WEBVTT 00:00.230 --> 00:01.452 You can go up there . 00:04.469 --> 00:06.636 All right . Well , thank you very much 00:06.636 --> 00:08.525 for being here today . Ladies and 00:08.525 --> 00:10.636 gentlemen , uh for today's briefing . 00:10.636 --> 00:10.449 I'm pleased to introduce Mr Mark Gore , 00:10.770 --> 00:13.079 the principal Director for Resources 00:13.090 --> 00:14.949 and Analysis for Dod S Chief 00:14.960 --> 00:17.100 Information Officer . He's joining us 00:17.110 --> 00:20.270 today to announce the Dod S 2023 2027 00:20.280 --> 00:22.739 Cyber Workforce strategy implementation 00:22.750 --> 00:25.010 plan . Uh Mr Gore will provide some 00:25.020 --> 00:27.242 opening remarks and then has graciously 00:27.242 --> 00:29.020 agreed to stay and answer a few 00:29.020 --> 00:31.020 questions afterwards . I will stick 00:31.020 --> 00:33.131 around and provide an update on a few 00:33.131 --> 00:35.242 other items uh for ground rules , I'd 00:35.242 --> 00:37.464 ask that you keep your questions for Mr 00:37.464 --> 00:39.464 Gore focused on the Cyber workforce 00:39.464 --> 00:39.400 strategy and I'll be happy to take any 00:39.409 --> 00:41.520 unrelated questions later in the 00:41.529 --> 00:44.349 briefing . Uh Sir , over to you . Thank 00:44.360 --> 00:46.527 you Jenna Rider and thanks for joining 00:46.527 --> 00:49.169 us today on behalf of the dog , Chief 00:49.180 --> 00:51.389 Information Officer , Honorable John 00:51.400 --> 00:54.470 Sherman . I'm Mark , I'm the principal 00:54.479 --> 00:57.509 Director for Resources and analysis in 00:57.520 --> 00:59.464 March . Deputy Deputy Secretary of 00:59.464 --> 01:01.849 Defense Kathleen Hicks signed the 2023 01:01.860 --> 01:05.720 2027 DG Cyber Workforce Strategy . The 01:05.730 --> 01:07.879 strategy provides a road map for the 01:07.889 --> 01:10.089 advancement and unified management of 01:10.099 --> 01:12.690 the cyber workforce comprise about 01:12.699 --> 01:15.839 225,000 highly trained civilians , 01:15.849 --> 01:18.220 military and contractor personnel . 01:19.879 --> 01:22.209 Today we are releasing the cyber 01:22.220 --> 01:24.387 workforce strategy implementation plan 01:25.029 --> 01:27.550 which is a comprehensive and proactive 01:27.559 --> 01:29.779 approach that will further assist the 01:29.790 --> 01:31.809 department in advancing talent 01:31.819 --> 01:34.250 management initiatives aimed at 01:34.260 --> 01:37.550 cultivating an agile , flexible and 01:37.559 --> 01:40.400 responsive cyber workforce . The 01:40.410 --> 01:42.632 implementation plan sets the foundation 01:42.632 --> 01:44.188 for how the department will 01:44.188 --> 01:46.660 successfully execute the 22 objectives 01:46.830 --> 01:49.510 and 38 initiatives tied to the four 01:49.519 --> 01:51.741 goals in the cyber workforce strategy . 01:52.300 --> 01:54.411 To realize the success of these goals 01:54.411 --> 01:56.467 and objectives . We will measure and 01:56.470 --> 01:58.803 monitor progress on a set battle rhythm , 01:59.050 --> 02:01.510 holding ourselves and our executing 02:01.519 --> 02:05.250 organizations accountable to 02:05.260 --> 02:07.349 recruit and retain the most talented 02:07.360 --> 02:09.399 workforce . We must advance our 02:09.410 --> 02:11.860 institutional culture and reform the 02:11.869 --> 02:14.240 way we do business . We are breaking 02:14.250 --> 02:16.509 the mold of the past and changing the 02:16.520 --> 02:19.899 way we identify recruit , develop and 02:19.910 --> 02:23.539 retain our cyber talent . The 02:23.550 --> 02:25.550 threats to our nation don't sleep . 02:25.970 --> 02:27.803 They are watching our every move 02:28.070 --> 02:30.181 imminent cyberattacks are just around 02:30.181 --> 02:32.539 the corner and the calling to defend 02:32.550 --> 02:34.470 and protect our nation in today's 02:34.479 --> 02:36.880 digital battlefield is more important 02:36.889 --> 02:40.850 now than ever before , which brings me 02:40.860 --> 02:43.419 to tell you a story about how dog 02:43.429 --> 02:46.360 personnel are writing history . Now , 02:46.369 --> 02:49.279 we changed the name to protect the um , 02:49.289 --> 02:50.800 the privacy 02:53.130 --> 02:55.309 master sergeant , Jason Hines grew up 02:55.320 --> 02:57.639 in a small town , he graduated high 02:57.649 --> 02:59.816 school and made a decision to join the 02:59.816 --> 03:02.600 Marine Corps . Not long after enlisting 03:02.940 --> 03:05.300 Jason deployed to Iraq , supporting the 03:05.309 --> 03:07.759 regional or regimental combat team's 03:07.770 --> 03:09.937 ability to maneuver and communicate in 03:09.937 --> 03:12.130 the cyber domain though it wasn't the 03:12.139 --> 03:14.259 combat he envisioned . He quickly 03:14.270 --> 03:15.992 discovered the vital role that 03:15.992 --> 03:18.048 technology plays in modern warfare . 03:18.600 --> 03:20.669 Heinz gained experience maintaining 03:20.679 --> 03:23.479 communication systems , analyzing data 03:23.679 --> 03:25.512 and securing networks in extreme 03:25.512 --> 03:28.050 environments . Jason's affinity for 03:28.059 --> 03:29.929 technology drove him to seek out 03:29.940 --> 03:32.490 opportunities to expand his skills and 03:32.500 --> 03:34.833 knowledge in the field of cybersecurity . 03:35.529 --> 03:37.529 He enrolled in specialized training 03:37.529 --> 03:39.585 programs and obtained certifications 03:39.585 --> 03:41.362 that furthered his expertise in 03:41.362 --> 03:43.696 protecting critical information systems . 03:44.360 --> 03:46.416 As Master Sargen Heinz progressed in 03:46.416 --> 03:48.638 his military career , his skills caught 03:48.638 --> 03:50.527 the attention of the Marine Corps 03:50.527 --> 03:52.759 forces cyberspace command , a unit 03:52.770 --> 03:54.992 responsible for offensive and defensive 03:54.992 --> 03:57.699 cyber operations . Jason served as a 03:57.710 --> 03:59.821 defensive cyber operator for the next 03:59.821 --> 04:01.988 few years , few years until making the 04:01.990 --> 04:04.268 decision to separate from the military , 04:04.949 --> 04:07.110 leaving his cyber expertise and top 04:07.119 --> 04:08.960 secret clearance correction , 04:08.970 --> 04:11.169 leveraging his cyber expertise and top 04:11.179 --> 04:13.550 secret clearance . Jason joined a 04:13.559 --> 04:17.220 cybersecurity firm here in DC . Fast 04:17.230 --> 04:20.250 forward to 2016 and the Democratic 04:20.260 --> 04:22.316 National Committee had been hacked . 04:22.559 --> 04:25.190 Jason is now part of a small elite team 04:25.230 --> 04:27.559 of cyber defenders investigating the 04:27.570 --> 04:29.970 breach . The malicious code used to 04:29.980 --> 04:32.910 infiltrate the DNC has been identified 04:32.920 --> 04:34.920 and is discovered to share the same 04:34.920 --> 04:37.320 digital footprint as a previous fishing 04:37.329 --> 04:40.730 attack that occurred in 2015 . After 04:40.739 --> 04:42.517 some additional analysis , it's 04:42.517 --> 04:44.628 confirmed the team has identified the 04:44.628 --> 04:47.410 perpetrator of the attack Russia . 