WEBVTT 00:00.009 --> 00:03.380 Lieutenant General Gregory Gregory GEO 00:03.390 --> 00:05.579 to be Commander of us Northern Command 00:05.590 --> 00:07.860 and Lieutenant General Stephen Whitting 00:08.079 --> 00:10.190 to be Commander of us Space Command . 00:10.229 --> 00:12.579 Gentlemen , thank you for your decades 00:12.590 --> 00:14.312 of service to the nation . And 00:14.312 --> 00:16.819 congratulations , General G , I would 00:16.829 --> 00:18.718 like to welcome your wife Carolyn 00:18.718 --> 00:21.379 daughter , Elizabeth and son Mark , who 00:21.389 --> 00:24.420 I know is proudly watching . Uh his 00:24.430 --> 00:26.659 father , General Whitting . I'd like to 00:26.670 --> 00:28.600 welcome your wife , Tammy , the 00:28.610 --> 00:30.777 daughter Allie and the loved ones that 00:30.777 --> 00:33.054 are here today supporting your efforts . 00:33.229 --> 00:37.229 Um I think you've got uh your 00:37.240 --> 00:39.184 son , parents and in-laws who will 00:39.184 --> 00:42.430 probably watch him from afar and also 00:42.580 --> 00:44.990 to commend them . We thank you your 00:45.000 --> 00:47.056 families for their continued support 00:47.056 --> 00:49.278 because I think we all recognize no one 00:49.278 --> 00:51.500 serves alone and their efforts and your 00:51.500 --> 00:53.833 efforts to support us through the stack . 00:53.833 --> 00:55.833 I'd also like to note that you both 00:55.833 --> 00:58.056 graduate of the Air Force Academy class 00:58.056 --> 01:00.000 in 1989 . And despite that , we're 01:00.000 --> 01:02.222 holding this hearing and I am sure many 01:02.222 --> 01:04.444 of your classmates are cheering you off 01:04.444 --> 01:07.300 from afar . Um uh I will at this point 01:07.309 --> 01:09.476 ask that the remainder of my statement 01:09.476 --> 01:11.642 be included in the record and uh yield 01:11.642 --> 01:13.976 to Senator work for his opening remarks . 01:14.029 --> 01:17.239 Uh We've started early and we uh start 01:17.250 --> 01:19.361 the floor procedures about 10 . So we 01:19.361 --> 01:21.306 want to export as much as we can . 01:21.306 --> 01:23.470 Thank you very much . Thank you Mr 01:23.480 --> 01:27.230 Chairman and uh I too welcome these 01:27.239 --> 01:29.419 witnesses and their families and 01:29.430 --> 01:32.410 friends . We look forward to uh uh an 01:32.419 --> 01:34.529 excellent question and answer uh 01:34.540 --> 01:38.209 session today and as the chair 01:38.220 --> 01:41.209 has indicated , uh we have much to do 01:41.220 --> 01:43.980 on the floor . And so I will ask that 01:43.989 --> 01:46.610 my statement be included in its 01:46.620 --> 01:48.787 entirety in the record at this point . 01:49.870 --> 01:51.870 Well , uh let me first recognize uh 01:51.870 --> 01:54.080 General uh go for your opening 01:54.089 --> 01:56.089 statement and then General Whitting 01:56.089 --> 01:59.080 General go , please . Could you turn 01:59.089 --> 02:01.256 your microphone on , please gentle and 02:01.256 --> 02:03.311 bring it as close as possible . Ok . 02:05.019 --> 02:07.199 Chairman Reed , ranking member wicker 02:07.209 --> 02:09.042 and distinguished members of the 02:09.042 --> 02:10.709 committee . Thank you for the 02:10.709 --> 02:12.653 opportunity to appear today . I am 02:12.653 --> 02:14.876 deeply honored to be nominated to serve 02:14.876 --> 02:16.987 as the Commander of the United States 02:16.987 --> 02:18.987 Northern Command and North American 02:18.987 --> 02:21.098 Aerospace Defense Command and testify 02:21.098 --> 02:23.376 next to my Air Force Academy classmate , 02:23.376 --> 02:23.330 Lieutenant General Stephen Whiting , 02:24.199 --> 02:26.421 I'd like to begin by thanking President 02:26.421 --> 02:28.532 Biden , Secretary Austin and Chairman 02:28.532 --> 02:30.755 Milley for their trust and confidence . 02:30.755 --> 02:32.588 And I'm grateful to the Canadian 02:32.588 --> 02:34.755 leadership for their endorsement of my 02:34.755 --> 02:36.866 nomination as well . I'd also like to 02:36.866 --> 02:38.921 thank General Glenn Van . He and his 02:38.921 --> 02:40.977 wife Marilyn for their tremendous 36 02:40.977 --> 02:43.143 years of service and example , I would 02:43.143 --> 02:44.977 not be here without the constant 02:44.977 --> 02:47.032 support of my family . Caroline , my 02:47.032 --> 02:49.032 incredible wife of 34 years and our 02:49.032 --> 02:51.032 daughter Elizabeth , a cyber policy 02:51.032 --> 02:53.143 professional are here with me today . 02:53.210 --> 02:55.266 Our son , Mark can't be here as he's 02:55.266 --> 02:57.750 pursuing a bachelor's in nursing and 02:57.759 --> 02:59.929 he'd better be in class right now . 03:00.929 --> 03:03.040 Caroline has held our family together 03:03.040 --> 03:05.040 through countless deployments in 20 03:05.040 --> 03:07.151 moves and developed our Children into 03:07.151 --> 03:09.207 outstanding young adults . All three 03:09.207 --> 03:11.429 are not only supportive of me and those 03:11.429 --> 03:13.485 with whom I serve and their families 03:13.485 --> 03:15.596 but also strongly support our mission 03:15.596 --> 03:17.596 for the last 34 years . I've served 03:17.596 --> 03:20.220 alongside extraordinary Americans 03:20.229 --> 03:22.396 allies and partners across the globe . 03:22.729 --> 03:24.451 During that time , I have been 03:24.451 --> 03:26.396 fortunate to learn from the finest 03:26.396 --> 03:28.451 leaders , mentors , non commissioned 03:28.451 --> 03:30.919 officers and troops in the world . I'd 03:30.929 --> 03:33.096 also like to thank and acknowledge the 03:33.096 --> 03:35.262 most influential mentors . I've had my 03:35.262 --> 03:37.318 parents , a career air force officer 03:37.320 --> 03:39.399 and Vietnam veteran and Susan who 03:39.410 --> 03:41.354 handled the challenges of military 03:41.354 --> 03:43.466 family life with strength and humor . 03:44.089 --> 03:45.700 Also shaping me have been my 03:45.700 --> 03:47.756 operational experience in leadership 03:47.756 --> 03:49.478 assignments in three different 03:49.478 --> 03:51.200 combatant commands , including 03:51.200 --> 03:53.367 commanding all joint and coalition air 03:53.367 --> 03:55.700 power in the Middle East . If confirmed , 03:55.700 --> 03:57.645 I will humbly bring the benefit of 03:57.645 --> 03:59.899 these experiences gained in combat and 03:59.910 --> 04:02.699 in peace to appropriately energetically 04:02.710 --> 04:04.821 and decisively lead the women and men 04:04.821 --> 04:06.988 of NORAD and North comm in the defense 04:06.988 --> 04:09.000 of our great homeland . The United 04:09.009 --> 04:10.953 States , Canada and our allies and 04:10.953 --> 04:12.342 partners must address an 04:12.342 --> 04:14.565 extraordinarily complicated and quickly 04:14.565 --> 04:16.398 changing strategic environment . 04:16.398 --> 04:18.509 Competitors can hold North America at 04:18.509 --> 04:20.342 risk in multiple domains and are 04:20.342 --> 04:22.398 increasing both their capability and 04:22.398 --> 04:24.453 capacity to strike the homeland at a 04:24.453 --> 04:26.676 rate , far exceeding the pace seen just 04:26.676 --> 04:29.130 a few years ago . While NORAD and North 04:29.190 --> 04:31.559 comm are distinct commands , they share 04:31.570 --> 04:33.626 complementary missions that are more 04:33.626 --> 04:35.799 vital today than ever . The success of 04:35.809 --> 04:38.031 both commands in defending the homeland 04:38.031 --> 04:39.642 is only possible with strong 04:39.642 --> 04:41.829 interagency collaboration as well as 04:41.839 --> 04:44.809 close alliances and partnerships . If 04:44.820 --> 04:46.987 confirmed , I will remain committed to 04:46.987 --> 04:48.709 expanding those already strong 04:48.709 --> 04:50.764 relationships in order to ensure the 04:50.764 --> 04:52.876 command's constant readiness to deter 04:52.876 --> 04:55.420 aggression and defend our nation . I 04:55.429 --> 04:57.485 will also commit to establishing and 04:57.485 --> 04:59.373 maintaining partnerships with the 04:59.373 --> 05:01.596 National Guard Bureau State Interagency 05:01.596 --> 05:03.707 partners to conduct north comms vital 05:03.707 --> 05:05.929 defense support of civil authorities 05:05.940 --> 05:08.950 role during catastrophic disasters and 05:08.959 --> 05:10.792 other periods of national need . 05:11.679 --> 05:13.790 Likewise , if confirmed , I will be a 05:13.790 --> 05:15.980 strong advocate for ongoing NORAD and 05:15.989 --> 05:17.989 north com efforts to improve domain 05:17.989 --> 05:19.989 awareness and global integration of 05:19.989 --> 05:23.019 operations , plans and data . Our 05:23.029 --> 05:25.251 competitors advanced long range weapons 05:25.251 --> 05:27.480 systems and delivery platforms pose 05:27.489 --> 05:29.545 challenges from within and even well 05:29.545 --> 05:31.850 beyond NORAD and north comm operational 05:31.859 --> 05:33.915 boundaries . Therefore , it would be 05:33.915 --> 05:35.859 important that I work closely with 05:35.859 --> 05:37.970 other combatant commanders to deliver 05:37.970 --> 05:39.915 an integrated layered and seamless 05:39.915 --> 05:43.010 defense of our homeland . Finally , if 05:43.019 --> 05:45.019 confirmed , I assure this committee 05:45.019 --> 05:47.075 that I will always provide my candid 05:47.075 --> 05:48.852 assessment and my best military 05:48.852 --> 05:51.019 judgment regarding NORAD and North com 05:51.019 --> 05:52.741 missions , homeland defense is 05:52.741 --> 05:54.852 fundamental mission of the Department 05:54.852 --> 05:56.797 of Defense . And I can think of no 05:56.797 --> 05:58.908 greater honor than being nominated to 05:58.908 --> 06:01.075 lead the commands responsible for that 06:01.075 --> 06:03.019 vital mission . Thank you for your 06:03.019 --> 06:04.963 support of the United States Armed 06:04.963 --> 06:07.075 Forces and for the honor of appearing 06:07.075 --> 06:09.241 before this committee . I look forward 06:09.241 --> 06:11.463 to answering your questions . Thank you 06:11.463 --> 06:11.350 very much , General uh General Whitting , 06:11.359 --> 06:13.630 please . Chairman Reed ranking member 06:13.640 --> 06:15.807 wicker . Thank you for the opportunity 06:15.807 --> 06:18.029 to appear before this committee and the 06:18.029 --> 06:20.196 American people today . I'm humbled to 06:20.196 --> 06:22.307 be the president's nominee to command 06:22.307 --> 06:24.196 United States Space Command . I'm 06:24.196 --> 06:26.251 grateful to the Secretary of Defense 06:26.251 --> 06:25.630 and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 06:25.640 --> 06:27.918 Staff for their confidence and support . 06:27.929 --> 06:30.170 And I'm pleased to testify beside my US 06:30.179 --> 06:32.068 Air Force Academy , classmate and 06:32.068 --> 06:34.235 friend , Lieutenant General Greg Guo . 06:34.235 --> 06:36.068 I also want to thank the current 06:36.068 --> 06:38.290 Commander of Us Space Command , General 06:38.290 --> 06:40.457 Jim Dickinson and his wife , Angie for 06:40.457 --> 06:42.512 their leadership of the command over 06:42.512 --> 06:44.735 the past three years and their personal 06:44.735 --> 06:46.957 friendship to Tammy . And I , I'm proud 06:46.957 --> 06:49.179 to have my family and some dear friends 06:49.179 --> 06:51.512 here with me today . First and foremost , 06:51.512 --> 06:53.735 my wife of 34 years , Tammy has been my 06:53.735 --> 06:55.623 best friend and greatest strength 06:55.623 --> 06:57.735 during 19 moves . She's an incredible 06:57.735 --> 06:59.790 wife , mom , friend , entrepreneur , 06:59.790 --> 07:01.901 and business owner . We also have our 07:01.901 --> 07:03.957 daughter , Allie in attendance . She 07:03.957 --> 07:05.846 finished her master's degree last 07:05.846 --> 07:07.957 summer and is now a tech writer for a 07:07.957 --> 07:10.068 Silicon Valley software company , but 07:10.068 --> 07:09.920 living in Nashville , Tennessee 07:10.589 --> 07:12.589 supporting us in spirit are our son 07:12.589 --> 07:15.250 Chase and his wife , Olivia Chase is a 07:15.260 --> 07:17.482 youth minister also living in Nashville 07:17.482 --> 07:19.482 and his terrific wife , Olivia is a 07:19.482 --> 07:21.704 first grade public school teacher there 07:21.704 --> 07:23.649 in the Nashville schools Chase had 07:23.649 --> 07:25.704 previously committed to accompanying 07:25.704 --> 07:25.540 the members of his youth group to 07:25.549 --> 07:27.549 support a church overseas and he is 07:27.559 --> 07:29.781 appropriately taking care of those kids 07:29.781 --> 07:31.670 and ensuring they get back to the 07:31.670 --> 07:33.837 United States safely . Tammy and I are 07:33.837 --> 07:36.059 immensely proud of our Children and the 07:36.059 --> 07:35.769 role they have played in our military 07:35.779 --> 07:38.000 career . Joining us virtually are my 07:38.010 --> 07:40.239 parents , Larry and Helen Whiting . My 07:40.250 --> 07:42.472 dad was also a career air force officer 07:42.472 --> 07:44.472 and Vietnam veteran and my mom is a 07:44.472 --> 07:46.417 retired public school teacher from 07:46.417 --> 07:48.639 Mississippi . My in-laws , Ken and Joan 07:48.639 --> 07:50.861 Presler are also joining us virtually . 07:50.861 --> 07:52.972 And Tammy's dad is also a retired air 07:52.972 --> 07:55.194 force officer and Tammy's mom is simply 07:55.194 --> 07:57.472 the glue who holds our family together . 07:57.472 --> 07:59.139 Both sets of our parents have 07:59.139 --> 08:01.306 established legacies of service to and 08:01.306 --> 08:03.361 love of our country that Tammy and I 08:03.361 --> 08:05.583 try to live up to every day . Finally , 08:05.583 --> 08:07.806 we have five dear friends with us today 08:07.806 --> 08:09.972 here with us today who have adopted us 08:09.972 --> 08:12.194 along the way . David and Carmen Bell , 08:12.194 --> 08:14.417 Steve Watkins and Missy and Lee Bones . 08:14.417 --> 08:16.528 No doubt our military career has been 08:16.528 --> 08:18.750 undergirded by the strength and support 08:18.750 --> 08:20.972 of our family and friends and thank you 08:20.972 --> 08:22.972 for allowing me to acknowledge them 08:22.972 --> 08:25.306 today . International Space Competition . 08:25.306 --> 08:27.528 Has become increasingly complex . China 08:27.528 --> 08:29.750 and Russia are rapidly fielding counter 08:29.750 --> 08:31.639 space capabilities to disrupt our 08:31.639 --> 08:34.289 access to space . And China is swiftly 08:34.299 --> 08:36.609 making its own military forces . Space 08:36.619 --> 08:39.539 enabled these strategic competitors , 08:39.549 --> 08:41.650 irresponsible actions and assertive 08:41.659 --> 08:44.469 posturing have transformed space into a 08:44.479 --> 08:47.500 contested domain . All the while space 08:47.510 --> 08:50.030 continues to become more congested as 08:50.039 --> 08:51.761 more and more actors including 08:51.761 --> 08:53.817 commercial industry are launching an 08:53.817 --> 08:55.950 increasing number of satellites to 08:55.960 --> 08:57.738 leverage the advantages . Space 08:57.738 --> 09:00.739 provides the increasing complexity of 09:00.750 --> 09:03.020 our strategic competition in space has 09:03.030 --> 09:05.130 resulted in real threats to national 09:05.140 --> 09:06.751 space power and the critical 09:06.751 --> 09:09.369 infrastructure which supports it us . 09:09.380 --> 09:11.491 Space command's purpose is to protect 09:11.500 --> 09:13.820 us interest by preserving freedom of 09:13.830 --> 09:16.200 action in space and providing critical 09:16.210 --> 09:18.488 support to the rest of the joint force , 09:18.488 --> 09:20.609 our allies all while protecting the 09:20.619 --> 09:22.786 joint force and allied militaries from 09:22.786 --> 09:25.570 space enabled attack . To say that more 09:25.580 --> 09:27.260 plainly , it is the moral 09:27.270 --> 09:29.270 responsibility of the United States 09:29.270 --> 09:31.437 Space Command to ensure that the joint 09:31.437 --> 09:34.119 force , the nation and our allies have 09:34.130 --> 09:36.679 access to the space capabilities . They 09:36.690 --> 09:38.579 have become dependent on over the 09:38.579 --> 09:40.801 decades and that they must have through 09:40.801 --> 09:43.134 all phases of conflict to be successful . 09:43.669 --> 09:45.891 If confirmed , I will ensure us . Space 09:45.891 --> 09:48.239 command provides a formidable deterrent 09:48.409 --> 09:50.576 against potential adversary aggression 09:50.576 --> 09:52.520 while collaborating with the joint 09:52.520 --> 09:54.669 force , our allies and partners . I 09:54.679 --> 09:56.846 will ensure the command is prepared to 09:56.846 --> 09:59.012 win in conflict through the employment 09:59.012 --> 10:01.179 of military space power and integrated 10:01.179 --> 10:02.901 trans regional missile defense 10:02.901 --> 10:04.957 capabilities . And I will assure the 10:04.957 --> 10:06.735 command is postured to gain and 10:06.735 --> 10:09.219 maintain space superiority , to assure 10:09.229 --> 10:11.118 freedom of action in space and to 10:11.118 --> 10:13.285 protect the joint force and our allies 10:13.285 --> 10:15.007 from the space capabilities of 10:15.007 --> 10:17.118 potential adversaries . The source of 10:17.118 --> 10:19.229 strength of any military formation is 10:19.229 --> 10:21.062 our people . Our joint space war 10:21.062 --> 10:23.007 fighters are the best in the world 10:23.007 --> 10:25.489 because of their expertise , dedication 10:25.500 --> 10:27.890 and collective innovation . Leadership 10:27.900 --> 10:29.622 of America's military sons and 10:29.622 --> 10:32.010 daughters is a most sacred trust . If 10:32.020 --> 10:33.964 confirmed , it will be my distinct 10:33.964 --> 10:35.853 honor and solemn duty to lead the 10:35.853 --> 10:38.479 18,000 patriots of us . Space command , 10:39.309 --> 10:41.587 distinguished members of the committee . 10:41.587 --> 10:43.753 Thank you again for the opportunity to 10:43.753 --> 10:45.698 appear before you today and I look 10:45.698 --> 10:47.753 forward to your questions . Uh Thank 10:47.753 --> 10:49.976 you , General . Uh Gentlemen , I have a 10:49.976 --> 10:49.940 series of questions that are asked of 10:49.950 --> 10:52.280 all nominees . Uh You may respond 10:52.289 --> 10:55.219 appropriately together . Have you 10:55.229 --> 10:56.951 adhered to applicable laws and 10:56.951 --> 10:58.896 regulations governing conflicts of 10:58.896 --> 11:02.270 interest ? Have you assumed any duties 11:02.280 --> 11:04.447 or taken any actions that would appear 11:04.447 --> 11:06.113 to presume the outcome of the 11:06.113 --> 11:08.750 confirmation process ? Exercising our 11:08.760 --> 11:10.204 legislative and oversight 11:10.204 --> 11:12.316 responsibilities , makes it important 11:12.316 --> 11:14.538 that this committee , its subcommittees 11:14.538 --> 11:16.538 and other appropriate committees of 11:16.538 --> 11:18.816 Congress receive testimony , briefings , 11:18.816 --> 11:21.038 reports , records and other information 11:21.038 --> 11:23.149 from the executive branch on a timely 11:23.149 --> 11:26.190 basis . Do you agree if confirmed to 11:26.200 --> 11:27.922 appear and testify before this 11:27.922 --> 11:30.729 committee when requested ? Yes . Do you 11:30.739 --> 11:32.906 agree when asked before this committee 11:32.906 --> 11:35.017 to give your personal views , even if 11:35.017 --> 11:36.517 your views differ from the 11:36.517 --> 11:38.710 administration ? Do you agree to 11:38.719 --> 11:40.497 provide records , documents and 11:40.497 --> 11:42.710 electronic communications in a timely 11:42.719 --> 11:45.052 manner when requested by this committee . 11:45.052 --> 11:47.275 It's subcommittees or other appropriate 11:47.275 --> 11:49.386 committees of Congress and to consult 11:49.386 --> 11:51.608 with the request or regarding the basis 11:51.608 --> 11:53.849 for any good faith delay or denial in 11:53.859 --> 11:56.770 providing such records . Yes . Will you 11:56.780 --> 11:58.836 ensure that your staff complies with 11:58.836 --> 12:01.058 deadlines established by this committee 12:01.058 --> 12:03.280 for the production of reports , records 12:03.280 --> 12:05.447 and other information including timely 12:05.447 --> 12:07.669 responding to hearing questions for the 12:07.669 --> 12:09.391 record . Will you cooperate in 12:09.391 --> 12:11.391 providing witnesses and briefing in 12:11.391 --> 12:13.391 response to congressional request ? 12:13.739 --> 12:15.795 Will those witnesses and briefers be 12:15.795 --> 12:17.572 protected from Reprisal for the 12:17.572 --> 12:21.239 testimony or briefings ? Thank you . Uh 12:22.309 --> 12:26.000 General uh geo uh 12:26.010 --> 12:28.450 you've talked about the evolving 12:28.460 --> 12:32.400 threats uh that are facing uh the 12:32.409 --> 12:34.859 homeland . Could you give us an idea of 12:34.869 --> 12:37.091 what are those most significant threats 12:37.091 --> 12:39.169 you see right now ? Yes , chairman , 12:40.599 --> 12:42.655 the most significant threat that the 12:42.655 --> 12:45.619 homeland faces is no longer from a 12:45.630 --> 12:47.890 single capability or a single nation . 12:47.979 --> 12:50.250 But it's the compilation of multiple 12:50.260 --> 12:52.969 actors that can threaten the homeland 12:52.979 --> 12:56.750 from multiple avenues of approach and 12:56.760 --> 13:00.010 across all domains . So the combination 13:00.020 --> 13:02.479 of all of those simultaneously is the 13:02.489 --> 13:04.378 biggest threat that we face now . 13:04.378 --> 13:06.545 Whereas in the past , it may have been 13:06.545 --> 13:08.489 a single weapon system or a single 13:08.489 --> 13:10.600 actor that presented that threat . Do 13:10.600 --> 13:12.767 you think we're appropriately postured 13:12.767 --> 13:14.711 to deal with these threats ? Yes , 13:14.711 --> 13:16.378 chairman I do . However , our 13:16.378 --> 13:18.545 adversaries are growing at a very fast 13:18.545 --> 13:21.450 rate and we need to do across the whole 13:21.460 --> 13:24.500 of government . Uh uh All of our effort 13:24.510 --> 13:26.820 must be to keeping pace with the uh the 13:26.830 --> 13:30.349 rate of change of our adversary . Uh Do 13:30.359 --> 13:32.470 you have any specific changes in mind 13:32.470 --> 13:34.692 if , if confirmed of what you'd like to 13:34.692 --> 13:37.849 do for your 1st 180 days 13:38.119 --> 13:40.940 chairman , uh if confirmed , I I will 13:40.950 --> 13:42.839 largely uh follow the outstanding 13:42.839 --> 13:44.950 course that's been set by General Van 13:44.950 --> 13:46.783 Huk uh focusing on defending the 13:46.783 --> 13:49.117 homeland . And in the first uh few days , 13:49.117 --> 13:51.228 as you mentioned , uh my goal to make 13:51.228 --> 13:53.172 sure that there are no gaps in the 13:53.172 --> 13:55.283 transition of authorities uh that the 13:55.283 --> 13:57.394 commander must take uh to , to defend 13:57.394 --> 13:59.400 the homeland . And I'd also like to 13:59.409 --> 14:01.780 strengthen the network , everything 14:01.789 --> 14:04.270 that we do in north and north comm 14:04.280 --> 14:06.890 requires partnership . And I'd like to 14:06.900 --> 14:08.844 strengthen the networks with other 14:08.844 --> 14:10.956 combatant commanders , the services , 14:10.956 --> 14:13.090 National Guard , the Interagency 14:13.099 --> 14:15.266 International Partners . And of course 14:15.266 --> 14:17.321 Congress to make sure that all those 14:17.321 --> 14:19.321 relationships are set now in steady 14:19.321 --> 14:22.440 state . So we can easily enact those in 14:22.450 --> 14:24.429 times of crisis . And then I will 14:24.440 --> 14:26.559 conduct a 90 day assessment of our , 14:26.570 --> 14:29.190 our people , our Miss mission and our 14:29.200 --> 14:31.422 resourcing to ensure that we're set for 14:31.422 --> 14:33.478 the changing environment that we see 14:33.478 --> 14:35.700 ahead . Thank you uh General Whiting . 