1 00:00:01,210 --> 00:00:03,321 All right , good afternoon , everyone 2 00:00:03,321 --> 00:00:05,154 and welcome to our in person and 3 00:00:05,154 --> 00:00:07,199 virtual uh participants in today's 4 00:00:07,210 --> 00:00:09,210 press briefing uh to my left in the 5 00:00:09,210 --> 00:00:11,321 room . We are grateful to have uh the 6 00:00:11,321 --> 00:00:13,488 undersecretary of defense for policy , 7 00:00:13,488 --> 00:00:15,599 Dr Colin Cole . Uh We'll have roughly 8 00:00:15,599 --> 00:00:17,710 30 minutes today for our discussion . 9 00:00:17,909 --> 00:00:20,076 Uh and we will endeavor to get through 10 00:00:20,076 --> 00:00:22,298 as many questions as possible uh in the 11 00:00:22,298 --> 00:00:24,540 briefing room and online if I do not 12 00:00:24,549 --> 00:00:26,493 call you out by your name and your 13 00:00:26,493 --> 00:00:28,549 outlet , if you can please introduce 14 00:00:28,549 --> 00:00:30,605 yourself when asking your question . 15 00:00:30,605 --> 00:00:32,493 And with that , I will toss it to 16 00:00:32,493 --> 00:00:34,660 Doctor Cole . Great , thanks Dave . Uh 17 00:00:34,660 --> 00:00:36,882 Good afternoon , everybody . I'm deeply 18 00:00:36,882 --> 00:00:39,009 grateful for another opportunity to 19 00:00:39,020 --> 00:00:41,242 address you all today . This time ahead 20 00:00:41,242 --> 00:00:43,290 of my travel to the NATO summit in 21 00:00:43,299 --> 00:00:45,970 Vilnius with the president and with 22 00:00:45,979 --> 00:00:48,299 Secretary Austin next week . And before 23 00:00:48,310 --> 00:00:50,532 my eventual transition from leading our 24 00:00:50,532 --> 00:00:52,754 policy apparatus here in the Pentagon , 25 00:00:52,754 --> 00:00:54,977 which has been the honor of my lifetime 26 00:00:54,977 --> 00:00:57,199 at such a critical period in the global 27 00:00:57,199 --> 00:00:59,254 security environment . As you know , 28 00:00:59,254 --> 00:01:02,029 NATO leaders will convene in Vilnius at 29 00:01:02,040 --> 00:01:04,096 a crucial juncture for transatlantic 30 00:01:04,096 --> 00:01:06,330 security . 17 months into Russia's 31 00:01:06,339 --> 00:01:08,450 unlawful aggression against Ukraine , 32 00:01:08,450 --> 00:01:10,172 we bear witness to the tragedy 33 00:01:10,172 --> 00:01:12,228 unfolding in the heart of Europe . A 34 00:01:12,228 --> 00:01:14,395 tragedy that Vladimir Putin can end at 35 00:01:14,395 --> 00:01:16,228 any time as by every measure his 36 00:01:16,228 --> 00:01:18,395 objectives have not been fulfilled and 37 00:01:18,395 --> 00:01:20,728 they will not be fulfilled . In Ukraine . 38 00:01:20,728 --> 00:01:22,561 The nations of NATO stand united 39 00:01:22,561 --> 00:01:24,783 alongside nations from around the world 40 00:01:24,783 --> 00:01:27,309 showing an unwavering determination to 41 00:01:27,319 --> 00:01:29,430 provide unprecedented support to 42 00:01:29,440 --> 00:01:31,162 Ukraine . While simultaneously 43 00:01:31,162 --> 00:01:32,996 strengthening the alliance's own 44 00:01:32,996 --> 00:01:35,180 deterrence and defense . During our 45 00:01:35,190 --> 00:01:37,357 meetings in wilderness , we will build 46 00:01:37,357 --> 00:01:39,579 upon years of adaptation , charting the 47 00:01:39,579 --> 00:01:41,579 course for a more safe , secure and 48 00:01:41,579 --> 00:01:43,809 prosperous world and refining our next 49 00:01:43,819 --> 00:01:46,089 steps in response to the ongoing crisis 50 00:01:46,099 --> 00:01:48,389 in Ukraine . Today , the United States 51 00:01:48,400 --> 00:01:50,289 also continues to demonstrate its 52 00:01:50,289 --> 00:01:52,400 enduring commitment to Ukraine . With 53 00:01:52,400 --> 00:01:54,511 the announcement of a new drawdown of 54 00:01:54,511 --> 00:01:56,233 military assistance to provide 55 00:01:56,233 --> 00:01:58,067 Ukraine's forces with additional 56 00:01:58,067 --> 00:01:59,956 munitions , weapons and equipment 57 00:01:59,956 --> 00:02:02,178 needed to defend their country and push 58 00:02:02,178 --> 00:02:04,233 back on Russia's war of aggression . 59 00:02:04,233 --> 00:02:06,178 With the announcement of this 42nd 60 00:02:06,178 --> 00:02:08,178 presidential drawdown package , the 61 00:02:08,178 --> 00:02:08,139 United States has committed more than 62 00:02:08,149 --> 00:02:11,779 $41.3 billion in military assistance 63 00:02:11,789 --> 00:02:13,567 since Russia first launched its 64 00:02:13,567 --> 00:02:15,456 unprovoked and brutal war against 65 00:02:15,456 --> 00:02:18,809 Ukraine on February 24 2022 and more 66 00:02:18,820 --> 00:02:20,820 than 44.1 billion in military 67 00:02:20,830 --> 00:02:22,759 assistance since Russia's initial 68 00:02:22,770 --> 00:02:25,899 invasion of Ukraine back in 2014 . Some 69 00:02:25,910 --> 00:02:27,960 of the capabilities in today's $800 70 00:02:27,970 --> 00:02:30,649 million drawdown package include 105 5 71 00:02:30,660 --> 00:02:32,771 millimeter artillery rounds including 72 00:02:32,771 --> 00:02:34,789 dual purpose improved conventional 73 00:02:34,800 --> 00:02:37,550 munitions or to picks and 15 millimeter 74 00:02:37,559 --> 00:02:40,139 artillery rounds , additional munitions 75 00:02:40,149 --> 00:02:42,149 for patriot air defense systems and 76 00:02:42,149 --> 00:02:44,316 ammunition for high mobility artillery 77 00:02:44,316 --> 00:02:45,982 rocket systems or high mars , 78 00:02:46,100 --> 00:02:48,156 additional Bradley infantry fighting 79 00:02:48,156 --> 00:02:50,267 vehicles , additional striker armored 80 00:02:50,267 --> 00:02:52,378 personnel carriers , precision aerial 81 00:02:52,378 --> 00:02:54,669 munitions , demolition munitions and 82 00:02:54,679 --> 00:02:57,139 systems for obstacle clearing and 83 00:02:57,149 --> 00:02:59,399 various uh spare parts and operational 84 00:02:59,410 --> 00:03:01,800 sustainment equipment . With this 85 00:03:01,809 --> 00:03:03,698 announcement , we will be able to 86 00:03:03,698 --> 00:03:05,531 provide Ukraine with hundreds of 87 00:03:05,531 --> 00:03:07,420 thousands of additional artillery 88 00:03:07,420 --> 00:03:09,587 ammunition immediately . This decision 89 00:03:09,587 --> 00:03:11,753 will ensure we can sustain our support 90 00:03:11,753 --> 00:03:13,865 for Ukraine by bridging us to a point 91 00:03:13,865 --> 00:03:15,753 where we are producing sufficient 92 00:03:15,753 --> 00:03:17,976 artillery ammunition on a monthly basis 93 00:03:17,976 --> 00:03:20,198 across the coalition . We recognize the 94 00:03:20,198 --> 00:03:22,309 complexities here which is why I want 95 00:03:22,309 --> 00:03:24,309 to quickly provide a few additional 96 00:03:24,309 --> 00:03:26,253 pieces of information on DP IC M . 97 00:03:26,253 --> 00:03:28,365 First , Russia has been using cluster 98 00:03:28,365 --> 00:03:30,420 munitions munitions indiscriminately 99 00:03:30,420 --> 00:03:32,642 since the start of this war in order to 100 00:03:32,642 --> 00:03:34,809 attack Ukraine . By contrast , Ukraine 101 00:03:34,809 --> 00:03:36,880 is seeking DPM rounds in order to 102 00:03:36,889 --> 00:03:38,970 defend its own sovereign territory . 103 00:03:39,589 --> 00:03:41,645 Second , compared to Russian cluster 104 00:03:41,645 --> 00:03:43,960 munitions , the DPC rounds we will 105 00:03:43,970 --> 00:03:46,081 provide Ukraine have an extremely low 106 00:03:46,089 --> 00:03:49,009 failure or dead rate . The DM 107 00:03:49,020 --> 00:03:51,242 ammunition we are delivering to Ukraine 108 00:03:51,242 --> 00:03:53,353 will consist only of those with a dud 109 00:03:53,353 --> 00:03:56,479 rate . Less than 2.35% compare that to 110 00:03:56,490 --> 00:03:58,490 Russia which has been using cluster 111 00:03:58,490 --> 00:04:00,712 munitions across Ukraine with dud rates 112 00:04:00,712 --> 00:04:04,279 of between 30 40% during the first year 113 00:04:04,289 --> 00:04:06,770 of the conflict alone , Russia fired 114 00:04:06,779 --> 00:04:09,001 cluster munitions deployed from a range 115 00:04:09,001 --> 00:04:11,223 of weapons systems have likely expended 116 00:04:11,223 --> 00:04:13,223 tens of millions of submunitions or 117 00:04:13,223 --> 00:04:16,230 bomblets across Ukraine . Third , we're 118 00:04:16,239 --> 00:04:18,295 working with Ukraine to minimize the 119 00:04:18,295 --> 00:04:20,350 risks associated with the decision . 120 00:04:20,350 --> 00:04:22,572 The Ukrainian government has offered us 121 00:04:22,572 --> 00:04:24,183 assurances in writing on the 122 00:04:24,183 --> 00:04:26,295 responsible use of DMS including that 123 00:04:26,295 --> 00:04:28,072 they will not use the rounds in 124 00:04:28,072 --> 00:04:30,183 civilian populated urban environments 125 00:04:30,183 --> 00:04:32,239 and that they will record where they 126 00:04:32,239 --> 00:04:34,295 use these rounds which will simplify 127 00:04:34,295 --> 00:04:36,406 later demining efforts . Ukraine also 128 00:04:36,406 --> 00:04:38,295 has committed to post conflict in 129 00:04:38,295 --> 00:04:40,017 mining efforts to mitigate any 130 00:04:40,017 --> 00:04:41,906 potential harm to civilians . The 131 00:04:41,906 --> 00:04:44,128 United States has already invested more 132 00:04:44,128 --> 00:04:46,295 than $95 million in Ukraine's demining 133 00:04:46,295 --> 00:04:48,295 activities and we will provide more 134 00:04:48,295 --> 00:04:50,350 support to help Ukraine mitigate the 135 00:04:50,350 --> 00:04:52,572 impacts of cluster munition use by both 136 00:04:52,572 --> 00:04:54,795 sides in this conflict . And fourth and 137 00:04:54,795 --> 00:04:56,906 this is critical by providing Ukraine 138 00:04:56,906 --> 00:04:59,128 with DPM artillery ammunition . We will 139 00:04:59,128 --> 00:05:01,295 ensure that the Ukrainian military has 140 00:05:01,295 --> 00:05:03,295 sufficient artillery ammunition for 141 00:05:03,295 --> 00:05:05,461 many months to come . In this period . 