WEBVTT 00:02.569 --> 00:04.889 All right , good afternoon , everyone . 00:04.900 --> 00:07.960 Thanks for your patience . Uh First off , 00:07.969 --> 00:10.191 let me say it's great to be back in the 00:10.191 --> 00:12.302 press briefing room . I would like to 00:12.302 --> 00:14.520 thank Mr Tom Aston and the defense 00:14.529 --> 00:16.473 press operations team here for all 00:16.473 --> 00:18.590 their hard work over the past four 00:18.600 --> 00:20.656 months to enable us to implement the 00:20.656 --> 00:22.878 long needed renovations to the briefing 00:22.878 --> 00:25.100 room while also enabling us to continue 00:25.100 --> 00:27.267 our briefing cadence without missing a 00:27.267 --> 00:29.378 beat . Uh Needless to say , there's a 00:29.378 --> 00:31.378 lot of work that goes on behind the 00:31.378 --> 00:33.378 scenes . So I know I speak for many 00:33.378 --> 00:35.433 here at OS D Public Affairs . When I 00:35.433 --> 00:35.319 say how grateful we are for their 00:35.330 --> 00:37.386 efforts , I'd also like to thank our 00:37.389 --> 00:39.556 Pentagon Press Corps for your patience 00:39.556 --> 00:41.667 and flexibility and we understand all 00:41.667 --> 00:43.667 the logistical challenges that this 00:43.667 --> 00:46.430 renovation presented . Uh And so we 00:46.439 --> 00:48.106 appreciate your understanding 00:48.106 --> 00:50.272 throughout the process . And finally , 00:50.272 --> 00:52.439 a huge thanks to the Department of the 00:52.439 --> 00:54.495 Air Force for allowing us to use the 00:54.495 --> 00:56.717 Airman's Hall as our temporary briefing 00:56.717 --> 00:58.995 space . Uh Turning to today's briefing , 00:58.995 --> 01:00.995 I do have quite a few items to pass 01:00.995 --> 01:03.050 along on the top . So once again , I 01:03.050 --> 01:05.272 will ask for your patience , uh , while 01:05.272 --> 01:05.190 I kick things off and then be I'll be 01:05.199 --> 01:07.699 happy to take your questions . Uh first 01:07.709 --> 01:09.431 at the direction of the Deputy 01:09.431 --> 01:11.598 Secretary of Defense , Doctor Kathleen 01:11.598 --> 01:14.169 Hicks , the Dod S internal review team 01:14.180 --> 01:16.339 on racial disparities in the 01:16.349 --> 01:18.669 investigative and military justice 01:18.680 --> 01:21.790 systems or I RT has completed and 01:21.800 --> 01:23.744 delivered its report to the deputy 01:23.744 --> 01:26.440 secretary . The I RT was charged with 01:26.449 --> 01:28.282 addressing root causes of racial 01:28.290 --> 01:30.480 disparities in the investigative and 01:30.489 --> 01:33.120 military justice systems and providing 01:33.129 --> 01:35.339 actionable recommendations to improve 01:35.349 --> 01:37.989 department policies , processes and 01:38.000 --> 01:40.699 resources to address such disparities . 01:41.459 --> 01:44.459 The I RT S report details a total of 17 01:44.470 --> 01:47.069 recommendations based on three lines of 01:47.080 --> 01:49.029 effort which include training and 01:49.040 --> 01:51.870 education , service member protections , 01:51.879 --> 01:54.750 oversight and transparency . The I RT 01:54.760 --> 01:56.760 also found that additional data and 01:56.760 --> 01:58.927 research are warranted to identify and 01:58.927 --> 02:01.669 address root causes , mitigate bias and 02:01.680 --> 02:04.040 eliminate disparities . The Department 02:04.050 --> 02:05.939 of Defense is taking a deliberate 02:05.939 --> 02:08.161 approach to the implementation of the I 02:08.161 --> 02:10.649 RT S recommendations with the launch of 02:10.660 --> 02:13.279 a 120 day assessment that will be led 02:13.300 --> 02:15.356 by the undersecretary of defense for 02:15.356 --> 02:17.649 personnel and readiness . Taking care 02:17.660 --> 02:19.604 of our military community is a top 02:19.604 --> 02:21.549 priority for the department and we 02:21.549 --> 02:23.660 remain determined to eliminate racial 02:23.660 --> 02:25.993 disparities throughout our armed forces . 02:25.993 --> 02:28.104 Dod will continue to work to identify 02:28.104 --> 02:30.160 the causes of any racial , ethnic or 02:30.160 --> 02:32.104 gender disparities in the military 02:32.104 --> 02:34.271 justice system . And the I RT memo and 02:34.271 --> 02:36.493 report will be available later today on 02:36.493 --> 02:39.750 defense dot gov separately earlier this 02:39.759 --> 02:41.759 week , Secretary Austin concluded a 02:41.759 --> 02:43.759 successful trip to the Indo Pacific 02:43.759 --> 02:45.981 region and to Europe during which he uh 02:45.981 --> 02:48.092 during which he made stops in Japan , 02:48.092 --> 02:50.630 Singapore , India and France . Each 02:50.639 --> 02:52.750 stop afforded the opportunity to meet 02:52.750 --> 02:54.583 with counterparts to discuss our 02:54.583 --> 02:56.750 continued focus and shared vision of a 02:56.750 --> 02:58.917 free and open Indo Pacific region at a 02:58.917 --> 03:00.750 time of real momentum in our key 03:00.750 --> 03:02.861 relationships . As highlighted in his 03:02.861 --> 03:04.861 speech at the Shangri La Dialogue . 03:04.861 --> 03:06.972 More and more of the countries of the 03:06.972 --> 03:09.139 Indo Pacific have come together around 03:09.139 --> 03:11.139 this shared vision of the future in 03:11.139 --> 03:13.361 which all nations are free to thrive on 03:13.361 --> 03:15.361 their own terms without coercion or 03:15.361 --> 03:17.361 intimidation or bullying . To quote 03:17.361 --> 03:19.539 Secretary Austin . It's a vision of a 03:19.550 --> 03:22.369 free and open and secure Indo Pacific 03:22.380 --> 03:24.436 within a world of rules and rights . 