04:49.880 --> 04:52.109 The department commits to being bold 04:52.350 --> 04:54.910 challenging the historical norms and 04:54.920 --> 04:56.698 deriving innovation through new 04:56.698 --> 04:58.642 programs and initiatives that will 04:58.642 --> 05:01.209 bolster the cyber workforce . The 05:01.220 --> 05:03.239 nation's challenges and economic 05:03.250 --> 05:05.417 security are dependent on an effective 05:05.417 --> 05:07.690 cyber workforce ready and able to 05:07.700 --> 05:09.867 execute any mission around the world . 05:10.390 --> 05:13.190 The dod cyber work force continues to 05:13.200 --> 05:15.559 evolve and adapt to address the 05:15.570 --> 05:17.579 challenges posed by our adversaries 05:17.750 --> 05:20.470 with confidence and resolve to win any 05:20.480 --> 05:23.339 conflict . The successful execution of 05:23.350 --> 05:25.406 the cyber workforce strategy through 05:25.406 --> 05:27.829 this implementation plan and follow on 05:27.839 --> 05:30.429 actions will empower the department and 05:30.440 --> 05:32.380 its components to foster the most 05:32.390 --> 05:34.670 capable and dominant cyber workforce in 05:34.679 --> 05:37.029 the world . I look forward to your 05:37.040 --> 05:39.500 questions . Thank you very much , sir . 05:39.579 --> 05:41.412 OK . We'll go ahead and take any 05:41.412 --> 05:42.635 questions for Mr Gore 05:45.040 --> 05:48.059 Jenny . Uh Thank you . Uh I have one 05:48.070 --> 05:50.559 question about the cyber hacking . How 05:50.570 --> 05:53.209 are you copying with the manpower , the 05:53.220 --> 05:56.609 enforcement to respond to North Korea's 05:56.619 --> 06:00.209 uh cyber hacking or Cryptocurrency ? 06:01.640 --> 06:03.862 So again , I'm focused on the workforce 06:03.862 --> 06:05.973 in general and one of our initiatives 06:05.973 --> 06:08.170 is to work with our international 06:08.179 --> 06:11.450 partners on establishing basis of uh 06:11.459 --> 06:14.579 education and tasks and abilities for 06:14.589 --> 06:16.970 each of our cyber work roles . So 06:16.980 --> 06:19.329 partying with North Korea to identify 06:19.429 --> 06:21.940 uh those training objectives , South 06:21.950 --> 06:23.950 Korea , sorry , partying with South 06:23.950 --> 06:27.720 Korea to identify those uh 06:28.239 --> 06:30.295 that training required to be able to 06:30.295 --> 06:32.929 address those operational impacts . So , 06:34.109 --> 06:36.165 you know , involved with the , we're 06:36.165 --> 06:37.942 gonna keep the focus on the the 06:37.942 --> 06:39.739 workforce strategy and not not 06:39.750 --> 06:42.399 operational questions , Jennifer . So 06:42.410 --> 06:44.577 what is the biggest change as a result 06:44.577 --> 06:46.743 of this strategy ? What were you doing 06:46.743 --> 06:48.910 before ? And what's the biggest change 06:48.910 --> 06:48.739 that we're gonna see ? So I think the 06:48.750 --> 06:50.917 biggest change is this is not business 06:50.917 --> 06:53.850 as usual . So to , to address our 06:53.890 --> 06:56.223 shortage and to keep up with the demand , 06:56.223 --> 06:58.279 we must fundamentally change the way 06:58.279 --> 07:00.390 we're doing business . So I think the 07:00.390 --> 07:02.557 biggest change in these initiatives is 07:02.557 --> 07:04.668 how we go after recruitment , looking 07:04.668 --> 07:06.723 at the whole spectrum , how do we go 07:06.723 --> 07:08.668 after education of it's a national 07:08.668 --> 07:10.446 challenge , it's not just a dod 07:10.446 --> 07:12.820 challenge . So how the initiatives we 07:12.829 --> 07:14.920 put in place to go after this , you 07:14.929 --> 07:16.985 know , K through 12 reach , reaching 07:16.985 --> 07:19.440 out getting kids interested in stem uh 07:19.450 --> 07:21.617 and then all the way through the whole 07:21.617 --> 07:23.394 human capital talent management 07:23.394 --> 07:27.329 pipeline to get to uh actual outputs of 07:27.339 --> 07:29.670 people who are qualified and want to 07:29.679 --> 07:31.790 serve their , their , their country . 07:31.859 --> 07:33.748 Uh And , and I , I view this as a 07:33.748 --> 07:36.390 partnership , both private and public . 07:36.529 --> 07:38.751 So we have a lot of initiatives in here 07:38.751 --> 07:41.200 with exchange programs with uh private 07:41.209 --> 07:43.320 industry as well as with other public 07:43.320 --> 07:45.579 entities , other federal agencies . So 07:45.589 --> 07:47.645 we can exchange that talent back and 07:47.645 --> 07:50.029 forth and keeping track of that talent 07:50.040 --> 07:52.649 as we uh go through time . You know , 07:52.660 --> 07:54.938 even for people who leave the military , 07:54.938 --> 07:57.070 like in my story , that's OK . That 07:57.079 --> 07:59.246 helps the nation . The key then is how 07:59.246 --> 08:01.357 do we keep track of those people ? So 08:01.357 --> 08:03.468 if we need them in crisis . We can be 08:03.468 --> 08:05.523 able to call on them to help serve , 08:07.820 --> 08:10.239 um , have a number of cyber attacks , 08:10.250 --> 08:12.417 incidents increased because you have a 08:12.417 --> 08:14.309 larger , uh , number of people 08:14.320 --> 08:16.153 teleworking . Has that increased 08:16.153 --> 08:18.153 vulnerability where they're working 08:18.153 --> 08:20.264 from home , maybe don't have the same 08:20.264 --> 08:22.431 protections or they've got other stuff 08:22.431 --> 08:24.542 on their computer . Yeah . So I don't 08:24.542 --> 08:24.070 have any data that supports that , uh , 08:24.079 --> 08:26.839 assumption . But I would say one of our 08:26.850 --> 08:29.440 initiatives is to empower our hybrid 08:29.450 --> 08:31.940 workforce . We have to find ways to 08:31.950 --> 08:34.549 mitigate the security challenges , um 08:34.559 --> 08:36.670 address those risks and then mitigate 08:36.670 --> 08:39.030 them . Uh So because I think in order 08:39.039 --> 08:41.349 to address the best talent , you have 08:41.359 --> 08:43.679 to have uh flexibility in the workforce 08:44.010 --> 08:46.066 because that's what the workforce of 08:46.066 --> 08:48.260 today is demanding . So how do we uh 08:48.270 --> 08:50.940 enable that flexibility and yet still 08:50.950 --> 08:53.900 remain maintained security ? So that's 08:53.909 --> 08:56.076 one of the huge initiatives that we're 08:56.076 --> 08:58.298 addressing . Let's go to John , I'll go 08:58.298 --> 09:00.242 over to Phil . Thanks . Uh Are you 09:00.242 --> 09:02.353 currently facing currently facing any 09:02.353 --> 09:04.576 uh personnel shortfalls in terms of the 09:04.576 --> 09:06.409 cyber force ? I know some of the 09:06.409 --> 09:08.465 services have been having challenges 09:08.465 --> 09:10.631 recruiting folks for other positions , 09:10.631 --> 09:10.539 but with regard to the cyber workforce 09:10.549 --> 09:12.660 specifically , are you trying to grow 09:12.660 --> 09:14.605 that force ? Uh what's kind of the 09:14.605 --> 09:16.660 state of play there ? So I think the 09:16.660 --> 09:18.771 force is growing . Uh Today , we have 09:18.771 --> 09:21.559 about 24% vacancy rate and our plan in 09:21.570 --> 09:23.514 the first two years of this plan , 09:23.514 --> 09:25.570 we're trying to reduce that about in 09:25.570 --> 09:27.570 half . Uh On the military side , we 09:27.570 --> 09:29.237 actually don't have