WEBVTT 00:01.210 --> 00:03.321 All right , good afternoon , everyone 00:03.321 --> 00:05.154 and welcome to our in person and 00:05.154 --> 00:07.199 virtual uh participants in today's 00:07.210 --> 00:09.210 press briefing uh to my left in the 00:09.210 --> 00:11.321 room . We are grateful to have uh the 00:11.321 --> 00:13.488 undersecretary of defense for policy , 00:13.488 --> 00:15.599 Dr Colin Cole . Uh We'll have roughly 00:15.599 --> 00:17.710 30 minutes today for our discussion . 00:17.909 --> 00:20.076 Uh and we will endeavor to get through 00:20.076 --> 00:22.298 as many questions as possible uh in the 00:22.298 --> 00:24.540 briefing room and online if I do not 00:24.549 --> 00:26.493 call you out by your name and your 00:26.493 --> 00:28.549 outlet , if you can please introduce 00:28.549 --> 00:30.605 yourself when asking your question . 00:30.605 --> 00:32.493 And with that , I will toss it to 00:32.493 --> 00:34.660 Doctor Cole . Great , thanks Dave . Uh 00:34.660 --> 00:36.882 Good afternoon , everybody . I'm deeply 00:36.882 --> 00:39.009 grateful for another opportunity to 00:39.020 --> 00:41.242 address you all today . This time ahead 00:41.242 --> 00:43.290 of my travel to the NATO summit in 00:43.299 --> 00:45.970 Vilnius with the president and with 00:45.979 --> 00:48.299 Secretary Austin next week . And before 00:48.310 --> 00:50.532 my eventual transition from leading our 00:50.532 --> 00:52.754 policy apparatus here in the Pentagon , 00:52.754 --> 00:54.977 which has been the honor of my lifetime 00:54.977 --> 00:57.199 at such a critical period in the global 00:57.199 --> 00:59.254 security environment . As you know , 00:59.254 --> 01:02.029 NATO leaders will convene in Vilnius at 01:02.040 --> 01:04.096 a crucial juncture for transatlantic 01:04.096 --> 01:06.330 security . 17 months into Russia's 01:06.339 --> 01:08.450 unlawful aggression against Ukraine , 01:08.450 --> 01:10.172 we bear witness to the tragedy 01:10.172 --> 01:12.228 unfolding in the heart of Europe . A 01:12.228 --> 01:14.395 tragedy that Vladimir Putin can end at 01:14.395 --> 01:16.228 any time as by every measure his 01:16.228 --> 01:18.395 objectives have not been fulfilled and 01:18.395 --> 01:20.728 they will not be fulfilled . In Ukraine . 01:20.728 --> 01:22.561 The nations of NATO stand united 01:22.561 --> 01:24.783 alongside nations from around the world 01:24.783 --> 01:27.309 showing an unwavering determination to 01:27.319 --> 01:29.430 provide unprecedented support to 01:29.440 --> 01:31.162 Ukraine . While simultaneously 01:31.162 --> 01:32.996 strengthening the alliance's own 01:32.996 --> 01:35.180 deterrence and defense . During our 01:35.190 --> 01:37.357 meetings in wilderness , we will build 01:37.357 --> 01:39.579 upon years of adaptation , charting the 01:39.579 --> 01:41.579 course for a more safe , secure and 01:41.579 --> 01:43.809 prosperous world and refining our next 01:43.819 --> 01:46.089 steps in response to the ongoing crisis 01:46.099 --> 01:48.389 in Ukraine . Today , the United States 01:48.400 --> 01:50.289 also continues to demonstrate its 01:50.289 --> 01:52.400 enduring commitment to Ukraine . With 01:52.400 --> 01:54.511 the announcement of a new drawdown of 01:54.511 --> 01:56.233 military assistance to provide 01:56.233 --> 01:58.067 Ukraine's forces with additional 01:58.067 --> 01:59.956 munitions , weapons and equipment 01:59.956 --> 02:02.178 needed to defend their country and push 02:02.178 --> 02:04.233 back on Russia's war of aggression . 02:04.233 --> 02:06.178 With the announcement of this 42nd 02:06.178 --> 02:08.178 presidential drawdown package , the 02:08.178 --> 02:08.139 United States has committed more than 02:08.149 --> 02:11.779 $41.3 billion in military assistance 02:11.789 --> 02:13.567 since Russia first launched its 02:13.567 --> 02:15.456 unprovoked and brutal war against 02:15.456 --> 02:18.809 Ukraine on February 24 2022 and more 02:18.820 --> 02:20.820 than 44.1 billion in military 02:20.830 --> 02:22.759 assistance since Russia's initial 02:22.770 --> 02:25.899 invasion of Ukraine back in 2014 . Some 02:25.910 --> 02:27.960 of the capabilities in today's $800 02:27.970 --> 02:30.649 million drawdown package include 105 5 02:30.660 --> 02:32.771 millimeter artillery rounds including 02:32.771 --> 02:34.789 dual purpose improved conventional 02:34.800 --> 02:37.550 munitions or to picks and 15 millimeter 02:37.559 --> 02:40.139 artillery rounds , additional munitions 02:40.149 --> 02:42.149 for patriot air defense systems and 02:42.149 --> 02:44.316 ammunition for high mobility artillery 02:44.316 --> 02:45.982 rocket systems or high mars , 02:46.100 --> 02:48.156 additional Bradley infantry fighting 02:48.156 --> 02:50.267 vehicles , additional striker armored 02:50.267 --> 02:52.378 personnel carriers , precision aerial 02:52.378 --> 02:54.669 munitions , demolition munitions and 02:54.679 --> 02:57.139 systems for obstacle clearing and 02:57.149 --> 02:59.399 various uh spare parts and operational 02:59.410 --> 03:01.800 sustainment equipment . With this 03:01.809 --> 03:03.698 announcement , we will be able to 03:03.698 --> 03:05.531 provide Ukraine with hundreds of 03:05.531 --> 03:07.420 thousands of additional artillery 03:07.420 --> 03:09.587 ammunition immediately . This decision 03:09.587 --> 03:11.753 will ensure we can sustain our support 03:11.753 --> 03:13.865 for Ukraine by bridging us to a point 03:13.865 --> 03:15.753 where we are producing sufficient 03:15.753 --> 03:17.976 artillery ammunition on a monthly basis 03:17.976 --> 03:20.198 across the coalition . We recognize the 03:20.198 --> 03:22.309 complexities here which is why I want 03:22.309 --> 03:24.309 to quickly provide a few additional 03:24.309 --> 03:26.253 pieces of information on DP IC M . 03:26.253 --> 03:28.365 First , Russia has been using cluster 03:28.365 --> 03:30.420 munitions munitions indiscriminately 03:30.420 --> 03:32.642 since the start of this war in order to 03:32.642 --> 03:34.809 attack Ukraine . By contrast , Ukraine 03:34.809 --> 03:36.880 is seeking DPM rounds in order to 03:36.889 --> 03:38.970 defend its own sovereign territory . 03:39.589 --> 03:41.645 Second , compared to Russian cluster 03:41.645 --> 03:43.960 munitions , the DPC rounds we will 03:43.970 --> 03:46.081 provide Ukraine have an extremely low 03:46.089 --> 03:49.009 failure or dead rate . The DM 03:49.020 --> 03:51.242 ammunition we are delivering to Ukraine 03:51.242 --> 03:53.353 will consist only of those with a dud 03:53.353 --> 03:56.479 rate . Less than 2.35% compare that to 03:56.490 --> 03:58.490 Russia which has been using cluster 03:58.490 --> 04:00.712 munitions across Ukraine with dud rates 04:00.712 --> 04:04.279 of between 30 40% during the first year 04:04.289 --> 04:06.770 of the conflict alone , Russia fired 04:06.779 --> 04:09.001 cluster munitions deployed from a range 04:09.001 --> 04:11.223 of weapons systems have likely expended 04:11.223 --> 04:13.223 tens of millions of submunitions or 04:13.223 --> 04:16.230 bomblets across Ukraine . Third , we're 04:16.239 --> 04:18.295 working with Ukraine to minimize the 04:18.295 --> 04:20.350 risks associated with the decision . 04:20.350 --> 04:22.572 The Ukrainian government has offered us 04:22.572 --> 04:24.183 assurances in writing on the 04:24.183 --> 04:26.295 responsible use of DMS including that 04:26.295 --> 04:28.072 they will not use the rounds in 04:28.072 --> 04:30.183 civilian populated urban environments 04:30.183 --> 04:32.239 and that they will record where they 04:32.239 --> 04:34.295 use these rounds which will simplify 04:34.295 --> 04:36.406 later demining efforts . Ukraine also 04:36.406 --> 04:38.295 has committed to post conflict in 04:38.295 --> 04:40.017 mining efforts to mitigate any 04:40.017 --> 04:41.906 potential harm to civilians . The 04:41.906 --> 04:44.128 United States has already invested more 04:44.128 --> 04:46.295 than $95 million in Ukraine's demining 04:46.295 --> 04:48.295 activities and we will provide more 04:48.295 --> 04:50.350 support to help Ukraine mitigate the 04:50.350 --> 04:52.572 impacts of cluster munition use by both 04:52.572 --> 04:54.795 sides in this conflict . And fourth and 04:54.795 --> 04:56.906 this is critical by providing Ukraine 04:56.906 --> 04:59.128 with DPM artillery ammunition . We will 04:59.128 --> 05:01.295 ensure that the Ukrainian military has 05:01.295 --> 05:03.295 sufficient artillery ammunition for 05:03.295 --> 05:05.461 many months to come . In this period . 