14:35.710 --> 14:37.619 Uh what is your assessment of the 14:37.630 --> 14:39.852 threats to the United States and allied 14:39.852 --> 14:42.630 Space assets by Russia and China over 14:42.640 --> 14:44.807 the next five years ? And what must we 14:44.807 --> 14:47.029 do to counter those threats . Thank you 14:47.029 --> 14:48.918 for that question , Chairman . Uh 14:48.918 --> 14:51.140 certainly we have seen a rapid increase 14:51.140 --> 14:53.084 particularly from China as they've 14:53.084 --> 14:55.362 built counter space capabilities after , 14:55.362 --> 14:57.584 after really studying the United States 14:57.584 --> 14:59.900 and how we leverage space for military 14:59.909 --> 15:01.909 advantage . And so they have , they 15:01.909 --> 15:03.742 have sought to build a series of 15:03.742 --> 15:05.853 capabilities from nondestructive , to 15:05.853 --> 15:08.159 destructive , to hold at risk , those 15:08.169 --> 15:10.336 space capabilities . We've seen Russia 15:10.336 --> 15:12.391 do that to a lesser degree as well . 15:12.429 --> 15:14.450 And , and Mr Chairman , it is our 15:14.460 --> 15:16.429 responsibility across the national 15:16.440 --> 15:18.218 security space Enterprise , but 15:18.218 --> 15:20.273 certainly if confirmed at us , space 15:20.273 --> 15:22.107 command to make sure that we can 15:22.107 --> 15:24.162 operate in the face of those threats 15:24.162 --> 15:26.329 that we now see to continue to support 15:26.329 --> 15:28.384 the rest of the joint force with the 15:28.384 --> 15:30.551 space capabilities that they've become 15:30.551 --> 15:33.299 dependent upon . Thank you . Um uh uh 15:33.309 --> 15:36.609 We are uh developing the 15:36.619 --> 15:39.070 technologies and one of the key is uh 15:39.320 --> 15:41.770 continuous encrypted communication . 15:41.780 --> 15:44.002 Can you give us a sense of where do you 15:44.002 --> 15:46.058 think we are in that process ? Yes , 15:46.058 --> 15:48.169 sir . It is vital that , that we have 15:48.169 --> 15:50.809 the uh capability to encrypt ourselves 15:50.820 --> 15:52.931 with , with encryption that will last 15:52.931 --> 15:55.580 over , over decades as we uh field uh 15:55.590 --> 15:57.840 military space systems that last for 15:57.849 --> 16:00.016 for a long time , we want to make sure 16:00.016 --> 16:02.238 that uh that , that encryption does not 16:02.238 --> 16:05.909 become um uh compromised by , by other 16:05.919 --> 16:08.030 countries potentially . And so it's a 16:08.030 --> 16:09.863 very important partnership uh Mr 16:09.863 --> 16:12.086 Chairman that we have with the National 16:12.086 --> 16:14.363 Security Agency and , and if confirmed , 16:14.363 --> 16:16.363 uh I would ensure that , that we uh 16:16.363 --> 16:18.419 continue to work requirements that , 16:18.419 --> 16:19.975 that laid into , into those 16:19.975 --> 16:22.197 requirements , sets that requirement so 16:22.197 --> 16:23.975 that we uh we don't end up in a 16:23.975 --> 16:26.197 position where another country could uh 16:26.197 --> 16:28.308 could compromise our communications . 16:28.308 --> 16:30.965 Thank you . Uh General Gu uh The issue 16:30.974 --> 16:33.474 of fentaNYL uh crossing the Mexican 16:33.484 --> 16:36.859 border is one that's a serious crisis 16:36.869 --> 16:40.500 in the United States today . You uh are 16:40.510 --> 16:42.070 already your commanders in 16:42.080 --> 16:44.130 communication and cooperation with 16:44.140 --> 16:46.418 Mexican authorities , the Mexican Army , 16:46.418 --> 16:49.200 Mexican Navy . Uh How do you believe 16:49.210 --> 16:51.369 you can leverage uh those military 16:51.380 --> 16:54.760 forces to uh be more effective in 16:54.770 --> 16:57.219 disrupting this uh trade in fentaNYL 16:58.330 --> 17:00.669 chairman , the drug threat that you 17:00.679 --> 17:02.790 mentioned is acute . It's significant 17:02.790 --> 17:06.420 and it's serious and north comms role 17:06.430 --> 17:08.510 is as part of a whole of government 17:08.520 --> 17:11.489 effort . North comm provides direct 17:11.500 --> 17:13.500 support to the lead law enforcement 17:13.500 --> 17:16.709 agency to attack these networks . If 17:16.719 --> 17:18.886 I'm confirmed due to the importance of 17:18.886 --> 17:20.830 this mission as soon as possible . 17:20.830 --> 17:23.052 After the change of command , I will go 17:23.052 --> 17:25.108 down to the southern border and meet 17:25.108 --> 17:27.163 with all of not only the US military 17:27.163 --> 17:29.163 that are in support of the lead law 17:29.163 --> 17:31.219 enforcement agencies , but also with 17:31.219 --> 17:33.400 the interagency , the intel community 17:33.410 --> 17:35.577 and the Mexican military partners that 17:35.577 --> 17:38.660 we have during that time , I'll make an 17:38.670 --> 17:40.726 effort to gain a greater operational 17:40.726 --> 17:42.837 understanding and then I will draw an 17:42.837 --> 17:44.948 assessment on how we can optimize our 17:44.948 --> 17:46.948 support to , to get after this . Uh 17:46.948 --> 17:48.892 very serious problem . Thank you . 17:48.892 --> 17:51.059 Thank you . Both gentlemen . Uh work , 17:51.059 --> 17:53.114 please . Thank you , Mr Chairman and 17:53.114 --> 17:55.170 thank you gentlemen , uh general . I 17:55.170 --> 17:57.392 was going to ask the very question that 17:57.392 --> 17:59.281 our chairman just asked about the 17:59.281 --> 18:02.359 fentaNYL crisis . I I view it as a very 18:02.369 --> 18:04.959 serious matter . And so uh please 18:04.969 --> 18:07.069 understand from the chair and the 18:07.079 --> 18:10.160 ranking member uh where we uh rank that 18:10.170 --> 18:12.337 issue . Let me ask you , you mentioned 18:12.337 --> 18:14.699 Domain awareness in your opening 18:14.709 --> 18:16.876 statement . We're not where we need to 18:16.876 --> 18:19.989 be in domain awareness . Are we Senator ? 18:20.000 --> 18:23.560 I agree . Although steps through the 18:23.569 --> 18:25.880 government , Congress's funding and 18:25.890 --> 18:28.040 industry were making strides in that 18:28.050 --> 18:29.839 direction . The fact that the 18:29.849 --> 18:33.079 adversaries we face can attack us from 18:33.089 --> 18:35.510 distances further away at speeds 18:35.520 --> 18:37.699 altitudes with maneuverability and low 18:37.709 --> 18:40.609 cross radar cross sections that we 18:40.619 --> 18:42.810 hadn't seen in the past . It's a 18:42.819 --> 18:44.708 constant fight to have the domain 18:44.708 --> 18:46.930 awareness , the ability to detect these 18:46.930 --> 18:50.349 threats and it takes our constant and 18:50.359 --> 18:52.581 improving effort because after all , we 18:52.581 --> 18:54.637 can't defeat what we can't see . You 18:54.637 --> 18:57.180 know , it seems to me that the balloon 18:57.189 --> 18:59.880 fiasco uh that occurred several months 18:59.890 --> 19:03.040 ago is an example of this . I have a 19:03.050 --> 19:05.900 question here which I wanna read uh uh 19:05.910 --> 19:07.743 word for word . Do you commit to 19:07.743 --> 19:10.077 sharing information with this committee ? 19:10.077 --> 19:11.854 Even when it is contrary to the 19:11.854 --> 19:14.060 administration Communications 19:14.069 --> 19:16.569 Objectives ? And I asked that question 19:16.760 --> 19:19.819 because we on this side have asked some 19:19.829 --> 19:22.349 specific questions in writing of the 19:22.359 --> 19:25.640 administration and have not gotten all 19:25.650 --> 19:27.872 of the answers we needed . And during a 19:27.872 --> 19:30.199 visit to Beijing in June , Secretary of 19:30.209 --> 19:33.709 State Blinken said uh publicly that the 19:33.719 --> 19:36.880 Chinese balloon Matter uh is a chapter 19:36.890 --> 19:39.300 that should be closed . Uh If , if 19:39.310 --> 19:41.421 members of the Congress believe there 19:41.421 --> 19:44.160 are questions to be answered , you do 19:44.170 --> 19:46.359 commit to a answering those questions 19:46.369 --> 19:49.829 regardless of the uh views of , of the 19:49.839 --> 19:52.680 administration . Do you not ? Yes , I 19:52.709 --> 19:54.820 absolutely do . Thank you very much . 19:54.820 --> 19:56.987 And let me ask you , I , I was glad to 19:56.987 --> 19:59.153 hear that you and General Whiting were 19:59.153 --> 20:01.153 classmates at the academy . Is that 20:01.153 --> 20:02.987 correct ? Yeah . Yes . Senator . 20:02.987 --> 20:05.042 Although , uh , I think he graduated 20:05.042 --> 20:06.987 much higher in the , uh , order of 20:06.987 --> 20:09.042 merit than I , I was gonna ask about 20:09.042 --> 20:11.320 that . Did you find that his excellent , 20:11.320 --> 20:13.320 um , high school education at Ocean 20:13.320 --> 20:15.542 Springs High School in Mississippi gave 20:15.542 --> 20:17.739 him a leg up over most of the other , 20:17.750 --> 20:19.972 uh , Senator . I have no doubt that was 20:19.972 --> 20:22.139 the spring board . Ok . Thank you very 20:22.139 --> 20:24.139 much . Yeah , I think you're , uh , 20:24.139 --> 20:26.028 you're well on your way , uh , to 20:26.028 --> 20:28.020 confirmation , um , general , uh , 20:28.030 --> 20:31.430 Whiting . Um , we're , uh , uh , 20:31.439 --> 20:35.229 you're gonna be giving up some of , of 20:35.239 --> 20:38.329 your more commercial duties from , uh , 20:38.339 --> 20:41.569 your predecessor and moving them over 20:41.579 --> 20:45.020 to the Department of Commerce as far as 20:45.030 --> 20:47.329 space , situational awareness . Tell us 20:47.339 --> 20:49.561 about that . And , and I understand you 20:49.561 --> 20:51.450 think that's a good idea and that 20:51.450 --> 20:53.617 Congress made the correct move there . 20:53.617 --> 20:55.783 Right . Ranking member . Thank you for 20:55.783 --> 20:58.006 that question . It's a really important 20:58.006 --> 21:00.172 issue today . The Space Force provides 21:00.172 --> 21:02.283 space situational awareness um to the 21:02.283 --> 21:04.450 entire , the entire world really . But 21:04.450 --> 21:06.617 we do that for non military purposes . 21:06.617 --> 21:08.839 But under the your leadership and , and 21:08.839 --> 21:10.950 the actions of Congress uh that civil 21:10.950 --> 21:13.061 portion of that responsibility is now 21:13.061 --> 21:15.228 transferring to , to the Department of 21:15.228 --> 21:15.099 Commerce . And they are very willing 21:15.109 --> 21:17.359 partners in that . And we are working a 21:17.369 --> 21:19.258 plan with them that over the next 21:19.258 --> 21:21.369 couple years , they will take on that 21:21.369 --> 21:23.369 nonmilitary responsibility . Um And 21:23.369 --> 21:25.425 that will free up capacity inside of 21:25.425 --> 21:27.647 our military formations to focus on the 21:27.647 --> 21:29.869 military , unique responsibilities that 21:29.869 --> 21:31.591 we have . Um So we , we really 21:31.591 --> 21:33.758 appreciate that uh leadership from the 21:33.758 --> 21:35.980 Congress and the work of the Department 21:35.980 --> 21:38.258 of Commerce to take that on . OK . Now , 21:38.258 --> 21:38.074 I wanna ask a question that will 21:38.084 --> 21:40.744 require a relatively brief answer , but 21:40.755 --> 21:42.866 then I'll ask you to supplement it on 21:42.866 --> 21:45.994 the record . Let's war game in , in 21:46.375 --> 21:49.439 what we can do publicly . Let's say 21:49.449 --> 21:52.510 that the Communist Party of China under 21:52.520 --> 21:55.219 Xi Jinping decides to invade their 21:55.229 --> 21:59.089 neighbor Taiwan . There will be 21:59.479 --> 22:02.030 uh a battle in space 22:03.160 --> 22:05.709 um almost immediately . Is that correct , 22:06.569 --> 22:08.791 sir ? Uh I agree . We think the opening 22:08.791 --> 22:11.013 shots of such a , a war could happen in 22:11.013 --> 22:13.300 uh space or Cyber . OK . What I'd like 22:13.310 --> 22:15.421 for you to do and I know , I know you 22:15.421 --> 22:17.819 can , you only got 38 seconds to , to 22:17.829 --> 22:19.940 speak . But if you could sort of give 22:19.940 --> 22:21.839 us an overview briefly and then 22:21.849 --> 22:24.339 supplement your answer on the record , 22:24.349 --> 22:26.770 sir . Yes , sir . Because the People's 22:26.780 --> 22:28.836 Republic of China has studied how we 22:28.836 --> 22:31.369 use space . Uh We do expect that they 22:31.380 --> 22:34.099 would try to uh inhibit our ability to 22:34.109 --> 22:36.630 use space the way we would prefer to 22:36.640 --> 22:39.449 across the joint force . And uh Senator , 22:39.459 --> 22:41.459 if it's good with you , I'll , I'll 22:41.459 --> 22:43.570 take you up on your offer and provide 22:43.570 --> 22:43.119 additional details . Absolutely , 22:43.130 --> 22:45.819 because it's uh quite complex and uh 22:46.170 --> 22:48.790 and requires more than five minutes 22:48.800 --> 22:50.911 even . Thank you . And thank you , Mr 22:50.911 --> 22:53.133 Chairman . Thank you , Senator Worker . 22:53.133 --> 22:55.467 Uh Senator Shaheen , please . Thank you . 22:55.467 --> 22:57.522 Congratulations to both of you and , 22:57.522 --> 22:59.689 and your families . Thank you for your 22:59.689 --> 22:59.290 willingness to continue to serve this 22:59.300 --> 23:03.099 country . Um Senator Wicker raised the , 23:03.290 --> 23:05.810 the move of the Office of Space 23:05.819 --> 23:07.986 Commerce to the Department of Commerce 23:07.986 --> 23:11.880 General Whiting um , as a member of the 23:11.890 --> 23:14.001 Appropriations Committee , I remember 23:14.001 --> 23:16.168 there was some controversy at the time 23:16.168 --> 23:18.112 about that decision and a question 23:18.112 --> 23:20.223 about whether that was actually going 23:20.223 --> 23:22.300 to work . Can you tell us how , how 23:22.310 --> 23:24.449 that's working at this point ? Um I 23:24.459 --> 23:27.160 understand that there , we will have a 23:27.170 --> 23:29.337 shortfall in terms of the funding that 23:29.337 --> 23:31.337 we were planning to give to them to 23:31.337 --> 23:33.559 continue the integration . So where are 23:33.559 --> 23:35.781 we in that process and what do we still 23:35.781 --> 23:37.837 need to do ? Senator ? Thank you for 23:37.837 --> 23:39.948 that question . I am not aware of the 23:39.948 --> 23:43.270 specific funding um , exactly where 23:43.280 --> 23:45.113 they are in their funding in the 23:45.113 --> 23:47.169 Department of Commerce . But I can't 23:47.169 --> 23:49.280 say that they are an absolutely eager 23:49.280 --> 23:48.905 and willing partner . We have multiple 23:48.915 --> 23:51.137 engagements from senior leadership down 23:51.137 --> 23:53.359 to their tactical level where they have 23:53.359 --> 23:55.359 been out to our operating locations 23:55.359 --> 23:57.582 where we conduct this mission . They've 23:57.582 --> 23:59.582 seen how we do business and they're 23:59.582 --> 24:01.693 partnering with us on their plans for 24:01.693 --> 24:04.026 how they move forward . But , but ma'am , 24:04.026 --> 24:03.015 I am just not familiar with exactly 24:03.025 --> 24:05.358 where they are in their funding profile . 24:05.358 --> 24:09.050 Um You the Space command however , 24:09.060 --> 24:11.699 has also created a new commercial 24:11.709 --> 24:13.820 integration office to help coordinate 24:13.820 --> 24:16.042 commercial space capabilities . Is that 24:16.042 --> 24:18.209 correct , ma'am ? That is correct . So 24:18.209 --> 24:20.431 how do you see that office working with 24:20.431 --> 24:22.265 the office and the Department of 24:22.265 --> 24:24.376 Commerce ? Yes , ma'am . Uh inside of 24:24.376 --> 24:26.542 us Space Command . That office senator 24:26.542 --> 24:29.489 is figuring out ways that us Space 24:29.500 --> 24:31.670 Command can take advantage of the 24:31.680 --> 24:34.180 incredible capability that us space 24:34.189 --> 24:37.000 industry brings us um that will be 24:37.010 --> 24:39.959 focused on military , unique aspects of , 24:39.969 --> 24:41.747 of obviously , our mission . Um 24:41.747 --> 24:43.979 Department of Commerce will be focused 24:43.989 --> 24:46.045 on nonmilitary aspects , but I think 24:46.045 --> 24:47.933 there will be a chance to partner 24:47.933 --> 24:50.156 together . So that for example , the US 24:50.156 --> 24:52.060 government isn't paying twice for 24:52.069 --> 24:54.910 commercial space situational awareness 24:54.920 --> 24:57.142 data that may be useful to both of us . 24:57.400 --> 24:59.567 Thank you . Well , as you point out um 24:59.930 --> 25:02.609 commercial um space is playing a 25:02.619 --> 25:05.270 greater role in what's happening with 25:05.280 --> 25:08.060 our military and we've seen in Russia's 25:08.069 --> 25:11.569 war against Ukraine , the role of um 25:12.790 --> 25:16.300 Starlink and how they're operating 25:16.550 --> 25:19.229 their um operation , military 25:19.239 --> 25:22.969 operations . Can you talk about how you 25:22.979 --> 25:26.680 see um an attack on those 25:26.689 --> 25:30.150 commercial operations ? How we should 25:30.160 --> 25:32.300 view that is that should we consider 25:32.310 --> 25:34.790 that an act of war if we see that 25:34.800 --> 25:37.359 happening ? How , where are we in the 25:37.369 --> 25:39.760 thinking about how we look at 25:41.790 --> 25:44.439 the commercial space operations in 25:44.449 --> 25:47.079 connection with what we say about our 25:47.089 --> 25:49.719 military space operations ? Senator ? 25:49.729 --> 25:51.729 That is a , a topic obviously that 25:51.739 --> 25:54.260 we're focused on uh very , very keenly 25:54.410 --> 25:56.521 inside the Unified Command plan where 25:56.521 --> 25:58.577 the President gives tasks to each of 25:58.577 --> 26:00.688 the combatant commanders . There is a 26:00.688 --> 26:02.910 task to the United States Space Command 26:02.910 --> 26:04.630 to defend commercial uh space 26:04.640 --> 26:06.473 capabilities if directed . So we 26:06.473 --> 26:08.696 understand that importance and have put 26:08.696 --> 26:10.918 that hook into that , that mission . Uh 26:10.918 --> 26:13.084 I think moving forward , as you said , 26:13.084 --> 26:15.140 ma'am , uh with the Russia Ukraine , 26:15.140 --> 26:17.307 we've only seen the growing importance 26:17.307 --> 26:19.473 of commercial space capability . Uh So 26:19.473 --> 26:21.640 we must continue to partner with those 26:21.640 --> 26:23.696 companies so that they look to build 26:23.696 --> 26:25.862 resilience into their systems and then 26:25.862 --> 26:28.084 partner with them that if we do need to 26:28.084 --> 26:27.910 actively defend them , we have the 26:27.920 --> 26:30.031 communication avenues open to be able 26:30.031 --> 26:32.479 to do so . And , and have we actually 26:32.489 --> 26:35.439 defined what an attack on commercial 26:35.449 --> 26:38.040 operations would mean , ma'am ? I think 26:38.050 --> 26:40.339 ultimately , that would be a policy 26:40.349 --> 26:42.516 question , but we certainly understand 26:42.516 --> 26:44.571 what the actions are that would look 26:44.571 --> 26:46.793 like , you know , some kind of attack , 26:46.793 --> 26:48.849 whether that was jamming or a direct 26:48.849 --> 26:50.849 physical attack on a satellite or a 26:50.849 --> 26:53.071 ground station . So we haven't actually 26:53.071 --> 26:55.127 in terms of policy delineated how we 26:55.127 --> 26:56.905 would respond to that kind of a 26:56.905 --> 26:59.127 situation , Senator . I think we have a 26:59.127 --> 27:01.238 range of options but , but they are , 27:01.238 --> 27:03.293 they are not coded that if X happens 27:03.293 --> 27:05.516 then Y will follow . We have to look at 27:05.516 --> 27:07.571 each set of circumstances uniquely . 27:07.571 --> 27:10.770 Thank you . Um General , how are 27:10.780 --> 27:13.369 hypersonic weapons changing the way 27:13.380 --> 27:17.150 NORAD thinks about your job ? Senator , 27:17.219 --> 27:19.939 I think that hypersonic present the 27:19.949 --> 27:22.300 greatest technical challenge that we 27:22.310 --> 27:25.369 face today . We're in a three way race 27:25.380 --> 27:28.250 strategically with our two main 27:28.260 --> 27:30.329 competitors in hypersonic , both in 27:30.339 --> 27:32.506 offensive and defensive capabilities . 27:32.506 --> 27:34.530 We're working closely with MD , the 27:34.540 --> 27:36.651 missile defense agency to develop our 27:36.651 --> 27:38.207 own offensive and defensive 27:38.207 --> 27:40.180 capabilities to keep pace . If I'm 27:40.189 --> 27:42.300 confirmed , I'll be keenly interested 27:42.300 --> 27:44.300 in this because as the commander of 27:44.300 --> 27:46.467 NORAD , I would be responsible for the 27:46.467 --> 27:48.467 integrated tactical warning and the 27:48.467 --> 27:51.670 attack assessment of any of any 27:51.680 --> 27:53.880 hypersonic attack on the continental 27:53.890 --> 27:55.946 United States . And then we would be 27:55.946 --> 27:58.430 using United States space command 27:58.439 --> 28:02.130 systems to help us get that data . So 28:02.140 --> 28:04.251 it's a field that we're watching very 28:04.251 --> 28:06.229 closely and we're in a tight 28:06.239 --> 28:08.780 competition with Russia and China . 28:09.510 --> 28:11.621 Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 28:11.621 --> 28:13.677 Thank you , Senator Senator Fisher , 28:13.677 --> 28:15.732 please . Thank you , Mr Chairman and 28:15.732 --> 28:17.954 thank you both for being here today . I 28:17.954 --> 28:19.732 appreciate your service and the 28:19.732 --> 28:21.899 sacrifice and service of your families 28:21.899 --> 28:24.410 as well . General GEO I've heard 28:24.420 --> 28:26.819 extensively from General Van Huk about 28:26.829 --> 28:28.849 a requirement for increased domain 28:28.859 --> 28:31.530 awareness , whether that's Air Domain 28:31.540 --> 28:34.219 awareness or undersea domain awareness . 28:34.469 --> 28:37.400 And I would encourage you if confirmed 28:37.410 --> 28:40.680 to make use of the unfunded priorities 28:40.689 --> 28:44.099 um requirements list that's available 28:44.109 --> 28:47.510 to you so that you have that process to 28:47.520 --> 28:51.050 inform Congress of any capability gaps 28:51.060 --> 28:52.838 that you see in this area . You 28:52.838 --> 28:55.229 mentioned those earlier that that was 28:55.239 --> 28:57.250 something you would look into . So 28:57.459 --> 28:59.681 that's a tool that's available to you . 28:59.681 --> 29:02.189 And it's very helpful to us also 29:02.199 --> 29:04.579 general over the past few years , we've 29:04.589 --> 29:07.140 seen North Korea Russia , China 29:07.229 --> 29:09.290 dramatically expand their nuclear 29:09.300 --> 29:12.780 arsenals and develop a wide range of 29:12.790 --> 29:15.000 missile systems capable of directly 29:15.010 --> 29:16.790 attacking the United States . 29:17.160 --> 29:19.930 Unfortunately , the same cannot be said 29:19.939 --> 29:22.400 for our own defense capabilities which 29:22.410 --> 29:25.089 are failing to keep pace with growing 29:25.099 --> 29:27.260 threats . Do you believe that the 29:27.270 --> 29:29.310 United States should continue to 29:29.319 --> 29:31.579 posture its homeland missile defense 29:31.589 --> 29:34.689 capabilities to stay ahead of the North 29:34.699 --> 29:37.989 Korean threat ? Yes , Senator I do . 