our forces ability to operate , whether

01:00:34.176 --> 01:00:36.120
that's what I'm looking for direct

01:00:36.120 --> 01:00:38.231
impact . Because as far as I know the

01:00:38.231 --> 01:00:40.342
military , the navy in particular has

01:00:40.342 --> 01:00:42.453
been dealing with rising and lowering

01:00:42.453 --> 01:00:44.398
sea levels , if not for tides . If

01:00:44.398 --> 01:00:46.453
anything else , ever since it's been

01:00:46.453 --> 01:00:48.676
the navy and the marines and the army .

01:00:48.676 --> 01:00:50.842
If you've been in the army , you sleep

01:00:50.842 --> 01:00:53.120
out in the rain . I , I , I don't know .

01:00:53.120 --> 01:00:52.689
Look , I , I read through your

01:00:52.699 --> 01:00:54.810
credentials . You've got a long , you

01:00:54.810 --> 01:00:56.977
know , you've published a lot . You've

01:00:56.977 --> 01:00:58.977
been around a lot . I don't know if

01:00:58.977 --> 01:01:00.921
you've ever done a carrier landing

01:01:00.921 --> 01:01:02.921
under goggles . I , I don't know if

01:01:02.921 --> 01:01:05.143
you've flown a low level mission in the

01:01:05.143 --> 01:01:07.310
trees under a , I don't know if you've

01:01:07.310 --> 01:01:09.421
humped the pack through the trails of

01:01:09.421 --> 01:01:11.477
Afghanistan . But the folks that are

01:01:11.477 --> 01:01:13.709
depending on what you write have to do

01:01:13.719 --> 01:01:15.775
those things and here's what they're

01:01:15.775 --> 01:01:18.580
not focused on . They're not focused on

01:01:18.590 --> 01:01:22.189
a recycling program where the enemy is

01:01:22.199 --> 01:01:24.389
raining fire down on their heads .

01:01:24.469 --> 01:01:27.629
They're trying to stay alive and win

01:01:27.639 --> 01:01:29.472
the war with the least amount of

01:01:29.472 --> 01:01:31.695
casualties as quickly as possible . And

01:01:31.695 --> 01:01:33.899
I wonder , and I'm concerned because

01:01:33.909 --> 01:01:37.750
this is what we project , what this is

01:01:37.760 --> 01:01:39.927
what we project to the folks in August

01:01:39.927 --> 01:01:42.204
and all around the world as the leader .

01:01:42.204 --> 01:01:44.371
And if we can't focus on lethality and

01:01:44.371 --> 01:01:47.360
readiness , lethality and readiness and

01:01:47.370 --> 01:01:49.537
maybe in your case because it's , it's

01:01:49.537 --> 01:01:52.419
a national , uh , military strategy

01:01:52.620 --> 01:01:56.209
force projection . Then , then we're in

01:01:56.219 --> 01:01:58.386
the wrong business , ma'am . We , we ,

01:01:58.386 --> 01:02:00.441
we've got our eye off the ball and I

01:02:00.441 --> 01:02:02.663
don't know if you've noticed recruiting

01:02:02.663 --> 01:02:04.830
levels lately , but maybe , instead of

01:02:04.830 --> 01:02:06.886
this paragraph , there ought to be a

01:02:06.886 --> 01:02:09.052
paragraph on why recruiting levels are

01:02:09.052 --> 01:02:10.997
unsustainable and why Americans no

01:02:10.997 --> 01:02:13.219
longer want to be in the military . And

01:02:13.219 --> 01:02:15.441
why do they no longer can , can qualify

01:02:15.441 --> 01:02:17.552
to be in the military because they're

01:02:17.552 --> 01:02:19.497
overweight or because they've been

01:02:19.497 --> 01:02:21.219
incarcerated because they have

01:02:21.219 --> 01:02:23.386
addictions , maybe , maybe that should

01:02:23.386 --> 01:02:25.679
be the focus instead of climate change

01:02:25.689 --> 01:02:28.610
and rising sea levels . You know , if

01:02:28.620 --> 01:02:30.787
the base has rising sea levels , maybe

01:02:30.787 --> 01:02:32.787
you ought to look at China and just

01:02:32.787 --> 01:02:34.842
build a base out of a , you know , a

01:02:34.842 --> 01:02:37.120
reef that doesn't where no base exists .

01:02:37.120 --> 01:02:39.009
Maybe that should be the military

01:02:39.009 --> 01:02:40.898
strategy . And I wonder if you've

01:02:40.898 --> 01:02:43.064
considered any of that . This national

01:02:43.064 --> 01:02:45.231
defense strategy is arguably among the

01:02:45.231 --> 01:02:47.398
punchiest and Pius , the Department of

01:02:47.398 --> 01:02:49.509
Defense has put out , it has one very

01:02:49.509 --> 01:02:51.731
clear priority which is the urgent need

01:02:51.731 --> 01:02:51.659
to sustain and strengthen deterrence

01:02:51.669 --> 01:02:53.669
focused on the People's Republic of

01:02:53.669 --> 01:02:55.447
China . It looks at that from a

01:02:55.447 --> 01:02:57.336
strategic perspective and from an

01:02:57.336 --> 01:02:59.447
operational perspective as well . And

01:02:59.447 --> 01:03:01.502
sir part of the reason that we don't

01:03:01.502 --> 01:03:03.558
need to build islands , the way that

01:03:03.558 --> 01:03:03.540
the Chinese do is because dozens of

01:03:03.550 --> 01:03:05.494
countries have welcomed our troops

01:03:05.494 --> 01:03:07.717
around the world to have bases there on

01:03:07.717 --> 01:03:09.939
bases that aren't underwater because of

01:03:09.939 --> 01:03:11.939
rising sea levels . Mr Chairman , I

01:03:11.939 --> 01:03:14.217
yield the Bell . Gentleman yields back .

01:03:14.217 --> 01:03:16.383
Uh Chair recognizes Mr Keating . Thank

01:03:16.383 --> 01:03:18.606
you , Mr Chairman . I like to thank the

01:03:18.606 --> 01:03:20.717
witnesses . Um I'm curious , uh and I

01:03:20.717 --> 01:03:22.883
guess we could do it in the context of

01:03:22.883 --> 01:03:25.106
uh uh a pillar two , but we could do it

01:03:25.106 --> 01:03:27.600
more broadly . Uh I'm just concerned on ,

01:03:27.610 --> 01:03:29.832
on an ongoing basis as we're developing

01:03:29.832 --> 01:03:31.888
technology , advanced technology and

01:03:31.888 --> 01:03:33.979
defenses together . Uh the issue of

01:03:33.989 --> 01:03:36.179
artificial intelligence and A I is a

01:03:36.189 --> 01:03:38.229
concern , a growing concern about

01:03:38.239 --> 01:03:40.679
making sure we have controls over that

01:03:40.689 --> 01:03:42.689
kind of advanced technology . So it

01:03:42.689 --> 01:03:44.689
can't be , get out of control or be

01:03:44.689 --> 01:03:47.409
misused somehow . Uh When we're doing

01:03:47.419 --> 01:03:50.340
this research , uh is that an area that

01:03:50.350 --> 01:03:53.050
we're uh doing independently or in

01:03:53.060 --> 01:03:55.379
conjunction with our allies like uh in

01:03:55.419 --> 01:03:56.580
a or two ?

01:03:59.459 --> 01:04:01.570
August pillar two is really trying to

01:04:01.570 --> 01:04:03.681
look at advanced capabilities exactly

01:04:03.681 --> 01:04:05.515
as you say , sir . Uh artificial

01:04:05.515 --> 01:04:07.348
intelligence being one example ,

01:04:07.348 --> 01:04:09.181
hypersonic being , being another

01:04:09.181 --> 01:04:11.403
example and trying to figure out how we

01:04:11.403 --> 01:04:13.570
can better collaborate with our , with

01:04:13.570 --> 01:04:15.292
our allies uh to realize these

01:04:15.292 --> 01:04:17.459
capabilities , develop them , exercise

01:04:17.459 --> 01:04:19.737
them . But what about controlling them ?

01:04:19.737 --> 01:04:21.570
Uh Are we doing research so that

01:04:21.570 --> 01:04:23.737
somehow these can't somehow uh get out

01:04:23.737 --> 01:04:26.015
of control spinning into a catastrophe ,

01:04:26.110 --> 01:04:29.199
sir ? Um If I may um I think that you

01:04:29.209 --> 01:04:31.209
hit on a critically important point

01:04:31.209 --> 01:04:35.040
which is why um when we move forward

01:04:35.050 --> 01:04:37.959
with a um it doesn't mean that um

01:04:37.969 --> 01:04:41.060
everything that anybody wants to send

01:04:41.070 --> 01:04:43.370
or share will just be sent . We are

01:04:43.379 --> 01:04:46.719
still going to have to know um the

01:04:46.729 --> 01:04:48.840
technologies that for example , can't

01:04:48.850 --> 01:04:50.906
be moved , we're still gonna have to

01:04:50.906 --> 01:04:53.129
know who's going to receive them . Um

01:04:53.330 --> 01:04:55.510
And the reason that will be , but then

01:04:55.520 --> 01:04:57.520
we want , once we know that we want

01:04:57.520 --> 01:04:59.520
them to be able to move quickly and

01:04:59.520 --> 01:05:01.742
smoothly . But what you're saying is we

01:05:01.742 --> 01:05:03.464
need to make sure that we have

01:05:03.464 --> 01:05:05.631
protections in place to make sure that

01:05:05.631 --> 01:05:07.742
they don't get exploited even for our

01:05:07.742 --> 01:05:09.909
own use . Yes . And I think um that is

01:05:09.909 --> 01:05:11.465
something that , you know ,

01:05:11.465 --> 01:05:13.631
particularly I know there are concerns

01:05:13.631 --> 01:05:15.520
in the A I space . Um But that we

01:05:15.520 --> 01:05:17.520
really are going to have to look at

01:05:17.520 --> 01:05:19.631
across the board . Uh I do think it's

01:05:19.631 --> 01:05:19.459
something that we have to pay

01:05:19.469 --> 01:05:21.691
particular attention to going forward ,

01:05:21.691 --> 01:05:23.949
given the advancements in A I . Uh

01:05:23.959 --> 01:05:26.070
secondly , we're talking about delays

01:05:26.070 --> 01:05:28.237
quite a bit . Uh And , and they're not

01:05:28.237 --> 01:05:31.729
just simply uh explained through a one

01:05:31.739 --> 01:05:34.017
dimensional view of what causes delays .

01:05:34.300 --> 01:05:36.889
Uh If you could , uh you know , I'm on

01:05:36.899 --> 01:05:39.066
uh armed services as well . We're well

01:05:39.066 --> 01:05:41.288
aware of this , but some of our members

01:05:41.288 --> 01:05:43.455
here aren't , could you describe , you

01:05:43.455 --> 01:05:45.621
know that period of the value of death

01:05:45.621 --> 01:05:47.843
when you're taking it from prototype to

01:05:47.843 --> 01:05:49.788
real product and what you're doing

01:05:49.788 --> 01:05:52.010
about that and , and , and explain that

01:05:52.010 --> 01:05:54.010
delay , what , what valley of death

01:05:54.010 --> 01:05:56.288
means in terms of delays in production .

01:05:56.288 --> 01:05:59.209
Absolutely . Uh The , you know , there ,

01:05:59.219 --> 01:06:02.199
there are um i uh

01:06:02.800 --> 01:06:04.969
technologies that will be developed .

01:06:04.979 --> 01:06:07.035
And then the question is really , do

01:06:07.035 --> 01:06:09.090
you decide to mass produce them ? Do

01:06:09.090 --> 01:06:11.312
you decide that they um need to pop out

01:06:11.312 --> 01:06:13.479
in the right quantity so that they are

01:06:13.479 --> 01:06:15.590
irrelevant for the force ? And that ,

01:06:15.590 --> 01:06:15.000
that is sort of the valley of death of

01:06:15.010 --> 01:06:17.232
how do you make that transition ? I can

01:06:17.232 --> 01:06:19.177
assure you , sir , this is an area

01:06:19.177 --> 01:06:21.121
Deputy Secretary of Hicks . Um and

01:06:21.121 --> 01:06:23.343
under secretary Chu have been extremely

01:06:23.343 --> 01:06:25.288
focused on and how do we make that

01:06:25.288 --> 01:06:27.343
easier , particularly how do we make

01:06:27.343 --> 01:06:29.010
that easier for those smaller

01:06:29.010 --> 01:06:31.010
businesses who maybe don't have the

01:06:31.010 --> 01:06:33.121
same level of experience of , of work

01:06:33.121 --> 01:06:35.232
working with the department . So some

01:06:35.232 --> 01:06:37.066
of these delays aren't just pure

01:06:37.066 --> 01:06:39.649
regulation or uh delay and there are

01:06:39.659 --> 01:06:42.689
real life reasons for these delays . Uh

01:06:42.699 --> 01:06:45.870
And , and certainly uh we can do more

01:06:45.879 --> 01:06:48.046
and I and I uh assistant secretary chu

01:06:48.046 --> 01:06:50.212
I think is doing extraordinary work at

01:06:50.212 --> 01:06:52.310
in this particular area herself . Uh

01:06:52.320 --> 01:06:55.270
And uh I just want the members here to

01:06:55.280 --> 01:06:57.447
understand this isn't just an issue of

01:06:57.447 --> 01:07:00.100
red tape or slowing down . There's very

01:07:00.110 --> 01:07:02.709
real technological and production

01:07:02.719 --> 01:07:05.052
issues that are here , financial issues .

01:07:05.052 --> 01:07:07.219
And by the way , uh for the members of

01:07:07.219 --> 01:07:09.330
congress that are here uh budgeting

01:07:09.340 --> 01:07:12.250
from C R to C R to C R and not dealing

01:07:12.260 --> 01:07:14.427
with the real budget , we have to take

01:07:14.427 --> 01:07:16.479
responsibility as well . Uh When we

01:07:16.489 --> 01:07:18.711
don't act the way we're supposed to act

01:07:18.711 --> 01:07:20.879
uh with real order . So , uh I

01:07:24.840 --> 01:07:27.280
yields back . Uh Mr Masters recognized .

01:07:27.290 --> 01:07:29.709
Thank you , Mr Chairman . I appreciate

01:07:29.719 --> 01:07:31.775
both of you being here . Obviously a

01:07:31.775 --> 01:07:33.886
lot of the conversations blur between

01:07:33.886 --> 01:07:36.120
both agencies , both bureaus . So I

01:07:36.129 --> 01:07:37.907
want to start with longer range

01:07:37.907 --> 01:07:39.851
missiles and start with you , Miss

01:07:39.851 --> 01:07:41.962
Lewis . Can you discuss with us right

01:07:41.962 --> 01:07:44.540
now ? What is the UK doing to provide

01:07:44.550 --> 01:07:48.399
longer range capabilities as their role

01:07:48.409 --> 01:07:52.050
to support the UK or the Ukraine ? Um

01:07:52.219 --> 01:07:54.570
Sir , first of all , uh we are all

01:07:54.580 --> 01:07:56.636
working very hard to get Ukraine the

01:07:56.636 --> 01:07:58.770
capabilities they need . Um those

01:07:58.780 --> 01:08:01.330
specifically I understand . Um You know ,

01:08:01.340 --> 01:08:04.310
I am not gonna go into uh details on

01:08:04.320 --> 01:08:06.649
the exactly what the UK is providing or

01:08:06.659 --> 01:08:09.100
not . I do think that all of our

01:08:09.110 --> 01:08:11.166
partners have different capabilities

01:08:11.166 --> 01:08:12.943
that they're able to provide at

01:08:12.943 --> 01:08:15.110
different times . And I think the goal

01:08:15.110 --> 01:08:16.999
is to make sure that as the fight

01:08:16.999 --> 01:08:19.110
changes in Ukraine , that Ukraine has

01:08:19.110 --> 01:08:20.944
what it needs for the fight . So

01:08:20.964 --> 01:08:23.186
whether it was in the beginning when we

01:08:23.186 --> 01:08:25.297
were looking at stingers and javelins

01:08:25.297 --> 01:08:27.634
to tanks later in the war to air

01:08:27.645 --> 01:08:29.984
defense right now , we are working

01:08:29.995 --> 01:08:32.375
together both with the UK , but with a

01:08:32.384 --> 01:08:34.551
whole host of about 50 other countries

01:08:34.551 --> 01:08:36.717
to make sure they get what they need .

01:08:36.717 --> 01:08:38.940
It doesn't seem like the most effective

01:08:38.940 --> 01:08:41.660
way to wage war in that micromanaging

01:08:41.669 --> 01:08:43.725
way that that you're looking at each

01:08:43.725 --> 01:08:45.558
and every distance . Is this the

01:08:45.558 --> 01:08:47.113
appropriate time given what

01:08:47.259 --> 01:08:49.600
bipartisanly has been discussed here

01:08:49.609 --> 01:08:51.919
about the timelines to get munitions

01:08:51.930 --> 01:08:54.660
from one place to another , even with ,

01:08:54.669 --> 01:08:56.669
with allies , not at war , those

01:08:56.680 --> 01:09:00.319
timelines are just not reasonable to

01:09:00.330 --> 01:09:04.100
be the most tactical and ,

01:09:04.109 --> 01:09:06.879
and the most capable entities on the

01:09:06.890 --> 01:09:09.001
battlefield . And , and so I think it

01:09:09.001 --> 01:09:11.112
does hurt the system as a whole , but

01:09:11.112 --> 01:09:13.112
let's move to , to our own personal

01:09:13.112 --> 01:09:15.334
opinions if you're not willing to speak

01:09:15.334 --> 01:09:17.390
about UK on this , are you concerned

01:09:17.390 --> 01:09:19.620
about Ukraine having longer range

01:09:19.629 --> 01:09:22.990
capabilities ? Um I

01:09:23.000 --> 01:09:26.609
believe that Ukraine has been

01:09:26.620 --> 01:09:30.479
responsible . Um And with what

01:09:30.490 --> 01:09:32.712
we have quantify responsible , please ,

01:09:32.939 --> 01:09:35.106
when we started working with Ukraine ,

01:09:35.106 --> 01:09:37.660
we have provided them over the past 15

01:09:37.669 --> 01:09:40.649
months , over $36 billion in security

01:09:40.660 --> 01:09:44.009
assistance . Um They have used those

01:09:44.020 --> 01:09:46.729
weapons to fight the war to defend

01:09:46.740 --> 01:09:48.990
their homeland . I was just in Ukraine

01:09:49.000 --> 01:09:51.000
actually last week . What would you

01:09:51.009 --> 01:09:53.740
consider irresponsible ? Um Well , to

01:09:53.750 --> 01:09:56.069
step back from Ukraine , we have rules

01:09:56.080 --> 01:09:59.350
about how our weapons uh can be used

01:09:59.470 --> 01:10:01.470
across the board . Let's just stick

01:10:01.470 --> 01:10:03.637
with Ukraine . What would you consider

01:10:03.637 --> 01:10:05.581
your response ? I think when we've

01:10:05.581 --> 01:10:07.692
provided weapons to Ukraine , we have

01:10:07.692 --> 01:10:09.803
provided them for them to use them in

01:10:09.803 --> 01:10:11.970
Ukraine , we provided them to use them

01:10:11.970 --> 01:10:13.803
to fight the war to defend their

01:10:13.803 --> 01:10:16.026
sovereignty and territorial integrity .

01:10:16.026 --> 01:10:18.081
So you consider it irresponsible for

01:10:18.081 --> 01:10:20.359
them to attack Russia in sovereign

01:10:20.370 --> 01:10:23.339
Russian territory . We have not

01:10:23.350 --> 01:10:25.560
provided weapons for that purpose ,

01:10:27.049 --> 01:10:30.350
Miss Carlin , you work on strategy .

01:10:31.069 --> 01:10:33.125
Indeed , thank you . Uh Do you think

01:10:33.125 --> 01:10:35.839
that would be sound strategy ? It is

01:10:35.850 --> 01:10:37.961
our assessment from the Department of

01:10:37.961 --> 01:10:39.950
Defense perspective that with the

01:10:39.959 --> 01:10:42.330
existing gimler capability that the

01:10:42.339 --> 01:10:44.561
Ukrainians have on the high mars , they

01:10:44.561 --> 01:10:46.728
can reach the vast majority of targets

01:10:46.728 --> 01:10:48.672
that they need to inside Ukrainian

01:10:48.672 --> 01:10:50.783
territory . Moreover , we are working

01:10:50.783 --> 01:10:53.006
uh about outside of Ukrainian territory

01:10:53.250 --> 01:10:55.306
right now , We are really focused on

01:10:55.306 --> 01:10:57.528
making sure they have what they need to

01:10:57.528 --> 01:10:59.639
deliver effects on the battlefield to

01:10:59.639 --> 01:11:01.694
regain their sovereign territory . I

01:11:01.694 --> 01:11:03.306
think it's also an important

01:11:03.306 --> 01:11:05.560
consideration when looking at the

01:11:05.569 --> 01:11:08.299
battlefield or to understand how Russia

01:11:08.310 --> 01:11:10.479
might look at the battlefield that

01:11:10.490 --> 01:11:14.350
whether I'm not

01:11:14.359 --> 01:11:16.692
trying to get you to say something that ,

01:11:16.692 --> 01:11:18.803
that you shouldn't . I understand the

01:11:18.803 --> 01:11:20.859
concerns about what you're saying is

01:11:20.859 --> 01:11:23.081
responsible or not responsible , but to

01:11:23.081 --> 01:11:25.580
have an ally have a capability ,

01:11:26.669 --> 01:11:30.479
adds another dimension to what

01:11:30.490 --> 01:11:32.839
Russia has to think about , has to

01:11:32.850 --> 01:11:36.379
calculate for whether our ally uses it

01:11:36.390 --> 01:11:39.419
for that purpose or not . I think it is

01:11:39.430 --> 01:11:41.859
important that you bear in mind what we

01:11:41.870 --> 01:11:44.629
make Russia have to worry about uh in

01:11:44.640 --> 01:11:46.807
that Mr Chairman , I thank you for the

01:11:46.807 --> 01:11:48.919
time gentleman Yield . Who was that ?

01:11:49.390 --> 01:11:51.557
This is the chairman right now ? Yes ,

01:11:51.557 --> 01:11:53.557
absolutely , Mr following up on the

01:11:53.557 --> 01:11:55.779
gentleman's questions that I think were

01:11:55.779 --> 01:11:57.834
implied . Uh Is it correct that some

01:11:57.834 --> 01:12:01.029
weapons Ukrainians have could fire and

01:12:01.040 --> 01:12:03.629
hit some parts of Russia and based on

01:12:03.640 --> 01:12:05.973
guidance and agreements , they have not ,

01:12:09.939 --> 01:12:12.709
um , my understanding , I think as you

01:12:12.720 --> 01:12:14.910
know , the weapons that Doctor Carlin

01:12:14.919 --> 01:12:17.290
just described , um , do you have a

01:12:17.299 --> 01:12:19.355
different ranges and different cap ?

01:12:19.355 --> 01:12:21.770
Let me rephrase that . Have they fired

01:12:21.779 --> 01:12:24.759
on Russia during this , uh , engagement

01:12:24.770 --> 01:12:27.410
at all ? Uh , not that I'm aware of ,

01:12:27.419 --> 01:12:29.586
but I'm not , I may not , there may be

01:12:29.586 --> 01:12:31.697
things I'm not aware of , but I'm not

01:12:31.697 --> 01:12:33.919
aware of them having done that . Ok . I

01:12:33.919 --> 01:12:33.220
think that was part of the gentleman's

01:12:33.229 --> 01:12:35.340
question . I appreciate the gentleman

01:12:35.340 --> 01:12:37.507
yield . And we now go to the gentleman

01:12:37.507 --> 01:12:37.009
from California Mr Beer

01:12:45.229 --> 01:12:48.839
uh to do some framing because Xi

01:12:48.850 --> 01:12:52.669
Jinping um and the PR C are , are gonna

01:12:52.680 --> 01:12:55.200
frame a as you know ,

01:12:56.029 --> 01:12:59.020
being offensive and being anti China ,

01:12:59.029 --> 01:13:01.700
et cetera . And , and the truth is ,

01:13:01.709 --> 01:13:04.520
you know , um very supportive uh of a

01:13:04.740 --> 01:13:06.962
very supportive of our working with our

01:13:06.979 --> 01:13:10.399
allies . But it is in response to um

01:13:10.410 --> 01:13:12.839
the Pr CS aggression in the maritime

01:13:12.850 --> 01:13:16.189
space , its aggression in um the South

01:13:16.200 --> 01:13:18.620
South China Sea , it's aggression in

01:13:18.629 --> 01:13:21.500
the Indian Ocean region . And it is a

01:13:21.509 --> 01:13:24.680
response to , you know , keep a rules

01:13:24.689 --> 01:13:26.411
based order to keep freedom of

01:13:26.411 --> 01:13:29.399
navigation to continue what really has

01:13:29.410 --> 01:13:32.560
been a peaceful , prosperous ,

01:13:32.569 --> 01:13:36.020
stable um number of decades in , in

01:13:36.029 --> 01:13:38.209
East Asia , in the Indian Ocean region

01:13:38.220 --> 01:13:41.200
in the Indo Pacific . Um one that China

01:13:41.439 --> 01:13:44.120
and or the PR C and Xi Jinping are

01:13:44.129 --> 01:13:47.220
moving to disrupt . Um So I

01:13:47.229 --> 01:13:50.020
reject um Xi Jinping's narrative that ,

01:13:50.180 --> 01:13:52.124
you know , these are , this is the

01:13:52.124 --> 01:13:54.740
United States being offensive with

01:13:54.750 --> 01:13:56.990
partners and allies . In fact , it's Xi

01:13:57.000 --> 01:14:00.600
Jinping's economic coercion reaction to

01:14:00.609 --> 01:14:03.040
legitimate um questions by the

01:14:03.049 --> 01:14:05.271
Australians uncovered origins and , and

01:14:05.271 --> 01:14:07.216
their ham handed economic coercion

01:14:07.299 --> 01:14:10.910
retaliation um that really has pushed

01:14:10.919 --> 01:14:13.030
the Australians to be one of our more

01:14:13.030 --> 01:14:14.697
hawkish allies here and , and

01:14:14.697 --> 01:14:16.752
understand um the competition that ,

01:14:16.752 --> 01:14:18.975
that we face and where Xi Jinping wants

01:14:18.975 --> 01:14:21.220
to take the the Pr C . So I applaud the

01:14:21.229 --> 01:14:23.285
work of the administration , I think

01:14:23.285 --> 01:14:26.140
this is a very important deal and very

01:14:26.149 --> 01:14:28.260
important for us to again maintain an

01:14:28.260 --> 01:14:30.316
architecture , a rules based order ,

01:14:30.316 --> 01:14:32.149
freedom of navigation , maritime

01:14:32.149 --> 01:14:34.569
security for not just the the the

01:14:34.759 --> 01:14:36.549
partners but also for the other

01:14:36.560 --> 01:14:38.616
countries in the region . You know ,

01:14:38.616 --> 01:14:40.838
when I look at gray zone tactics around

01:14:40.838 --> 01:14:42.979
Vietnam's exclusive economic zone ,

01:14:42.990 --> 01:14:45.212
when I look at gray zone tactics around

01:14:45.212 --> 01:14:48.430
the Philippines , when I look at um Xi

01:14:48.439 --> 01:14:50.740
Jinping's aggression in the , the

01:14:50.750 --> 01:14:52.890
straits of Taiwan again , is not the

01:14:52.899 --> 01:14:56.189
United States that is changing this um

01:14:56.279 --> 01:14:59.379
the the dynamic in the region . It is

01:14:59.680 --> 01:15:02.839
an intentional change uh led under Xi

01:15:02.850 --> 01:15:05.169
Jinping's leadership . And you know , I

01:15:05.180 --> 01:15:08.450
I am all in favor of dialogue with ,

01:15:08.459 --> 01:15:10.879
with the PR C and you know , trying to

01:15:10.890 --> 01:15:13.001
reset this , but it is not the United

01:15:13.001 --> 01:15:15.223
States that's looking for conflict . It

01:15:15.223 --> 01:15:18.700
is Xi Jinping um creating that context .