05:05.461 --> 05:07.406 The United States , our allies and 05:07.406 --> 05:09.517 partners will continue to ramp up our 05:09.517 --> 05:11.461 defense industrial base to support 05:11.461 --> 05:13.628 Ukraine for the past year and a half . 05:13.628 --> 05:15.795 President Biden has been clear that we 05:15.795 --> 05:17.961 will support Ukraine for as long as it 05:17.961 --> 05:20.128 takes . I want to commend the tireless 05:20.128 --> 05:22.295 efforts of the department , our allies 05:22.295 --> 05:22.269 and our partners in delivering this 05:22.279 --> 05:24.279 historically unprecedented level of 05:24.279 --> 05:26.480 security assistance throughout the 05:26.489 --> 05:28.600 Kremlin's vicious war of choice . The 05:28.600 --> 05:30.489 Ukrainian forces have effectively 05:30.489 --> 05:32.211 leveraged assistance and shown 05:32.211 --> 05:33.989 outstanding bravery and skill . 05:33.989 --> 05:36.100 Ukraine's fight is a marathon , not a 05:36.100 --> 05:38.322 sprint . So we will continue to provide 05:38.322 --> 05:40.378 Ukraine with the urgent capabilities 05:40.378 --> 05:42.378 that it needs to meet the moment as 05:42.378 --> 05:44.433 well as what it needs to keep itself 05:44.433 --> 05:46.545 secure for the long term from Russian 05:46.545 --> 05:48.600 aggression . Finally , on a personal 05:48.600 --> 05:50.600 note , as I enter my last week , as 05:50.600 --> 05:52.822 under Secretary of Defense for Policy , 05:52.822 --> 05:52.359 I want to thank the hundreds of 05:52.369 --> 05:54.529 patriots and professionals across OSD 05:54.540 --> 05:56.940 policy . I believe they are the finest 05:56.950 --> 05:59.061 national security organization in the 05:59.070 --> 06:01.459 business for all that they have done to 06:01.470 --> 06:03.303 support Ukraine , strengthen our 06:03.303 --> 06:05.414 alliances and partnerships around the 06:05.414 --> 06:07.690 world and work tirelessly every day 06:07.739 --> 06:09.906 alongside our military and interagency 06:09.906 --> 06:12.017 colleagues to keep America safe . And 06:12.017 --> 06:14.128 with that , I'll pass the mic back to 06:14.128 --> 06:16.461 Dave and look forward to your questions . 06:16.461 --> 06:16.279 Ok . Thanks , sir . Uh We'll go first 06:16.290 --> 06:19.390 to A P . Thank you very much for doing 06:19.399 --> 06:22.109 this . A couple of questions . If you 06:22.119 --> 06:24.175 could talk about the du rate , there 06:24.175 --> 06:26.230 seems to be some questions about how 06:26.230 --> 06:28.230 the US knows that its own munitions 06:28.230 --> 06:30.397 that will be provided will have such a 06:30.397 --> 06:32.508 low rate . And how have you been able 06:32.508 --> 06:34.619 to assure allies that these munitions 06:34.619 --> 06:36.869 won't cause excessive civilian harm ? 06:37.790 --> 06:39.829 And then secondly , is the primary 06:39.839 --> 06:42.279 reason that the cluster munitions are 06:42.290 --> 06:45.390 being used now because there is so much 06:45.399 --> 06:47.890 strain on the 155 millimeter pile . 06:48.940 --> 06:51.107 Yeah , those are , those are important 06:51.107 --> 06:53.162 questions . So look , we're aware of 06:53.162 --> 06:55.162 reporting and I've , I've seen some 06:55.162 --> 06:57.218 things uh in , in the press over the 06:57.218 --> 06:59.162 last 24 hours . Um you know , that 06:59.162 --> 07:01.384 references various dod studies uh which 07:01.384 --> 07:03.607 analyze the dud rates of older versions 07:03.607 --> 07:05.384 of DP IC MS . There are lots of 07:05.384 --> 07:07.329 different variants , I think as we 07:07.329 --> 07:07.260 talked about , you know , the Russians 07:07.269 --> 07:09.436 are , you know , a cluster munition is 07:09.436 --> 07:11.491 not a cluster munition . There are , 07:11.491 --> 07:11.429 there are , there are big differences 07:11.589 --> 07:13.850 between them . Many of those studies 07:13.859 --> 07:15.915 that have been referenced , at least 07:15.915 --> 07:17.970 the ones that I've seen in the press 07:17.970 --> 07:20.137 were based on testing completed in the 07:20.137 --> 07:22.359 19 eighties and many of the DP IC MS of 07:22.359 --> 07:24.081 those variants have since been 07:24.081 --> 07:26.248 demilitarized . Uh We're not providing 07:26.248 --> 07:28.470 those variants of DP IC MS to Ukraine . 07:28.470 --> 07:30.470 Instead we'll be providing our most 07:30.470 --> 07:32.692 modern DP IC MS with DUD rates assessed 07:32.692 --> 07:35.519 to be under 2.35% demonstrated through 07:35.529 --> 07:37.640 five comprehensive tests conducted by 07:37.640 --> 07:39.850 the Department of Defense between 1998 07:39.859 --> 07:43.380 and 2020 . So we're confident in 07:43.390 --> 07:45.970 those in those numbers . I will also 07:45.980 --> 07:49.670 say how they're used matters . And 07:49.679 --> 07:52.029 that's one of the reasons why uh as we 07:52.040 --> 07:54.040 deliberated on this and look this , 07:54.040 --> 07:56.207 this was a , a decision . It took us a 07:56.207 --> 07:57.984 while to come to uh and all the 07:57.984 --> 08:00.040 concerns that people have raised the 08:00.040 --> 08:01.873 humanitarian concerns , what the 08:01.873 --> 08:01.679 reaction of allies and partners would 08:01.690 --> 08:03.857 be , what the rea reaction would be on 08:03.857 --> 08:05.857 the hill . All of these things were 08:05.857 --> 08:08.079 debated and , and adjudicated within uh 08:08.079 --> 08:10.412 the interagency . But one of the things , 08:10.412 --> 08:12.412 uh in addition to the fact that you 08:12.412 --> 08:14.357 know , we weren't providing , uh , 08:14.357 --> 08:16.468 cluster munitions above the rate that 08:16.468 --> 08:18.523 II I talked about was the assurances 08:18.523 --> 08:20.468 that we , uh , got from , uh , the 08:20.468 --> 08:22.468 Ukrainian side on this . Um , we've 08:22.468 --> 08:24.801 gotten these assurances in writing . Uh , 08:24.801 --> 08:26.801 the secretary had an opportunity to 08:26.801 --> 08:28.690 discuss this with , uh , Minister 08:28.690 --> 08:30.801 Reznikoff yesterday and he reiterated 08:30.801 --> 08:33.023 those assurances . And I , I said in my 08:33.023 --> 08:34.746 opening , those assurances are 08:34.746 --> 08:36.912 essentially that , uh , they would not 08:36.912 --> 08:39.079 use DP IC M in uh urban areas that are 08:39.079 --> 08:41.301 populated by civilians . And that there 08:41.301 --> 08:43.468 would be a careful accounting of where 08:43.468 --> 08:45.559 uh they use uh these weapons . Uh 08:45.570 --> 08:47.940 that's going to matter for future uh de 08:47.950 --> 08:50.770 mining uh efforts . I should also say , 08:50.780 --> 08:53.409 well , none of us should minimize this 08:53.419 --> 08:55.641 issue . This is an issue the Ukrainians 08:55.641 --> 08:57.530 are going to have to grapple with 08:57.530 --> 08:59.697 regardless if , if we had never made a 08:59.697 --> 09:01.752 decision on DP IC M . The Ukrainians 09:01.752 --> 09:03.752 would be denying it's going to be a 09:03.752 --> 09:05.697 generational effort because of the 09:05.697 --> 09:08.489 amount of land mines , anti personnel , 09:08.500 --> 09:10.500 anti tank mines , cluster munitions 09:10.500 --> 09:13.929 that the Russians have been using . So 09:13.940 --> 09:16.051 this is an issue we have to tackle uh 09:16.051 --> 09:18.162 regardless we're committed to helping 09:18.162 --> 09:20.500 the , the Ukrainians . Uh do that . You 09:20.510 --> 09:22.788 asked about the primary reason I would , 09:22.788 --> 09:24.899 I would really point to two reasons . 