29:39.160 --> 29:41.280 Should the United States consider 29:41.290 --> 29:43.550 adjusting its stated missile defense 29:43.560 --> 29:47.109 policy and allow for the possibility of 29:47.119 --> 29:49.910 defending against limited missile 29:49.920 --> 29:52.989 attacks from either Russia or China 29:54.630 --> 29:58.040 Senator that policy that would , as you 29:58.050 --> 29:59.828 stated , that would be a policy 29:59.828 --> 30:01.890 decision . But I do think that it's 30:01.900 --> 30:04.609 something we should look at based on 30:04.619 --> 30:06.675 what we're seeing in Ukraine and the 30:06.675 --> 30:09.689 way the Russians are using new weapons 30:09.699 --> 30:12.260 systems there , civilian infrastructure , 30:12.400 --> 30:15.000 I think although the policy is set and 30:15.010 --> 30:17.760 has worked well for years as our 30:17.770 --> 30:19.881 adversaries change their capabilities 30:19.881 --> 30:21.937 in the way they employ . I think our 30:21.937 --> 30:25.189 military should look at adapting and on 30:25.199 --> 30:27.430 a recurring basis . Assess the policy . 30:28.180 --> 30:30.709 Thank you . You , you mentioned earlier 30:30.719 --> 30:33.930 about monitoring uh the gaps that 30:33.939 --> 30:37.660 exist um in the authorities that you're 30:37.670 --> 30:40.949 given right at this point in time . Do 30:40.959 --> 30:42.681 you believe that there are any 30:42.681 --> 30:45.170 additional authorities or capabilities 30:45.290 --> 30:49.150 that North comm or no , a missile 30:49.160 --> 30:51.327 defense system need ? No , Senator . I 30:51.327 --> 30:53.709 don't see any gaps . My goal is just to 30:53.719 --> 30:56.560 make sure that that due to my new 30:56.569 --> 30:58.625 status in the position , I don't let 30:58.625 --> 31:00.458 any authorities or gaps that are 31:00.458 --> 31:03.420 presently set develop due to the 31:03.430 --> 31:06.189 transition general whiting . To what 31:06.199 --> 31:08.630 extent do you believe that space based 31:08.640 --> 31:11.239 capabilities can contribute to our 31:11.250 --> 31:13.439 missile defense system ? Senator , 31:13.449 --> 31:15.560 thank you for that question . They're 31:15.560 --> 31:17.560 absolutely vital . It is space that 31:17.560 --> 31:19.727 allows us to instantly look around the 31:19.727 --> 31:21.560 globe watch for missile launches 31:21.560 --> 31:23.671 anywhere on the globe and report that 31:23.671 --> 31:26.005 in real time to our national leadership . 31:26.005 --> 31:27.782 If confirmed , I would have the 31:27.782 --> 31:29.616 responsibility of providing that 31:29.616 --> 31:31.838 missile warning data to General Gu . So 31:31.838 --> 31:34.005 he could make an assessment of whether 31:34.005 --> 31:36.005 North America was under attack . So 31:36.005 --> 31:38.116 ma'am , it's absolutely vital . China 31:38.116 --> 31:41.010 tested in 2021 . Uh the fractional 31:41.020 --> 31:43.979 orbital bombardment system . Do you 31:43.989 --> 31:45.959 believe that we should explore the 31:45.969 --> 31:49.510 viability of such systems as a , as a 31:49.520 --> 31:52.819 means of , of pacing new and novel 31:52.829 --> 31:54.718 threats that this country faces . 31:55.489 --> 31:57.656 Senator . Thank you for the question . 31:57.656 --> 31:59.489 Obviously , the Wu 14 fractional 31:59.489 --> 32:01.711 orbital bomb system is something we are 32:01.711 --> 32:03.878 very carefully watching and we have to 32:03.878 --> 32:05.989 be able to track that from launch all 32:05.989 --> 32:08.100 the way through to potential impact . 32:08.100 --> 32:10.267 Um I think it's a matter of whether we 32:10.267 --> 32:12.322 believe such a system would fill any 32:12.322 --> 32:14.100 gaps that we have . That is not 32:14.100 --> 32:15.989 something I've looked at , but if 32:15.989 --> 32:17.767 confirmed , I would be happy to 32:17.767 --> 32:17.630 participate in that and provide my best 32:17.640 --> 32:20.270 military advice back in this setting . 32:20.560 --> 32:23.910 Um Can you tell us the 32:23.920 --> 32:27.589 concerns that you may have with , with 32:27.599 --> 32:31.439 not just the um the abilities that 32:31.449 --> 32:33.810 Russia and China currently have , but 32:34.060 --> 32:37.180 the directions um that they are headed 32:37.189 --> 32:40.920 that we are aware of and , and how we 32:40.930 --> 32:44.670 are preparing to , to defend 32:44.680 --> 32:47.229 against that to counter it . Yes , 32:47.239 --> 32:49.630 Senator , um certainly I mentioned that 32:49.640 --> 32:51.430 China in particular has rapidly 32:51.439 --> 32:53.106 increased their counter space 32:53.106 --> 32:55.106 capabilities , but we also see them 32:55.189 --> 32:57.410 making the rest of their military 32:57.420 --> 33:00.359 forces more space enabled to be more 33:00.369 --> 33:02.800 precise and more lethal . So it's , 33:02.810 --> 33:05.459 it's important that we as a nation have 33:05.469 --> 33:07.525 a range of capabilities where we can 33:07.525 --> 33:09.580 integrate intelligence , command and 33:09.580 --> 33:11.802 control offense , defense , cyber joint 33:11.802 --> 33:14.714 fire to make sure that we can protect 33:14.724 --> 33:16.665 our joint force from those space 33:16.675 --> 33:18.564 enabled capabilities that they're 33:18.564 --> 33:20.453 developing and they have dual use 33:20.453 --> 33:22.508 platforms as well . Correct . That's 33:22.508 --> 33:24.619 correct . And we , we assume anything 33:24.619 --> 33:26.786 commercial is dual use from , from the 33:26.786 --> 33:28.897 PR C Ok , thank you very much . Thank 33:28.897 --> 33:30.842 you . Thank you , Senator Fisher . 33:30.842 --> 33:33.469 Senator Kaine , please . Thank you , Mr 33:33.479 --> 33:35.312 Chair and , and thank you to our 33:35.312 --> 33:37.423 nominees for your service . Uh I look 33:37.423 --> 33:39.701 forward to supporting your nominations . 33:39.701 --> 33:41.923 Um General Guo , I want to try uh tread 33:41.923 --> 33:44.146 a little ground that both the chair and 33:44.146 --> 33:46.146 ranking member have with respect to 33:46.146 --> 33:48.368 fentaNYL . I don't need to ask the same 33:48.368 --> 33:50.257 questions but Senator Ernst and I 33:50.257 --> 33:52.423 offered an amendment that was included 33:52.423 --> 33:54.646 in the end , a version that's currently 33:54.646 --> 33:54.140 pending on the Senate floor to 33:54.150 --> 33:56.079 designate fentaNYL as a national 33:56.089 --> 33:59.060 security threat . Uh and to encourage 33:59.069 --> 34:01.160 the dod to be more forward leaning 34:01.250 --> 34:03.489 first within the US whole of government 34:03.500 --> 34:05.389 effort , which has tended to rely 34:05.389 --> 34:08.760 pretty heavily on DEA Doj DH S . But 34:08.929 --> 34:11.080 we're encouraging the dod to be more 34:11.090 --> 34:13.423 forward leaning in this , in this fight , 34:13.423 --> 34:15.840 um both within the US government , but 34:15.850 --> 34:17.628 also in tandem with the Mexican 34:17.628 --> 34:19.628 military . And I would suspect that 34:19.628 --> 34:21.794 that responsibility is gonna be pretty 34:21.794 --> 34:23.961 heavily on North Comms shoulders . And 34:23.961 --> 34:26.128 so , uh with other committee members , 34:26.128 --> 34:28.350 we , we just see the ravages of this in 34:28.350 --> 34:28.250 all of our communities . I know you 34:28.260 --> 34:30.538 understand that and we'll look forward . 34:30.538 --> 34:32.760 Should you be confirmed to following up 34:32.760 --> 34:34.927 and talking about what , what we might 34:34.927 --> 34:37.093 do from the Pentagon side to really um 34:37.093 --> 34:39.399 energize and amplify the efforts to 34:39.409 --> 34:41.409 counter uh fentaNYL coming into the 34:41.409 --> 34:43.465 United States . Um General White , I 34:43.465 --> 34:45.669 wanna ask you a question about Space 34:45.679 --> 34:49.510 Command and our allies . Um I am very 34:49.520 --> 34:51.820 forward leaning on the a framework that 34:51.830 --> 34:53.997 was announced by President Biden . I'm 34:53.997 --> 34:55.663 the chairman of the Sea Power 34:55.663 --> 34:57.608 subcommittee of Armed services . I 34:57.608 --> 34:59.608 think that this partnership which I 34:59.608 --> 35:01.719 hope will be decades long offers real 35:01.719 --> 35:03.941 opportunity to promote stability in the 35:03.941 --> 35:06.052 Indo Pacific as you know , pillar one 35:06.052 --> 35:08.274 is a pillar dealing with Virginia class 35:08.274 --> 35:10.497 submarines , but there's a broad pillar 35:10.497 --> 35:12.608 two that talks about cooperation with 35:12.608 --> 35:14.441 Australia and the UK and a whole 35:14.441 --> 35:16.497 variety of uh technologies , whether 35:16.497 --> 35:20.090 it's space cyber A I um hypersonic . 35:20.500 --> 35:22.722 Um Should you be confirmed , talk to us 35:22.722 --> 35:24.778 a little bit about the way you would 35:24.778 --> 35:26.944 see that a framework and how you might 35:26.944 --> 35:29.056 use your position at Space Command to 35:29.056 --> 35:31.056 work together with these allies and 35:31.056 --> 35:33.222 then just more broadly our allies , it 35:33.222 --> 35:35.685 is a strategic edge that we have over 35:35.695 --> 35:37.751 China and Russia that we have such a 35:37.751 --> 35:41.125 network of allies . How how should we 35:41.135 --> 35:43.854 be thinking about joint activities in 35:43.864 --> 35:46.034 the Space domain with nations allied 35:46.044 --> 35:47.988 with the United States ? Senator ? 35:47.988 --> 35:50.155 Thank you for that question . Uh Space 35:50.155 --> 35:52.377 is a team sport and it takes us and our 35:52.377 --> 35:54.544 allies to , to be the best we can be . 35:54.544 --> 35:56.655 In fact , Senator 33 years ago , as a 35:56.655 --> 35:58.655 second lieutenant at my first space 35:58.655 --> 36:00.211 assignment , the very first 36:00.211 --> 36:01.933 noncommissioned officer I ever 36:01.933 --> 36:03.377 supervised was a Canadian 36:03.377 --> 36:05.600 noncommissioned officer assigned to our 36:05.600 --> 36:07.766 unit . Because of those partnerships . 36:07.766 --> 36:09.933 We have a , a grouping of countries we 36:09.933 --> 36:12.159 call that combines space operations uh 36:12.379 --> 36:14.490 and , and together . It's , it's us , 36:14.490 --> 36:17.449 it's our Canadian British Australian , 36:17.459 --> 36:19.500 uh New New Zealand plus some other 36:19.510 --> 36:21.732 countries that are observers that we're 36:21.732 --> 36:23.732 asking to come in . In that forum . 36:23.732 --> 36:26.250 We're able to coordinate military um 36:26.260 --> 36:28.489 operations . We're able to coordinate 36:28.500 --> 36:30.860 uh future architectures policies . 36:30.870 --> 36:32.981 We've seen a real value in that as we 36:32.981 --> 36:34.981 work together other . And in fact , 36:34.981 --> 36:37.314 Senator , over the last couple of years , 36:37.314 --> 36:39.481 us , Space Command has created a named 36:39.481 --> 36:41.426 operation called Operation Olympic 36:41.426 --> 36:43.648 Defender where we operate in space with 36:43.648 --> 36:45.814 our Canadian Australian and and United 36:45.814 --> 36:47.648 Kingdom allies . So uh I will if 36:47.648 --> 36:49.481 confirm , do everything I can to 36:49.481 --> 36:51.648 maximize those partnerships uh because 36:51.648 --> 36:53.759 it is an asymmetric advantage for the 36:53.759 --> 36:55.814 United States and , and tell me what 36:55.814 --> 36:57.703 the acronym co stands for again , 36:57.703 --> 36:59.703 combines space operations . Great , 36:59.703 --> 37:01.926 great . I'm I'm very glad to hear about 37:01.926 --> 37:03.981 that . Um intentional effort to work 37:03.981 --> 37:06.203 together with allies to follow up on an 37:06.203 --> 37:08.314 earlier question that Senator Shaheen 37:08.314 --> 37:10.259 was asking space is an interesting 37:10.259 --> 37:11.926 domain because of the massive 37:11.926 --> 37:14.889 proliferation of commercial satellites 37:14.899 --> 37:18.030 in space . Uh that can have a security 37:18.040 --> 37:20.709 of connection to us . She referenced 37:20.719 --> 37:23.580 Starlink in Ukraine . Um Our , our 37:23.590 --> 37:25.701 adversaries may have their own assets 37:25.701 --> 37:27.757 in space , but they tend not to have 37:27.757 --> 37:29.923 the same amount of uh government owned 37:29.923 --> 37:32.260 assets , but then private sector assets 37:32.479 --> 37:34.550 where uh they are in at least some 37:34.560 --> 37:36.671 collaboration with them . What talk a 37:36.671 --> 37:38.838 little bit about how you would see the 37:38.838 --> 37:40.504 uh both the opportunities and 37:40.504 --> 37:42.616 challenges to work in tandem with our 37:42.616 --> 37:44.782 commercial space assets to advance our 37:44.782 --> 37:46.949 space capacities . Senator I'd like to 37:46.949 --> 37:49.060 say we're in the second golden age of 37:49.060 --> 37:51.171 space . The first golden age was when 37:51.171 --> 37:53.116 Neil Armstrong walked out onto the 37:53.116 --> 37:55.282 lunar surface . But this second golden 37:55.282 --> 37:54.820 age is really being led by American 37:54.830 --> 37:56.997 commercial industry and it gives us so 37:56.997 --> 37:59.000 many untold advantages . We have to 37:59.010 --> 38:01.456 maximize that . And over the last eight 38:01.466 --> 38:03.706 years or so out at our Vandenberg Space 38:03.716 --> 38:05.883 Force Base in California , we have a , 38:05.883 --> 38:08.295 a grouping . Uh they called the , the 38:08.305 --> 38:10.527 uh commercial integration cell where we 38:10.527 --> 38:12.527 brought in the 10 companies that we 38:12.527 --> 38:14.638 contract with the most for capability 38:14.638 --> 38:16.749 to the Department of Defense . And in 38:16.749 --> 38:18.805 that cell , we share intelligence at 38:18.805 --> 38:20.845 the highest level . We get insights 38:20.855 --> 38:22.577 into what's happening in their 38:22.577 --> 38:24.799 constellations because we believe if we 38:24.799 --> 38:26.744 all have that insight , we operate 38:26.744 --> 38:28.799 better together . So that's just one 38:28.799 --> 38:31.022 example of the ways that if confirmed , 38:31.022 --> 38:33.133 I would want to continue to drive our 38:33.133 --> 38:34.911 ability to leverage us American 38:34.911 --> 38:37.022 industry because of the advantages it 38:37.022 --> 38:36.632 brings for us . Excellent . Well , I I 38:36.642 --> 38:38.922 hope to uh entertain you at Wallops 38:38.931 --> 38:40.951 Island at some point following your 38:40.961 --> 38:43.439 confirmation . Thank you . Thank you , 38:43.449 --> 38:45.727 Senator Kaine , Senator Ernst , please . 38:45.727 --> 38:47.671 Thank you , Mr Chair and thank you 38:47.671 --> 38:50.320 General Gillo and uh General Whiting 38:50.330 --> 38:52.386 and to your families as well . Thank 38:52.386 --> 38:54.459 you very much for being here and uh 38:54.469 --> 38:58.030 supporting these gentlemen . So 38:58.040 --> 39:01.320 general GEO we have talked a lot 39:01.330 --> 39:03.389 about a number of threats . We've 39:03.399 --> 39:06.879 covered China and Russia . We've heard 39:06.889 --> 39:10.040 about North Korea's arsenal and how 39:10.050 --> 39:11.883 they are outpacing our ballistic 39:11.883 --> 39:13.870 missile defenses . Um , a lot of 39:13.879 --> 39:16.989 concern out there and in your , your 39:17.000 --> 39:19.629 policy questions , the advanced policy 39:19.639 --> 39:21.695 questions , you stated that a second 39:21.695 --> 39:24.570 missile defense site on the east coast 39:24.580 --> 39:27.669 is quote , not operationally required 39:27.679 --> 39:30.699 at this time . End quote . So what 39:30.709 --> 39:33.409 advancements um in adversary 39:33.419 --> 39:36.439 capabilities would lead you to 39:36.449 --> 39:39.330 reevaluate this assessment ? What 39:39.340 --> 39:41.659 should be , what should we be watching 39:41.669 --> 39:45.110 for Senator ? I understand that the uh 39:45.120 --> 39:47.810 assessment was uh recently made and , 39:47.820 --> 39:49.653 and said that it's not operation 39:49.653 --> 39:51.820 required at this time . Uh But from my 39:51.820 --> 39:53.810 perspective , uh if I'm confirmed 39:53.820 --> 39:56.239 coming into the position , uh all 39:56.250 --> 39:58.530 military operations require depth and 39:58.540 --> 40:01.520 dispersal and uh we have to keep pace 40:01.530 --> 40:03.752 with the , with the threat and , and uh 40:03.760 --> 40:05.909 I , I do not question the assessment 40:05.919 --> 40:07.975 that was made but it was a different 40:07.975 --> 40:10.197 context and a and a different threat at 40:10.197 --> 40:12.308 the time of the assessment . Uh So if 40:12.308 --> 40:14.086 I'm confirmed , I would support 40:14.086 --> 40:16.252 recurring assessments uh that would uh 40:16.252 --> 40:18.141 ensure that we keep pace with the 40:18.141 --> 40:19.919 adversaries uh specific to your 40:19.919 --> 40:22.030 question , the number of threats that 40:22.030 --> 40:24.141 they have that , that might uh defeat 40:24.141 --> 40:26.363 the total number uh that we have in our 40:26.363 --> 40:28.363 existing uh locations or if another 40:28.363 --> 40:30.530 rogue state uh develops the capability 40:30.530 --> 40:32.752 and can attack the homeland . Uh That's 40:32.752 --> 40:34.863 another reason I think that we should 40:34.863 --> 40:36.641 look at the uh reassess uh on a 40:36.641 --> 40:38.697 periodic basis to ensure that we can 40:38.697 --> 40:40.808 keep pace with that with that . I , I 40:40.808 --> 40:43.290 appreciate that answer very much and I 40:43.300 --> 40:45.467 I in my estimation , that would be the 40:45.467 --> 40:47.633 correct answer is we have threats that 40:47.633 --> 40:49.989 change grow more over time . And it's 40:50.000 --> 40:52.260 important that we continually reassess 40:52.270 --> 40:55.780 that um we , we have heard also from a 40:55.790 --> 40:57.679 number of my colleagues about the 40:57.679 --> 40:59.679 southern border and , and obviously 40:59.679 --> 41:03.149 that is a huge concern um with all of 41:03.159 --> 41:05.381 us , uh Senator Kaine and I are working 41:05.381 --> 41:07.492 together on , on an amendment for the 41:07.492 --> 41:11.110 NDA A and that would um improve our 41:11.120 --> 41:13.469 milk to milk cooperation with the 41:13.479 --> 41:15.389 Mexican authorities to counter uh 41:15.399 --> 41:19.030 fentaNYL . And we've also seen a 41:19.040 --> 41:21.310 number of National Guard troops that we 41:21.320 --> 41:23.376 have used on our southern border and 41:23.376 --> 41:25.431 I'd like to focus on that just for a 41:25.431 --> 41:27.376 second . Um I've traveled a couple 41:27.376 --> 41:29.542 times to the southern border and every 41:29.542 --> 41:31.764 time I'm there , I have the opportunity 41:31.764 --> 41:33.820 to meet with from different states . 41:33.820 --> 41:36.760 And of course , Texas , um the those 41:36.770 --> 41:38.659 that are assisting with the civil 41:38.659 --> 41:40.659 authorities , I think we have about 41:40.659 --> 41:42.600 2500 National Guard . So how does 41:42.610 --> 41:44.666 defense support to civil authorities 41:44.666 --> 41:47.800 fit in those priorities as commander 41:48.760 --> 41:50.850 uh Senator , it's right at the top 41:50.860 --> 41:53.689 because uh uh border security is 41:53.699 --> 41:56.010 national security and uh national 41:56.020 --> 41:58.187 security is , is a key element of , of 41:58.187 --> 42:00.298 homeland defense . And so uh what you 42:00.298 --> 42:02.520 just described would be in the , in the 42:02.520 --> 42:04.576 number one priority that I think the 42:04.576 --> 42:06.687 command would have if I'm confirmed . 42:06.687 --> 42:09.550 And uh strong support uh within the uh , 42:09.560 --> 42:11.671 authorities given by the Secretary of 42:11.671 --> 42:13.671 Defense to a Department of Homeland 42:13.671 --> 42:15.671 Security would be a top priority of 42:15.671 --> 42:17.893 mine . Very good . And how would we use 42:17.893 --> 42:19.893 those reserve forces , whether it's 42:19.893 --> 42:22.790 National Guard or Reserve units ? Um 42:22.800 --> 42:25.610 How can we continue to support the 42:25.620 --> 42:27.953 mission without hurting their readiness ? 42:28.080 --> 42:31.050 Uh Senator , uh , so many of the 42:31.060 --> 42:33.282 missions that the , uh , no A and North 42:33.282 --> 42:35.489 com conduct are with National Guard 42:35.500 --> 42:37.889 Forces and they're all extremely 42:37.899 --> 42:40.121 capable , extremely disciplined mission 42:40.121 --> 42:42.232 focused . Uh , I , I don't think that 42:42.232 --> 42:44.288 the , uh , no and North com could do 42:44.288 --> 42:46.455 their uh important mission without the 42:46.455 --> 42:49.189 support of the National Guard . Some of 42:49.199 --> 42:51.800 the , some of the actions that they 42:51.810 --> 42:53.588 conduct , for instance , in the 42:53.588 --> 42:55.939 Southwest border actually build some 42:55.949 --> 42:58.330 readiness aviation , for example , but 42:58.340 --> 43:00.062 there are some where they lose 43:00.062 --> 43:02.284 readiness in their wartime mission . So 43:02.284 --> 43:04.451 if I'm confirmed , I would establish a 43:04.451 --> 43:06.959 routine reporting process with the 43:06.969 --> 43:09.080 deployed commanders to see where they 43:09.080 --> 43:10.913 feel they have lost readiness in 43:10.913 --> 43:13.139 specific uh worldwide deployment uh 43:13.149 --> 43:15.959 areas and see if we could give them 43:15.969 --> 43:18.191 training opportunities while they're on 43:18.191 --> 43:20.413 the border to maintain those . Uh , and 43:20.413 --> 43:22.525 certainly they need to keep readiness 43:22.525 --> 43:24.691 in their current missions . But , uh , 43:24.691 --> 43:26.413 their , their long term , uh , 43:26.413 --> 43:28.636 readiness would be very important . And 43:28.636 --> 43:30.802 I think we need to find ways that they 43:30.802 --> 43:32.969 can uh keep their worldwide deployment 43:32.969 --> 43:32.300 readiness while they're conducting the 43:32.310 --> 43:34.143 Southwest border . Thank you . I 43:34.143 --> 43:36.254 appreciate that . And general Whiting 43:36.254 --> 43:38.143 because I am out of time . I will 43:38.143 --> 43:40.254 submit a question for the record that 43:40.254 --> 43:42.310 deals with our cyber and our Special 43:42.310 --> 43:45.199 Operations forces and space triad . 43:45.310 --> 43:47.366 It's of great interest to those that 43:47.366 --> 43:49.588 are , are working in special operations 43:49.588 --> 43:51.366 command . So I appreciate you , 43:51.366 --> 43:53.366 gentlemen . Thank you very much and 43:53.366 --> 43:55.477 congratulations on your nominations . 43:55.600 --> 43:57.656 Thank Senator Ernst Senator Hirono , 43:57.656 --> 44:00.830 please . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 44:01.250 --> 44:03.590 Congratulations to both of you and 44:03.600 --> 44:06.040 welcome to your families . I asked the 44:06.050 --> 44:08.260 follow following two initial questions 44:08.270 --> 44:11.219 to address the fitness of any , any 44:11.229 --> 44:13.285 nominee before any of the committees 44:13.285 --> 44:16.919 that I sit on . So I will ask uh the 44:16.929 --> 44:19.096 two questions of both of you since you 44:19.096 --> 44:21.151 became a legal adult . Have you ever 44:21.151 --> 44:23.040 made unwanted requests for sexual 44:23.040 --> 44:25.280 favors or committed any verbal or 44:25.290 --> 44:27.290 physical harassment or assault of a 44:27.290 --> 44:30.949 sexual nature ? No , Senator , no , 44:30.959 --> 44:33.015 ma'am . Thank you . Uh Have you ever 44:33.015 --> 44:34.959 faced discipline or entered into a 44:34.959 --> 44:36.959 settlement relating to this kind of 44:36.959 --> 44:39.300 conduct ? No , no , Senator General 44:39.389 --> 44:43.270 writing as space becomes exponentially 44:43.280 --> 44:46.040 busier . Understanding where satellites 44:46.050 --> 44:47.939 are is increasingly important and 44:47.939 --> 44:49.969 challenging . The 15th Space 44:49.979 --> 44:53.129 Surveillance Squadron in Maui does this 44:53.139 --> 44:55.139 important work while simultaneously 44:55.139 --> 44:57.083 conducting leading edge research . 