a problem 09:29.237 --> 09:31.126 recruiting in the cyber workforce 09:31.126 --> 09:33.014 because the military provides the 09:33.014 --> 09:35.181 training and education to train you in 09:35.181 --> 09:37.126 this and then they provide you the 09:37.126 --> 09:39.126 experience . So then the problem is 09:39.126 --> 09:41.126 retention on the civilian side , we 09:41.126 --> 09:43.292 have both a recruiting and a retention 09:43.292 --> 09:45.514 challenge . Um And again , I look at it 09:45.514 --> 09:47.737 as a partnership with industry , how do 09:47.737 --> 09:49.959 we increase those partnerships ? Uh and 09:49.959 --> 09:52.126 moving between each of those , between 09:52.126 --> 09:54.292 public and private sector . So I think 09:54.292 --> 09:56.459 we have to get better at doing that to 09:56.459 --> 09:58.626 address this . And do you have figures 09:58.626 --> 09:58.500 for the total number of personnel that 09:58.510 --> 10:00.732 you're short that you're , you said , I 10:00.732 --> 10:02.899 think 24% something like that . Do you 10:02.899 --> 10:05.121 have , like just in terms of the number 10:05.121 --> 10:07.232 of billets that you're trying to fill 10:07.232 --> 10:10.559 in ? Um So yes , it's about 24% vacancy 10:10.570 --> 10:14.270 rate . Our total force is about 75,000 10:14.280 --> 10:16.909 civilians , 75,000 military and about 10:16.919 --> 10:19.789 75,000 contractors . So you can do the 10:19.799 --> 10:23.739 math on that a couple more . Phil . 10:23.750 --> 10:25.972 And then we'll go over here to Jim . Uh 10:25.972 --> 10:28.229 how has the case of the Air National 10:28.239 --> 10:32.140 Guard , uh , uh , cars affected you , 10:32.150 --> 10:34.372 your , your view of the workforce and , 10:34.372 --> 10:36.440 and the uh talent management , uh 10:36.450 --> 10:38.783 issues that you may be facing as far as . 10:39.270 --> 10:41.492 So again , we , we are looking at the , 10:41.492 --> 10:43.437 the total force here and how do we 10:43.437 --> 10:46.349 provide the talent um and education , 10:46.359 --> 10:48.526 part of our job is to provide them the 10:48.526 --> 10:50.470 knowledge , skills , abilities and 10:50.470 --> 10:52.526 tasks and specific education to know 10:52.526 --> 10:52.369 what's acceptable and what's not 10:52.380 --> 10:54.659 acceptable . Uh So that's how we're 10:54.669 --> 10:56.836 addressing that is through education . 10:56.849 --> 10:58.960 Um In addition , the challenges there 10:58.960 --> 11:01.127 are also , again , like I mentioned in 11:01.127 --> 11:03.016 the hybrid workforce , how do you 11:03.016 --> 11:06.469 maintain that flexibility by yet still 11:06.479 --> 11:08.701 providing the security that we have and 11:08.701 --> 11:10.812 the safeguards that we need to put in 11:10.812 --> 11:13.035 place so that those things don't happen 11:13.035 --> 11:14.979 going in a different way if you're 11:14.979 --> 11:17.570 trying to fill a 24% shortfall , um You 11:17.580 --> 11:19.858 know , are there concerns that by , by , 11:19.858 --> 11:21.913 in the rush to do that ? You could , 11:21.913 --> 11:23.969 you could have opened yourself up to 11:23.969 --> 11:26.080 other vulnerabilities from , from bad 11:26.080 --> 11:28.247 actors . Uh No , I don't , I don't see 11:28.247 --> 11:30.469 it that way at all . Um Again , I think 11:30.469 --> 11:32.469 uh as a national challenge . Well , 11:32.469 --> 11:34.636 first of all , I just think there , if 11:34.636 --> 11:36.802 there's gonna be a bad actor , there's 11:36.802 --> 11:38.913 gonna be a bad actor . Uh The numbers 11:38.913 --> 11:38.250 that we're looking at , you know , 11:38.260 --> 11:42.080 99.999% of all of our uh employees are 11:42.090 --> 11:44.201 outstanding employees and , and doing 11:44.201 --> 11:46.257 the right thing . So when we have an 11:46.257 --> 11:48.979 occasional uh issue , um I think we 11:48.989 --> 11:51.211 address it and we put in procedures and 11:51.211 --> 11:53.378 safeguards to try to prevent that from 11:53.378 --> 11:55.433 happening . Again , final question , 11:55.433 --> 11:57.849 we'll go to the gym . So you gonna have 11:57.859 --> 12:00.020 uh for civilians especially . Are you 12:00.030 --> 12:03.190 gonna have special pays , uh , bonuses 12:03.200 --> 12:05.659 or , you know , signing bonuses or are 12:05.669 --> 12:07.710 you gonna , are you asking for that 12:07.719 --> 12:09.710 sort of leeway in order to try and 12:09.719 --> 12:11.719 attract people because you're never 12:11.719 --> 12:13.886 really gonna be able to match what a , 12:13.886 --> 12:16.809 what a civilian corporation can pay a , 12:16.830 --> 12:19.760 uh , an it specialist . So , so I think 12:19.770 --> 12:21.714 we look at compensation as a total 12:21.714 --> 12:23.881 package and I think one of the biggest 12:23.881 --> 12:25.714 advantages we have in dod is our 12:25.714 --> 12:27.881 mission and it's the only place I know 12:27.881 --> 12:29.881 of in the country that can do legal 12:29.881 --> 12:32.048 offensive cyber operations . So it's a 12:32.048 --> 12:34.214 very much of an attraction to a lot of 12:34.214 --> 12:36.103 people and then service , right ? 12:36.103 --> 12:38.326 Providing that service people have that 12:38.326 --> 12:40.492 uh quality . But in addition , we have 12:40.492 --> 12:42.869 cyber accepted service within Dod where 12:42.880 --> 12:44.991 we can actually pinpoint through work 12:44.991 --> 12:47.750 roles that are critically short and 12:47.760 --> 12:50.038 incentivize them with even greater pay . 12:50.038 --> 12:51.649 And also we already have the 12:51.649 --> 12:53.871 authorities today in general to provide 12:53.871 --> 12:56.038 what we call the three Rs , you know , 12:56.038 --> 12:58.093 relocation retention and recruitment 12:58.093 --> 13:00.359 bonuses which can relate up to 25 or 13:00.369 --> 13:02.258 sometimes up to 50% of their base 13:02.258 --> 13:04.369 salary . So we have those authorities 13:04.369 --> 13:06.425 today . Now it's a matter of getting 13:06.425 --> 13:08.425 the word out and actually utilizing 13:08.425 --> 13:10.313 those authorities to maintain and 13:10.313 --> 13:12.425 attract not all of our talent but the 13:12.425 --> 13:14.536 best talent , sir . Thank you so much 13:14.536 --> 13:16.702 for your time today . Did you have any 13:16.702 --> 13:18.099 closing remarks ? I do 13:23.330 --> 13:25.386 so , I'm closing Thank you again for 13:25.386 --> 13:27.497 joining us today . The call to action 13:27.497 --> 13:30.260 starts now we are a advancing our 13:30.270 --> 13:32.559 institutional culture . We are 13:32.570 --> 13:34.880 proactively and productively addressing 13:34.890 --> 13:36.880 today's cyber threats and we will 13:36.890 --> 13:38.946 remain the most capable and dominant 13:38.946 --> 13:41.001 cyber workforce in the world . And I 13:41.001 --> 13:43.112 thank you for your time . Thank you , 13:43.112 --> 13:46.979 sir . Thank you very 13:46.989 --> 13:47.989 much . 