09:24.899 --> 09:27.121 One is the agency of the moment , which 09:27.121 --> 09:29.288 is that , uh you know , the Ukrainians 09:29.288 --> 09:31.177 are in the midst of their counter 09:31.177 --> 09:31.059 offensive . It's been a , it's been 09:31.070 --> 09:33.460 hard sledding . Uh because the Russians 09:33.469 --> 09:35.691 had , you know , six months to dig in . 09:35.691 --> 09:37.802 And so those defensive belts that the 09:37.802 --> 09:39.969 Russians have put in place in the east 09:39.969 --> 09:42.191 and the south are hard , they'd be hard 09:42.191 --> 09:44.559 for any military to punch through . And 09:44.570 --> 09:46.403 so we want to make sure that the 09:46.403 --> 09:48.626 Ukrainians have sufficient artillery to 09:48.626 --> 09:50.737 keep them in the fight in the context 09:50.737 --> 09:52.903 of the current counter offensive . And 09:52.903 --> 09:52.700 because things are going a little 09:52.710 --> 09:55.340 slower than some had hoped , there are 09:55.349 --> 09:57.380 very high expenditures of artillery 09:57.390 --> 09:59.849 rates . So this is to make sure that 09:59.859 --> 10:02.081 the Ukrainians have the confidence that 10:02.081 --> 10:04.359 they have what they need . But frankly , 10:04.359 --> 10:06.526 also that the Russians know that the , 10:06.526 --> 10:08.637 that the Ukrainians are going to stay 10:08.637 --> 10:10.859 in the game . And then the second point 10:10.859 --> 10:13.081 which is important is we don't see this 10:13.081 --> 10:15.248 as a permanent solution , but rather a 10:15.248 --> 10:17.303 bridge , we've already substantially 10:17.303 --> 10:19.526 increased the production of unitary 155 10:19.526 --> 10:21.637 millimeter rounds . The Europeans and 10:21.637 --> 10:23.581 others are also investing in their 10:23.581 --> 10:25.692 defense industrial base . That's good 10:25.692 --> 10:28.026 news and it's starting to pay dividends . 10:28.026 --> 10:27.729 But the reality is we're going to need 10:27.739 --> 10:30.289 to build a bridge to the point at which 10:30.299 --> 10:32.466 that capacity is sufficient on a month 10:32.466 --> 10:34.719 to month basis to keep the Ukrainians 10:34.739 --> 10:36.850 in the artillery fight . And the last 10:36.850 --> 10:39.017 point I will make is a strategic one . 10:39.017 --> 10:41.049 Um Vladimir Putin has a theory of 10:41.059 --> 10:43.369 victory . OK . His theory of victory is 10:43.380 --> 10:45.690 that he will outlast everybody . He'll 10:45.700 --> 10:47.867 outlast the Ukrainians , he'll outlast 10:47.867 --> 10:49.978 the United States . He'll outlast the 10:49.978 --> 10:51.644 Europeans , he'll outlast the 10:51.644 --> 10:53.533 international community . He will 10:53.533 --> 10:55.867 simply brute force his way through this , 10:55.867 --> 10:57.922 having failed in kind of achieving a 10:57.922 --> 11:00.033 lightning victory . He's now going to 11:00.033 --> 11:01.811 play the long game . That's why 11:01.811 --> 11:03.811 President Biden has been clear that 11:03.811 --> 11:03.380 we're going to be with Ukraine as long 11:03.390 --> 11:05.446 as it takes and why we are signaling 11:05.446 --> 11:07.279 that we will continue to provide 11:07.279 --> 11:09.501 Ukraine with the capabilities that will 11:09.501 --> 11:11.723 keep them in the fight . And look , I'm 11:11.723 --> 11:11.489 as concerned about the humanitarian 11:11.500 --> 11:14.960 circumstance as anybody . But the worst 11:14.969 --> 11:17.140 thing for civilians in Ukraine is for 11:17.150 --> 11:19.609 Russia to win the war . Uh And so it's 11:19.619 --> 11:21.979 important that they don't . Let's go , 11:21.989 --> 11:24.580 Liz Fox . Thank you . Thanks for doing 11:24.590 --> 11:26.590 this . Um When will these munitions 11:26.590 --> 11:29.210 make it into Ukraine ? And can you talk 11:29.219 --> 11:31.719 specifically about what the strengths 11:31.729 --> 11:33.919 are of using these cluster munitions ? 11:33.929 --> 11:36.729 Um And are they going to be as 11:36.739 --> 11:38.850 effective as the ones Russia has been 11:38.850 --> 11:42.049 using ? Well , I mean , I don't , I 11:42.059 --> 11:43.948 don't know , I don't want to draw 11:43.948 --> 11:46.115 comparisons between what they're using 11:46.115 --> 11:45.580 it . They're apples and oranges . It's 11:45.590 --> 11:47.757 the point that I made before a cluster 11:47.757 --> 11:49.812 munition is not a cluster munition . 11:49.812 --> 11:51.646 These are uh much more efficient 11:51.646 --> 11:53.701 weapons because they have much lower 11:53.701 --> 11:55.923 dud rates . So the bad news about 30 to 11:55.923 --> 11:58.090 40% dud rates is that it creates a lot 11:58.090 --> 12:00.312 of unexploded ordinance . It also means 12:00.312 --> 11:59.590 it's not generating the effects that 11:59.599 --> 12:01.766 they , that they want either . So what 12:01.766 --> 12:03.599 you want is for these weapons to 12:03.599 --> 12:05.599 generate the effects that they were 12:05.599 --> 12:07.655 designed for . And in this context , 12:07.655 --> 12:09.877 you know , I think they will help um in 12:09.877 --> 12:11.988 some of these security belts that the 12:11.988 --> 12:11.960 Ukraine's are pushing against , against 12:11.969 --> 12:14.369 some of the dug in formations that uh 12:14.486 --> 12:17.056 that the Russians have . I think they 12:17.065 --> 12:18.875 will also be useful for troop 12:18.885 --> 12:20.941 concentrations and concentrations of 12:20.941 --> 12:22.996 armored vehicles and lighter skinned 12:22.996 --> 12:25.296 vehicles . So they'll have , they'll 12:25.306 --> 12:27.417 have utility . I think it's important 12:27.417 --> 12:29.584 that they have a mix of capabilities . 12:29.584 --> 12:31.750 It's not , no one capability is a , is 12:31.750 --> 12:33.917 a silver bullet . So they have unitary 12:33.917 --> 12:36.028 155 high explosive rounds . They have 12:36.028 --> 12:37.973 the Excalibur rounds which are GPS 12:37.973 --> 12:40.195 guided . They obviously have the rocket 12:40.195 --> 12:42.195 systems that we have transferred to 12:42.195 --> 12:44.306 them in the , in the form of Gimler . 12:44.306 --> 12:46.528 So it's really no one thing is going to 12:46.528 --> 12:46.382 make a difference , but I think this 12:46.392 --> 12:48.351 gives them an extra arrow in their 12:48.361 --> 12:50.361 quiver on the timing . I'm gonna be 12:50.361 --> 12:52.417 going to be a little circumspect for 12:52.417 --> 12:54.711 operational security reasons . Um We 12:54.721 --> 12:56.943 have been pretty cautious about talking 12:56.943 --> 12:58.888 about specific timelines . The one 12:58.888 --> 13:00.999 thing I will say is they will deliver 13:00.999 --> 13:03.054 in a time frame that is relevant for 13:03.054 --> 13:05.165 the counter offensive . Great . Let's 13:05.165 --> 13:07.388 go , Tony uh Bloomberg , I had a couple 13:07.388 --> 13:09.554 questions and um has the United States 13:09.554 --> 13:12.840 ever used the D IC MD P IC M in combat ? 13:12.849 --> 13:14.793 I don't think they have . So , how 13:14.793 --> 13:17.016 robust are our inventories and why were 13:17.016 --> 13:19.127 these , why was these in us inventory 13:19.130 --> 13:21.297 in a way ? Were these used to plan for 13:21.297 --> 13:23.690 a North Korea invasion kind of scenario ? 