44:57.083 --> 44:59.250 However , they are hamstrung by aging 44:59.260 --> 45:01.750 infrastructure and for your information , 45:01.760 --> 45:03.816 the 15th Space Surveillance Squadron 45:03.816 --> 45:06.310 operates several telescopes on 45:08.399 --> 45:10.570 a that tracks satellites and in 45:10.580 --> 45:12.524 partnership with the University of 45:12.524 --> 45:14.989 Hawaii conducts research . It is here 45:15.000 --> 45:18.020 that a mechanical issue in a 45:18.270 --> 45:21.610 backup generator caused uh about 700 45:21.620 --> 45:24.760 gallons of diesel fuel to spill after a 45:24.770 --> 45:27.000 lightning strike caused electrical grid 45:27.010 --> 45:29.449 failures on the summit . And uh 45:29.459 --> 45:31.530 additionally , many of the buildings 45:31.540 --> 45:34.360 and telescope domes are leaking and 45:34.370 --> 45:36.360 generally in bad shapes . General 45:36.439 --> 45:38.383 writing terrestrial infrastructure 45:38.383 --> 45:40.820 underpins our space capabilities . How 45:40.830 --> 45:42.886 does deferring maintenance at places 45:42.886 --> 45:44.719 like the 15th Space Surveillance 45:44.719 --> 45:47.760 Squadron impact Space Comms mission 45:47.770 --> 45:49.881 accomplishment ? Uh Senator Thank you 45:49.881 --> 45:52.103 for that question and I've had the good 45:52.103 --> 45:53.992 fortune to visit the 15th on Maui 45:53.992 --> 45:56.214 multiple times . And as you highlight , 45:56.214 --> 45:58.270 they're doing uh incredibly critical 45:58.270 --> 46:00.603 work in in our number one priority area , 46:00.603 --> 46:02.826 which is Space Domain Awareness . So it 46:02.826 --> 46:04.603 is vital that we invest in that 46:04.603 --> 46:06.989 infrastructure so that we can um ensure 46:07.000 --> 46:09.169 that we can continue to provide that 46:09.179 --> 46:12.770 mission support . And um I appreciate 46:12.780 --> 46:15.002 the uh local leadership on Maui who has 46:15.002 --> 46:16.891 worked with us as we've worked to 46:16.891 --> 46:19.058 remediate the the fuel spill . There's 46:19.058 --> 46:21.224 more work to be done there . Uh But we 46:21.224 --> 46:23.447 appreciate the vice and counsel that we 46:23.447 --> 46:23.429 received from the local leaders there . 46:23.879 --> 46:25.850 Well , generally we get to the 46:25.860 --> 46:28.260 infrastructure needs when the crisis 46:28.270 --> 46:30.437 has already occurred . My question has 46:30.437 --> 46:32.548 to do with how we're going to upgrade 46:32.548 --> 46:34.381 and , and prevent these kinds of 46:34.381 --> 46:36.590 incidences so that our uh people on 46:36.600 --> 46:40.399 Maui can do their jobs . So I don't 46:40.409 --> 46:42.576 think we've put enough emphasis on the 46:42.576 --> 46:44.465 need for repair , repairing , and 46:44.465 --> 46:46.576 maintaining our infrastructure across 46:46.576 --> 46:50.209 the dod and space is um included in 46:50.219 --> 46:52.386 that . So I would request , should you 46:52.389 --> 46:56.300 be uh confirmed that that uh there be a 46:56.310 --> 46:58.580 review and assessment of the 46:58.590 --> 47:01.209 infrastructure needs for your command ? 47:01.280 --> 47:03.391 Senator ? Thank you . And I do commit 47:03.391 --> 47:05.336 to that . And there is right now a 47:05.336 --> 47:08.050 effort going on to assess all of our 47:08.070 --> 47:09.903 infrastructure across my current 47:09.903 --> 47:12.070 command space operations , command and 47:12.070 --> 47:14.126 specifically tie it to our readiness 47:14.126 --> 47:16.237 standards that work is ongoing and we 47:16.237 --> 47:18.348 will complete here over the next year 47:18.348 --> 47:18.199 or two . But ma'am , I absolutely 47:18.209 --> 47:20.265 commit to the review you requested . 47:20.265 --> 47:22.098 Thank you and again for you . If 47:22.098 --> 47:23.653 confirmed , you will assume 47:23.653 --> 47:25.889 responsibilities as the global sensor 47:25.899 --> 47:28.739 manager for missile defense . Do you 47:28.750 --> 47:30.528 believe current missile defense 47:30.528 --> 47:33.330 policies reflect all global threats and 47:33.340 --> 47:35.550 adequately encompass rapidly changing 47:35.560 --> 47:38.030 missile technologies and if confirmed , 47:38.040 --> 47:40.040 you will be responsible for missile 47:40.040 --> 47:43.850 warning segment , sensors and in part 47:43.969 --> 47:47.870 for the dod space based command and 47:47.879 --> 47:49.899 control systems . Do you think that 47:49.909 --> 47:52.929 these acquisition programs including 47:52.939 --> 47:55.699 that the dual use radar requested in 47:55.709 --> 47:58.040 this year's budget for Hawaii are on 47:58.050 --> 48:00.590 track and will meet your requirements ? 48:00.770 --> 48:02.992 Uh Senator , I think those are critical 48:02.992 --> 48:04.992 programs that we have to watch very 48:04.992 --> 48:06.770 carefully . It is vital that we 48:06.770 --> 48:08.714 continue to provide global missile 48:08.714 --> 48:10.270 warning and missile defense 48:10.270 --> 48:13.449 capabilities . If confirmed . I I will 48:13.459 --> 48:15.681 provide my best military advice . After 48:15.681 --> 48:18.040 looking into those specific programs , 48:18.050 --> 48:20.272 I think we have the right investments , 48:20.272 --> 48:22.383 but we've got to make sure we execute 48:22.383 --> 48:24.383 on the program successfully . Now , 48:24.383 --> 48:26.606 I've had concerns about missile defense 48:26.606 --> 48:28.717 for Hawaii . And uh , as you probably 48:28.717 --> 48:30.883 know HDRH Hawaii was on track , but it 48:30.883 --> 48:33.129 is no longer . And so we're looking for 48:33.139 --> 48:35.195 some other ways that we are going to 48:35.195 --> 48:37.083 make sure that there is a missile 48:37.083 --> 48:39.417 warning system that will protect Hawaii . 48:39.417 --> 48:41.070 And that also includes some 48:41.080 --> 48:43.310 responsibility that you have General 48:43.419 --> 48:46.129 Gill . So please , for both of you , I 48:46.139 --> 48:48.790 would very much appreciate uh your 48:48.989 --> 48:51.419 paying attention to the missile defense 48:51.429 --> 48:53.262 needs of Hawaii . Thank you , Mr 48:53.262 --> 48:55.429 Chairman . Thank you , Senator Senator 48:55.429 --> 48:57.373 Sullivan . Please . Thank you , Mr 48:57.373 --> 48:59.540 Chairman . I want to congratulate both 48:59.540 --> 49:01.707 of you , gentlemen and your families . 49:01.707 --> 49:03.596 I appreciate it very much your uh 49:04.399 --> 49:06.510 comments about your families and your 49:06.510 --> 49:08.510 opening statements . I think it's a 49:08.510 --> 49:10.649 great reminder to Americans that uh 49:11.169 --> 49:13.760 it's not just the people wearing the 49:13.770 --> 49:16.209 uniform , it's oftentimes the spouses 49:16.219 --> 49:18.570 and the kids behind them who in my view 49:18.580 --> 49:21.469 have a harder job . So to them . Thank 49:21.479 --> 49:25.129 you , um uh 49:25.500 --> 49:28.689 General uh you , you mentioned Canada , 49:29.379 --> 49:31.709 um which I think might puzzle a lot of 49:31.719 --> 49:34.229 people . You have a unique command 49:34.239 --> 49:37.000 responsibility in terms of no ad which 49:37.010 --> 49:39.066 has to be nominated by the president 49:39.066 --> 49:41.179 and the Prime Minister . You want to 49:41.189 --> 49:43.411 just mention that very briefly . I have 49:43.411 --> 49:45.578 a actually a couple of questions about 49:45.578 --> 49:47.800 Canada . Yes , Senator , no ad is a bal 49:47.860 --> 49:49.916 command with the United States . And 49:49.916 --> 49:53.669 Canada has been for 65 years and uh uh 49:53.679 --> 49:56.209 65 years of , of defending the homeland 49:56.219 --> 49:59.370 side by side . So , uh Senator Kaine 49:59.379 --> 50:01.657 mentioned the importance of our allies . 50:01.657 --> 50:03.712 I couldn't agree more . It's a giant 50:03.750 --> 50:07.610 strategic advantage to um our , 50:07.620 --> 50:10.419 our uh national security I do wanna 50:10.429 --> 50:12.318 mention and it's , you know , not 50:12.318 --> 50:14.318 always polite , but I'm gonna do it 50:14.318 --> 50:16.485 here anyways , the Wall Street Journal 50:16.485 --> 50:18.800 on July 12th had an editorial entitled 50:18.810 --> 50:22.260 Canada is a Military Free Rider in NATO . 50:22.350 --> 50:24.461 Mr Chairman , I'd like to submit that 50:24.461 --> 50:27.429 for the record and it goes on to talk 50:27.439 --> 50:29.661 about Ottawa's feeble commitment to the 50:29.661 --> 50:32.709 alliance at the Vilnius summit . Uh 50:32.719 --> 50:34.886 They should have been put at the kids' 50:34.886 --> 50:36.886 table . I was actually at the Villa 50:36.886 --> 50:40.060 summit last week in NATO . Uh Canada is 50:40.070 --> 50:44.030 not even close to its 2% commitment and 50:44.040 --> 50:45.984 it was common knowledge that Prime 50:45.984 --> 50:48.040 Minister Trudeau was trying to water 50:48.040 --> 50:50.899 down the Villa commitment to 2% as a 50:50.909 --> 50:54.580 floor , all of which is incredibly 50:54.590 --> 50:56.870 disappointing . I hope the Canadians 50:56.879 --> 50:59.157 are watching your confirmation hearing . 50:59.157 --> 51:01.500 Uh General , you'll be working closely 51:01.510 --> 51:04.919 with Canada if confirmed . Can you 51:04.929 --> 51:07.159 commit to this committee that you can 51:07.169 --> 51:09.391 have discussions with the Canadians and 51:09.391 --> 51:11.336 say , hey , look , when you're not 51:11.336 --> 51:13.225 supporting NATO , when you're not 51:13.225 --> 51:15.280 supporting missile defense for North 51:15.280 --> 51:17.447 America , it's actually harmful to the 51:17.447 --> 51:19.447 alliance . Americans get frustrated 51:19.447 --> 51:21.780 when our allies don't pull their weight . 51:22.040 --> 51:24.262 And with regard to NATO , Canada is not 51:24.262 --> 51:26.429 even close to pulling its weight . Can 51:26.429 --> 51:28.484 you commit to us to have those tough 51:28.484 --> 51:30.596 conversations but important with your 51:30.596 --> 51:32.818 Canadian counterparts ? Yes , Senator , 51:32.818 --> 51:34.984 you can count on me to do that . Thank 51:34.984 --> 51:34.969 you . That's really important . You're 51:34.979 --> 51:37.201 both Air Force Academy grads , which is 51:37.201 --> 51:39.368 great . I'm sure the Air Force Academy 51:39.368 --> 51:41.312 is very proud . We're proud . It's 51:41.312 --> 51:43.423 awesome . Um As you know , the father 51:43.423 --> 51:45.646 of the Air Force , Billy Mitchell had a 51:45.646 --> 51:48.459 very famous quote . He said it was 51:48.469 --> 51:50.580 actually in front of a armed services 51:50.580 --> 51:54.050 hearing in 1935 he talked about one 51:54.060 --> 51:56.227 place that actually wasn't a state yet 51:56.360 --> 51:58.527 in America . And he called it the most 51:58.527 --> 52:01.040 strategic place in the world . Whoever 52:01.050 --> 52:03.979 holds this place literally holds the 52:03.989 --> 52:06.620 world . Ok . Now you guys are Air Force 52:06.629 --> 52:08.685 Academy grads , that's the father of 52:08.685 --> 52:11.139 the US Air Force . What place was Billy 52:11.149 --> 52:13.929 Mitchell referring to Alaska , Senator 52:13.939 --> 52:15.939 Alaska General . Are you good to go 52:15.939 --> 52:17.995 with that ? I'm familiar with that . 52:17.995 --> 52:20.272 Did you confirm that ? That was Alaska ? 52:20.272 --> 52:22.550 Good . You passed the test . Thank you . 52:22.550 --> 52:26.419 Now , um In all seriousness , two 52:26.429 --> 52:28.485 issues , I just want to talk briefly 52:28.485 --> 52:30.596 about Alaska . We talked about Domain 52:30.596 --> 52:32.596 Awareness General Van . He has been 52:32.596 --> 52:34.830 great on Domain Awareness . But when it 52:34.840 --> 52:36.969 comes to Domain Awareness , whether 52:36.979 --> 52:40.820 it's hypersonic or cruise missiles or 52:40.830 --> 52:43.800 balloons , where are they , what's the 52:43.810 --> 52:46.239 avenue of approach ? If our adversaries 52:46.250 --> 52:48.639 are gonna attack New York City , Miami 52:48.649 --> 52:50.760 Chicago , it doesn't matter where are 52:50.760 --> 52:53.000 they coming through ? Senator , almost 52:53.010 --> 52:55.010 any avenue of approach to the , the 52:55.010 --> 52:57.310 homeland comes over the Arctic , right ? 52:57.540 --> 52:59.818 So when we talk about domain awareness , 52:59.818 --> 53:01.818 where do we need to beef that up in 53:01.818 --> 53:03.651 particular ? Senator , first and 53:03.651 --> 53:05.818 foremost , it needs to be the Arctic . 53:06.129 --> 53:09.479 So America is an Arctic nation because 53:09.489 --> 53:11.600 of what state Alaska . So when you're 53:11.600 --> 53:13.878 talking about beefing up in the Arctic , 53:13.878 --> 53:13.800 you're talking about beefing up in 53:13.810 --> 53:15.866 Alaska , correct ? Yes , sir . And , 53:15.866 --> 53:17.977 and uh to your previous point to talk 53:17.977 --> 53:20.143 to our Canadian counterparts about and 53:20.143 --> 53:22.310 hopefully they'll pay for that some at 53:22.310 --> 53:24.588 some point radars there as well . Yeah , 53:24.588 --> 53:24.350 they're not very good at paying for 53:24.360 --> 53:26.582 missile defense either . Uh Even though 53:26.582 --> 53:28.582 we protect the whole North American 53:28.582 --> 53:30.582 continent , let me uh ask the final 53:30.582 --> 53:33.040 question with regard to a , the Arctic , 53:34.469 --> 53:36.580 we have huge strategic interests as a 53:36.580 --> 53:38.429 country in the Arctic , natural 53:38.439 --> 53:40.439 resources , transportation routes , 53:40.439 --> 53:42.439 strategic locations , mentioned the 53:42.439 --> 53:44.383 environment people , the north com 53:44.383 --> 53:46.495 commanders in my experience have gone 53:46.495 --> 53:48.439 from , you're the advocate for the 53:48.439 --> 53:50.328 Arctic have gone from essentially 53:50.328 --> 53:52.550 disinterest when I got here eight years 53:52.550 --> 53:54.772 ago to increasingly strong interest . I 53:54.772 --> 53:56.995 think General Van . He has done a great 53:56.995 --> 54:00.639 job . Um And yet the Pentagon has 54:00.649 --> 54:03.060 been the one agency in all of 54:03.070 --> 54:05.169 Washington DC that in my view , has 54:05.360 --> 54:07.919 kind of not really focused . So the 54:07.929 --> 54:09.707 reason America and our national 54:09.707 --> 54:11.873 security and even the Pentagon are now 54:11.873 --> 54:13.929 focusing in the Arctic is almost all 54:13.929 --> 54:16.151 from this committee where we had put it 54:16.151 --> 54:18.318 every year in the NDA A including this 54:18.318 --> 54:20.899 requirements . Hey guys , wake up 54:20.909 --> 54:22.687 Pentagon , wake up . We got big 54:22.687 --> 54:25.100 strategic interest in the Arctic last 54:25.110 --> 54:27.689 year , Senator uh King and I got the 54:27.699 --> 54:29.977 Arctic security initiative in Pentagon , 54:29.977 --> 54:32.479 fought that by the way , icebreakers , 54:32.610 --> 54:35.659 ports and nome all these presence 54:35.870 --> 54:39.409 resources issues we put in not the 54:39.419 --> 54:42.100 Pentagon . So can I get your commitment 54:42.409 --> 54:45.570 to work with this committee to be 100 54:45.580 --> 54:48.270 and 10% focus on the Arctic . To be 54:48.280 --> 54:50.550 honest , it's been a little tiring to 54:50.560 --> 54:52.616 have to go to the Pentagon and say , 54:52.616 --> 54:54.782 hey , guys , focus here . Well , we're 54:54.782 --> 54:56.949 not really focus here . Then we put it 54:56.949 --> 54:59.399 into law . It would be better if you 54:59.409 --> 55:01.242 guys could help us . And again , 55:01.242 --> 55:03.465 General Van , he's been great . But can 55:03.465 --> 55:05.520 you continue that commitment to work 55:05.520 --> 55:07.520 with this committee on the critical 55:07.520 --> 55:09.520 issues in the Arctic , particularly 55:09.520 --> 55:11.520 these deals with Russia and China ? 55:11.520 --> 55:13.465 Senator , you have my commitment . 55:13.465 --> 55:13.280 Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 55:14.949 --> 55:17.116 Thank you , Senator Sullivan , Senator 55:17.116 --> 55:19.282 King , please . Well , first I want to 55:19.282 --> 55:21.338 associate myself with that series of 55:21.338 --> 55:21.030 questions about the Arctic . It was a 55:21.040 --> 55:22.984 question of whether or not Senator 55:22.984 --> 55:25.096 Sullivan and I , we would go first to 55:25.096 --> 55:27.207 ask the Arctic questions . He's asked 55:27.207 --> 55:28.762 them . I would also have to 55:28.762 --> 55:30.707 respectfully point out that if our 55:30.707 --> 55:33.159 beloved chairman John mccain was here , 55:33.169 --> 55:35.336 he would point out that Billy Mitchell 55:35.336 --> 55:38.209 was later court martial , but I think 55:38.219 --> 55:42.110 that was rescinded later after he uh 55:42.510 --> 55:46.500 General Whiting it's been us policy for 55:46.510 --> 55:48.959 as long as anybody can remember to not 55:48.969 --> 55:52.280 militarize space . But that , that 55:52.469 --> 55:54.802 train has left the station . Has it not , 55:54.802 --> 55:56.691 isn't , hasn't , they haven't the 55:56.691 --> 55:58.747 Chinese and to a lesser extent , the 55:58.747 --> 56:00.860 Russians developed the capacity for 56:00.870 --> 56:03.219 offensive weapons in space . Uh Senator , 56:03.229 --> 56:06.159 they absolutely have and therefore we 56:06.169 --> 56:08.370 need to be in a position to respond 56:08.379 --> 56:10.490 because the cornerstone of our entire 56:10.490 --> 56:12.810 defense , national security policy is 56:12.820 --> 56:15.370 deterrence . And if they have an 56:15.379 --> 56:18.520 asymmetric advantage that we can't hold 56:18.530 --> 56:21.669 them at risk , doesn't that undermine 56:21.679 --> 56:24.120 our policy of deterrence . Senator ? It 56:24.129 --> 56:27.419 does . And so we're gonna have to , 56:27.750 --> 56:30.729 we're gonna have to put aside the , the 56:30.739 --> 56:33.409 laudable policy because of a change of , 56:33.419 --> 56:35.870 of circumstance . Is that correct ? Yes , 56:35.879 --> 56:37.990 Senator . And I think the creation of 56:37.990 --> 56:40.157 United States Space Command just under 56:40.157 --> 56:42.268 four years ago and then by the action 56:42.268 --> 56:44.435 of the Congress , uh , the creation of 56:44.435 --> 56:44.149 the United States Space Force just 56:44.159 --> 56:46.326 under four years ago , recognizes that 56:46.326 --> 56:48.215 new reality . And I think my , my 56:48.215 --> 56:50.381 concern is that there are areas of the 56:50.381 --> 56:52.492 federal government that haven't quite 56:52.492 --> 56:54.715 gotten there . And I think we need to , 56:54.715 --> 56:56.881 we need to understand that not because 56:56.881 --> 56:56.649 we want a militarized space , but 56:56.659 --> 56:59.209 because we have to face the reality and 56:59.219 --> 57:01.108 the , the undermining of , of our 57:01.108 --> 57:03.219 deterrent capability if we don't , if 57:03.219 --> 57:06.969 we don't match that , uh , general , um , 57:07.370 --> 57:09.590 since we've been talking , uh , almost 57:09.600 --> 57:12.159 exactly an hour in this hearing , 10 of 57:12.169 --> 57:14.479 12 Americans have died of drug 57:14.489 --> 57:17.129 overdoses . We are under attack and 57:17.139 --> 57:19.469 it's , it's , it's in large measure in 57:19.479 --> 57:23.260 your a or it's , 57:23.270 --> 57:25.500 it's not a nation state . But these 57:25.510 --> 57:28.149 international organizations talk to me 57:28.159 --> 57:30.437 about a strategy for dealing with this . 57:30.437 --> 57:32.548 We've been having hearings year after 57:32.548 --> 57:34.715 year . We don't have sufficient ISR we 57:34.715 --> 57:36.826 don't have sufficient uh interdiction 57:36.826 --> 57:39.110 capability . When are we gonna take 57:39.120 --> 57:41.231 this seriously for what it is ? Which 57:41.231 --> 57:43.176 is an attack on the people of this 57:43.176 --> 57:45.149 country ? Senator , the threat you 57:45.159 --> 57:47.669 described is acute . It's , it's 57:47.679 --> 57:50.850 serious and it's very significant as if 57:50.860 --> 57:52.804 I'm confirmed to be the north comm 57:52.804 --> 57:55.399 commander . I will immediately upon 57:55.409 --> 57:57.889 taking change of command , go down to 57:57.899 --> 58:00.219 the border , meet with all of the US 58:00.229 --> 58:02.510 forces that are in direct support of 58:02.520 --> 58:04.409 the lead law enforcement agencies 58:04.409 --> 58:06.576 conducting this mission and , and make 58:06.576 --> 58:08.687 an assessment on what we can do to uh 58:08.687 --> 58:11.229 optimize uh our , our presentation of 58:11.239 --> 58:13.406 force and , and make uh suggestions to 58:13.406 --> 58:15.628 the , to the secretary . And part of it 58:15.628 --> 58:18.879 is , is advocating in a , in a vigorous 58:18.889 --> 58:22.520 way for additional ISR , for example , 58:22.530 --> 58:24.709 I mean , and plus we've had testimony 58:24.719 --> 58:26.830 before this committee from south comm 58:26.830 --> 58:29.820 that we're only able to interdict 25% 58:29.959 --> 58:32.330 of the drug shipments coming by sea 58:32.340 --> 58:34.590 that we know about . In other words , 58:34.600 --> 58:36.711 we know they're coming , we know that 58:36.711 --> 58:38.822 they're carrying deadly cargo and yet 58:38.822 --> 58:40.878 we don't have , there are not enough 58:40.878 --> 58:43.100 ships , there are not enough capacity , 58:43.100 --> 58:45.267 Coast Guard Navy it just seems to me , 58:45.267 --> 58:47.156 uh , uh , everybody's pointing at 58:47.156 --> 58:49.322 everybody else , please . I would urge 58:49.322 --> 58:52.080 you to develop AAA special task force , 58:52.090 --> 58:54.239 a strike force to really think about 58:54.250 --> 58:56.139 how to organize the United States 58:56.139 --> 58:58.361 government response . Because what it , 58:58.361 --> 59:00.472 what's come through to me is a , is a 59:00.472 --> 59:02.870 lack of , of central authority and , 59:02.879 --> 59:05.389 and you're the nearest thing to that . 59:05.399 --> 59:08.219 And I hope you will really , uh , get 59:08.229 --> 59:10.969 on this , uh , September 11th . We lost 59:11.280 --> 59:14.070 over 3000 people turned our society 59:14.080 --> 59:17.070 upside down here . We're losing 100,000 59:17.080 --> 59:20.149 a year and yet nobody seems to be in 59:20.159 --> 59:23.179 charge . Will you take charge ? Senator ? 59:23.189 --> 59:25.659 I will take charge of uh assessing that 59:25.669 --> 59:28.550 from the dod uh standpoint and , and uh 59:28.570 --> 59:31.179 forwarding those recommendations . Now , 59:31.189 --> 59:33.729 let me , let me make a go change the 59:33.739 --> 59:36.199 subject again to get back to the Arctic . 