03:24.436 --> 03:26.658 And that vision is anchored in some key 03:26.658 --> 03:28.547 principles to include respect for 03:28.547 --> 03:30.050 sovereignty , adherence to 03:30.059 --> 03:32.115 international law , transparency and 03:32.115 --> 03:34.170 openness , the free flow of commerce 03:34.170 --> 03:36.115 and ideas , human rights and human 03:36.115 --> 03:38.337 dignity , equal rights for all states , 03:38.337 --> 03:40.503 large and small and resolving disputes 03:40.503 --> 03:42.392 through peaceful dialogue and not 03:42.392 --> 03:44.503 coercion or conquest of note . On the 03:44.503 --> 03:46.770 heels of Secretary Austin's travel to 03:46.779 --> 03:49.059 the Indo Pacific under Secretary of 03:49.070 --> 03:51.292 Defense for Policy , Dr Colin call will 03:51.292 --> 03:53.292 depart this weekend for a series of 03:53.292 --> 03:55.626 engagements in Hawaii , Korea and Japan . 03:55.919 --> 03:57.863 During the visit , he'll meet with 03:57.863 --> 03:59.975 senior Indo peco military leaders and 03:59.975 --> 04:02.086 conduct various counterpart visits in 04:02.086 --> 04:03.975 Japan and Korea that will further 04:03.975 --> 04:06.086 strengthen our ironclad alliances and 04:06.086 --> 04:08.197 partnerships in the region . Readouts 04:08.197 --> 04:10.363 from the under secretary's engagements 04:10.363 --> 04:12.586 will be posted on the dod website . And 04:12.586 --> 04:14.752 another travel news secretary , Austin 04:14.752 --> 04:16.975 will travel again next week to Brussels 04:16.975 --> 04:18.919 where he and chairman of the Joint 04:18.919 --> 04:21.030 Chiefs of Staff , General Milley will 04:21.030 --> 04:22.863 host an in person meeting of the 04:22.863 --> 04:24.975 Ukraine defense contact group on June 04:24.975 --> 04:26.752 15 followed by the NATO defense 04:26.752 --> 04:28.919 ministers meeting on June 16 . We will 04:28.919 --> 04:30.975 provide additional details regarding 04:30.975 --> 04:33.141 the trip in the near future . Shifting 04:33.141 --> 04:35.308 gears in the Middle East region . This 04:35.308 --> 04:37.197 week marks the second week for us 04:37.197 --> 04:39.419 participation in exercise Eagle Resolve 04:39.419 --> 04:41.363 23 for the first time . This multi 04:41.363 --> 04:43.419 domain exercise focused primarily on 04:43.419 --> 04:45.586 integrated air and missile defense and 04:45.586 --> 04:47.920 maritime interdiction is being hosted 04:47.929 --> 04:49.873 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 04:49.873 --> 04:51.873 includes participation from all six 04:51.873 --> 04:53.818 Gulf Cooperation council countries 04:54.209 --> 04:56.042 separately , nearly a half dozen 04:56.042 --> 04:58.299 partner nation air Forces from across 04:58.309 --> 05:00.142 the US . Central command area of 05:00.142 --> 05:02.420 responsibility came together today in 05:02.429 --> 05:04.649 support of a B one bomber led us 05:04.660 --> 05:06.660 strategic command bomber task force 05:06.660 --> 05:08.716 mission that culminated in a pair of 05:08.716 --> 05:11.010 live fire events on ranges in Jordan 05:11.019 --> 05:14.750 and Saudi Arabia . Taken together these 05:14.760 --> 05:16.927 activities reinforce the US commitment 05:16.927 --> 05:18.927 to contributing to the security and 05:18.927 --> 05:21.149 stability of the Middle East region and 05:21.149 --> 05:23.427 demonstrate the increase in complexity , 05:23.859 --> 05:26.220 deepening military interoperability and 05:26.230 --> 05:27.952 strength of our shared defense 05:27.952 --> 05:30.174 capabilities . And I would refer you to 05:30.174 --> 05:32.230 us central command uh for additional 05:32.230 --> 05:34.341 details . Meanwhile , in the European 05:34.341 --> 05:36.452 region , the 52nd iteration of Baltic 05:36.452 --> 05:38.397 operations also known as Balt Tops 05:38.397 --> 05:40.508 began this week with 19 NATO allies , 05:40.508 --> 05:42.674 one NATO partner nation , 50 ships and 05:42.674 --> 05:44.897 more than 45 aircraft and approximately 05:44.897 --> 05:46.952 6000 personnel participating through 05:46.959 --> 05:50.149 June 16 . This annual maritime focused 05:50.160 --> 05:52.160 exercise provides a unique training 05:52.160 --> 05:54.327 opportunity to strengthen the combined 05:54.327 --> 05:56.104 response capability critical to 05:56.104 --> 05:58.160 preserving freedom of navigation and 05:58.160 --> 05:59.660 security in the Baltic sea 05:59.660 --> 06:01.779 participating nations will exercise a 06:01.790 --> 06:03.846 myriad of capabilities demonstrating 06:03.846 --> 06:05.901 the flexibility of maritime forces . 06:05.959 --> 06:08.181 For more information , please visit the 06:08.181 --> 06:10.292 US Naval forces , Europe , Africa and 06:10.292 --> 06:12.403 US six fleet website and social media 06:12.403 --> 06:14.181 platforms for the latest on the 06:14.181 --> 06:16.015 exercise . And finally on Monday 06:16.015 --> 06:18.309 morning , June 12th , Secretary Austin 06:18.320 --> 06:20.589 and Deputy Secretary Hicks will lead a 06:20.600 --> 06:22.600 Pentagon ceremony Commemorating the 06:22.600 --> 06:25.140 75th anniversary of the Women's Armed 06:25.149 --> 06:28.130 Forces Integration Act of 1948 to 06:28.140 --> 06:30.196 celebrate the enormous contributions 06:30.196 --> 06:32.196 that women have made to us national 06:32.196 --> 06:34.519 security . Over the last 7.5 decades , 06:34.829 --> 06:36.996 the Pentagon Courtyard ceremony begins 06:36.996 --> 06:39.579 at 10 30 will be broadcast on defense 06:39.589 --> 06:42.089 dot gov . And with that , I will take 06:42.100 --> 06:45.619 your questions . All right , Tara , 06:45.859 --> 06:48.519 let's go to associated press kicking it 06:48.529 --> 06:51.179 off of the bang there , aren't you ? Um 06:53.470 --> 06:55.637 Good to be back ? All right . I wanted 06:55.637 --> 06:57.192 to start off with Ukraine , 06:57.220 --> 07:00.130 particularly the dam break and the 07:00.140 --> 07:02.362 catastrophic flooding that's going on . 07:02.362 --> 07:04.670 Um Typically in humanitarian disasters 07:04.679 --> 07:06.790 of this size , there's a role for dod 07:06.790 --> 07:08.512 to play whether it's flying in 07:08.512 --> 07:10.401 humanitarian aid , assisting with 07:10.401 --> 07:12.690 evacuations . Does the ongoing conflict 07:12.700 --> 07:16.369 make that impossible ? Sure . Um So , 07:16.380 --> 07:20.350 so as it pertains to uh aid , um right 07:20.359 --> 07:22.581 now , I don't have anything to announce 07:22.581 --> 07:24.748 in terms of what dod uh is providing , 07:24.750 --> 07:26.917 you know , as , as you well know , our 07:26.917 --> 07:29.250 current focus is on security assistance . 