13:23.900 --> 13:26.067 Yeah , I'll have to get back to you on 13:26.067 --> 13:28.067 previous uses . My understanding is 13:28.067 --> 13:30.233 there were uses of DP IC M back but it 13:30.233 --> 13:32.567 may go back to the Gulf War , but I may , 13:32.567 --> 13:34.789 may have that wrong . So let's get back 13:34.789 --> 13:36.844 to you uh on that . Um I will say uh 13:36.844 --> 13:38.789 they're in our inventories because 13:38.789 --> 13:40.956 there are a range of contingency plans 13:40.956 --> 13:43.178 where this could be uh where this could 13:43.178 --> 13:45.400 be useful . Um But this is also an area 13:45.400 --> 13:47.511 where our inventories are quite large 13:47.511 --> 13:49.567 and we are not concerned that in the 13:49.567 --> 13:51.567 quantities we would transfer to the 13:51.567 --> 13:50.614 Ukrainians , that it would have a 13:50.625 --> 13:52.792 meaningful impact on our readiness for 13:52.792 --> 13:54.958 other contingencies if I'm a Ukrainian 13:54.958 --> 13:57.181 squad or platoon leader , and I'm going 13:57.181 --> 13:59.403 into areas where these things have been 13:59.403 --> 14:01.181 fired into the conference . How 14:01.181 --> 14:03.236 concerned should I be that my troops 14:03.236 --> 14:05.181 may fall into these things and get 14:05.181 --> 14:05.169 blown apart ? I mean , frankly , I 14:05.179 --> 14:07.290 think the , the grave concern is that 14:07.299 --> 14:10.489 they wander into a Russian minefield uh 14:10.500 --> 14:12.489 or areas where the Russians have 14:12.500 --> 14:14.940 expended weapons with a much higher dud 14:14.950 --> 14:17.309 rate . Um I think that this is a reason 14:17.320 --> 14:20.039 though A they were only transferring DP 14:20.049 --> 14:22.160 IC M with a very low dud rate . There 14:22.160 --> 14:24.216 are variants with higher dud rates . 14:24.216 --> 14:25.882 They were not , they were not 14:25.882 --> 14:27.771 transferring and B why it will be 14:27.771 --> 14:29.827 important for the Ukrainians to keep 14:29.827 --> 14:31.827 track of where they're firing these 14:31.827 --> 14:33.716 things , both for immediate force 14:33.716 --> 14:35.882 protection reasons and over the medium 14:35.882 --> 14:38.105 to longer term for de mining operations 14:38.105 --> 14:40.160 in , in kind of post occupation , uh 14:40.160 --> 14:42.382 post liberation parts of Ukraine . Ok . 14:42.382 --> 14:44.382 We're going to go out to the line , 14:44.382 --> 14:46.605 Michael Gordon Wall Street Journal . Uh 14:46.605 --> 14:48.660 Thank you uh for Doctor Karl . Um uh 14:48.660 --> 14:50.700 Sir , you said that uh the Russians 14:50.710 --> 14:54.609 have um uh used uh tens of millions 14:54.619 --> 14:57.090 of submunitions . Um In Ukraine , I 14:57.099 --> 15:00.030 have um two questions . Uh Since you've 15:00.039 --> 15:02.150 described this as a bridge , how many 15:02.150 --> 15:05.159 submunitions is the US now providing uh 15:05.169 --> 15:07.840 planning to provide to Ukraine ? Say on 15:07.849 --> 15:10.260 a month to month basis ? Uh Given is a 15:10.270 --> 15:12.270 bridge . Are you gonna be providing 15:12.270 --> 15:14.492 millions or hundreds of thousands ? How 15:14.492 --> 15:16.659 many are you providing ? And since the 15:16.659 --> 15:18.826 US has been so critical of the Russian 15:18.826 --> 15:21.419 employment of um uh cluster munitions . 15:21.429 --> 15:23.651 Are there any additional steps that you 15:23.651 --> 15:26.580 can identify to mitigate the risk to 15:26.590 --> 15:28.646 civilians beyond the assurances from 15:28.646 --> 15:30.757 the Ukrainians ? Is there going to be 15:30.757 --> 15:32.868 special training ? Is the US going to 15:32.868 --> 15:34.479 monitor the dud rates on the 15:34.479 --> 15:36.701 battlefield and oversee the areas where 15:36.701 --> 15:38.590 they're employed ? Are there some 15:38.590 --> 15:40.701 specific additional steps the US will 15:40.701 --> 15:43.034 take to reduce the risk of to civilians ? 15:43.479 --> 15:45.701 Thanks Michael . So I'm not going to go 15:45.701 --> 15:47.812 into specific numbers . I will say in 15:47.812 --> 15:49.868 my opening statement , I I mentioned 15:49.868 --> 15:51.646 hundreds of thousands , we have 15:51.646 --> 15:53.757 hundreds of thousands of these rounds 15:53.757 --> 15:55.923 available below the dud rate threshold 15:55.923 --> 15:58.146 that I mentioned . But I'm not going to 15:58.146 --> 16:00.090 tip our hand to the Russians about 16:00.090 --> 15:59.909 knowing what's coming and what volume . 15:59.919 --> 16:02.086 When I will say , we're confident that 16:02.086 --> 16:04.179 with this inflow of DP IC M , in 16:04.190 --> 16:06.700 combination with the unitary 155 rounds , 16:06.710 --> 16:09.159 we continue to provide that the 16:09.169 --> 16:12.281 Ukrainians will be able to sustain the 16:12.291 --> 16:14.291 artillery fight for the foreseeable 16:14.291 --> 16:16.180 future , which I said is not only 16:16.180 --> 16:18.402 important in the moment for the counter 16:18.402 --> 16:20.513 offensive , but to signal to Vladimir 16:20.513 --> 16:22.682 Putin that he can't just outlast the , 16:22.692 --> 16:26.221 the Ukrainians . Um Look , I , I think 16:26.231 --> 16:28.287 we have been critical of the Russian 16:28.287 --> 16:30.398 use of this but in large part for two 16:30.398 --> 16:32.620 reasons , one because the Russians have 16:32.620 --> 16:34.842 been indiscriminate in their use of all 16:34.842 --> 16:37.064 kinds of weapons . Uh They , you know , 16:37.064 --> 16:39.287 even their so-called precision guided , 16:39.287 --> 16:41.509 you know , fly into apartment buildings 16:41.509 --> 16:44.104 uh and hit schools . Um And uh so , and 16:44.114 --> 16:46.058 they've been indiscriminate in the 16:46.058 --> 16:48.281 usage of uh cluster munitions as well . 16:48.281 --> 16:50.392 Um They're also using uh weapons that 16:50.392 --> 16:52.503 are much older , which much with much 16:52.503 --> 16:54.725 higher rate and that's , that's uh much 16:54.725 --> 16:56.725 higher risk of collateral damage uh 16:56.725 --> 16:58.225 even when they're not used 16:58.225 --> 17:00.503 indiscriminately . So as I said before , 17:00.503 --> 17:00.133 I think this is kind of an apples , 17:00.143 --> 17:02.133 oranges comparison beyond the 17:02.143 --> 17:04.199 assurances , which I think we should 17:04.199 --> 17:06.310 take meaningfully . I mean , in the , 17:06.310 --> 17:08.365 in the , in the , when we have asked 17:08.365 --> 17:10.365 the Ukrainians to offer us explicit 17:10.365 --> 17:12.365 assurances , they've stuck by those 17:12.365 --> 17:14.532 assurances . So I think we should give 17:14.532 --> 17:16.865 the Ukrainians the benefit of the doubt . 17:16.865 --> 17:18.976 We will of course be watching how the 17:18.976 --> 17:20.976 Ukrainians use these systems , they 17:20.976 --> 17:23.087 will be reporting their usage back to 17:23.087 --> 17:24.810 us . And so we can always make 17:24.810 --> 17:26.921 judgments later if we feel like those 17:26.921 --> 17:29.199 assurances are not , are not being met . 17:29.199 --> 17:31.310 But I'm confident that the Ukrainians 17:31.310 --> 17:33.476 will be true to their word . I'll also 17:33.476 --> 17:35.421 say like with every system that we 17:35.421 --> 17:37.587 provide the Ukrainians , there will be 17:37.587 --> 17:39.421 uh not just training but kind of 17:39.421 --> 17:41.587 coaching and mentoring associated with 17:41.587 --> 17:43.699 this . And I think one of the reasons 17:43.699 --> 17:43.368 why the Ukrainians have been so 17:43.378 --> 17:46.057 effective in employing the artillery 17:46.067 --> 17:48.897 they have had regardless of system is 17:48.907 --> 17:50.697 that that they've received some 17:50.708 --> 17:52.875 coaching and mentoring from the United 17:52.875 --> 17:54.875 States about the best employment of 17:54.875 --> 17:57.208 that . And so we'll continue to do that . 17:57.208 --> 17:59.430 So one more online , we got to Lee Seng 17:59.430 --> 18:00.597 of Radio Free Asia . 18:04.890 --> 18:08.180 Are you there ? OK . Let's come back to 18:08.189 --> 18:10.849 the room . Uh Courtney non cluster 18:10.859 --> 18:12.915 munition question . Actually , I one 18:12.915 --> 18:15.192 quick cluster . Have you , did you say , 18:15.192 --> 18:17.526 have you said how many is in this first ? 