59:36.310 --> 59:39.479 Um One of the realities again , it's 59:39.489 --> 59:41.909 like my questions about space . Uh It's 59:41.919 --> 59:43.752 no secret that the Russians have 59:43.752 --> 59:45.697 essentially remilitarization , the 59:45.697 --> 59:48.439 share of the Arctic , uh which really 59:48.449 --> 59:51.899 was a much more peaceful area uh in the 59:51.909 --> 59:54.810 prior to the last 10 years , don't we 59:54.820 --> 59:57.239 need uh some capacity , uh 59:57.250 --> 59:59.679 infrastructure uh in the Arctic , a , a 59:59.689 --> 01:00:02.949 port , for example , uh to be able 01:00:02.959 --> 01:00:06.419 to uh uh field the kind of uh force 01:00:06.429 --> 01:00:08.151 that's necessary . Again , for 01:00:08.151 --> 01:00:09.879 deterrence , this is not about 01:00:10.239 --> 01:00:13.439 offensive capability , but uh the best 01:00:13.449 --> 01:00:15.560 way to , to prevent a war is for your 01:00:15.560 --> 01:00:17.782 adversary to know that they will suffer 01:00:17.782 --> 01:00:20.179 unacceptable uh results if they attack 01:00:20.189 --> 01:00:22.500 us . Talk to me about infrastructure in 01:00:22.510 --> 01:00:24.566 the Arctic of , of , for example , a 01:00:24.566 --> 01:00:27.850 port in Nome , Senator uh presence is 01:00:27.860 --> 01:00:30.027 the , is the best form of deterrence . 01:00:30.027 --> 01:00:32.249 Uh in the , in the Arctic , the port of 01:00:32.249 --> 01:00:34.550 Nome is a uh is a game changer for uh 01:00:34.560 --> 01:00:36.729 operations in the Arctic . Uh I 01:00:36.739 --> 01:00:38.929 understand that it's uh underway and , 01:00:38.939 --> 01:00:41.350 and we're looking at 2027 2028 for 01:00:41.360 --> 01:00:43.889 completion of that . Uh but just that 01:00:43.899 --> 01:00:46.669 uh that port alone will , will add uh 01:00:46.899 --> 01:00:49.689 eight days per operational sort of our 01:00:49.699 --> 01:00:51.866 ships where they don't have to go down 01:00:51.866 --> 01:00:54.088 to Dutch Harbor to refuel they can stay 01:00:54.088 --> 01:00:55.699 up in the High North so that 01:00:55.699 --> 01:00:58.030 infrastructure and then the recurring 01:00:58.040 --> 01:01:01.050 presence of forces training and 01:01:01.060 --> 01:01:04.610 operating in the , in the high 01:01:04.620 --> 01:01:08.560 North in Alaska , I think is , is a 01:01:08.570 --> 01:01:10.181 very strong deterrent to our 01:01:10.181 --> 01:01:12.292 adversaries up there . Well , both of 01:01:12.292 --> 01:01:14.070 you are taking on extraordinary 01:01:14.070 --> 01:01:16.126 responsibilities at an extraordinary 01:01:16.126 --> 01:01:17.848 time . Congratulations on your 01:01:17.848 --> 01:01:17.629 appointment . We look forward to your 01:01:17.639 --> 01:01:19.806 confirmation . Thank you . Thank you , 01:01:19.806 --> 01:01:21.972 Mr Chairman . Thank you , Senator King 01:01:21.972 --> 01:01:25.850 Senator to please . Thank you , Mr 01:01:25.860 --> 01:01:27.860 Chairman . Thanks both of you being 01:01:27.860 --> 01:01:29.971 here today . Good to meet with you in 01:01:29.971 --> 01:01:31.870 my office and congratulations and 01:01:31.879 --> 01:01:33.546 welcome to your families . Um 01:01:35.820 --> 01:01:38.989 General uh yo um several 01:01:39.000 --> 01:01:41.989 conversations with General Van Her uh 01:01:42.139 --> 01:01:44.139 over the last few years , he talked 01:01:44.139 --> 01:01:47.489 about North Com's need for more 01:01:47.500 --> 01:01:49.389 assigned troops and I know you're 01:01:49.389 --> 01:01:51.444 coming from another command . But if 01:01:51.444 --> 01:01:53.469 you had uh , conversations with him 01:01:53.709 --> 01:01:57.000 about your possible move to , uh , to 01:01:57.010 --> 01:01:59.121 the commander of that , of , of North 01:01:59.510 --> 01:02:01.566 Senator , I haven't talked with them 01:02:01.566 --> 01:02:03.677 directly about that but , uh , in the 01:02:03.677 --> 01:02:05.788 function of my current job , I'm in , 01:02:05.788 --> 01:02:07.788 in several uh video teleconferences 01:02:07.788 --> 01:02:09.954 with General Van Huk and other leaders 01:02:09.954 --> 01:02:09.860 where the topic you you mentioned is 01:02:09.870 --> 01:02:11.926 discussed . Yeah , I would , I would 01:02:11.926 --> 01:02:14.037 hope you'd get back with , with me on 01:02:14.037 --> 01:02:16.259 that once you , once you're assigned to 01:02:16.259 --> 01:02:18.426 that and let us know what we , what we 01:02:18.426 --> 01:02:20.481 need to do to help . As you've heard 01:02:20.481 --> 01:02:20.110 today , a lot of questions have been 01:02:20.120 --> 01:02:22.342 about certain things that's killing our 01:02:22.342 --> 01:02:24.800 people in this country and not overseas . 01:02:24.810 --> 01:02:26.489 So , thank you for that . Uh 01:02:28.709 --> 01:02:31.520 General Whiting . Uh I'm not gonna make 01:02:31.530 --> 01:02:34.159 a long dissertation about this , but , 01:02:34.169 --> 01:02:36.629 uh , of course , uh Space Command is 01:02:36.639 --> 01:02:40.100 very new and , uh , uh we in uh 01:02:40.110 --> 01:02:42.620 Alabama and Huntsville were excited 01:02:42.629 --> 01:02:44.810 about Space Command being signed to 01:02:44.820 --> 01:02:47.070 Huntsville and rest on Arsenal . Uh , 01:02:47.080 --> 01:02:49.850 after 21 different criteria . Uh , a 01:02:49.860 --> 01:02:52.860 lot of things were , were going through 01:02:52.870 --> 01:02:55.037 and with a fine tooth cone and we , we 01:02:55.037 --> 01:02:57.037 were excited about that . But , you 01:02:57.037 --> 01:02:59.259 know , unfortunately , politics has got 01:02:59.259 --> 01:03:01.481 involved and that's not you . But , you 01:03:01.481 --> 01:03:03.426 know , for a few months now , I've 01:03:03.426 --> 01:03:05.648 heard nothing but , uh , and because of 01:03:05.648 --> 01:03:07.814 some things that I'm involved in about 01:03:07.814 --> 01:03:09.814 readiness of our military , uh It's 01:03:09.814 --> 01:03:12.037 been three years and we do not have a , 01:03:12.110 --> 01:03:14.929 uh , permanent home yet for , uh , 01:03:14.939 --> 01:03:17.239 space command . And it's , it's a shame 01:03:17.250 --> 01:03:19.306 that we've gotten into politics . Of 01:03:19.306 --> 01:03:21.417 course , it's moved slow up here . Uh 01:03:21.417 --> 01:03:23.417 But even for Washington , it's very 01:03:23.417 --> 01:03:25.583 slow for this to have happened to us , 01:03:25.583 --> 01:03:27.917 have a permanent home for space command . 01:03:27.917 --> 01:03:27.590 So hopefully we get that done in the 01:03:27.600 --> 01:03:30.149 near future . Uh But I'd like to ask 01:03:30.159 --> 01:03:32.381 you a couple of questions . How's space 01:03:32.381 --> 01:03:34.548 com uh command doing in regard to this 01:03:34.548 --> 01:03:36.603 workforce ? I know you've been there 01:03:36.603 --> 01:03:38.715 for a while and what do we need to do 01:03:38.715 --> 01:03:40.826 to improve ? Because it's very new to 01:03:40.826 --> 01:03:42.937 our country and for the world ? Thank 01:03:42.937 --> 01:03:44.992 you , Senator . I , I appreciate you 01:03:44.992 --> 01:03:46.937 highlighting our workforce because 01:03:46.937 --> 01:03:48.548 despite the incredible space 01:03:48.548 --> 01:03:50.659 capabilities and satellites , we , we 01:03:50.659 --> 01:03:52.659 bring in our rockets . Uh it is our 01:03:52.659 --> 01:03:54.881 people that are our most critical asset 01:03:54.881 --> 01:03:57.229 and uh and we have , we have to ensure 01:03:57.239 --> 01:03:59.709 as a nation that we have uh military 01:03:59.719 --> 01:04:02.830 and civilian who want to join our space 01:04:02.840 --> 01:04:05.007 enterprise , national security , space 01:04:05.007 --> 01:04:07.173 enterprise and are willing to uh to uh 01:04:07.173 --> 01:04:09.340 be a part of that . Uh So I think it's 01:04:09.340 --> 01:04:11.754 important that we uh invest in those uh 01:04:11.764 --> 01:04:15.195 stem activities that inspire our young 01:04:15.205 --> 01:04:17.475 men and women to , to join into space . 01:04:17.485 --> 01:04:19.374 And then I think we have a unique 01:04:19.374 --> 01:04:21.541 opportunity given all the great things 01:04:21.541 --> 01:04:23.596 that uh commercial industry and NASA 01:04:23.596 --> 01:04:23.514 are doing right now to leverage that 01:04:23.524 --> 01:04:25.580 excitement to , to bring these young 01:04:25.580 --> 01:04:27.746 men and women into our organizations . 01:04:27.746 --> 01:04:29.857 How big a role does uh Cyber play and 01:04:29.857 --> 01:04:32.024 space come and , and , and what are we 01:04:32.024 --> 01:04:34.080 doing to make sure that we , we have 01:04:34.080 --> 01:04:37.439 enough . Uh um one of my sons is in 01:04:37.449 --> 01:04:40.679 Cyber and uh uh but it's very new and 01:04:40.689 --> 01:04:42.689 it's very complicated . What are we 01:04:42.689 --> 01:04:44.578 doing to make sure we have enough 01:04:44.578 --> 01:04:46.689 people to be involved in , in what we 01:04:46.689 --> 01:04:48.689 do in space command through Cyber . 01:04:48.689 --> 01:04:50.800 Senator . I like to say that the soft 01:04:50.800 --> 01:04:53.022 underbelly of our space capabilities is 01:04:53.022 --> 01:04:55.189 cyber because our networks , our space 01:04:55.189 --> 01:04:57.300 networks truly are global in nature , 01:04:57.300 --> 01:04:59.522 but they also reach out to 22,000 miles 01:04:59.522 --> 01:05:01.022 above the earth surface to 01:05:01.022 --> 01:05:03.245 geosynchronous orbit . And that creates 01:05:03.245 --> 01:05:05.356 a lot of novel cyber attack surface . 01:05:05.356 --> 01:05:07.578 And so while potential adversaries like 01:05:07.578 --> 01:05:09.800 Russia and China could attack us in the 01:05:09.800 --> 01:05:09.679 space domain directly , they would 01:05:09.689 --> 01:05:11.760 rather attack us in the Cyber domain 01:05:11.770 --> 01:05:13.937 because it's cheaper for them and it's 01:05:13.937 --> 01:05:16.445 harder for to attribute . So we um must 01:05:16.455 --> 01:05:18.511 work if confirmed , I must work with 01:05:18.511 --> 01:05:20.733 the services and in particular us space 01:05:20.733 --> 01:05:22.733 force to execute the excellent plan 01:05:22.733 --> 01:05:25.155 they've laid in place to pivot hundreds 01:05:25.165 --> 01:05:27.235 of guardians into the cyber defense 01:05:27.245 --> 01:05:29.905 workforce to , to defend our space 01:05:29.915 --> 01:05:32.375 capabilities from Cyber attack . Have 01:05:32.385 --> 01:05:34.496 we done any studies to where we stand 01:05:34.496 --> 01:05:36.663 with other countries , even our allies 01:05:36.663 --> 01:05:38.885 to in terms of Cyber , uh the education 01:05:38.885 --> 01:05:41.052 part uh you know , where do we stand ? 01:05:41.052 --> 01:05:43.870 We good , bad , indifferent , Senator , 01:05:43.879 --> 01:05:46.101 I I believe the United States is at the 01:05:46.101 --> 01:05:47.990 absolute forefront of uh of cyber 01:05:47.990 --> 01:05:50.212 capability . And if confirmed , I would 01:05:50.212 --> 01:05:52.323 look to work with us Cyber command on 01:05:52.323 --> 01:05:54.435 ensuring that we're leveraging all of 01:05:54.435 --> 01:05:56.379 that partnership work they do with 01:05:56.379 --> 01:05:58.546 others to best defend us space command 01:05:58.546 --> 01:06:00.879 in the Cyber domain . One last question , 01:06:00.879 --> 01:06:02.939 what's our top uh threat in space 01:06:02.949 --> 01:06:05.060 theater right now ? What , what would 01:06:05.060 --> 01:06:07.399 be your thoughts ? Um Senator , our top 01:06:07.409 --> 01:06:09.879 threat is the growing Chinese counter 01:06:09.889 --> 01:06:12.189 space capabilities . Uh both from uh 01:06:12.199 --> 01:06:15.729 reversible threats like jamming all the 01:06:15.739 --> 01:06:17.959 way up to the , the direct ascent as 01:06:17.969 --> 01:06:20.280 SAS and laser capabilities . We've seen 01:06:20.290 --> 01:06:22.346 them testing . Thank you . Thank you 01:06:22.346 --> 01:06:24.401 and good luck to both of you . Thank 01:06:24.401 --> 01:06:26.623 you , Mr Chairman . Thank you , Senator 01:06:26.623 --> 01:06:28.734 Tuberville . Senator Kelly , please . 01:06:28.734 --> 01:06:30.790 Thank you , Mr Chairman . Uh Senator 01:06:30.790 --> 01:06:32.901 Tuberville had some uh good questions 01:06:32.901 --> 01:06:35.510 uh for uh the two generals . Let me , 01:06:35.520 --> 01:06:38.689 let me point out though that uh you 01:06:38.699 --> 01:06:40.921 know , both General Whiting and General 01:06:40.921 --> 01:06:43.790 Guilla said if confirmed a number of 01:06:43.800 --> 01:06:47.659 times in your testimony and the roles 01:06:47.669 --> 01:06:50.500 uh that you are going into are so 01:06:50.510 --> 01:06:53.060 critical for our national defense . But 01:06:53.070 --> 01:06:55.070 the if if confirmed is certainly in 01:06:55.070 --> 01:06:56.626 question because of Senator 01:06:56.626 --> 01:06:59.820 Tuberville's holds on these promotions 01:07:00.000 --> 01:07:03.320 and these uh these positions uh that I 01:07:03.330 --> 01:07:05.497 imagine would still be in place . So I 01:07:05.497 --> 01:07:07.608 think that's important to note here . 01:07:07.608 --> 01:07:10.800 Uh General um you know , welcome . 01:07:11.030 --> 01:07:14.020 Um and General Whiting , welcome to the , 01:07:14.030 --> 01:07:17.370 to uh to the hearing here . Um General 01:07:17.379 --> 01:07:19.268 Guille , I believe you grew up in 01:07:19.268 --> 01:07:21.379 Tucson or Tucson Arizona where Gabby 01:07:21.389 --> 01:07:23.870 and I live . Um , and we talked about 01:07:23.879 --> 01:07:26.320 that in my office , uh , a couple weeks 01:07:26.330 --> 01:07:29.209 ago , um , like , you know , Senator 01:07:29.219 --> 01:07:31.497 King and many others on this committee . 01:07:31.497 --> 01:07:33.663 I'm very concerned about transnational 01:07:33.663 --> 01:07:35.830 criminal organizations and the flow of 01:07:35.830 --> 01:07:37.941 drugs across the uh southern border , 01:07:37.941 --> 01:07:40.479 fentaNYL poisoning our communities . Um , 01:07:40.489 --> 01:07:43.340 Senator King asked about this but I 01:07:43.350 --> 01:07:45.517 want , I want to just get down to some 01:07:45.517 --> 01:07:47.850 resources you think you may need uh , 01:07:47.860 --> 01:07:51.139 in your , uh , new position here . Um , 01:07:51.310 --> 01:07:53.600 I , I , do you anticipate needing more 01:07:53.610 --> 01:07:55.709 staffing , more authority , more 01:07:55.719 --> 01:07:59.629 funding ? Senator , I , I 01:07:59.639 --> 01:08:01.639 agree on the , uh , severity of the 01:08:01.639 --> 01:08:03.695 threat and the need for us to , uh , 01:08:03.695 --> 01:08:06.010 use any , any means available to , to 01:08:06.020 --> 01:08:08.242 stop that threat from coming across our 01:08:08.242 --> 01:08:11.270 border . Uh , if I'm confirmed and I , 01:08:11.280 --> 01:08:13.540 when I go down to the , uh , uh 01:08:13.570 --> 01:08:15.879 southwest border and , and everywhere 01:08:15.889 --> 01:08:17.945 from California all the way to Texas 01:08:17.945 --> 01:08:19.945 and look at each site , uh , things 01:08:19.945 --> 01:08:22.278 that I'll be looking for , not only are , 01:08:22.278 --> 01:08:24.445 what are we doing today but what could 01:08:24.445 --> 01:08:26.778 we be doing in terms of , uh , ISR , uh , 01:08:26.778 --> 01:08:29.000 the types of forces that we're using in 01:08:29.000 --> 01:08:30.722 supporting the , uh , lead law 01:08:30.722 --> 01:08:32.889 enforcement agency . And then if I see 01:08:32.889 --> 01:08:34.833 anything , uh , in terms of , uh , 01:08:34.833 --> 01:08:37.000 numbers , authorities , anything along 01:08:37.000 --> 01:08:39.000 those lines or types of help , uh , 01:08:39.000 --> 01:08:38.959 that's what I will report back to the 01:08:38.970 --> 01:08:41.009 Secretary of Defense . All right . 01:08:41.020 --> 01:08:44.729 Thank you . Um , and General also , um , 01:08:45.829 --> 01:08:48.579 you know , related to ISR sort of uh do 01:08:48.588 --> 01:08:51.008 Domain Awareness . Um Senator Butt and 01:08:51.019 --> 01:08:53.878 I introduced legislation uh called the 01:08:54.008 --> 01:08:57.358 act . Uh We hope to move this in the 01:08:57.369 --> 01:09:00.208 FAA reauthorization bill . Uh This is 01:09:00.219 --> 01:09:02.441 bipartisan legislation that will ensure 01:09:02.441 --> 01:09:04.679 that these high altitude balloons um 01:09:04.688 --> 01:09:07.738 that are released , uh you know , 01:09:07.749 --> 01:09:10.269 rather frequently uh for scientific 01:09:10.278 --> 01:09:12.208 purposes and other purposes have 01:09:12.219 --> 01:09:14.441 transponders so they can be tracked and 01:09:14.441 --> 01:09:17.040 identified and it'll take a little bit 01:09:17.049 --> 01:09:20.330 of the workload off of uh North Com . 01:09:20.689 --> 01:09:23.779 Um But it'll also allow you to act more 01:09:23.790 --> 01:09:26.359 quickly to identify any activity that 01:09:26.370 --> 01:09:28.537 could be a threat if it doesn't have a 01:09:28.537 --> 01:09:32.140 transponder on it . Um What 01:09:32.149 --> 01:09:34.720 could you as the commander of North com ? 01:09:34.729 --> 01:09:37.479 What would you do to further improve 01:09:37.490 --> 01:09:41.370 domain awareness uh over the 01:09:41.379 --> 01:09:44.240 north comm uh area of operations ? 01:09:44.720 --> 01:09:46.664 Senator the first and I think most 01:09:46.664 --> 01:09:48.609 important step to improving domain 01:09:48.609 --> 01:09:50.831 awareness uh would be to ensure that we 01:09:50.831 --> 01:09:52.831 have the uh types of radars and the 01:09:52.831 --> 01:09:55.080 locations needed to uh cover all the 01:09:55.089 --> 01:09:56.922 avenues of approach that are now 01:09:56.922 --> 01:09:59.145 vulnerable uh to the uh to the homeland 01:09:59.350 --> 01:10:01.517 and to ensure that the systems are the 01:10:01.517 --> 01:10:03.406 types that can detect the new and 01:10:03.406 --> 01:10:06.040 emerging threats that our competitors 01:10:06.049 --> 01:10:09.319 are building higher speed . Uh all 01:10:09.330 --> 01:10:12.649 altitude maneuvering low radar cross 01:10:12.660 --> 01:10:14.716 section types of threats that we can 01:10:14.716 --> 01:10:16.716 build into a network . And the next 01:10:16.716 --> 01:10:18.771 important step , Senator would be to 01:10:18.771 --> 01:10:20.771 bring all those back to our command 01:10:20.771 --> 01:10:22.882 center on a single pane of glass that 01:10:22.882 --> 01:10:25.049 we can not only look at in no or North 01:10:25.049 --> 01:10:27.160 Comms headquarters but share with all 01:10:27.160 --> 01:10:29.382 the other combatant commands like you . 01:10:29.382 --> 01:10:32.770 And uh so it's a seamless picture of 01:10:32.779 --> 01:10:35.080 the uh of the um the threats that we 01:10:35.089 --> 01:10:37.770 face across all uh combatant commands . 01:10:38.060 --> 01:10:40.470 All right . Thank you . And uh just one 01:10:40.799 --> 01:10:44.700 comment uh about uh the space com 01:10:44.709 --> 01:10:48.620 headquarters . So , um you know , 01:10:48.629 --> 01:10:52.399 it's imperative that we get a decision 01:10:52.629 --> 01:10:55.700 on uh where space comm is gonna be 01:10:55.709 --> 01:10:57.931 located . I mean , this has gone on too 01:10:57.931 --> 01:11:00.540 long . Uh These decisions impact our 01:11:00.549 --> 01:11:02.382 members , their families , local 01:11:02.382 --> 01:11:04.560 communities , it impacts the mission 01:11:04.569 --> 01:11:06.791 and the national security of the United 01:11:06.791 --> 01:11:09.013 States . So we can't , we shouldn't let 01:11:09.013 --> 01:11:11.125 indecision , bureaucracy and politics 01:11:11.125 --> 01:11:13.402 impact our national security like this . 01:11:13.402 --> 01:11:15.513 So especially on a mission set that's 01:11:15.513 --> 01:11:17.402 as critical as managing the space 01:11:17.402 --> 01:11:21.149 domain that underpins our defense 01:11:21.160 --> 01:11:23.689 and an area where our adversaries are 01:11:23.700 --> 01:11:26.680 investing heavily in . So , um you know , 01:11:26.689 --> 01:11:28.720 my , my hope is that we uh get a 01:11:28.729 --> 01:11:31.549 resolution on where space comm is going 01:11:31.560 --> 01:11:33.449 to be headquartered . Thank you . 01:11:35.970 --> 01:11:39.060 Thank you , Senator Scott . Thank you . 01:11:40.200 --> 01:11:42.422 First . I want to thank both of you for 01:11:42.422 --> 01:11:44.478 being here . Congratulations on your 01:11:44.478 --> 01:11:46.311 nominations . Thank you for your 01:11:46.311 --> 01:11:46.089 service and I wanna thank your families 01:11:46.100 --> 01:11:48.649 for what they do . Um I'm sure you guys 01:11:48.660 --> 01:11:50.771 have moved a lot . Hopefully , you've 01:11:50.771 --> 01:11:53.049 spent a lot of time in Florida , China , 01:11:53.049 --> 01:11:55.160 Russia , North Korea , Iran and other 01:11:55.160 --> 01:11:57.049 terrorist groups want to harm the 01:11:57.049 --> 01:11:59.104 United States at any cost in any way 01:11:59.104 --> 01:12:01.216 they can , they all possess ballistic 01:12:01.216 --> 01:12:00.970 missiles and will do anything they can 01:12:00.979 --> 01:12:02.979 to harm us in our national interest 01:12:02.979 --> 01:12:05.189 here in the homeland and in space . I 01:12:05.200 --> 01:12:07.311 know you're both focused on deterring 01:12:07.311 --> 01:12:09.533 these threats and if they , and if they 01:12:09.533 --> 01:12:11.589 ever try to attack us here at home , 01:12:11.589 --> 01:12:13.756 defeat whatever they throw our way . I 01:12:13.756 --> 01:12:15.978 look forward , you're hearing about how 01:12:15.978 --> 01:12:15.120 you're going to continue to make sure 01:12:15.129 --> 01:12:18.720 we stay safe . Um uh As our 01:12:18.729 --> 01:12:21.009 strategic focus shifts from the threat 01:12:21.020 --> 01:12:23.131 of terrorists to threats from adverse 01:12:23.131 --> 01:12:25.464 nations like communist China and Russia , 01:12:25.464 --> 01:12:27.576 North Korea will still have to defend 01:12:27.576 --> 01:12:29.409 the homeland from both . I would 01:12:29.409 --> 01:12:29.350 characterize our reactions to the 01:12:29.359 --> 01:12:31.526 Chinese spy balloon incident as pretty 01:12:31.526 --> 01:12:33.748 bad uh terrible . What have you learned 01:12:33.748 --> 01:12:35.970 from that ? And how will you handle the 01:12:35.970 --> 01:12:37.859 next spy balloon when you are the 01:12:37.859 --> 01:12:39.803 commander ? Senator II . I was not 01:12:39.803 --> 01:12:41.637 personally familiar with all the 01:12:41.637 --> 01:12:43.803 factors that went into the , the first 01:12:43.803 --> 01:12:45.859 uh decision . Uh But what I can tell 01:12:45.859 --> 01:12:47.970 you that if confirmed air sovereignty 01:12:47.970 --> 01:12:50.248 will be the cornerstone of the nod and , 01:12:50.248 --> 01:12:52.509 and North com mission . And uh if 01:12:52.520 --> 01:12:55.120 confirmed , I will aggressively execute 01:12:55.129 --> 01:12:57.160 all the authorities and the roe 01:12:57.169 --> 01:12:58.947 associated with maintaining air 01:12:58.947 --> 01:13:02.750 sovereignty of , of the uh the US that 01:13:02.759 --> 01:13:05.200 goes to early detection , making 01:13:05.209 --> 01:13:07.540 decisions that within my authority and 01:13:07.549 --> 01:13:09.899 then quickly passing all of the 01:13:09.910 --> 01:13:12.720 valuable information and options to my 01:13:12.729 --> 01:13:14.840 senior leadership . If it's something 01:13:14.840 --> 01:13:17.007 that's beyond my authority . Thank you 01:13:17.410 --> 01:13:19.188 from a strategic and resourcing 01:13:19.188 --> 01:13:21.077 standpoint . How is defending the 01:13:21.077 --> 01:13:23.243 homeland from terrorists and defending 01:13:23.243 --> 01:13:25.243 it from adversary nations different 01:13:27.009 --> 01:13:30.609 serve , uh , senator , they certainly 01:13:30.620 --> 01:13:34.299 overlap , uh , deterring from terrorist 01:13:34.310 --> 01:13:36.532 threats that are originating overseas . 