142 00:05:05,461 --> 00:05:07,406 The United States , our allies and 143 00:05:07,406 --> 00:05:09,517 partners will continue to ramp up our 144 00:05:09,517 --> 00:05:11,461 defense industrial base to support 145 00:05:11,461 --> 00:05:13,628 Ukraine for the past year and a half . 146 00:05:13,628 --> 00:05:15,795 President Biden has been clear that we 147 00:05:15,795 --> 00:05:17,961 will support Ukraine for as long as it 148 00:05:17,961 --> 00:05:20,128 takes . I want to commend the tireless 149 00:05:20,128 --> 00:05:22,295 efforts of the department , our allies 150 00:05:22,295 --> 00:05:22,269 and our partners in delivering this 151 00:05:22,279 --> 00:05:24,279 historically unprecedented level of 152 00:05:24,279 --> 00:05:26,480 security assistance throughout the 153 00:05:26,489 --> 00:05:28,600 Kremlin's vicious war of choice . The 154 00:05:28,600 --> 00:05:30,489 Ukrainian forces have effectively 155 00:05:30,489 --> 00:05:32,211 leveraged assistance and shown 156 00:05:32,211 --> 00:05:33,989 outstanding bravery and skill . 157 00:05:33,989 --> 00:05:36,100 Ukraine's fight is a marathon , not a 158 00:05:36,100 --> 00:05:38,322 sprint . So we will continue to provide 159 00:05:38,322 --> 00:05:40,378 Ukraine with the urgent capabilities 160 00:05:40,378 --> 00:05:42,378 that it needs to meet the moment as 161 00:05:42,378 --> 00:05:44,433 well as what it needs to keep itself 162 00:05:44,433 --> 00:05:46,545 secure for the long term from Russian 163 00:05:46,545 --> 00:05:48,600 aggression . Finally , on a personal 164 00:05:48,600 --> 00:05:50,600 note , as I enter my last week , as 165 00:05:50,600 --> 00:05:52,822 under Secretary of Defense for Policy , 166 00:05:52,822 --> 00:05:52,359 I want to thank the hundreds of 167 00:05:52,369 --> 00:05:54,529 patriots and professionals across OSD 168 00:05:54,540 --> 00:05:56,940 policy . I believe they are the finest 169 00:05:56,950 --> 00:05:59,061 national security organization in the 170 00:05:59,070 --> 00:06:01,459 business for all that they have done to 171 00:06:01,470 --> 00:06:03,303 support Ukraine , strengthen our 172 00:06:03,303 --> 00:06:05,414 alliances and partnerships around the 173 00:06:05,414 --> 00:06:07,690 world and work tirelessly every day 174 00:06:07,739 --> 00:06:09,906 alongside our military and interagency 175 00:06:09,906 --> 00:06:12,017 colleagues to keep America safe . And 176 00:06:12,017 --> 00:06:14,128 with that , I'll pass the mic back to 177 00:06:14,128 --> 00:06:16,461 Dave and look forward to your questions . 178 00:06:16,461 --> 00:06:16,279 Ok . Thanks , sir . Uh We'll go first 179 00:06:16,290 --> 00:06:19,390 to A P . Thank you very much for doing 180 00:06:19,399 --> 00:06:22,109 this . A couple of questions . If you 181 00:06:22,119 --> 00:06:24,175 could talk about the du rate , there 182 00:06:24,175 --> 00:06:26,230 seems to be some questions about how 183 00:06:26,230 --> 00:06:28,230 the US knows that its own munitions 184 00:06:28,230 --> 00:06:30,397 that will be provided will have such a 185 00:06:30,397 --> 00:06:32,508 low rate . And how have you been able 186 00:06:32,508 --> 00:06:34,619 to assure allies that these munitions 187 00:06:34,619 --> 00:06:36,869 won't cause excessive civilian harm ? 188 00:06:37,790 --> 00:06:39,829 And then secondly , is the primary 189 00:06:39,839 --> 00:06:42,279 reason that the cluster munitions are 190 00:06:42,290 --> 00:06:45,390 being used now because there is so much 191 00:06:45,399 --> 00:06:47,890 strain on the 155 millimeter pile . 192 00:06:48,940 --> 00:06:51,107 Yeah , those are , those are important 193 00:06:51,107 --> 00:06:53,162 questions . So look , we're aware of 194 00:06:53,162 --> 00:06:55,162 reporting and I've , I've seen some 195 00:06:55,162 --> 00:06:57,218 things uh in , in the press over the 196 00:06:57,218 --> 00:06:59,162 last 24 hours . Um you know , that 197 00:06:59,162 --> 00:07:01,384 references various dod studies uh which 198 00:07:01,384 --> 00:07:03,607 analyze the dud rates of older versions 199 00:07:03,607 --> 00:07:05,384 of DP IC MS . There are lots of 200 00:07:05,384 --> 00:07:07,329 different variants , I think as we 201 00:07:07,329 --> 00:07:07,260 talked about , you know , the Russians 202 00:07:07,269 --> 00:07:09,436 are , you know , a cluster munition is 203 00:07:09,436 --> 00:07:11,491 not a cluster munition . There are , 204 00:07:11,491 --> 00:07:11,429 there are , there are big differences 205 00:07:11,589 --> 00:07:13,850 between them . Many of those studies 206 00:07:13,859 --> 00:07:15,915 that have been referenced , at least 207 00:07:15,915 --> 00:07:17,970 the ones that I've seen in the press 208 00:07:17,970 --> 00:07:20,137 were based on testing completed in the 209 00:07:20,137 --> 00:07:22,359 19 eighties and many of the DP IC MS of 210 00:07:22,359 --> 00:07:24,081 those variants have since been 211 00:07:24,081 --> 00:07:26,248 demilitarized . Uh We're not providing 212 00:07:26,248 --> 00:07:28,470 those variants of DP IC MS to Ukraine . 213 00:07:28,470 --> 00:07:30,470 Instead we'll be providing our most 214 00:07:30,470 --> 00:07:32,692 modern DP IC MS with DUD rates assessed 215 00:07:32,692 --> 00:07:35,519 to be under 2.35% demonstrated through 216 00:07:35,529 --> 00:07:37,640 five comprehensive tests conducted by 217 00:07:37,640 --> 00:07:39,850 the Department of Defense between 1998 218 00:07:39,859 --> 00:07:43,380 and 2020 . So we're confident in 219 00:07:43,390 --> 00:07:45,970 those in those numbers . I will also 220 00:07:45,980 --> 00:07:49,670 say how they're used matters . And 221 00:07:49,679 --> 00:07:52,029 that's one of the reasons why uh as we 222 00:07:52,040 --> 00:07:54,040 deliberated on this and look this , 223 00:07:54,040 --> 00:07:56,207 this was a , a decision . It took us a 224 00:07:56,207 --> 00:07:57,984 while to come to uh and all the 225 00:07:57,984 --> 00:08:00,040 concerns that people have raised the 226 00:08:00,040 --> 00:08:01,873 humanitarian concerns , what the 227 00:08:01,873 --> 00:08:01,679 reaction of allies and partners would 228 00:08:01,690 --> 00:08:03,857 be , what the rea reaction would be on 229 00:08:03,857 --> 00:08:05,857 the hill . All of these things were 230 00:08:05,857 --> 00:08:08,079 debated and , and adjudicated within uh 231 00:08:08,079 --> 00:08:10,412 the interagency . But one of the things , 232 00:08:10,412 --> 00:08:12,412 uh in addition to the fact that you 233 00:08:12,412 --> 00:08:14,357 know , we weren't providing , uh , 234 00:08:14,357 --> 00:08:16,468 cluster munitions above the rate that 235 00:08:16,468 --> 00:08:18,523 II I talked about was the assurances 236 00:08:18,523 --> 00:08:20,468 that we , uh , got from , uh , the 237 00:08:20,468 --> 00:08:22,468 Ukrainian side on this . Um , we've 238 00:08:22,468 --> 00:08:24,801 gotten these assurances in writing . Uh , 239 00:08:24,801 --> 00:08:26,801 the secretary had an opportunity to 240 00:08:26,801 --> 00:08:28,690 discuss this with , uh , Minister 241 00:08:28,690 --> 00:08:30,801 Reznikoff yesterday and he reiterated 242 00:08:30,801 --> 00:08:33,023 those assurances . And I , I said in my 243 00:08:33,023 --> 00:08:34,746 opening , those assurances are 244 00:08:34,746 --> 00:08:36,912 essentially that , uh , they would not 245 00:08:36,912 --> 00:08:39,079 use DP IC M in uh urban areas that are 246 00:08:39,079 --> 00:08:41,301 populated by civilians . And that there 247 00:08:41,301 --> 00:08:43,468 would be a careful accounting of where 248 00:08:43,468 --> 00:08:45,559 uh they use uh these weapons . Uh 249 00:08:45,570 --> 00:08:47,940 that's going to matter for future uh de 250 00:08:47,950 --> 00:08:50,770 mining uh efforts . I should also say , 251 00:08:50,780 --> 00:08:53,409 well , none of us should minimize this 252 00:08:53,419 --> 00:08:55,641 issue . This is an issue the Ukrainians 253 00:08:55,641 --> 00:08:57,530 are going to have to grapple with 254 00:08:57,530 --> 00:08:59,697 regardless if , if we had never made a 255 00:08:59,697 --> 00:09:01,752 decision on DP IC M . The Ukrainians 256 00:09:01,752 --> 00:09:03,752 would be denying it's going to be a 257 00:09:03,752 --> 00:09:05,697 generational effort because of the 258 00:09:05,697 --> 00:09:08,489 amount of land mines , anti personnel , 259 00:09:08,500 --> 00:09:10,500 anti tank mines , cluster munitions 260 00:09:10,500 --> 00:09:13,929 that the Russians have been using . So 261 00:09:13,940 --> 00:09:16,051 this is an issue we have to tackle uh 262 00:09:16,051 --> 00:09:18,162 regardless we're committed to helping 263 00:09:18,162 --> 00:09:20,500 the , the Ukrainians . Uh do that . You 264 00:09:20,510 --> 00:09:22,788 asked about the primary reason I would , 265 00:09:22,788 --> 00:09:24,899 I would really point to two reasons . 