18:17.526 --> 18:17.040 So I'm not gonna go into specific 18:17.050 --> 18:19.161 numbers . We talked about hundreds of 18:19.161 --> 18:21.272 thousands of of uh of munitions , but 18:21.272 --> 18:23.439 I'm not gonna just stockpiles hundreds 18:23.439 --> 18:25.494 of thousands , right ? I'm not gonna 18:25.494 --> 18:27.606 talk about how much in each tranche . 18:27.606 --> 18:27.339 All I'm gonna say is we have hundreds 18:27.349 --> 18:29.460 of thousands that are available uh at 18:29.460 --> 18:31.930 this uh dud rate . Um And that we 18:31.939 --> 18:34.106 believe the numbers and our ability to 18:34.106 --> 18:36.328 flow them to Ukraine will be sufficient 18:36.328 --> 18:38.383 to keep them not only in the current 18:38.383 --> 18:40.272 fight but to build this bridge to 18:40.272 --> 18:42.630 increase capacity on the 155 units each . 18:42.920 --> 18:44.809 That means you're gonna have more 18:44.809 --> 18:47.031 tranches . This isn't just a one time , 18:47.031 --> 18:49.142 I guess too . Right . I don't want to 18:49.142 --> 18:48.810 prejudge decisions that haven't been 18:48.819 --> 18:50.763 made since at the end of the day . 18:50.763 --> 18:52.986 These are decisions the president , the 18:52.986 --> 18:52.844 secretary recommends to the president , 18:52.854 --> 18:54.854 the president signs off on . I will 18:54.854 --> 18:57.076 just say this , we have the capacity to 18:57.076 --> 18:59.021 continue to flow additional rounds 18:59.021 --> 19:01.187 forward . And if we were to do so , we 19:01.187 --> 19:03.298 have sufficient quantities to be able 19:03.298 --> 19:05.521 to do the things I said , since we have 19:05.521 --> 19:07.521 you here , I'm wondering if you can 19:07.521 --> 19:09.576 talk a little bit about these recent 19:09.576 --> 19:11.743 interactions with the Iranian Navy and 19:11.743 --> 19:11.724 just give us a sense . It seems as if 19:11.734 --> 19:13.935 there's been a small uptick at least 19:13.944 --> 19:16.055 this week in these incidents . If you 19:16.055 --> 19:18.545 have any sense of why now why Iran is 19:18.555 --> 19:20.910 doing this ? They tend to actions like 19:20.920 --> 19:23.253 this tend to be a response to something . 19:25.550 --> 19:27.439 Uh Well , first of all , it's not 19:27.439 --> 19:29.439 completely clear , um and frankly , 19:29.439 --> 19:31.680 it's not a very effective message uh to 19:31.689 --> 19:33.856 uh essentially engage in piracy on the 19:33.856 --> 19:35.745 high seas and shoot it uh unarmed 19:35.745 --> 19:38.650 civilian maritime craft . I think as 19:38.660 --> 19:40.771 you're all tracking essentially there 19:40.771 --> 19:42.993 were two incidents in the , in the past 19:42.993 --> 19:44.993 few days that occurred within a few 19:44.993 --> 19:46.771 hours of each other . The first 19:46.771 --> 19:48.993 incident was a case in which an Iranian 19:48.993 --> 19:51.160 vessel approached the Marshall Islands 19:51.160 --> 19:53.327 flagged oil tanker , the TRF Mosque in 19:53.327 --> 19:55.438 the Gulf of Oman . The Iranian vessel 19:55.438 --> 19:57.438 departed the scene when the US Navy 19:57.438 --> 19:59.493 guided missile destroyer US S mcfaul 19:59.493 --> 20:01.493 arrived and then there was a second 20:01.493 --> 20:03.910 incident three hours later uh where an 20:03.920 --> 20:06.199 Iranian vessel closed uh within one 20:06.209 --> 20:08.209 mile and fired multiple long bursts 20:08.250 --> 20:10.194 from small arms and crew served uh 20:10.194 --> 20:12.083 weapons . And the navy received a 20:12.083 --> 20:14.520 distress call from the Bahamian flagged 20:14.680 --> 20:17.380 uh oil tanker , Richmond Voyager . And 20:17.390 --> 20:21.329 the US S US S mcfaul responded uh again , 20:21.550 --> 20:23.910 why the Iranians are doing in this at 20:23.920 --> 20:26.339 this moment uh is not at all clear uh 20:26.349 --> 20:28.182 to us . Um I think it's a better 20:28.182 --> 20:30.800 question uh left uh left to them , but 20:30.810 --> 20:32.921 it's got the highest attention of the 20:32.921 --> 20:34.810 department . I I'll just say as a 20:34.810 --> 20:36.977 personal anecdote . Um I don't know if 20:36.977 --> 20:36.599 any of you are here on the Fourth of 20:36.609 --> 20:39.219 July for uh the fireworks display . 20:39.229 --> 20:41.118 It's a cool place to watch uh the 20:41.118 --> 20:43.229 fireworks . But as the , you know , 9 20:43.229 --> 20:45.300 30 as the crescendo of fireworks was 20:45.310 --> 20:47.477 occurring over the mall , I got a call 20:47.477 --> 20:49.477 on my cell phone . I was out on the 20:49.477 --> 20:51.643 lawn with my kids . Uh It was , and it 20:51.643 --> 20:53.810 was uh cable saying that the secretary 20:53.810 --> 20:55.866 wanted to convene a secure call with 20:55.866 --> 20:57.977 his senior leadership team to discuss 20:57.977 --> 20:59.754 these issues because the second 20:59.754 --> 21:02.469 incident was ongoing . And so for 45 21:02.479 --> 21:04.550 minutes , we were on the phone , the 21:04.560 --> 21:06.782 secretary , the Chairman General Rila , 21:06.782 --> 21:09.540 our nascent commander working through , 21:09.550 --> 21:11.606 what were the Iranians doing ? Where 21:11.606 --> 21:13.717 were our assets ? What was the ship's 21:13.717 --> 21:15.717 captain requesting us to do what we 21:15.717 --> 21:17.606 were we advising them to do ? The 21:17.606 --> 21:19.828 mcfaul was steaming in that direction . 21:19.828 --> 21:21.994 The captain was advised by NAV sent to 21:21.994 --> 21:23.994 redirect to enter Omani Territorial 21:23.994 --> 21:27.069 waters and the combination of all of 21:27.079 --> 21:29.060 those decisions appears to have uh 21:29.069 --> 21:31.291 warned the Iranians off . So even after 21:31.291 --> 21:33.402 taking some pot shots at the Richmond 21:33.402 --> 21:35.979 Voyager , uh we were successful in uh 21:35.989 --> 21:38.109 in the Iranians uh leaving the area 21:38.119 --> 21:40.390 before right before the mcfall showed 21:40.400 --> 21:42.567 up , I mentioned that to say that just 21:42.567 --> 21:44.733 like this has the highest attention uh 21:44.733 --> 21:46.789 of the department . Uh We're gonna , 21:46.789 --> 21:49.011 you know , we have , I think uh general 21:49.011 --> 21:51.067 has done a good job of moving around 21:51.067 --> 21:53.067 the assets he already has uh at his 21:53.067 --> 21:56.000 disposal um uh to thicken um our 21:56.010 --> 21:58.066 ability to respond to incidents like 21:58.066 --> 22:00.232 this . And I think the proof is in the 22:00.232 --> 22:02.454 other night . Um I think we continue to 22:02.454 --> 22:04.454 work with our allies and partners , 22:04.454 --> 22:06.677 especially in the I MS C , which is the 22:06.677 --> 22:05.949 International Maritime Security 22:05.959 --> 22:07.903 construct , which some of you have 22:07.903 --> 22:10.070 probably been out the fifth fleet , it 22:10.070 --> 22:12.181 runs out of Bahrain . I know you have 22:12.181 --> 22:14.403 uh uh Courtney and So we'll continue to 22:14.403 --> 22:16.626 work with our allies and partners , not 22:16.626 --> 22:16.449 just in the region but around the world 22:16.459 --> 22:19.130 like the , like the UK um to try to 22:19.140 --> 22:21.489 thicken that out because whatever the 22:21.500 --> 22:23.444 Iranians are trying to do here , I 22:23.444 --> 22:25.667 don't think we should assume it will be 22:25.667 --> 22:27.833 the last time . Uh They try . Let's go 22:27.833 --> 22:27.760 to the back room Fadi Al Jazeera . 