01:15:18.919 --> 01:15:22.109
So bring bringing it back to , to a um

01:15:22.520 --> 01:15:24.131
you know , I also sit on the

01:15:24.131 --> 01:15:26.353
intelligence community and um very much

01:15:26.353 --> 01:15:28.520
appreciate the , the , the partnership

01:15:28.520 --> 01:15:30.742
that we have with the Australians . But

01:15:30.742 --> 01:15:33.879
also , you know , as we start to share

01:15:33.890 --> 01:15:37.569
um critical technologies , um the

01:15:37.580 --> 01:15:39.802
Chinese are very good at stealing those

01:15:39.802 --> 01:15:41.858
technologies . And , you know , I do

01:15:41.858 --> 01:15:43.913
worry about cyber risks . I do worry

01:15:43.913 --> 01:15:46.024
about , you know , how we maintain um

01:15:46.024 --> 01:15:49.419
you know , um security around the

01:15:49.430 --> 01:15:51.839
these uh technologies and , and maybe

01:15:51.850 --> 01:15:53.850
either one of you or both of you if

01:15:53.850 --> 01:15:55.906
you'd want to talk to things that we

01:15:55.906 --> 01:15:57.794
should be thinking about from the

01:15:57.794 --> 01:15:59.628
congressional side um as , as we

01:15:59.628 --> 01:16:02.759
develop um and share , you know , the ,

01:16:02.779 --> 01:16:04.779
the the most sensitive technologies

01:16:04.779 --> 01:16:07.001
that we can make sure that our partners

01:16:07.001 --> 01:16:08.779
have the highest level of cyber

01:16:08.779 --> 01:16:11.319
security as well . Well , thank you .

01:16:11.330 --> 01:16:13.640
Um And I agree , I think this is a

01:16:13.649 --> 01:16:15.899
critically important issue for us to

01:16:15.910 --> 01:16:18.640
look at . Um you know , I wanna start

01:16:18.649 --> 01:16:21.939
by saying that because it is Australia

01:16:21.959 --> 01:16:24.339
and the UK and because we've had such

01:16:24.350 --> 01:16:27.169
close cooperation with them on some of

01:16:27.180 --> 01:16:29.759
our most sensitive technologies ,

01:16:29.770 --> 01:16:32.770
intelligence capabilities , um We

01:16:32.779 --> 01:16:35.001
really do believe that we work together

01:16:35.001 --> 01:16:38.754
as um we put standards in place

01:16:38.765 --> 01:16:40.975
um not just on the cyber front , but

01:16:40.984 --> 01:16:43.515
really across the board to make sure

01:16:43.524 --> 01:16:46.834
that we maintain that mission critical

01:16:46.845 --> 01:16:49.464
control over these key capabilities and

01:16:49.475 --> 01:16:53.035
sometimes information . Um I think

01:16:53.044 --> 01:16:56.640
that um when we look at uh other

01:16:56.649 --> 01:16:58.593
examples where we have worked very

01:16:58.593 --> 01:17:00.760
closely with countries particularly as

01:17:00.760 --> 01:17:02.871
it relates to their export controls .

01:17:02.871 --> 01:17:05.093
Um We have been able and I am confident

01:17:05.093 --> 01:17:07.316
that we will be able to do that in this

01:17:07.316 --> 01:17:09.810
um environment in this uh alliance as

01:17:09.819 --> 01:17:12.180
well . Um uh Excuse me , a

01:17:12.339 --> 01:17:14.459
authorization um that we will be able

01:17:14.470 --> 01:17:17.379
to make sure that all that we align um

01:17:17.390 --> 01:17:19.612
both from the technical level , but all

01:17:19.612 --> 01:17:22.100
the way up to uh the strategic level ,

01:17:22.879 --> 01:17:25.101
I might just add to Assistant Secretary

01:17:25.101 --> 01:17:27.101
Lewis's point , the emphasis on the

01:17:27.101 --> 01:17:29.101
trilateral standards . Really , all

01:17:29.101 --> 01:17:31.323
three of us taking this as seriously as

01:17:31.323 --> 01:17:33.435
possible . And I think we have really

01:17:33.435 --> 01:17:35.435
found in the conversations with our

01:17:35.435 --> 01:17:35.169
Australian and British colleagues that

01:17:35.180 --> 01:17:36.902
we all have the same strategic

01:17:36.902 --> 01:17:39.149
perspective on why we want to ensure ,

01:17:39.160 --> 01:17:41.216
you know , why Aus exists and why it

01:17:41.220 --> 01:17:43.331
needs to be a success . Great . Thank

01:17:43.331 --> 01:17:45.569
you . I , I think the gentleman now

01:17:45.580 --> 01:17:47.358
recognize myself for a round of

01:17:47.358 --> 01:17:48.969
questions following up on my

01:17:48.969 --> 01:17:51.330
colleague's question . Uh You use the

01:17:51.339 --> 01:17:54.270
word would be so uh it's fair to say

01:17:54.279 --> 01:17:57.220
that you have some items which you

01:17:57.229 --> 01:17:59.509
believe that uh particularly Australia

01:17:59.520 --> 01:18:02.069
will uh in , in

01:18:03.560 --> 01:18:07.250
engage , provide and , and comply with

01:18:07.259 --> 01:18:09.426
that would allow you to have that full

01:18:09.426 --> 01:18:12.049
confidence currently rather than would ,

01:18:12.060 --> 01:18:15.009
is that correct ? Um I think it's both

01:18:15.020 --> 01:18:17.020
we currently have confidence and we

01:18:17.020 --> 01:18:19.076
will continue to have confidence . I

01:18:19.076 --> 01:18:21.298
think as you , but you are going to ask

01:18:21.298 --> 01:18:23.409
them to do certain things in order to

01:18:23.409 --> 01:18:27.209
uh , comply fully with our , our goals

01:18:27.220 --> 01:18:30.200
of , of not having uh sensitive

01:18:30.209 --> 01:18:32.490
equipment in any way fall into other

01:18:32.500 --> 01:18:34.979
hands . We are going to ask all three

01:18:34.990 --> 01:18:38.250
countries to do that . Ok . Uh But I

01:18:38.259 --> 01:18:40.315
just wanna make it clear that it's ,

01:18:40.315 --> 01:18:42.426
it's a confidence that those laws and

01:18:42.426 --> 01:18:45.379
other efforts will be , will take place

01:18:45.399 --> 01:18:46.899
that causes you to ask for

01:18:46.899 --> 01:18:49.069
authorization , but recognize that it

01:18:49.080 --> 01:18:51.080
doesn't actually begin the transfer

01:18:51.080 --> 01:18:54.589
until those terms are met . Um I think

01:18:54.600 --> 01:18:57.310
just to be clear , um and I appreciate

01:18:57.319 --> 01:19:00.290
the question . We also believe um we

01:19:00.299 --> 01:19:02.109
are going to do multiple things

01:19:02.120 --> 01:19:05.430
simultaneously . So given the urgency

01:19:05.439 --> 01:19:07.661
that um we have heard from you and that

01:19:07.661 --> 01:19:10.080
we feel ourselves , we believe under

01:19:10.089 --> 01:19:12.145
our current authorities that we have

01:19:12.145 --> 01:19:14.479
now um that we are going to be able to

01:19:14.490 --> 01:19:17.450
set up this structure using um the

01:19:17.459 --> 01:19:21.209
articles that we know that uh that I

01:19:21.220 --> 01:19:23.442
appreciate you do everything you can do

01:19:23.442 --> 01:19:25.664
without our permission and then come to

01:19:25.664 --> 01:19:27.498
our permission when you only are

01:19:27.498 --> 01:19:29.498
absolutely positive . You need it .

01:19:29.498 --> 01:19:29.490
Nothing , nothing surprising there

01:19:29.500 --> 01:19:33.129
after 24 years . Uh But you

01:19:33.140 --> 01:19:35.362
urgency is an interesting tee up for my

01:19:35.362 --> 01:19:37.584
next question and it is primarily a dod

01:19:37.584 --> 01:19:41.359
question . But uh uh earlier

01:19:41.370 --> 01:19:43.310
today , there was a figure of 36

01:19:43.319 --> 01:19:45.950
billion that has been expended in

01:19:45.959 --> 01:19:48.189
Ukraine in , in actual weapons system .

01:19:48.200 --> 01:19:50.311
Fair number . That's what I heard one

01:19:50.311 --> 01:19:52.839
of you say . Uh currently there's about

01:19:52.850 --> 01:19:56.419
19 backlog with Taiwan now in

01:19:56.430 --> 01:19:59.310
15 months , $36 billion some of it

01:19:59.319 --> 01:20:01.486
pretty advanced weapons , some of it ,

01:20:01.669 --> 01:20:03.613
bread and butter weapons have been

01:20:03.613 --> 01:20:05.669
successfully transferred and for the

01:20:05.669 --> 01:20:07.891
most part expended on the battlefield .

01:20:07.891 --> 01:20:10.459
Is that a fair statement ? So , I , I

01:20:10.470 --> 01:20:12.490
believe so unexpended , but I don't

01:20:12.500 --> 01:20:14.389
wanna say that , I mean , they're

01:20:14.390 --> 01:20:16.334
shooting the as fast as they can .

01:20:16.334 --> 01:20:18.390
Let's be honest , we were there , we

01:20:18.390 --> 01:20:20.390
were there , we did , we didn't see

01:20:20.390 --> 01:20:22.390
them holding back just in case they

01:20:22.390 --> 01:20:24.501
someday wanted to use it . We have no

01:20:24.501 --> 01:20:26.649
evidence of . Ok . So uh based on the

01:20:26.660 --> 01:20:28.660
assumption that 30 plus billion has

01:20:28.660 --> 01:20:30.882
been literally expended , delivered and

01:20:30.882 --> 01:20:33.680
expended in a 15 month period . What is

01:20:33.689 --> 01:20:37.310
our basis not to provide in a similar

01:20:37.319 --> 01:20:41.200
speed as though they were at war , the

01:20:41.209 --> 01:20:43.839
$19 billion rather than as an

01:20:43.850 --> 01:20:46.759
expenditure , but as a deterrent , you

01:20:46.770 --> 01:20:48.603
know , and I'm , I'm asking this

01:20:48.603 --> 01:20:50.659
because everybody has a reason . You

01:20:50.659 --> 01:20:52.770
can't do something until the hits the

01:20:52.770 --> 01:20:54.937
fan . OK ? Then it's come as you are ,

01:20:54.937 --> 01:20:56.992
bring what you have , go find it and

01:20:56.992 --> 01:21:00.089
get it . I want to know why we have not

01:21:00.350 --> 01:21:03.779
in light of Xi Jinping's aggression and

01:21:03.790 --> 01:21:06.259
threats of almost immediate invasion ,

01:21:06.459 --> 01:21:09.819
why we have not expedited as though

01:21:09.830 --> 01:21:12.819
they were similar to Ukraine at least

01:21:12.830 --> 01:21:14.941
some of that $19 billion that they've

01:21:14.941 --> 01:21:17.910
agreed to pay for . Um , well , you and

01:21:17.919 --> 01:21:20.379
here in Congress actually in the most

01:21:20.390 --> 01:21:22.890
recent uh defense authorization bill

01:21:22.899 --> 01:21:25.740
provided us the ability to do so with

01:21:25.750 --> 01:21:29.580
$1 billion . Um So uh the vast

01:21:29.589 --> 01:21:32.120
majority of uh the assistant that has

01:21:32.129 --> 01:21:33.962
gone to Ukraine has gone through

01:21:33.962 --> 01:21:36.018
something called the president . I'm

01:21:36.018 --> 01:21:35.680
not talking about Ukraine , I'm talking

01:21:35.689 --> 01:21:38.120
about Taiwan . So I understand , I'm

01:21:38.129 --> 01:21:40.185
just uh I'm saying that we have used

01:21:40.185 --> 01:21:42.073
something called the presidential

01:21:42.073 --> 01:21:44.296
drawdown authority , which is allows us

01:21:44.296 --> 01:21:46.518
to take from dod stocks and directly to

01:21:46.518 --> 01:21:48.629
you . So you're saying that it is the

01:21:48.629 --> 01:21:50.685
drawdown authority that accounts for

01:21:50.685 --> 01:21:52.685
virtually all of the $36 billion of

01:21:52.685 --> 01:21:54.851
transfers to Ukraine . It accounts for

01:21:54.851 --> 01:21:57.035
the vast majority over $20 billion of

01:21:57.044 --> 01:21:59.265
it and it is the speediest way to move

01:21:59.274 --> 01:22:01.274
forward . And Congress gave us that

01:22:01.274 --> 01:22:03.734
ability with Taiwan and the Secretary

01:22:03.745 --> 01:22:06.334
of Defense recently said that we are

01:22:06.345 --> 01:22:08.564
planning to move forward on that $1

01:22:08.575 --> 01:22:10.686
billion as provided for by Congress .

01:22:10.686 --> 01:22:12.964
Now with the remaining time , uh a

01:22:12.975 --> 01:22:15.990
billion ain't what it used to be . Uh

01:22:16.000 --> 01:22:19.879
Would you say fairly that the type of

01:22:19.890 --> 01:22:23.479
deterrent equipment necessary by Taiwan

01:22:23.490 --> 01:22:26.709
to truly cause China to think again

01:22:26.720 --> 01:22:29.290
about invasion would be dramatically

01:22:29.299 --> 01:22:31.509
greater than one billion . Meaning we

01:22:31.520 --> 01:22:33.520
need to look at the one billion and

01:22:33.520 --> 01:22:36.430
exponentially increase it uh to the

01:22:36.439 --> 01:22:38.772
extent that the authority could be used .

01:22:38.772 --> 01:22:40.939
That's a fair statement , isn't it ? I

01:22:40.939 --> 01:22:42.717
think that what Taiwan needs is

01:22:42.717 --> 01:22:44.939
significant . Obviously , I would defer

01:22:44.939 --> 01:22:46.828
to Congress on what it chooses to

01:22:46.828 --> 01:22:50.810
authorize . OK , I like that . Uh with

01:22:50.819 --> 01:22:52.819
that , we recognize the gentle lady

01:22:52.819 --> 01:22:54.597
from Pennsylvania , Miss Wild .

01:22:56.500 --> 01:23:00.330
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Um My

01:23:00.339 --> 01:23:02.117
first question is for Assistant

01:23:02.117 --> 01:23:05.770
Secretary Lewis . Um There are

01:23:05.779 --> 01:23:09.209
two distinct components of our strategy

01:23:09.220 --> 01:23:11.549
to defend core us interest vis vis .

01:23:11.560 --> 01:23:14.870
The PR C um first is building a broad

01:23:14.879 --> 01:23:17.180
coalition that will stand up against PR

01:23:17.189 --> 01:23:20.310
C attempts to undermine global rules .

01:23:20.319 --> 01:23:22.930
And the second is deepening security

01:23:22.939 --> 01:23:24.883
and strategic cooperation with our

01:23:24.883 --> 01:23:28.140
closest allies and partners to deter

01:23:28.149 --> 01:23:30.600
the PR C from considering military

01:23:30.609 --> 01:23:32.720
options . But sometimes these two

01:23:32.729 --> 01:23:35.240
things come into conflict . Um Some of

01:23:35.250 --> 01:23:37.439
our partners in Southeast Asia have

01:23:37.450 --> 01:23:40.509
expressed concerns about a and fear

01:23:40.520 --> 01:23:42.409
that our initiative could in fact

01:23:42.409 --> 01:23:44.631
ratchet up tensions in the region . How

01:23:44.631 --> 01:23:47.129
do we reassure those partners that A is

01:23:47.140 --> 01:23:49.879
a defense and deterrence focused

01:23:50.069 --> 01:23:52.236
initiative and that we are going to be

01:23:52.240 --> 01:23:54.629
a responsible partner in the

01:23:54.640 --> 01:23:56.862
competition with China so that they are

01:23:56.862 --> 01:24:00.759
less hesitant to support us . Um

01:24:00.770 --> 01:24:02.979
Thank you for the question and I do

01:24:02.990 --> 01:24:05.046
think it is really important that we

01:24:05.046 --> 01:24:08.390
talk about a for what it is . Um And

01:24:08.399 --> 01:24:11.629
really it is about uh deepening and

01:24:11.640 --> 01:24:14.979
strengthening the very close

01:24:14.990 --> 01:24:17.430
alliances that we already have with

01:24:17.439 --> 01:24:21.089
Australia . Um and the UK and it's an

01:24:21.100 --> 01:24:24.290
opportunity for us to um take some of

01:24:24.299 --> 01:24:26.910
these very critical capabilities on A I

01:24:26.919 --> 01:24:30.890
on cyber um and hypersonic um and work

01:24:30.899 --> 01:24:34.069
together , I think when we talk to some

01:24:34.080 --> 01:24:36.910
of our allies in the regions as they um

01:24:36.919 --> 01:24:38.870
raise these concerns I think the

01:24:38.879 --> 01:24:41.689
message is , this is one piece of an

01:24:41.700 --> 01:24:44.220
Indo Pacific strategy that is going to

01:24:44.229 --> 01:24:46.490
involve working to get together with

01:24:46.500 --> 01:24:48.722
different countries in different ways .

01:24:48.722 --> 01:24:50.959
And I think as Secretary Blinken said ,

01:24:51.080 --> 01:24:54.330
um our goal with China is to

01:24:54.529 --> 01:24:57.850
compete where necessary um to

01:24:57.859 --> 01:25:00.509
cooperate , where we can on mission

01:25:00.520 --> 01:25:02.631
critical issues that affect the whole

01:25:02.631 --> 01:25:05.200
globe um and then confront if we need

01:25:05.209 --> 01:25:07.042
to . Um And so I think it's very

01:25:07.042 --> 01:25:08.987
important that we need to get that

01:25:08.987 --> 01:25:11.339
message across and we are working um

01:25:11.350 --> 01:25:13.239
part of my job and I know part of

01:25:13.239 --> 01:25:15.479
Doctor Carlin's job is to work with all

01:25:15.490 --> 01:25:17.323
of our other allies and partners

01:25:17.323 --> 01:25:19.434
throughout the region as they look at

01:25:19.434 --> 01:25:21.323
both their security needs , their

01:25:21.323 --> 01:25:23.490
defense capabilities . Um and the ways

01:25:23.490 --> 01:25:25.712
that they wish to deepen and strengthen

01:25:25.712 --> 01:25:27.712
their relationships with the United

01:25:27.712 --> 01:25:29.768
States and our other allies . Do you

01:25:29.768 --> 01:25:29.089
believe we can do that in a way that

01:25:29.100 --> 01:25:31.529
will be reassuring to them ? I do

01:25:31.540 --> 01:25:33.484
believe we can do that . Yes . All

01:25:33.484 --> 01:25:35.596
right . I have more questions for you

01:25:35.596 --> 01:25:37.762
that I'm gonna submit in writing , but

01:25:37.762 --> 01:25:39.929
I wanna move on to a question . I have

01:25:39.929 --> 01:25:41.873
of Assistant Secretary Carlin , um

01:25:41.873 --> 01:25:45.520
having to do with the um production uh

01:25:45.540 --> 01:25:49.209
the output um of , of um

01:25:49.479 --> 01:25:52.919
our defense hardware . Um It's my

01:25:52.930 --> 01:25:55.569
understanding that we are currently

01:25:55.580 --> 01:25:58.339
producing roughly 1.2 Virginia class

01:25:58.350 --> 01:26:01.069
submarines a year and we'd like it to

01:26:01.080 --> 01:26:04.310
see it closer to three . Um My

01:26:04.319 --> 01:26:06.430
understanding further is that part of

01:26:06.430 --> 01:26:09.439
August pillar . One is that Australia

01:26:09.450 --> 01:26:11.220
has signaled plans to make an

01:26:11.229 --> 01:26:13.149
investment into our shipbuilding

01:26:13.160 --> 01:26:15.439
industry which obviously would help

01:26:15.450 --> 01:26:17.783
with production . But on the other hand ,

01:26:17.783 --> 01:26:20.049
I have concerns about what the impact

01:26:20.060 --> 01:26:22.009
might be on American workers and

01:26:22.020 --> 01:26:24.187
families if this kind of investment is

01:26:24.187 --> 01:26:25.799
made . Um I say that as a

01:26:25.810 --> 01:26:28.032
representative of a district that is on

01:26:28.040 --> 01:26:29.899
the leading edge of advanced

01:26:29.910 --> 01:26:32.021
specialized manufacturing , including

01:26:32.021 --> 01:26:34.229
in the defense field . Can you address

01:26:34.240 --> 01:26:37.540
that please ? Absolutely . And uh as ,

01:26:37.549 --> 01:26:39.959
as you know , ma'am , the most recent

01:26:39.970 --> 01:26:42.259
um request uh from , from , for our

01:26:42.270 --> 01:26:46.100
defense budget included uh 4.6 billion

01:26:46.109 --> 01:26:47.970
in uh in , in investments in our

01:26:47.979 --> 01:26:49.923
submarine industrial base for both

01:26:49.923 --> 01:26:52.035
maintenance and production because we

01:26:52.035 --> 01:26:53.812
want to increase the number you

01:26:53.812 --> 01:26:55.868
highlighted and we want to have more

01:26:55.868 --> 01:26:57.812
submarines uh available and uh and

01:26:57.812 --> 01:26:59.590
ready exactly as you know , the

01:26:59.590 --> 01:27:01.646
Australians have committed to make a

01:27:01.646 --> 01:27:03.812
significant , significant contribution

01:27:03.812 --> 01:27:05.923
to our submarine industrial base that

01:27:05.923 --> 01:27:08.165
is perfect , important . Uh Obviously ,

01:27:08.174 --> 01:27:10.285
it is meaningful in terms of jobs for

01:27:10.285 --> 01:27:12.174
Americans in terms of helping our

01:27:12.174 --> 01:27:14.285
industry . But I would highlight it's

01:27:14.285 --> 01:27:16.174
also especially important because

01:27:16.174 --> 01:27:18.230
investment early we have seen in the

01:27:18.230 --> 01:27:20.396
industrial base is going to bear fruit

01:27:20.396 --> 01:27:22.618
and we have watched this with thanks to

01:27:22.618 --> 01:27:24.730
Congress's leadership in recent years

01:27:24.730 --> 01:27:26.785
that that uh that that trajectory uh

01:27:26.785 --> 01:27:29.430
looks increasingly better . Ok . So ,

01:27:29.439 --> 01:27:32.200
but , but how is it going to , what's

01:27:32.209 --> 01:27:34.689
the interplay going to be in terms of

01:27:34.700 --> 01:27:37.689
how we make sure that we um produce as

01:27:37.700 --> 01:27:39.589
much as we can here while still

01:27:39.600 --> 01:27:41.689
accepting this generous investment .

01:27:43.149 --> 01:27:45.600
Thank you , the uh I I don't know that

01:27:45.609 --> 01:27:49.129
these will um clash the investment that

01:27:49.140 --> 01:27:51.196
the Australians will be making . The

01:27:51.196 --> 01:27:53.418
significant investment in our submarine

01:27:53.418 --> 01:27:55.540
industrial base will be for our

01:27:55.549 --> 01:27:57.899
industrial base specifically for what

01:27:57.910 --> 01:27:59.966
we are producing . Obviously much of

01:27:59.966 --> 01:28:02.645
that is , is , is for um our own

01:28:02.654 --> 01:28:04.876
submarines . And then of course , those

01:28:04.876 --> 01:28:07.043
that uh that one would ultimately sell

01:28:07.043 --> 01:28:09.265
to Australia . So I don't think there's

01:28:09.265 --> 01:28:11.464
a mutual exclusivity here . Ok . We I

01:28:11.475 --> 01:28:13.364
think we may be talking about two

01:28:13.364 --> 01:28:16.035
different things at a time . Thank you ,

01:28:16.115 --> 01:28:19.229
Chairman Green for five minutes . Thank

01:28:19.240 --> 01:28:21.240
you Mr Chairman for uh holding this

01:28:21.240 --> 01:28:23.184
important hear , important hearing

01:28:23.184 --> 01:28:25.296
today and for your work to strengthen

01:28:25.296 --> 01:28:27.407
America's alliances during a critical

01:28:27.407 --> 01:28:29.629
point in our nation's history . The AUC

01:28:29.629 --> 01:28:29.450
partnership represents one of the most

01:28:29.459 --> 01:28:32.299
critical strategic frameworks for

01:28:32.310 --> 01:28:34.477
countering the Chinese Communist Party

01:28:34.477 --> 01:28:36.421
in the Indo Pacific and around the

01:28:36.421 --> 01:28:38.532
globe , working alongside our closest

01:28:38.532 --> 01:28:41.035
allies . The UK and Australia is a

01:28:41.044 --> 01:28:43.044
golden opportunity to roll back the

01:28:43.044 --> 01:28:45.625
gains . The C C P has made not only in

01:28:45.634 --> 01:28:47.801
the Indo Pacific but in other critical

01:28:47.801 --> 01:28:49.856
domains of competition such as cyber

01:28:49.856 --> 01:28:52.023
and financial markets as we celebrated

01:28:52.023 --> 01:28:54.104
victory in Europe day this week . It

01:28:54.115 --> 01:28:56.171
was a timely reminder of what can be

01:28:56.171 --> 01:28:58.171
achieved when we work together with

01:28:58.171 --> 01:29:00.282
freedom , loving partners , however ,

01:29:00.282 --> 01:29:01.948
without consistent effort and

01:29:01.948 --> 01:29:04.365
efficiency and effective diplomacy .

01:29:04.375 --> 01:29:06.964
There's no way Aus can live up to this

01:29:06.975 --> 01:29:09.031
potential . The Biden administration

01:29:09.031 --> 01:29:11.253
wants to take a victory lap for signing

01:29:11.253 --> 01:29:13.475
this agreement but doesn't seem willing

01:29:13.475 --> 01:29:15.479
to make the effort to ensure we're

01:29:15.490 --> 01:29:17.700
leveraging it in the fight against the

01:29:17.709 --> 01:29:20.830
C C P . American leadership is the most

01:29:20.839 --> 01:29:23.009
essential component of this alliance .