13:52.030 --> 13:55.820 All right . Uh again , big thanks 13:55.830 --> 13:58.260 to Mr Gore for doing that . Uh I do 13:58.270 --> 14:00.381 have a few things at the top that I'd 14:00.381 --> 14:02.492 like to pass along and then we'll get 14:02.492 --> 14:04.548 right to your questions . Um So , um 14:04.659 --> 14:07.330 first regarding the current situation 14:07.340 --> 14:09.919 in , uh let me flag up front that there 14:09.929 --> 14:13.289 are no changes at this time to the US 14:13.299 --> 14:16.349 Military Force posture in during the US 14:16.359 --> 14:18.137 Department of State led ordered 14:18.137 --> 14:19.970 departure . Additionally , state 14:19.970 --> 14:22.400 department has not requested dod 14:22.409 --> 14:24.520 personnel or equipment as part of the 14:24.520 --> 14:27.450 ordered departure . Also , no policy 14:27.460 --> 14:29.404 decisions have been made regarding 14:29.404 --> 14:31.460 future security cooperation . And in 14:31.460 --> 14:33.627 the meantime , as we previously said , 14:33.627 --> 14:35.349 we're taking prudent for force 14:35.349 --> 14:37.516 protection measures and monitoring the 14:37.516 --> 14:39.929 security situation as we continue to 14:39.940 --> 14:42.359 move forward , uh We will monitor the 14:42.369 --> 14:44.570 situation which is fluid and evolving 14:44.770 --> 14:46.659 and I would reiterate that the US 14:46.659 --> 14:48.326 government focus remains on a 14:48.326 --> 14:50.880 diplomatic solution . When and if we 14:50.890 --> 14:53.223 have any significant updates to provide , 14:53.223 --> 14:55.390 we'll be sure to get those to you . On 14:55.390 --> 14:57.168 a separate note earlier today , 14:57.168 --> 14:59.168 Secretary Austin met with Mongolian 14:59.168 --> 15:01.168 Prime Minister Oun Erin here at the 15:01.168 --> 15:03.057 Pentagon to discuss our bilateral 15:03.057 --> 15:05.279 security cooperation efforts within the 15:05.279 --> 15:07.501 Indo Pacific region . A full readout of 15:07.501 --> 15:09.557 the discussion will be posted to the 15:09.557 --> 15:11.779 dod website later this afternoon . Also 15:11.779 --> 15:13.890 today , the Department of Defense and 15:13.890 --> 15:15.834 Coordination with the US Office of 15:15.834 --> 15:17.723 Personnel Management has expanded 15:17.723 --> 15:19.723 eligibility for a benefit that will 15:19.723 --> 15:21.668 provide our military families with 15:21.668 --> 15:23.890 another financial option to help reduce 15:23.890 --> 15:25.723 the cost burdens associated with 15:25.723 --> 15:27.834 dependent child care . This important 15:27.834 --> 15:29.946 initiative is another key step in the 15:29.946 --> 15:32.057 dod s continuing efforts to take care 15:32.057 --> 15:34.390 of our people and ultimately bolsters 15:34.400 --> 15:36.969 military readiness . The dependent care 15:36.979 --> 15:39.035 flexible spending account initiative 15:39.035 --> 15:41.409 provides personal accounts that will 15:41.419 --> 15:43.700 allow eligible service members to set 15:43.710 --> 15:46.900 aside up to $5000 per household and pre 15:46.909 --> 15:48.965 tax earnings for qualified dependent 15:48.969 --> 15:51.909 care expenses . The introduction of the 15:51.919 --> 15:54.219 dependent care , flexible spending will 15:54.229 --> 15:56.340 further help our families afford care 15:56.340 --> 15:58.451 for their loved ones while supporting 15:58.451 --> 16:00.451 the US military's important mission 16:00.451 --> 16:02.173 worldwide . Again , additional 16:02.173 --> 16:04.173 information can be found on the dod 16:04.173 --> 16:06.173 website tomorrow . Secretary Austin 16:06.173 --> 16:08.340 will attend Chief of Staff of the army 16:08.340 --> 16:09.840 General James mcconville , 16:09.840 --> 16:11.896 relinquishment of responsibility and 16:11.896 --> 16:13.951 sergeant major of the army , Michael 16:13.951 --> 16:15.729 Gris's change of responsibility 16:15.729 --> 16:17.729 ceremony . The ceremonies will take 16:17.729 --> 16:19.729 place at Summerall field located on 16:19.729 --> 16:21.951 joint base Myer Henderson Hall . Please 16:21.951 --> 16:23.729 contact army public affairs for 16:23.729 --> 16:25.951 additional details . Another news is an 16:25.951 --> 16:28.118 update from earlier this week over the 16:28.118 --> 16:30.285 last 72 hours in the wake of typhoon I 16:30.285 --> 16:32.229 US . Marines with the third marine 16:32.229 --> 16:34.007 aircraft wing joined with their 16:34.007 --> 16:36.229 Philippine counterparts to deliver over 16:36.229 --> 16:38.173 32 tons of humanitarian assistance 16:38.173 --> 16:40.340 supplies provided by the government of 16:40.340 --> 16:42.396 the Philippines to remote Philippine 16:42.396 --> 16:44.960 Islands . Us marines provided relief 16:44.969 --> 16:47.136 and life saving capabilities to remote 16:47.136 --> 16:49.136 regions at the request of the armed 16:49.136 --> 16:51.247 forces of the Philippines in response 16:51.247 --> 16:53.413 to the typhoon . In addition , US Navy 16:53.413 --> 16:55.469 and Marines also conducted over land 16:55.469 --> 16:57.580 and water , search and rescue efforts 16:57.580 --> 16:59.525 in support of the Philippine Coast 16:59.525 --> 17:01.691 Guard north of the Luzon region . On 3 17:01.691 --> 17:03.580 August US Marines were pleased to 17:03.580 --> 17:05.747 accompany the Philippines Secretary of 17:05.747 --> 17:07.858 National Defense to do to participate 17:07.858 --> 17:09.920 in humanitarian efforts at LALO an 17:09.930 --> 17:12.097 enhanced defense cooperation agreement 17:12.097 --> 17:14.041 site to demonstrate our unwavering 17:14.041 --> 17:16.079 support to the ongoing humanitarian 17:16.089 --> 17:17.922 assistance and disaster response 17:17.922 --> 17:21.380 operations . Shifting gears over the 17:21.390 --> 17:23.612 over the next few days , national Guard 17:23.612 --> 17:25.819 troops from 25 states , one territory 17:25.829 --> 17:27.829 and multiple international partners 17:27.920 --> 17:30.189 will arrive at the National All Domain 17:30.199 --> 17:32.421 War Fighting Center in Michigan for the 17:32.421 --> 17:35.420 kickoff of northern strike 23-2 . 1 of 17:35.430 --> 17:37.430 the Department of Defense's largest 17:37.430 --> 17:39.541 Reserve Component readiness exercises 17:39.750 --> 17:41.972 from August 5th through the 19th . More 17:41.972 --> 17:43.972 than 7000 service members will take 17:43.972 --> 17:46.194 part in the integrated training at Camp 17:46.194 --> 17:48.194 Grayling Maneuver training center , 17:48.194 --> 17:50.528 Alpena Combat readiness training center , 17:50.528 --> 17:52.639 Selfridge Air National Guard Base and 17:52.639 --> 17:55.500 Oscoda forth airfield . Northern strike 17:55.510 --> 17:57.500 uh trains for joint operations and 17:57.510 --> 17:59.454 decisive action missions including 17:59.454 --> 18:01.232 offense , defense and stability 18:01.232 --> 18:03.329 operations with special emphasis on 18:03.339 --> 18:05.339 contested sustainment , logistics , 18:05.339 --> 18:07.450 combined joint all Domain command and 18:07.450 --> 18:09.506 control and combined armed live fire 18:09.506 --> 18:11.640 exercises . Additional focused 18:11.650 --> 18:13.483 opportunities include joint fire 18:13.483 --> 18:15.594 support with live close air support , 18:15.594 --> 18:17.650 integrated maneuver with fires force 18:17.650 --> 18:19.817 protection , air mobility and C four I 18:19.817 --> 18:22.094 elements of theater air ground systems . 