22:27.770 --> 22:29.992 Thank you . Thank you , Doctor Cole . I 22:29.992 --> 22:32.214 have two quick questions on the cluster 22:32.214 --> 22:34.270 munition and one on on Russia on the 22:34.270 --> 22:36.048 cluster munition . Um You , you 22:36.048 --> 22:38.270 mentioned five studies since 1998 until 22:38.270 --> 22:40.437 2020 that prove uh you have in your uh 22:40.437 --> 22:42.800 stockpile that that rate lower than 22:42.810 --> 22:45.979 2.35 is the department willing to uh 22:45.989 --> 22:48.339 make these studies available . So 22:48.349 --> 22:50.516 experts can verify the accuracy of the 22:50.855 --> 22:54.225 second one . in , in terms of uh 22:54.336 --> 22:57.086 providing cluster munition is that this 22:57.095 --> 22:59.262 administration breaking the law passed 22:59.262 --> 23:01.446 by the Congress that prohibits the the 23:01.456 --> 23:04.786 transfer of cluster munition that is 23:04.796 --> 23:08.515 without uh level above 1% . And 23:08.526 --> 23:10.582 finally , on Russia , we've seen two 23:10.582 --> 23:13.485 incidents lately uh in , in , in Syria 23:13.495 --> 23:16.612 where Russian aircraft um according to 23:16.621 --> 23:19.932 the Pentagon harassed uh uh us 23:19.942 --> 23:22.391 drones before that we saw something 23:22.401 --> 23:25.072 happening similarly in the Black Sea . 23:25.112 --> 23:28.192 Are you concerned that this Russia is 23:28.202 --> 23:30.511 kind of kind of normalizing this 23:30.521 --> 23:32.632 behavior ? And is that the OD willing 23:32.632 --> 23:35.692 to take any actions to prevent Russia 23:35.702 --> 23:37.924 from continuing this type of behavior ? 23:37.924 --> 23:41.030 Thank you . Sure . Uh So a bunch of 23:41.040 --> 23:43.151 things there on the , on the , on the 23:43.151 --> 23:44.984 test itself . Uh I think at this 23:44.984 --> 23:46.762 juncture , uh because the tests 23:46.762 --> 23:48.984 themselves are classified , we won't be 23:48.984 --> 23:51.207 releasing them . But uh we'll take that 23:51.207 --> 23:52.929 question , uh uh question back 23:52.929 --> 23:55.040 presently . Uh those tests , uh those 23:55.040 --> 23:57.262 uh , reports are classified , I can say 23:57.262 --> 23:59.484 this , we have uh high confidence uh in 23:59.484 --> 24:01.707 those numbers based on five consecutive 24:01.707 --> 24:03.873 tests . Um I also have high confidence 24:03.873 --> 24:06.182 that they will be far more efficient 24:06.192 --> 24:08.081 and discriminate than the cluster 24:08.081 --> 24:10.303 munitions that the Russians are using . 24:10.303 --> 24:12.525 And I think the Ukrainian assurances on 24:12.525 --> 24:15.262 top of that , um uh give me added 24:15.272 --> 24:17.753 confidence in that . I'll also say that 24:17.762 --> 24:19.929 it's not a good thing for civilians in 24:19.929 --> 24:21.873 Ukraine or the humanitarian system 24:21.873 --> 24:23.929 situation in Ukraine , for Ukraine's 24:23.929 --> 24:26.151 counter offensive to be unsuccessful or 24:26.151 --> 24:25.875 for the Russians to be more successful . 24:25.885 --> 24:28.416 That seems like a recipe for more 24:28.426 --> 24:30.426 humanitarian suffering . So to the 24:30.436 --> 24:32.735 degree that there's uh a utilitarian 24:32.745 --> 24:34.912 calculus in this , I think it's , it's 24:34.912 --> 24:36.912 worth thinking that through . And I 24:36.912 --> 24:39.134 think that's ultimately why even though 24:39.134 --> 24:40.689 this is a decision that the 24:40.689 --> 24:42.801 administration deliberated on . Uh uh 24:42.801 --> 24:44.801 and that the president thought very 24:44.801 --> 24:46.689 carefully about . Um there was no 24:46.689 --> 24:48.869 disagreement among the president's uh 24:48.880 --> 24:50.824 uh principal advisor on whether we 24:50.824 --> 24:52.991 should provide uh this system and that 24:52.991 --> 24:55.102 includes across the department . It's 24:55.102 --> 24:57.324 not just the department uh of , of , of 24:57.324 --> 24:59.491 defense . Um Are we breaking the law ? 24:59.491 --> 25:01.436 We are not breaking the law . Um I 25:01.436 --> 25:01.180 would say , first of all the , the 25:01.189 --> 25:03.719 prohibition against exporting above 1% 25:03.729 --> 25:05.896 these munitions are pretty close to 1% 25:05.896 --> 25:07.951 but they're not at the 1% level . Uh 25:07.951 --> 25:09.729 But the president does have the 25:09.729 --> 25:11.896 authority uh to waive that requirement 25:11.896 --> 25:13.840 on national security grounds . And 25:13.840 --> 25:15.785 that's what uh he has done in this 25:15.785 --> 25:15.670 instance . Uh There's no dispute that 25:15.680 --> 25:17.847 he has that authority . It's in , it's 25:17.847 --> 25:19.847 in law . Um But we also didn't make 25:19.847 --> 25:21.958 this as a unilateral decision . We've 25:21.958 --> 25:23.847 been having conversations with uh 25:23.847 --> 25:25.847 informal conversations for weeks uh 25:25.847 --> 25:27.902 with the hill . I'm sure many of you 25:27.902 --> 25:29.958 have had your own conversations with 25:29.958 --> 25:32.180 members on both sides of the aisle , on 25:32.180 --> 25:34.402 the , on the hill . This is obviously a 25:34.402 --> 25:34.329 capability that the Ukrainians have 25:34.339 --> 25:37.489 been asking for for a while . Um And we 25:37.500 --> 25:39.670 continued uh those consultations with 25:39.680 --> 25:42.599 the Hill um and escalated them as we 25:42.609 --> 25:44.442 got closer to this decision . So 25:44.442 --> 25:46.553 doesn't mean everybody uh in Congress 25:46.553 --> 25:48.387 will uh will agree , but I think 25:48.387 --> 25:50.609 everybody will agree that it was within 25:50.609 --> 25:52.720 the right of the president to do this 25:52.720 --> 25:54.720 um on the Syrian uh on the , on the 25:54.720 --> 25:56.887 Russian activities in Syria . Yeah , I 25:56.887 --> 25:59.053 mean , I think we've seen , we've seen 25:59.053 --> 26:01.109 activities uh by the Russians uh Air 26:01.109 --> 26:03.349 Force um to encroach on kind of the 26:03.599 --> 26:05.710 informal arrangements we have uh with 26:05.710 --> 26:08.680 them about deconflicting airspace . Um 26:08.689 --> 26:11.022 I will say that it , it does concern us . 26:11.022 --> 26:13.245 Um And I do think uh what we don't want 26:13.245 --> 26:15.411 to be is in a situation where they are 26:15.411 --> 26:17.633 normalizing behavior where there can be 26:17.633 --> 26:19.800 an incident . Um You know , it would , 26:19.800 --> 26:21.856 it would be , I think significant if 26:21.856 --> 26:21.479 there was an incident involving an un 26:21.540 --> 26:24.160 crude system , um it would be even more 26:24.170 --> 26:26.281 significant if it involved uh piloted 26:26.281 --> 26:28.170 aircraft . So we will continue to 26:28.170 --> 26:30.380 highlight uh when the Russians engage 26:30.390 --> 26:32.223 in reckless unprofessional uh uh 26:32.223 --> 26:34.689 behavior in the skies . Uh , we will 26:34.699 --> 26:36.755 highlight for the world so that when 26:36.755 --> 26:38.755 and if an incident happens , people 26:38.755 --> 26:40.921 will know who's at fault here . And we 26:40.921 --> 26:42.866 hope to dissuade the Russians from 26:42.866 --> 26:44.866 continuing this pattern of behavior 26:44.866 --> 26:46.810 because , you know , incidents and 26:46.810 --> 26:49.088 accidents if they occur can , you know , 26:49.088 --> 26:51.310 can spin out of control , that's not in 26:51.310 --> 26:51.310 our interest , but it's also not in 26:51.319 --> 26:53.097 Russia's interest . Uh So we'll 26:53.097 --> 26:55.208 continue to make that point to them . 26:55.208 --> 26:57.375 Ok . We're gonna go out for one more . 26:57.375 --> 26:59.652 Uh Eric Schmidt , New York Times . Yes . 