266 00:09:24,899 --> 00:09:27,121 One is the agency of the moment , which 267 00:09:27,121 --> 00:09:29,288 is that , uh you know , the Ukrainians 268 00:09:29,288 --> 00:09:31,177 are in the midst of their counter 269 00:09:31,177 --> 00:09:31,059 offensive . It's been a , it's been 270 00:09:31,070 --> 00:09:33,460 hard sledding . Uh because the Russians 271 00:09:33,469 --> 00:09:35,691 had , you know , six months to dig in . 272 00:09:35,691 --> 00:09:37,802 And so those defensive belts that the 273 00:09:37,802 --> 00:09:39,969 Russians have put in place in the east 274 00:09:39,969 --> 00:09:42,191 and the south are hard , they'd be hard 275 00:09:42,191 --> 00:09:44,559 for any military to punch through . And 276 00:09:44,570 --> 00:09:46,403 so we want to make sure that the 277 00:09:46,403 --> 00:09:48,626 Ukrainians have sufficient artillery to 278 00:09:48,626 --> 00:09:50,737 keep them in the fight in the context 279 00:09:50,737 --> 00:09:52,903 of the current counter offensive . And 280 00:09:52,903 --> 00:09:52,700 because things are going a little 281 00:09:52,710 --> 00:09:55,340 slower than some had hoped , there are 282 00:09:55,349 --> 00:09:57,380 very high expenditures of artillery 283 00:09:57,390 --> 00:09:59,849 rates . So this is to make sure that 284 00:09:59,859 --> 00:10:02,081 the Ukrainians have the confidence that 285 00:10:02,081 --> 00:10:04,359 they have what they need . But frankly , 286 00:10:04,359 --> 00:10:06,526 also that the Russians know that the , 287 00:10:06,526 --> 00:10:08,637 that the Ukrainians are going to stay 288 00:10:08,637 --> 00:10:10,859 in the game . And then the second point 289 00:10:10,859 --> 00:10:13,081 which is important is we don't see this 290 00:10:13,081 --> 00:10:15,248 as a permanent solution , but rather a 291 00:10:15,248 --> 00:10:17,303 bridge , we've already substantially 292 00:10:17,303 --> 00:10:19,526 increased the production of unitary 155 293 00:10:19,526 --> 00:10:21,637 millimeter rounds . The Europeans and 294 00:10:21,637 --> 00:10:23,581 others are also investing in their 295 00:10:23,581 --> 00:10:25,692 defense industrial base . That's good 296 00:10:25,692 --> 00:10:28,026 news and it's starting to pay dividends . 297 00:10:28,026 --> 00:10:27,729 But the reality is we're going to need 298 00:10:27,739 --> 00:10:30,289 to build a bridge to the point at which 299 00:10:30,299 --> 00:10:32,466 that capacity is sufficient on a month 300 00:10:32,466 --> 00:10:34,719 to month basis to keep the Ukrainians 301 00:10:34,739 --> 00:10:36,850 in the artillery fight . And the last 302 00:10:36,850 --> 00:10:39,017 point I will make is a strategic one . 303 00:10:39,017 --> 00:10:41,049 Um Vladimir Putin has a theory of 304 00:10:41,059 --> 00:10:43,369 victory . OK . His theory of victory is 305 00:10:43,380 --> 00:10:45,690 that he will outlast everybody . He'll 306 00:10:45,700 --> 00:10:47,867 outlast the Ukrainians , he'll outlast 307 00:10:47,867 --> 00:10:49,978 the United States . He'll outlast the 308 00:10:49,978 --> 00:10:51,644 Europeans , he'll outlast the 309 00:10:51,644 --> 00:10:53,533 international community . He will 310 00:10:53,533 --> 00:10:55,867 simply brute force his way through this , 311 00:10:55,867 --> 00:10:57,922 having failed in kind of achieving a 312 00:10:57,922 --> 00:11:00,033 lightning victory . He's now going to 313 00:11:00,033 --> 00:11:01,811 play the long game . That's why 314 00:11:01,811 --> 00:11:03,811 President Biden has been clear that 315 00:11:03,811 --> 00:11:03,380 we're going to be with Ukraine as long 316 00:11:03,390 --> 00:11:05,446 as it takes and why we are signaling 317 00:11:05,446 --> 00:11:07,279 that we will continue to provide 318 00:11:07,279 --> 00:11:09,501 Ukraine with the capabilities that will 319 00:11:09,501 --> 00:11:11,723 keep them in the fight . And look , I'm 320 00:11:11,723 --> 00:11:11,489 as concerned about the humanitarian 321 00:11:11,500 --> 00:11:14,960 circumstance as anybody . But the worst 322 00:11:14,969 --> 00:11:17,140 thing for civilians in Ukraine is for 323 00:11:17,150 --> 00:11:19,609 Russia to win the war . Uh And so it's 324 00:11:19,619 --> 00:11:21,979 important that they don't . Let's go , 325 00:11:21,989 --> 00:11:24,580 Liz Fox . Thank you . Thanks for doing 326 00:11:24,590 --> 00:11:26,590 this . Um When will these munitions 327 00:11:26,590 --> 00:11:29,210 make it into Ukraine ? And can you talk 328 00:11:29,219 --> 00:11:31,719 specifically about what the strengths 329 00:11:31,729 --> 00:11:33,919 are of using these cluster munitions ? 330 00:11:33,929 --> 00:11:36,729 Um And are they going to be as 331 00:11:36,739 --> 00:11:38,850 effective as the ones Russia has been 332 00:11:38,850 --> 00:11:42,049 using ? Well , I mean , I don't , I 333 00:11:42,059 --> 00:11:43,948 don't know , I don't want to draw 334 00:11:43,948 --> 00:11:46,115 comparisons between what they're using 335 00:11:46,115 --> 00:11:45,580 it . They're apples and oranges . It's 336 00:11:45,590 --> 00:11:47,757 the point that I made before a cluster 337 00:11:47,757 --> 00:11:49,812 munition is not a cluster munition . 338 00:11:49,812 --> 00:11:51,646 These are uh much more efficient 339 00:11:51,646 --> 00:11:53,701 weapons because they have much lower 340 00:11:53,701 --> 00:11:55,923 dud rates . So the bad news about 30 to 341 00:11:55,923 --> 00:11:58,090 40% dud rates is that it creates a lot 342 00:11:58,090 --> 00:12:00,312 of unexploded ordinance . It also means 343 00:12:00,312 --> 00:11:59,590 it's not generating the effects that 344 00:11:59,599 --> 00:12:01,766 they , that they want either . So what 345 00:12:01,766 --> 00:12:03,599 you want is for these weapons to 346 00:12:03,599 --> 00:12:05,599 generate the effects that they were 347 00:12:05,599 --> 00:12:07,655 designed for . And in this context , 348 00:12:07,655 --> 00:12:09,877 you know , I think they will help um in 349 00:12:09,877 --> 00:12:11,988 some of these security belts that the 350 00:12:11,988 --> 00:12:11,960 Ukraine's are pushing against , against 351 00:12:11,969 --> 00:12:14,369 some of the dug in formations that uh 352 00:12:14,486 --> 00:12:17,056 that the Russians have . I think they 353 00:12:17,065 --> 00:12:18,875 will also be useful for troop 354 00:12:18,885 --> 00:12:20,941 concentrations and concentrations of 355 00:12:20,941 --> 00:12:22,996 armored vehicles and lighter skinned 356 00:12:22,996 --> 00:12:25,296 vehicles . So they'll have , they'll 357 00:12:25,306 --> 00:12:27,417 have utility . I think it's important 358 00:12:27,417 --> 00:12:29,584 that they have a mix of capabilities . 359 00:12:29,584 --> 00:12:31,750 It's not , no one capability is a , is 360 00:12:31,750 --> 00:12:33,917 a silver bullet . So they have unitary 361 00:12:33,917 --> 00:12:36,028 155 high explosive rounds . They have 362 00:12:36,028 --> 00:12:37,973 the Excalibur rounds which are GPS 363 00:12:37,973 --> 00:12:40,195 guided . They obviously have the rocket 364 00:12:40,195 --> 00:12:42,195 systems that we have transferred to 365 00:12:42,195 --> 00:12:44,306 them in the , in the form of Gimler . 366 00:12:44,306 --> 00:12:46,528 So it's really no one thing is going to 367 00:12:46,528 --> 00:12:46,382 make a difference , but I think this 368 00:12:46,392 --> 00:12:48,351 gives them an extra arrow in their 369 00:12:48,361 --> 00:12:50,361 quiver on the timing . I'm gonna be 370 00:12:50,361 --> 00:12:52,417 going to be a little circumspect for 371 00:12:52,417 --> 00:12:54,711 operational security reasons . Um We 372 00:12:54,721 --> 00:12:56,943 have been pretty cautious about talking 373 00:12:56,943 --> 00:12:58,888 about specific timelines . The one 374 00:12:58,888 --> 00:13:00,999 thing I will say is they will deliver 375 00:13:00,999 --> 00:13:03,054 in a time frame that is relevant for 376 00:13:03,054 --> 00:13:05,165 the counter offensive . Great . Let's 377 00:13:05,165 --> 00:13:07,388 go , Tony uh Bloomberg , I had a couple 378 00:13:07,388 --> 00:13:09,554 questions and um has the United States 379 00:13:09,554 --> 00:13:12,840 ever used the D IC MD P IC M in combat ? 380 00:13:12,849 --> 00:13:14,793 I don't think they have . So , how 381 00:13:14,793 --> 00:13:17,016 robust are our inventories and why were 382 00:13:17,016 --> 00:13:19,127 these , why was these in us inventory 383 00:13:19,130 --> 00:13:21,297 in a way ? Were these used to plan for 384 00:13:21,297 --> 00:13:23,690 a North Korea invasion kind of scenario ? 