18:22.319 --> 18:24.430 Unique to this year's exercise design 18:24.439 --> 18:26.439 is the integration of inter theater 18:26.439 --> 18:28.495 medical care training where Northern 18:28.495 --> 18:30.328 strike participants will eval or 18:30.328 --> 18:32.328 evacuate simulated patients to Fort 18:32.328 --> 18:34.106 mccoy , Wisconsin for follow on 18:34.106 --> 18:36.050 treatment . Northern strike is the 18:36.060 --> 18:38.004 premier reserve component training 18:38.004 --> 18:40.171 event designed to build readiness with 18:40.171 --> 18:42.393 joint and partner forces in all domains 18:42.393 --> 18:44.504 of warfare . And I'd encourage you to 18:44.504 --> 18:46.227 contact the National Guard for 18:46.227 --> 18:48.504 additional information . And with that , 18:48.504 --> 18:50.671 we'll take your questions , start with 18:50.671 --> 18:52.671 A P and then we'll go to Fox Tara . 18:52.671 --> 18:54.782 Thank you . Um I'd like to go back to 18:55.270 --> 18:58.640 besides the uh training being suspended . 18:58.939 --> 19:02.199 Are there any other changes to uh the 19:02.209 --> 19:04.320 US military presence there ? Are they 19:04.320 --> 19:06.619 all staying on base ? Are any flights 19:06.630 --> 19:08.939 taking off um the airspace ? As I 19:08.949 --> 19:11.171 understand the junta has restricted the 19:11.171 --> 19:13.171 airspace . So is that affecting any 19:13.171 --> 19:15.116 sort of training flights for uh us 19:15.116 --> 19:17.282 military personnel ? Um Thanks for the 19:17.282 --> 19:19.393 question . So first of all , as we've 19:19.393 --> 19:21.560 highlighted , there's no changes uh to 19:21.560 --> 19:23.969 the US Military Force posture in or 19:23.979 --> 19:26.739 policies at this time . Um The our 19:26.750 --> 19:29.500 forces there in continue to uh 19:29.510 --> 19:32.109 cooperate daily with Nigerian forces to 19:32.119 --> 19:34.150 keep base operations and services 19:34.160 --> 19:36.449 functioning . Uh And so we're , as I 19:36.459 --> 19:38.681 mentioned , we're continuing to monitor 19:38.681 --> 19:40.792 the situation which remains fluid and 19:40.792 --> 19:43.015 evolving . Uh But right now again , our 19:43.015 --> 19:45.126 focus is going to continue to be on a 19:45.126 --> 19:47.609 diplomatic solution to the situation 19:47.619 --> 19:49.786 there . So just to follow up on that , 19:49.786 --> 19:52.140 so cooperate , are us forces going 19:52.150 --> 19:54.372 outside the base ? Are they still going 19:54.372 --> 19:56.372 on missions or is everybody staying 19:56.372 --> 19:58.539 inside the base for now ? Yes . So for 19:58.539 --> 20:00.539 the most part , right now , they're 20:00.539 --> 20:02.650 staying on the bases , as I mentioned 20:02.650 --> 20:04.706 earlier this week , uh If there is a 20:04.706 --> 20:06.928 reason that they need to go off base to 20:06.928 --> 20:09.209 engage with counterparts , um you know , 20:09.219 --> 20:11.619 certainly conditions permitting they're 20:11.630 --> 20:13.741 doing that . But for force protection 20:13.741 --> 20:15.686 reasons , largely remaining on the 20:15.686 --> 20:17.949 bases and again , cooperating with the 20:18.400 --> 20:21.310 forces to keep those bases running . 20:22.089 --> 20:24.130 One quick question . I go to Fox 20:24.400 --> 20:26.500 because the airspace is restricted . 20:26.510 --> 20:28.454 Does the military have any role in 20:28.454 --> 20:30.959 helping negotiate flights for the 20:30.969 --> 20:33.810 Americans that are in that are being 20:33.819 --> 20:36.160 asked to evacuate out ? Uh So for the 20:36.170 --> 20:38.281 order departure , uh State Department 20:38.281 --> 20:40.337 has a lead . They have not requested 20:40.337 --> 20:42.337 any support from dod at this time , 20:42.337 --> 20:44.226 Jennifer , are there any Nigerian 20:44.226 --> 20:46.003 troops on the base where the US 20:46.003 --> 20:49.140 military is located ? Um So uh I'd 20:49.150 --> 20:51.483 refer you to Africo for further details . 20:51.483 --> 20:53.706 But my understanding , the short answer 20:53.706 --> 20:56.209 is yes , we continue to uh work with uh 20:56.219 --> 20:58.386 our Nigerian counterparts there on the 20:58.386 --> 21:00.552 ground . Uh Obviously the , the forces 21:00.552 --> 21:02.552 that are not necessarily associated 21:02.552 --> 21:05.400 with uh this seizure of uh the , the 21:05.410 --> 21:08.699 president . Um But again , we're , 21:08.709 --> 21:10.709 we're working with them on a , on a 21:10.709 --> 21:12.820 daily basis to keep the bases running 21:12.820 --> 21:14.820 and the services going ? And do you 21:14.820 --> 21:16.876 have any assurances from the current 21:16.876 --> 21:18.987 military leadership of that they will 21:18.987 --> 21:21.530 not harm either us forces or that , 21:21.540 --> 21:24.739 that us forces can remain on the base 21:24.760 --> 21:28.719 in , in uh in a well , uh 21:28.729 --> 21:31.349 again , uh as we monitor the situation , 21:31.359 --> 21:33.415 I I mentioned earlier in the week uh 21:33.415 --> 21:35.526 that the , the chairman has spoken to 21:35.526 --> 21:38.229 his counterpart in . Um Right now , we 21:38.239 --> 21:40.183 have no indication of any imminent 21:40.183 --> 21:43.160 threat against American forces in the 21:43.170 --> 21:45.337 country . Uh Again , this is something 21:45.337 --> 21:47.337 that we'll continue to monitor very 21:47.337 --> 21:50.530 closely . Thank you . I have two 21:50.540 --> 21:52.459 questions . First question on the 21:52.469 --> 21:55.619 private kings . Private King's North 21:55.630 --> 21:59.099 Korea choice seems to be the wrong 21:59.109 --> 22:02.839 choice because there is no freedom and 22:02.849 --> 22:05.229 human rights in North Korea and the 22:05.239 --> 22:08.890 people suffer from hunger . My question 22:08.900 --> 22:12.689 is , what kind of education is the dod 22:13.109 --> 22:17.069 providing to us soldiers about North 22:17.079 --> 22:20.979 Korea ? Um Janie , you know , in 22:20.989 --> 22:24.810 terms of uh what kind of um 22:25.170 --> 22:27.170 training or , or anything like like 22:27.170 --> 22:29.392 that in Korea . And I'd refer you to us 22:29.392 --> 22:32.540 FK I think largely speaking , most 22:32.550 --> 22:34.880 folks have an understanding of the 22:34.890 --> 22:37.410 situation in North Korea as it pertains 22:37.420 --> 22:39.587 to private king . Again , I don't want 22:39.587 --> 22:41.809 to speculate as I've mentioned before . 22:41.809 --> 22:44.031 It's under investigation and we'll know 22:44.031 --> 22:46.510 more later , the US is aware that North 22:46.520 --> 22:50.119 Korea is an enemy country . Uh Again , 22:50.130 --> 22:52.300 I I think there are , are clear , uh 22:52.310 --> 22:55.150 There's a clear understanding about 22:55.310 --> 22:59.310 entry into and out of North Korea . But 22:59.489 --> 23:01.600 again , for specifics , I'd refer you 23:01.600 --> 23:04.079 to us FK Phil . Um The Department of 23:04.089 --> 23:06.200 Justice has announced charges against 23:06.200 --> 23:09.089 two sailors for espionage related to 23:09.099 --> 23:11.469 China . Um Has the , I'm not asking 23:11.479 --> 23:13.701 about that investigation or that case , 23:13.701 --> 23:15.646 but has the dod conducted a damage 23:15.646 --> 23:17.839 assessment ? And if so , um what are 23:17.849 --> 23:19.905 your concerns ? Yeah , thanks . So I 23:19.905 --> 23:21.738 don't , I don't have anything to 23:21.738 --> 23:23.682 provide on that right now . I I am 23:23.682 --> 23:25.849 aware uh of DOJ S announcement today . 