26:59.652 --> 27:01.910 Uh Doctor Cole , you , you acknowledge 27:01.920 --> 27:03.920 that the , uh , the , the Ukrainian 27:03.920 --> 27:06.180 counter offensive is going slower than 27:06.189 --> 27:08.245 anticipated , uh attributing some of 27:08.245 --> 27:10.411 that to the Russian defenses including 27:10.411 --> 27:12.522 mine fields . But you could , could , 27:12.522 --> 27:14.689 you also discuss uh the limitations of 27:14.689 --> 27:16.689 the combined arms training , uh the 27:16.689 --> 27:18.911 short duration training that they got , 27:18.911 --> 27:21.078 uh , the Ukrainians and to what extent 27:21.078 --> 27:23.245 they've been able to absorb that those 27:23.245 --> 27:25.356 that kind of training and apply it in 27:25.356 --> 27:27.300 this kind of difficult battlefield 27:27.300 --> 27:29.522 situation . Thank you . Yeah , I mean , 27:29.522 --> 27:31.633 first , I think , uh as the Ukrainian 27:31.633 --> 27:33.745 leadership has said , you know , this 27:33.745 --> 27:35.856 isn't a movie . Uh Right . So this is 27:35.856 --> 27:37.911 gonna , it , things are hard in real 27:37.911 --> 27:39.856 war . Uh Things are hard sometimes 27:39.856 --> 27:42.022 things go faster than you think . Uh , 27:42.022 --> 27:43.745 like in Kharkiv , uh last fall 27:43.745 --> 27:45.967 sometimes . Uh It's a slog , uh like it 27:45.967 --> 27:48.133 was in last fall . I think when you're 27:48.133 --> 27:50.078 talking about eastern and southern 27:50.078 --> 27:52.189 Ukraine , the Russians have had , you 27:52.189 --> 27:54.411 know , during the winter , neither side 27:54.411 --> 27:56.133 was standing still right . The 27:56.133 --> 27:58.300 Ukrainians with our assistance and the 27:58.300 --> 27:58.165 assistance of the allies and partners 27:58.175 --> 28:00.231 were building this mountain of steel 28:00.231 --> 28:02.008 for the counter offensive . The 28:02.008 --> 28:04.231 Russians were digging in uh laying mine 28:04.231 --> 28:06.380 fields , uh anti anti tank , uh 28:06.390 --> 28:08.780 obstacles and barriers , trench lines . 28:08.969 --> 28:11.380 Uh And so , uh we always knew it was 28:11.390 --> 28:13.900 going to be uh tough . Um Eric , I 28:13.910 --> 28:16.077 think to your point about the combined 28:16.077 --> 28:18.243 arms training , I think we should draw 28:18.243 --> 28:20.354 lessons at the end , not in the , not 28:20.354 --> 28:19.920 in the middle . And I think we're only 28:19.930 --> 28:22.097 in the beginning of the middle . Uh uh 28:22.097 --> 28:24.619 And I say that because um yeah , the , 28:24.630 --> 28:27.189 the uh you know , a number of brigades 28:27.199 --> 28:29.479 uh went through training uh in Germany 28:29.582 --> 28:31.749 and elsewhere by the United States and 28:31.749 --> 28:33.860 our allies to get them ready for this 28:33.860 --> 28:36.026 fight . It was truncated relative to , 28:36.026 --> 28:38.193 you know , what a US army unit might , 28:38.193 --> 28:40.138 might go through . But I think the 28:40.138 --> 28:42.249 Ukrainians have regularly proved that 28:42.249 --> 28:41.592 they can kind of step on the 28:41.602 --> 28:43.972 accelerator pedal and be pretty 28:43.982 --> 28:46.271 proficient . It does , of course , you 28:46.291 --> 28:48.235 know , it pushes them out of their 28:48.235 --> 28:50.513 comfort zone a little bit because this , 28:50.513 --> 28:52.680 you know , has them employing fire and 28:52.680 --> 28:54.847 maneuver in a way that's more familiar 28:54.847 --> 28:57.514 to NATO forces than forces that have a 28:57.524 --> 28:59.624 Soviet legacy and Soviet doctrine uh 28:59.634 --> 29:02.543 behind uh behind them . Um So it is in , 29:02.553 --> 29:04.664 you know , requiring them to fight in 29:04.664 --> 29:06.894 different uh ways . But um I will say 29:06.904 --> 29:09.071 this , I , I am not particularly , I'm 29:09.071 --> 29:11.182 not , you know , it is slower than we 29:11.182 --> 29:12.904 had hoped again . Uh Ukrainian 29:12.904 --> 29:15.126 officials have , have said as much . Um 29:15.134 --> 29:17.356 but the Ukrainians have a lot of combat 29:17.356 --> 29:19.394 power left . Um And in fact , the 29:19.404 --> 29:21.626 majority of their combat power for this 29:21.626 --> 29:23.682 fight has not been brought to bear . 29:23.682 --> 29:25.737 And so what you're seeing across the 29:25.737 --> 29:27.793 east and the south is the Ukrainians 29:27.793 --> 29:29.571 deliberately and understandably 29:29.571 --> 29:31.776 deliberately probing for weak spots . 29:32.095 --> 29:34.365 And I think the real test will be when 29:34.375 --> 29:36.715 they identify weak spots or create weak 29:36.725 --> 29:38.765 spots and generate a breach , how 29:38.776 --> 29:40.832 rapidly they're able to exploit that 29:40.832 --> 29:43.054 with the combat power that they have in 29:43.054 --> 29:45.109 reserve and how rapidly the Russians 29:45.109 --> 29:47.276 will be able to respond . And Eric , I 29:47.276 --> 29:49.387 just don't , I don't know the answers 29:49.387 --> 29:49.225 to either of those questions because 29:49.235 --> 29:51.319 we're not at the point in the battle 29:51.329 --> 29:53.440 yet , we're going to come back in the 29:53.440 --> 29:55.662 room for two more . Phil Fall on that . 29:55.662 --> 29:57.662 I mean , do you think then that the 29:57.662 --> 29:59.829 Ukrainians are making effective use of 29:59.829 --> 30:01.885 the materials that the United States 30:01.885 --> 30:03.940 has provided or not yet . And then I 30:03.940 --> 30:06.051 want to ask you about , what do you , 30:06.051 --> 30:08.107 what do you know about him ? What is 30:08.107 --> 30:10.670 his status ? What is he doing in Russia ? 30:10.680 --> 30:12.458 What do you think his future is 30:14.300 --> 30:17.589 uh so on the effective use piece . Um 30:19.119 --> 30:21.170 This stuff is hard and uh and 30:21.180 --> 30:23.236 especially if you're encountering it 30:23.236 --> 30:25.236 and using techniques , techniques , 30:25.236 --> 30:27.458 procedures and capabilities that you're 30:27.458 --> 30:29.236 not familiar with . I think the 30:29.236 --> 30:29.140 Ukrainians are doing their best . I 30:29.150 --> 30:31.569 think they are determined to liberate 30:31.579 --> 30:34.810 these areas from Russian occupation . I 30:34.819 --> 30:37.170 think the Russians probably were more 30:37.180 --> 30:39.236 successful in digging in more deeply 30:39.236 --> 30:42.359 than perhaps was fully appreciated . Um 30:42.390 --> 30:44.680 You know , you , you , you know , no 30:44.689 --> 30:46.689 plan survives first contact with uh 30:46.689 --> 30:49.030 with the enemy . So they uh they are 30:49.040 --> 30:51.207 moving deliberately against the threat 30:51.207 --> 30:53.262 that's there . I would return to the 30:53.262 --> 30:55.318 point that , that I made . I I think 30:55.318 --> 30:57.373 that it's too early to judge how the 30:57.373 --> 30:59.484 counter offensive is going one way or 30:59.484 --> 31:01.207 the other because we're at the 31:01.207 --> 31:03.318 beginning of the middle , they , they 31:03.318 --> 31:05.484 are still uh probing Russian lines and 31:05.484 --> 31:07.484 Russian areas uh for weak spots and 31:07.484 --> 31:09.540 real test will be when they identify 31:09.540 --> 31:11.596 those , how rapidly they are able to 31:11.596 --> 31:13.762 exploit those weak spots . And we will 31:13.762 --> 31:15.873 continue to offer our advice uh where 31:15.873 --> 31:18.040 it's uh useful . But at the end of the 31:18.040 --> 31:19.929 day , these are Ukrainian choices 31:19.929 --> 31:21.984 because after all , it's their lives 31:21.984 --> 31:23.873 that are on the line , it's their 31:23.873 --> 31:23.760 territory that's , that's on the line . 31:23.770 --> 31:25.770 So we can provide coaching advice , 31:25.770 --> 31:27.992 mentoring . But at the end of the day , 31:27.992 --> 31:30.103 they're gonna make the decisions that 31:30.103 --> 31:32.103 they believe is right where he is , 31:32.103 --> 31:34.214 what he's up to . I have no idea . Um 31:34.214 --> 31:36.214 And so , and I really don't want to 31:36.214 --> 31:36.079 speculate , I see the same things that 31:36.089 --> 31:38.160 you see . You know , it's clear that 31:38.959 --> 31:40.681 the Russian state is trying to 31:40.681 --> 31:43.260 systematically dismantle his empire and 31:43.310 --> 31:45.421 put peace parts in different places . 