385 00:13:23,900 --> 00:13:26,067 Yeah , I'll have to get back to you on 386 00:13:26,067 --> 00:13:28,067 previous uses . My understanding is 387 00:13:28,067 --> 00:13:30,233 there were uses of DP IC M back but it 388 00:13:30,233 --> 00:13:32,567 may go back to the Gulf War , but I may , 389 00:13:32,567 --> 00:13:34,789 may have that wrong . So let's get back 390 00:13:34,789 --> 00:13:36,844 to you uh on that . Um I will say uh 391 00:13:36,844 --> 00:13:38,789 they're in our inventories because 392 00:13:38,789 --> 00:13:40,956 there are a range of contingency plans 393 00:13:40,956 --> 00:13:43,178 where this could be uh where this could 394 00:13:43,178 --> 00:13:45,400 be useful . Um But this is also an area 395 00:13:45,400 --> 00:13:47,511 where our inventories are quite large 396 00:13:47,511 --> 00:13:49,567 and we are not concerned that in the 397 00:13:49,567 --> 00:13:51,567 quantities we would transfer to the 398 00:13:51,567 --> 00:13:50,614 Ukrainians , that it would have a 399 00:13:50,625 --> 00:13:52,792 meaningful impact on our readiness for 400 00:13:52,792 --> 00:13:54,958 other contingencies if I'm a Ukrainian 401 00:13:54,958 --> 00:13:57,181 squad or platoon leader , and I'm going 402 00:13:57,181 --> 00:13:59,403 into areas where these things have been 403 00:13:59,403 --> 00:14:01,181 fired into the conference . How 404 00:14:01,181 --> 00:14:03,236 concerned should I be that my troops 405 00:14:03,236 --> 00:14:05,181 may fall into these things and get 406 00:14:05,181 --> 00:14:05,169 blown apart ? I mean , frankly , I 407 00:14:05,179 --> 00:14:07,290 think the , the grave concern is that 408 00:14:07,299 --> 00:14:10,489 they wander into a Russian minefield uh 409 00:14:10,500 --> 00:14:12,489 or areas where the Russians have 410 00:14:12,500 --> 00:14:14,940 expended weapons with a much higher dud 411 00:14:14,950 --> 00:14:17,309 rate . Um I think that this is a reason 412 00:14:17,320 --> 00:14:20,039 though A they were only transferring DP 413 00:14:20,049 --> 00:14:22,160 IC M with a very low dud rate . There 414 00:14:22,160 --> 00:14:24,216 are variants with higher dud rates . 415 00:14:24,216 --> 00:14:25,882 They were not , they were not 416 00:14:25,882 --> 00:14:27,771 transferring and B why it will be 417 00:14:27,771 --> 00:14:29,827 important for the Ukrainians to keep 418 00:14:29,827 --> 00:14:31,827 track of where they're firing these 419 00:14:31,827 --> 00:14:33,716 things , both for immediate force 420 00:14:33,716 --> 00:14:35,882 protection reasons and over the medium 421 00:14:35,882 --> 00:14:38,105 to longer term for de mining operations 422 00:14:38,105 --> 00:14:40,160 in , in kind of post occupation , uh 423 00:14:40,160 --> 00:14:42,382 post liberation parts of Ukraine . Ok . 424 00:14:42,382 --> 00:14:44,382 We're going to go out to the line , 425 00:14:44,382 --> 00:14:46,605 Michael Gordon Wall Street Journal . Uh 426 00:14:46,605 --> 00:14:48,660 Thank you uh for Doctor Karl . Um uh 427 00:14:48,660 --> 00:14:50,700 Sir , you said that uh the Russians 428 00:14:50,710 --> 00:14:54,609 have um uh used uh tens of millions 429 00:14:54,619 --> 00:14:57,090 of submunitions . Um In Ukraine , I 430 00:14:57,099 --> 00:15:00,030 have um two questions . Uh Since you've 431 00:15:00,039 --> 00:15:02,150 described this as a bridge , how many 432 00:15:02,150 --> 00:15:05,159 submunitions is the US now providing uh 433 00:15:05,169 --> 00:15:07,840 planning to provide to Ukraine ? Say on 434 00:15:07,849 --> 00:15:10,260 a month to month basis ? Uh Given is a 435 00:15:10,270 --> 00:15:12,270 bridge . Are you gonna be providing 436 00:15:12,270 --> 00:15:14,492 millions or hundreds of thousands ? How 437 00:15:14,492 --> 00:15:16,659 many are you providing ? And since the 438 00:15:16,659 --> 00:15:18,826 US has been so critical of the Russian 439 00:15:18,826 --> 00:15:21,419 employment of um uh cluster munitions . 440 00:15:21,429 --> 00:15:23,651 Are there any additional steps that you 441 00:15:23,651 --> 00:15:26,580 can identify to mitigate the risk to 442 00:15:26,590 --> 00:15:28,646 civilians beyond the assurances from 443 00:15:28,646 --> 00:15:30,757 the Ukrainians ? Is there going to be 444 00:15:30,757 --> 00:15:32,868 special training ? Is the US going to 445 00:15:32,868 --> 00:15:34,479 monitor the dud rates on the 446 00:15:34,479 --> 00:15:36,701 battlefield and oversee the areas where 447 00:15:36,701 --> 00:15:38,590 they're employed ? Are there some 448 00:15:38,590 --> 00:15:40,701 specific additional steps the US will 449 00:15:40,701 --> 00:15:43,034 take to reduce the risk of to civilians ? 450 00:15:43,479 --> 00:15:45,701 Thanks Michael . So I'm not going to go 451 00:15:45,701 --> 00:15:47,812 into specific numbers . I will say in 452 00:15:47,812 --> 00:15:49,868 my opening statement , I I mentioned 453 00:15:49,868 --> 00:15:51,646 hundreds of thousands , we have 454 00:15:51,646 --> 00:15:53,757 hundreds of thousands of these rounds 455 00:15:53,757 --> 00:15:55,923 available below the dud rate threshold 456 00:15:55,923 --> 00:15:58,146 that I mentioned . But I'm not going to 457 00:15:58,146 --> 00:16:00,090 tip our hand to the Russians about 458 00:16:00,090 --> 00:15:59,909 knowing what's coming and what volume . 459 00:15:59,919 --> 00:16:02,086 When I will say , we're confident that 460 00:16:02,086 --> 00:16:04,179 with this inflow of DP IC M , in 461 00:16:04,190 --> 00:16:06,700 combination with the unitary 155 rounds , 462 00:16:06,710 --> 00:16:09,159 we continue to provide that the 463 00:16:09,169 --> 00:16:12,281 Ukrainians will be able to sustain the 464 00:16:12,291 --> 00:16:14,291 artillery fight for the foreseeable 465 00:16:14,291 --> 00:16:16,180 future , which I said is not only 466 00:16:16,180 --> 00:16:18,402 important in the moment for the counter 467 00:16:18,402 --> 00:16:20,513 offensive , but to signal to Vladimir 468 00:16:20,513 --> 00:16:22,682 Putin that he can't just outlast the , 469 00:16:22,692 --> 00:16:26,221 the Ukrainians . Um Look , I , I think 470 00:16:26,231 --> 00:16:28,287 we have been critical of the Russian 471 00:16:28,287 --> 00:16:30,398 use of this but in large part for two 472 00:16:30,398 --> 00:16:32,620 reasons , one because the Russians have 473 00:16:32,620 --> 00:16:34,842 been indiscriminate in their use of all 474 00:16:34,842 --> 00:16:37,064 kinds of weapons . Uh They , you know , 475 00:16:37,064 --> 00:16:39,287 even their so-called precision guided , 476 00:16:39,287 --> 00:16:41,509 you know , fly into apartment buildings 477 00:16:41,509 --> 00:16:44,104 uh and hit schools . Um And uh so , and 478 00:16:44,114 --> 00:16:46,058 they've been indiscriminate in the 479 00:16:46,058 --> 00:16:48,281 usage of uh cluster munitions as well . 480 00:16:48,281 --> 00:16:50,392 Um They're also using uh weapons that 481 00:16:50,392 --> 00:16:52,503 are much older , which much with much 482 00:16:52,503 --> 00:16:54,725 higher rate and that's , that's uh much 483 00:16:54,725 --> 00:16:56,725 higher risk of collateral damage uh 484 00:16:56,725 --> 00:16:58,225 even when they're not used 485 00:16:58,225 --> 00:17:00,503 indiscriminately . So as I said before , 486 00:17:00,503 --> 00:17:00,133 I think this is kind of an apples , 487 00:17:00,143 --> 00:17:02,133 oranges comparison beyond the 488 00:17:02,143 --> 00:17:04,199 assurances , which I think we should 489 00:17:04,199 --> 00:17:06,310 take meaningfully . I mean , in the , 490 00:17:06,310 --> 00:17:08,365 in the , in the , when we have asked 491 00:17:08,365 --> 00:17:10,365 the Ukrainians to offer us explicit 492 00:17:10,365 --> 00:17:12,365 assurances , they've stuck by those 493 00:17:12,365 --> 00:17:14,532 assurances . So I think we should give 494 00:17:14,532 --> 00:17:16,865 the Ukrainians the benefit of the doubt . 495 00:17:16,865 --> 00:17:18,976 We will of course be watching how the 496 00:17:18,976 --> 00:17:20,976 Ukrainians use these systems , they 497 00:17:20,976 --> 00:17:23,087 will be reporting their usage back to 498 00:17:23,087 --> 00:17:24,810 us . And so we can always make 499 00:17:24,810 --> 00:17:26,921 judgments later if we feel like those 500 00:17:26,921 --> 00:17:29,199 assurances are not , are not being met . 501 00:17:29,199 --> 00:17:31,310 But I'm confident that the Ukrainians 502 00:17:31,310 --> 00:17:33,476 will be true to their word . I'll also 503 00:17:33,476 --> 00:17:35,421 say like with every system that we 504 00:17:35,421 --> 00:17:37,587 provide the Ukrainians , there will be 505 00:17:37,587 --> 00:17:39,421 uh not just training but kind of 506 00:17:39,421 --> 00:17:41,587 coaching and mentoring associated with 507 00:17:41,587 --> 00:17:43,699 this . And I think one of the reasons 508 00:17:43,699 --> 00:17:43,368 why the Ukrainians have been so 509 00:17:43,378 --> 00:17:46,057 effective in employing the artillery 510 00:17:46,067 --> 00:17:48,897 they have had regardless of system is 511 00:17:48,907 --> 00:17:50,697 that that they've received some 512 00:17:50,708 --> 00:17:52,875 coaching and mentoring from the United 513 00:17:52,875 --> 00:17:54,875 States about the best employment of 514 00:17:54,875 --> 00:17:57,208 that . And so we'll continue to do that . 515 00:17:57,208 --> 00:17:59,430 So one more online , we got to Lee Seng 516 00:17:59,430 --> 00:18:00,597 of Radio Free Asia . 517 00:18:04,890 --> 00:18:08,180 Are you there ? OK . Let's come back to 518 00:18:08,189 --> 00:18:10,849 the room . Uh Courtney non cluster 519 00:18:10,859 --> 00:18:12,915 munition question . Actually , I one 520 00:18:12,915 --> 00:18:15,192 quick cluster . Have you , did you say , 521 00:18:15,192 --> 00:18:17,526 have you said how many is in this first ? 522 00:18:17,526 --> 00:18:17,040 So I'm not gonna go into specific 523 00:18:17,050 --> 00:18:19,161 numbers . We talked about hundreds of 524 00:18:19,161 --> 00:18:21,272 thousands of of uh of munitions , but 525 00:18:21,272 --> 00:18:23,439 I'm not gonna just stockpiles hundreds 526 00:18:23,439 --> 00:18:25,494 of thousands , right ? I'm not gonna 527 00:18:25,494 --> 00:18:27,606 talk about how much in each tranche . 