07:29.250 --> 07:32.429 I would highlight uh that uh you may 07:32.440 --> 07:34.551 have heard the White House talk today 07:34.551 --> 07:36.496 about USA ID uh working with local 07:36.496 --> 07:38.496 agencies and international agencies 07:38.496 --> 07:40.779 that are on the ground to provide some 07:40.790 --> 07:43.309 humanitarian assistance . Uh which 07:43.320 --> 07:46.799 includes things like uh transportation 07:46.809 --> 07:48.809 for people away from the flooding , 07:48.809 --> 07:50.700 distributing water , purification 07:50.709 --> 07:52.809 equipment , water pumps , um boat 07:52.820 --> 07:55.230 motors , other rescue gear . So I would 07:55.239 --> 07:57.461 refer you to USA ID to talk about those 07:57.461 --> 07:59.461 particular efforts . Um but when it 07:59.461 --> 08:01.461 comes to dod right now , um I don't 08:01.461 --> 08:03.517 have anything to announce them . And 08:03.517 --> 08:06.010 then so that sometimes duty aircraft 08:06.019 --> 08:08.241 are used to fly in that aid too is that 08:08.260 --> 08:10.940 it cannot not even be uh it's not 08:10.950 --> 08:13.061 something that , that we're currently 08:13.061 --> 08:15.117 looking at again . If that changes , 08:15.117 --> 08:15.049 we'll be sure to let you know . And 08:15.059 --> 08:17.899 then secondly , there's a lot of 08:17.910 --> 08:19.966 reporting right now that the counter 08:19.966 --> 08:22.500 offensive has begun based on activity 08:22.510 --> 08:25.290 you're seeing on the banks of the river 08:25.440 --> 08:28.140 in Zaria . What can you say about that ? 08:28.600 --> 08:30.822 Yeah , so uh we're certainly monitoring 08:30.822 --> 08:33.130 reports of increased fighting between 08:33.140 --> 08:35.619 Ukrainian and Russian forces at various 08:35.630 --> 08:37.630 locations across the front lines in 08:37.630 --> 08:40.289 Ukraine . But when it comes to 08:40.299 --> 08:42.077 characterizing those particular 08:42.077 --> 08:43.966 operations or talking about those 08:43.966 --> 08:46.188 operations . Uh That's really something 08:46.188 --> 08:48.521 that's best left to the Ukrainians . Ok , 08:48.521 --> 08:50.466 Jennifer , have you assessed who's 08:50.466 --> 08:52.688 responsible for blowing up the dam ? Uh 08:52.688 --> 08:54.855 We have not at this time , we're still 08:54.855 --> 08:57.021 continuing to look at that . And there 08:57.021 --> 08:59.132 are two reports today suggesting that 08:59.132 --> 09:02.030 the Chinese have a new agreement with 09:02.039 --> 09:04.909 Cuba to set up a listening post in Cuba . 09:05.210 --> 09:08.039 Are those reports accurate ? Uh What is 09:08.049 --> 09:10.400 the extent is there a new listening 09:10.409 --> 09:13.640 post in Cuba um that affects the United 09:13.650 --> 09:15.880 States ? Yes . So , so uh I've seen 09:15.890 --> 09:18.057 that , that reporting , I can tell you 09:18.057 --> 09:20.168 based on the information that we have 09:20.168 --> 09:22.279 that that is not accurate . Uh that , 09:22.279 --> 09:24.690 that we are not aware of China and Cuba 09:24.869 --> 09:27.349 uh developing any type of spy station 09:27.359 --> 09:29.248 separately . I would say that the 09:29.248 --> 09:31.359 relationship that those two countries 09:31.359 --> 09:33.581 share is something that we continuously 09:33.581 --> 09:35.940 monitor . Uh I would say that that as 09:35.950 --> 09:38.380 you've heard us say many times China's 09:38.390 --> 09:40.739 activities both in our hemisphere and 09:40.750 --> 09:42.639 around the world , any concerning 09:42.639 --> 09:44.750 activities are something that we will 09:44.750 --> 09:47.770 continue to , to watch closely . Um But 09:47.780 --> 09:49.724 in terms of that , that particular 09:49.724 --> 09:51.780 report , uh no , it's not accurate . 09:51.780 --> 09:54.002 Have you seen China set up any military 09:54.002 --> 09:55.947 base in Cuba or is there any plans 09:56.000 --> 09:58.222 we've seen elsewhere in the region that 09:58.222 --> 10:00.739 they have ? Yeah , none that I'm aware 10:00.750 --> 10:03.359 of at this time . Getting back to 10:03.369 --> 10:05.536 Ukraine , you can't talk about Ukraine 10:05.536 --> 10:07.591 is doing . What about what Russia is 10:07.591 --> 10:09.813 doing . Are you seeing any movements of 10:09.813 --> 10:11.980 troops , shifts of troops , additional 10:11.980 --> 10:14.202 forces coming in along the front line ? 10:14.202 --> 10:16.036 Yeah , Tom , so I appreciate the 10:16.036 --> 10:18.202 question . Um What I'm not going to do 10:18.202 --> 10:20.369 today is provide an operational update 10:20.369 --> 10:22.369 on , on ongoing developments on the 10:22.369 --> 10:24.591 battlefield . You know , clearly Russia 10:24.591 --> 10:26.591 for some time has been building its 10:26.591 --> 10:29.460 defenses in Ukraine and in anticipation 10:29.469 --> 10:32.460 of a Ukrainian counter offensive . Uh 10:32.469 --> 10:34.691 And so , you know , that's about as far 10:34.691 --> 10:37.000 as I'll go right now coming in . Can 10:37.010 --> 10:39.066 you at least say you , you're seeing 10:39.066 --> 10:42.219 some uh beyond what we've seen in terms 10:42.229 --> 10:44.285 of , you know , replacement forces . 10:44.285 --> 10:46.229 I'm not aware of any significant , 10:46.229 --> 10:48.390 large number of additional Russian 10:48.400 --> 10:50.344 forces coming in . But of course , 10:50.344 --> 10:52.567 that's something we'll continue to keep 10:52.567 --> 10:54.622 an eye on . Ok . Yes , ma'am . Thank 10:54.622 --> 10:56.979 you so much , sir . Um First for you , 10:56.989 --> 10:59.489 there has been some reporting that Dod 10:59.500 --> 11:02.280 and D T IC are experimenting with open 11:02.289 --> 11:05.130 A I . And so I wanted to um hear a 11:05.140 --> 11:07.029 little bit more about how they're 11:07.029 --> 11:09.251 experimenting with those large language 11:09.251 --> 11:11.362 models and how they're managing their 11:11.362 --> 11:13.418 risks that we continue to hear about 11:13.418 --> 11:15.473 those emerging capabilities . Yeah , 11:15.473 --> 11:17.418 sure . Um So I don't have anything 11:17.418 --> 11:19.640 specific to provide on that . Um So let 11:19.640 --> 11:21.862 me take that question and we'll , we'll 11:21.862 --> 11:23.973 come back to your CD A O to respond . 