01:29:23.020 --> 01:29:25.859
But how can our partners trust us when

01:29:25.870 --> 01:29:27.870
they see how we treat our Taiwanese

01:29:27.870 --> 01:29:30.620
allies where we have $19 billion in

01:29:30.629 --> 01:29:32.796
backlog and weapons systems deliveries

01:29:32.796 --> 01:29:35.370
while they experience an existential

01:29:35.379 --> 01:29:37.200
threat to their way of life . I

01:29:37.209 --> 01:29:39.098
recognize the inherent challenges

01:29:39.098 --> 01:29:41.209
present in achieving the goals of aus

01:29:41.209 --> 01:29:43.265
many of which stem from bureaucratic

01:29:43.265 --> 01:29:45.320
inefficiencies and outdated statutes

01:29:45.320 --> 01:29:47.265
that don't move at the pace of the

01:29:47.265 --> 01:29:49.479
threat or technology . I do thank our

01:29:49.490 --> 01:29:51.434
witnesses for their commitments to

01:29:51.434 --> 01:29:53.434
tackling these issues . Head on . I

01:29:53.434 --> 01:29:55.268
also thank my colleagues on this

01:29:55.268 --> 01:29:57.490
committee for making arms export reform

01:29:57.490 --> 01:29:59.601
a priority . And that's what I'd also

01:29:59.601 --> 01:30:01.768
like to speak about . I , I would like

01:30:01.768 --> 01:30:03.669
to address the issue of I and I

01:30:03.930 --> 01:30:06.209
exemptions . This last week I traveled

01:30:06.220 --> 01:30:08.276
to the United Kingdom and I met with

01:30:08.276 --> 01:30:10.387
among others , the defense minister ,

01:30:10.387 --> 01:30:12.498
he raised a very serious concern that

01:30:12.498 --> 01:30:14.810
Canada is granted an IRS full exemption

01:30:15.049 --> 01:30:17.410
but the UK , our greatest ally is not .

01:30:17.569 --> 01:30:19.879
He cited a specific example of A UK

01:30:19.890 --> 01:30:22.057
company that has technology that would

01:30:22.057 --> 01:30:23.779
advance our hypersonic missile

01:30:23.779 --> 01:30:26.890
capability . But the company , if the

01:30:26.899 --> 01:30:28.955
company sells to the US under Itar ,

01:30:28.955 --> 01:30:30.959
that technology becomes exclusively

01:30:30.970 --> 01:30:33.839
controlled by the United States . That

01:30:33.850 --> 01:30:35.794
company has chosen not to sell the

01:30:35.794 --> 01:30:38.017
technology to the United States to help

01:30:38.017 --> 01:30:40.128
us with our capability . He also said

01:30:40.128 --> 01:30:42.240
compliance costs , have him spending

01:30:42.250 --> 01:30:45.259
half a billion pounds in every year .

01:30:45.459 --> 01:30:47.292
He specifically said that half a

01:30:47.292 --> 01:30:49.640
billion pounds could buy American

01:30:49.649 --> 01:30:51.816
equipment for him if he didn't have to

01:30:51.816 --> 01:30:53.982
do that with compliance . The UK wants

01:30:53.982 --> 01:30:56.093
an exemption to Itar is equivalent to

01:30:56.093 --> 01:30:58.629
Canada as Winston Churchill noted

01:30:58.640 --> 01:31:00.807
regarding our World War Two alliance ,

01:31:00.807 --> 01:31:02.751
there is only one thing worse than

01:31:02.751 --> 01:31:05.270
fighting with allies and that's

01:31:05.279 --> 01:31:07.589
fighting without them . Uh We , we've

01:31:07.600 --> 01:31:10.589
got to fix this issue with England to

01:31:10.600 --> 01:31:12.489
miss the opportunity to have this

01:31:12.489 --> 01:31:14.959
capability is unacceptable and I have

01:31:14.970 --> 01:31:17.350
intentions to bring a bill that would

01:31:17.359 --> 01:31:19.939
do just that . And I'd like to ask my

01:31:19.950 --> 01:31:22.890
first question . Would you guys support

01:31:22.899 --> 01:31:25.270
that ? And if , if not , why not ,

01:31:26.959 --> 01:31:29.015
sir ? First of all , let me start by

01:31:29.015 --> 01:31:31.181
saying , I think you raise sort of the

01:31:31.181 --> 01:31:33.015
core issue that we are trying to

01:31:33.015 --> 01:31:35.629
address here today , which is how to

01:31:35.640 --> 01:31:37.807
make sure that our defense trade , but

01:31:37.807 --> 01:31:39.696
specifically , in this case , our

01:31:39.696 --> 01:31:41.870
defense trade under a with two of our

01:31:41.879 --> 01:31:45.649
closest allies can move with speed um

01:31:45.660 --> 01:31:49.509
and with safety and in a secure way .

01:31:49.790 --> 01:31:53.640
Um As we look at the issue of

01:31:53.649 --> 01:31:57.140
how to make that happen , we have put

01:31:57.149 --> 01:31:59.729
together a , a plan that encompasses

01:31:59.740 --> 01:32:02.020
actually , not only the I R which only

01:32:02.029 --> 01:32:04.629
governs actually our commercial sales ,

01:32:04.640 --> 01:32:07.020
but actually our foreign military sales ,

01:32:07.095 --> 01:32:09.262
which are our government to government

01:32:09.262 --> 01:32:12.285
sales and just for reference , 90% of

01:32:12.294 --> 01:32:15.185
the sales that uh the trade that we do ,

01:32:15.194 --> 01:32:16.972
for example , with Australia is

01:32:16.972 --> 01:32:18.972
actually under the foreign military

01:32:18.972 --> 01:32:21.083
sales process . Right ? I mean , he's

01:32:21.083 --> 01:32:22.865
asking very specifically for an

01:32:23.225 --> 01:32:26.189
exemption that would uh we're not

01:32:26.200 --> 01:32:28.422
talking AUS , in this case , hypersonic

01:32:28.422 --> 01:32:30.256
are , are not a part of a , as I

01:32:30.256 --> 01:32:32.089
understand , Aus uh I understand

01:32:32.089 --> 01:32:34.311
there's a second phase of this . That's

01:32:34.319 --> 01:32:37.569
A I and other things , right ? But um

01:32:37.580 --> 01:32:40.569
hypersonic aren't in there . I'm not

01:32:40.580 --> 01:32:42.913
gonna go into detail in this setting on ,

01:32:42.913 --> 01:32:44.913
on what he shared with us about the

01:32:44.913 --> 01:32:46.969
capabilities , advancement that that

01:32:46.969 --> 01:32:49.109
would be for our uh you know ,

01:32:49.120 --> 01:32:51.870
development of that uh resource . But

01:32:51.879 --> 01:32:54.339
it ain't happening because that company

01:32:54.350 --> 01:32:56.350
has made a business decision . They

01:32:56.350 --> 01:32:58.406
made a business decision not to give

01:32:58.406 --> 01:33:00.239
their technology that then would

01:33:00.239 --> 01:33:02.461
restrict their sale anywhere else . And

01:33:02.461 --> 01:33:04.683
we , I mean , it's the United Kingdom ,

01:33:04.683 --> 01:33:07.720
the they've been with us . I mean , it ,

01:33:07.729 --> 01:33:09.919
it , the blood that has been shared

01:33:10.200 --> 01:33:12.939
spilled on the soil together on beaches

01:33:12.950 --> 01:33:15.439
in Normandy all over Europe . I mean ,

01:33:15.649 --> 01:33:18.000
there is no reason why we can do the

01:33:18.009 --> 01:33:20.120
same with Canada , but we can't do it

01:33:20.120 --> 01:33:22.520
with the UK . And so my , my argument

01:33:22.529 --> 01:33:24.696
is we're gonna bring legislation and I

01:33:24.696 --> 01:33:26.918
would love for you guys to support this

01:33:26.918 --> 01:33:28.918
I exemption . And with that I yield

01:33:29.080 --> 01:33:31.136
gentleman's time has expired . Chair

01:33:31.136 --> 01:33:33.136
now recognized Miss Jacobs for five

01:33:33.136 --> 01:33:35.080
minutes . Thank you , Mr Chair and

01:33:35.080 --> 01:33:37.302
thank you both for being here . Um As ,

01:33:37.302 --> 01:33:39.413
as we're talking about how to improve

01:33:39.413 --> 01:33:41.524
our arms exports . I , I think one of

01:33:41.524 --> 01:33:43.469
the things that is gonna be really

01:33:43.469 --> 01:33:45.469
important is ensuring that our arms

01:33:45.469 --> 01:33:47.636
transfer policy aligns with our values

01:33:47.636 --> 01:33:49.524
and our broader strategic foreign

01:33:49.524 --> 01:33:51.636
policy goals . Um You know , it's not

01:33:51.636 --> 01:33:53.913
only important um for human rights and ,

01:33:53.913 --> 01:33:56.080
and all of the , the good things and ,

01:33:56.080 --> 01:33:58.080
and moral reasons , but I , I think

01:33:58.080 --> 01:34:00.247
it's actually really important for our

01:34:00.247 --> 01:34:02.358
long term security and our ability to

01:34:02.358 --> 01:34:04.580
have these alliances in the future . Um

01:34:04.580 --> 01:34:06.802
So I was really encouraged by the Biden

01:34:06.802 --> 01:34:08.969
administration's new conventional arms

01:34:08.969 --> 01:34:11.080
transfer policy . And in particular ,

01:34:11.080 --> 01:34:13.080
one of the specific changes that uh

01:34:13.080 --> 01:34:14.913
changes the standard from actual

01:34:14.913 --> 01:34:16.969
knowledge that arms would be used to

01:34:16.969 --> 01:34:19.080
commit atrocities to a commitment not

01:34:19.080 --> 01:34:18.995
to transfer arms that would more likely

01:34:19.004 --> 01:34:21.282
than not contribute to atrocities . So ,

01:34:21.282 --> 01:34:23.282
a Assistant Secretary Lewis , I , I

01:34:23.282 --> 01:34:25.393
wanted to see if you could talk about

01:34:25.393 --> 01:34:27.393
how this policy is materially gonna

01:34:27.393 --> 01:34:29.337
change things , how you plan to do

01:34:29.337 --> 01:34:31.560
monitoring and evaluation to assess its

01:34:31.560 --> 01:34:33.782
impact on arms transfers and how you're

01:34:33.782 --> 01:34:35.948
going to implement this new standard .

01:34:35.948 --> 01:34:38.115
Um Well , first of all , thank you for

01:34:38.115 --> 01:34:39.782
the question . I think um the

01:34:39.782 --> 01:34:41.782
conventional arms transfer policy ,

01:34:41.782 --> 01:34:44.004
which is the policy that governs all of

01:34:44.004 --> 01:34:46.115
our arms transfers around the world .

01:34:46.115 --> 01:34:48.171
Um And actually , um you have uh you

01:34:48.171 --> 01:34:47.990
could have read from my talking points

01:34:48.000 --> 01:34:50.689
on that specific change uh that we made

01:34:50.700 --> 01:34:52.589
as it relates to the human rights

01:34:52.589 --> 01:34:54.819
standard . Um I would recognize that

01:34:54.830 --> 01:34:57.540
the cap policy um also includes a whole

01:34:57.549 --> 01:34:59.792
host of other things . Um For example ,

01:34:59.803 --> 01:35:02.853
trying to make um our uh weapons uh

01:35:02.862 --> 01:35:04.918
looking at different ways to finance

01:35:04.918 --> 01:35:07.203
them and a whole host of other things

01:35:07.212 --> 01:35:09.592
um as we move forward . Um But to get

01:35:09.603 --> 01:35:11.792
to your specific question , um we

01:35:11.803 --> 01:35:14.353
already work very closely with our

01:35:14.362 --> 01:35:17.643
colleagues um in uh the in D R L , the

01:35:17.652 --> 01:35:19.763
bureau that oversees um our human

01:35:19.772 --> 01:35:22.422
rights issues um as we look at arms

01:35:22.433 --> 01:35:25.266
trans . Um and so we are using these

01:35:25.275 --> 01:35:27.806
criteria as we evaluate all of the

01:35:27.815 --> 01:35:30.636
transfers . Um We are gonna continue um

01:35:30.645 --> 01:35:32.978
our current end use monitoring programs ,

01:35:32.978 --> 01:35:34.978
some of which are , are done by the

01:35:34.978 --> 01:35:37.145
defense department , some of which are

01:35:37.145 --> 01:35:37.096
done by the state department depending

01:35:37.105 --> 01:35:39.346
on the authorities . Um Again , to make

01:35:39.355 --> 01:35:41.522
sure that we comply with the law . And

01:35:41.522 --> 01:35:43.522
then , in addition , I think you're

01:35:43.522 --> 01:35:45.755
probably aware that we also have to do

01:35:45.766 --> 01:35:48.879
lay vetting um when it is when arms

01:35:48.890 --> 01:35:51.509
transfers are funded through uh using

01:35:51.520 --> 01:35:53.464
us government money . So there's a

01:35:53.464 --> 01:35:56.629
whole host of ways um that we have to

01:35:56.640 --> 01:35:59.089
address this criteria in the cap policy .

01:35:59.100 --> 01:36:01.044
Uh I'm glad you brought up any use

01:36:01.044 --> 01:36:04.009
monitoring . Um because um while this

01:36:04.020 --> 01:36:06.242
revised policy says the US will monitor

01:36:06.242 --> 01:36:08.464
and ensure uh transferred arms are used

01:36:08.464 --> 01:36:10.631
responsibly and in accordance with the

01:36:10.631 --> 01:36:12.520
conditions and obligations of the

01:36:12.520 --> 01:36:14.409
policy including human rights and

01:36:14.409 --> 01:36:16.520
international Humanitarian law . As ,

01:36:16.520 --> 01:36:16.220
as you both know , at the moment ,

01:36:16.229 --> 01:36:18.396
current us and use monitoring programs

01:36:18.396 --> 01:36:20.451
are really only focused on diversion

01:36:20.451 --> 01:36:22.396
risks . Um but they actually don't

01:36:22.396 --> 01:36:24.618
monitor or track how us items are being

01:36:24.618 --> 01:36:26.785
used including in human rights or , or

01:36:26.785 --> 01:36:28.507
international humanitarian law

01:36:28.507 --> 01:36:30.740
violations . So how will implementation

01:36:30.750 --> 01:36:33.459
of the address this gap in how we do

01:36:33.470 --> 01:36:36.129
and use monitoring ? Well , I do think

01:36:36.140 --> 01:36:38.410
um we are going to continue to do and

01:36:38.419 --> 01:36:40.641
use monitoring as it complies with both

01:36:40.641 --> 01:36:43.339
the law and this program . I think we

01:36:43.350 --> 01:36:45.239
are and again , part of that , it

01:36:45.239 --> 01:36:47.910
includes the work that we do with D R L

01:36:47.919 --> 01:36:49.975
and the other pieces of the bureau .

01:36:49.975 --> 01:36:52.141
I'm sorry of the State Department that

01:36:52.141 --> 01:36:54.252
work on these issues . Um I know that

01:36:54.252 --> 01:36:56.790
this has been something that um from

01:36:56.799 --> 01:36:58.966
the president on down making sure that

01:36:58.966 --> 01:37:01.189
we consider human rights . Um as we

01:37:01.200 --> 01:37:03.089
look at these arms transfers will

01:37:03.089 --> 01:37:04.978
continue to be at the core of our

01:37:04.978 --> 01:37:07.589
policy . Ok . Well , that sounds great ,

01:37:07.600 --> 01:37:09.656
although it sounds like most of what

01:37:09.656 --> 01:37:11.656
you're saying is what you have been

01:37:11.656 --> 01:37:13.489
doing and not necessarily what's

01:37:13.489 --> 01:37:15.656
changed based on this policy . So I'll

01:37:15.656 --> 01:37:17.656
look forward to working with you to

01:37:17.656 --> 01:37:19.878
make sure that we're actually , this is

01:37:19.878 --> 01:37:19.490
not just a continuation but , but

01:37:19.500 --> 01:37:21.778
actually doing something new . I I , I ,

01:37:21.778 --> 01:37:24.229
I wanted to go to the , the F MS 2023 .

01:37:24.240 --> 01:37:26.240
That , that you all just put out it

01:37:26.240 --> 01:37:29.109
references the cat policy in it , which

01:37:29.120 --> 01:37:31.839
I think is great . Um However , the F

01:37:31.850 --> 01:37:35.279
MS 2023 policy itself doesn't mention

01:37:35.290 --> 01:37:37.439
human rights concerns at all . Um So

01:37:37.450 --> 01:37:40.520
how will the cat policy and F MS 2023

01:37:40.529 --> 01:37:42.850
fit together ? And how will you ensure

01:37:42.859 --> 01:37:45.049
that retooling F MS doesn't sideline

01:37:45.060 --> 01:37:47.060
the very human rights concerns that

01:37:47.060 --> 01:37:49.171
you're addressing trying to addressed

01:37:49.171 --> 01:37:51.282
through the new cap policy . Um Thank

01:37:51.282 --> 01:37:50.875
you for that question . I think it's

01:37:50.886 --> 01:37:53.108
actually a really important question to

01:37:53.108 --> 01:37:55.786
answer . Um these two things to me work ,

01:37:55.795 --> 01:37:58.128
they align actually quite well together .

01:37:58.128 --> 01:38:00.295
If you look at what we put in the F MS

01:38:00.295 --> 01:38:02.556
uh 23 plan , we are looking at things

01:38:02.565 --> 01:38:06.226
about uh prioritizing uh having

01:38:06.235 --> 01:38:08.402
priorities as we look at the arm sales

01:38:08.402 --> 01:38:10.568
that we transfer . We're looking at um

01:38:10.568 --> 01:38:12.291
making sure we take a regional

01:38:12.291 --> 01:38:14.402
perspective . We're looking at issues

01:38:14.402 --> 01:38:16.291
um related to the training of the

01:38:16.291 --> 01:38:19.142
people who do uh the work uh in our

01:38:19.151 --> 01:38:21.881
embassies uh to get arms sales to move .

01:38:21.892 --> 01:38:23.781
We're looking at um improving our

01:38:23.781 --> 01:38:25.836
processes with Congress . So I don't

01:38:25.836 --> 01:38:28.032
think any of that work um is

01:38:28.041 --> 01:38:30.321
incongruent with the same , the

01:38:30.332 --> 01:38:32.221
principles laid out in the in the

01:38:32.221 --> 01:38:34.850
policy . Then a lady time has expired .

01:38:34.859 --> 01:38:36.970
Chair now recognizes Mr Barr for five

01:38:36.970 --> 01:38:39.680
minutes . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Um

01:38:39.990 --> 01:38:42.046
Thank you to our witnesses for being

01:38:42.046 --> 01:38:44.830
here and uh discussing the important uh

01:38:44.839 --> 01:38:47.979
trilateral relationship . Uh that is I

01:38:47.990 --> 01:38:51.189
think critical uh to uh deterring uh

01:38:51.200 --> 01:38:53.422
the Chinese Communist Party in the Indo

01:38:53.422 --> 01:38:56.069
Pacific . Um So let me start with

01:38:56.080 --> 01:38:58.302
Taiwan , uh Assistant Secretary Lewis .

01:38:58.302 --> 01:39:00.302
We know that Taiwan is waiting on a

01:39:00.302 --> 01:39:02.439
number of F MS deliveries uh from

01:39:02.450 --> 01:39:04.506
conventional weapons like the Abrams

01:39:04.506 --> 01:39:07.830
tank to F-16 upgrades , uh asymmetric

01:39:07.839 --> 01:39:10.509
harpoons and high Mars is state working

01:39:10.520 --> 01:39:13.430
with uh the defense industrial base to

01:39:13.439 --> 01:39:16.149
prioritize delivery of these asymmetric

01:39:16.160 --> 01:39:18.382
weapons that would be most effective at

01:39:18.382 --> 01:39:21.189
countering a cross strait invasion and

01:39:21.200 --> 01:39:23.680
um uh be happy for our defense

01:39:23.689 --> 01:39:25.467
department witness to offer her

01:39:25.467 --> 01:39:28.509
thoughts as well . Um Sir , I think

01:39:28.520 --> 01:39:31.500
that um we are all very focused on

01:39:31.509 --> 01:39:34.100
getting Taiwan what it needs to defend

01:39:34.109 --> 01:39:38.040
itself . Um As you know , that $19

01:39:38.049 --> 01:39:40.500
billion that you're discussing is um

01:39:40.509 --> 01:39:42.398
our sales that have already moved

01:39:42.398 --> 01:39:44.565
through our process and are now in the

01:39:44.565 --> 01:39:46.787
production phase . Um And I , I think I

01:39:46.787 --> 01:39:48.850
will just say one or two things and

01:39:48.859 --> 01:39:50.970
then let Dr Carlin speak more to that

01:39:50.970 --> 01:39:52.915
because the defense department has

01:39:52.915 --> 01:39:55.026
really been leading the charge on key

01:39:55.026 --> 01:39:58.640
capabilities to reduce the timelines

01:39:58.649 --> 01:40:01.279
or increase production so that we can

01:40:01.290 --> 01:40:03.512
get those mission critical capabilities

01:40:03.512 --> 01:40:07.490
to partners like Taiwan . Thank you .

01:40:07.500 --> 01:40:10.220
Uh We are um running an effort that is

01:40:10.229 --> 01:40:12.490
chaired by Deputy Secretary Hicks to

01:40:12.500 --> 01:40:15.240
make sure that uh Taiwan is getting the

01:40:15.250 --> 01:40:17.470
material and non material capabilities

01:40:17.479 --> 01:40:20.020
it needs as quickly as possible and

01:40:20.029 --> 01:40:22.029
that there is the most senior level

01:40:22.029 --> 01:40:23.751
attention as possible . We are

01:40:23.751 --> 01:40:25.862
constantly engaging Taiwan as well to

01:40:25.862 --> 01:40:27.529
work with them in terms of an

01:40:27.529 --> 01:40:29.085
understanding of what those

01:40:29.085 --> 01:40:30.973
capabilities would look like . Uh

01:40:30.973 --> 01:40:33.196
Obviously , you know , in line with our

01:40:33.196 --> 01:40:35.251
long stay policy . Um and uh and our

01:40:35.251 --> 01:40:37.418
commitments , I would also just take a

01:40:37.418 --> 01:40:39.640
moment now to thank Congress because as

01:40:39.640 --> 01:40:41.640
it relates to our own military , uh

01:40:41.640 --> 01:40:43.418
congress' support of multi year

01:40:43.418 --> 01:40:45.307
procurement of munitions has been

01:40:45.307 --> 01:40:47.418
especially important for our military

01:40:47.418 --> 01:40:49.640
as we look at ensuring that we have the

01:40:49.640 --> 01:40:49.254
most combat credible force to deal with

01:40:49.345 --> 01:40:51.401
this . And Doctor Carlin , there's a

01:40:51.401 --> 01:40:53.512
lot of bipartisan work going on , not

01:40:53.512 --> 01:40:55.567
just in this committee , but also in

01:40:55.567 --> 01:40:57.678
the select committee on the strategic

01:40:57.678 --> 01:40:57.185
competition between United States and

01:40:57.194 --> 01:40:59.305
China . And you're , you're gonna see

01:40:59.310 --> 01:41:01.310
those recommendations on multi year

01:41:01.310 --> 01:41:03.532
procurement . The industrial base needs

01:41:03.532 --> 01:41:06.169
certainty on this . Uh And uh this is ,

01:41:06.180 --> 01:41:08.124
this is gonna be an absolutely top

01:41:08.124 --> 01:41:10.479
priority of accelerating those F MS uh

01:41:10.490 --> 01:41:12.919
and getting those capabilities . Uh Now

01:41:12.930 --> 01:41:15.390
yesterday , what have you to , to uh

01:41:15.430 --> 01:41:18.060
that democracy ? Uh Let me follow up

01:41:18.069 --> 01:41:20.339
out of uh all of the open F MS cases

01:41:20.350 --> 01:41:22.709
with Taiwan . How many can we expect to

01:41:22.720 --> 01:41:24.498
be completed by the end of this

01:41:24.498 --> 01:41:27.209
calendar year ? Um I think in this

01:41:27.220 --> 01:41:29.442
setting , we are not gonna discuss when

01:41:29.442 --> 01:41:31.442
things will be delivered . Happy to

01:41:31.442 --> 01:41:33.442
continue that conversation . Yeah ,

01:41:33.442 --> 01:41:35.664
fair point . I just just know that this

01:41:35.664 --> 01:41:37.776
is an urgent uh uh a priority for the

01:41:37.776 --> 01:41:39.887
Congress as , as you know , uh let me

01:41:39.887 --> 01:41:42.810
ask you about um uh a Governance

01:41:42.819 --> 01:41:44.986
Assistant Secretary Lewis , how is the

01:41:44.986 --> 01:41:47.097
state department planning on deciding

01:41:47.097 --> 01:41:49.660
which sectors or projects uh or a

01:41:49.700 --> 01:41:51.422
projects that will qualify for

01:41:51.422 --> 01:41:53.779
expedited approvals under the AUS uh

01:41:53.819 --> 01:41:57.169
trade authorization concept ? Um Sir ,

01:41:57.180 --> 01:41:59.319
we are going to be sitting down both

01:41:59.330 --> 01:42:02.359
with um Australia and the UK to work

01:42:02.370 --> 01:42:05.049
through exactly those details . So

01:42:05.060 --> 01:42:08.330
obviously , it needs to fit into uh the ,

01:42:08.339 --> 01:42:10.450
the definitions of what we're working

01:42:10.450 --> 01:42:13.390
on within August . Um And then I think

01:42:13.399 --> 01:42:16.535
the second piece of that is um we're

01:42:16.544 --> 01:42:18.266
also looking at making sure we

01:42:18.266 --> 01:42:21.084
understand sort of what's excluded . Um

01:42:21.095 --> 01:42:23.564
And we did that very carefully because

01:42:23.575 --> 01:42:25.631
it's easier to move quickly when you

01:42:25.631 --> 01:42:27.964
have a clear list of what can't , right ?

01:42:27.964 --> 01:42:30.131
What cannot move as opposed to sort of

01:42:30.131 --> 01:42:32.884
uh trying to keep uh a , a track of

01:42:32.895 --> 01:42:35.899
what can move ? Uh And again , I don't

01:42:35.910 --> 01:42:38.132
know if this is the right setting , but

01:42:38.132 --> 01:42:40.379
is there an example of a technology , a

01:42:40.390 --> 01:42:42.930
critical technology that is so

01:42:42.939 --> 01:42:46.080
sensitive that it could not be shared

01:42:46.419 --> 01:42:49.020
in the , I think I can answer that in a ,

01:42:49.029 --> 01:42:51.140
in a broad , in a broad way , we have

01:42:51.149 --> 01:42:53.205
certain items that we are prohibited

01:42:53.205 --> 01:42:55.371
from transferring under treaties , for

01:42:55.371 --> 01:42:57.649
example , that would violate our , our ,

01:42:57.649 --> 01:43:00.540
our nuclear nonproliferation laws . OK ?

01:43:00.919 --> 01:43:03.390
Um To both of our witnesses , clarity

01:43:03.399 --> 01:43:06.250
is key for a success industries wanting

01:43:06.259 --> 01:43:08.315
to participate in this opportunity .