01:13:36.532 --> 01:13:38.588 Uh Other combatant commands like the 01:13:38.588 --> 01:13:41.290 one that I'm presently proud to work in 01:13:41.299 --> 01:13:43.589 Central Command in cooperation with 01:13:43.600 --> 01:13:45.822 Southern Com Special Operations Command 01:13:45.822 --> 01:13:47.822 are doing a lot of work to keep the 01:13:47.822 --> 01:13:50.580 terrorists as an away game . Uh But as 01:13:50.589 --> 01:13:53.430 we start to develop uh um indications 01:13:53.439 --> 01:13:55.606 that they could be working towards the 01:13:55.606 --> 01:13:57.661 US , then it transitions to a strong 01:13:57.661 --> 01:13:59.717 partnership from uh no , a and North 01:13:59.717 --> 01:14:01.890 with the uh law enforcement agencies 01:14:01.899 --> 01:14:03.955 that would be responsible along with 01:14:03.955 --> 01:14:06.121 the Department of Homeland Security uh 01:14:06.121 --> 01:14:08.232 to , to building that uh barrier from 01:14:08.232 --> 01:14:10.121 them actually entering the United 01:14:10.121 --> 01:14:12.177 States . Thank you . What additional 01:14:12.177 --> 01:14:13.955 authorities or resources do you 01:14:13.955 --> 01:14:15.788 anticipate needing to defend our 01:14:15.788 --> 01:14:17.843 homeland Senator at this time ? I do 01:14:17.843 --> 01:14:19.899 not know of any but uh I I pledge to 01:14:19.899 --> 01:14:21.939 the uh committee that uh if I'm 01:14:21.950 --> 01:14:24.006 confirmed within 90 days , I'll have 01:14:24.006 --> 01:14:26.399 completed a full assessment of , of uh 01:14:26.410 --> 01:14:28.466 all the people , the mission and the 01:14:28.466 --> 01:14:30.354 resourcing to include authorities 01:14:30.354 --> 01:14:32.410 associated with no and North . And I 01:14:32.410 --> 01:14:34.354 will make it very clear uh in that 01:14:34.354 --> 01:14:36.577 assessment if there are any authorities 01:14:36.577 --> 01:14:38.632 that I need . Thank you . In October 01:14:38.632 --> 01:14:40.743 2018 , Department of Defense deployed 01:14:40.743 --> 01:14:42.854 5200 troops to the southern border to 01:14:42.854 --> 01:14:44.743 in response to migrant caravans . 01:14:44.743 --> 01:14:44.689 Currently , the Biden administration 01:14:44.700 --> 01:14:46.922 has authorized a maximum of 2500 troops 01:14:46.922 --> 01:14:48.700 in the Southwest border support 01:14:48.700 --> 01:14:50.756 operations . The past year has , has 01:14:50.759 --> 01:14:52.981 continued to witness a surge in migrant 01:14:52.981 --> 01:14:55.148 encounters has made . There is about , 01:14:55.148 --> 01:14:56.981 uh , you know , one half million 01:14:56.981 --> 01:14:59.092 getaways . Uh , some of them possibly 01:14:59.092 --> 01:15:01.037 terrorists , would you first off ? 01:15:01.037 --> 01:15:03.203 Agree there's a crisis at the border . 01:15:03.203 --> 01:15:05.370 He says that there is a drug smuggling 01:15:05.370 --> 01:15:07.592 emergency at the southern border . What 01:15:07.592 --> 01:15:06.890 role do you anticipate North Korea 01:15:06.899 --> 01:15:09.066 playing in addressing this emergency ? 01:15:09.240 --> 01:15:11.296 Senator , I think border security is 01:15:11.296 --> 01:15:13.518 national security and that would be the 01:15:13.518 --> 01:15:16.200 number one priority . Uh For me , if 01:15:16.209 --> 01:15:18.660 I'm confirmed as the commander of NORAD 01:15:18.669 --> 01:15:21.430 and , and , and North as for the , uh 01:15:21.439 --> 01:15:24.140 the , the drugs and the efforts of the 01:15:24.149 --> 01:15:26.479 trans national criminal organizations . 01:15:26.660 --> 01:15:28.950 Uh that is a , a problem that's acute , 01:15:28.959 --> 01:15:30.830 it's significant and it's , it's 01:15:30.839 --> 01:15:33.061 extremely serious and it falls into the 01:15:33.061 --> 01:15:34.839 same responsibility that I just 01:15:34.839 --> 01:15:36.839 mentioned . Thank you , Joe White . 01:15:36.839 --> 01:15:39.061 Congratulations . You have a base named 01:15:39.061 --> 01:15:41.228 after you in , uh in Florida already . 01:15:41.228 --> 01:15:43.228 You've done really well . Um Do you 01:15:43.228 --> 01:15:45.450 believe that delaying the space command 01:15:45.450 --> 01:15:44.970 headquarters decision has affected 01:15:44.979 --> 01:15:48.459 readiness ? Um Senator , 01:15:48.979 --> 01:15:51.669 that decision um , needs to be made so 01:15:51.680 --> 01:15:53.791 that we can decide where that's gonna 01:15:53.791 --> 01:15:56.700 go and place it ? Um I think till now 01:15:56.709 --> 01:15:58.709 that headquarters has been maturing 01:15:58.709 --> 01:16:00.820 from what I've seen but uh a decision 01:16:00.820 --> 01:16:02.820 is needed . So what are the biggest 01:16:02.820 --> 01:16:04.931 challenges um , space comms facing in 01:16:04.931 --> 01:16:06.987 addressing threats in space over the 01:16:06.987 --> 01:16:09.209 next two years . And how do we , how do 01:16:09.209 --> 01:16:11.265 you plan to address them ? And , and 01:16:11.265 --> 01:16:11.060 have you spent any time thinking about 01:16:11.069 --> 01:16:13.470 what happens when we , when they start , 01:16:13.479 --> 01:16:15.646 you know , whatever adversary starts , 01:16:15.646 --> 01:16:17.868 uh , uh , shooting up satellites and we 01:16:17.868 --> 01:16:19.979 get all the debris , uh , going there 01:16:19.979 --> 01:16:21.646 and how it's gonna impact our 01:16:21.646 --> 01:16:23.868 communication . Senator . The answer to 01:16:23.868 --> 01:16:26.035 those two questions are related . Uh , 01:16:26.035 --> 01:16:27.812 the number one thing we need to 01:16:27.812 --> 01:16:29.757 continue to build out as our space 01:16:29.757 --> 01:16:31.868 domain awareness capability . We have 01:16:31.868 --> 01:16:31.439 the best in the world and the world 01:16:31.450 --> 01:16:33.561 looks to us , but we have to continue 01:16:33.561 --> 01:16:35.728 to improve that to maintain custody of 01:16:35.728 --> 01:16:37.894 the threats . We now see and Senator , 01:16:37.894 --> 01:16:40.006 we want to avoid a future in which we 01:16:40.006 --> 01:16:42.006 do see that proliferation of debris 01:16:42.006 --> 01:16:43.783 because of uh of anti satellite 01:16:43.783 --> 01:16:45.728 capabilities . But if that were to 01:16:45.728 --> 01:16:47.950 happen , it would be our responsibility 01:16:47.950 --> 01:16:50.410 to quickly track that debris cloud and 01:16:50.419 --> 01:16:52.475 make sure we're providing warning to 01:16:52.475 --> 01:16:54.799 those uh those uh individuals , units , 01:16:54.810 --> 01:16:56.977 companies that own those satellites so 01:16:56.977 --> 01:16:59.143 that we can mitigate that debris . But 01:16:59.143 --> 01:17:01.310 we , we do not want to see that happen 01:17:01.310 --> 01:17:03.310 and which is why we must deter that 01:17:03.310 --> 01:17:05.588 from happening . Thank you . Thank you , 01:17:05.588 --> 01:17:05.560 Senator Scott , Senator Gillibrand . 01:17:05.569 --> 01:17:07.458 Thank you , ma'am , chairwoman um 01:17:07.458 --> 01:17:10.379 General Guo . Um General Van Huck has 01:17:10.390 --> 01:17:12.612 stated that our country is under attack 01:17:12.612 --> 01:17:14.834 every single day in the information and 01:17:14.834 --> 01:17:16.390 cyber domain , our critical 01:17:16.390 --> 01:17:18.446 infrastructure providers on which we 01:17:18.450 --> 01:17:21.379 rely to execute North Com . No North 01:17:21.580 --> 01:17:23.830 Comms . Mission are key targets for 01:17:23.839 --> 01:17:25.850 threat actors . How do you envision 01:17:25.859 --> 01:17:28.850 coordinating with both DH S and CIA to 01:17:28.859 --> 01:17:30.970 protect our critical infrastructure ? 01:17:30.970 --> 01:17:33.137 Can I have your commitment to directly 01:17:33.137 --> 01:17:35.303 collaborate with them and other sector 01:17:35.303 --> 01:17:37.526 management agencies in order to protect 01:17:37.526 --> 01:17:39.692 critical infrastructure and ensure you 01:17:39.692 --> 01:17:41.915 can execute your mission ? And will you 01:17:41.915 --> 01:17:43.970 report back to this committee if you 01:17:43.970 --> 01:17:46.192 encounter issues in that effort ? Yes , 01:17:46.192 --> 01:17:48.359 Senator , you , you have my commitment 01:17:48.359 --> 01:17:47.919 not only to work in the manner that you 01:17:47.930 --> 01:17:50.041 described , but also to report back . 01:17:50.459 --> 01:17:53.770 And do you have any um uh 01:17:53.779 --> 01:17:56.100 ideas about what , what , how you will 01:17:56.109 --> 01:17:58.129 implement that coordination ? Uh 01:17:58.140 --> 01:18:00.450 Senator , I would , I would like to uh 01:18:00.459 --> 01:18:02.189 first uh get to know all the 01:18:02.200 --> 01:18:04.422 counterparts as you mentioned . There , 01:18:04.422 --> 01:18:06.644 there are several that have overlapping 01:18:06.644 --> 01:18:08.478 responsibility for protecting uh 01:18:08.478 --> 01:18:10.589 defense , critical infrastructure . I 01:18:10.589 --> 01:18:12.756 would work very closely with the Cyber 01:18:12.756 --> 01:18:14.867 command commander if I'm confirmed as 01:18:14.867 --> 01:18:16.811 well as the Department of Homeland 01:18:16.811 --> 01:18:18.867 Security FBI and another of others , 01:18:18.867 --> 01:18:20.811 but more than just meeting him and 01:18:20.811 --> 01:18:22.922 talking to them , I'd like to propose 01:18:22.922 --> 01:18:25.089 with them a series of high level table 01:18:25.089 --> 01:18:27.089 talk exercises that really push and 01:18:27.089 --> 01:18:28.867 pull at the seams of where once 01:18:28.867 --> 01:18:30.978 authorities may start and , and , and 01:18:30.978 --> 01:18:33.200 other agencies may stop because there's 01:18:33.200 --> 01:18:35.200 a lot of gray area in , in critical 01:18:35.200 --> 01:18:37.033 infrastructure if it's owned and 01:18:37.033 --> 01:18:39.595 operated by dod , if it has heavy dod 01:18:39.604 --> 01:18:42.310 uh influence in our mission . And I 01:18:42.319 --> 01:18:44.959 think that we need to uh have a strong 01:18:44.970 --> 01:18:47.026 exercises and , and discussions that 01:18:47.026 --> 01:18:48.914 are really going to pull up those 01:18:48.914 --> 01:18:51.081 scenes to ensure that they can uh hold 01:18:51.081 --> 01:18:53.192 during a crisis . I would urge you to 01:18:53.192 --> 01:18:55.248 do those table top exercises . We do 01:18:55.248 --> 01:18:57.581 tabletop exercises with regard to China , 01:18:57.581 --> 01:18:59.359 with regard to Taiwan . But the 01:18:59.359 --> 01:19:01.470 scenario of the first three months of 01:19:01.470 --> 01:19:03.470 that is almost all cyber . And so I 01:19:03.470 --> 01:19:05.692 want to know what you're gonna do every 01:19:05.692 --> 01:19:07.637 day during that first three months 01:19:07.637 --> 01:19:07.600 because it's not kinetic activity that 01:19:07.609 --> 01:19:10.810 you are going to be um managing . It's 01:19:10.819 --> 01:19:13.080 gonna be how do we make sure we can do 01:19:13.089 --> 01:19:14.922 the work we need to do if things 01:19:14.922 --> 01:19:17.033 escalate . So it's really important . 01:19:17.033 --> 01:19:18.978 And I'm , I'm grateful that you're 01:19:18.978 --> 01:19:21.200 focused on that . We've talked in the , 01:19:21.200 --> 01:19:23.422 in the hearing about Domain Awareness . 01:19:23.422 --> 01:19:25.422 Um One of our biggest challenges in 01:19:25.422 --> 01:19:27.533 Domain awareness is the space between 01:19:27.533 --> 01:19:29.700 commercial airspace and space . And we 01:19:29.700 --> 01:19:31.810 saw that with the uh Chinese spy 01:19:31.819 --> 01:19:35.640 balloon . So I think um having Domain 01:19:35.649 --> 01:19:37.705 awareness and focusing on how you're 01:19:37.705 --> 01:19:39.927 gonna increase your domain awareness so 01:19:39.927 --> 01:19:42.038 that our pilots can operate safely so 01:19:42.038 --> 01:19:44.040 that we understand if we are being 01:19:44.049 --> 01:19:47.109 spied upon by adversaries is essential 01:19:47.189 --> 01:19:49.411 and in that regard , uh can I have your 01:19:49.411 --> 01:19:51.522 commitment to collaborate with Doctor 01:19:51.522 --> 01:19:54.439 Sean Kirkpatrick and the All Domain 01:19:54.450 --> 01:19:56.529 anomaly Resolution Office to ensure 01:19:56.540 --> 01:19:58.373 that they have what they need to 01:19:58.373 --> 01:20:00.429 identify and resolve reports of uaps 01:20:00.429 --> 01:20:02.700 and us Air Senator . You have my 01:20:02.709 --> 01:20:04.876 commitment . I've , I've read a little 01:20:04.876 --> 01:20:06.931 about Arrow . I know that uh General 01:20:06.931 --> 01:20:08.931 Van Huk is uh is is consulting with 01:20:08.931 --> 01:20:10.653 them and I look forward to the 01:20:10.653 --> 01:20:12.431 opportunity and undersea domain 01:20:12.431 --> 01:20:15.180 awareness is also critical for our 01:20:15.189 --> 01:20:17.022 national defense . Recent public 01:20:17.022 --> 01:20:19.100 reporting indicates that the Russian 01:20:19.109 --> 01:20:21.919 Navy is repainting its ships to confuse 01:20:21.930 --> 01:20:24.041 or fool tracking systems that rely on 01:20:24.041 --> 01:20:26.208 artificial intelligence if confirmed , 01:20:26.208 --> 01:20:28.430 will help this committee understand the 01:20:28.430 --> 01:20:30.541 complexity of ongoing threats and the 01:20:30.541 --> 01:20:32.541 ways that developing technology can 01:20:32.541 --> 01:20:34.600 help or hinder our defense systems . 01:20:35.080 --> 01:20:37.358 Yes , Senator , you have my commitment . 01:20:37.358 --> 01:20:39.689 Thank you , General Whiting the plas 01:20:39.700 --> 01:20:42.189 quote lectures on the Science of space 01:20:42.200 --> 01:20:44.859 operations . Its authors describe an 01:20:44.870 --> 01:20:48.129 overall space strike that includes both 01:20:48.140 --> 01:20:50.720 a soft strike option focused on inform 01:20:50.729 --> 01:20:53.020 information attacks , em spectrum 01:20:53.029 --> 01:20:55.604 operations , cyber attacks and hard 01:20:55.615 --> 01:20:57.615 strike options that involve strikes 01:20:57.615 --> 01:20:59.671 against vulnerable enemy positions . 01:20:59.671 --> 01:21:01.774 From your perspective . What are the 01:21:01.785 --> 01:21:03.955 miscalculations risks when a country's 01:21:03.964 --> 01:21:06.765 space studies ? Documents include the 01:21:06.774 --> 01:21:08.941 execution of offensive strikes as part 01:21:08.941 --> 01:21:11.052 of their deterrence options ? And how 01:21:11.052 --> 01:21:13.107 does this impact your thinking about 01:21:13.107 --> 01:21:15.052 the resiliency of the systems that 01:21:15.052 --> 01:21:17.274 would be under your command ? Senator . 01:21:17.274 --> 01:21:19.607 Thank you for that question . Of course , 01:21:19.607 --> 01:21:19.250 when we see those kind of writings , we 01:21:19.259 --> 01:21:21.315 have to take them at their word that 01:21:21.315 --> 01:21:23.315 that is potentially within their uh 01:21:23.315 --> 01:21:25.259 their plans . And so deterrence is 01:21:25.259 --> 01:21:27.426 built upon a framework of number one , 01:21:27.426 --> 01:21:29.450 we must have capabilities that deny 01:21:29.459 --> 01:21:31.570 potential adversaries the benefits of 01:21:31.570 --> 01:21:33.737 such an attack . Uh Secondly , we must 01:21:33.737 --> 01:21:35.681 have capabilities that allow us to 01:21:35.681 --> 01:21:37.681 impose costs in response to such an 01:21:37.681 --> 01:21:39.903 attack and then finally that we have to 01:21:39.903 --> 01:21:41.792 clearly communicate that . So I I 01:21:41.792 --> 01:21:43.903 support the effort of the space force 01:21:43.903 --> 01:21:45.959 to rearchitect our current satellite 01:21:45.959 --> 01:21:47.959 constellations to be more resilient 01:21:47.959 --> 01:21:47.745 against those attacks . But we also 01:21:47.754 --> 01:21:49.955 need those range of options so that we 01:21:49.964 --> 01:21:52.910 can bring intel cyber offense , defense , 01:21:52.919 --> 01:21:54.697 command and control joint fires 01:21:54.697 --> 01:21:57.410 together to to also hold at risk those 01:21:57.419 --> 01:21:59.197 space capabilities of potential 01:21:59.197 --> 01:22:01.252 adversaries . Thank you . Last month 01:22:01.252 --> 01:22:03.609 space comm announced its authorities to 01:22:03.620 --> 01:22:05.620 conduct missile defense led to some 01:22:05.620 --> 01:22:07.910 confusion about north com common space 01:22:07.919 --> 01:22:09.475 comms different but related 01:22:09.475 --> 01:22:11.530 responsibilities to conduct homeland 01:22:11.530 --> 01:22:13.990 missile defense . If confirmed will you 01:22:14.000 --> 01:22:16.299 will um you will be responsible for 01:22:16.310 --> 01:22:17.977 operating the missile warning 01:22:17.977 --> 01:22:20.250 satellites while general GEO will be 01:22:20.259 --> 01:22:22.148 responsible for warning America's 01:22:22.148 --> 01:22:24.037 leaders in the event of a missile 01:22:24.037 --> 01:22:26.100 threat . Can you commit to work to 01:22:26.109 --> 01:22:28.160 ensure that space comms and no ad 01:22:28.169 --> 01:22:30.391 systems will be integrated and that you 01:22:30.391 --> 01:22:32.502 will work closely together to protect 01:22:32.502 --> 01:22:34.613 national security ? Yes , I commit to 01:22:34.613 --> 01:22:36.558 that . Yes . Thank you . Thank you 01:22:36.558 --> 01:22:38.613 madam chairman . Thank you , Senator 01:22:38.613 --> 01:22:41.009 Gillibrand , Senator Kramer . Thank you , 01:22:41.020 --> 01:22:43.020 madam chairman . Congratulations to 01:22:43.020 --> 01:22:45.298 both of you generals and your families . 01:22:45.298 --> 01:22:47.353 Thank you for being here . Thank you 01:22:47.353 --> 01:22:49.576 for your willingness to step in the gap 01:22:49.576 --> 01:22:49.029 and into these very important positions 01:22:49.040 --> 01:22:51.096 since we've been talking a lot about 01:22:51.096 --> 01:22:53.262 domain awareness , I'm gonna just stay 01:22:53.262 --> 01:22:55.262 with the theme . Um But maybe get a 01:22:55.262 --> 01:22:57.484 little bit specific . My first question 01:22:57.484 --> 01:22:59.484 is one that I I didn't come in here 01:22:59.484 --> 01:23:01.651 anticipating , but I , I think is , is 01:23:01.651 --> 01:23:03.707 relevant and probably start with you 01:23:03.707 --> 01:23:06.600 general whiting over the last several 01:23:06.609 --> 01:23:08.553 years . We've , we've had a lot of 01:23:08.553 --> 01:23:10.830 discussion and obviously noticed that 01:23:10.839 --> 01:23:12.950 the air force has been shedding quite 01:23:12.950 --> 01:23:15.117 successfully . A lot of its legacy ISR 01:23:15.117 --> 01:23:17.270 airborne ISR missions and , and 01:23:17.279 --> 01:23:20.490 equipment to afford new stuff . Makes 01:23:20.500 --> 01:23:22.540 perfect sense . My concern has been 01:23:22.549 --> 01:23:24.771 that , that while they , they live with 01:23:24.771 --> 01:23:26.993 and plan for the promise of space being 01:23:26.993 --> 01:23:29.049 able to handle ISR for the combatant 01:23:29.049 --> 01:23:30.938 commanders wherever they may be , 01:23:30.938 --> 01:23:32.938 whether it's the southern border or 01:23:32.938 --> 01:23:35.216 Centcom , you name it . Um that , that , 01:23:35.216 --> 01:23:37.640 that a gap , it could very well occur 01:23:37.649 --> 01:23:39.871 where there , there won't be adequate . 01:23:39.871 --> 01:23:42.430 Um ISR at what 01:23:43.330 --> 01:23:45.441 presuming for a moment that space can 01:23:45.441 --> 01:23:48.160 do that at some point , what's your 01:23:48.169 --> 01:23:50.620 comfort level that space can , can 01:23:50.629 --> 01:23:53.350 unilaterally handle the type of ISR 01:23:53.359 --> 01:23:56.419 that , that uh today , global hawks and , 01:23:56.430 --> 01:23:58.930 and uh and others . Uh MC Nines and 01:23:58.939 --> 01:24:01.189 others are able to provide . Yeah , 01:24:01.200 --> 01:24:03.422 Senator , thank you for that question . 01:24:03.422 --> 01:24:05.311 Um Space ISR from space brings us 01:24:05.311 --> 01:24:07.629 untold advantages . Um For example , uh 01:24:07.640 --> 01:24:09.799 satellites as they orbit the earth 01:24:09.810 --> 01:24:11.921 don't go through sovereign airspace , 01:24:11.921 --> 01:24:14.143 we can freely over fly any point of the 01:24:14.143 --> 01:24:16.366 earth and , and get those um you know , 01:24:16.366 --> 01:24:18.532 get that intelligence that we need . I 01:24:18.532 --> 01:24:20.699 think it's a , it's a , it's a layered 01:24:20.699 --> 01:24:22.977 uh need for systems as we move forward , 01:24:22.977 --> 01:24:25.560 there will be need for ground based ISR 01:24:25.569 --> 01:24:27.736 capabilities . Sea based air based and 01:24:27.736 --> 01:24:29.979 space based , but I am supportive of 01:24:29.990 --> 01:24:32.209 doing the reviews to , to move as much 01:24:32.220 --> 01:24:35.029 to space as we can while leveraging the 01:24:35.040 --> 01:24:36.873 unique attributes that the other 01:24:36.873 --> 01:24:39.270 domains can bring as well . Very good . 01:24:39.279 --> 01:24:41.279 Thank you . Um Since you brought up 01:24:41.279 --> 01:24:43.446 layers , I'm gonna ask about the space 01:24:43.446 --> 01:24:45.557 development agency's um you know , uh 01:24:45.557 --> 01:24:47.990 tracking layer program that's going to 01:24:48.000 --> 01:24:50.222 be operated out of the Ground Force Air 01:24:50.222 --> 01:24:52.500 Force Space . First of all , are , are , 01:24:52.500 --> 01:24:54.556 are both of you familiar with it and 01:24:54.556 --> 01:24:56.556 how do you see we'll start with you 01:24:56.556 --> 01:24:58.667 general G north com NORAD integrating 01:24:58.667 --> 01:25:01.000 um SD A into your , into your awareness , 01:25:01.390 --> 01:25:04.279 senator as you alluded to uh Domain 01:25:04.290 --> 01:25:06.457 awareness and certainly in the sensing 01:25:06.457 --> 01:25:08.899 grid takes a variety of , of sensors . 01:25:08.910 --> 01:25:11.021 I look forward to bringing , bringing 01:25:11.021 --> 01:25:13.243 those in that , that capability as well 01:25:13.243 --> 01:25:15.560 as the uh space based long term 01:25:15.569 --> 01:25:17.779 persistence . Uh That General Whiting 01:25:17.790 --> 01:25:19.901 mentioned for space to complement the 01:25:19.901 --> 01:25:22.012 other terrestrial systems that , that 01:25:22.012 --> 01:25:24.234 we're using now or bringing online here 01:25:24.234 --> 01:25:26.457 in the near future . So bringing up one 01:25:26.457 --> 01:25:28.930 more um legacy uh domain awareness um 01:25:29.189 --> 01:25:31.245 that I'm familiar with . Of course , 01:25:31.245 --> 01:25:33.359 we're very pleased with um the , the 01:25:33.370 --> 01:25:35.209 legacy of the Parks Radar at the 01:25:35.220 --> 01:25:37.950 Cavalier Air Force or Space Force 01:25:37.959 --> 01:25:40.040 Station . Now , I look forward to 01:25:40.049 --> 01:25:42.240 having you up there um sometime after 01:25:42.250 --> 01:25:44.417 you're confirmed , which I'm confident 01:25:44.417 --> 01:25:47.270 will be soon . Um But maybe each of you 01:25:47.279 --> 01:25:49.501 could share a little bit with about the 01:25:49.501 --> 01:25:51.723 importance of that Parks Radar over the 01:25:51.723 --> 01:25:53.890 years and decades and of course , it's 01:25:53.890 --> 01:25:56.319 expanded its , its role um from missile 01:25:56.330 --> 01:25:58.859 defense or missile awareness to space , 01:25:58.870 --> 01:26:00.814 obviously just monitoring a lot of 01:26:00.814 --> 01:26:02.870 stuff in space . Um But , but that's 01:26:02.870 --> 01:26:05.279 one of those legacy systems that um we 01:26:05.290 --> 01:26:07.568 don't know the lifespan of um what are , 01:26:07.568 --> 01:26:09.068 what are the modernization 01:26:09.068 --> 01:26:11.229 opportunities efforts um to just be 01:26:11.240 --> 01:26:13.518 interested in both of your opinions on , 01:26:13.518 --> 01:26:15.684 on parks and its importance and how we 01:26:15.684 --> 01:26:17.740 can , how we can extend it . Senator 01:26:17.740 --> 01:26:20.680 Parks at Cavalier is an essential part 01:26:20.689 --> 01:26:24.299 of the uh no ad uh uh sensing grid 01:26:24.310 --> 01:26:26.421 that uh that we've been talking about 01:26:26.421 --> 01:26:28.870 it and specifically , it provides the 01:26:28.879 --> 01:26:31.046 integrated tactical warning and attack 01:26:31.046 --> 01:26:34.060 assessment uh capability uh for the 01:26:34.069 --> 01:26:37.580 NORAD commander uh to use to decide if 01:26:37.589 --> 01:26:40.810 uh a uh a threat is a threat to North 01:26:40.819 --> 01:26:44.220 America . Uh So upgrading uh that radar 01:26:44.229 --> 01:26:46.451 and several just like it that , that we 01:26:46.451 --> 01:26:48.890 have across the network is extremely 01:26:48.899 --> 01:26:51.640 important to complement the new systems 01:26:51.649 --> 01:26:53.705 that are coming in to make sure that 01:26:53.705 --> 01:26:55.927 that sensing grid can reach out and get 01:26:55.927 --> 01:26:58.038 all types of threats in all domains . 