11:23.973 --> 11:26.196 That would be great . Second question . 11:26.196 --> 11:28.362 Um The bolt typhoon China linked cyber 11:28.362 --> 11:30.625 attack that we've been hearing a lot 11:30.635 --> 11:33.494 about how is dod responding if at all ? 11:33.505 --> 11:35.227 And at this point , is it your 11:35.227 --> 11:37.227 assessment that it was contained to 11:37.227 --> 11:39.338 Guam ? Yeah , when it , when it comes 11:39.338 --> 11:41.394 to uh those kinds of activities as a 11:41.394 --> 11:43.338 matter of policy and for operation 11:43.338 --> 11:45.394 security , we're just not gonna talk 11:45.394 --> 11:47.616 about what actions we may or may not be 11:47.616 --> 11:49.561 taking . Obviously , we take cyber 11:49.561 --> 11:51.727 security very seriously , but I'm just 11:51.727 --> 11:51.440 not gonna go into details . Yes , ma'am . 11:51.460 --> 11:53.750 Thank you and uh very happy to be back 11:53.760 --> 11:57.049 this year . Um I just wanted to follow 11:57.059 --> 11:59.359 up um on Jen and your response to Jen's 11:59.369 --> 12:01.770 question . Um So you said it's not 12:01.780 --> 12:03.679 accurate that China and Cuba are 12:03.690 --> 12:05.969 developing uh spying base here ? Is 12:05.979 --> 12:07.979 that , are you aware of discussions 12:07.979 --> 12:10.312 about this or are there , is the report , 12:10.539 --> 12:12.650 are those reports completely just not 12:12.650 --> 12:14.317 accurate again , based on the 12:14.317 --> 12:16.206 information that we have ? Uh the 12:16.206 --> 12:18.739 report is inaccurate ? Certainly , we , 12:18.750 --> 12:20.583 we know that that China and Cuba 12:20.583 --> 12:23.760 maintain a relationship of sorts . But 12:23.770 --> 12:26.409 when it comes to the specific outlined 12:26.840 --> 12:29.179 uh in the press reporting again , based 12:29.190 --> 12:31.357 on the information we have that is not 12:31.357 --> 12:33.357 accurate . And then um one question 12:33.357 --> 12:35.412 just on the F-16 training , I'm just 12:35.412 --> 12:37.820 wondering if you have any update on um 12:37.830 --> 12:40.210 which countries are going to be 12:40.219 --> 12:42.840 providing support for training 12:42.849 --> 12:45.479 Ukrainian pilots on F-16s . And there 12:45.489 --> 12:48.280 was some reporting that F-18s may be 12:48.289 --> 12:50.450 involved as well . Are there any , is 12:50.460 --> 12:52.571 there any truth to that ? And can you 12:52.571 --> 12:54.682 kind of give us an update . Yeah , in 12:54.682 --> 12:56.516 terms of any additional types of 12:56.516 --> 12:58.682 aircraft , nothing to announce on that 12:58.682 --> 13:00.809 front . Um As far as F-16 pilot 13:00.820 --> 13:03.280 training goes , uh no new updates to 13:03.289 --> 13:05.289 provide today . You know , as we've 13:05.289 --> 13:07.011 talked about in the past , the 13:07.011 --> 13:09.178 Netherlands and Denmark have agreed to 13:09.178 --> 13:11.345 take the lead in terms of developing a 13:11.345 --> 13:13.511 training plan for Ukrainian pilots and 13:13.511 --> 13:15.511 maintainers . Um We do have several 13:15.511 --> 13:17.567 other allies who have said that they 13:17.567 --> 13:19.678 are uh interested in participating in 13:19.678 --> 13:22.520 that training . And so uh I I think the 13:22.530 --> 13:24.989 last time we talked uh from the 13:25.000 --> 13:27.010 briefing room , that was a topic of 13:27.020 --> 13:29.242 discussion um or excuse me , actually , 13:29.242 --> 13:31.076 that was before . So at the last 13:31.076 --> 13:33.131 Ukraine defense contact group , that 13:33.131 --> 13:35.353 was a topic of discussion . We've got a 13:35.353 --> 13:37.464 contact group next week , I expect it 13:37.464 --> 13:39.520 will be discussed there as well . Uh 13:39.520 --> 13:41.631 And so we should have more details in 13:41.631 --> 13:43.798 the relatively near future in terms of 13:43.798 --> 13:46.076 when , where , how um but at this time , 13:46.076 --> 13:47.853 no , nothing new to provide any 13:47.853 --> 13:50.076 requested that they be able to transfer 13:50.076 --> 13:53.179 F-16s to Ukraine uh again , much more 13:53.190 --> 13:55.523 to follow in the in the future . Thanks , 13:55.729 --> 13:58.119 go here , Dan , thank you . Um There's 13:58.130 --> 14:00.241 a , there's a new letter , a new push 14:00.241 --> 14:02.463 bipartisan on the hill kind of circling 14:02.463 --> 14:04.352 back to the Pentagon asking about 14:04.352 --> 14:06.869 attacks , trying to expedite Abrams 14:06.880 --> 14:09.330 moves , trying to expedite uh F-16 14:09.340 --> 14:12.179 moves any reaction to that in general . 14:12.190 --> 14:13.968 And then separately , we're all 14:13.968 --> 14:16.190 watching obviously , the wildfire fires 14:16.190 --> 14:18.412 affect a good portion of the East coast 14:18.412 --> 14:20.830 at this point . Um Senate majority 14:20.840 --> 14:23.159 leader Schumer uh raised the point of 14:23.169 --> 14:25.391 having additional American firefighting 14:25.391 --> 14:27.502 capabilities uh assist Canada if they 14:27.502 --> 14:29.900 ask for it . Do you see a role for dod 14:29.909 --> 14:32.076 in that particularly possibly with the 14:32.076 --> 14:34.298 Guard that already does that on a state 14:34.298 --> 14:36.076 level ? Thanks Dan . So uh last 14:36.076 --> 14:38.298 question , first , I'm not aware of any 14:38.298 --> 14:40.131 specific requests at this time . 14:40.131 --> 14:42.298 Obviously , you know , um firefighting 14:42.299 --> 14:44.521 is a capability that , that some of our 14:44.521 --> 14:46.577 forces as you highlight the Guard uh 14:46.577 --> 14:49.830 have provided support for in the past . 