31:45.421 --> 31:47.979 What the ultimate endgame Putin has for 31:47.989 --> 31:50.640 pro and the , the , the remnants of 31:50.650 --> 31:52.317 Wagner I think is still to be 31:52.317 --> 31:54.372 determined . Um But I , I just don't 31:54.372 --> 31:56.594 want to speculate about , you know , is 31:56.594 --> 31:58.761 he in Belarus ? Is he in ST Petersburg 31:58.761 --> 31:57.979 or Moscow or somewhere else ? I , I 31:57.989 --> 32:00.045 don't know where he is . Let's close 32:00.045 --> 32:03.839 with Jim . Thanks for , thanks for 32:03.849 --> 32:07.579 doing this . And as this is our last 32:07.589 --> 32:09.920 chance to get you , at least in this 32:09.930 --> 32:12.599 position at this time . I'd like to 32:12.609 --> 32:14.750 broaden it a little bit . President 32:14.760 --> 32:17.420 Biden , Secretary Austin , Secretary 32:17.430 --> 32:19.680 Blin and many others say that the US 32:19.689 --> 32:22.979 asymmetric advantage is its network of 32:22.989 --> 32:25.900 allies , partners and friends . Yet 32:25.910 --> 32:28.199 there are many Americans who really 32:28.209 --> 32:30.320 believe that the United States should 32:30.320 --> 32:33.989 go it alone and given your experience 32:34.000 --> 32:36.489 not only this time , but in your 32:36.500 --> 32:39.400 previous stints with the other 32:39.410 --> 32:41.188 administrations and here at the 32:41.188 --> 32:43.410 Pentagon , what do you tell people like 32:43.410 --> 32:45.969 that . And what do you tell them that 32:45.979 --> 32:49.609 allies and partners bring to , to the 32:49.619 --> 32:53.520 collective defense ? Yeah , it's a , 32:53.530 --> 32:56.410 it's a great question and , um , look , 32:56.420 --> 32:58.642 I think we've tested , we , we've tried 32:58.642 --> 33:00.364 as an administration to test a 33:00.364 --> 33:02.989 proposition . Right . Um , I don't 33:03.000 --> 33:05.569 think it's a partisan point to say that , 33:05.579 --> 33:07.746 you know , there were at least some in 33:07.746 --> 33:09.968 the previous administration that didn't 33:09.968 --> 33:12.135 value our allies and partners in quite 33:12.135 --> 33:14.468 the way that , that we do . And they're , 33:14.468 --> 33:13.479 they're at the center , they're at the 33:13.489 --> 33:15.267 center of our national security 33:15.267 --> 33:17.489 strategy . They're at the center of our 33:17.489 --> 33:19.600 national defense strategy . We do use 33:19.600 --> 33:19.099 these , you know , fancy jargon , like 33:19.109 --> 33:21.109 asymmetric advantage and network of 33:21.109 --> 33:22.998 allies and partners . But what it 33:22.998 --> 33:25.109 really uh uh adds up to and I think , 33:25.109 --> 33:27.276 you know , the average person in a bar 33:27.276 --> 33:29.053 can understand is international 33:29.053 --> 33:30.998 relations is a team sport that the 33:30.998 --> 33:32.942 United States is the most powerful 33:32.942 --> 33:35.053 country in the world . We're the most 33:35.053 --> 33:35.050 powerful country in the history of the 33:35.060 --> 33:37.116 world . We have the best military in 33:37.116 --> 33:39.227 the world . We have the best military 33:39.227 --> 33:41.449 in the history of the world as powerful 33:41.449 --> 33:43.727 as we are , as capable as our military . 33:43.727 --> 33:45.949 Uh uh is there is no problem that comes 33:45.959 --> 33:48.219 across my desk , my desk where I say , 33:48.229 --> 33:50.396 you know , what would make this easier 33:50.396 --> 33:52.618 if we had to do this all by ourselves ? 33:52.618 --> 33:54.618 Right ? It's just , it's not , it's 33:54.618 --> 33:56.618 just like you don't play basketball 33:56.618 --> 33:58.618 even if you're Michael Jordan . You 33:58.618 --> 33:58.270 like to have four other bowls with you 33:58.280 --> 34:00.447 on the court . Sorry . That's a really 34:00.447 --> 34:02.558 old reference for , uh , but I'm 52 . 34:02.558 --> 34:04.891 So , yeah , you , you got me , um , the , 34:04.891 --> 34:07.058 it's a team sport and , you know , you 34:07.058 --> 34:09.169 can make that and people can get it , 34:09.169 --> 34:11.169 but the proof is in the pudding and 34:11.169 --> 34:13.224 that is , look , we are , you know , 34:13.224 --> 34:15.447 how are we contending with the greatest 34:15.447 --> 34:17.613 threat to the geopolitical order since 34:17.613 --> 34:19.558 the uh end of the Cold War , maybe 34:19.558 --> 34:21.780 since the end of the Second World War , 34:21.780 --> 34:24.009 by building a team . In the first 34:24.019 --> 34:26.059 instance , uh you know , Putin went 34:26.069 --> 34:28.618 into this hoping that NATO would buckle 34:28.628 --> 34:31.329 weaken fray shatter apart . The exact 34:31.339 --> 34:33.319 opposite has happened . NATO is 34:33.329 --> 34:35.496 stronger , the defense commitments are 34:35.496 --> 34:37.218 going up . You're going to see 34:37.218 --> 34:39.385 manifestations of that unity . I think 34:39.385 --> 34:41.607 this week in , in Vilnius , our efforts 34:41.607 --> 34:43.729 to deter attacks on the United States 34:43.739 --> 34:45.906 and our allies have been bolstered not 34:45.906 --> 34:48.017 only by what we're doing in Ukraine , 34:48.017 --> 34:50.128 but what we've done to strengthen the 34:50.128 --> 34:52.406 NATO alliance that makes America safer , 34:52.406 --> 34:54.628 that's not charity to Europe that makes 34:54.628 --> 34:56.683 us safer from the threat that Russia 34:56.683 --> 34:59.185 poses . But also the world that 34:59.195 --> 35:01.185 Russia's model of aggression would 35:01.195 --> 35:05.000 impose on , on the rest of us . And 35:05.010 --> 35:07.121 then you look in the Indo Pacific and 35:07.121 --> 35:09.399 there's a lot of focus in our strategy , 35:09.399 --> 35:11.232 documents on China as the pacing 35:11.232 --> 35:13.343 challenge . That's what we call it in 35:13.343 --> 35:12.550 the National Defense strategy . Our 35:12.560 --> 35:15.550 most consequential strategic competitor . 35:16.350 --> 35:19.270 We're not gonna win that competition on 35:19.280 --> 35:21.058 our own . Now , we have to make 35:21.058 --> 35:23.391 investments in ourselves , which we are . 35:23.391 --> 35:25.558 That's why we've made investments in , 35:25.558 --> 35:27.613 you know , the Chips and Science Act 35:27.613 --> 35:29.780 and the Infrastructure Bill . It's why 35:29.780 --> 35:31.836 we are making massive investments in 35:31.836 --> 35:33.836 defense modernization . Why there's 35:33.836 --> 35:36.169 bipartisan consensus around all of that , 35:36.169 --> 35:38.280 but we are not going to best China in 35:38.280 --> 35:40.447 this competition alone . Uh We need to 35:40.447 --> 35:42.502 get our team together , which is why 35:42.502 --> 35:44.669 I'm extraordinarily proud of what this 35:44.669 --> 35:46.836 administration has accomplished , what 35:46.836 --> 35:48.891 this president , what this secretary 35:48.891 --> 35:48.350 has accomplished , frankly , what my 35:48.360 --> 35:50.582 team has helped to accomplish in things 35:50.582 --> 35:52.750 like a or the posture changes in 35:52.760 --> 35:54.649 Australia or the historic posture 35:54.649 --> 35:56.482 changes in Japan or the historic 35:56.482 --> 35:58.593 posture changes in the Philippines or 35:58.593 --> 36:00.760 the deepening of our alliance with the 36:00.760 --> 36:02.927 rok on display during the recent state 36:02.927 --> 36:05.149 visit or the strategic opportunity of a 36:05.149 --> 36:07.316 lifetime we have with India on display 36:07.316 --> 36:09.427 during the most recent uh India uh uh 36:09.427 --> 36:11.649 state visit by Prime Minister Modi . We 36:11.649 --> 36:13.704 are putting real points on the board 36:13.704 --> 36:16.864 because we are , we are leaning in to 36:16.875 --> 36:19.097 our existing alliances and building out 36:19.097 --> 36:21.264 our , our partnerships . And if we are 36:21.264 --> 36:23.153 going to win the rest of the 21st 36:23.153 --> 36:25.264 century , that's how we are gonna win 36:25.264 --> 36:27.486 alongside our teammates . Doctor Cole . 36:27.486 --> 36:27.399 Thank you very much . Ladies and 36:27.409 --> 36:29.687 gentlemen , thanks for attending today . 36:35.159 --> 36:36.603 I'm not gonna tell this . 36:41.899 --> 36:43.899 There are a number of , there are a 36:43.899 --> 36:46.066 number of models below the dud rate of 36:46.066 --> 36:46.239 2.35% .