528 00:18:27,606 --> 00:18:27,339 All I'm gonna say is we have hundreds 529 00:18:27,349 --> 00:18:29,460 of thousands that are available uh at 530 00:18:29,460 --> 00:18:31,930 this uh dud rate . Um And that we 531 00:18:31,939 --> 00:18:34,106 believe the numbers and our ability to 532 00:18:34,106 --> 00:18:36,328 flow them to Ukraine will be sufficient 533 00:18:36,328 --> 00:18:38,383 to keep them not only in the current 534 00:18:38,383 --> 00:18:40,272 fight but to build this bridge to 535 00:18:40,272 --> 00:18:42,630 increase capacity on the 155 units each . 536 00:18:42,920 --> 00:18:44,809 That means you're gonna have more 537 00:18:44,809 --> 00:18:47,031 tranches . This isn't just a one time , 538 00:18:47,031 --> 00:18:49,142 I guess too . Right . I don't want to 539 00:18:49,142 --> 00:18:48,810 prejudge decisions that haven't been 540 00:18:48,819 --> 00:18:50,763 made since at the end of the day . 541 00:18:50,763 --> 00:18:52,986 These are decisions the president , the 542 00:18:52,986 --> 00:18:52,844 secretary recommends to the president , 543 00:18:52,854 --> 00:18:54,854 the president signs off on . I will 544 00:18:54,854 --> 00:18:57,076 just say this , we have the capacity to 545 00:18:57,076 --> 00:18:59,021 continue to flow additional rounds 546 00:18:59,021 --> 00:19:01,187 forward . And if we were to do so , we 547 00:19:01,187 --> 00:19:03,298 have sufficient quantities to be able 548 00:19:03,298 --> 00:19:05,521 to do the things I said , since we have 549 00:19:05,521 --> 00:19:07,521 you here , I'm wondering if you can 550 00:19:07,521 --> 00:19:09,576 talk a little bit about these recent 551 00:19:09,576 --> 00:19:11,743 interactions with the Iranian Navy and 552 00:19:11,743 --> 00:19:11,724 just give us a sense . It seems as if 553 00:19:11,734 --> 00:19:13,935 there's been a small uptick at least 554 00:19:13,944 --> 00:19:16,055 this week in these incidents . If you 555 00:19:16,055 --> 00:19:18,545 have any sense of why now why Iran is 556 00:19:18,555 --> 00:19:20,910 doing this ? They tend to actions like 557 00:19:20,920 --> 00:19:23,253 this tend to be a response to something . 558 00:19:25,550 --> 00:19:27,439 Uh Well , first of all , it's not 559 00:19:27,439 --> 00:19:29,439 completely clear , um and frankly , 560 00:19:29,439 --> 00:19:31,680 it's not a very effective message uh to 561 00:19:31,689 --> 00:19:33,856 uh essentially engage in piracy on the 562 00:19:33,856 --> 00:19:35,745 high seas and shoot it uh unarmed 563 00:19:35,745 --> 00:19:38,650 civilian maritime craft . I think as 564 00:19:38,660 --> 00:19:40,771 you're all tracking essentially there 565 00:19:40,771 --> 00:19:42,993 were two incidents in the , in the past 566 00:19:42,993 --> 00:19:44,993 few days that occurred within a few 567 00:19:44,993 --> 00:19:46,771 hours of each other . The first 568 00:19:46,771 --> 00:19:48,993 incident was a case in which an Iranian 569 00:19:48,993 --> 00:19:51,160 vessel approached the Marshall Islands 570 00:19:51,160 --> 00:19:53,327 flagged oil tanker , the TRF Mosque in 571 00:19:53,327 --> 00:19:55,438 the Gulf of Oman . The Iranian vessel 572 00:19:55,438 --> 00:19:57,438 departed the scene when the US Navy 573 00:19:57,438 --> 00:19:59,493 guided missile destroyer US S mcfaul 574 00:19:59,493 --> 00:20:01,493 arrived and then there was a second 575 00:20:01,493 --> 00:20:03,910 incident three hours later uh where an 576 00:20:03,920 --> 00:20:06,199 Iranian vessel closed uh within one 577 00:20:06,209 --> 00:20:08,209 mile and fired multiple long bursts 578 00:20:08,250 --> 00:20:10,194 from small arms and crew served uh 579 00:20:10,194 --> 00:20:12,083 weapons . And the navy received a 580 00:20:12,083 --> 00:20:14,520 distress call from the Bahamian flagged 581 00:20:14,680 --> 00:20:17,380 uh oil tanker , Richmond Voyager . And 582 00:20:17,390 --> 00:20:21,329 the US S US S mcfaul responded uh again , 583 00:20:21,550 --> 00:20:23,910 why the Iranians are doing in this at 584 00:20:23,920 --> 00:20:26,339 this moment uh is not at all clear uh 585 00:20:26,349 --> 00:20:28,182 to us . Um I think it's a better 586 00:20:28,182 --> 00:20:30,800 question uh left uh left to them , but 587 00:20:30,810 --> 00:20:32,921 it's got the highest attention of the 588 00:20:32,921 --> 00:20:34,810 department . I I'll just say as a 589 00:20:34,810 --> 00:20:36,977 personal anecdote . Um I don't know if 590 00:20:36,977 --> 00:20:36,599 any of you are here on the Fourth of 591 00:20:36,609 --> 00:20:39,219 July for uh the fireworks display . 592 00:20:39,229 --> 00:20:41,118 It's a cool place to watch uh the 593 00:20:41,118 --> 00:20:43,229 fireworks . But as the , you know , 9 594 00:20:43,229 --> 00:20:45,300 30 as the crescendo of fireworks was 595 00:20:45,310 --> 00:20:47,477 occurring over the mall , I got a call 596 00:20:47,477 --> 00:20:49,477 on my cell phone . I was out on the 597 00:20:49,477 --> 00:20:51,643 lawn with my kids . Uh It was , and it 598 00:20:51,643 --> 00:20:53,810 was uh cable saying that the secretary 599 00:20:53,810 --> 00:20:55,866 wanted to convene a secure call with 600 00:20:55,866 --> 00:20:57,977 his senior leadership team to discuss 601 00:20:57,977 --> 00:20:59,754 these issues because the second 602 00:20:59,754 --> 00:21:02,469 incident was ongoing . And so for 45 603 00:21:02,479 --> 00:21:04,550 minutes , we were on the phone , the 604 00:21:04,560 --> 00:21:06,782 secretary , the Chairman General Rila , 605 00:21:06,782 --> 00:21:09,540 our nascent commander working through , 606 00:21:09,550 --> 00:21:11,606 what were the Iranians doing ? Where 607 00:21:11,606 --> 00:21:13,717 were our assets ? What was the ship's 608 00:21:13,717 --> 00:21:15,717 captain requesting us to do what we 609 00:21:15,717 --> 00:21:17,606 were we advising them to do ? The 610 00:21:17,606 --> 00:21:19,828 mcfaul was steaming in that direction . 611 00:21:19,828 --> 00:21:21,994 The captain was advised by NAV sent to 612 00:21:21,994 --> 00:21:23,994 redirect to enter Omani Territorial 613 00:21:23,994 --> 00:21:27,069 waters and the combination of all of 614 00:21:27,079 --> 00:21:29,060 those decisions appears to have uh 615 00:21:29,069 --> 00:21:31,291 warned the Iranians off . So even after 616 00:21:31,291 --> 00:21:33,402 taking some pot shots at the Richmond 617 00:21:33,402 --> 00:21:35,979 Voyager , uh we were successful in uh 618 00:21:35,989 --> 00:21:38,109 in the Iranians uh leaving the area 619 00:21:38,119 --> 00:21:40,390 before right before the mcfall showed 620 00:21:40,400 --> 00:21:42,567 up , I mentioned that to say that just 621 00:21:42,567 --> 00:21:44,733 like this has the highest attention uh 622 00:21:44,733 --> 00:21:46,789 of the department . Uh We're gonna , 623 00:21:46,789 --> 00:21:49,011 you know , we have , I think uh general 624 00:21:49,011 --> 00:21:51,067 has done a good job of moving around 625 00:21:51,067 --> 00:21:53,067 the assets he already has uh at his 626 00:21:53,067 --> 00:21:56,000 disposal um uh to thicken um our 627 00:21:56,010 --> 00:21:58,066 ability to respond to incidents like 628 00:21:58,066 --> 00:22:00,232 this . And I think the proof is in the 629 00:22:00,232 --> 00:22:02,454 other night . Um I think we continue to 630 00:22:02,454 --> 00:22:04,454 work with our allies and partners , 631 00:22:04,454 --> 00:22:06,677 especially in the I MS C , which is the 632 00:22:06,677 --> 00:22:05,949 International Maritime Security 633 00:22:05,959 --> 00:22:07,903 construct , which some of you have 634 00:22:07,903 --> 00:22:10,070 probably been out the fifth fleet , it 635 00:22:10,070 --> 00:22:12,181 runs out of Bahrain . I know you have 636 00:22:12,181 --> 00:22:14,403 uh uh Courtney and So we'll continue to 637 00:22:14,403 --> 00:22:16,626 work with our allies and partners , not 638 00:22:16,626 --> 00:22:16,449 just in the region but around the world 639 00:22:16,459 --> 00:22:19,130 like the , like the UK um to try to 640 00:22:19,140 --> 00:22:21,489 thicken that out because whatever the 641 00:22:21,500 --> 00:22:23,444 Iranians are trying to do here , I 642 00:22:23,444 --> 00:22:25,667 don't think we should assume it will be 643 00:22:25,667 --> 00:22:27,833 the last time . Uh They try . Let's go 644 00:22:27,833 --> 00:22:27,760 to the back room Fadi Al Jazeera . 