23:25.849 --> 23:28.016 So a as it relates to that , I'd , I'd 23:28.016 --> 23:30.127 refer you to them . Thank you or just 23:30.127 --> 23:32.293 to follow on that . This is the second 23:32.293 --> 23:31.510 time this year a service member has 23:31.520 --> 23:33.464 been charged with uh disseminating 23:33.464 --> 23:35.298 classified information . Are you 23:35.298 --> 23:37.409 considering taking measures above and 23:37.409 --> 23:39.464 beyond what the Pentagon has already 23:39.464 --> 23:41.576 done following the case of Jack ? Are 23:41.576 --> 23:43.853 you looking at the possibility of that , 23:43.853 --> 23:43.280 you know , without getting into 23:43.290 --> 23:45.680 specific cases ? Uh as we've talked 23:45.689 --> 23:47.745 about before , I think we have clear 23:47.745 --> 23:49.856 policies and procedures in place when 23:49.856 --> 23:52.078 it comes to safeguarding and protecting 23:52.078 --> 23:54.310 sensitive information . Uh And so , uh 23:54.319 --> 23:56.349 if those rules are violated , 23:56.359 --> 23:58.526 appropriate action will be taken uh as 23:58.530 --> 24:00.520 it has in the cases that were 24:00.530 --> 24:02.586 highlighted , you put in more , more 24:02.586 --> 24:04.586 actions and more steps for security 24:04.586 --> 24:06.474 following to , to share . Are you 24:06.474 --> 24:08.641 considering adding on to those or , or 24:08.641 --> 24:08.530 expanding those in some way ? Because 24:08.829 --> 24:10.890 you just see them fail again in this 24:10.900 --> 24:12.956 case . Yeah . Again , I mean , the , 24:12.956 --> 24:16.180 the broader issue of uh espionage 24:16.239 --> 24:19.800 or , um , or the , the 24:19.810 --> 24:21.921 lack of proper handling of classified 24:21.921 --> 24:24.479 information , uh is something as old as 24:24.489 --> 24:26.489 warfare itself that said again , we 24:26.489 --> 24:28.378 have a robust set of policies and 24:28.378 --> 24:30.619 procedures going through uh the 24:30.630 --> 24:32.989 situation uh that you're referencing in 24:33.000 --> 24:35.939 terms of uh , uh the airmen , as you 24:35.949 --> 24:38.569 know , uh , we have done a , a very 24:38.579 --> 24:40.746 thorough analysis on steps that can be 24:40.746 --> 24:43.660 taken to further tighten controls and , 24:43.670 --> 24:45.837 and we're working through that process 24:45.837 --> 24:48.059 now . Thank you . Let me go back here . 24:48.059 --> 24:50.520 Yes , ma'am . Uh Do they have any ties 24:50.530 --> 24:53.890 to China such as family members ? Again , 24:53.900 --> 24:56.122 I don't want to get ahead of the DO DOJ 24:56.122 --> 24:58.122 investigation . So I'd refer you to 24:58.122 --> 25:00.289 them for any questions on that . Thank 25:00.289 --> 25:02.579 you , sir . So , in the Wall Street 25:02.589 --> 25:04.589 Journal this week , it was reported 25:04.589 --> 25:06.589 that anywhere from 20,000 to 50,000 25:06.589 --> 25:09.130 Ukrainians have suffered mutilation of 25:09.140 --> 25:11.251 limbs . I'm just wondering if you can 25:11.251 --> 25:13.362 add color to that if the Pentagon has 25:13.362 --> 25:15.418 any figures in terms of , you know , 25:15.418 --> 25:18.199 casualties to that level over there in 25:18.209 --> 25:20.589 Ukraine , I don't have any casualty 25:20.599 --> 25:22.920 data to provide as it relates to 25:22.930 --> 25:26.760 Ukraine . Clearly , we know that the um 25:26.849 --> 25:29.071 that the damage and suffering inflicted 25:29.071 --> 25:30.905 upon the Ukrainian people by the 25:30.905 --> 25:33.290 Russians uh due to their illegal 25:33.300 --> 25:36.329 invasion of Ukraine is significant . Uh 25:36.339 --> 25:39.160 which is again , another reason why we 25:39.170 --> 25:41.003 would call on Russia to end this 25:41.003 --> 25:42.949 conflict immediately . Um In the 25:42.959 --> 25:45.130 meantime , knowing that they have no 25:45.140 --> 25:47.307 indication of doing that , we're going 25:47.307 --> 25:49.473 to continue to support Ukraine working 25:49.473 --> 25:51.640 with our allies and partners to ensure 25:51.640 --> 25:53.807 that they have the capabilities , they 25:53.807 --> 25:53.560 need to defend their country . Thank 25:53.569 --> 25:57.010 you . Yes , ma'am , Tima from Al 25:57.160 --> 25:59.327 Jazeera English . Could you comment on 25:59.327 --> 26:01.750 reporting from the A P today about the 26:01.760 --> 26:03.927 possibility of the US military putting 26:03.927 --> 26:06.390 armed personnel on commercial ships to 26:06.400 --> 26:08.630 prevent Iran harassing and seizing 26:08.640 --> 26:10.949 ships in the street ? Yeah , I've seen 26:10.959 --> 26:13.237 those press reports . I would tell you , 26:13.237 --> 26:15.403 I don't have any announcements to make 26:15.403 --> 26:17.515 regarding any force posture changes . 26:17.515 --> 26:19.770 As you are tracking , we previously 26:19.780 --> 26:22.489 announced the decision to deploy the 26:22.500 --> 26:24.520 Baton Amphibious Readiness Group , 26:24.530 --> 26:27.229 marine expeditionary unit into uh the 26:27.239 --> 26:29.530 area of responsibility there uh as well 26:29.540 --> 26:32.880 as F-35s , F-16s and A tens . Uh But as 26:32.890 --> 26:35.001 it pertains to that , that particular 26:35.001 --> 26:37.057 reporting , I don't have anything to 26:37.057 --> 26:39.223 provide . Thank you very much , Tony . 26:39.223 --> 26:41.223 One budget question and one broader 26:41.223 --> 26:43.446 question . Uh Jon Tester last week said 26:43.446 --> 26:45.557 the Senator Jon Tester last week said 26:45.557 --> 26:45.510 he expected the dod to submit a 26:45.520 --> 26:48.469 supplemental for Ukraine this month . 26:48.479 --> 26:50.535 What's the status of any preparation 26:50.535 --> 26:53.994 for a fiscal 23 or 24 supplemental ? 26:54.015 --> 26:55.793 Thanks , Tony . Um I don't have 26:55.793 --> 26:57.959 anything to provide for you today . Um 26:57.959 --> 27:00.182 If that changes , certainly , we'll let 27:00.182 --> 27:02.182 you know something in the works . A 27:02.182 --> 27:04.459 again , I'm not gonna get ahead of any , 27:04.459 --> 27:06.626 any process at this point on a broader 27:06.626 --> 27:08.848 subject , the , the Gallup uh this week 27:09.430 --> 27:11.263 disclosed a poll that shows that 27:11.263 --> 27:13.486 confidence in the US military among the 27:13.486 --> 27:15.597 public is the lowest in two decades . 