01:43:08.315 --> 01:43:10.481
Need to know what is possible for this

01:43:10.481 --> 01:43:10.160
to work . They need a green light , red

01:43:10.169 --> 01:43:12.113
light system . Have either of your

01:43:12.113 --> 01:43:14.169
agencies actually sat down with your

01:43:14.169 --> 01:43:16.169
counterpart ministries in the UK or

01:43:16.169 --> 01:43:18.169
Australia and outlined specifically

01:43:18.169 --> 01:43:20.225
what barriers exist in their laws or

01:43:20.225 --> 01:43:21.891
regulations that could hinder

01:43:21.891 --> 01:43:24.850
implementation . We have been in a um

01:43:24.859 --> 01:43:27.810
really a nonstop conversation with our

01:43:27.819 --> 01:43:30.759
counterparts in Australia and the UK to

01:43:30.770 --> 01:43:32.603
try to make sure that all of our

01:43:32.603 --> 01:43:35.399
systems are aligned . Um And that will ,

01:43:35.410 --> 01:43:37.359
that will need to continue as we

01:43:37.370 --> 01:43:39.481
continue to work through all of these

01:43:39.481 --> 01:43:41.648
steps to move forward . That's great .

01:43:41.648 --> 01:43:43.870
Well , I appreciate that effort to , to

01:43:43.870 --> 01:43:45.981
give uh industry that clarity uh with

01:43:45.981 --> 01:43:48.203
that uh I yield back when yields back .

01:43:48.203 --> 01:43:49.939
Uh Chair recognizes Manning .

01:43:54.250 --> 01:43:56.899
Thank you , Mr Chairman , Doctor Carlin .

01:43:57.029 --> 01:44:00.580
As you know , um our ally , Japan faces

01:44:00.589 --> 01:44:03.049
serious challenges from China . I was

01:44:03.060 --> 01:44:05.060
recently on a congressional trip to

01:44:05.060 --> 01:44:07.171
Japan . We spent a great deal of time

01:44:07.171 --> 01:44:09.227
focusing on the dramatic increase of

01:44:09.227 --> 01:44:11.140
Japan's military budget and the

01:44:11.149 --> 01:44:12.760
increasing importance of our

01:44:12.760 --> 01:44:14.816
relationship . And as you know , the

01:44:14.816 --> 01:44:17.020
next August step , the expansion into

01:44:17.029 --> 01:44:19.620
hypersonic weapons falls squarely into

01:44:19.629 --> 01:44:22.169
Japan's priorities . So can you talk

01:44:22.180 --> 01:44:24.729
about whether there are ways Japan can

01:44:24.740 --> 01:44:27.060
contribute to different aspects of AUS

01:44:27.240 --> 01:44:29.407
and whether they could be brought into

01:44:29.407 --> 01:44:31.518
deeper cooperation with this group in

01:44:31.518 --> 01:44:33.462
the future ? Thank you . First , I

01:44:33.462 --> 01:44:35.184
would just like to applaud the

01:44:35.184 --> 01:44:37.296
extraordinary investments that we see

01:44:37.296 --> 01:44:39.407
by Japan . Exactly as , as you know ,

01:44:39.407 --> 01:44:41.629
ma'am , they really are meaningful . We

01:44:41.629 --> 01:44:43.851
are also from the Department of Defense

01:44:43.851 --> 01:44:43.310
perspective , doing all we can to

01:44:43.319 --> 01:44:45.319
strengthen that relationship . Most

01:44:45.319 --> 01:44:47.541
recently announcing that we're going to

01:44:47.541 --> 01:44:49.319
send our most capable marine uh

01:44:49.319 --> 01:44:51.549
regiment uh out to Japan . Um regarding

01:44:51.560 --> 01:44:53.782
uh an any sort of expansion right now ,

01:44:53.782 --> 01:44:56.004
we're really focused on ensuring that a

01:44:56.004 --> 01:44:59.415
can succeed as designed . And then as

01:44:59.424 --> 01:45:01.424
we've generated momentum on it , et

01:45:01.424 --> 01:45:03.535
cetera , we are absolutely interested

01:45:03.535 --> 01:45:05.646
in looking at exploring opportunities

01:45:05.646 --> 01:45:08.395
to integrate partners uh in into kind

01:45:08.404 --> 01:45:11.154
of certain uh activities or so as as we

01:45:11.165 --> 01:45:14.365
go forward , are there uh security or

01:45:14.375 --> 01:45:17.055
um other concerns that Japan would

01:45:17.064 --> 01:45:19.120
technology concerns that Japan would

01:45:19.120 --> 01:45:21.654
have to overcome to create a , a closer

01:45:21.665 --> 01:45:24.750
relationship with A I think we would

01:45:24.759 --> 01:45:26.870
want to ensure just as we were saying

01:45:26.870 --> 01:45:29.037
about the trilateral need to make sure

01:45:29.037 --> 01:45:31.203
we've got elevated standards . I think

01:45:31.203 --> 01:45:33.315
with any country we work with in such

01:45:33.315 --> 01:45:35.537
an intimate way on sensitive technology

01:45:35.537 --> 01:45:37.759
cooperation . You know , we , we all we

01:45:37.759 --> 01:45:37.689
have the same strategic goal . Let's

01:45:37.700 --> 01:45:39.700
make sure that operationally we can

01:45:39.700 --> 01:45:41.756
make that a reality . OK . And under

01:45:41.756 --> 01:45:43.756
pillar two , the agreement seeks to

01:45:43.756 --> 01:45:45.756
expand technology sharing cyber and

01:45:45.756 --> 01:45:47.756
quantum capabilities as you're just

01:45:47.756 --> 01:45:50.033
describing and artificial intelligence .

01:45:50.033 --> 01:45:52.089
How important is it that we have the

01:45:52.089 --> 01:45:54.144
upper hand in these critical areas ?

01:45:54.250 --> 01:45:56.417
And can you talk about what safeguards

01:45:56.417 --> 01:45:58.361
need to be put in place to prevent

01:45:58.361 --> 01:46:00.450
China from seeking to steal our

01:46:00.459 --> 01:46:02.070
technology and undermine our

01:46:02.070 --> 01:46:05.709
capabilities . Thank you . It is

01:46:05.720 --> 01:46:07.740
incredibly important as we see the

01:46:07.750 --> 01:46:09.861
security environment shifting . And I

01:46:09.861 --> 01:46:12.028
would highlight as we see the military

01:46:12.028 --> 01:46:14.139
technological environment shifting as

01:46:14.139 --> 01:46:16.250
well for us to be able to collaborate

01:46:16.250 --> 01:46:18.250
closely with our allies . And to be

01:46:18.250 --> 01:46:20.417
clear , uh all boats are rising here .

01:46:20.417 --> 01:46:22.583
We it's a two way street . We are also

01:46:22.583 --> 01:46:24.750
getting , getting things from them and

01:46:24.750 --> 01:46:26.972
given these changes , uh AAA failure to

01:46:26.972 --> 01:46:29.139
collaborate and integrate and innovate

01:46:29.139 --> 01:46:31.361
will actually only hurt us . I think uh

01:46:31.361 --> 01:46:33.583
in this competition , we have got to do

01:46:33.583 --> 01:46:35.472
that though with these meaningful

01:46:35.472 --> 01:46:37.472
safeguards . And I do believe as it

01:46:37.472 --> 01:46:37.395
relates to Australia and the UK

01:46:37.404 --> 01:46:39.765
specifically that we're in a similar

01:46:39.774 --> 01:46:41.830
headspace on the need to ensure that

01:46:41.830 --> 01:46:43.663
security . Thank you , Assistant

01:46:43.663 --> 01:46:45.718
Secretary Lewis . Can you talk about

01:46:45.718 --> 01:46:47.663
some of the challenges the defense

01:46:47.663 --> 01:46:50.100
production industry is facing overall ,

01:46:50.209 --> 01:46:52.376
the impact it's having in terms of our

01:46:52.376 --> 01:46:54.098
assistance to Taiwan and other

01:46:54.098 --> 01:46:56.589
countries and what can and needs to be

01:46:56.600 --> 01:46:58.660
done to help strengthen our supply

01:46:58.669 --> 01:47:01.779
chain . Um Thank you for that question .

01:47:01.790 --> 01:47:04.149
And uh I'll certainly um talk about

01:47:04.160 --> 01:47:06.470
what we're seeing , I think um we are

01:47:06.479 --> 01:47:08.649
really at a moment of what I call

01:47:08.660 --> 01:47:10.680
tectonic change when it comes to

01:47:10.689 --> 01:47:12.689
security assistance and cooperation

01:47:12.689 --> 01:47:14.856
around the world because we are seeing

01:47:14.856 --> 01:47:17.133
not only because of the war in Ukraine ,

01:47:17.133 --> 01:47:19.350
but um because countries are concerned

01:47:19.359 --> 01:47:22.040
about the pr C threat and we're seeing

01:47:22.049 --> 01:47:23.993
the eastern flank of Europe really

01:47:23.993 --> 01:47:26.160
change its security process dramatic

01:47:26.169 --> 01:47:29.089
increases in both uh security needs and

01:47:29.100 --> 01:47:31.290
defense spending . Um And that is

01:47:31.299 --> 01:47:33.299
happening at the same time that our

01:47:33.299 --> 01:47:35.132
defense indus industrial base is

01:47:35.132 --> 01:47:37.819
emerging from COVID just as many other

01:47:37.830 --> 01:47:39.886
industries in the United States have

01:47:39.886 --> 01:47:42.669
done . Um And we are working very

01:47:42.680 --> 01:47:44.680
closely with the defense industrial

01:47:44.680 --> 01:47:48.120
base to uh increase their production uh

01:47:48.129 --> 01:47:50.819
to see where we can make investments .

01:47:50.850 --> 01:47:53.500
Um And then , um as Dr Carlin has

01:47:53.509 --> 01:47:56.069
outlined , uh the defense , the Deputy

01:47:56.080 --> 01:47:58.419
Secretary of Defense has honed in on a

01:47:58.430 --> 01:48:00.990
specific set of capabilities where we

01:48:01.000 --> 01:48:04.299
need to really move more quickly if I

01:48:04.310 --> 01:48:06.569
could just add uh uh just uh really

01:48:06.580 --> 01:48:08.747
thanking Congress for the Chips Act um

01:48:08.747 --> 01:48:11.089
which has some profound relevance for

01:48:11.100 --> 01:48:12.989
all of this because it'll help us

01:48:12.989 --> 01:48:15.279
bolster central American industry to

01:48:15.290 --> 01:48:17.529
maintain our military technical logical

01:48:17.540 --> 01:48:19.596
edge without , without which frankly

01:48:19.596 --> 01:48:21.707
much of this just won't be feasible .

01:48:21.707 --> 01:48:23.818
And if there were cuts to uh what has

01:48:23.818 --> 01:48:25.818
been achieved through our Chips Act

01:48:25.818 --> 01:48:25.720
because of the deficit negotiations ,

01:48:25.729 --> 01:48:28.319
would that have a negative impact ? I

01:48:28.330 --> 01:48:30.108
think there would absolutely be

01:48:30.108 --> 01:48:32.163
national security implications if we

01:48:32.163 --> 01:48:34.052
are unable to make the meaningful

01:48:34.052 --> 01:48:36.052
change that we need as a country to

01:48:36.052 --> 01:48:38.219
shore up our defense industrial base ,

01:48:38.219 --> 01:48:40.497
which really is a core strategic asset .

01:48:40.497 --> 01:48:42.386
I want to thank you both for your

01:48:42.386 --> 01:48:44.552
service to our country and with that ,

01:48:44.552 --> 01:48:46.386
I yield back yields back . Chair

01:48:46.386 --> 01:48:49.350
recognizes Mr Burt . Thank you Mr

01:48:49.359 --> 01:48:53.200
Chairman as the um someone whose

01:48:53.209 --> 01:48:55.669
questions get asked kind of late in the ,

01:48:55.680 --> 01:48:58.120
in the day and is the 435th most

01:48:58.129 --> 01:49:00.296
powerful member of congress . I expect

01:49:00.296 --> 01:49:02.407
when I ask my questions , you all are

01:49:02.407 --> 01:49:04.720
attack shocked and maybe you can

01:49:04.870 --> 01:49:07.290
proclaim how profound my questions were

01:49:07.299 --> 01:49:09.521
and how intellectually they were , they

01:49:09.521 --> 01:49:11.577
were presented to you because that's

01:49:11.577 --> 01:49:13.799
why when , when we record this and show

01:49:13.799 --> 01:49:15.966
it to my folks back home , that's what

01:49:15.966 --> 01:49:18.021
I want them to think . Anyway . So ,

01:49:18.021 --> 01:49:19.855
thank you all so much . Um uh uh

01:49:19.855 --> 01:49:23.419
Secretary Carlin uh ma'am , do you

01:49:23.430 --> 01:49:25.709
believe that stability in the Middle

01:49:25.720 --> 01:49:29.200
East is any way possible , shape form

01:49:29.209 --> 01:49:30.850
or fashion ? Honestly ,

01:49:32.370 --> 01:49:35.100
stability in the Middle East is writ

01:49:35.109 --> 01:49:37.740
large . I do believe we can have some

01:49:37.750 --> 01:49:39.806
stability and security in the Middle

01:49:39.806 --> 01:49:41.861
East over the years . It has gone up

01:49:41.861 --> 01:49:44.083
and down right now . If we just look at

01:49:44.083 --> 01:49:46.083
Yemen as an example , we've had the

01:49:46.083 --> 01:49:48.306
longest period of quiet since the civil

01:49:48.306 --> 01:49:50.250
war broke out and that is indeed a

01:49:50.250 --> 01:49:52.139
positive . Ok . But you said this

01:49:52.139 --> 01:49:54.028
morning , any efforts to increase

01:49:54.028 --> 01:49:56.083
security and stability in the region

01:49:56.083 --> 01:49:58.028
should be welcomed by all . And of

01:49:58.028 --> 01:50:00.194
course , China has worked with Iran to

01:50:00.194 --> 01:50:02.306
build relationships with the Saudis .

01:50:02.419 --> 01:50:04.197
You believe that that should be

01:50:04.197 --> 01:50:07.819
welcomed ? I think efforts to bring

01:50:07.830 --> 01:50:09.663
the countries together in a more

01:50:09.669 --> 01:50:13.350
peaceful way are a positive . That said ,

01:50:13.359 --> 01:50:16.370
I think it is quite clear that many of

01:50:16.379 --> 01:50:18.450
our Gulf countries have a threat ,

01:50:18.459 --> 01:50:20.640
perception of Iran's irresponsible and

01:50:20.649 --> 01:50:22.705
aggressive behavior that is quite in

01:50:22.705 --> 01:50:25.830
line with ours as well . Ok ,

01:50:27.540 --> 01:50:29.810
China seems to be attempting to become

01:50:29.819 --> 01:50:32.339
a diplomatic actor in the region . Do

01:50:32.350 --> 01:50:34.128
you think that's a good thing ?

01:50:36.890 --> 01:50:39.950
I think to the extent the People's

01:50:39.959 --> 01:50:42.620
Republic of China is trying to play a

01:50:42.629 --> 01:50:44.870
more positive role in the region . That

01:50:44.879 --> 01:50:46.601
is a good thing . I do want to

01:50:46.601 --> 01:50:48.712
emphasize that there is absolutely no

01:50:48.712 --> 01:50:52.029
comparison to the level scope scale of

01:50:52.040 --> 01:50:54.040
us involvement in the Middle East ,

01:50:54.040 --> 01:50:56.151
decades and decades long than what we

01:50:56.151 --> 01:50:58.318
say . The People's Republic of China .

01:50:58.318 --> 01:51:00.540
I would also just note for our partners

01:51:00.540 --> 01:51:02.651
in the Middle East , of course , that

01:51:02.651 --> 01:51:05.115
uh that as they increasingly cooperate

01:51:05.125 --> 01:51:07.354
with the People's Republic of China ,

01:51:07.365 --> 01:51:09.143
we will of course , look at the

01:51:09.143 --> 01:51:11.634
technological implications of , of that

01:51:11.645 --> 01:51:14.294
cooperation , the communications uh of ,

01:51:14.305 --> 01:51:16.645
of that cooperation as well . Um to

01:51:16.654 --> 01:51:20.035
ensure that our robust relationship can

01:51:20.044 --> 01:51:22.785
uh can , can result in this security

01:51:22.794 --> 01:51:25.104
that , that we need to . Yes , I feel

01:51:25.115 --> 01:51:28.089
like any any effort of the Chinese

01:51:28.330 --> 01:51:30.569
towards anything is is looking out for

01:51:30.580 --> 01:51:33.930
China and with them , their involvement

01:51:33.939 --> 01:51:36.161
in the Middle East , I think that is um

01:51:36.161 --> 01:51:38.050
to me that's , that's a dangerous

01:51:38.359 --> 01:51:41.600
situation . I think it shows especially

01:51:41.609 --> 01:51:44.029
any , any alignment with Iran who's ,

01:51:44.649 --> 01:51:46.871
who have stated that they don't believe

01:51:46.871 --> 01:51:49.038
Israel should exist to me is a , is an

01:51:49.038 --> 01:51:51.609
affront to me and a lot of people that

01:51:51.620 --> 01:51:55.129
I represent . Um do you think the

01:51:55.140 --> 01:51:57.307
Chinese involvement in the Middle East

01:51:57.307 --> 01:51:59.362
is a threat to the Abraham Accords .

01:52:02.529 --> 01:52:05.890
Um uh I don't know that I would see it

01:52:05.899 --> 01:52:08.410
as a threat that Abraham Accords per se .

01:52:08.419 --> 01:52:11.149
I think on the face of it , it is clear

01:52:11.160 --> 01:52:13.382
that the People's Republic of China has

01:52:13.382 --> 01:52:15.604
a relationship with Iran and it is also

01:52:15.604 --> 01:52:17.770
clear that like us , uh the Gulf

01:52:17.779 --> 01:52:19.879
countries are worried understandably

01:52:19.890 --> 01:52:21.810
about Iran's irresponsible and

01:52:21.899 --> 01:52:24.830
aggressive uh behavior . So I think ,

01:52:24.839 --> 01:52:27.629
um that the , those who participate in

01:52:27.640 --> 01:52:30.330
the Abraham uh Accords would want to be ,

01:52:30.339 --> 01:52:32.850
uh aware of how , how various countries

01:52:32.859 --> 01:52:35.569
understand the threats uh in the region ,

01:52:35.580 --> 01:52:37.747
who is fomenting threats in the region

01:52:37.747 --> 01:52:40.629
and how best to tackle them ? Ok . The

01:52:41.270 --> 01:52:43.270
Israeli defense Chief of staff says

01:52:43.270 --> 01:52:45.326
Iran has right now has more enriched

01:52:45.326 --> 01:52:48.600
uranium than ever before and , um , is

01:52:48.609 --> 01:52:50.776
increasingly aggressive . Do you think

01:52:50.776 --> 01:52:52.839
your plan of deterrence is working ?

01:52:55.049 --> 01:52:59.020
We take , uh , effort to deter Iran

01:52:59.029 --> 01:53:02.830
very seriously across the US government ?

01:53:02.839 --> 01:53:05.189
I would note most recently in late

01:53:05.200 --> 01:53:07.819
March when there was an attack by

01:53:07.830 --> 01:53:10.459
Iranian sponsored militias , the US

01:53:10.470 --> 01:53:12.637
military responded , I think within 12

01:53:12.637 --> 01:53:14.470
hours or so . And we believe the

01:53:14.470 --> 01:53:16.859
Iranians understood what that response

01:53:16.870 --> 01:53:19.839
was as well . Again , I would , oh , I

01:53:19.850 --> 01:53:22.072
hope the State Department and the White

01:53:22.072 --> 01:53:24.128
House would pay special attention to

01:53:24.128 --> 01:53:26.350
the situation with Iran . I just , um ,

01:53:27.189 --> 01:53:29.589
with their , uh , statements of

01:53:29.600 --> 01:53:31.890
hostility towards Iran historically and

01:53:31.899 --> 01:53:34.799
currently I think is it ought to be a ,

01:53:34.810 --> 01:53:38.029
uh , a what a note of awareness for us

01:53:38.040 --> 01:53:40.040
and the Chinese are hooking up with

01:53:40.040 --> 01:53:42.569
them . I would be really concerned . So ,

01:53:42.580 --> 01:53:44.524
anyway , thank you , ma'am . And I

01:53:44.790 --> 01:53:47.169
yield the remainder of my three seconds ,

01:53:47.220 --> 01:53:49.331
Mr Chair , we thank the gentleman for

01:53:49.331 --> 01:53:51.331
his eloquence and for yielding back

01:53:51.331 --> 01:53:53.700
chair now recognizes Mr Moskowitz . Uh

01:53:53.709 --> 01:53:57.029
Thank you Mr Chairman . Um you know ,

01:53:57.040 --> 01:53:59.290
actually kind of continuing the same

01:53:59.299 --> 01:54:02.169
line of thought uh from uh the previous

01:54:02.180 --> 01:54:04.830
speaker , I just got back from uh

01:54:04.839 --> 01:54:07.770
Israel Jordan , Egypt . Uh and Italy

01:54:07.779 --> 01:54:10.040
with the speaker and we met with the

01:54:10.049 --> 01:54:11.882
king of Jordan , we met with the

01:54:11.882 --> 01:54:13.716
president of Egypt , the Foreign

01:54:13.716 --> 01:54:15.938
Minister of Egypt , the CIA director of

01:54:15.938 --> 01:54:18.105
Egypt , the Prime Minister of Israel ,

01:54:18.105 --> 01:54:20.216
the president of Israel , the Speaker

01:54:20.216 --> 01:54:19.819
of the House , the Prime Minister of

01:54:19.830 --> 01:54:21.886
Italy , the president of Italy , the

01:54:21.886 --> 01:54:23.886
Speaker of the House of Italy . And

01:54:23.886 --> 01:54:25.830
there was a consistent theme among

01:54:25.830 --> 01:54:28.163
these four countries and that was China .

01:54:28.290 --> 01:54:31.839
Uh and also the consistent theme was is

01:54:31.850 --> 01:54:34.640
that they were very honest ,

01:54:35.700 --> 01:54:37.589
they want to do business with the

01:54:37.589 --> 01:54:39.644
United States , they want to buy our

01:54:39.644 --> 01:54:41.644
equipment , they think our stuff is

01:54:41.644 --> 01:54:44.470
superior , but if we can't sell it to

01:54:44.479 --> 01:54:46.201
them , they're going to get it

01:54:46.201 --> 01:54:48.201
somewhere else . And that's new , I

01:54:48.201 --> 01:54:51.149
think for the United States that

01:54:52.750 --> 01:54:55.240
similar equipment can be purchased from

01:54:55.290 --> 01:54:57.457
Russia and China since the fall of the

01:54:57.457 --> 01:54:59.679
Soviet Union , maybe we've not had that

01:54:59.679 --> 01:55:03.560
in the space . Also , we heard

01:55:03.569 --> 01:55:07.419
from them that if we , if we start to

01:55:07.430 --> 01:55:09.740
pull out of the region , whether it's

01:55:09.750 --> 01:55:11.972
in Africa or in the Middle East because

01:55:11.972 --> 01:55:14.779
we're focused elsewhere . China is

01:55:14.790 --> 01:55:17.169
coming in and China is not coming in

01:55:17.180 --> 01:55:19.236
with grants , they're coming in with

01:55:19.236 --> 01:55:21.236
loans , loans that at some point in

01:55:21.236 --> 01:55:23.410
time , China is hoping maybe won't get

01:55:23.419 --> 01:55:25.859
paid so that they can take further

01:55:25.870 --> 01:55:28.580
control of those countries . Economics

01:55:28.589 --> 01:55:30.700
also when China comes in , they don't

01:55:30.700 --> 01:55:33.000
lift these countries up and give , give

01:55:33.009 --> 01:55:35.176
the the projects , their funding don't

01:55:35.176 --> 01:55:37.342
come to the workers of those countries

01:55:37.342 --> 01:55:39.620
because they bring in Chinese labor to ,

01:55:39.620 --> 01:55:41.842
to build all of these things . And so I

01:55:41.842 --> 01:55:45.399
have serious concerns over that . I

01:55:45.410 --> 01:55:47.720
think we're , we're a general fighting

01:55:47.729 --> 01:55:50.120
the last war and that we have not

01:55:50.129 --> 01:55:53.479
changed with the times . Uh Secretary

01:55:53.490 --> 01:55:55.434
Carlin , did I hear you say or did

01:55:55.434 --> 01:55:57.323
someone bring up that it takes 18

01:55:57.323 --> 01:56:00.819
months to do a contract ? Uh Someone

01:56:00.830 --> 01:56:02.830
did raise that figure . I , I can't

01:56:02.830 --> 01:56:04.997
corroborate that figure . I don't know

01:56:04.997 --> 01:56:06.997
if Assistant Secretary Lewis uh can

01:56:06.997 --> 01:56:09.108
either , I can't either on that . I'd

01:56:09.108 --> 01:56:11.274
be happy . Can I address uh the issues

01:56:11.274 --> 01:56:13.497
that you raised previously ? Um because

01:56:13.497 --> 01:56:13.299
we've actually spent a lot of time

01:56:13.310 --> 01:56:15.532
thinking about this . The United States

01:56:15.532 --> 01:56:18.500
currently is about 41% of the world

01:56:18.509 --> 01:56:20.890
market on arms sales . That's you take

01:56:20.899 --> 01:56:22.843
a 10 year average and that's , and

01:56:22.843 --> 01:56:24.899
that's we've actually increased from

01:56:24.899 --> 01:56:27.066
38% percent to 41% . Russia has fallen

01:56:27.066 --> 01:56:29.288
from the second largest producer in the

01:56:29.288 --> 01:56:31.510
world to the third largest producer and

01:56:31.510 --> 01:56:33.566
China is , is , is down there in the

01:56:33.566 --> 01:56:35.950
single , in the single digits . So , um

01:56:35.959 --> 01:56:39.459
and our sales combined are uh is , is

01:56:39.470 --> 01:56:41.459
larger than the next sort of five

01:56:41.470 --> 01:56:44.620
countries um aligned uh below us .

01:56:44.649 --> 01:56:46.982
Listen , I understand where the data is .

01:56:46.982 --> 01:56:49.359
I'm telling you where it's going . Ok ,

01:56:49.370 --> 01:56:52.779
if we don't fix some of these problems ,

01:56:52.790 --> 01:56:55.129
um the they're , you know , when these

01:56:55.140 --> 01:56:57.140
folks are looking us in the eye and

01:56:57.140 --> 01:56:58.918
telling us , you know , we , we

01:56:58.918 --> 01:56:58.839
purchase these things , we haven't

01:56:58.850 --> 01:57:00.961
received them . We'd , we'd like them

01:57:00.961 --> 01:57:03.017
from you . We still think you're the

01:57:03.017 --> 01:57:05.017
best partner , but at some point in

01:57:05.017 --> 01:57:07.128
time , we're gonna buy them elsewhere

01:57:07.128 --> 01:57:09.183
or in some instances in Egypt , they

01:57:09.183 --> 01:57:11.640
already have . Um that's , that's

01:57:11.649 --> 01:57:13.750
putting us on notice that something

01:57:13.759 --> 01:57:16.830
isn't , isn't working . Uh Another one

01:57:16.839 --> 01:57:19.061
of my colleagues asked you about excess

01:57:19.061 --> 01:57:21.117
capacity . Let me tell you what he's

01:57:21.117 --> 01:57:22.950
asking . OK ? Because this is no

01:57:22.950 --> 01:57:25.228
different than with COVID supply chain ,

01:57:25.228 --> 01:57:27.979
right ? We didn't , we had to buy stuff

01:57:27.990 --> 01:57:30.212
from all over , all over the world . We

01:57:30.212 --> 01:57:32.101
were competing with everybody but

01:57:32.101 --> 01:57:34.323
Antarctica for materials during COVID .