645 00:22:27,770 --> 00:22:29,992 Thank you . Thank you , Doctor Cole . I 646 00:22:29,992 --> 00:22:32,214 have two quick questions on the cluster 647 00:22:32,214 --> 00:22:34,270 munition and one on on Russia on the 648 00:22:34,270 --> 00:22:36,048 cluster munition . Um You , you 649 00:22:36,048 --> 00:22:38,270 mentioned five studies since 1998 until 650 00:22:38,270 --> 00:22:40,437 2020 that prove uh you have in your uh 651 00:22:40,437 --> 00:22:42,800 stockpile that that rate lower than 652 00:22:42,810 --> 00:22:45,979 2.35 is the department willing to uh 653 00:22:45,989 --> 00:22:48,339 make these studies available . So 654 00:22:48,349 --> 00:22:50,516 experts can verify the accuracy of the 655 00:22:50,855 --> 00:22:54,225 second one . in , in terms of uh 656 00:22:54,336 --> 00:22:57,086 providing cluster munition is that this 657 00:22:57,095 --> 00:22:59,262 administration breaking the law passed 658 00:22:59,262 --> 00:23:01,446 by the Congress that prohibits the the 659 00:23:01,456 --> 00:23:04,786 transfer of cluster munition that is 660 00:23:04,796 --> 00:23:08,515 without uh level above 1% . And 661 00:23:08,526 --> 00:23:10,582 finally , on Russia , we've seen two 662 00:23:10,582 --> 00:23:13,485 incidents lately uh in , in , in Syria 663 00:23:13,495 --> 00:23:16,612 where Russian aircraft um according to 664 00:23:16,621 --> 00:23:19,932 the Pentagon harassed uh uh us 665 00:23:19,942 --> 00:23:22,391 drones before that we saw something 666 00:23:22,401 --> 00:23:25,072 happening similarly in the Black Sea . 667 00:23:25,112 --> 00:23:28,192 Are you concerned that this Russia is 668 00:23:28,202 --> 00:23:30,511 kind of kind of normalizing this 669 00:23:30,521 --> 00:23:32,632 behavior ? And is that the OD willing 670 00:23:32,632 --> 00:23:35,692 to take any actions to prevent Russia 671 00:23:35,702 --> 00:23:37,924 from continuing this type of behavior ? 672 00:23:37,924 --> 00:23:41,030 Thank you . Sure . Uh So a bunch of 673 00:23:41,040 --> 00:23:43,151 things there on the , on the , on the 674 00:23:43,151 --> 00:23:44,984 test itself . Uh I think at this 675 00:23:44,984 --> 00:23:46,762 juncture , uh because the tests 676 00:23:46,762 --> 00:23:48,984 themselves are classified , we won't be 677 00:23:48,984 --> 00:23:51,207 releasing them . But uh we'll take that 678 00:23:51,207 --> 00:23:52,929 question , uh uh question back 679 00:23:52,929 --> 00:23:55,040 presently . Uh those tests , uh those 680 00:23:55,040 --> 00:23:57,262 uh , reports are classified , I can say 681 00:23:57,262 --> 00:23:59,484 this , we have uh high confidence uh in 682 00:23:59,484 --> 00:24:01,707 those numbers based on five consecutive 683 00:24:01,707 --> 00:24:03,873 tests . Um I also have high confidence 684 00:24:03,873 --> 00:24:06,182 that they will be far more efficient 685 00:24:06,192 --> 00:24:08,081 and discriminate than the cluster 686 00:24:08,081 --> 00:24:10,303 munitions that the Russians are using . 687 00:24:10,303 --> 00:24:12,525 And I think the Ukrainian assurances on 688 00:24:12,525 --> 00:24:15,262 top of that , um uh give me added 689 00:24:15,272 --> 00:24:17,753 confidence in that . I'll also say that 690 00:24:17,762 --> 00:24:19,929 it's not a good thing for civilians in 691 00:24:19,929 --> 00:24:21,873 Ukraine or the humanitarian system 692 00:24:21,873 --> 00:24:23,929 situation in Ukraine , for Ukraine's 693 00:24:23,929 --> 00:24:26,151 counter offensive to be unsuccessful or 694 00:24:26,151 --> 00:24:25,875 for the Russians to be more successful . 695 00:24:25,885 --> 00:24:28,416 That seems like a recipe for more 696 00:24:28,426 --> 00:24:30,426 humanitarian suffering . So to the 697 00:24:30,436 --> 00:24:32,735 degree that there's uh a utilitarian 698 00:24:32,745 --> 00:24:34,912 calculus in this , I think it's , it's 699 00:24:34,912 --> 00:24:36,912 worth thinking that through . And I 700 00:24:36,912 --> 00:24:39,134 think that's ultimately why even though 701 00:24:39,134 --> 00:24:40,689 this is a decision that the 702 00:24:40,689 --> 00:24:42,801 administration deliberated on . Uh uh 703 00:24:42,801 --> 00:24:44,801 and that the president thought very 704 00:24:44,801 --> 00:24:46,689 carefully about . Um there was no 705 00:24:46,689 --> 00:24:48,869 disagreement among the president's uh 706 00:24:48,880 --> 00:24:50,824 uh principal advisor on whether we 707 00:24:50,824 --> 00:24:52,991 should provide uh this system and that 708 00:24:52,991 --> 00:24:55,102 includes across the department . It's 709 00:24:55,102 --> 00:24:57,324 not just the department uh of , of , of 710 00:24:57,324 --> 00:24:59,491 defense . Um Are we breaking the law ? 711 00:24:59,491 --> 00:25:01,436 We are not breaking the law . Um I 712 00:25:01,436 --> 00:25:01,180 would say , first of all the , the 713 00:25:01,189 --> 00:25:03,719 prohibition against exporting above 1% 714 00:25:03,729 --> 00:25:05,896 these munitions are pretty close to 1% 715 00:25:05,896 --> 00:25:07,951 but they're not at the 1% level . Uh 716 00:25:07,951 --> 00:25:09,729 But the president does have the 717 00:25:09,729 --> 00:25:11,896 authority uh to waive that requirement 718 00:25:11,896 --> 00:25:13,840 on national security grounds . And 719 00:25:13,840 --> 00:25:15,785 that's what uh he has done in this 720 00:25:15,785 --> 00:25:15,670 instance . Uh There's no dispute that 721 00:25:15,680 --> 00:25:17,847 he has that authority . It's in , it's 722 00:25:17,847 --> 00:25:19,847 in law . Um But we also didn't make 723 00:25:19,847 --> 00:25:21,958 this as a unilateral decision . We've 724 00:25:21,958 --> 00:25:23,847 been having conversations with uh 725 00:25:23,847 --> 00:25:25,847 informal conversations for weeks uh 726 00:25:25,847 --> 00:25:27,902 with the hill . I'm sure many of you 727 00:25:27,902 --> 00:25:29,958 have had your own conversations with 728 00:25:29,958 --> 00:25:32,180 members on both sides of the aisle , on 729 00:25:32,180 --> 00:25:34,402 the , on the hill . This is obviously a 730 00:25:34,402 --> 00:25:34,329 capability that the Ukrainians have 731 00:25:34,339 --> 00:25:37,489 been asking for for a while . Um And we 732 00:25:37,500 --> 00:25:39,670 continued uh those consultations with 733 00:25:39,680 --> 00:25:42,599 the Hill um and escalated them as we 734 00:25:42,609 --> 00:25:44,442 got closer to this decision . So 735 00:25:44,442 --> 00:25:46,553 doesn't mean everybody uh in Congress 736 00:25:46,553 --> 00:25:48,387 will uh will agree , but I think 737 00:25:48,387 --> 00:25:50,609 everybody will agree that it was within 738 00:25:50,609 --> 00:25:52,720 the right of the president to do this 739 00:25:52,720 --> 00:25:54,720 um on the Syrian uh on the , on the 740 00:25:54,720 --> 00:25:56,887 Russian activities in Syria . Yeah , I 741 00:25:56,887 --> 00:25:59,053 mean , I think we've seen , we've seen 742 00:25:59,053 --> 00:26:01,109 activities uh by the Russians uh Air 743 00:26:01,109 --> 00:26:03,349 Force um to encroach on kind of the 744 00:26:03,599 --> 00:26:05,710 informal arrangements we have uh with 745 00:26:05,710 --> 00:26:08,680 them about deconflicting airspace . Um 746 00:26:08,689 --> 00:26:11,022 I will say that it , it does concern us . 747 00:26:11,022 --> 00:26:13,245 Um And I do think uh what we don't want 748 00:26:13,245 --> 00:26:15,411 to be is in a situation where they are 749 00:26:15,411 --> 00:26:17,633 normalizing behavior where there can be 750 00:26:17,633 --> 00:26:19,800 an incident . Um You know , it would , 751 00:26:19,800 --> 00:26:21,856 it would be , I think significant if 752 00:26:21,856 --> 00:26:21,479 there was an incident involving an un 753 00:26:21,540 --> 00:26:24,160 crude system , um it would be even more 754 00:26:24,170 --> 00:26:26,281 significant if it involved uh piloted 755 00:26:26,281 --> 00:26:28,170 aircraft . So we will continue to 756 00:26:28,170 --> 00:26:30,380 highlight uh when the Russians engage 757 00:26:30,390 --> 00:26:32,223 in reckless unprofessional uh uh 758 00:26:32,223 --> 00:26:34,689 behavior in the skies . Uh , we will 759 00:26:34,699 --> 00:26:36,755 highlight for the world so that when 760 00:26:36,755 --> 00:26:38,755 and if an incident happens , people 761 00:26:38,755 --> 00:26:40,921 will know who's at fault here . And we 762 00:26:40,921 --> 00:26:42,866 hope to dissuade the Russians from 763 00:26:42,866 --> 00:26:44,866 continuing this pattern of behavior 764 00:26:44,866 --> 00:26:46,810 because , you know , incidents and 765 00:26:46,810 --> 00:26:49,088 accidents if they occur can , you know , 766 00:26:49,088 --> 00:26:51,310 can spin out of control , that's not in 767 00:26:51,310 --> 00:26:51,310 our interest , but it's also not in 768 00:26:51,319 --> 00:26:53,097 Russia's interest . Uh So we'll 769 00:26:53,097 --> 00:26:55,208 continue to make that point to them . 770 00:26:55,208 --> 00:26:57,375 Ok . We're gonna go out for one more . 771 00:26:57,375 --> 00:26:59,652 Uh Eric Schmidt , New York Times . Yes . 