01:26:58.609 --> 01:27:00.665 Senator , just building on that . Uh 01:27:00.665 --> 01:27:02.609 I've had the good fortune to visit 01:27:02.609 --> 01:27:04.498 Cavalier multiple times during my 01:27:04.498 --> 01:27:06.665 career was just there . Last September 01:27:06.665 --> 01:27:08.887 and General Guilla mentioned it's vital 01:27:08.887 --> 01:27:10.998 to our missile warning capabilities , 01:27:10.998 --> 01:27:10.830 but as you alluded to , it's also vital 01:27:10.839 --> 01:27:12.830 to our space Domain awareness 01:27:12.839 --> 01:27:14.783 capabilities . Its unique position 01:27:14.783 --> 01:27:17.250 pointing north allows it to see all of 01:27:17.259 --> 01:27:20.084 our polar orbiting are all polar 01:27:20.095 --> 01:27:22.165 orbiting objects . And so it's just 01:27:22.174 --> 01:27:24.396 absolutely uh critical for us given its 01:27:24.396 --> 01:27:26.618 unique location and capabilities and uh 01:27:26.618 --> 01:27:28.618 and I expect we'll continue to need 01:27:28.618 --> 01:27:30.785 that going forward . Thank you . Thank 01:27:30.785 --> 01:27:33.007 you to both of you and I'm not going to 01:27:33.007 --> 01:27:35.174 test you the way that Senator Sullivan 01:27:35.174 --> 01:27:34.254 did . But we do think there's some 01:27:34.265 --> 01:27:36.487 other states that could be important to 01:27:36.487 --> 01:27:38.598 an Arctic mission as well . But we're 01:27:38.598 --> 01:27:40.765 all for Alaska too . Thank you . Thank 01:27:40.765 --> 01:27:42.821 you , Mr Chair , madam chair . Thank 01:27:42.821 --> 01:27:42.270 you , Senator Kramer . Senator 01:27:42.279 --> 01:27:46.129 Blumenthal . Thanks madam chair . Thank 01:27:46.140 --> 01:27:48.680 you to you both for your service and to 01:27:48.689 --> 01:27:51.109 your families as well . Uh You're both 01:27:51.120 --> 01:27:53.830 graduates of the Air Force Academy . 01:27:54.009 --> 01:27:57.479 Both class of 1989 must have been an 01:27:57.490 --> 01:28:00.419 outstanding class . You must have known 01:28:00.430 --> 01:28:02.740 each other there , correct , known each 01:28:02.750 --> 01:28:05.160 other a long time and you've known each 01:28:05.169 --> 01:28:07.640 other since then and worked together . 01:28:07.890 --> 01:28:11.370 Uh So congratulations uh to you both . 01:28:11.600 --> 01:28:13.544 Um I wanna talk a little bit about 01:28:13.544 --> 01:28:16.520 artificial intelligence . Uh I'm 01:28:17.009 --> 01:28:19.410 learning about the 01:28:20.220 --> 01:28:23.870 immense and in many ways 01:28:23.879 --> 01:28:27.450 uncertain , unknown capabilities of A I 01:28:27.990 --> 01:28:30.046 in so many different areas , whether 01:28:30.046 --> 01:28:33.770 it's medicine or environmental 01:28:33.990 --> 01:28:37.430 concerns . Uh talking about the 01:28:37.439 --> 01:28:39.709 military , particularly in space . I 01:28:39.770 --> 01:28:43.100 wonder if um each of you could share 01:28:43.109 --> 01:28:45.310 your thoughts about how you think A I 01:28:45.319 --> 01:28:47.910 will impact the challenges and work 01:28:47.919 --> 01:28:51.899 ahead for each of you senator from 01:28:51.910 --> 01:28:55.529 uh uh no north uh position . If I'm 01:28:55.540 --> 01:28:58.259 confirmed . I look forward to uh using 01:28:58.270 --> 01:29:01.500 artificial intelligence uh to , to , to 01:29:01.509 --> 01:29:03.959 make what we do really well now , even 01:29:03.970 --> 01:29:05.692 better , maybe even easier and 01:29:05.692 --> 01:29:08.490 certainly uh faster . Uh I , I've seen 01:29:08.500 --> 01:29:10.667 in my current command under uh some of 01:29:10.667 --> 01:29:12.778 the initiatives that general Rila has 01:29:12.778 --> 01:29:14.722 undertaken where we , we take uh a 01:29:14.722 --> 01:29:17.810 situational awareness of software . But 01:29:17.819 --> 01:29:19.986 using artificial intelligence , it can 01:29:19.986 --> 01:29:22.919 help us find uh uh equipment pieces 01:29:22.930 --> 01:29:25.415 targets that , that the naked eye would 01:29:25.424 --> 01:29:28.495 take a long time to find QSN . And then 01:29:28.504 --> 01:29:30.726 with a combination of a human on top of 01:29:30.726 --> 01:29:33.015 the loop , uh very quickly uh make an 01:29:33.024 --> 01:29:35.191 assessment if there's a target there . 01:29:35.191 --> 01:29:38.214 Uh The , the speed with which that 01:29:38.225 --> 01:29:41.205 improves our our ability is , is just 01:29:41.214 --> 01:29:43.834 phenomenal applying uh another uh 01:29:43.845 --> 01:29:45.845 artificial intelligence and machine 01:29:45.845 --> 01:29:48.012 learning capability to the NORAD north 01:29:48.012 --> 01:29:50.640 comm uh realm that uh if if confirmed I 01:29:50.649 --> 01:29:53.100 would like to see is uh a program 01:29:53.109 --> 01:29:55.160 called pathfinder which takes radar 01:29:55.169 --> 01:29:56.891 data that I that is considered 01:29:56.891 --> 01:29:59.479 cluttered uh that our radars see and , 01:29:59.490 --> 01:30:01.712 and , and throws aside so it doesn't uh 01:30:01.712 --> 01:30:04.569 confuse the operator . It can those uh 01:30:04.580 --> 01:30:06.358 machine learning and artificial 01:30:06.358 --> 01:30:08.469 intelligence can go through there and 01:30:08.469 --> 01:30:10.413 find valid tracks uh that we might 01:30:10.413 --> 01:30:12.729 otherwise be overlooking that could be 01:30:12.830 --> 01:30:15.560 a threat to our homeland . We've used 01:30:15.569 --> 01:30:18.500 the uh with the North comms permission . 01:30:18.509 --> 01:30:20.453 We've used those algorithms in the 01:30:20.453 --> 01:30:22.676 Middle East and run some of the one way 01:30:22.676 --> 01:30:25.089 attack that we've had in Iraq and Syria 01:30:25.220 --> 01:30:27.450 taken our radar files , run it through 01:30:27.459 --> 01:30:29.570 that algorithm and we've been able to 01:30:29.570 --> 01:30:33.100 see uh the , the UAVS that attacked our 01:30:33.109 --> 01:30:35.520 positions that we couldn't see real 01:30:35.529 --> 01:30:37.640 time . So that's a couple of examples 01:30:37.640 --> 01:30:39.473 of ways that I would like to use 01:30:39.473 --> 01:30:41.473 artificial intelligence and machine 01:30:41.473 --> 01:30:43.585 learning to enhance the uh no a north 01:30:43.585 --> 01:30:46.000 com miss if I'm confirmed , Senator . 01:30:46.009 --> 01:30:48.120 Similarly , we have missions that are 01:30:48.120 --> 01:30:50.065 very data rich . For example , our 01:30:50.065 --> 01:30:52.120 space domain Awareness , we get tens 01:30:52.120 --> 01:30:54.231 upon tens of thousands of data points 01:30:54.231 --> 01:30:56.342 and tracks and observations per day . 01:30:56.342 --> 01:30:58.453 And today it takes our humans kind of 01:30:58.453 --> 01:31:00.509 slogging through all of that to find 01:31:00.509 --> 01:31:02.620 what's most important . Where are the 01:31:02.620 --> 01:31:04.787 threats ? How do we maintain custody ? 01:31:04.787 --> 01:31:07.009 But artificial intelligence and machine 01:31:07.009 --> 01:31:09.176 learning can help do that for us so we 01:31:09.176 --> 01:31:11.342 can stop the humans doing the the rote 01:31:11.342 --> 01:31:13.453 work and and elevate them to the more 01:31:13.453 --> 01:31:15.676 higher cognitive work to focus on those 01:31:15.676 --> 01:31:17.676 threats and what should we be doing 01:31:17.676 --> 01:31:19.565 about them . So it's an important 01:31:19.565 --> 01:31:21.676 capability for Senator . Uh the , the 01:31:21.830 --> 01:31:25.200 work that you've described is in very 01:31:25.209 --> 01:31:27.879 simplistic layman's terms , screening 01:31:27.890 --> 01:31:31.640 of information and in effect 01:31:31.649 --> 01:31:35.029 organizing it , making use of , as you 01:31:35.040 --> 01:31:38.370 say , reams of data . Do you anticipate 01:31:38.779 --> 01:31:42.040 at some point ? Turning decisions over 01:31:42.049 --> 01:31:44.669 to artificial intelligence ? In other 01:31:44.680 --> 01:31:47.040 words , uh there has been discussion 01:31:47.049 --> 01:31:50.589 about how decision making by artificial 01:31:50.600 --> 01:31:53.640 intelligence could be made autonomous , 01:31:53.649 --> 01:31:57.649 that uh machine learning could be in 01:31:57.660 --> 01:32:00.649 control more than it is now , Senator , 01:32:00.660 --> 01:32:02.604 I'll certainly look at that in the 01:32:02.604 --> 01:32:04.660 future . But at this time , I do not 01:32:04.660 --> 01:32:06.770 see uh AAA place where we would take 01:32:06.779 --> 01:32:08.946 the human off the loop of an important 01:32:08.946 --> 01:32:11.112 decision . I think it's much better to 01:32:11.112 --> 01:32:13.112 use those tools to help us with our 01:32:13.112 --> 01:32:15.223 decision making and keep the human on 01:32:15.223 --> 01:32:17.600 the loop . I agree . Yeah . Yes , I 01:32:17.609 --> 01:32:19.665 agree with that as well . That right 01:32:19.665 --> 01:32:21.720 now our , our people are still vital 01:32:21.720 --> 01:32:23.887 for our um decision making and we want 01:32:23.887 --> 01:32:23.700 to make sure that any uh decisions we 01:32:23.709 --> 01:32:25.876 do contemplate , perhaps looking at uh 01:32:25.876 --> 01:32:27.987 machines to make that that's all done 01:32:27.987 --> 01:32:29.876 in concert with the Department of 01:32:29.876 --> 01:32:32.819 Defense's Ethical A I Guidelines . Uh I 01:32:33.549 --> 01:32:35.439 think that A I is going to 01:32:35.450 --> 01:32:37.689 revolutionize a lot of what we do in 01:32:37.700 --> 01:32:41.299 civilian life . Likewise , in military 01:32:41.310 --> 01:32:44.500 work . And uh I do think at the same 01:32:44.509 --> 01:32:46.676 time it's important to have controls , 01:32:46.676 --> 01:32:49.609 countermeasures and ethical standards 01:32:49.620 --> 01:32:51.453 that apply . And that's why I've 01:32:51.549 --> 01:32:53.771 actually proposed an independent entity 01:32:53.771 --> 01:32:56.359 or body that would establish some rules 01:32:56.370 --> 01:32:58.450 and guard rails . It's a bipartisan 01:32:58.459 --> 01:33:02.040 effort and I hope that the military 01:33:02.049 --> 01:33:04.271 leaders like yourself will be a part of 01:33:04.271 --> 01:33:06.327 it . Thank you so much , sir . Thank 01:33:06.327 --> 01:33:08.271 you , Senator Blumenthal , Senator 01:33:08.271 --> 01:33:11.439 Rounds . Thank you , madam , chair 01:33:12.859 --> 01:33:15.109 General . First of all , I want to 01:33:15.120 --> 01:33:17.064 thank you for your service to this 01:33:17.064 --> 01:33:19.064 nation and congratulate you on your 01:33:19.064 --> 01:33:21.231 nomination to be the next Commander of 01:33:21.231 --> 01:33:23.509 North Common NORAD and General Whiting . 01:33:23.509 --> 01:33:23.259 I would also like to thank you for your 01:33:23.270 --> 01:33:24.826 service . To our nation and 01:33:24.826 --> 01:33:26.992 congratulate you on your nomination to 01:33:26.992 --> 01:33:29.159 be the next commander of Space com . I 01:33:29.159 --> 01:33:31.159 would also like to say thank you to 01:33:31.159 --> 01:33:33.381 your families as well . Um As you noted 01:33:33.381 --> 01:33:35.548 when you have to move the family moves 01:33:35.548 --> 01:33:37.714 with you , uh when you're deployed and 01:33:37.714 --> 01:33:39.770 they're not with you . That , that , 01:33:39.770 --> 01:33:41.770 that is a sacrifice which they also 01:33:41.770 --> 01:33:41.689 make . And I would like to thank your 01:33:41.700 --> 01:33:43.811 families as well for their service to 01:33:43.811 --> 01:33:47.560 our country . Um General and General 01:33:47.569 --> 01:33:49.513 Whiting , as you know , I've asked 01:33:49.513 --> 01:33:51.750 every single combatant commander this 01:33:51.759 --> 01:33:54.379 question with regard to the spectrum . 01:33:54.879 --> 01:33:56.879 There has been an attempt lately to 01:33:56.879 --> 01:34:00.870 perhaps sell or auction portions of the 01:34:00.890 --> 01:34:03.240 band , the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz 01:34:03.250 --> 01:34:05.417 portion of the spectrum , which is one 01:34:05.419 --> 01:34:07.586 which I believe to be critical for our 01:34:07.586 --> 01:34:09.586 national defense . But I have asked 01:34:09.589 --> 01:34:11.478 this and so far I have had no one 01:34:11.478 --> 01:34:13.589 disagree with me that's been in front 01:34:13.589 --> 01:34:15.700 of this committee , but I'm gonna ask 01:34:15.700 --> 01:34:17.811 both of you , please , how serious is 01:34:17.811 --> 01:34:20.520 the need for us to be able to maintain 01:34:20.529 --> 01:34:23.859 control of the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz 01:34:23.870 --> 01:34:27.049 portion of the , the spectrum ? And how 01:34:27.060 --> 01:34:29.319 do you view that in your job ? And uh 01:34:29.330 --> 01:34:32.939 are you aware of the different types of 01:34:32.950 --> 01:34:35.129 uses for that for that portion of the 01:34:35.140 --> 01:34:37.418 spectrum in the defense of our country ? 01:34:37.418 --> 01:34:39.696 And I'll begin with General Gu Senator . 01:34:39.696 --> 01:34:42.419 I'm , I'm keenly aware of the impact 01:34:42.430 --> 01:34:45.520 that losing or sharing the uh 3.1 to 01:34:45.529 --> 01:34:47.899 3.45 gigahertz range of the spectrum 01:34:47.910 --> 01:34:49.910 would bring to the homeland defense 01:34:49.910 --> 01:34:53.100 mission . Uh For example , three of the 01:34:53.109 --> 01:34:56.089 key capabilities that if confirmed I 01:34:56.100 --> 01:34:58.549 would rely upon for homeland defense a 01:34:58.819 --> 01:35:02.689 wax the AIS cruisers and the new long 01:35:02.700 --> 01:35:04.879 range discrimination radar , which is 01:35:04.890 --> 01:35:07.057 critical to defeating the North Korean 01:35:07.057 --> 01:35:09.279 ballistic missile threat all operate in 01:35:09.279 --> 01:35:11.390 that range . Well , I understand that 01:35:11.390 --> 01:35:13.390 there is a study ongoing and I look 01:35:13.390 --> 01:35:15.501 forward to seeing the results of that 01:35:15.501 --> 01:35:17.723 study and at that time , I will make my 01:35:17.723 --> 01:35:19.668 final recommendations . My initial 01:35:19.668 --> 01:35:21.779 position is that it would have a very 01:35:21.779 --> 01:35:23.723 significant and damaging effect on 01:35:23.723 --> 01:35:26.685 homeland defense to either lose or have 01:35:26.694 --> 01:35:28.970 to share that range . Thank you , 01:35:28.979 --> 01:35:31.201 General Whiting . Uh sir , I completely 01:35:31.201 --> 01:35:33.479 agree with uh that uh if this study 01:35:33.490 --> 01:35:35.490 comes back and says that that there 01:35:35.490 --> 01:35:37.657 will be an impact , we , we absolutely 01:35:37.657 --> 01:35:39.546 cannot have a loss of operational 01:35:39.546 --> 01:35:41.712 capability and we need to uh make sure 01:35:41.712 --> 01:35:43.657 that that doesn't happen . Are you 01:35:43.657 --> 01:35:45.879 aware if , if , if , if our adversaries 01:35:45.879 --> 01:35:48.046 could choose a portion of the spectrum 01:35:48.046 --> 01:35:50.323 that would impact our national defense , 01:35:50.323 --> 01:35:52.434 would this be one of those areas that 01:35:52.434 --> 01:35:54.601 they would love to see us have uh uh a 01:35:54.601 --> 01:35:56.768 reduction in our capabilities in terms 01:35:56.768 --> 01:35:59.560 of their ability to , to uh uh find 01:35:59.569 --> 01:36:03.080 ways to uh aggressively get into uh the 01:36:03.089 --> 01:36:05.830 North American Air defense area . 01:36:06.560 --> 01:36:08.560 Senator . Our adversaries are , are 01:36:08.560 --> 01:36:10.509 very good . At knowing , uh , what 01:36:10.520 --> 01:36:12.742 parts of the spectrum we , we rely upon 01:36:12.819 --> 01:36:15.580 and , and trying to , uh , uh , take 01:36:15.589 --> 01:36:17.589 that away from us . So it would not 01:36:17.589 --> 01:36:19.756 surprise me at all . General Whiting , 01:36:19.756 --> 01:36:21.867 sir . I agree with that . Thank you . 01:36:21.867 --> 01:36:24.089 Let me ask also , just with regard to , 01:36:24.089 --> 01:36:26.250 to , uh , cyber and , and , and the 01:36:26.259 --> 01:36:28.759 need for cyber protection . What do you 01:36:28.770 --> 01:36:30.770 think is the greatest threat that , 01:36:30.770 --> 01:36:33.080 that you see with regard to North Com 01:36:33.089 --> 01:36:35.390 uh , and uh , the use of , of , of 01:36:35.399 --> 01:36:38.299 cyber activity or the aggressive cyber 01:36:38.310 --> 01:36:40.532 activities that some of our adversaries 01:36:40.532 --> 01:36:42.754 are using right now . Senator , I think 01:36:42.754 --> 01:36:44.921 the threat , the cyber threat to North 01:36:44.921 --> 01:36:47.259 Comm is the most , uh , present and 01:36:47.270 --> 01:36:49.381 persistent threat that we see today . 01:36:49.381 --> 01:36:53.040 Uh , uh I , I , I've spoken about uh 01:36:53.049 --> 01:36:55.330 the totality of the threats and in all 01:36:55.339 --> 01:36:57.450 domains and all avenues of approach , 01:36:57.450 --> 01:36:59.506 which is certainly the , the largest 01:36:59.506 --> 01:37:02.370 concern , uh that , that I have if I 01:37:02.379 --> 01:37:04.601 were to take command of North and North 01:37:04.601 --> 01:37:06.950 comm upon confirmation , uh , however , 01:37:06.959 --> 01:37:09.015 the threat that we see today and the 01:37:09.015 --> 01:37:10.959 most persistent is in , in cyber . 01:37:11.089 --> 01:37:13.033 Thank you , General Whiting . Same 01:37:13.033 --> 01:37:15.089 question . Yes , sir . For the space 01:37:15.089 --> 01:37:16.867 enterprise , Senator , the most 01:37:16.867 --> 01:37:19.089 pressing cyber threats come from , uh , 01:37:19.089 --> 01:37:21.089 state , um , you know , competitors 01:37:21.089 --> 01:37:24.279 like , uh , the Pr C Russia , Iran , 01:37:24.290 --> 01:37:26.512 North Korea , they would rather take us 01:37:26.512 --> 01:37:28.623 on in the Cyber domain uh than , than 01:37:28.623 --> 01:37:30.623 try to take us on physically in the 01:37:30.623 --> 01:37:32.734 space domain . Although certainly the 01:37:32.734 --> 01:37:34.957 Pr C and Russia have proven they can do 01:37:34.957 --> 01:37:37.123 that because it's cheaper for them and 01:37:37.123 --> 01:37:39.346 it's harder for us to attribute . So we 01:37:39.346 --> 01:37:41.234 must build out our cyber defenses 01:37:41.234 --> 01:37:43.401 across our space enterprise to protect 01:37:43.401 --> 01:37:45.234 that soft underbelly from , from 01:37:45.234 --> 01:37:47.512 allowing cyber to deny that capability . 01:37:47.512 --> 01:37:49.512 Thank you . Thank you both for your 01:37:49.512 --> 01:37:51.679 service and we look forward to working 01:37:51.679 --> 01:37:51.584 with you in the future . Thank you , 01:37:51.595 --> 01:37:53.706 madam chair . Thank you , Senator Ran 01:37:53.706 --> 01:37:56.055 Senator Schmidt . Thank you madam chair . 01:37:56.314 --> 01:38:00.049 Um General Whiting in uh speaking in 01:38:00.060 --> 01:38:02.470 support of DE I initiatives , General 01:38:02.479 --> 01:38:04.750 Brown said that quote , there's still a 01:38:04.759 --> 01:38:06.815 lot to do because this is a cultural 01:38:06.815 --> 01:38:08.870 shift . This isn't something you can 01:38:08.870 --> 01:38:11.092 get done in just a couple of years . Do 01:38:11.092 --> 01:38:13.203 you believe that General Brown should 01:38:13.203 --> 01:38:12.660 be relieved of his command because of 01:38:12.669 --> 01:38:15.410 those statements ? Senator ? No , I do 01:38:15.419 --> 01:38:17.850 not . Ok , General Milley in speaking 01:38:17.859 --> 01:38:19.970 in support of DE I Initiatives said , 01:38:19.970 --> 01:38:22.229 quote , it's diversity to improve the 01:38:22.240 --> 01:38:24.462 system , improve the military , improve 01:38:24.462 --> 01:38:26.518 our problem solving capabilities and 01:38:26.518 --> 01:38:28.740 improve our war , fighting readiness in 01:38:28.740 --> 01:38:30.518 order to protect and defend the 01:38:30.518 --> 01:38:30.160 constitution . That's why it's so 01:38:30.169 --> 01:38:32.391 important , so fundamental that we have 01:38:32.391 --> 01:38:34.558 this as one of our elements as we move 01:38:34.558 --> 01:38:36.502 forward to continue to develop the 01:38:36.502 --> 01:38:38.336 joint force . End quote . Do you 01:38:38.336 --> 01:38:37.810 believe General Milley should be 01:38:37.819 --> 01:38:40.097 relieved of his command ? Senator ? No , 01:38:40.097 --> 01:38:42.319 I do not . Do you believe that that's a 01:38:42.319 --> 01:38:44.839 partisan , do you believe that's 01:38:44.850 --> 01:38:47.549 partisan political speech ? Senator ? 01:38:47.560 --> 01:38:50.310 No , I do not . Ok . Lieutenant Colonel 01:38:50.319 --> 01:38:52.740 Lomar said our , our DE I industry and 01:38:52.750 --> 01:38:54.583 trainings we're receiving in the 01:38:54.583 --> 01:38:56.806 military via the industry are rooted in 01:38:56.806 --> 01:38:59.028 critical race theory which is rooted in 01:38:59.028 --> 01:39:00.861 Marxism . He was relieved of his 01:39:00.861 --> 01:39:03.139 command for those statements . Correct , 01:39:03.139 --> 01:39:05.472 Senator . That's correct by you . Right , 01:39:05.472 --> 01:39:07.472 Senator , there were other comments 01:39:07.472 --> 01:39:09.528 regarding specific political parties 01:39:09.528 --> 01:39:11.750 that , that are in addition to what you 01:39:11.750 --> 01:39:11.720 just quoted . Ok . This was from the 01:39:11.729 --> 01:39:13.990 podcast which was cited by you . So I'm 01:39:14.000 --> 01:39:17.839 asking is opposition to de I partisan 01:39:17.850 --> 01:39:20.479 political speech , Senator . No , it's 01:39:20.490 --> 01:39:22.657 not unless it advocates for a specific 01:39:22.657 --> 01:39:24.768 political party or a candidate . Ok . 01:39:24.790 --> 01:39:26.901 Well , I would agree with that . Um , 01:39:26.901 --> 01:39:28.846 but Lieutenant , so your testimony 01:39:28.846 --> 01:39:30.957 today is Lieutenant Colonel Lomar was 01:39:30.957 --> 01:39:33.179 relieved for something other than these 01:39:33.179 --> 01:39:35.290 statements on the podcast or was that 01:39:35.290 --> 01:39:37.680 part of your consideration , Senator ? 01:39:37.689 --> 01:39:40.029 It involved a specific quote involving 01:39:40.040 --> 01:39:43.620 a specific political party in his free 01:39:43.629 --> 01:39:47.080 time or on duty or it was on a podcast 01:39:47.089 --> 01:39:49.310 where he associated himself or he 01:39:49.319 --> 01:39:51.486 identified himself as an active duty , 01:39:51.486 --> 01:39:53.763 space force officer and commander ? Ok , 01:39:53.763 --> 01:39:55.930 on that . So there were other comments 01:39:55.930 --> 01:39:58.097 that other than this one I read to you 01:39:58.097 --> 01:40:00.109 about DE I Senator . I think that 01:40:00.120 --> 01:40:02.490 podcast was about an hour long . Ok . 01:40:02.970 --> 01:40:05.192 Well , we'll follow up with some of our 01:40:05.192 --> 01:40:07.303 questions . I guess I wanna ask you . 