14:50.039 --> 14:52.559 Um But I'm not aware of any specific 14:52.570 --> 14:56.570 asks at this time . Um in terms of 14:56.580 --> 15:00.080 uh congressional requests for or , you 15:00.090 --> 15:01.812 know , highlighting additional 15:01.812 --> 15:04.146 capabilities for Ukraine . I , you know , 15:04.146 --> 15:05.923 I'm not gonna get into specific 15:05.923 --> 15:08.034 conversations or requests between the 15:08.034 --> 15:10.201 Hill and the Pentagon and will respond 15:10.201 --> 15:13.190 appropriately to , to uh Congress when , 15:13.200 --> 15:15.256 when and as those requests come in . 15:15.256 --> 15:17.200 But more broadly speaking , what I 15:17.200 --> 15:19.200 would tell you is uh nothing new to 15:19.210 --> 15:21.789 announce today in that regard . Uh As 15:21.799 --> 15:23.966 we have been from the very beginning , 15:23.966 --> 15:25.966 we'll continue to talk very closely 15:25.966 --> 15:28.021 with our Ukrainian partners with our 15:28.021 --> 15:30.510 allies on what Ukrainians most pressing 15:30.520 --> 15:33.450 needs are . Uh And so , you know , as , 15:33.460 --> 15:35.571 as we've talked about many times , we 15:35.571 --> 15:37.682 are committed to supporting them both 15:37.682 --> 15:39.904 in the near term and in the long term , 15:39.904 --> 15:41.793 uh and we'll continue to keep you 15:41.793 --> 15:43.904 updated as there are new developments 15:43.904 --> 15:45.849 on that front . Thank you . Sure . 15:45.849 --> 15:48.182 Thanks Liam Cosgrove with the gray zone . 15:48.182 --> 15:50.182 Quick question on the coke of a dam 15:50.182 --> 15:51.960 explosion . So several European 15:51.960 --> 15:53.904 politicians have come out and were 15:53.904 --> 15:56.127 quick to blame Russia saying you know , 15:56.127 --> 15:58.460 this is an example of Russian terrorism . 15:58.460 --> 16:00.627 But if you look at the context the dam 16:00.627 --> 16:02.793 was in Russian occupied territory . Um 16:02.840 --> 16:05.489 The Ukrainian Ecological League said 16:05.500 --> 16:07.611 this could leave Crimea without water 16:07.611 --> 16:10.000 for over a decade . And there were 16:10.010 --> 16:12.010 reports in the Washington Post last 16:12.010 --> 16:13.899 year that Ukrainian soldiers were 16:13.899 --> 16:15.954 explicitly looking at targeting this 16:15.954 --> 16:18.121 dam as part of a strategy to flood the 16:18.121 --> 16:20.066 region and prevent further Russian 16:20.066 --> 16:22.121 advancements . And they even fired a 16:22.121 --> 16:24.288 couple Haimar missiles into it to test 16:24.288 --> 16:26.454 that theory . So can the dod share any 16:26.454 --> 16:28.788 evidence as to who might have done this ? 16:28.788 --> 16:30.399 And are you entertaining the 16:30.399 --> 16:32.399 possibility that it might have been 16:32.399 --> 16:34.510 Ukraine ? Yeah . Well , I like as you 16:34.510 --> 16:34.210 heard us say , I mean , we're 16:34.219 --> 16:36.609 continuing to assess how this could 16:36.619 --> 16:38.786 have happened . Uh So , you know , all 16:38.786 --> 16:41.063 great questions . Uh but at this point , 16:41.063 --> 16:44.000 it's all speculation . Um And so , you 16:44.010 --> 16:45.677 know , I'm not gonna get into 16:45.677 --> 16:47.788 hypotheticals or speculate . Um I , I 16:47.788 --> 16:50.710 think it's very clear , however , uh 16:50.719 --> 16:53.010 the reason we're in this situation is 16:53.020 --> 16:56.039 because Russia invaded Ukraine . Uh And , 16:56.049 --> 16:57.909 and so it's obviously a terrible 16:57.919 --> 16:59.960 humanitarian tragedy and you , you 16:59.969 --> 17:01.969 heard me talk here a little bit ago 17:01.969 --> 17:03.691 about how the US government is 17:03.691 --> 17:06.359 attempting to assist the Ukrainians on 17:06.369 --> 17:09.040 the humanitarian front . Um but in 17:09.050 --> 17:12.260 terms of how this uh dam could have 17:12.270 --> 17:14.270 been destroyed , you know , again , 17:14.270 --> 17:16.492 it's something that we're continuing to 17:16.492 --> 17:18.959 look into . We have seen before where 17:18.969 --> 17:22.670 Ukraine , you know , a avoids 17:22.680 --> 17:24.569 culpability and is quick to blame 17:24.569 --> 17:26.791 Russia like that missile that went into 17:26.791 --> 17:28.902 Poland . Um that they said was Russia 17:28.902 --> 17:31.124 turned out , it was actually Ukraine by 17:31.124 --> 17:33.236 accident . So is there a concern that 17:33.236 --> 17:35.347 they're not being totally transparent 17:35.347 --> 17:37.458 with us and that , you know , efforts 17:37.458 --> 17:39.780 like this , um with the dam , you know , 17:39.790 --> 17:41.957 putting the dam aside because we don't 17:41.957 --> 17:44.179 know who did it , but that , you know , 17:44.229 --> 17:46.451 and never like that with the missile in 17:46.451 --> 17:48.173 Poland and perhaps the dam are 17:48.173 --> 17:50.285 attempting to draw us deeper into the 17:50.285 --> 17:52.507 conflict by blaming Russia , you know , 17:52.507 --> 17:54.840 when we don't know yet . Yeah . So , uh , 17:54.840 --> 17:56.729 you know , you , you started your 17:56.729 --> 17:58.951 question with , you know , more broadly 17:58.951 --> 18:01.173 speaking . So I'll , I'll do the same . 18:01.173 --> 18:01.000 I'll talk more broadly here . I mean , 18:03.000 --> 18:04.889 as we say , in the Air force from 18:04.889 --> 18:08.550 10,000 ft again , why are we in this 18:08.560 --> 18:11.310 situation in February of 2022 Russia 18:11.319 --> 18:13.199 invaded Ukraine and attempted to 18:13.209 --> 18:15.153 eliminate it as a country . So the 18:15.153 --> 18:17.209 Ukrainians naturally have a right to 18:17.209 --> 18:19.376 defend themselves . Uh , and we have a 18:19.376 --> 18:21.376 right to be able to support them to 18:21.376 --> 18:23.431 defend themselves . I'm not going to 18:23.431 --> 18:25.653 speak for the Ukrainians in terms of uh 18:25.653 --> 18:27.653 their various activities . Um , you 18:27.660 --> 18:29.604 know , when , when it comes to the 18:29.604 --> 18:31.771 things that you highlight , other than 18:31.771 --> 18:33.716 to say , it's very clear that on a 18:33.716 --> 18:35.882 daily basis , there are Russian forces 18:35.882 --> 18:38.160 attempting to kill innocent Ukrainians . 