772 00:26:59,652 --> 00:27:01,910 Uh Doctor Cole , you , you acknowledge 773 00:27:01,920 --> 00:27:03,920 that the , uh , the , the Ukrainian 774 00:27:03,920 --> 00:27:06,180 counter offensive is going slower than 775 00:27:06,189 --> 00:27:08,245 anticipated , uh attributing some of 776 00:27:08,245 --> 00:27:10,411 that to the Russian defenses including 777 00:27:10,411 --> 00:27:12,522 mine fields . But you could , could , 778 00:27:12,522 --> 00:27:14,689 you also discuss uh the limitations of 779 00:27:14,689 --> 00:27:16,689 the combined arms training , uh the 780 00:27:16,689 --> 00:27:18,911 short duration training that they got , 781 00:27:18,911 --> 00:27:21,078 uh , the Ukrainians and to what extent 782 00:27:21,078 --> 00:27:23,245 they've been able to absorb that those 783 00:27:23,245 --> 00:27:25,356 that kind of training and apply it in 784 00:27:25,356 --> 00:27:27,300 this kind of difficult battlefield 785 00:27:27,300 --> 00:27:29,522 situation . Thank you . Yeah , I mean , 786 00:27:29,522 --> 00:27:31,633 first , I think , uh as the Ukrainian 787 00:27:31,633 --> 00:27:33,745 leadership has said , you know , this 788 00:27:33,745 --> 00:27:35,856 isn't a movie . Uh Right . So this is 789 00:27:35,856 --> 00:27:37,911 gonna , it , things are hard in real 790 00:27:37,911 --> 00:27:39,856 war . Uh Things are hard sometimes 791 00:27:39,856 --> 00:27:42,022 things go faster than you think . Uh , 792 00:27:42,022 --> 00:27:43,745 like in Kharkiv , uh last fall 793 00:27:43,745 --> 00:27:45,967 sometimes . Uh It's a slog , uh like it 794 00:27:45,967 --> 00:27:48,133 was in last fall . I think when you're 795 00:27:48,133 --> 00:27:50,078 talking about eastern and southern 796 00:27:50,078 --> 00:27:52,189 Ukraine , the Russians have had , you 797 00:27:52,189 --> 00:27:54,411 know , during the winter , neither side 798 00:27:54,411 --> 00:27:56,133 was standing still right . The 799 00:27:56,133 --> 00:27:58,300 Ukrainians with our assistance and the 800 00:27:58,300 --> 00:27:58,165 assistance of the allies and partners 801 00:27:58,175 --> 00:28:00,231 were building this mountain of steel 802 00:28:00,231 --> 00:28:02,008 for the counter offensive . The 803 00:28:02,008 --> 00:28:04,231 Russians were digging in uh laying mine 804 00:28:04,231 --> 00:28:06,380 fields , uh anti anti tank , uh 805 00:28:06,390 --> 00:28:08,780 obstacles and barriers , trench lines . 806 00:28:08,969 --> 00:28:11,380 Uh And so , uh we always knew it was 807 00:28:11,390 --> 00:28:13,900 going to be uh tough . Um Eric , I 808 00:28:13,910 --> 00:28:16,077 think to your point about the combined 809 00:28:16,077 --> 00:28:18,243 arms training , I think we should draw 810 00:28:18,243 --> 00:28:20,354 lessons at the end , not in the , not 811 00:28:20,354 --> 00:28:19,920 in the middle . And I think we're only 812 00:28:19,930 --> 00:28:22,097 in the beginning of the middle . Uh uh 813 00:28:22,097 --> 00:28:24,619 And I say that because um yeah , the , 814 00:28:24,630 --> 00:28:27,189 the uh you know , a number of brigades 815 00:28:27,199 --> 00:28:29,479 uh went through training uh in Germany 816 00:28:29,582 --> 00:28:31,749 and elsewhere by the United States and 817 00:28:31,749 --> 00:28:33,860 our allies to get them ready for this 818 00:28:33,860 --> 00:28:36,026 fight . It was truncated relative to , 819 00:28:36,026 --> 00:28:38,193 you know , what a US army unit might , 820 00:28:38,193 --> 00:28:40,138 might go through . But I think the 821 00:28:40,138 --> 00:28:42,249 Ukrainians have regularly proved that 822 00:28:42,249 --> 00:28:41,592 they can kind of step on the 823 00:28:41,602 --> 00:28:43,972 accelerator pedal and be pretty 824 00:28:43,982 --> 00:28:46,271 proficient . It does , of course , you 825 00:28:46,291 --> 00:28:48,235 know , it pushes them out of their 826 00:28:48,235 --> 00:28:50,513 comfort zone a little bit because this , 827 00:28:50,513 --> 00:28:52,680 you know , has them employing fire and 828 00:28:52,680 --> 00:28:54,847 maneuver in a way that's more familiar 829 00:28:54,847 --> 00:28:57,514 to NATO forces than forces that have a 830 00:28:57,524 --> 00:28:59,624 Soviet legacy and Soviet doctrine uh 831 00:28:59,634 --> 00:29:02,543 behind uh behind them . Um So it is in , 832 00:29:02,553 --> 00:29:04,664 you know , requiring them to fight in 833 00:29:04,664 --> 00:29:06,894 different uh ways . But um I will say 834 00:29:06,904 --> 00:29:09,071 this , I , I am not particularly , I'm 835 00:29:09,071 --> 00:29:11,182 not , you know , it is slower than we 836 00:29:11,182 --> 00:29:12,904 had hoped again . Uh Ukrainian 837 00:29:12,904 --> 00:29:15,126 officials have , have said as much . Um 838 00:29:15,134 --> 00:29:17,356 but the Ukrainians have a lot of combat 839 00:29:17,356 --> 00:29:19,394 power left . Um And in fact , the 840 00:29:19,404 --> 00:29:21,626 majority of their combat power for this 841 00:29:21,626 --> 00:29:23,682 fight has not been brought to bear . 842 00:29:23,682 --> 00:29:25,737 And so what you're seeing across the 843 00:29:25,737 --> 00:29:27,793 east and the south is the Ukrainians 844 00:29:27,793 --> 00:29:29,571 deliberately and understandably 845 00:29:29,571 --> 00:29:31,776 deliberately probing for weak spots . 846 00:29:32,095 --> 00:29:34,365 And I think the real test will be when 847 00:29:34,375 --> 00:29:36,715 they identify weak spots or create weak 848 00:29:36,725 --> 00:29:38,765 spots and generate a breach , how 849 00:29:38,776 --> 00:29:40,832 rapidly they're able to exploit that 850 00:29:40,832 --> 00:29:43,054 with the combat power that they have in 851 00:29:43,054 --> 00:29:45,109 reserve and how rapidly the Russians 852 00:29:45,109 --> 00:29:47,276 will be able to respond . And Eric , I 853 00:29:47,276 --> 00:29:49,387 just don't , I don't know the answers 854 00:29:49,387 --> 00:29:49,225 to either of those questions because 855 00:29:49,235 --> 00:29:51,319 we're not at the point in the battle 856 00:29:51,329 --> 00:29:53,440 yet , we're going to come back in the 857 00:29:53,440 --> 00:29:55,662 room for two more . Phil Fall on that . 858 00:29:55,662 --> 00:29:57,662 I mean , do you think then that the 859 00:29:57,662 --> 00:29:59,829 Ukrainians are making effective use of 860 00:29:59,829 --> 00:30:01,885 the materials that the United States 861 00:30:01,885 --> 00:30:03,940 has provided or not yet . And then I 862 00:30:03,940 --> 00:30:06,051 want to ask you about , what do you , 863 00:30:06,051 --> 00:30:08,107 what do you know about him ? What is 864 00:30:08,107 --> 00:30:10,670 his status ? What is he doing in Russia ? 865 00:30:10,680 --> 00:30:12,458 What do you think his future is 866 00:30:14,300 --> 00:30:17,589 uh so on the effective use piece . Um 867 00:30:19,119 --> 00:30:21,170 This stuff is hard and uh and 868 00:30:21,180 --> 00:30:23,236 especially if you're encountering it 869 00:30:23,236 --> 00:30:25,236 and using techniques , techniques , 870 00:30:25,236 --> 00:30:27,458 procedures and capabilities that you're 871 00:30:27,458 --> 00:30:29,236 not familiar with . I think the 872 00:30:29,236 --> 00:30:29,140 Ukrainians are doing their best . I 873 00:30:29,150 --> 00:30:31,569 think they are determined to liberate 874 00:30:31,579 --> 00:30:34,810 these areas from Russian occupation . I 875 00:30:34,819 --> 00:30:37,170 think the Russians probably were more 876 00:30:37,180 --> 00:30:39,236 successful in digging in more deeply 877 00:30:39,236 --> 00:30:42,359 than perhaps was fully appreciated . Um 878 00:30:42,390 --> 00:30:44,680 You know , you , you , you know , no 879 00:30:44,689 --> 00:30:46,689 plan survives first contact with uh 880 00:30:46,689 --> 00:30:49,030 with the enemy . So they uh they are 881 00:30:49,040 --> 00:30:51,207 moving deliberately against the threat 882 00:30:51,207 --> 00:30:53,262 that's there . I would return to the 883 00:30:53,262 --> 00:30:55,318 point that , that I made . I I think 884 00:30:55,318 --> 00:30:57,373 that it's too early to judge how the 885 00:30:57,373 --> 00:30:59,484 counter offensive is going one way or 886 00:30:59,484 --> 00:31:01,207 the other because we're at the 887 00:31:01,207 --> 00:31:03,318 beginning of the middle , they , they 888 00:31:03,318 --> 00:31:05,484 are still uh probing Russian lines and 889 00:31:05,484 --> 00:31:07,484 Russian areas uh for weak spots and 890 00:31:07,484 --> 00:31:09,540 real test will be when they identify 891 00:31:09,540 --> 00:31:11,596 those , how rapidly they are able to 892 00:31:11,596 --> 00:31:13,762 exploit those weak spots . And we will 893 00:31:13,762 --> 00:31:15,873 continue to offer our advice uh where 894 00:31:15,873 --> 00:31:18,040 it's uh useful . But at the end of the 895 00:31:18,040 --> 00:31:19,929 day , these are Ukrainian choices 896 00:31:19,929 --> 00:31:21,984 because after all , it's their lives 897 00:31:21,984 --> 00:31:23,873 that are on the line , it's their 898 00:31:23,873 --> 00:31:23,760 territory that's , that's on the line . 899 00:31:23,770 --> 00:31:25,770 So we can provide coaching advice , 900 00:31:25,770 --> 00:31:27,992 mentoring . But at the end of the day , 901 00:31:27,992 --> 00:31:30,103 they're gonna make the decisions that 902 00:31:30,103 --> 00:31:32,103 they believe is right where he is , 903 00:31:32,103 --> 00:31:34,214 what he's up to . I have no idea . Um 904 00:31:34,214 --> 00:31:36,214 And so , and I really don't want to 905 00:31:36,214 --> 00:31:36,079 speculate , I see the same things that 906 00:31:36,089 --> 00:31:38,160 you see . You know , it's clear that 907 00:31:38,959 --> 00:31:40,681 the Russian state is trying to 908 00:31:40,681 --> 00:31:43,260 systematically dismantle his empire and 909 00:31:43,310 --> 00:31:45,421 put peace parts in different places . 