01:40:07.303 --> 01:40:10.890 Um , do you support DE I initiatives 01:40:11.370 --> 01:40:13.959 in the military ? Senator ? I support , 01:40:13.970 --> 01:40:16.200 uh , a ready Lethal Force that draws 01:40:16.209 --> 01:40:18.431 from the best talent all across America 01:40:18.431 --> 01:40:20.542 because that's not my question . Um I 01:40:20.542 --> 01:40:22.598 support that too . Uh But that's not 01:40:22.598 --> 01:40:25.589 what DE I is de I is rooted in Cultural 01:40:25.600 --> 01:40:27.656 Marxism . So I'm asking you , do you 01:40:27.656 --> 01:40:29.433 support DE I initiatives in the 01:40:29.433 --> 01:40:31.433 Military Center ? I support a merit 01:40:31.433 --> 01:40:33.378 based approach to finding the best 01:40:33.378 --> 01:40:35.656 people across . That's not DE I either . 01:40:35.819 --> 01:40:37.930 So do you support DE I initiatives in 01:40:37.930 --> 01:40:41.680 the military Senator based on how it is , 01:40:41.689 --> 01:40:43.911 it is defined . I want to find the best 01:40:43.911 --> 01:40:46.078 people across anywhere in this country 01:40:46.078 --> 01:40:48.189 geographically or any demographic who 01:40:48.189 --> 01:40:50.245 can support the defense of this ? Do 01:40:50.245 --> 01:40:52.022 you believe that uh , our brave 01:40:52.022 --> 01:40:51.759 military , men and women should be 01:40:51.770 --> 01:40:53.992 pitted against one another based solely 01:40:53.992 --> 01:40:56.159 on the race ? No , sir . I do not . Do 01:40:56.159 --> 01:40:58.381 you believe , um , or do you accept the 01:40:58.381 --> 01:41:00.492 proposition that General Brown in his 01:41:00.492 --> 01:41:02.990 August of 2022 memo that we should have 01:41:03.000 --> 01:41:05.129 racial quotas with officer class ? 01:41:05.930 --> 01:41:07.819 Senator ? I , I am not aware that 01:41:07.819 --> 01:41:09.930 General Brown has said that , ok , if 01:41:09.930 --> 01:41:12.299 General Brown said that we should have 01:41:12.310 --> 01:41:14.254 a reduction in the number of white 01:41:14.254 --> 01:41:17.959 officers serving to 67% of officers 01:41:18.439 --> 01:41:20.439 down from whatever , I think it's a 01:41:20.439 --> 01:41:23.080 total of 5400 officers . Do you support 01:41:23.089 --> 01:41:25.330 that Senator ? I support that promotion 01:41:25.339 --> 01:41:27.720 should be based on merit ? Ok . So you 01:41:27.729 --> 01:41:29.785 don't support the idea that we would 01:41:29.785 --> 01:41:31.729 have racial quotas for the officer 01:41:31.729 --> 01:41:33.951 class . That's correct , Senator . Um , 01:41:34.290 --> 01:41:36.401 I do want to ask you also , what role 01:41:36.401 --> 01:41:38.100 do you think ? Um 01:41:40.850 --> 01:41:44.430 de I , alright . What's your experience ? 01:41:44.439 --> 01:41:46.606 What firsthand for you ? What have you 01:41:46.606 --> 01:41:48.939 in these trainings ? What have you seen , 01:41:48.939 --> 01:41:51.050 what have been the the trainings that 01:41:51.050 --> 01:41:50.700 have taken place ? I'm not talking 01:41:50.709 --> 01:41:52.709 about reaching for the best and the 01:41:52.709 --> 01:41:54.931 brightest I wanna understand because we 01:41:54.931 --> 01:41:57.153 have a , we have a military recruitment 01:41:57.153 --> 01:41:59.310 problem , right ? And so the issue I 01:41:59.319 --> 01:42:02.529 think is if people view and this is 01:42:02.540 --> 01:42:04.651 coming from the Department of Defense 01:42:04.651 --> 01:42:06.707 and it's been widely talked about in 01:42:06.707 --> 01:42:08.930 this committee , if people view that um 01:42:09.609 --> 01:42:11.442 politics is being infused in our 01:42:11.442 --> 01:42:13.665 military , do you think that that would 01:42:13.665 --> 01:42:16.140 hurt recruitment ? So that I , I do ? 01:42:16.149 --> 01:42:18.316 And I think the , the military must be 01:42:18.316 --> 01:42:20.649 rigorously alit and nonpartisan , right ? 01:42:20.649 --> 01:42:22.538 Do you think in infusing abortion 01:42:22.538 --> 01:42:24.593 politics into our military hurts our 01:42:24.593 --> 01:42:26.990 recruiting ? So we in the military 01:42:27.000 --> 01:42:29.290 should not be partisan or political ? 01:42:29.299 --> 01:42:31.799 Ok . Do you think infusing COVID 01:42:31.810 --> 01:42:33.866 politics into our military hurts our 01:42:33.866 --> 01:42:37.680 recruiting ? Meaning do you think 01:42:37.689 --> 01:42:40.310 that people should have been fired for 01:42:40.319 --> 01:42:43.040 not getting the vaccine ? So we are 01:42:43.049 --> 01:42:45.271 required to uphold a legal order ? Ok . 01:42:45.271 --> 01:42:47.493 Do you think we should actively recruit 01:42:47.493 --> 01:42:49.810 those 8500 people who were fired for 01:42:49.819 --> 01:42:51.875 not getting the vaccine ? So I would 01:42:51.875 --> 01:42:54.097 like to see those individuals who , who 01:42:54.097 --> 01:42:56.208 can come back um apply to come back . 01:42:56.208 --> 01:42:58.375 Do you think we should recruit them to 01:42:58.375 --> 01:43:00.700 come back ? Yes , sir . Ok . And then 01:43:00.709 --> 01:43:04.660 do you believe um that the , are you 01:43:04.669 --> 01:43:07.089 familiar with the August memo ? Of 2022 01:43:07.100 --> 01:43:09.433 from General Brown . I , I am not sorry . 01:43:09.433 --> 01:43:11.767 Ok , we'll and some follow up questions , 01:43:11.767 --> 01:43:13.878 ask you your , your points of view on 01:43:13.878 --> 01:43:15.878 that . Thank you , Senator Mullin . 01:43:16.979 --> 01:43:19.669 Thank you um for those that are here 01:43:19.680 --> 01:43:21.791 and thank you for the family that has 01:43:21.791 --> 01:43:24.680 come along and , and supported um 01:43:25.509 --> 01:43:27.453 support of these two generals here 01:43:27.453 --> 01:43:30.240 along the way . It's a , it's a family 01:43:30.250 --> 01:43:32.250 affair and I , I said this multiple 01:43:32.250 --> 01:43:35.290 times that , uh you know , no one can 01:43:35.299 --> 01:43:38.089 do their job at their best ability . 01:43:38.100 --> 01:43:40.560 Things at home are rocky . And so those 01:43:40.569 --> 01:43:42.513 that are home , there's still that 01:43:42.513 --> 01:43:44.910 solid foundation uh for um these 01:43:44.919 --> 01:43:47.141 generals and others that are serving uh 01:43:47.141 --> 01:43:49.363 to be at their best . I wanna thank you 01:43:49.363 --> 01:43:51.363 for that . Uh And thank you for the 01:43:51.363 --> 01:43:53.586 time that you've packed up , the houses 01:43:53.586 --> 01:43:55.363 moved and still held the family 01:43:55.363 --> 01:43:57.620 together . Uh It's a sacrifice for the 01:43:57.629 --> 01:43:59.851 entire family and from the deepest part 01:43:59.851 --> 01:43:59.839 of my heart , I want to tell you . 01:43:59.850 --> 01:44:01.939 Thank you so much for that . Um I'm 01:44:01.950 --> 01:44:04.140 gonna be pretty quick here , uh just 01:44:04.149 --> 01:44:06.260 because we're running every which way 01:44:06.260 --> 01:44:08.371 direction right now . Uh So I've just 01:44:08.371 --> 01:44:12.229 got questions for uh general um 01:44:12.240 --> 01:44:14.819 as you know , obviously you spent time 01:44:14.830 --> 01:44:17.029 at Tinker , which we appreciate that . 01:44:17.040 --> 01:44:19.262 Uh It's uh obviously something I'm very 01:44:19.262 --> 01:44:22.089 proud of Bill to represent . Uh I'd 01:44:22.100 --> 01:44:24.479 like to ask uh your best military 01:44:24.490 --> 01:44:26.910 advice on issues , you , uh you know , 01:44:26.919 --> 01:44:29.141 from your time at Tinker Air force base 01:44:29.141 --> 01:44:31.252 in your long career in the air uh air 01:44:31.252 --> 01:44:33.930 battle management . Um The Air Force is 01:44:33.939 --> 01:44:36.161 in the process of investing the E three 01:44:36.161 --> 01:44:38.540 fleet and switching to the E seven . Uh 01:44:38.549 --> 01:44:41.299 the timeline as it stands now has us 01:44:41.310 --> 01:44:44.680 totally divesting the E three by Fy 29 . 01:44:44.970 --> 01:44:47.081 Uh And at that time , I believe we're 01:44:47.081 --> 01:44:49.399 gonna only gonna have five E seven on 01:44:49.410 --> 01:44:52.060 platforms . Are , are we concerned 01:44:52.069 --> 01:44:54.236 about the mission capabilities and the 01:44:54.236 --> 01:44:56.402 gap that might be taking place at that 01:44:56.402 --> 01:44:58.450 point ? Uh Senator , thanks for uh 01:44:58.459 --> 01:45:00.515 mentioning my time at Tinker , I had 01:45:00.515 --> 01:45:02.570 three assignments there and , and uh 01:45:02.570 --> 01:45:04.459 love the base , the people on the 01:45:04.459 --> 01:45:06.740 mission . Uh And , and the E three , I 01:45:06.750 --> 01:45:08.806 have a lot of experience uh in the E 01:45:08.806 --> 01:45:10.879 three all over the , the world great 01:45:10.890 --> 01:45:13.001 capability , but it , it does need to 01:45:13.001 --> 01:45:15.270 be replaced by the E seven and , and I 01:45:15.279 --> 01:45:17.549 appreciate the uh Air Force and , and 01:45:17.560 --> 01:45:20.500 Congress's help in doing that . The gap 01:45:20.509 --> 01:45:23.040 that you mentioned is , is similar to 01:45:23.049 --> 01:45:25.729 the uh uh ballistic missile defense gap 01:45:25.740 --> 01:45:27.959 that , that we've talked about has to 01:45:27.970 --> 01:45:30.081 be managed very , very carefully . Uh 01:45:30.081 --> 01:45:33.000 So if I'm confirmed as the commander of 01:45:33.009 --> 01:45:35.000 NORA and North com , that is a key 01:45:35.009 --> 01:45:37.176 system , not necessarily the E three , 01:45:37.176 --> 01:45:39.049 but the airborne early warning 01:45:39.060 --> 01:45:41.171 capability , whether it's the E three 01:45:41.171 --> 01:45:43.393 or the E seven uh would be critical and 01:45:43.393 --> 01:45:45.338 I would be uh very vocal about the 01:45:45.338 --> 01:45:47.282 requirements and to ensure that we 01:45:47.282 --> 01:45:49.393 don't drop in capability and create a 01:45:49.393 --> 01:45:51.504 bathtub that would keep us from doing 01:45:51.504 --> 01:45:53.727 that job before the new system comes on 01:45:53.727 --> 01:45:56.140 at the current project prediction , a 01:45:56.149 --> 01:46:00.089 pre prediction , current rate to 01:46:00.100 --> 01:46:01.989 which we're going sorry . Uh I uh 01:46:01.989 --> 01:46:04.509 didn't have my coffee this morning um 01:46:04.520 --> 01:46:06.631 at the current rate that we're headed 01:46:06.631 --> 01:46:08.853 right now , we , we see that there will 01:46:08.853 --> 01:46:11.720 be a gap and uh Senator Lankford and 01:46:11.729 --> 01:46:15.600 myself , uh I have a uh , an amendment 01:46:15.609 --> 01:46:18.009 in the ND A that hopefully is gonna be 01:46:18.020 --> 01:46:20.589 helpful to , to fulfilling the mission . 01:46:20.600 --> 01:46:23.339 Why we're making the transition to the 01:46:23.350 --> 01:46:25.520 E seven . And I agree the E three is , 01:46:25.529 --> 01:46:28.129 uh , had a wonderful shelf life . Uh , 01:46:28.140 --> 01:46:30.307 and it's performed this mission well , 01:46:30.350 --> 01:46:32.419 uh , and we do need to upgrade 01:46:32.430 --> 01:46:34.652 especially for the new threats that are 01:46:34.652 --> 01:46:37.520 facing us , but we wanna make sure that 01:46:37.529 --> 01:46:39.970 we are , uh , we're not , we're not , 01:46:40.290 --> 01:46:42.123 you know , hurting ourselves for 01:46:42.123 --> 01:46:44.290 national security purposes , uh on the 01:46:44.290 --> 01:46:46.290 way out the door . Uh , at the same 01:46:46.290 --> 01:46:48.401 time , we don't , we don't want to do 01:46:48.401 --> 01:46:50.512 something that , that , uh , that Air 01:46:50.512 --> 01:46:52.512 Force isn't on track with too , you 01:46:52.512 --> 01:46:54.679 know , a lot of times as legislators , 01:46:54.679 --> 01:46:56.623 we have great ideas , but it's not 01:46:56.623 --> 01:46:58.679 practical . We want to make sure the 01:46:58.679 --> 01:46:58.629 amendment we have is actually practical . 01:46:58.640 --> 01:47:00.680 And so , um , I'd love for you to 01:47:00.689 --> 01:47:02.633 follow up . Uh , and if you're not 01:47:02.633 --> 01:47:04.689 familiar with the amendment , take a 01:47:04.689 --> 01:47:06.911 look at it because it's moving now . Uh 01:47:06.911 --> 01:47:08.967 And so we make sure that we're doing 01:47:08.967 --> 01:47:11.910 what is uh , mission capable and what 01:47:11.919 --> 01:47:13.975 you think would be best in line with 01:47:13.975 --> 01:47:16.030 you too . Right . Yes , I'll do that 01:47:16.030 --> 01:47:18.363 with that . I'll yield back . Thank you , 01:47:18.363 --> 01:47:19.641 sir . Senator Cotton , 01:47:22.379 --> 01:47:24.430 gentlemen . Congratulations on your 01:47:24.439 --> 01:47:26.383 nominations and thank you for your 01:47:26.383 --> 01:47:28.550 lifetime of service and thanks to your 01:47:28.550 --> 01:47:30.661 families for your service and support 01:47:30.661 --> 01:47:33.540 to your missions as well . Uh General , 01:47:33.649 --> 01:47:35.910 yo you believe that as part of part of 01:47:35.919 --> 01:47:38.086 your mission as North com commander is 01:47:38.086 --> 01:47:40.197 airspace control over the continental 01:47:40.197 --> 01:47:42.530 United States , correct ? Yes , Senator . 01:47:42.530 --> 01:47:44.530 Domestically , there are reports of 01:47:44.530 --> 01:47:46.641 over 57 drone incursions over nuclear 01:47:46.641 --> 01:47:49.060 sites since 2015 and at least 510 01:47:49.359 --> 01:47:51.359 unidentified aerial objects reports 01:47:51.359 --> 01:47:53.779 since 2004 centered around restricted 01:47:53.790 --> 01:47:56.012 and sensitive airspace with around half 01:47:56.012 --> 01:47:58.346 of those reported in the last two years . 01:47:58.346 --> 01:48:00.346 How do you view north comms role in 01:48:00.346 --> 01:48:02.401 defense against the threat from such 01:48:02.401 --> 01:48:05.229 unmanned aerial vehicles ? Uh Senator 01:48:05.240 --> 01:48:07.299 is it is a uh role uh to my 01:48:07.310 --> 01:48:09.532 understanding that no ad and North comm 01:48:09.532 --> 01:48:12.790 share with uh with the services uh that 01:48:12.799 --> 01:48:14.966 have been delegated authorities around 01:48:14.966 --> 01:48:16.966 their installations to , to protect 01:48:16.966 --> 01:48:18.410 those . And then the nr A 01:48:18.410 --> 01:48:20.466 responsibility picks up generally in 01:48:20.466 --> 01:48:22.466 the uh air space structure above uh 01:48:22.466 --> 01:48:24.790 above those facilities . Ok . Um I I 01:48:24.799 --> 01:48:26.799 don't want to go into depth through 01:48:26.799 --> 01:48:28.855 hashing the Chinese balloon incident 01:48:28.855 --> 01:48:30.799 from earlier this year . Um But in 01:48:30.799 --> 01:48:32.910 general , if a malign actor illegally 01:48:32.910 --> 01:48:34.688 flies an aircraft over American 01:48:34.688 --> 01:48:36.799 territory with malign intent . Do you 01:48:36.799 --> 01:48:38.966 believe that we should shoot it down , 01:48:38.966 --> 01:48:40.855 Senator ? I absolutely believe we 01:48:40.855 --> 01:48:42.466 should shoot it down if it's 01:48:42.466 --> 01:48:44.466 demonstrated hostile act or hostile 01:48:44.466 --> 01:48:46.577 intent ? Ok . Um , are you aware that 01:48:46.577 --> 01:48:48.743 there were more than 10,000 violations 01:48:48.743 --> 01:48:50.855 of our airspace with drone aircraft , 01:48:50.855 --> 01:48:53.077 conducting intelligence operations last 01:48:53.077 --> 01:48:55.132 year and given the threat we've seen 01:48:55.132 --> 01:48:55.020 that drones pose in Ukraine 01:48:55.470 --> 01:48:59.339 increasingly in Russia . Um , uh , how 01:48:59.350 --> 01:49:01.350 significant are your concerns about 01:49:01.350 --> 01:49:03.294 those violations of our airspace ? 01:49:03.294 --> 01:49:05.239 Senator ? I'm , I'm very concerned 01:49:05.239 --> 01:49:07.017 about any airspace violations . 01:49:07.017 --> 01:49:08.739 Certainly , uh the unmanned uh 01:49:08.739 --> 01:49:10.517 capabilities that , that you're 01:49:10.517 --> 01:49:12.628 mentioning , uh bring a new dimension 01:49:12.628 --> 01:49:14.850 that we haven't had to see in uh in the 01:49:14.850 --> 01:49:16.961 recent years . And if I'm confirmed , 01:49:16.961 --> 01:49:19.072 that would uh take a great deal of my 01:49:19.072 --> 01:49:21.183 attention to address that good . Uh , 01:49:21.183 --> 01:49:23.294 the vast majority of those incursions 01:49:23.294 --> 01:49:25.517 uh were conducted by Mexican cartels in 01:49:25.517 --> 01:49:27.683 support of drug smuggling activities . 01:49:27.683 --> 01:49:29.739 In fact , the US border patrol chief 01:49:29.739 --> 01:49:29.310 has said that we don't have operational 01:49:29.319 --> 01:49:31.375 control of the southern border given 01:49:31.375 --> 01:49:33.597 how drones drones are now being used in 01:49:33.597 --> 01:49:37.140 Ukraine and in Russia . Um How do you 01:49:37.149 --> 01:49:39.371 view the loss of operational control of 01:49:39.371 --> 01:49:41.538 our southern border and the failure to 01:49:41.538 --> 01:49:43.705 establish airspace control as a threat 01:49:43.705 --> 01:49:45.649 there to our ability to defend our 01:49:45.649 --> 01:49:47.816 homeland and our people ? Senator . Uh 01:49:48.169 --> 01:49:50.225 I , I know it sounds trite but I , I 01:49:50.225 --> 01:49:52.391 firmly believe that border security is 01:49:52.391 --> 01:49:55.180 national security and uh if I'm 01:49:55.189 --> 01:49:57.330 confirmed the number one priority , I 01:49:57.339 --> 01:49:59.395 would have is to defend the homeland 01:49:59.395 --> 01:50:01.561 and , and certainly border security uh 01:50:01.561 --> 01:50:03.672 is at the top of that . So I would be 01:50:03.672 --> 01:50:05.506 very concerned about any loss of 01:50:05.506 --> 01:50:07.450 sovereignty in the airspace or the 01:50:07.450 --> 01:50:09.506 ground uh of our borders . But thank 01:50:09.506 --> 01:50:11.728 you for that . According to DH S data , 01:50:11.728 --> 01:50:13.561 uh customs and border protection 01:50:13.561 --> 01:50:15.560 encounter more than 100 Russians 01:50:15.839 --> 01:50:17.729 attempting to illegally enter the 01:50:17.740 --> 01:50:19.851 United States every month near just a 01:50:19.851 --> 01:50:22.229 single location on the US Mexico border . 01:50:22.299 --> 01:50:24.649 Russian military intelligence has more 01:50:24.660 --> 01:50:27.040 officers deployed to Mexico than any 01:50:27.049 --> 01:50:29.620 other country in the world . The 01:50:29.629 --> 01:50:31.462 current north comm commander has 01:50:31.470 --> 01:50:33.649 described China and Russia as quote 01:50:33.660 --> 01:50:36.549 very , a very aggressive and active in 01:50:36.560 --> 01:50:38.939 North comm . Uh We've seen what 01:50:38.950 --> 01:50:41.390 happened with Chinese spy balloon . We 01:50:41.399 --> 01:50:43.540 know that China is setting up shop in 01:50:43.549 --> 01:50:45.160 Cuba , which I understand is 01:50:45.160 --> 01:50:47.327 technically not a part of your area of 01:50:47.327 --> 01:50:49.605 responsibility , but it's pretty close . 01:50:49.605 --> 01:50:51.771 It is in the same way that North Korea 01:50:51.771 --> 01:50:53.993 and China aren't a part of your area of 01:50:53.993 --> 01:50:53.439 responsibility , but they project 01:50:53.450 --> 01:50:55.450 threats into that area . How do you 01:50:55.450 --> 01:50:59.379 view these actions by Russia and China 01:50:59.390 --> 01:51:01.370 to our South as a threat to our 01:51:01.379 --> 01:51:03.959 homeland ? Senator ? I view the actions 01:51:03.970 --> 01:51:06.509 you described as a , a very serious 01:51:06.520 --> 01:51:08.370 threat and , and one that have 01:51:08.379 --> 01:51:10.546 confirmed I will watch very closely uh 01:51:10.546 --> 01:51:12.712 a as you alluded to . It's not just in 01:51:12.712 --> 01:51:14.657 the air that Nora and North com uh 01:51:14.657 --> 01:51:17.540 protect the homeland , uh but also 01:51:17.549 --> 01:51:19.771 through , through all domains including 01:51:19.771 --> 01:51:22.839 the ground . Indeed . Um 01:51:24.330 --> 01:51:26.274 Probably the case that James , for 01:51:26.274 --> 01:51:28.274 instance , was recruited by Russian 01:51:28.274 --> 01:51:30.330 intelligence in Mexico City . And we 01:51:30.330 --> 01:51:32.163 know it's a class that case that 01:51:32.163 --> 01:51:34.620 Russians Russian agents stuck a ice 01:51:34.629 --> 01:51:37.479 pick into Trotsky's head in Mexico . So 01:51:37.890 --> 01:51:40.839 again , that threat is genuine and real 01:51:41.240 --> 01:51:43.073 to the United States . One final 01:51:43.073 --> 01:51:45.129 question . Uh at least 98 terrorists 01:51:45.129 --> 01:51:47.351 were caught on the southern border last 01:51:47.351 --> 01:51:49.351 year . And that doesn't include any 01:51:49.351 --> 01:51:49.330 potential , got ways that we don't know 01:51:49.339 --> 01:51:51.700 about . Uh General Carla said last year , 01:51:51.709 --> 01:51:53.653 it was that it was his commander's 01:51:53.653 --> 01:51:55.910 estimate that ISIS K could conduct an 01:51:55.919 --> 01:51:58.030 external operation against the United 01:51:58.030 --> 01:52:00.086 States or Western interest abroad in 01:52:00.086 --> 01:52:02.252 about six months , perhaps with little 01:52:02.252 --> 01:52:04.197 to no warning . Two years ago , an 01:52:04.197 --> 01:52:06.363 Iraqi man in the United States hatched 01:52:06.363 --> 01:52:08.586 a plot to bring Isis operatives through 01:52:08.586 --> 01:52:08.339 our southern border to assassinate 01:52:08.350 --> 01:52:11.009 former President Bush . Um given your 01:52:11.020 --> 01:52:13.169 experience as the deputy commander in 01:52:13.180 --> 01:52:15.629 the Middle East . Um , can you draw 01:52:15.640 --> 01:52:17.751 upon that to help secure our southern 01:52:17.751 --> 01:52:19.973 border from terrorist attack and ensure 01:52:19.973 --> 01:52:22.196 it does not become yet a new vector for 01:52:22.196 --> 01:52:24.418 attack ? Senator , if I'm confirmed , I 01:52:24.418 --> 01:52:26.640 absolutely will draw on the experiences 01:52:26.640 --> 01:52:28.751 from Central Command cooperation with 01:52:28.751 --> 01:52:30.973 the Special Operations Command and then 01:52:30.973 --> 01:52:33.084 uh new and lasting relationships with 01:52:33.084 --> 01:52:35.140 law enforcement agencies here in the 01:52:35.140 --> 01:52:34.970 homeland to ensure that any of the 01:52:34.979 --> 01:52:36.646 threats that General Carla is 01:52:36.649 --> 01:52:39.069 effectively uh addressing overseas , do 01:52:39.080 --> 01:52:41.247 not make it to our , to our homeland . 01:52:41.247 --> 01:52:43.247 Ok . Thank you . Thank you for your 01:52:43.247 --> 01:52:45.302 testimony . General Whiting . I know 01:52:45.302 --> 01:52:44.410 you're disappointed you didn't get lots 01:52:44.419 --> 01:52:46.530 of hard questions from me , but maybe 01:52:46.530 --> 01:52:48.530 next time . Yes , sir . Thank you . 01:52:49.459 --> 01:52:52.390 Well , thank you , uh General and 01:52:52.399 --> 01:52:55.629 General Whiting and congratulations on 01:52:55.640 --> 01:52:57.751 both of your nominations and great to 01:52:57.751 --> 01:52:59.473 see you and your family here . 01:52:59.473 --> 01:53:01.529 Hopefully we can , uh you know , get 01:53:01.529 --> 01:53:03.751 you through this process and uh get you 01:53:03.751 --> 01:53:05.807 into these important positions , you 01:53:05.807 --> 01:53:08.979 know , North and no ad and United 01:53:08.990 --> 01:53:11.212 States Space Command are so critical to 01:53:11.212 --> 01:53:13.046 our national defense . So I look 01:53:13.046 --> 01:53:14.934 forward to , uh , voting for your 01:53:14.934 --> 01:53:17.157 nomination in committee and then , uh , 01:53:17.157 --> 01:53:19.157 eventually , uh on the floor of the 01:53:19.157 --> 01:53:21.379 United States Senate . Uh , thank you . 01:53:21.379 --> 01:53:21.910 And this hearing is adjourned .