18:38.160 --> 18:40.327 And so we the United States government 18:40.327 --> 18:39.319 are going to work with the 18:39.329 --> 18:40.996 international community to do 18:40.996 --> 18:43.107 everything we can to help them defend 18:43.107 --> 18:45.218 their country and take back sovereign 18:45.218 --> 18:47.385 territory . So let me go to Rio behind 18:47.385 --> 18:49.440 you there . Uh Thank you very much , 18:49.440 --> 18:51.449 General . Uh on NATO , NATO is 18:51.459 --> 18:53.800 considering a new office in Tokyo , 18:53.810 --> 18:56.530 Japan to show its alignment with the 18:56.709 --> 18:59.439 Pacific region . But the France is 18:59.449 --> 19:01.689 opposing this initiative . Does the 19:01.699 --> 19:04.239 Pentagon support a new NATO office in 19:04.250 --> 19:07.000 Tokyo ? Um What I would tell you is 19:07.010 --> 19:09.177 that , you know , we certainly welcome 19:09.177 --> 19:11.399 the increasing cooperation between NATO 19:11.399 --> 19:14.569 and our and our Asian allies . Um Japan 19:14.579 --> 19:17.050 is a cornerstone of our security in the 19:17.060 --> 19:19.227 Indo Pacific region . Our , our shared 19:19.227 --> 19:21.560 vision for a free and open Indo Pacific . 19:21.560 --> 19:23.660 Uh We certainly welcome them as a uh 19:23.670 --> 19:26.150 NATO global partner . But when it comes 19:26.160 --> 19:28.420 to whether or not NATO is gonna open an 19:28.430 --> 19:31.170 office in Japan , uh That's really a 19:31.180 --> 19:34.219 question for NATO and Japan and , and 19:34.229 --> 19:36.118 France in this case to address it 19:36.118 --> 19:38.310 follow up when the secretary was in 19:38.319 --> 19:40.550 France this week . Did the secretary 19:40.560 --> 19:42.560 have a chance to discuss this issue 19:42.560 --> 19:44.782 with , with his French counterpart ? Uh 19:44.782 --> 19:47.004 This particular issue did not come up ? 19:47.050 --> 19:50.719 OK . Yes , ma'am . Thank you . My name 19:50.729 --> 19:54.410 is Ariana from T P A Angola . So 19:54.670 --> 19:56.560 can you tell us what could be the 19:56.569 --> 20:00.390 consequences if China and Cuba indeed 20:00.400 --> 20:03.709 building a more stronger relationship 20:03.719 --> 20:05.830 other than the one that you are aware 20:05.830 --> 20:07.663 of ? Well , you know , without , 20:07.663 --> 20:09.552 without getting into , you know , 20:09.552 --> 20:11.569 hypothetical situations , I think 20:11.579 --> 20:14.050 broadly speaking , uh as I mentioned 20:14.060 --> 20:17.430 before , uh any type of activity , 20:17.439 --> 20:19.880 coercive activity or belligerent 20:19.890 --> 20:22.339 activity within our hemisphere is 20:22.349 --> 20:24.293 something that we're watching very 20:24.293 --> 20:26.405 closely when it comes to China . It's 20:26.405 --> 20:28.405 something that we've been concerned 20:28.405 --> 20:28.119 about for a while . It's something that 20:28.130 --> 20:30.352 we continue to work with our allies and 20:30.352 --> 20:32.574 partners to counter in the hemisphere . 20:32.709 --> 20:34.876 Uh And so , uh again , without getting 20:34.876 --> 20:37.260 into hypothetical situations , it's 20:37.270 --> 20:39.492 something that we will continue to take 20:39.492 --> 20:41.603 very serious . In the beginning , you 20:41.603 --> 20:44.400 mentioned a few trip , successful trip 20:44.410 --> 20:46.979 uh made by the secretary is any 20:46.989 --> 20:49.199 upcoming visit of the secretary to 20:49.209 --> 20:51.459 Africa . Uh I don't have anything to 20:51.469 --> 20:53.580 announce on that front . Um Obviously 20:53.580 --> 20:55.550 Africa continues to play a very 20:55.560 --> 20:58.040 important role when it comes to our 20:58.050 --> 21:01.000 partnerships uh and our in our national 21:01.010 --> 21:03.250 security interest . Um you know , we 21:03.260 --> 21:05.479 have a lot of very valued partners 21:05.489 --> 21:07.600 throughout the African continent . Uh 21:07.600 --> 21:09.656 And so when the opportunity presents 21:09.656 --> 21:11.810 itself , um you know , the secretary 21:11.819 --> 21:14.097 certainly uh will look forward to that , 21:14.097 --> 21:16.208 but I don't have anything to announce 21:16.208 --> 21:18.486 right now . Thank you very much , Tony . 21:18.486 --> 21:20.597 Well , you were traveling last week , 21:20.597 --> 21:20.530 the the nation came together on the 21:20.540 --> 21:22.229 debt ceiling agreement 21:24.099 --> 21:26.979 afterwards , Mr mccarthy , the House 21:26.989 --> 21:29.510 speaker threw cold water on the idea of 21:29.520 --> 21:32.189 defense supplemental to uh overcome the 21:32.199 --> 21:36.140 $886 billion national security cap . He 21:36.150 --> 21:38.317 became the latest politician to invoke 21:38.317 --> 21:40.428 the fact that the Pentagon has failed 21:40.428 --> 21:43.660 five audits in a row . His point was 21:44.130 --> 21:46.297 they failed five audits in a row . You 21:46.297 --> 21:48.352 don't think there's waste . This has 21:48.352 --> 21:50.630 become a recurring theme among members . 