910 00:31:45,421 --> 00:31:47,979 What the ultimate endgame Putin has for 911 00:31:47,989 --> 00:31:50,640 pro and the , the , the remnants of 912 00:31:50,650 --> 00:31:52,317 Wagner I think is still to be 913 00:31:52,317 --> 00:31:54,372 determined . Um But I , I just don't 914 00:31:54,372 --> 00:31:56,594 want to speculate about , you know , is 915 00:31:56,594 --> 00:31:58,761 he in Belarus ? Is he in ST Petersburg 916 00:31:58,761 --> 00:31:57,979 or Moscow or somewhere else ? I , I 917 00:31:57,989 --> 00:32:00,045 don't know where he is . Let's close 918 00:32:00,045 --> 00:32:03,839 with Jim . Thanks for , thanks for 919 00:32:03,849 --> 00:32:07,579 doing this . And as this is our last 920 00:32:07,589 --> 00:32:09,920 chance to get you , at least in this 921 00:32:09,930 --> 00:32:12,599 position at this time . I'd like to 922 00:32:12,609 --> 00:32:14,750 broaden it a little bit . President 923 00:32:14,760 --> 00:32:17,420 Biden , Secretary Austin , Secretary 924 00:32:17,430 --> 00:32:19,680 Blin and many others say that the US 925 00:32:19,689 --> 00:32:22,979 asymmetric advantage is its network of 926 00:32:22,989 --> 00:32:25,900 allies , partners and friends . Yet 927 00:32:25,910 --> 00:32:28,199 there are many Americans who really 928 00:32:28,209 --> 00:32:30,320 believe that the United States should 929 00:32:30,320 --> 00:32:33,989 go it alone and given your experience 930 00:32:34,000 --> 00:32:36,489 not only this time , but in your 931 00:32:36,500 --> 00:32:39,400 previous stints with the other 932 00:32:39,410 --> 00:32:41,188 administrations and here at the 933 00:32:41,188 --> 00:32:43,410 Pentagon , what do you tell people like 934 00:32:43,410 --> 00:32:45,969 that . And what do you tell them that 935 00:32:45,979 --> 00:32:49,609 allies and partners bring to , to the 936 00:32:49,619 --> 00:32:53,520 collective defense ? Yeah , it's a , 937 00:32:53,530 --> 00:32:56,410 it's a great question and , um , look , 938 00:32:56,420 --> 00:32:58,642 I think we've tested , we , we've tried 939 00:32:58,642 --> 00:33:00,364 as an administration to test a 940 00:33:00,364 --> 00:33:02,989 proposition . Right . Um , I don't 941 00:33:03,000 --> 00:33:05,569 think it's a partisan point to say that , 942 00:33:05,579 --> 00:33:07,746 you know , there were at least some in 943 00:33:07,746 --> 00:33:09,968 the previous administration that didn't 944 00:33:09,968 --> 00:33:12,135 value our allies and partners in quite 945 00:33:12,135 --> 00:33:14,468 the way that , that we do . And they're , 946 00:33:14,468 --> 00:33:13,479 they're at the center , they're at the 947 00:33:13,489 --> 00:33:15,267 center of our national security 948 00:33:15,267 --> 00:33:17,489 strategy . They're at the center of our 949 00:33:17,489 --> 00:33:19,600 national defense strategy . We do use 950 00:33:19,600 --> 00:33:19,099 these , you know , fancy jargon , like 951 00:33:19,109 --> 00:33:21,109 asymmetric advantage and network of 952 00:33:21,109 --> 00:33:22,998 allies and partners . But what it 953 00:33:22,998 --> 00:33:25,109 really uh uh adds up to and I think , 954 00:33:25,109 --> 00:33:27,276 you know , the average person in a bar 955 00:33:27,276 --> 00:33:29,053 can understand is international 956 00:33:29,053 --> 00:33:30,998 relations is a team sport that the 957 00:33:30,998 --> 00:33:32,942 United States is the most powerful 958 00:33:32,942 --> 00:33:35,053 country in the world . We're the most 959 00:33:35,053 --> 00:33:35,050 powerful country in the history of the 960 00:33:35,060 --> 00:33:37,116 world . We have the best military in 961 00:33:37,116 --> 00:33:39,227 the world . We have the best military 962 00:33:39,227 --> 00:33:41,449 in the history of the world as powerful 963 00:33:41,449 --> 00:33:43,727 as we are , as capable as our military . 964 00:33:43,727 --> 00:33:45,949 Uh uh is there is no problem that comes 965 00:33:45,959 --> 00:33:48,219 across my desk , my desk where I say , 966 00:33:48,229 --> 00:33:50,396 you know , what would make this easier 967 00:33:50,396 --> 00:33:52,618 if we had to do this all by ourselves ? 968 00:33:52,618 --> 00:33:54,618 Right ? It's just , it's not , it's 969 00:33:54,618 --> 00:33:56,618 just like you don't play basketball 970 00:33:56,618 --> 00:33:58,618 even if you're Michael Jordan . You 971 00:33:58,618 --> 00:33:58,270 like to have four other bowls with you 972 00:33:58,280 --> 00:34:00,447 on the court . Sorry . That's a really 973 00:34:00,447 --> 00:34:02,558 old reference for , uh , but I'm 52 . 974 00:34:02,558 --> 00:34:04,891 So , yeah , you , you got me , um , the , 975 00:34:04,891 --> 00:34:07,058 it's a team sport and , you know , you 976 00:34:07,058 --> 00:34:09,169 can make that and people can get it , 977 00:34:09,169 --> 00:34:11,169 but the proof is in the pudding and 978 00:34:11,169 --> 00:34:13,224 that is , look , we are , you know , 979 00:34:13,224 --> 00:34:15,447 how are we contending with the greatest 980 00:34:15,447 --> 00:34:17,613 threat to the geopolitical order since 981 00:34:17,613 --> 00:34:19,558 the uh end of the Cold War , maybe 982 00:34:19,558 --> 00:34:21,780 since the end of the Second World War , 983 00:34:21,780 --> 00:34:24,009 by building a team . In the first 984 00:34:24,019 --> 00:34:26,059 instance , uh you know , Putin went 985 00:34:26,069 --> 00:34:28,618 into this hoping that NATO would buckle 986 00:34:28,628 --> 00:34:31,329 weaken fray shatter apart . The exact 987 00:34:31,339 --> 00:34:33,319 opposite has happened . NATO is 988 00:34:33,329 --> 00:34:35,496 stronger , the defense commitments are 989 00:34:35,496 --> 00:34:37,218 going up . You're going to see 990 00:34:37,218 --> 00:34:39,385 manifestations of that unity . I think 991 00:34:39,385 --> 00:34:41,607 this week in , in Vilnius , our efforts 992 00:34:41,607 --> 00:34:43,729 to deter attacks on the United States 993 00:34:43,739 --> 00:34:45,906 and our allies have been bolstered not 994 00:34:45,906 --> 00:34:48,017 only by what we're doing in Ukraine , 995 00:34:48,017 --> 00:34:50,128 but what we've done to strengthen the 996 00:34:50,128 --> 00:34:52,406 NATO alliance that makes America safer , 997 00:34:52,406 --> 00:34:54,628 that's not charity to Europe that makes 998 00:34:54,628 --> 00:34:56,683 us safer from the threat that Russia 999 00:34:56,683 --> 00:34:59,185 poses . But also the world that 1000 00:34:59,195 --> 00:35:01,185 Russia's model of aggression would 1001 00:35:01,195 --> 00:35:05,000 impose on , on the rest of us . And 1002 00:35:05,010 --> 00:35:07,121 then you look in the Indo Pacific and 1003 00:35:07,121 --> 00:35:09,399 there's a lot of focus in our strategy , 1004 00:35:09,399 --> 00:35:11,232 documents on China as the pacing 1005 00:35:11,232 --> 00:35:13,343 challenge . That's what we call it in 1006 00:35:13,343 --> 00:35:12,550 the National Defense strategy . Our 1007 00:35:12,560 --> 00:35:15,550 most consequential strategic competitor . 1008 00:35:16,350 --> 00:35:19,270 We're not gonna win that competition on 1009 00:35:19,280 --> 00:35:21,058 our own . Now , we have to make 1010 00:35:21,058 --> 00:35:23,391 investments in ourselves , which we are . 1011 00:35:23,391 --> 00:35:25,558 That's why we've made investments in , 1012 00:35:25,558 --> 00:35:27,613 you know , the Chips and Science Act 1013 00:35:27,613 --> 00:35:29,780 and the Infrastructure Bill . It's why 1014 00:35:29,780 --> 00:35:31,836 we are making massive investments in 1015 00:35:31,836 --> 00:35:33,836 defense modernization . Why there's 1016 00:35:33,836 --> 00:35:36,169 bipartisan consensus around all of that , 1017 00:35:36,169 --> 00:35:38,280 but we are not going to best China in 1018 00:35:38,280 --> 00:35:40,447 this competition alone . Uh We need to 1019 00:35:40,447 --> 00:35:42,502 get our team together , which is why 1020 00:35:42,502 --> 00:35:44,669 I'm extraordinarily proud of what this 1021 00:35:44,669 --> 00:35:46,836 administration has accomplished , what 1022 00:35:46,836 --> 00:35:48,891 this president , what this secretary 1023 00:35:48,891 --> 00:35:48,350 has accomplished , frankly , what my 1024 00:35:48,360 --> 00:35:50,582 team has helped to accomplish in things 1025 00:35:50,582 --> 00:35:52,750 like a or the posture changes in 1026 00:35:52,760 --> 00:35:54,649 Australia or the historic posture 1027 00:35:54,649 --> 00:35:56,482 changes in Japan or the historic 1028 00:35:56,482 --> 00:35:58,593 posture changes in the Philippines or 1029 00:35:58,593 --> 00:36:00,760 the deepening of our alliance with the 1030 00:36:00,760 --> 00:36:02,927 rok on display during the recent state 1031 00:36:02,927 --> 00:36:05,149 visit or the strategic opportunity of a 1032 00:36:05,149 --> 00:36:07,316 lifetime we have with India on display 1033 00:36:07,316 --> 00:36:09,427 during the most recent uh India uh uh 1034 00:36:09,427 --> 00:36:11,649 state visit by Prime Minister Modi . We 1035 00:36:11,649 --> 00:36:13,704 are putting real points on the board 1036 00:36:13,704 --> 00:36:16,864 because we are , we are leaning in to 1037 00:36:16,875 --> 00:36:19,097 our existing alliances and building out 1038 00:36:19,097 --> 00:36:21,264 our , our partnerships . And if we are 1039 00:36:21,264 --> 00:36:23,153 going to win the rest of the 21st 1040 00:36:23,153 --> 00:36:25,264 century , that's how we are gonna win 1041 00:36:25,264 --> 00:36:27,486 alongside our teammates . Doctor Cole . 1042 00:36:27,486 --> 00:36:27,399 Thank you very much . Ladies and 1043 00:36:27,409 --> 00:36:29,687 gentlemen , thanks for attending today . 1044 00:36:35,159 --> 00:36:36,603 I'm not gonna tell this . 1045 00:36:41,899 --> 00:36:43,899 There are a number of , there are a 1046 00:36:43,899 --> 00:36:46,066 number of models below the dud rate of 1047 00:36:46,066 --> 00:36:46,239 2.35% .