01:57:34.323 --> 01:57:36.546
OK ? And most of the stuff was procured

01:57:36.546 --> 01:57:38.434
from China and other countries it

01:57:38.434 --> 01:57:40.546
wasn't made here . And we incentive ,

01:57:40.546 --> 01:57:42.157
we had all this money and we

01:57:42.157 --> 01:57:44.101
incentivize all these companies to

01:57:44.101 --> 01:57:46.323
bring these new lines , right ? To make

01:57:46.323 --> 01:57:48.434
masks in country . It took months and

01:57:48.434 --> 01:57:50.657
months and months and months to do that

01:57:50.657 --> 01:57:52.712
or for them to change their lines to

01:57:52.712 --> 01:57:52.270
ventilators , it took months and months

01:57:52.279 --> 01:57:55.350
to do that . And so what he's asking is

01:57:55.359 --> 01:57:57.569
that , are there excess lines that are

01:57:57.580 --> 01:57:59.500
already built ? Right ? Are we

01:57:59.509 --> 01:58:02.319
incentivizing producers to break , to

01:58:02.330 --> 01:58:04.441
have excess lines in the event we get

01:58:04.441 --> 01:58:06.608
into , I don't know , a war or a proxy

01:58:06.608 --> 01:58:08.663
war . So that when , when we use the

01:58:08.663 --> 01:58:10.886
production Act , we're not waiting , we

01:58:10.886 --> 01:58:13.108
saw when we use the Production Act , it

01:58:13.108 --> 01:58:15.330
wasn't like this . It's still months to

01:58:15.330 --> 01:58:17.608
bring these , these lines uh uh online .

01:58:17.608 --> 01:58:19.830
So that's what the question was . Do we

01:58:19.830 --> 01:58:21.497
have excess capacity ? Are we

01:58:21.497 --> 01:58:23.608
incentivizing excess capacity that we

01:58:23.608 --> 01:58:25.719
can bring online because it's already

01:58:25.719 --> 01:58:28.939
built . I I think what we , we are not

01:58:28.950 --> 01:58:31.117
at that stage yet frankly , because we

01:58:31.117 --> 01:58:33.283
are trying to increase that capacity .

01:58:33.283 --> 01:58:35.339
I hope that we will be at that stage

01:58:35.339 --> 01:58:37.394
going forward . But right now , what

01:58:37.394 --> 01:58:39.450
we're trying to do especially in key

01:58:39.450 --> 01:58:41.506
areas is to signal to industry . And

01:58:41.506 --> 01:58:43.506
Congress is actually obviously been

01:58:43.506 --> 01:58:43.439
really , really important in this to be

01:58:43.450 --> 01:58:45.283
able to signal where we want our

01:58:45.283 --> 01:58:46.950
priorities , where we want to

01:58:46.950 --> 01:58:49.117
prioritize and how we can increase the

01:58:49.117 --> 01:58:51.450
security and the resilience of , of the ,

01:58:51.450 --> 01:58:53.617
of the defense industrial . My last my

01:58:53.617 --> 01:58:55.839
last question because I'm out of time .

01:58:55.839 --> 01:58:58.117
Do we know ? And if you can't share it ,

01:58:58.117 --> 01:59:00.283
that's fine . Do we know how many days

01:59:00.283 --> 01:59:02.394
we , if we've gotten into a hot war ,

01:59:02.394 --> 01:59:04.506
do we know how many days of supply we

01:59:04.506 --> 01:59:06.172
have before we would be in an

01:59:06.172 --> 01:59:09.120
existential situation that would depend

01:59:09.129 --> 01:59:11.185
specifically on what platform you're

01:59:11.185 --> 01:59:12.962
talking about . But we would be

01:59:12.962 --> 01:59:15.129
delighted to have that conversation in

01:59:15.129 --> 01:59:17.351
another forum . Thank you , Mr Chairman

01:59:17.351 --> 01:59:19.351
Joe Yields . Uh chair recognizes MS

01:59:19.351 --> 01:59:23.000
Young Kim . Thank you , Chairman mccaul .

01:59:23.089 --> 01:59:24.811
And I want to thank all of our

01:59:24.811 --> 01:59:26.930
witnesses for joining us today . You

01:59:26.939 --> 01:59:28.883
know , as a chairwoman of the Indo

01:59:28.883 --> 01:59:30.717
Pacific subcommittee , one of my

01:59:30.717 --> 01:59:33.520
priorities is ensuring that our foreign

01:59:33.529 --> 01:59:35.696
military sales programs are supporting

01:59:35.696 --> 01:59:38.310
the most vulnerable allies and partners

01:59:38.319 --> 01:59:41.140
in the region . Last Congress

01:59:41.939 --> 01:59:44.299
Chairman mccaul and I introduced the

01:59:44.310 --> 01:59:46.899
arms exports Delivery Solutions Act

01:59:46.910 --> 01:59:49.529
which requires an annual report from

01:59:49.540 --> 01:59:52.810
Dod and D OS . Uh That details the

01:59:52.819 --> 01:59:54.763
efforts being taken to address the

01:59:54.770 --> 01:59:57.370
multi billion dollar backlog of arms

01:59:57.379 --> 02:00:00.080
sales to Taiwan and our other allies in

02:00:00.089 --> 02:00:02.870
the in the Pacific . And two weeks ago ,

02:00:03.129 --> 02:00:06.290
we received the 55 oh eight report due

02:00:06.299 --> 02:00:09.549
to us from that legislation regarding

02:00:09.560 --> 02:00:11.616
foreign military sales . And in that

02:00:11.616 --> 02:00:13.282
report , the state department

02:00:13.282 --> 02:00:15.171
highlights challenges such as the

02:00:15.171 --> 02:00:18.609
supply chain issues and long lead as

02:00:18.620 --> 02:00:22.470
causes for delays uh to that process .

02:00:22.680 --> 02:00:25.229
Um Question to you , Miss Lewis . One

02:00:25.240 --> 02:00:27.184
of the report requirement is for a

02:00:27.184 --> 02:00:30.060
description of interagency efforts to

02:00:30.069 --> 02:00:31.791
support Taiwan's attainment of

02:00:31.791 --> 02:00:34.040
operational capabilities including

02:00:34.049 --> 02:00:36.200
training . Where is that part of the

02:00:36.209 --> 02:00:39.560
report ? I think if we're certainly

02:00:39.569 --> 02:00:41.830
happy to discuss that with you further

02:00:41.839 --> 02:00:43.950
and if there's additional information

02:00:43.950 --> 02:00:46.061
you need in the report I guess what I

02:00:46.061 --> 02:00:48.006
got in the report . That's why I'm

02:00:48.006 --> 02:00:50.172
asking . But the report also require a

02:00:50.172 --> 02:00:51.839
description of the action the

02:00:51.839 --> 02:00:53.950
department is planning to take or has

02:00:53.950 --> 02:00:56.350
taken to prioritize Taiwan's F MS cases .

02:00:56.359 --> 02:00:59.799
So when can we expect that portion ? Um

02:00:59.810 --> 02:01:01.588
If there is anything that's not

02:01:01.588 --> 02:01:03.588
included , we'll be happy , I'll be

02:01:03.588 --> 02:01:03.580
happy to take that back and make sure

02:01:03.589 --> 02:01:05.700
that you get that . I'm also happy to

02:01:05.700 --> 02:01:07.867
answer any questions now or in another

02:01:07.867 --> 02:01:09.922
setting ? If that's well , would you

02:01:09.922 --> 02:01:12.033
agree then the couple questions I ask

02:01:12.033 --> 02:01:11.819
it's not there . So would you agree ?

02:01:11.830 --> 02:01:14.339
This report is incomplete and when

02:01:14.350 --> 02:01:16.990
should we expect to get the rest of the

02:01:17.000 --> 02:01:19.279
report ? That includes the information

02:01:19.290 --> 02:01:21.123
that we were asking through that

02:01:21.123 --> 02:01:23.179
legislation ? I'm happy to take that

02:01:23.179 --> 02:01:25.346
back and get back to you as soon as we

02:01:25.346 --> 02:01:27.568
can . Well , one of the requirements in

02:01:27.568 --> 02:01:29.470
section 55 08 B is for the State

02:01:29.479 --> 02:01:31.479
Department and dod to recommend to

02:01:31.490 --> 02:01:34.240
Congress authorities we can use and

02:01:34.250 --> 02:01:36.319
actions we can take to support

02:01:36.330 --> 02:01:38.810
expedited arms shipments to in the

02:01:38.819 --> 02:01:41.640
Pacific Allies and the report does not

02:01:41.649 --> 02:01:44.069
have these recommendations . So what

02:01:44.080 --> 02:01:46.660
are they ? Well , I think we've covered

02:01:46.669 --> 02:01:48.759
some of those here today because the

02:01:48.770 --> 02:01:50.937
issues that the region and that Taiwan

02:01:50.937 --> 02:01:53.250
are facing uh in terms of the

02:01:53.259 --> 02:01:55.370
production timeline , challenges that

02:01:55.370 --> 02:01:57.481
we are having are not specific to the

02:01:57.481 --> 02:01:59.481
region . These are across the board

02:01:59.481 --> 02:02:01.592
challenges for our defense industrial

02:02:01.592 --> 02:02:03.648
base . Um And so I think again , the

02:02:03.648 --> 02:02:05.759
work that Kath Hicks , uh , Secretary

02:02:05.759 --> 02:02:07.926
Deputy Secretary Hicks has done , um ,

02:02:07.926 --> 02:02:10.450
at dod to prioritize specific

02:02:10.459 --> 02:02:12.515
capabilities . We have done things ,

02:02:12.515 --> 02:02:14.620
for example . Um , we had lines that

02:02:14.629 --> 02:02:16.851
were cold , meaning they had , they had

02:02:16.851 --> 02:02:19.390
stopped producing items gone back ,

02:02:19.399 --> 02:02:21.580
figured out why is that line cold ?

02:02:21.589 --> 02:02:23.700
Sometimes it comes down to a specific

02:02:23.700 --> 02:02:26.069
widget that a sub producer may have

02:02:26.080 --> 02:02:28.191
gone out of business . Thank you back

02:02:28.229 --> 02:02:30.062
forward to getting that specific

02:02:30.062 --> 02:02:32.399
recommendations in the report when you

02:02:32.410 --> 02:02:34.899
complete that section 55 oh eight ,

02:02:34.910 --> 02:02:37.399
also required the State Department and

02:02:37.410 --> 02:02:40.299
dod to submit the report by March 31 of

02:02:40.310 --> 02:02:43.459
this year . So why were your agencies

02:02:43.470 --> 02:02:45.637
unable to meet that deadline ? And why

02:02:45.637 --> 02:02:48.169
is the report incomplete ? Um My

02:02:48.180 --> 02:02:50.069
understanding is we submitted the

02:02:50.069 --> 02:02:52.180
report on April 17th . I think as you

02:02:52.180 --> 02:02:54.013
know , we have a large number of

02:02:54.013 --> 02:02:56.013
reports that April Sember still not

02:02:56.013 --> 02:02:59.129
March 31 . So I hope that uh we can

02:02:59.140 --> 02:03:01.140
expect the next report which is due

02:03:01.140 --> 02:03:04.180
March 31 of next year 2024 to be on

02:03:04.189 --> 02:03:05.890
time . Of course ,

02:03:08.419 --> 02:03:11.149
next question , August is intended to

02:03:11.160 --> 02:03:13.410
strengthen the ability of the US

02:03:13.669 --> 02:03:16.549
Australia and the UK to support each

02:03:16.560 --> 02:03:18.504
respective government security and

02:03:18.504 --> 02:03:20.770
defense uh interest . And much of the

02:03:20.779 --> 02:03:23.129
conversation around this security pact

02:03:23.140 --> 02:03:24.862
has been about nuclear powered

02:03:24.862 --> 02:03:27.790
submarines . So what are the areas of

02:03:27.799 --> 02:03:30.290
cooperation other than the transfer of

02:03:30.299 --> 02:03:32.669
nuclear powered submarines to Australia

02:03:32.680 --> 02:03:35.470
that Aus can serve as a platform for .

02:03:35.919 --> 02:03:37.752
Thank you . There are indeed two

02:03:37.752 --> 02:03:40.209
pillars if you will of August one is ,

02:03:40.220 --> 02:03:43.189
as you note the um the the um the

02:03:43.200 --> 02:03:45.367
United States providing Australia with

02:03:45.367 --> 02:03:47.533
a conventionally armed nuclear powered

02:03:47.533 --> 02:03:49.589
submarine capability at the earliest

02:03:49.589 --> 02:03:51.478
possible date . While setting the

02:03:51.478 --> 02:03:53.478
highest nonproliferation standard ,

02:03:53.478 --> 02:03:55.533
that's kind of known as pillar one ,

02:03:55.533 --> 02:03:57.756
pillar two is that AUS will develop and

02:03:57.756 --> 02:03:59.533
provide joint advanced military

02:03:59.533 --> 02:04:01.589
capabilities to promote security and

02:04:01.589 --> 02:04:03.644
stability . As of now , a handful of

02:04:03.644 --> 02:04:07.020
those areas include um uh hypersonic

02:04:07.029 --> 02:04:09.259
artificial Intelligence . For example ,

02:04:09.270 --> 02:04:11.492
what we really want to do is be able to

02:04:11.492 --> 02:04:13.714
lift up all of our defense , industrial

02:04:13.714 --> 02:04:15.826
bases and to cooperate together so we

02:04:15.826 --> 02:04:17.881
can enhance our competitive military

02:04:17.881 --> 02:04:19.937
edge . Thank you very quickly . Last

02:04:19.937 --> 02:04:21.937
question , I know there is a lot of

02:04:21.937 --> 02:04:24.159
numbers being thrown around about the ,

02:04:24.159 --> 02:04:26.381
the exact dollar amount for Taiwan arms

02:04:26.381 --> 02:04:28.548
that's on backlog right now . So is it

02:04:28.548 --> 02:04:30.714
19 billion , 20 billion , 21 billion ?

02:04:30.714 --> 02:04:34.100
Do you know uh ma'am ? Uh I think that

02:04:34.109 --> 02:04:36.109
it depends what you're counting . I

02:04:36.109 --> 02:04:38.689
think our view is um those have come

02:04:38.700 --> 02:04:40.922
out of the US government system and are

02:04:40.922 --> 02:04:42.756
items that are being that are in

02:04:42.756 --> 02:04:45.560
production . Um And so again , we would

02:04:45.569 --> 02:04:48.209
have to go industry by industry um to

02:04:48.220 --> 02:04:50.331
analyze that further . Thank you . My

02:04:50.331 --> 02:04:52.970
time's up , I yield back uh generally

02:04:52.979 --> 02:04:55.419
uh yields back . Uh chair recognizes M

02:04:55.939 --> 02:04:58.560
DEV . Thank you , Mr Chair first .

02:04:58.569 --> 02:05:00.680
Completely unrelated . I just want to

02:05:00.680 --> 02:05:02.791
say that Tina Turner died today . And

02:05:02.791 --> 02:05:05.229
she was the master of soft diplomacy

02:05:05.439 --> 02:05:07.810
and also a former constituent of mine .

02:05:07.819 --> 02:05:10.720
So I'm a little sad but I am glad uh

02:05:10.729 --> 02:05:12.759
that this committee is holding a

02:05:12.770 --> 02:05:15.529
hearing on the important topic of us ,

02:05:15.540 --> 02:05:18.290
arms exports policy and reclaiming the

02:05:18.299 --> 02:05:20.410
underutilized oversight role that

02:05:20.419 --> 02:05:22.470
Congress plays in our security

02:05:22.479 --> 02:05:25.859
cooperation for trusted partners with

02:05:25.870 --> 02:05:27.990
closely aligned goals such as Ukraine

02:05:28.000 --> 02:05:30.629
and Taiwan . Us . Security assistance

02:05:30.640 --> 02:05:32.807
can be essential in helping our allies

02:05:32.807 --> 02:05:35.589
deter aggression and defend against

02:05:35.600 --> 02:05:37.580
existential threats . But as the

02:05:37.589 --> 02:05:39.839
revised cat policy acknowledges when

02:05:39.850 --> 02:05:42.160
our defense material is transferred to

02:05:42.169 --> 02:05:44.770
actors who do not employ it responsibly .

02:05:44.879 --> 02:05:47.310
Us weaponry can and has been used to

02:05:47.319 --> 02:05:49.486
violate human rights and international

02:05:49.486 --> 02:05:51.770
human humanitarian law , harm civilians

02:05:51.779 --> 02:05:54.129
and undermine long term us interests in

02:05:54.140 --> 02:05:56.560
stability and good governance abroad .

02:05:56.569 --> 02:05:59.810
There was an earlier question about um

02:06:00.259 --> 02:06:02.370
in use monitoring and I have a follow

02:06:02.370 --> 02:06:05.009
up question to , to that uh what tools

02:06:05.020 --> 02:06:07.490
and resources would the US government

02:06:07.500 --> 02:06:11.229
need to conduct robust monitoring of

02:06:11.240 --> 02:06:12.962
how arms delivered to security

02:06:12.962 --> 02:06:15.240
cooperation partners are actually used ?

02:06:15.899 --> 02:06:18.720
Um Well , we do end use monitoring and

02:06:18.729 --> 02:06:20.785
I'll talk about the state Department

02:06:20.785 --> 02:06:22.729
side and the defense department as

02:06:22.729 --> 02:06:24.896
something similar . Um So when weapons

02:06:24.896 --> 02:06:27.509
are transferred , um we have uh on our

02:06:27.520 --> 02:06:29.742
side , it's on the commercial side , we

02:06:29.742 --> 02:06:31.909
have the responsibility to account for

02:06:31.909 --> 02:06:33.798
those weapons . Um There are site

02:06:33.798 --> 02:06:36.350
visits , there are uh simple mechanisms

02:06:36.359 --> 02:06:38.526
such as making sure literally you have

02:06:38.526 --> 02:06:40.748
a log of those weapons you know , where

02:06:40.748 --> 02:06:43.330
they are . Um and a whole host of other

02:06:43.339 --> 02:06:46.770
ways is to um ensure that we know that

02:06:46.779 --> 02:06:48.946
they have been delivered and accounted

02:06:48.946 --> 02:06:50.835
for properly . I know the defense

02:06:50.835 --> 02:06:53.689
department has um similar uh mechanisms

02:06:53.700 --> 02:06:56.310
in place for uh their end use

02:06:56.319 --> 02:06:58.890
monitoring . But I think um one of the

02:06:58.899 --> 02:07:01.066
things that I actually think is really

02:07:01.066 --> 02:07:03.121
important is as we look at the human

02:07:03.121 --> 02:07:05.343
rights question , I think it's not just

02:07:05.343 --> 02:07:07.288
an issue of end use monitoring . I

02:07:07.288 --> 02:07:09.121
think the leahy vetting piece is

02:07:09.121 --> 02:07:12.149
actually uh equally as important . Um

02:07:12.160 --> 02:07:15.450
And so I think as you know what the um

02:07:15.459 --> 02:07:17.910
we have , all of our partners have to

02:07:17.919 --> 02:07:20.370
sign agreements on the use of us ,

02:07:20.379 --> 02:07:23.100
origin defense equipment um and comply

02:07:23.109 --> 02:07:25.053
with the armed , the laws of armed

02:07:25.053 --> 02:07:27.276
conflict and international Humanitarian

02:07:27.276 --> 02:07:29.442
law and respect for human rights . And

02:07:29.442 --> 02:07:31.553
then when it comes to Leahy vetting ,

02:07:31.553 --> 02:07:33.776
we have to get down um even to the unit

02:07:33.776 --> 02:07:35.776
level uh to ensure that we are when

02:07:35.776 --> 02:07:37.950
that's um just to clarify when , when

02:07:37.959 --> 02:07:40.129
it is provided using us government

02:07:40.140 --> 02:07:43.540
funding um that uh we are uh

02:07:43.549 --> 02:07:46.160
not providing those to units that have

02:07:46.169 --> 02:07:48.336
committed uh gross violations of human

02:07:48.336 --> 02:07:50.979
rights . So I think for me , um we tend

02:07:50.990 --> 02:07:53.157
to talk about end use monitoring . But

02:07:53.157 --> 02:07:55.101
I actually think for me , it's the

02:07:55.101 --> 02:07:57.046
combination of that with the leahy

02:07:57.046 --> 02:07:59.157
vetting . Um that is mission critical

02:07:59.157 --> 02:08:01.101
in terms of meeting the goals that

02:08:01.101 --> 02:08:03.101
you're laying out , right ? Because

02:08:03.101 --> 02:08:04.934
there's a difference between how

02:08:04.934 --> 02:08:06.990
they're being accounted for and then

02:08:06.990 --> 02:08:09.046
what they're actually being used for

02:08:09.046 --> 02:08:11.101
and who they're going to . Correct .

02:08:11.101 --> 02:08:13.212
Yes . Would you like to add to this M

02:08:13.212 --> 02:08:15.379
Carlin ? Thank you . Uh The only point

02:08:15.379 --> 02:08:14.779
I would add to what Secretary Lewis was

02:08:14.790 --> 02:08:17.040
saying is that uh when we are training

02:08:17.049 --> 02:08:19.216
partner militaries , we spend a ton of

02:08:19.216 --> 02:08:21.216
time on things like rule of law and

02:08:21.216 --> 02:08:23.382
human rights and we do that because it

02:08:23.382 --> 02:08:25.605
is our values . We also do that because

02:08:25.605 --> 02:08:27.771
there's a lot of evidence that it will

02:08:27.771 --> 02:08:27.600
make them more effective . And so we

02:08:27.609 --> 02:08:29.831
want uh to , to ensure that they , they

02:08:29.831 --> 02:08:32.053
take that approach . Um But that , that

02:08:32.053 --> 02:08:35.000
sounds like the honor system . I'm not

02:08:35.009 --> 02:08:37.231
sure if I understand . As in you said ,

02:08:37.231 --> 02:08:39.453
we go through these trainings and we're

02:08:39.453 --> 02:08:41.009
talking about the use of uh

02:08:41.009 --> 02:08:42.842
international law , human rights

02:08:42.842 --> 02:08:44.842
violations , et cetera . So letting

02:08:44.842 --> 02:08:46.787
folks know what they should not be

02:08:46.787 --> 02:08:48.842
using them for a absolutely and also

02:08:48.842 --> 02:08:50.842
helping them understand that that's

02:08:50.842 --> 02:08:52.953
ultimately not effective . Uh So they

02:08:52.953 --> 02:08:52.660
shouldn't do it because it is wrong and

02:08:52.669 --> 02:08:54.780
they shouldn't do it because it won't

02:08:54.780 --> 02:08:57.113
ultimately achieve their strategic aims ,

02:08:57.113 --> 02:08:59.439
right ? Also recognizing that people

02:08:59.450 --> 02:09:01.617
still do bad things with our weapons .

02:09:01.617 --> 02:09:04.689
And so there has to be consequential

02:09:04.700 --> 02:09:06.756
maneuvers as well . Absolutely . You

02:09:06.756 --> 02:09:08.978
may , yeah , all I would say is I think

02:09:08.978 --> 02:09:11.200
you have to look at these as combined .

02:09:11.200 --> 02:09:13.422
I think it is very important that we do

02:09:13.422 --> 02:09:15.379
provide training . Um and that we

02:09:15.390 --> 02:09:17.629
include in any training that we provide

02:09:17.640 --> 02:09:19.759
the human rights law , international

02:09:19.770 --> 02:09:22.419
Humanitarian law , et cetera because uh

02:09:22.430 --> 02:09:24.486
people need to know the rules of the

02:09:24.486 --> 02:09:26.541
game and then you're right , then in

02:09:26.541 --> 02:09:28.486
addition , we have to do the other

02:09:28.486 --> 02:09:30.486
pieces . So my last question , um ,

02:09:30.486 --> 02:09:32.597
from Miss Carlin is under the Biden's

02:09:32.597 --> 02:09:34.763
administration's new guidance . Do you

02:09:34.763 --> 02:09:36.930
anticipate any changes to the weaponry

02:09:36.930 --> 02:09:39.152
amounts or recipients of arms transfers

02:09:39.152 --> 02:09:41.097
that we've seen in the past ? Um I

02:09:41.097 --> 02:09:43.152
think you're referencing the updated

02:09:43.152 --> 02:09:46.259
policy . Um and we have absolutely uh

02:09:46.270 --> 02:09:49.620
used that to inform our own F MS uh uh

02:09:49.689 --> 02:09:51.745
tiger team . Look as I know my state

02:09:51.745 --> 02:09:54.060
department colleagues have as well and

02:09:54.069 --> 02:09:56.291
we will ensure that that threshold that

02:09:56.291 --> 02:09:58.125
is highlighted the the big , the

02:09:58.125 --> 02:10:00.236
notable change in the threshold , you

02:10:00.236 --> 02:10:02.458
know , applying it more likely than not

02:10:02.458 --> 02:10:04.513
threshold um will will inform how we

02:10:04.513 --> 02:10:06.625
look at these uh at these transfers .

02:10:06.625 --> 02:10:08.791
Great . Thank you , Mr Chair . Are you

02:10:08.791 --> 02:10:12.450
back ? Thank you . I now recognize

02:10:12.459 --> 02:10:15.620
Mr Hea for five minutes . Well , thank

02:10:15.629 --> 02:10:19.240
you madam chair . Um uh Appreciate this .

02:10:19.250 --> 02:10:21.528
I don't want to dwell too long on this .

02:10:21.528 --> 02:10:23.750
So let's let's move quickly uh before I

02:10:23.750 --> 02:10:26.350
get to it and , and foreign military

02:10:26.359 --> 02:10:30.120
sales . Uh but uh going off of what

02:10:30.129 --> 02:10:32.540
my colleague , Mr Mass had had asked

02:10:32.549 --> 02:10:35.040
earlier earlier , is there evidence

02:10:35.049 --> 02:10:38.600
that Ukraine has struck Russia directly ?

02:10:41.950 --> 02:10:43.728
I I thought he asked a slightly

02:10:43.728 --> 02:10:45.728
different question , I think . Ok ,

02:10:45.728 --> 02:10:48.006
well , then I'll clarify that question ,

02:10:48.006 --> 02:10:49.950
is there evidence that Ukraine has

02:10:49.950 --> 02:10:52.061
struck Russia ? Um , I have seen news

02:10:52.061 --> 02:10:54.283
reports indicating that beyond that , I

02:10:54.283 --> 02:10:56.617
don't have any specific evidence myself .