21:50.630 --> 21:52.852 He's the highest ranking to bring it up 21:52.852 --> 21:54.908 again . What , how do you respond to 21:54.908 --> 21:56.908 that ? The Pentagon can't they fail 21:56.908 --> 21:58.963 five audits ? Is there a correlation 21:58.963 --> 22:01.074 between the failure of the audits and 22:01.074 --> 22:02.963 effectively spending appropriated 22:02.963 --> 22:05.209 dollars from Congress ? Should I be 22:05.219 --> 22:06.941 concerned ? If I don't live in 22:06.941 --> 22:09.329 Washington , you fail five audits and 22:09.339 --> 22:11.506 you're wasting my money you're getting 22:11.506 --> 22:13.506 and you're getting more money every 22:13.506 --> 22:15.506 year . Yeah , thanks Tony . Uh So a 22:15.506 --> 22:15.439 couple of things . So , first of all , 22:15.449 --> 22:17.616 when it comes to audits , I would tell 22:17.616 --> 22:19.890 you that the department welcomes the 22:19.900 --> 22:21.956 scrutiny and the transparency that , 22:21.956 --> 22:25.359 that audits provide . Um these audits 22:25.369 --> 22:27.609 are part of a long term effort to 22:27.619 --> 22:30.229 transform and modernize the , the dod 22:30.569 --> 22:33.520 uh and help us transform . Uh you know , 22:33.699 --> 22:35.930 in , in terms of providing the kinds of 22:36.079 --> 22:38.339 capabilities that the country expects 22:38.510 --> 22:40.177 uh any entity as large as the 22:40.177 --> 22:41.843 department , there's gonna be 22:41.843 --> 22:44.150 challenges uh in terms of uh when you 22:44.160 --> 22:46.510 conduct these types of audits , audits 22:46.520 --> 22:48.742 and it's gonna take time and it's gonna 22:48.742 --> 22:51.209 take investment um while we currently 22:51.219 --> 22:53.630 fall short of having a clean audit of 22:53.640 --> 22:55.473 our financial statements , we do 22:55.473 --> 22:57.584 receive favorable audit opinions on a 22:57.584 --> 22:59.696 significant amount of our resources . 22:59.696 --> 23:01.807 Uh And there are controls in place to 23:01.807 --> 23:04.029 help ensure that taxpayer resources are 23:04.029 --> 23:06.140 being spent as intended by Congress . 23:06.319 --> 23:08.541 Uh So , uh this is something that we're 23:08.541 --> 23:10.763 gonna continue to take very seriously . 23:10.763 --> 23:12.763 Uh We understand uh what we've been 23:12.763 --> 23:14.875 charged with as a department in terms 23:14.875 --> 23:17.041 of national security and the , and the 23:17.041 --> 23:19.263 appropriate use of taxpayer resources . 23:19.263 --> 23:21.541 And so we'll continue to stay after it . 23:21.541 --> 23:23.763 You hear correctly . There's not a real 23:23.763 --> 23:25.875 correlation between failed audits and 23:25.875 --> 23:28.949 effectively spending obligating dollars . 23:28.959 --> 23:31.869 Congress authorizes and appropriates 23:31.880 --> 23:33.936 every year . There are two different 23:34.020 --> 23:36.160 entities , two different mechanisms , 23:36.770 --> 23:38.770 right ? I mean , uh again , when it 23:38.770 --> 23:41.439 comes to uh managing the resources of 23:41.449 --> 23:43.671 the department , um again , we're gonna 23:43.671 --> 23:45.671 do everything we can to effectively 23:45.671 --> 23:48.099 manage and spend uh those , do those 23:48.109 --> 23:50.880 dollars . Um when it comes to the audit . 23:50.890 --> 23:52.890 Uh again , that's something that we 23:52.890 --> 23:55.057 going to continue to work very hard in 23:55.057 --> 23:57.057 terms of ensuring that we can track 23:57.057 --> 23:59.279 where those dollars are being spent and 23:59.279 --> 24:00.946 how they're being spent . One 24:00.946 --> 24:03.168 transparency question to a couple about 24:03.168 --> 24:05.334 a week and a half ago , the department 24:05.334 --> 24:07.168 disclosed that SpaceX received a 24:07.168 --> 24:10.160 contract for Starlink terminals . They 24:10.170 --> 24:12.239 refuse your , your , your body , you 24:12.250 --> 24:14.949 refused to even allow how much of it 24:14.959 --> 24:17.181 was the contract was worth . Can you go 24:17.181 --> 24:19.439 back and revisit that these are white 24:19.449 --> 24:21.689 systems ? It's not classified and I 24:21.699 --> 24:23.755 think the public had a right to know 24:23.755 --> 24:25.866 roughly how much money is being spent 24:25.866 --> 24:27.699 by on the Sterling terminals for 24:27.699 --> 24:29.866 Ukraine . Yeah , I'll , I'll take your 24:29.866 --> 24:31.921 question . Um , you know , as you've 24:31.921 --> 24:33.866 heard us talk about for reasons of 24:33.866 --> 24:35.977 operational security and , and due to 24:35.977 --> 24:37.810 the critical nature of satellite 24:37.810 --> 24:39.866 communication systems , uh it's just 24:39.866 --> 24:41.977 something that we're just not able to 24:41.977 --> 24:44.310 get into , to details at , at this time . 24:44.310 --> 24:43.630 So all those are different than 24:43.640 --> 24:45.640 technologies and how many and where 24:45.640 --> 24:47.640 they're being placed . That's all I 24:47.640 --> 24:49.751 wanna do . Yeah . No , I understand . 24:49.751 --> 24:51.918 Thank you . Ok , time for a few more . 24:51.918 --> 24:53.973 Let me go to Tom . Welcome back from 24:53.973 --> 24:56.084 your trip . Two follow up questions , 24:56.084 --> 24:58.029 please . Um uh Putting on your Air 24:58.029 --> 24:59.973 Force hat again , as you said from 24:59.973 --> 25:01.807 10,000 ft . Follow up on Laura's 25:01.807 --> 25:04.029 question regarding the F-18s from a Air 25:04.035 --> 25:06.146 Force point of view . What would they 25:06.146 --> 25:09.135 bring to a conflict like Ukraine ? Uh I 25:09.145 --> 25:11.256 appreciate the question , Tom , but I 25:11.256 --> 25:13.256 don't want to get into hypothetical 25:13.256 --> 25:15.256 discussions about capabilities that 25:15.256 --> 25:17.367 Yeah . No , I understand . I , I just 25:17.367 --> 25:19.423 by me answering that question though 25:19.423 --> 25:21.756 implies that we're now gonna , you know , 25:21.756 --> 25:21.750 go down a fictional road where Yeah . 25:21.760 --> 25:23.982 No , I understand . Yeah . So follow up 25:23.982 --> 25:25.989 was to Brandy's question about the 25:26.040 --> 25:28.270 attack on Guam and one of the parts you 25:28.359 --> 25:30.869 didn't respond to was uh whether it was 25:30.880 --> 25:33.109 beyond Guam , the attack . Could you 25:33.119 --> 25:35.341 address that again ? I'm not gonna talk 25:35.341 --> 25:37.563 about , you know , whether or not there 25:37.563 --> 25:39.008 are particular attacks or 25:39.008 --> 25:41.063 vulnerabilities . Uh That that's our 25:41.063 --> 25:43.230 policy when it comes to uh any type of 25:43.230 --> 25:45.520 cyber activities . And yeah , thanks 25:45.530 --> 25:47.697 very much . Yes , sir . No , Robertson 25:47.697 --> 25:49.752 with the Christian science monitor . 