02:10:56.617 --> 02:10:59.080
Ok . Um , do we know whether any us

02:10:59.100 --> 02:11:01.970
arms or us supplied arms were used in

02:11:01.979 --> 02:11:04.500
that we have seen those same news

02:11:04.509 --> 02:11:06.799
reports ? And I believe that we are

02:11:06.810 --> 02:11:09.279
looking into that . Um , as I think you

02:11:09.290 --> 02:11:11.589
also know , and as I said before , um ,

02:11:11.600 --> 02:11:14.890
we provide our weapons for the

02:11:14.899 --> 02:11:16.899
Ukrainians to use in their fight in

02:11:16.899 --> 02:11:19.149
Ukraine . And I just want to say again

02:11:19.160 --> 02:11:21.339
that what we all know that obviously

02:11:21.500 --> 02:11:24.000
that the war would end today if Russia

02:11:24.009 --> 02:11:27.109
stopped its aggression . Um Do you have

02:11:27.120 --> 02:11:29.700
any concern about F-16s that's just

02:11:29.709 --> 02:11:31.876
been announced of a potential transfer

02:11:31.876 --> 02:11:33.987
to Ukraine that that could be used or

02:11:33.987 --> 02:11:37.890
misused ? I do not have any concerns

02:11:37.899 --> 02:11:40.649
about that . I think that because you

02:11:40.660 --> 02:11:42.771
believe the Ukrainians would use them

02:11:42.771 --> 02:11:44.993
for the purpose intended . Uh I believe

02:11:45.000 --> 02:11:47.222
so , but obviously that hasn't happened

02:11:47.222 --> 02:11:49.959
yet . Um But uh that would be my

02:11:49.970 --> 02:11:52.069
understanding . Ok . Would it not be

02:11:52.080 --> 02:11:54.979
better to have say Poland send the

02:11:55.450 --> 02:11:59.140
uh the uh M 29 S ? I believe

02:11:59.149 --> 02:12:01.149
Poland has already sent them big 20

02:12:01.149 --> 02:12:03.093
nines , which they are um they are

02:12:03.093 --> 02:12:05.316
already trained on and using . And so ,

02:12:05.316 --> 02:12:07.538
um the announcement that was made would

02:12:07.538 --> 02:12:09.427
be uh providing them with this uh

02:12:09.427 --> 02:12:11.839
additional training and capability .

02:12:11.890 --> 02:12:14.057
All right , I'm gonna , I'm gonna move

02:12:14.057 --> 02:12:16.168
on with , I'll leave with this , this

02:12:16.168 --> 02:12:18.279
statement , many of us had encouraged

02:12:18.279 --> 02:12:20.479
this administration to get um whether

02:12:20.490 --> 02:12:22.669
it was tow missiles other arms in

02:12:22.680 --> 02:12:26.000
earlier prior to the conflict . Uh so

02:12:26.009 --> 02:12:29.410
that it could not be used as a , a um

02:12:29.419 --> 02:12:31.919
view towards escalation that the US is

02:12:31.930 --> 02:12:34.097
directly involved . I think that would

02:12:34.097 --> 02:12:36.263
have been a much better situation . Um

02:12:36.263 --> 02:12:39.529
I'm gonna move on to um I T and the uh

02:12:39.540 --> 02:12:42.140
foreign military sales . Uh I , I've

02:12:42.149 --> 02:12:44.427
been at this for a fair amount of time .

02:12:44.427 --> 02:12:46.260
I was a district director for my

02:12:46.260 --> 02:12:47.982
predecessor . Uh I was a state

02:12:47.982 --> 02:12:49.816
legislator . I have been in this

02:12:49.816 --> 02:12:52.560
position uh both in an older district

02:12:52.569 --> 02:12:54.569
and a new district . I've talked to

02:12:54.569 --> 02:12:56.970
suppliers um and uh both in the

02:12:56.979 --> 02:12:58.979
district and in , in Michigan ,

02:12:59.200 --> 02:13:01.256
virtually all of them over the years

02:13:01.256 --> 02:13:03.256
have relayed difficulties that they

02:13:03.256 --> 02:13:05.256
face in compliance with some of the

02:13:05.256 --> 02:13:07.422
various frameworks . I being uh one of

02:13:07.422 --> 02:13:09.850
those and uh regardless uh it seems

02:13:09.859 --> 02:13:12.379
that the same issues arise , uh current

02:13:12.390 --> 02:13:14.390
I T framework is too burdensome and

02:13:14.399 --> 02:13:16.649
clients costs are too significant for

02:13:16.660 --> 02:13:19.649
smaller , oftentimes , mom and pop or

02:13:19.660 --> 02:13:22.529
small business shops with innovative

02:13:22.540 --> 02:13:25.450
technologies who um instead choose to

02:13:25.459 --> 02:13:27.681
enter the commercial market rather than

02:13:27.681 --> 02:13:29.848
using the military . In fact , I had a

02:13:29.848 --> 02:13:31.959
small supplier , tell me that they're

02:13:31.959 --> 02:13:31.700
facing pressure from their tier one

02:13:31.709 --> 02:13:34.689
supplier to use non I R regulated

02:13:34.700 --> 02:13:36.819
products because they do not want to

02:13:36.830 --> 02:13:38.941
deal with the headache of it in their

02:13:38.941 --> 02:13:41.910
final supply chain . Um , so Assistant

02:13:41.919 --> 02:13:44.189
Secretary Lewis , uh how is state uh

02:13:44.200 --> 02:13:46.589
working to stop this process from

02:13:46.600 --> 02:13:48.689
getting in the way of innovative

02:13:48.700 --> 02:13:50.533
companies looking to bring their

02:13:50.533 --> 02:13:52.367
products to market uh within the

02:13:52.367 --> 02:13:54.359
defense industrial base . Well , I

02:13:54.370 --> 02:13:56.859
think , um , as you know , we have

02:13:56.870 --> 02:13:59.092
looked at these issues across the board

02:13:59.092 --> 02:14:02.950
and , um , when it comes to I T , uh

02:14:02.959 --> 02:14:05.870
in terms of a , I think we , I laid out

02:14:05.879 --> 02:14:09.180
a plan where we are going to be able to

02:14:09.189 --> 02:14:12.500
uh create a smooth moving system where

02:14:12.509 --> 02:14:14.600
we already know the people who are

02:14:14.609 --> 02:14:17.419
gonna receive it on the end . I'm sorry ,

02:14:17.430 --> 02:14:19.859
only within a , um , we are doing that

02:14:19.990 --> 02:14:23.060
within a , um , right now we've also

02:14:23.069 --> 02:14:25.700
created in addition to a open general

02:14:25.709 --> 02:14:29.319
licenses which allow um some technology

02:14:29.330 --> 02:14:33.049
to also move freely . Um And I'm happy

02:14:33.060 --> 02:14:35.282
to continue to work with you . Um I'm a

02:14:35.282 --> 02:14:37.338
former staffer , so I appreciate the

02:14:37.338 --> 02:14:39.338
importance of talking to the people

02:14:39.338 --> 02:14:41.393
back in your district . If there are

02:14:41.393 --> 02:14:43.227
specific issues , I know that in

02:14:43.227 --> 02:14:45.116
addition , we have gone through a

02:14:45.116 --> 02:14:47.171
series of changes in our regulations

02:14:47.171 --> 02:14:49.790
and sometimes as simple as updating the

02:14:49.799 --> 02:14:51.910
website so that people can understand

02:14:51.910 --> 02:14:54.132
what's there to try to help people with

02:14:54.132 --> 02:14:56.188
these compliance issues . Ok . Uh My

02:14:56.188 --> 02:14:58.399
last uh few seconds here , um

02:14:58.410 --> 02:15:01.859
Artificial Intelligence , uh we can't

02:15:01.870 --> 02:15:04.600
be continue to be flat footed . Um What

02:15:04.609 --> 02:15:06.331
assurance do we have that your

02:15:06.331 --> 02:15:08.498
department , uh from your department ,

02:15:08.498 --> 02:15:10.553
the United States is working to come

02:15:10.553 --> 02:15:12.165
back or deter the use of A I

02:15:12.165 --> 02:15:14.276
technologies against ourselves or our

02:15:14.276 --> 02:15:16.560
allies uh from places like China ? And

02:15:16.569 --> 02:15:18.870
is there an attempt for our allies and

02:15:18.879 --> 02:15:20.990
our partnership members to be sharing

02:15:20.990 --> 02:15:23.279
that information ? Um I think we're

02:15:23.290 --> 02:15:25.580
working across the interagency on all

02:15:25.589 --> 02:15:29.569
of those issues . Yelled back .

02:15:31.640 --> 02:15:33.729
All right , I now recognize Mr Costa

02:15:33.740 --> 02:15:37.509
for five minutes . Oh , it's not here ,

02:15:37.520 --> 02:15:39.700
Mr Crowe . You are now recognized for

02:15:39.709 --> 02:15:41.931
five minutes . Thank you . Uh And thank

02:15:41.931 --> 02:15:44.098
you to both of you for coming in today

02:15:44.098 --> 02:15:46.209
and for your testimony . Um Assistant

02:15:46.209 --> 02:15:48.209
Secretary Lewis , I'd like to start

02:15:48.209 --> 02:15:50.970
with you . Your bureau has encountered

02:15:50.979 --> 02:15:54.149
a significant explosion of workload in ,

02:15:54.160 --> 02:15:56.560
in the last year , in particular . But

02:15:56.689 --> 02:15:58.856
we have the largest land year in war ,

02:15:58.856 --> 02:16:01.379
land war in Europe . Since World War

02:16:01.390 --> 02:16:04.279
two , we have a modernizing NATO with

02:16:04.290 --> 02:16:07.200
significant new investments . We have a

02:16:07.279 --> 02:16:09.589
and other deals going on right now .

02:16:09.600 --> 02:16:11.822
Can you just touch on for a moment ? Uh

02:16:11.822 --> 02:16:14.589
The , the impact of that workload on

02:16:14.600 --> 02:16:16.822
your bureau because at the same time is

02:16:16.822 --> 02:16:18.656
there's a lot of people here are

02:16:18.656 --> 02:16:20.767
criticizing the speed at which you do

02:16:20.767 --> 02:16:22.933
things . A lot of these folks also are

02:16:22.933 --> 02:16:25.044
cutting your resources in your budget

02:16:25.044 --> 02:16:27.267
as well and making it harder for you to

02:16:27.267 --> 02:16:26.339
actually do the things that they're

02:16:26.350 --> 02:16:28.350
asking you to do . So , I'd love to

02:16:28.350 --> 02:16:30.350
just comment on what your folks are

02:16:30.350 --> 02:16:32.572
doing day in and day out and the impact

02:16:32.572 --> 02:16:34.572
of that workload on them . Well , I

02:16:34.572 --> 02:16:34.570
very much appreciate the question . I

02:16:34.580 --> 02:16:36.860
have to say I came to the bureau about

02:16:36.870 --> 02:16:38.370
two years ago and it is an

02:16:38.370 --> 02:16:40.889
extraordinary team of professionals .

02:16:40.900 --> 02:16:44.459
We have over 25% are uh veterans in my

02:16:44.469 --> 02:16:46.669
bureau and then a significant number ,

02:16:46.679 --> 02:16:49.070
um who we also have active duty ,

02:16:49.080 --> 02:16:51.247
military serving . And the reason they

02:16:51.247 --> 02:16:53.080
serve in the Bureau of Political

02:16:53.080 --> 02:16:54.913
Military Affairs is because they

02:16:54.913 --> 02:16:57.299
believe in the mission . Um And they

02:16:57.309 --> 02:16:59.940
believe that and they are workloads in

02:16:59.950 --> 02:17:02.172
some cases have increased over the past

02:17:02.172 --> 02:17:05.959
15 months , 15,000% . Um And those same

02:17:05.969 --> 02:17:09.049
15,000 15,000% for some of the pieces

02:17:09.059 --> 02:17:12.490
of , and when I talk to my team and I

02:17:12.500 --> 02:17:14.667
say , hey , you're here working late ,

02:17:14.750 --> 02:17:17.169
um you might be here over a weekend to

02:17:17.179 --> 02:17:19.123
get something to Ukraine or to get

02:17:19.123 --> 02:17:22.070
something to uh Taiwan or to one of our

02:17:22.080 --> 02:17:24.024
partners and allies . They tell me

02:17:24.024 --> 02:17:26.191
that's what we're here to do . There's

02:17:26.191 --> 02:17:28.302
been nothing else we'd rather do . In

02:17:28.302 --> 02:17:30.469
spite of that , we still move 95% of

02:17:30.480 --> 02:17:32.740
cases on the foreign military side

02:17:32.809 --> 02:17:35.629
within 24 to 48 hours . It is

02:17:35.639 --> 02:17:37.806
extraordinary . The work that is being

02:17:37.806 --> 02:17:40.919
done . I would note that um we had a $3

02:17:40.929 --> 02:17:42.985
billion increase in foreign military

02:17:42.985 --> 02:17:45.151
financing going to the Eastern flank .

02:17:45.151 --> 02:17:47.959
Um My team has taken that on . We have

02:17:47.969 --> 02:17:50.349
concurrence in over $9 billion and

02:17:50.360 --> 02:17:52.660
growing from the defense department .

02:17:52.910 --> 02:17:56.299
Um And the team also negotiates all of

02:17:56.309 --> 02:17:58.476
our security cooperation agreements in

02:17:58.476 --> 02:18:00.698
a normal year . My security cooperation

02:18:00.698 --> 02:18:03.259
team negotiates four of those this year ,

02:18:03.269 --> 02:18:05.489
they're negotiating nine . The reason

02:18:05.499 --> 02:18:07.388
they're negotiating nine of these

02:18:07.388 --> 02:18:09.555
agreements is because countries around

02:18:09.555 --> 02:18:11.777
the world want to deepen and strengthen

02:18:11.777 --> 02:18:13.999
their security cooperation relationship

02:18:13.999 --> 02:18:16.055
with us . Um And we are in charge of

02:18:16.055 --> 02:18:18.277
making sure that the , that we have the

02:18:18.277 --> 02:18:20.388
underlying agreements to do that . So

02:18:20.388 --> 02:18:22.555
it has been extraordinary and I'm both

02:18:22.555 --> 02:18:24.721
honored and humbled to be um at the of

02:18:24.721 --> 02:18:26.777
this bureau at this mission critical

02:18:26.777 --> 02:18:28.943
time . Well , that is an extraordinary

02:18:28.943 --> 02:18:28.929
effort and I appreciate you painting

02:18:28.940 --> 02:18:31.107
that picture and , and I thank you and

02:18:31.107 --> 02:18:33.162
your team for doing that uh critical

02:18:33.162 --> 02:18:34.884
work . So , um you know , with

02:18:34.884 --> 02:18:36.384
additional funding , say ,

02:18:36.384 --> 02:18:38.607
hypothetically if , if Congress were to

02:18:38.607 --> 02:18:40.551
provide additional funding to your

02:18:40.551 --> 02:18:42.384
bureau , what would you use that

02:18:42.384 --> 02:18:44.496
funding for and what would the impact

02:18:44.496 --> 02:18:46.662
of it be ? I have to be careful to not

02:18:46.662 --> 02:18:48.829
get ahead of um any uh specific asks .

02:18:48.829 --> 02:18:51.740
But what I would say is um I am working

02:18:51.750 --> 02:18:54.610
very hard to um increase the staff that

02:18:54.620 --> 02:18:57.700
we have to meet the mission . Um I've

02:18:57.709 --> 02:18:59.931
always believed that one of the jobs of

02:18:59.931 --> 02:19:01.931
a good manager is to make sure your

02:19:01.931 --> 02:19:03.820
people match your mission as your

02:19:03.820 --> 02:19:05.987
mission shifts and change . And we are

02:19:05.987 --> 02:19:05.900
literally in the process of doing that .

02:19:06.120 --> 02:19:08.379
Um And so I think we would continue

02:19:08.389 --> 02:19:10.860
that work . OK . Thank you very much ,

02:19:10.870 --> 02:19:13.959
Doctor Carlin to you next . Uh Are you

02:19:13.969 --> 02:19:16.410
aware of , um , the administration

02:19:16.419 --> 02:19:18.419
reconsidering policy with regard to

02:19:18.419 --> 02:19:20.641
cluster munitions and providing cluster

02:19:20.641 --> 02:19:24.139
munitions to Ukraine ? Thank you right

02:19:24.150 --> 02:19:26.206
now , we're really focused on making

02:19:26.206 --> 02:19:28.261
sure that Ukraine gets what it needs

02:19:28.261 --> 02:19:29.872
that can be effective on the

02:19:29.872 --> 02:19:31.983
battlefield um , immediately , and we

02:19:31.983 --> 02:19:34.094
have thanks to Congress's support , I

02:19:34.094 --> 02:19:36.206
think seeing the extraordinary impact

02:19:36.206 --> 02:19:38.428
of that over the last 15 or so months ,

02:19:38.428 --> 02:19:40.428
obviously , cluster munitions would

02:19:40.428 --> 02:19:42.594
have a serious humanitarian impact and

02:19:42.594 --> 02:19:44.872
that has informed our thinking to date .

02:19:44.872 --> 02:19:46.761
Ok . Um Lastly , could you doctor

02:19:46.761 --> 02:19:49.580
Carlin comment on um the impact of

02:19:49.879 --> 02:19:52.559
technology and telecommunications

02:19:52.570 --> 02:19:55.660
investments by the , the PR C in places

02:19:55.669 --> 02:19:57.725
around the world and the impact that

02:19:57.725 --> 02:19:59.836
that has on our ability to develop uh

02:19:59.836 --> 02:20:02.058
enhanced intelligence relationships and

02:20:02.058 --> 02:20:04.169
export control relationships with our

02:20:04.169 --> 02:20:06.830
allies and partners . We absolutely

02:20:06.839 --> 02:20:09.259
look vigilantly at how and in what ways

02:20:09.269 --> 02:20:12.559
the PR C makes such investments . And I

02:20:12.570 --> 02:20:14.929
have been heartened to see that many of

02:20:14.940 --> 02:20:16.884
our partners around the world have

02:20:16.884 --> 02:20:19.259
increasingly recognized um that there

02:20:19.269 --> 02:20:21.889
will be uh pros and cons if you will of

02:20:21.900 --> 02:20:24.122
engaging in such activity . And I think

02:20:24.122 --> 02:20:26.349
we have seen a number of examples of

02:20:26.360 --> 02:20:28.249
partners who recognized that that

02:20:28.249 --> 02:20:30.193
that's actually not a are we doing

02:20:30.193 --> 02:20:32.304
enough to communicate the , the risks

02:20:32.304 --> 02:20:34.527
at the long term and short term if they

02:20:34.527 --> 02:20:36.138
are to accept those types of

02:20:36.138 --> 02:20:38.249
investments ? Uh I can tell you we're

02:20:38.249 --> 02:20:40.193
doing a lot from the Department of

02:20:40.193 --> 02:20:42.249
Defense um to these , you know where

02:20:42.249 --> 02:20:44.416
there are certain partners that we are

02:20:44.416 --> 02:20:46.582
um that we understand that they may be

02:20:46.582 --> 02:20:48.749
pursuing uh such relationships , we uh

02:20:48.749 --> 02:20:50.875
articulate to them uh in uh a frank

02:20:50.884 --> 02:20:53.325
conversation , the implications of

02:20:53.334 --> 02:20:55.556
doing so and frankly , the implications

02:20:55.556 --> 02:20:57.612
for our relationship . Thank you . I

02:20:57.612 --> 02:21:00.780
yield back . I now recognize Mrs Rady

02:21:01.009 --> 02:21:03.280
Wagon for five minutes . Thank you ,

02:21:03.290 --> 02:21:06.219
madam , Chair Carlo . And good

02:21:06.230 --> 02:21:08.452
afternoon , I want to thank the both of

02:21:08.452 --> 02:21:10.730
you for appearing and testifying today .

02:21:11.139 --> 02:21:13.361
We're nearly at the two year mark since

02:21:13.361 --> 02:21:15.528
the original announcement for August .

02:21:15.528 --> 02:21:17.709
And since then , nefarious actors have

02:21:17.719 --> 02:21:21.230
spread misinformation about what Aus is .

02:21:21.410 --> 02:21:23.599
Quite simply , I want to address the

02:21:23.610 --> 02:21:26.030
Treaty of Rarotonga which formalize a

02:21:26.040 --> 02:21:28.339
nuclear weapons free zone in the South

02:21:28.349 --> 02:21:30.516
Pacific . I was there when they signed

02:21:30.516 --> 02:21:32.940
it . Now , we Pacific Islanders have a

02:21:32.950 --> 02:21:35.290
long memory and the nuclear weapons

02:21:35.299 --> 02:21:37.429
legacy of the early Cold War still

02:21:37.440 --> 02:21:40.219
impacts us today . We all know that a

02:21:40.419 --> 02:21:42.969
has nothing to do with nuclear weapons .

02:21:43.099 --> 02:21:45.266
Can you describe how the Department of

02:21:45.266 --> 02:21:47.400
Defense and the State Department are

02:21:47.410 --> 02:21:49.521
addressing misinformation regarding a

02:21:50.339 --> 02:21:52.440
and are you meeting and working with

02:21:52.450 --> 02:21:54.672
Pacific Island nations to address their

02:21:54.679 --> 02:21:56.589
potential concerns regarding a ?

02:22:00.370 --> 02:22:03.290
Um we are uh absolutely looking at this

02:22:03.299 --> 02:22:05.243
important point that , that you're

02:22:05.243 --> 02:22:07.355
raising ma'am . Uh And I think uh you

02:22:07.355 --> 02:22:09.500
see the fruits of those conversations

02:22:09.509 --> 02:22:12.480
um in , in the reactions to the

02:22:12.490 --> 02:22:14.546
announcement that the three heads of

02:22:14.546 --> 02:22:16.657
state made about two months or so ago

02:22:16.657 --> 02:22:18.990
on the submarines piece , which is that

02:22:19.000 --> 02:22:21.629
our colleagues around the Indo Pacific

02:22:21.639 --> 02:22:23.583
uh largely understood what we were

02:22:23.583 --> 02:22:25.639
doing and understood what we weren't

02:22:25.639 --> 02:22:27.639
doing . And so , while we recognize

02:22:27.639 --> 02:22:29.861
that there may be some parties who want

02:22:29.861 --> 02:22:31.861
to foment misinformation about what

02:22:31.861 --> 02:22:33.972
we're we're doing . Uh I think having

02:22:33.972 --> 02:22:35.861
those really um kind of active uh

02:22:35.861 --> 02:22:37.639
channels of dialogue with these

02:22:37.639 --> 02:22:39.917
partners has been incredibly important .

02:22:39.917 --> 02:22:42.144
Um And we , we are finding that there

02:22:42.155 --> 02:22:44.355
is uh you know , pretty , pretty clear

02:22:44.365 --> 02:22:46.476
understanding um among those partners

02:22:46.476 --> 02:22:48.643
of , of why we are engaged in and what

02:22:48.643 --> 02:22:51.099
that looks like . And all I all I would

02:22:51.110 --> 02:22:53.166
add is , first of all , I think your

02:22:53.166 --> 02:22:55.388
voice is very important in this . And I

02:22:55.388 --> 02:22:57.610
think we're being very intentional when

02:22:57.610 --> 02:22:59.777
we talk about conventionally armed but

02:22:59.777 --> 02:23:01.919
nuclear powered submarine capability

02:23:01.929 --> 02:23:03.985
and being very clear about what that

02:23:03.985 --> 02:23:06.151
means . I also know that we're working

02:23:06.151 --> 02:23:08.207
hard to strengthen our relationships

02:23:08.207 --> 02:23:10.151
across the Indo Pacific and one of

02:23:10.151 --> 02:23:12.207
these defense cooperation agreements

02:23:12.207 --> 02:23:14.429
that we just signed was signed was with

02:23:14.429 --> 02:23:16.540
the P N G um with P N G . And I think

02:23:16.540 --> 02:23:18.849
that indicates that um in addition to

02:23:18.860 --> 02:23:21.082
this conversation , we need to continue

02:23:21.082 --> 02:23:23.138
to work to deepen and strengthen our

02:23:23.138 --> 02:23:25.193
security cooperation relationships .

02:23:25.193 --> 02:23:27.304
Thank you for your answers . Now , on

02:23:27.304 --> 02:23:29.304
to the meat of the hearing , do you

02:23:29.304 --> 02:23:31.471
feel there's a sufficient mechanism to

02:23:31.471 --> 02:23:33.582
solve both strategic level and policy

02:23:33.582 --> 02:23:35.416
level concerns between the three

02:23:35.416 --> 02:23:37.527
partners ? And can you please explain

02:23:37.527 --> 02:23:40.820
how that mechanism works . Uh

02:23:40.969 --> 02:23:43.339
Yes , I think the short answer is yes ,

02:23:43.349 --> 02:23:45.460
I think these are some of our closest

02:23:45.460 --> 02:23:47.610
uh partners , I'm sorry , closest

02:23:47.620 --> 02:23:49.900
allies around the world . We already

02:23:49.910 --> 02:23:52.080
have a mechanism in place that allows

02:23:52.089 --> 02:23:54.490
us to meet regularly . Um And to sit

02:23:54.500 --> 02:23:56.570
and talk through both the strategic

02:23:56.580 --> 02:23:58.691
questions , but sometimes also really

02:23:58.691 --> 02:24:00.790
these nitty gritty technical issues

02:24:00.799 --> 02:24:02.966
which when it comes to defense trade ,

02:24:02.966 --> 02:24:05.188
actually our mission critical um and we

02:24:05.188 --> 02:24:07.410
are meeting regularly with them now and

02:24:07.410 --> 02:24:09.466
that will continue going forward . I

02:24:09.466 --> 02:24:11.577
might just add , ma'am . Uh This is a

02:24:11.577 --> 02:24:13.743
historic opportunity that will require

02:24:13.743 --> 02:24:15.743
historic change . We are clear eyed

02:24:15.743 --> 02:24:17.743
about that . Congress is bipartisan

02:24:17.743 --> 02:24:19.577
support of Aus and realizing the

02:24:19.577 --> 02:24:21.355
intention of Aus is also really

02:24:21.355 --> 02:24:23.410
critical to that . And I believe our

02:24:23.410 --> 02:24:25.521
British and Australian colleagues get

02:24:25.521 --> 02:24:27.688
that too . Thank you , madam chair . I

02:24:27.688 --> 02:24:27.440
yield back the balance of my time .

02:24:28.330 --> 02:24:30.400
Thank you . I now recognize Mr

02:24:30.410 --> 02:24:32.466
Schneider for five minutes . Oh , Mr

02:24:32.466 --> 02:24:36.259
Costa is here . Sorry . Thank you . Uh

02:24:36.269 --> 02:24:39.160
madam chairperson , um Doctor Carlin ,

02:24:39.389 --> 02:24:41.860
there's been a lot of discussion uh

02:24:41.870 --> 02:24:45.040
over the pace of a and implementation

02:24:45.049 --> 02:24:47.160
timelines and I think on a bipartisan

02:24:47.160 --> 02:24:49.269
basis , no one's satisfied with the

02:24:49.280 --> 02:24:51.447
timelines we're looking at right now .

02:24:51.447 --> 02:24:53.669
I hope you're not satisfied with them .

02:24:53.669 --> 02:24:55.919
Uh We had a uh a committee hearing um

02:24:55.929 --> 02:24:58.129
briefing with defense contractors last

02:24:58.139 --> 02:25:00.330
month uh and got a number of

02:25:00.339 --> 02:25:02.561
perspectives . There was a briefing , a

02:25:02.561 --> 02:25:04.728
comment from one of the witnesses from

02:25:04.728 --> 02:25:06.950
Adrian , a smaller defense manufacturer

02:25:06.969 --> 02:25:08.802
said that uh we ought to look at

02:25:08.802 --> 02:25:11.820
reimagining our procurement uh uh uh

02:25:11.830 --> 02:25:15.240
practices uh on capability development .

02:25:15.709 --> 02:25:17.790
Uh They use as an example . NASA

02:25:17.799 --> 02:25:19.910
instead of trying to do the ground up

02:25:19.910 --> 02:25:21.966
and everything , they're now NASA is

02:25:21.966 --> 02:25:24.599
looking at really setting um uh details

02:25:24.610 --> 02:25:28.240
for um specifications uh on , on

02:25:28.250 --> 02:25:31.620
how the goals should be uh designed and

02:25:31.629 --> 02:25:34.589
implemented and then uh let uh the

02:25:34.599 --> 02:25:37.209
private sector uh try to achieve it

02:25:37.219 --> 02:25:39.219
once those goals are established in

02:25:39.219 --> 02:25:42.639
terms of uh what the end results of the ,

02:25:42.669 --> 02:25:45.450
the Department of , of the Defense is

02:25:45.459 --> 02:25:47.690
seeking . Uh I wanna know whether or

02:25:47.700 --> 02:25:50.200
not uh you folks are looking uh at

02:25:50.209 --> 02:25:53.980
changing um your approach uh

02:25:53.990 --> 02:25:57.139
and looking at specific purpose or

02:25:57.150 --> 02:25:59.372
goals . In other words , don't tell the

02:25:59.372 --> 02:26:01.428
industry what to build but tell them

02:26:01.428 --> 02:26:03.372
the mission and let the innovation

02:26:03.372 --> 02:26:05.860
occur . So what's your reaction to this

02:26:05.870 --> 02:26:07.926
idea and how could it be applied for

02:26:07.926 --> 02:26:10.009
departments to move quicker whether

02:26:10.019 --> 02:26:12.241
we're talking about a or in our current

02:26:12.241 --> 02:26:14.297
supply chain efforts with the war in

02:26:14.297 --> 02:26:16.080
Ukraine ? I think it's a really

02:26:16.089 --> 02:26:18.089
reasonable and important approach ,

02:26:18.089 --> 02:26:20.033
especially as we recognize how the

02:26:20.033 --> 02:26:22.200
technological and security environment

02:26:22.200 --> 02:26:24.500
is uh is changing as it relates to a

02:26:24.700 --> 02:26:26.820
specifically , this is why we really

02:26:26.830 --> 02:26:29.052
want to work closely with Congress on a

02:26:29.052 --> 02:26:30.941
bold and innovative approach with

02:26:30.941 --> 02:26:33.108
legislative change that we can advance

02:26:33.108 --> 02:26:35.274
AUS projects . And the corner stone of

02:26:35.274 --> 02:26:37.330
that would be exempted defense trade

02:26:37.330 --> 02:26:39.330
for Caucus projects . And bilateral

02:26:39.330 --> 02:26:41.330
defense trade to include classified

02:26:41.330 --> 02:26:43.330
information sharing . So we want to

02:26:43.330 --> 02:26:45.330
work with you closely on developing

02:26:45.330 --> 02:26:47.441
that because as , as I said earlier ,

02:26:47.441 --> 02:26:49.663
this really is a historic opportunity .

02:26:49.663 --> 02:26:51.441
So we are going to need to make

02:26:51.441 --> 02:26:53.497
historic change . I think the moment

02:26:53.497 --> 02:26:55.608
does call for that . No , and I think

02:26:55.608 --> 02:26:54.889
there's an opportunity here . And

02:26:54.900 --> 02:26:57.011
frankly , you know , it reminds me of

02:26:57.011 --> 02:26:58.844
that old , you know , one of the

02:26:58.844 --> 02:27:01.820
definitions of insanity is expecting ,

02:27:01.830 --> 02:27:03.774
uh you know , doing things the way

02:27:03.774 --> 02:27:05.719
you've always done them and expect

02:27:05.719 --> 02:27:07.663
different results . It's not gonna

02:27:07.663 --> 02:27:09.497
happen . And , and so we need to

02:27:09.497 --> 02:27:11.860
reimagine uh with the challenges we

02:27:11.870 --> 02:27:14.179
face with China uh in our efforts ,

02:27:14.190 --> 02:27:17.179
dealing with UC . And also I think that

02:27:17.190 --> 02:27:19.246
applies in our current situation . I

02:27:19.246 --> 02:27:21.579
mean , I hear the Department of Defense ,

02:27:21.579 --> 02:27:23.468
you know , concerns about our own

02:27:23.468 --> 02:27:25.940
supply chains and our own needs and ,

02:27:25.950 --> 02:27:28.459
and certainly NATO partners are feeling

02:27:28.469 --> 02:27:31.879
similarly . So uh we ought to look at

02:27:31.889 --> 02:27:34.056
how we can do this better than we have

02:27:34.056 --> 02:27:36.320
in the past . I , I think that's

02:27:36.330 --> 02:27:38.663
exactly right . I mean , you know , the ,

02:27:38.663 --> 02:27:40.608
the goal of office is we're really

02:27:40.608 --> 02:27:42.830
trying to increase our capability , our

02:27:42.830 --> 02:27:44.774
and to deliver deterrents at every

02:27:44.774 --> 02:27:46.886
phase . And we need that to succeed .

02:27:46.886 --> 02:27:48.941
And that requires the cooperation of

02:27:48.941 --> 02:27:51.108
our entire US government in addition ,

02:27:51.108 --> 02:27:53.219
of course to our British . And yeah ,

02:27:53.219 --> 02:27:55.386
let me just make one comment and , and

02:27:55.386 --> 02:27:55.169
this relates to the big picture that

02:27:55.179 --> 02:27:57.068
we're all dealing with here as it

02:27:57.068 --> 02:27:59.769
relates to the uh uh lifting the

02:27:59.780 --> 02:28:01.947
deficit and getting our budget done by

02:28:01.947 --> 02:28:04.950
October 1st . And I'll just underline

02:28:04.959 --> 02:28:07.070
what uh Representative Keating said ,

02:28:07.070 --> 02:28:09.379
I've been here 19 years and I've heard

02:28:10.030 --> 02:28:12.419
Secretary of States and Secretary of

02:28:12.429 --> 02:28:14.596
Defenses that are Republicans and that

02:28:14.596 --> 02:28:17.950
are Democrats . Um And they all

02:28:17.959 --> 02:28:20.730
concur whether when we talk about our

02:28:20.740 --> 02:28:23.070
budget process , that the most

02:28:23.080 --> 02:28:25.080
difficult situation that we put the

02:28:25.080 --> 02:28:28.349
Department of Defense in and State is

02:28:28.360 --> 02:28:30.809
when we engage in these continuing

02:28:30.820 --> 02:28:34.349
continuing resolutions , uh , for a

02:28:34.360 --> 02:28:37.400
month , for two months and contracts on

02:28:37.410 --> 02:28:39.980
your part are not resolved . They're

02:28:39.990 --> 02:28:42.650
left in limbo . Uh , defense

02:28:42.660 --> 02:28:45.809
contractors don't know exactly what the

02:28:45.820 --> 02:28:48.700
lay of the land is and what to expect

02:28:48.839 --> 02:28:51.209
and we make ourselves most vulnerable

02:28:51.219 --> 02:28:53.386
when we don't do our jobs and we don't

02:28:53.386 --> 02:28:55.660
provide a budget on time . That's an

02:28:55.669 --> 02:28:58.480
editorial comment and it hasn't gotten

02:28:58.490 --> 02:29:00.712
much better here in the last 19 years .

02:29:00.712 --> 02:29:02.546
We need to work on that . That's

02:29:02.546 --> 02:29:04.768
Congress's responsibility . Thank you .

02:29:04.820 --> 02:29:06.931
I yield back the balance of my time .

02:29:07.660 --> 02:29:10.200
Thank you . I now recognize Mr Waltz

02:29:10.209 --> 02:29:13.190
for his five minutes . Thank you ,

02:29:13.200 --> 02:29:16.969
madam chair . Um Yep ,

02:29:17.759 --> 02:29:19.703
Miss Carlin , you said a couple of

02:29:19.703 --> 02:29:21.815
times and I certainly agree that this

02:29:21.815 --> 02:29:24.919
is , um , historic opportunity and that

02:29:24.929 --> 02:29:27.620
needs historic change , uh , as it

02:29:27.629 --> 02:29:31.070
pertains to August . Um , I wanna speak

02:29:31.080 --> 02:29:33.080
for a few minutes as it pertains to

02:29:33.080 --> 02:29:35.820
Taiwan . Um , would you agree that

02:29:35.830 --> 02:29:38.052
that's a historic threat that certainly

02:29:39.200 --> 02:29:42.030
certainly the case in multiple national

02:29:42.040 --> 02:29:44.207
defense strategies . I think you would

02:29:44.207 --> 02:29:46.690
agree . Um I think that also needs

02:29:46.700 --> 02:29:49.019
historic change in terms of our

02:29:49.030 --> 02:29:50.919
processes . We've talked about an

02:29:50.919 --> 02:29:53.141
August bubble . I think we need to talk

02:29:53.141 --> 02:29:55.309
about a Taiwan bubble . Uh and how we

02:29:55.320 --> 02:29:58.349
can accelerate fast track , provide

02:29:58.360 --> 02:30:00.950
waivers and work with the Congress

02:30:02.480 --> 02:30:05.769
to really peel back the layers on these

02:30:05.780 --> 02:30:08.849
weapon systems uh and get them there

02:30:08.860 --> 02:30:12.219
faster as a deterrent measure . Um Miss

02:30:12.230 --> 02:30:14.397
Lewis , you said we need , you've said

02:30:14.397 --> 02:30:16.508
a couple of times that you agree , we

02:30:16.508 --> 02:30:18.508
need to look at all options , but I

02:30:18.508 --> 02:30:20.508
don't think that's good enough . We

02:30:20.508 --> 02:30:22.452
need to understand what's actually

02:30:22.452 --> 02:30:24.508
being done and then what barriers we

02:30:24.508 --> 02:30:26.849
need to remove to move faster . So , in

02:30:26.860 --> 02:30:30.410
that vein , um Miss Carlin on the

02:30:30.419 --> 02:30:32.700
Dod Tiger team , you mentioned 12

02:30:32.709 --> 02:30:34.709
recommendations . Can you give some

02:30:34.709 --> 02:30:36.876
examples of what those recommendations

02:30:36.876 --> 02:30:39.570
were ? And can you provide those 12

02:30:40.160 --> 02:30:43.099
recommendations to the committee ? Uh I

02:30:43.110 --> 02:30:45.221
think you uh Congressman , you may be

02:30:45.221 --> 02:30:47.277
referring to the State Department uh

02:30:47.277 --> 02:30:49.019
Tiger team , they outlined 10

02:30:49.030 --> 02:30:51.730
recommendations . Um So I might defer

02:30:51.740 --> 02:30:53.684
this to Secretary Lewis . Ok . But

02:30:53.684 --> 02:30:57.059
didn't uh Defense secretary Hicks also

02:30:57.440 --> 02:31:00.089
have a Dod Tiger team . Yeah , so there

02:31:00.099 --> 02:31:02.210
has also been an F MS Tiger team that

02:31:02.210 --> 02:31:04.432
the Department of Defense has run uh as

02:31:04.432 --> 02:31:05.821
as well . And were there

02:31:05.821 --> 02:31:08.043
recommendations ? Uh there , there have

02:31:08.043 --> 02:31:10.099
been a couple of key recommendations

02:31:10.099 --> 02:31:12.321
the entire uh so uh a couple of key key

02:31:12.321 --> 02:31:14.543
initiatives that I would highlight . So

02:31:14.543 --> 02:31:16.655
one is the need for us to have a data

02:31:16.655 --> 02:31:18.377
driven approach so that we can

02:31:18.377 --> 02:31:20.543
accelerate the development of a common

02:31:20.543 --> 02:31:20.419
operating picture on security

02:31:20.429 --> 02:31:22.596
cooperation . Effectively , we want to

02:31:22.596 --> 02:31:24.762
be able to figure out F MS cases where

02:31:24.762 --> 02:31:26.929
they from initiation to delivery , how

02:31:26.929 --> 02:31:29.040
do we have that whole life cycle ? So

02:31:29.040 --> 02:31:30.985
this is an F MS Tiger team , not a

02:31:30.985 --> 02:31:33.096
Taiwan . Uh So there are two separate

02:31:33.096 --> 02:31:35.262
efforts . That's the F MS Tiger team .

02:31:35.262 --> 02:31:37.262
The uh other effort that you may be

02:31:37.262 --> 02:31:39.207
referring to is the um effort that

02:31:39.207 --> 02:31:38.995
Deputy Secretary Hicks has been

02:31:39.004 --> 02:31:41.115
highlight . Yes , exactly . So that ,

02:31:41.115 --> 02:31:43.644
that one is on uh on Taiwan . Um And

02:31:43.655 --> 02:31:45.665
that one is looking at how we can

02:31:45.674 --> 02:31:47.665
ensure that we are finding ways to

02:31:47.674 --> 02:31:49.730
accelerate and bolster Taiwan's self

02:31:49.730 --> 02:31:51.815
defense capabilities , Miss Carlin ,

02:31:52.570 --> 02:31:55.620
what , what are we doing ? Right . That

02:31:55.629 --> 02:31:57.796
I understand we went through the Tiger

02:31:57.796 --> 02:31:59.185
team last year . There's

02:31:59.185 --> 02:32:01.296
recommendations we identified needs .

02:32:01.296 --> 02:32:03.351
Like , can you , can you provide the

02:32:03.351 --> 02:32:05.518
committee what you're actually putting

02:32:05.518 --> 02:32:07.685
in place timelines troops to task , so

02:32:07.685 --> 02:32:10.160
to speak ? And what then the effect

02:32:10.169 --> 02:32:12.336
will be on these systems to accelerate

02:32:12.336 --> 02:32:14.969
them ? Is that possible ? Yeah . May I ,

02:32:14.980 --> 02:32:16.924
may I jump in here because some of

02:32:16.924 --> 02:32:18.924
these are actually state department

02:32:18.924 --> 02:32:20.980
authorities ? So let me just uh walk

02:32:20.980 --> 02:32:23.091
you through a few of them . The first

02:32:23.091 --> 02:32:25.147
one is that um the we are looking at

02:32:25.147 --> 02:32:27.669
using a new authority for Taiwan that

02:32:27.679 --> 02:32:29.735
Congress provided which is a billion

02:32:29.735 --> 02:32:31.910
dollars . I know the P D A got it 500

02:32:31.919 --> 02:32:34.589
million announced . Well , that just uh

02:32:34.599 --> 02:32:36.821
the reason I'm focusing on that is that

02:32:36.821 --> 02:32:38.488
it provides us the ability to

02:32:38.488 --> 02:32:40.655
immediately deliver , which I think is

02:32:40.655 --> 02:32:42.766
the question that you are asking . So

02:32:42.766 --> 02:32:44.932
that is that is thing one , the second

02:32:44.932 --> 02:32:46.988
thing and I can't go into all of the

02:32:46.988 --> 02:32:49.155
details here . But what I can tell you

02:32:49.155 --> 02:32:51.321
is we have looked at a specific set of

02:32:51.321 --> 02:32:53.488
capabilities and specific sets systems

02:32:53.488 --> 02:32:55.710
that Taiwan needs and we have been able

02:32:55.710 --> 02:32:57.894
to prioritize those systems both in

02:32:57.905 --> 02:33:00.285
terms of if we have , let's say 100 of

02:33:00.294 --> 02:33:02.485
them making sure a certain percentage

02:33:02.495 --> 02:33:05.785
go to Taiwan . And um again , I can't

02:33:05.794 --> 02:33:07.683
get into all the details here for

02:33:07.683 --> 02:33:09.850
obvious reasons . We have been able to

02:33:09.850 --> 02:33:12.072
also make sure that certain systems are

02:33:12.072 --> 02:33:14.183
being produced more quickly , so they

02:33:14.183 --> 02:33:16.183
get to Taiwan more quickly . But we

02:33:16.183 --> 02:33:19.089
still have a case where we have M Q

02:33:19.099 --> 02:33:22.849
nine um M Q nine I S R ,

02:33:22.860 --> 02:33:26.040
right ? That's 2027 or later , the

02:33:26.049 --> 02:33:28.509
chairman has his list of 2022 . For

02:33:28.519 --> 02:33:31.889
example , the harpoons took two years

02:33:32.259 --> 02:33:35.490
to get on contract award . The F-16s

02:33:35.500 --> 02:33:37.556
were just delayed . I mean we have a

02:33:37.556 --> 02:33:41.419
series of of major end items that are

02:33:41.429 --> 02:33:45.349
due somewhere between 2027 2029 .

02:33:45.849 --> 02:33:48.016
And yet Xi has told his military to be

02:33:48.016 --> 02:33:50.509
ready by 27 arguably some analysts

02:33:50.519 --> 02:33:53.639
think he will accelerate before Taiwan

02:33:53.650 --> 02:33:55.940
has these capabilities . And from a

02:33:55.950 --> 02:33:58.900
deterrent standpoint , that's too late .

02:33:59.650 --> 02:34:01.817
And if we look at the model in Ukraine

02:34:01.817 --> 02:34:04.030
and providing all of these systems

02:34:04.040 --> 02:34:06.660
after the country is devastated at huge

02:34:06.669 --> 02:34:09.030
expense to global stability and the

02:34:09.040 --> 02:34:11.820
taxpayer , that is a , that is a losing

02:34:11.830 --> 02:34:14.000
model . So I I look forward to working

02:34:14.009 --> 02:34:16.065
with you and I think we need a tiger

02:34:16.065 --> 02:34:18.740
team here uh in the Congress to peel

02:34:18.750 --> 02:34:21.410
back these layers and understand where

02:34:21.419 --> 02:34:24.059
we can accelerate authorities , whether

02:34:24.070 --> 02:34:26.070
it's enhancing the P D A or

02:34:26.080 --> 02:34:28.247
accelerating those authorities to move

02:34:28.247 --> 02:34:30.413
faster . Thank you . Thank you . I owe

02:34:30.413 --> 02:34:32.413
my time . Thank you , madam chair .

02:34:32.413 --> 02:34:34.136
Thank you . I now recognize Mr

02:34:34.136 --> 02:34:36.247
Schneider for five minutes . Uh Thank

02:34:36.247 --> 02:34:38.469
you madam chair and I want to thank the

02:34:38.469 --> 02:34:40.524
witnesses for uh your time here here

02:34:40.524 --> 02:34:42.691
today . And um as as was noted and you

02:34:42.691 --> 02:34:44.691
said very well , this is a historic

02:34:44.691 --> 02:34:46.636
opportunity that requires historic

02:34:46.636 --> 02:34:48.913
change in long term strategic thinking .

02:34:48.913 --> 02:34:51.320
Um And also , as mentioned , I look

02:34:51.330 --> 02:34:54.209
forward to working together uh with the

02:34:54.219 --> 02:34:56.275
administration and this committee to

02:34:56.275 --> 02:34:58.497
try to clear away obstacles and work to

02:34:58.497 --> 02:35:01.070
develop a smart , secure path forward .

02:35:01.080 --> 02:35:03.500
Uh for what is a vitally important

02:35:03.509 --> 02:35:05.809
region for our uh our nation and , and

02:35:05.820 --> 02:35:07.876
and for the world . When it comes to

02:35:07.876 --> 02:35:09.931
collaborating with close partners in

02:35:09.931 --> 02:35:12.098
tough neighborhoods , there's a lot to

02:35:12.098 --> 02:35:14.320
be learned , I think from the history ,

02:35:14.320 --> 02:35:13.870
our , our , our history of , of

02:35:13.879 --> 02:35:16.169
collaborating with uh another key ally .

02:35:16.179 --> 02:35:18.235
In this case , specifically Israel ,

02:35:18.290 --> 02:35:20.519
our assistance has helped the Israel

02:35:20.530 --> 02:35:22.641
defense forces become one of the most

02:35:22.641 --> 02:35:25.269
effective militaries in the world less

02:35:25.280 --> 02:35:27.391
well known . However , is that the US

02:35:27.391 --> 02:35:29.447
assistance has helped develop Israel

02:35:29.447 --> 02:35:32.129
formidable defense industrial base . Uh

02:35:32.139 --> 02:35:34.469
So when it comes to the Indo Pacific ,

02:35:34.540 --> 02:35:36.484
how would you think about goals of

02:35:36.484 --> 02:35:38.651
supplying our allies with capabilities

02:35:38.651 --> 02:35:40.818
versus helping them build up their own

02:35:40.818 --> 02:35:42.929
indigenous capabilities or capacities

02:35:42.929 --> 02:35:45.151
and capabilities uh specifically in the

02:35:45.151 --> 02:35:48.269
case of Taiwan . Um Well , this is a

02:35:48.280 --> 02:35:50.113
very interesting question and we

02:35:50.113 --> 02:35:52.224
actually um have paid close attention

02:35:52.224 --> 02:35:54.391
to the development of Israel's defense

02:35:54.391 --> 02:35:56.613
industrial base and they um really have

02:35:56.613 --> 02:35:58.391
developed some very significant

02:35:58.391 --> 02:36:00.589
capabilities . I think as we look

02:36:00.599 --> 02:36:03.990
across the Indo Pacific . Um and Taiwan ,

02:36:04.230 --> 02:36:05.929
when we talk about developing

02:36:05.940 --> 02:36:08.570
indigenous capabilities , um we need to

02:36:08.580 --> 02:36:11.490
do that in collaboration uh with our

02:36:11.500 --> 02:36:14.690
defense industrial base . Um And we

02:36:14.700 --> 02:36:16.589
have to make sure that we develop

02:36:16.589 --> 02:36:18.533
things . I'm going to get a little

02:36:18.533 --> 02:36:20.867
technical here , cooperative agreements ,

02:36:20.867 --> 02:36:23.089
co-production agreements , all of these

02:36:23.089 --> 02:36:24.867
kinds of things . Um We're very

02:36:24.867 --> 02:36:27.089
sensitive to the fact that our industry

02:36:27.089 --> 02:36:29.089
has to lead the way on the decision

02:36:29.089 --> 02:36:31.311
making in terms of what makes sense for

02:36:31.311 --> 02:36:33.533
them to do in coordination with another

02:36:33.533 --> 02:36:35.644
country . But I do think when we have

02:36:35.644 --> 02:36:37.422
countries that have significant

02:36:37.422 --> 02:36:39.367
capabilities that have an educated

02:36:39.367 --> 02:36:41.311
workforce that have um potentially

02:36:41.311 --> 02:36:43.478
their own defense industrial base , um

02:36:43.478 --> 02:36:45.478
that it makes sense to look at that

02:36:45.478 --> 02:36:47.256
potential moving forward . Ok .

02:36:47.256 --> 02:36:49.522
Assistant Secretary Carlin , I would

02:36:49.532 --> 02:36:51.254
completely concur with this is

02:36:51.254 --> 02:36:53.365
Secretary Lewis's points , ok ? And I

02:36:53.365 --> 02:36:55.588
know just for the sake of time , I have

02:36:55.588 --> 02:36:57.754
many more questions , but we have only

02:36:57.754 --> 02:36:57.442
a little bit of time . I'm gonna yield

02:36:57.452 --> 02:37:00.500
back so others can speak . Thank you

02:37:00.509 --> 02:37:03.240
very much . I now recognize Mr Kane for

02:37:03.250 --> 02:37:06.599
five minutes . Thank you , Mr Chairman .

02:37:07.049 --> 02:37:09.049
Thank you also to our witnesses for

02:37:09.049 --> 02:37:11.080
being with us today from the war in

02:37:11.089 --> 02:37:13.256
Ukraine to the preparation of defenses

02:37:13.256 --> 02:37:15.200
in Taiwan . And a request from our

02:37:15.200 --> 02:37:17.367
allies for equipment made in America .

02:37:17.367 --> 02:37:19.533
The United States once again stands as

02:37:19.533 --> 02:37:21.769
the arsenal of democracy . I like many

02:37:21.780 --> 02:37:24.002
of my colleagues . The caucus is a once

02:37:24.002 --> 02:37:26.113
in a generational opportunity to seek

02:37:26.113 --> 02:37:28.500
to counter the C C P's Malign influence

02:37:28.509 --> 02:37:30.731
in the Indo Pacific and also strengthen

02:37:30.731 --> 02:37:33.150
our relationships with close regional

02:37:33.160 --> 02:37:35.509
allies . The success of this

02:37:35.519 --> 02:37:37.463
partnership requires that our arms

02:37:37.463 --> 02:37:39.575
exports are able to meet the security

02:37:39.575 --> 02:37:41.797
needs of our allies at a time where our

02:37:41.797 --> 02:37:43.963
friends in Asia and Europe continue to

02:37:43.963 --> 02:37:45.630
look to the United States for

02:37:45.630 --> 02:37:47.686
leadership . Um What is the specific

02:37:47.686 --> 02:37:50.620
choke points in these just slowing

02:37:50.629 --> 02:37:52.685
things down that you think we , that

02:37:52.685 --> 02:37:54.685
you've identified , that we can cut

02:37:54.685 --> 02:37:56.518
through more quickly for foreign

02:37:56.518 --> 02:37:58.518
military sales ? Um Let me start by

02:37:58.518 --> 02:38:00.685
talking about what we've identified at

02:38:00.685 --> 02:38:02.740
the State Department and then talk a

02:38:02.740 --> 02:38:04.962
little bit about the defense industrial

02:38:04.962 --> 02:38:07.129
base . And then Doctor Carlin may have

02:38:07.129 --> 02:38:09.407
uh more to add . So just to start with ,

02:38:09.407 --> 02:38:11.407
as I said before , 95% of our cases

02:38:11.407 --> 02:38:13.629
move through the foreign military sales

02:38:13.629 --> 02:38:15.518
process in 24 to 48 hours . So we

02:38:15.518 --> 02:38:17.700
really took a look at what is , what

02:38:17.709 --> 02:38:19.765
sort of , what are the challenges in

02:38:19.765 --> 02:38:22.160
the other 5% . So um we have made a

02:38:22.169 --> 02:38:24.336
list of recommendations . So the first

02:38:24.336 --> 02:38:26.440
one is to make sure that we are

02:38:26.450 --> 02:38:28.660
prioritizing correctly based on our

02:38:28.669 --> 02:38:30.919
national security goals . That sounds

02:38:30.929 --> 02:38:33.080
like just talk , but that actually

02:38:33.089 --> 02:38:35.256
could make a significant difference in

02:38:35.256 --> 02:38:37.422
terms of being able to move forward on

02:38:37.422 --> 02:38:39.589
key priorities . Second of all , we're

02:38:39.589 --> 02:38:42.559
looking at regions . So um rather than

02:38:42.570 --> 02:38:45.719
having to say , OK , um we can provide

02:38:45.730 --> 02:38:48.440
this new capability only to one country

02:38:48.450 --> 02:38:50.561
when we start that analysis , look at

02:38:50.561 --> 02:38:52.561
it from a regional perspective . So

02:38:52.561 --> 02:38:54.506
we're prepared to move quickly and

02:38:54.506 --> 02:38:56.617
answer those questions for the entire

02:38:56.617 --> 02:38:58.672
region . We're also looking at other

02:38:58.672 --> 02:39:00.894
things like working with this committee

02:39:00.894 --> 02:39:03.061
here on the congressional notification

02:39:03.061 --> 02:39:05.283
process to make for make sure that's as

02:39:05.283 --> 02:39:07.450
streamlined as possible . I'm happy to

02:39:07.450 --> 02:39:09.506
talk about more details there . That

02:39:09.506 --> 02:39:09.450
would be great . There are a whole host

02:39:09.459 --> 02:39:11.700
of other things but , but just to give

02:39:11.709 --> 02:39:13.876
you a sense , OK , we're going to talk

02:39:13.876 --> 02:39:16.042
uh region for a quick sec on Ukraine .