25:49.752 --> 25:51.919 Thank you . Um President Zelinsky said 25:51.919 --> 25:53.697 earlier in an interview that uh 25:53.697 --> 25:55.863 humanitarian rescue workers were being 25:55.863 --> 25:58.030 shot at by Russians . They tried to do 25:58.030 --> 25:59.974 work in the flooded area um in the 25:59.974 --> 26:02.141 south of the country . Can you confirm 26:02.141 --> 26:04.197 that and offer any more details of ? 26:04.197 --> 26:04.119 Unfortunately , I can't , I just don't 26:04.130 --> 26:06.241 have that level of detail . Thank you 26:06.241 --> 26:08.241 very much . OK , go to the last two 26:08.241 --> 26:10.619 questions here . Uh Quick question on 26:10.630 --> 26:12.859 North Korean so-called space launch . 26:12.869 --> 26:15.500 Um What is the current U U V analysis 26:15.510 --> 26:17.979 assessment on how soon North Korea is 26:17.989 --> 26:20.459 prepared to conduct the next launch ? I 26:20.469 --> 26:22.810 mean , does D U D assess that it's 26:22.819 --> 26:25.500 technically possible for them to launch 26:25.750 --> 26:28.339 uh conduct the next launch very soon ? 26:28.869 --> 26:30.980 Yeah , so , so I'm not gonna get into 26:30.980 --> 26:33.459 any discussion of intelligence that , 26:33.469 --> 26:35.469 that we may or may not have on that 26:35.469 --> 26:37.413 front . I mean , as you know , the 26:37.413 --> 26:39.580 North Koreans have stated their intent 26:39.580 --> 26:41.802 to do that . You heard multiple leaders 26:41.802 --> 26:44.025 to include us and international leaders 26:44.030 --> 26:45.863 to include Secretary Austin from 26:45.863 --> 26:48.939 Singapore , condemn North Korea's 26:48.949 --> 26:52.880 recent launch . It's destabilizing uh 26:52.890 --> 26:55.680 it is in violation of un Security 26:55.689 --> 26:57.745 Council resolutions . And so again , 26:57.745 --> 26:59.522 we'll continue to stay in close 26:59.522 --> 27:01.890 consultation with our Republic of Korea 27:01.900 --> 27:03.956 and Japanese allies as well as other 27:03.956 --> 27:05.900 allies and partners throughout the 27:05.900 --> 27:08.011 region to continue to discuss uh this 27:08.011 --> 27:10.233 situation and continue to work together 27:10.233 --> 27:12.344 to deter potential aggression . Yes , 27:12.344 --> 27:14.567 sir . Last question . Uh thanks . Uh So 27:14.567 --> 27:16.733 last week , uh the Pentagon rolled out 27:16.733 --> 27:18.678 a policy that aimed at uh that was 27:18.678 --> 27:20.622 aimed at ban banning drag shows on 27:20.622 --> 27:23.810 military installations . Um You know , 27:23.819 --> 27:27.520 what message does the secretary hope 27:27.530 --> 27:30.109 service members take away from this 27:30.119 --> 27:32.560 policy change , especially in light of 27:32.569 --> 27:34.680 the fact that it came at the start of 27:34.680 --> 27:36.791 Pride Month . So um first let me just 27:36.791 --> 27:39.630 reiterate upfront that Dod recognizes 27:39.640 --> 27:43.260 June as LGBT Q I Plus Pride Month and 27:43.270 --> 27:45.339 that we are very grateful for and 27:45.349 --> 27:47.460 acknowledge the many contributions of 27:47.460 --> 27:49.293 service members and dod civilian 27:49.293 --> 27:51.650 employees from the LGBT Q I plus 27:51.660 --> 27:53.890 community who serve our country . And 27:53.900 --> 27:55.956 as , as you well know , those of you 27:55.956 --> 27:58.050 who've covered Dod uh we conduct 27:58.060 --> 28:00.599 special observance months to recognize 28:00.609 --> 28:02.553 the continuous achievements of all 28:02.553 --> 28:04.849 Americans uh and to American culture 28:04.859 --> 28:06.989 for increased awareness , mutual 28:07.000 --> 28:09.056 respect and understanding to include 28:09.056 --> 28:11.111 Pride Month uh when it comes to drag 28:11.111 --> 28:13.111 shows . However , uh you know , I I 28:13.111 --> 28:15.339 would take exception uh this has been a 28:15.349 --> 28:18.699 long standing policy uh in terms of uh 28:18.709 --> 28:22.280 of a activities like this uh 28:22.290 --> 28:24.910 that dod will not host drag events at 28:24.920 --> 28:26.689 us , military installations or 28:26.699 --> 28:29.680 facilities . We became aware uh of the 28:29.689 --> 28:32.579 drag events uh during uh an April 28:32.589 --> 28:36.030 congressional hearing uh at that that 28:36.119 --> 28:38.341 there were a uh drag event scheduled to 28:38.341 --> 28:40.341 take place at dod installations and 28:40.341 --> 28:42.880 facilities . And so , uh again , the 28:42.890 --> 28:45.001 secretary advised that the department 28:45.001 --> 28:48.849 will not host such events and you know , 28:48.859 --> 28:51.469 uh drawing on my , you know , just as a 28:51.479 --> 28:53.646 quick follow up draw drawing on my own 28:53.646 --> 28:55.757 navy background . I know , you know , 28:55.757 --> 28:57.701 crossing the line ceremonies , for 28:57.701 --> 28:59.812 example , feature one of the elements 28:59.812 --> 29:01.979 is oftentimes male sailors dressing in 29:01.979 --> 29:05.859 female garb is there is does the 29:05.869 --> 29:08.209 policy go so far as to address 29:08.219 --> 29:10.500 activities like that at the ? So , so 29:10.510 --> 29:12.621 again , what we're talking about here 29:12.621 --> 29:15.020 is um using dod installations and 29:15.030 --> 29:17.250 facilities uh to host these type of 29:17.260 --> 29:20.140 events . And so per dod joint ethics 29:20.150 --> 29:22.410 regulations , certain criteria must be 29:22.420 --> 29:24.476 met for persons or for organizations 29:24.476 --> 29:27.209 acting in a non federal capacity to use 29:27.219 --> 29:30.189 dod facilities and equipment . So 29:30.479 --> 29:32.368 hosting these types of events and 29:32.368 --> 29:34.090 federally funded facilities is 29:34.090 --> 29:36.829 inconsistent with regulations regarding 29:36.839 --> 29:39.520 the use of dod resources . Ok . Thank 29:39.530 --> 29:41.697 you very much , everybody . Appreciate 29:41.697 --> 29:40.869 it .