02:39:16.042 --> 02:39:17.987
Yes . Um Now that the Pentagon has

02:39:17.987 --> 02:39:20.153
realized it overestimated the value of

02:39:20.153 --> 02:39:22.042
the ammunition missiles and other

02:39:22.042 --> 02:39:24.042
equipment sent to Ukraine by around

02:39:24.042 --> 02:39:25.765
three billion has additional D

02:39:25.765 --> 02:39:27.820
authority . The Biden administration

02:39:27.820 --> 02:39:29.987
prepared to increase weapon packages .

02:39:29.987 --> 02:39:29.530
It's transferring to Ukraine for

02:39:29.839 --> 02:39:32.061
critical counter offensive because I am

02:39:32.061 --> 02:39:34.172
concerned that the administration has

02:39:34.172 --> 02:39:36.506
been weapons to Ukraine ahead the count ,

02:39:36.506 --> 02:39:38.117
the offensive , conservative

02:39:38.117 --> 02:39:40.879
presidential authority when in reality ,

02:39:40.889 --> 02:39:43.111
it didn't have to . And it's known that

02:39:43.111 --> 02:39:46.589
since March , um , thank you for , for

02:39:46.599 --> 02:39:49.040
raising this . Uh , I have seen no

02:39:49.049 --> 02:39:50.882
evidence that the department has

02:39:50.882 --> 02:39:52.993
rationed it . Its uh , its support to

02:39:52.993 --> 02:39:55.160
Ukraine . Indeed , I can't tell you um

02:39:55.160 --> 02:39:57.160
of another time where I've seen the

02:39:57.160 --> 02:39:59.271
department has mobilized for racing ,

02:39:59.271 --> 02:40:01.271
uh assistance that has had a direct

02:40:01.271 --> 02:40:03.438
impact on the battlefield so quickly .

02:40:03.438 --> 02:40:05.660
Um As you do highlight sir , during our

02:40:05.660 --> 02:40:07.493
regular oversight process of the

02:40:07.493 --> 02:40:08.993
drawdown authority , these

02:40:08.993 --> 02:40:11.049
inconsistencies in how equipment for

02:40:11.049 --> 02:40:13.216
Ukraine was valuated , were discovered

02:40:13.216 --> 02:40:15.049
effectively . What happened in a

02:40:15.049 --> 02:40:17.160
handful of cases was that replacement

02:40:17.160 --> 02:40:19.216
costs were used rather than net book

02:40:19.216 --> 02:40:21.327
value was used . So the amount of the

02:40:21.327 --> 02:40:23.382
equipment the value of it was uh was

02:40:23.382 --> 02:40:25.445
over overestimated . Um that has not

02:40:25.455 --> 02:40:27.665
constrained our support whatsoever .

02:40:27.674 --> 02:40:29.844
And the dod control has worked to

02:40:29.855 --> 02:40:32.165
reissue guidance to ensure that that

02:40:32.174 --> 02:40:34.285
that clarity is there and , and , and

02:40:34.285 --> 02:40:36.594
finally I'll yield back out of this .

02:40:36.714 --> 02:40:38.724
Um I was pleased to see the recent

02:40:38.735 --> 02:40:40.235
announcement regarding the

02:40:40.235 --> 02:40:42.179
administration's decision to allow

02:40:42.179 --> 02:40:44.235
Ukrainian pilots to train on F-16s .

02:40:44.235 --> 02:40:46.235
However , this administration still

02:40:46.235 --> 02:40:49.160
refuses to provide to pick them which

02:40:49.169 --> 02:40:51.058
could have an immediate impact on

02:40:51.058 --> 02:40:53.058
battlefield as Ukraine prepares its

02:40:53.058 --> 02:40:55.280
counter offensive with other members of

02:40:55.280 --> 02:40:57.502
this committee have brought up that our

02:40:57.502 --> 02:40:59.336
allies are sending equipment and

02:40:59.336 --> 02:41:01.169
training in for long before this

02:41:01.169 --> 02:41:03.280
president has . Uh I just want to end

02:41:03.280 --> 02:41:05.002
with that statement you back .

02:41:07.049 --> 02:41:09.459
Thank you . I now recognize Mr Lawler

02:41:09.469 --> 02:41:11.730
for five minutes . Thank you , madam

02:41:11.740 --> 02:41:14.959
chair . Uh as you both know , uh us

02:41:14.969 --> 02:41:17.191
arms exports to Turkey have been highly

02:41:17.191 --> 02:41:19.302
controversial in the past few years .

02:41:19.559 --> 02:41:21.781
Most recently , Turkey has requested to

02:41:21.781 --> 02:41:23.892
upgrade and add to its existing fleet

02:41:23.892 --> 02:41:26.179
of F-16 fighter jets . And last month ,

02:41:26.190 --> 02:41:28.357
the administration approved a software

02:41:28.357 --> 02:41:30.669
uh software sale to the country to

02:41:30.679 --> 02:41:33.160
modernize its fleet . Notably , the

02:41:33.169 --> 02:41:35.480
administration didn't approve the sale

02:41:35.490 --> 02:41:37.599
of 40 additional F-16s . Turkey

02:41:37.610 --> 02:41:40.129
requested . Can you please describe the

02:41:40.139 --> 02:41:42.250
process for reviewing and potentially

02:41:42.250 --> 02:41:46.160
approving uh this request ? Um

02:41:46.169 --> 02:41:48.336
I'm I'm happy to address that . Let me

02:41:48.336 --> 02:41:51.629
just clarify . Um I think the , the one

02:41:51.639 --> 02:41:54.480
the second sale you mentioned was for

02:41:54.490 --> 02:41:57.099
upgrades um that were mission critical

02:41:57.110 --> 02:41:59.089
for uh their ability to fly . In

02:41:59.099 --> 02:42:01.155
essence , the the software that went

02:42:01.155 --> 02:42:04.580
into the planes . Um I'm not . Yes .

02:42:04.589 --> 02:42:08.559
And then um I'm not , I'm unclear as to

02:42:08.570 --> 02:42:11.820
the , the third one you mentioned , you

02:42:11.830 --> 02:42:13.552
were saying we did not approve

02:42:13.552 --> 02:42:15.774
something specifically , didn't approve

02:42:15.774 --> 02:42:18.570
the sale of 40 additional F-16s . Um

02:42:18.580 --> 02:42:21.370
I'm not aware that that's uh it's the

02:42:21.379 --> 02:42:24.959
new one um that uh just to be clear

02:42:24.969 --> 02:42:28.469
there when um we have

02:42:28.480 --> 02:42:32.059
reviewed that . Um And I think uh at

02:42:32.070 --> 02:42:35.750
this point when we uh place things

02:42:35.759 --> 02:42:37.648
into tiered review , which is the

02:42:37.648 --> 02:42:40.769
process where we put , uh , sales uh ,

02:42:40.780 --> 02:42:43.000
before the committee , um , we can't

02:42:43.009 --> 02:42:45.176
discuss anything publicly . So I think

02:42:45.176 --> 02:42:47.287
at this point , I think what would be

02:42:47.287 --> 02:42:49.509
the most effective to say is that we've

02:42:49.509 --> 02:42:51.731
certainly reviewed that case . Um , and

02:42:51.731 --> 02:42:53.231
that we are moving forward

02:42:53.231 --> 02:42:56.540
expeditiously . Ok . Um ,

02:42:57.469 --> 02:43:00.049
given , uh , President Erdogan's

02:43:00.059 --> 02:43:02.379
relationship with Vladimir Putin ,

02:43:04.299 --> 02:43:06.700
will the upcoming runoff election in

02:43:06.709 --> 02:43:09.070
Turkey impact this decision making at

02:43:09.080 --> 02:43:11.950
all ? Um I think as we look at arm

02:43:11.959 --> 02:43:14.181
sales decision making , um we look at a

02:43:14.181 --> 02:43:16.839
whole host of criteria . Um I'm not

02:43:16.849 --> 02:43:19.389
aware as of right now that uh I know

02:43:19.400 --> 02:43:21.567
the election is happening in real time

02:43:21.567 --> 02:43:23.820
uh that we have sales before us where

02:43:23.830 --> 02:43:26.169
the outcome of that election uh would

02:43:26.179 --> 02:43:28.123
influence our decision making on a

02:43:28.123 --> 02:43:31.190
particular sale . And this past

02:43:31.200 --> 02:43:33.290
February Secretary Blinken visited

02:43:33.299 --> 02:43:36.160
Turkey . Um How did the secretary

02:43:36.169 --> 02:43:39.290
address the situation with uh President

02:43:39.509 --> 02:43:42.040
Erin ? Um I wasn't , I'm not privy to

02:43:42.049 --> 02:43:44.216
his specific conversation , but I know

02:43:44.216 --> 02:43:46.509
he addressed a whole host of issues um

02:43:46.519 --> 02:43:49.419
while he was there uh ranging from

02:43:49.429 --> 02:43:52.400
obviously issues with NATO Turkey as a

02:43:52.410 --> 02:43:54.940
NATO ally and then a whole host of

02:43:54.950 --> 02:43:57.290
additional concerns that we have uh

02:43:57.299 --> 02:43:59.639
involving the region . And I'm sure

02:43:59.650 --> 02:44:01.879
although again , I was not there for

02:44:01.889 --> 02:44:04.111
that , that they discussed other issues

02:44:04.111 --> 02:44:07.059
like Ukraine and NATO accession . Uh

02:44:07.070 --> 02:44:09.292
when I visited Taiwan with the chairman

02:44:09.292 --> 02:44:11.403
of this committee , uh President Tsai

02:44:11.403 --> 02:44:13.237
expressed the need for increased

02:44:13.237 --> 02:44:15.292
defense training and cooperation and

02:44:15.292 --> 02:44:17.459
delivery of critical weapons systems .

02:44:17.459 --> 02:44:19.440
Uh It's absolutely crucial that we

02:44:19.450 --> 02:44:21.759
provide Taiwan with the aid that they

02:44:21.769 --> 02:44:24.179
so desperately need to stand up to

02:44:24.190 --> 02:44:26.839
Chinese aggression in the Indo Pacific .

02:44:27.019 --> 02:44:29.186
Unfortunately , there's been a huge uh

02:44:29.186 --> 02:44:31.679
arms backlog and I sent the letter

02:44:31.690 --> 02:44:33.801
today to Secretary Blinken along with

02:44:33.801 --> 02:44:36.023
some of my colleagues on that trip that

02:44:36.023 --> 02:44:38.134
urged the State Department to address

02:44:38.134 --> 02:44:40.419
these shipment delays uh as it is not

02:44:40.429 --> 02:44:43.219
consistent with us law to leave Taiwan

02:44:43.230 --> 02:44:45.230
without uh necessary arms that they

02:44:45.230 --> 02:44:48.620
purchased . Uh what exactly is the root

02:44:48.629 --> 02:44:50.740
cause of this delay ? And what is the

02:44:50.740 --> 02:44:52.679
State Department and dod doing to

02:44:52.690 --> 02:44:55.200
address it so that we can uh

02:44:55.209 --> 02:44:57.320
efficiently and effectively get these

02:44:57.320 --> 02:45:00.769
weapon systems to them . Uh As we saw

02:45:00.780 --> 02:45:04.129
in Ukraine , uh the failure to get

02:45:04.160 --> 02:45:07.040
these weapons systems to the Ukrainian

02:45:07.049 --> 02:45:08.870
people , uh government early uh

02:45:08.879 --> 02:45:11.639
military early uh was part of the

02:45:11.650 --> 02:45:14.599
problem here . Well , uh sir , and I'm

02:45:14.610 --> 02:45:16.832
glad you raised this issue . I think as

02:45:16.832 --> 02:45:19.209
you pointed out , these are um uh sales

02:45:19.219 --> 02:45:21.386
that have already moved uh through the

02:45:21.386 --> 02:45:23.497
department and through Congress . And

02:45:23.497 --> 02:45:25.608
um what the challenges are now moving

02:45:25.608 --> 02:45:27.608
forward really is on the production

02:45:27.608 --> 02:45:29.830
side , right ? So what is , what is the

02:45:29.830 --> 02:45:31.719
State Department and dod doing to

02:45:31.730 --> 02:45:33.841
address that ? Well , we have to work

02:45:33.841 --> 02:45:35.841
with industry on that . And so as I

02:45:35.841 --> 02:45:37.952
because industry is the one producing

02:45:37.952 --> 02:45:40.174
them . So what , so what are we doing ?

02:45:40.174 --> 02:45:42.341
Well , what we are doing is one we are

02:45:42.341 --> 02:45:44.508
working on them , having them increase

02:45:44.508 --> 02:45:47.012
production for specific capabilities so

02:45:47.023 --> 02:45:49.245
that they can produce more of the items

02:45:49.245 --> 02:45:51.134
needed . We're also looking where

02:45:51.134 --> 02:45:53.190
possible to prioritize out of what's

02:45:53.190 --> 02:45:55.813
being produced uh for Taiwan , I'm not

02:45:55.823 --> 02:45:57.879
gonna get into the specifics of what

02:45:57.879 --> 02:46:00.045
we're doing in each capability in this

02:46:00.045 --> 02:46:02.101
setting . But we are working through

02:46:02.101 --> 02:46:04.101
that with industry , but ultimately

02:46:04.101 --> 02:46:06.215
industry is the one who has to , they

02:46:06.225 --> 02:46:08.475
have to , but we're paying them . So we

02:46:08.486 --> 02:46:10.486
need to , we need to , we need to

02:46:10.496 --> 02:46:12.925
expedite this process . Taiwan is

02:46:12.935 --> 02:46:15.268
actually they're purchasing the weapons ,

02:46:15.268 --> 02:46:17.326
but it's as a result of defense

02:46:17.335 --> 02:46:19.057
department contracts and state

02:46:19.057 --> 02:46:21.385
department contracts , we need to

02:46:21.435 --> 02:46:24.250
expedite in the interest of time

02:46:24.259 --> 02:46:26.426
because the votes are being taken . So

02:46:26.426 --> 02:46:28.481
I would like to call for Mr Courtney

02:46:28.481 --> 02:46:30.592
for five minutes . Thank you uh madam

02:46:30.592 --> 02:46:32.815
chairwoman and again for the record , I

02:46:32.815 --> 02:46:34.815
just want to thank Mr mccall and Mr

02:46:34.815 --> 02:46:37.037
Meeks for the courtesy to join you from

02:46:37.037 --> 02:46:39.148
the House Armed Services Committee to

02:46:39.148 --> 02:46:41.148
talk about a which uh there's great

02:46:41.148 --> 02:46:43.259
interest um after the uh announcement

02:46:43.259 --> 02:46:45.315
on March 13th out at uh naval base ,

02:46:45.315 --> 02:46:47.709
Port Loma uh March 13th when the three

02:46:47.719 --> 02:46:49.830
heads of government , three navies uh

02:46:49.830 --> 02:46:51.997
stacked hands to make an extraordinary

02:46:51.997 --> 02:46:53.719
commitment . The government of

02:46:53.719 --> 02:46:56.089
Australia really within days uh

02:46:56.099 --> 02:46:59.955
announce a commitment of $386

02:46:59.964 --> 02:47:02.094
billion which was supported by the

02:47:02.105 --> 02:47:05.334
opposition party to execute uh a over

02:47:05.344 --> 02:47:07.511
the life of the program . I think it's

02:47:07.511 --> 02:47:09.511
important to note this is a country

02:47:09.511 --> 02:47:11.622
with 26 million people that's smaller

02:47:11.622 --> 02:47:14.054
than the uh state of Texas , uh and the

02:47:14.065 --> 02:47:15.865
state of California . So , um ,

02:47:15.875 --> 02:47:18.195
obviously they have uh committed in a

02:47:18.205 --> 02:47:20.900
big way , uh in terms of making sure

02:47:20.910 --> 02:47:23.280
that this is a success . Doctor Carlin ,

02:47:23.290 --> 02:47:25.290
the Department of Defense sent over

02:47:25.290 --> 02:47:27.009
three uh requests for um , a

02:47:27.230 --> 02:47:29.397
implementation which are , uh in in in

02:47:29.397 --> 02:47:32.049
this committee . The first is a bill to

02:47:32.059 --> 02:47:34.115
authorize sale of two Virginia class

02:47:34.115 --> 02:47:36.337
submarines to Australia . The second to

02:47:36.337 --> 02:47:38.503
authorize um the Australian government

02:47:38.503 --> 02:47:40.337
to invest $2 billion into the US

02:47:40.337 --> 02:47:42.448
submarine industrial base . The third

02:47:42.448 --> 02:47:44.615
is to authorize training to Australian

02:47:44.615 --> 02:47:46.670
private industry to begin developing

02:47:46.670 --> 02:47:48.892
its own submarine industrial base . Can

02:47:48.892 --> 02:47:50.948
you talk for a moment about the need

02:47:50.948 --> 02:47:53.910
for Congress to reciprocate Australia's

02:47:53.919 --> 02:47:55.863
extraordinary commitment by moving

02:47:55.863 --> 02:47:58.086
forward in terms of getting these bills

02:47:58.086 --> 02:48:00.252
to the president's desk . Absolutely .

02:48:00.252 --> 02:48:02.363
First of all , Congressman Courtney ,

02:48:02.363 --> 02:48:04.030
thank you for your tremendous

02:48:04.030 --> 02:48:06.141
leadership on all things . Aus it has

02:48:06.141 --> 02:48:08.363
been just tremendous as I noted . So we

02:48:08.363 --> 02:48:10.530
need to act on these three legislative

02:48:10.530 --> 02:48:12.252
proposals for pillar one , the

02:48:12.252 --> 02:48:14.086
submarine piece of August for uh

02:48:14.086 --> 02:48:16.141
several reasons . So first is it's a

02:48:16.141 --> 02:48:18.086
signal of our commitment to August

02:48:18.086 --> 02:48:19.919
which is critical for generating

02:48:19.919 --> 02:48:21.975
deterrence across every phase of the

02:48:21.975 --> 02:48:24.200
optimal pathway acting . Now sends a

02:48:24.209 --> 02:48:26.376
message to our defense industrial base

02:48:26.376 --> 02:48:28.598
as well that there will be a persistent

02:48:28.598 --> 02:48:30.709
flow of business to come , which is a

02:48:30.709 --> 02:48:32.765
topic of course , that we've heard a

02:48:32.765 --> 02:48:34.987
lot about over these last few hours and

02:48:34.987 --> 02:48:37.153
uh and , and really ensuring that that

02:48:37.153 --> 02:48:39.209
submarine industrial base is able to

02:48:39.209 --> 02:48:41.265
start taking the steps that it needs

02:48:41.265 --> 02:48:43.598
with Australia's contribution . Frankly ,

02:48:43.598 --> 02:48:45.487
Australia is going to be making a

02:48:45.487 --> 02:48:47.709
significant investment in our submarine

02:48:47.709 --> 02:48:49.931
industrial base and absent this uh this

02:48:49.931 --> 02:48:51.876
legislative proposal , we actually

02:48:51.876 --> 02:48:53.931
don't have a way to take that , that

02:48:53.931 --> 02:48:55.876
money in . And so we know that our

02:48:55.876 --> 02:48:58.042
submarine industrial base , you know ,

02:48:58.042 --> 02:49:00.098
uh better than just about anyone has

02:49:00.098 --> 02:49:02.098
issues that long , long predate and

02:49:02.098 --> 02:49:04.265
have nothing to do with a which is why

02:49:04.265 --> 02:49:06.431
the administration has tried to make a

02:49:06.431 --> 02:49:08.487
historic investment in the submarine

02:49:08.487 --> 02:49:10.709
industrial base . Australia wants to do

02:49:10.709 --> 02:49:12.931
so alongside us and we wanna be able to

02:49:12.931 --> 02:49:14.876
absorb uh all of that . Um And you

02:49:14.876 --> 02:49:16.987
noted of course , that they have made

02:49:16.987 --> 02:49:18.987
robust commitments and really shown

02:49:18.987 --> 02:49:21.042
that they have a skin in the game on

02:49:21.042 --> 02:49:23.265
that uh other legislative proposal that

02:49:23.265 --> 02:49:22.459
you highlight is we need to start uh

02:49:22.469 --> 02:49:24.820
training Australians as soon as

02:49:24.830 --> 02:49:27.059
possible frankly , because we want them

02:49:27.070 --> 02:49:29.240
to be able to build the capacity to

02:49:29.250 --> 02:49:31.361
safely and responsibly be stewards of

02:49:31.370 --> 02:49:33.426
conventionally armed nuclear powered

02:49:33.426 --> 02:49:35.648
submarines . So that , that's uh that ,

02:49:35.648 --> 02:49:37.759
that's really , really why that's the

02:49:37.759 --> 02:49:39.814
case . And then of course , the ship

02:49:39.814 --> 02:49:41.870
transfer legislation , um We need to

02:49:41.870 --> 02:49:44.037
just show um just how seriously we are

02:49:44.037 --> 02:49:46.148
taking this . So we have a uh an ally

02:49:46.148 --> 02:49:47.926
in Australia who has made major

02:49:47.926 --> 02:49:50.219
commitments in terms of putting its

02:49:50.230 --> 02:49:52.452
money where its mouth is to demonstrate

02:49:52.452 --> 02:49:54.508
its seriousness with UC . This is in

02:49:54.508 --> 02:49:56.563
all of our interest to be clear . Uh

02:49:56.563 --> 02:49:58.674
And we want , we want to show that we

02:49:58.674 --> 02:50:00.897
can take their investment , that we can

02:50:00.897 --> 02:50:03.008
train them to be responsible and that

02:50:03.008 --> 02:50:05.174
we will also be able to deliver on the

02:50:05.174 --> 02:50:07.341
submarines , all of which I would just

02:50:07.341 --> 02:50:06.629
underscore helps our submarine

02:50:06.639 --> 02:50:08.750
industrial base . Great . Thank you .

02:50:08.750 --> 02:50:11.410
And I'm sure again , Mr mccall and all

02:50:11.419 --> 02:50:13.475
our colleagues in this committee are

02:50:13.475 --> 02:50:15.308
going to do everything we can to

02:50:15.308 --> 02:50:17.308
demonstrate on a bipartisan basis .

02:50:17.308 --> 02:50:19.530
Just what Australia is doing on its own

02:50:19.530 --> 02:50:21.363
bipartisan basis . There was 1/4

02:50:21.363 --> 02:50:23.475
proposal which came over last week on

02:50:23.475 --> 02:50:25.475
the Defense Production Act which uh

02:50:25.475 --> 02:50:27.419
President Biden and Prime Minister

02:50:27.419 --> 02:50:29.530
Albanese announced on Saturday at the

02:50:29.530 --> 02:50:31.475
G7 , which is basically to include

02:50:31.475 --> 02:50:33.586
Australia and the UK within the scope

02:50:33.586 --> 02:50:35.586
of the Defense Production Act which

02:50:35.586 --> 02:50:37.586
will help stimulate all those other

02:50:37.586 --> 02:50:39.641
technologies that are part of pillar

02:50:39.641 --> 02:50:39.610
two . Again , can you talk about the

02:50:39.620 --> 02:50:41.620
need to make sure that we move this

02:50:41.620 --> 02:50:44.660
measure swiftly ? A absolutely look

02:50:44.669 --> 02:50:47.150
pillar two is it , it's the scope , the

02:50:47.160 --> 02:50:49.327
scale , the complexity of it is really

02:50:49.327 --> 02:50:51.604
unlike anything that we have ever done ,

02:50:51.604 --> 02:50:53.327
right ? This is a generational

02:50:53.327 --> 02:50:55.438
opportunity and the announcement that

02:50:55.438 --> 02:50:57.438
the president made over the weekend

02:50:57.438 --> 02:50:59.382
really highlighted how this change

02:50:59.382 --> 02:51:01.382
would accelerate and strengthen aus

02:51:01.382 --> 02:51:03.382
implementation . It would build new

02:51:03.382 --> 02:51:05.549
opportunities for us investment in the

02:51:05.549 --> 02:51:07.660
production and purchase of Australian

02:51:07.660 --> 02:51:07.355
critical minerals , critical

02:51:07.365 --> 02:51:09.365
technologies and other strategic

02:51:09.375 --> 02:51:11.455
sectors . So while we were still

02:51:11.464 --> 02:51:13.631
looking , of course , at what it would

02:51:13.631 --> 02:51:15.631
mean for specific aus projects , it

02:51:15.631 --> 02:51:17.853
underscores a point I made earlier that

02:51:17.853 --> 02:51:19.686
this is a two way street uh that

02:51:19.686 --> 02:51:22.020
actually given the security environment ,

02:51:22.020 --> 02:51:23.742
given the the rapidly evolving

02:51:23.742 --> 02:51:25.908
technological environment , we need to

02:51:25.908 --> 02:51:27.908
be able to work with one another as

02:51:27.908 --> 02:51:29.964
much as possible . Thank you , madam

02:51:29.964 --> 02:51:32.075
chairman I yield back . Thank you . I

02:51:32.075 --> 02:51:34.242
thank the witnesses for their valuable

02:51:34.242 --> 02:51:36.242
testimony and the members for their

02:51:36.242 --> 02:51:37.964
questions . The members of the

02:51:37.964 --> 02:51:37.820
committee may have some additional

02:51:37.830 --> 02:51:40.052
questions for the witnesses and we will

02:51:40.052 --> 02:51:42.429
ask you to respond to those in writing

02:51:43.030 --> 02:51:45.086
in pursuant to committee roles . All

02:51:45.086 --> 02:51:47.141
members may have five days to submit

02:51:47.141 --> 02:51:49.730
questions , statements and extraneous

02:51:49.740 --> 02:51:51.910
materials for the record , subject to

02:51:51.919 --> 02:51:54.070
the length limitations without

02:51:54.080 --> 02:51:56.136
objection . The committee now stands

02:51:56.136 --> 02:51:56.679
adjourned .