27:16.079 --> 27:18.250 Did that poll generate any discussion 27:18.260 --> 27:21.119 among the leadership here in terms of 27:21.130 --> 27:23.650 why it's happened ? And what steps dud 27:23.660 --> 27:26.910 can take to uh pull that back or 27:27.810 --> 27:30.032 can't just pull that back , burnish his 27:30.032 --> 27:32.199 image with the public . Um Well , I've 27:32.199 --> 27:34.310 seen the , the press reporting on the 27:34.310 --> 27:36.477 poll . Uh I will say I'm not really in 27:36.477 --> 27:38.532 a position to address the why behind 27:38.532 --> 27:40.310 the decrease in those numbers , 27:40.310 --> 27:42.477 particularly since the research didn't 27:42.477 --> 27:44.588 really delve into that beyond stating 27:44.588 --> 27:46.699 that there has been a general decline 27:46.699 --> 27:48.921 in confidence in public institutions at 27:48.921 --> 27:51.143 large . Um So I'll offer a few thoughts 27:51.143 --> 27:53.088 with the caveat that these are pat 27:53.088 --> 27:55.199 rider , personal opinions . So , um , 27:55.199 --> 27:58.150 first , uh the US military uh continues 27:58.160 --> 28:00.910 to be the best fighting organization in 28:00.920 --> 28:03.142 the history of the world . Anywhere you 28:03.142 --> 28:05.142 go around the globe . 24 7 , you're 28:05.142 --> 28:07.087 gonna see our soldiers , sailors , 28:07.087 --> 28:09.142 airmen , marines , guardians , coast 28:09.142 --> 28:11.031 guard men conducting operations , 28:11.031 --> 28:13.031 bolstering our defense and security 28:13.031 --> 28:14.809 cooperation , relationships and 28:14.809 --> 28:16.864 engaging in activities that keep our 28:16.864 --> 28:18.976 country safe . And I would say that a 28:18.976 --> 28:21.142 consistent fact throughout the history 28:21.142 --> 28:23.309 of the American military is that there 28:23.309 --> 28:26.270 has been and continues to be uh brave 28:26.280 --> 28:28.391 and selfless , selfless Americans who 28:28.391 --> 28:30.558 are willing to raise their hand , take 28:30.558 --> 28:32.613 an oath to defend the constitution , 28:32.613 --> 28:34.724 defend our nation , regardless of how 28:34.724 --> 28:37.369 popular the military is or military 28:37.380 --> 28:39.949 service is at any point in time . Uh 28:39.959 --> 28:42.229 And , and as you see in those polls 28:42.239 --> 28:44.339 that popularity ebbs and flows over 28:44.349 --> 28:47.020 time . But let me just conclude by 28:47.030 --> 28:49.380 saying that we don't take public trust 28:49.390 --> 28:51.630 and confidence for granted is an all 28:51.640 --> 28:53.807 volunteer force . We know that we have 28:53.807 --> 28:55.862 a responsibility to Congress and the 28:55.862 --> 28:57.862 American public to ensure that they 28:57.862 --> 28:59.862 have an understanding of what we're 28:59.862 --> 29:01.918 doing to defend the country , how we 29:01.918 --> 29:04.150 are uh spending taxpayer dollars , how 29:04.160 --> 29:06.579 we are employing the resources that 29:06.589 --> 29:08.719 we've been entrusted with . Uh And so 29:08.729 --> 29:10.785 through a variety of means , whether 29:10.785 --> 29:13.007 it's community relations , whether it's 29:13.007 --> 29:14.785 media engagement , whether it's 29:14.785 --> 29:16.951 congressional testimony or through our 29:16.951 --> 29:19.285 recruiting efforts , just to name a few , 29:19.285 --> 29:21.285 uh we will continue to stay engaged 29:21.285 --> 29:23.451 with the public that we serve . Uh and 29:23.451 --> 29:25.562 that our fellow citizens can have the 29:25.562 --> 29:27.785 facts when it comes to their military . 29:27.785 --> 29:29.562 And so we're gonna work hard to 29:29.562 --> 29:29.469 continue to maintain that trust and 29:29.479 --> 29:31.701 confidence . This is an indication that 29:31.701 --> 29:33.757 the right wing republican attacks on 29:33.757 --> 29:36.469 the military from being too wonk and 29:36.479 --> 29:38.535 the media echo chamber and the right 29:38.535 --> 29:40.535 wing world are having an impact and 29:40.535 --> 29:42.646 this may be a reflection of that . Uh 29:42.646 --> 29:44.868 Again , you know , the challenge here , 29:44.868 --> 29:46.868 Tony is uh you go out and you ask a 29:46.868 --> 29:48.979 question , yes or no . And the Gallup 29:48.979 --> 29:51.090 poll produces some statistics . I I'm 29:51.099 --> 29:53.432 not gonna sit here and speculate on the , 29:53.432 --> 29:55.155 the specific wise , other than 29:55.155 --> 29:57.210 acknowledge the fact that uh earning 29:57.210 --> 29:58.988 the trust and confidence of the 29:58.988 --> 30:01.043 American public is something we will 30:01.043 --> 30:02.932 continue to do uh in the midst of 30:02.932 --> 30:05.210 continuing to do what's job number one , 30:05.210 --> 30:07.266 which is defending this nation . And 30:07.266 --> 30:09.377 that's something that we do very well 30:09.377 --> 30:11.599 and that we'll continue to do . But let 30:11.599 --> 30:11.439 me , I'm happy to talk with you a 30:11.449 --> 30:13.671 little bit more off line and we can let 30:13.671 --> 30:15.893 me go here to Dan and then I'm gonna go 30:15.893 --> 30:17.727 to the phone . So I don't get in 30:17.727 --> 30:19.838 trouble with the phone guys . Can you 30:19.838 --> 30:21.939 clarify what the situation is on the 30:21.949 --> 30:25.410 border between Poland and Belarus ? And 30:25.420 --> 30:27.364 to what degree is their heightened 30:27.364 --> 30:30.680 concern about the presence of Russian 30:30.689 --> 30:32.780 Wagner paramilitary units along the 30:32.790 --> 30:35.012 border ? Yeah , thanks Dan . So , um uh 30:35.012 --> 30:36.790 you know , when it comes to the 30:36.790 --> 30:38.846 specific situation on the border , I 30:38.846 --> 30:40.846 think really Poland are in the best 30:40.846 --> 30:42.790 position to talk to you about what 30:42.790 --> 30:45.199 their current situation and concerns 30:45.209 --> 30:47.153 are largely speaking . Again . I'm 30:47.153 --> 30:49.449 aware of uh the rhetoric that we've 30:49.459 --> 30:51.650 seen from , from Wagner and from 30:51.660 --> 30:54.469 Belarus as it pertains to the border 30:54.780 --> 30:57.420 right now . There are no plans that I'm 30:57.430 --> 30:59.920 aware of . Uh you know , from a US 30:59.930 --> 31:02.660 standpoint to , to adjust our current 31:02.670 --> 31:05.079 force posture . Um We obviously are 31:05.089 --> 31:07.200 committed to the security of NATO and 31:07.200 --> 31:09.089 we will continue to stay in close 31:09.089 --> 31:11.311 communication with our Polish allies on 31:11.311 --> 31:13.311 that front . But you don't see some 31:13.311 --> 31:15.533 kind of heightened risk . I'm not , I'm 31:15.533 --> 31:17.589 not aware of any imminent risk right 31:17.589 --> 31:19.619 now as it relates to cross border 31:19.630 --> 31:21.770 operations . But again , you know , 31:21.780 --> 31:24.113 when it comes to Wagner Group , I think , 31:24.113 --> 31:26.280 well , we all keep a close eye all the 31:26.280 --> 31:28.224 time . Just more on Ukraine on the 31:28.224 --> 31:30.447 counter offensive . There seems to be a 31:30.447 --> 31:32.839 consensus now that it's a difficult 31:32.849 --> 31:35.560 task and there hasn't been , you know , 31:35.569 --> 31:39.439 kind of a dramatic breakthrough . There 31:39.449 --> 31:41.616 is some criticism that the US has been 31:41.616 --> 31:43.616 too slow at times in providing some 31:43.616 --> 31:45.859 weapon systems over time , whether it's 31:45.869 --> 31:49.810 tanks or longer range missiles . And 31:49.819 --> 31:52.540 that , that is perhaps also complicated 31:52.550 --> 31:54.772 things for the Ukrainians . What's your 31:54.772 --> 31:56.772 response to that criticism ? Do you 31:56.772 --> 31:58.883 think there's any truth to that ? Not 31:58.883 --> 32:01.106 at all . I think that we have been very 32:01.106 --> 32:04.050 aggressive in providing Ukraine uh with 32:04.060 --> 32:06.227 a variety of capabilities . And when I 32:06.227 --> 32:08.171 say we , the United States and the 32:08.171 --> 32:08.150 international community and that's 32:08.160 --> 32:10.327 something that we're going to continue 32:10.327 --> 32:12.549 to keep after the , the problem is that 32:12.549 --> 32:15.719 Russia invaded its democratic neighbor , 32:15.729 --> 32:18.900 unprovoked uh and has killed thousands 32:18.910 --> 32:21.770 and thousands of innocent people . And 32:21.780 --> 32:24.729 so , um there are no illusions that 32:24.739 --> 32:27.250 this , this fight that Ukraine finds 32:27.260 --> 32:30.310 itself in is an easy fight . Uh And so 32:30.319 --> 32:33.709 again , um Russia has had time to build 32:33.719 --> 32:36.280 up the defenses along their occupied 32:36.290 --> 32:38.630 areas and Ukraine is , is taking the 32:38.640 --> 32:40.696 fight to them and it's going to be a 32:40.696 --> 32:42.918 tough fight . Um But you know , I would 32:42.918 --> 32:45.029 just go back and highlight , first of 32:45.029 --> 32:44.910 all , we've been training the 32:44.920 --> 32:48.880 Ukrainians since 2014 . Um Even 32:48.890 --> 32:51.650 after the war started after the , after 32:51.660 --> 32:53.771 Russia's invasion , the international 32:53.771 --> 32:55.716 community , the United States have 32:55.716 --> 32:57.604 continued to help train Ukrainian 32:57.604 --> 32:59.604 forces . We've literally met almost 32:59.604 --> 33:01.716 every single month since the invasion 33:01.716 --> 33:03.549 uh with international allies and 33:03.549 --> 33:05.771 partners over 50 to highlight Ukraine's 33:05.771 --> 33:08.060 needs and rush aid , uh security 33:08.069 --> 33:10.699 assistance to them . Uh So we , we are 33:10.709 --> 33:12.765 confident that they have significant 33:12.765 --> 33:15.140 combat capability uh available to them 33:15.150 --> 33:17.261 and that they're going to deploy that 33:17.261 --> 33:17.250 at a time and place that they're 33:17.260 --> 33:19.810 choosing to defend their country and 33:19.819 --> 33:21.986 take back sovereign territory . Let me 33:21.986 --> 33:24.152 move on to a few more questions here . 33:24.152 --> 33:26.430 Yes , sir . And then I'm really , yeah , 33:26.430 --> 33:28.486 you all the way in the back and then 33:28.486 --> 33:30.819 I'm gonna go to the phone um on Tuesday , 33:30.819 --> 33:32.597 uh you were asked about Senator 33:32.597 --> 33:34.652 Tuberville's holds uh about how that 33:34.652 --> 33:36.819 affects readiness . And you said , you 33:36.819 --> 33:38.708 know , the Pentagon is focused on 33:38.708 --> 33:40.930 winning our nation's wars and winning , 33:40.930 --> 33:43.152 you know , winning battles . Uh I think 33:43.152 --> 33:45.208 you said was the term you phrased um 33:45.208 --> 33:47.263 are are winning wars and I wanted to 33:47.263 --> 33:49.486 ask you about that . Um The Pentagon is 33:49.486 --> 33:51.708 a reflective institution along with the 33:51.708 --> 33:53.708 services . Uh That's why we have so 33:53.708 --> 33:55.869 lessons learned . Uh This month marks 33:55.880 --> 33:57.910 two years since the 20 year war of 33:57.920 --> 34:00.239 Afghanistan ended . What does the 34:00.250 --> 34:02.339 Pentagon see that ? As did we win or 34:02.349 --> 34:04.540 did we lose ? And I , and I don't ask 34:04.550 --> 34:06.828 that to be flippant or is it ? Got you . 34:06.828 --> 34:08.883 But , but I wondered what is the two 34:08.883 --> 34:10.994 years of reflection been like here at 34:10.994 --> 34:13.106 the Pentagon ? And , and how did they 34:13.106 --> 34:15.161 view that war in terms of like , you 34:15.161 --> 34:17.217 know , like you said , we , we fight 34:17.217 --> 34:19.272 our nation's wars to win . So , um , 34:19.272 --> 34:21.590 1st , 1st of all , I'm not gonna engage 34:21.600 --> 34:24.639 in a , in a , um sort of a , 34:25.969 --> 34:29.479 you know , oversimplification of uh 34:29.679 --> 34:32.239 our experience in Afghanistan , whether 34:32.250 --> 34:34.361 we won or lost . What I will tell you 34:34.361 --> 34:36.583 from a lessons learned standpoint is as 34:36.583 --> 34:39.149 someone who has served in the military 34:39.159 --> 34:42.000 for that duration of 20 years , uh when 34:42.010 --> 34:44.169 it comes to the global war on terror 34:44.350 --> 34:47.040 and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 34:47.050 --> 34:50.060 is that this is very much a learning 34:50.070 --> 34:51.792 organization . And I think our 34:51.792 --> 34:54.014 operations around the world demonstrate 34:54.014 --> 34:56.237 that most notably if you look at the US 34:56.237 --> 34:58.292 military and the level of engagement 34:58.292 --> 35:00.070 that we have with international 35:00.070 --> 35:02.292 partners and allies and how we go about 35:02.292 --> 35:04.979 in a coalition format in order to 35:04.989 --> 35:07.939 address international security issues . 35:08.189 --> 35:10.489 Those are all lessons that we took out 35:10.500 --> 35:13.830 of places like Iraq and Afghanistan and 35:13.840 --> 35:16.007 that we don't do anything alone . Look 35:16.007 --> 35:18.290 at the counter ISIS fight and the fact , 35:18.300 --> 35:20.300 you know , as an airman , we had 25 35:20.300 --> 35:21.967 different nations at one time 35:21.967 --> 35:24.209 conducting air operations over Syria 35:24.219 --> 35:26.270 and Iraq to strike ISIS what other 35:26.280 --> 35:28.770 nation can bring together 25 different 35:28.780 --> 35:30.613 countries to focus on a singular 35:30.613 --> 35:33.040 problem and address it . So all of 35:33.050 --> 35:34.994 those experiences and all of those 35:34.994 --> 35:36.883 relationships that were built are 35:36.883 --> 35:38.550 exactly the things that we're 35:38.550 --> 35:40.550 leveraging . Now , when it comes to 35:40.550 --> 35:42.550 challenges that we're seeing in the 35:42.550 --> 35:44.439 Indo Pacific region or that we're 35:44.439 --> 35:46.661 seeing in the European region right now 35:46.661 --> 35:46.639 with Russia and Ukraine . So the United 35:46.649 --> 35:48.816 States , when I say the US military is 35:48.816 --> 35:50.816 the strongest fighting force in the 35:50.816 --> 35:53.038 world . That is because of that because 35:53.038 --> 35:55.149 we don't do it alone because we do it 35:55.149 --> 35:57.371 with our partner . Shoulder to shoulder 35:57.371 --> 35:59.482 to address mutual uh areas of concern 36:00.729 --> 36:03.007 that let me let me iii I appreciate it . 36:03.007 --> 36:05.118 I , I just don't want to get into a a 36:05.118 --> 36:07.285 longer debate . I'm happy to talk with 36:07.285 --> 36:09.396 you offline . Let me go to John . Now 36:09.396 --> 36:08.689 let me go to the phone and then I'm 36:08.699 --> 36:10.755 gonna come to you John . All right , 36:10.755 --> 36:12.810 let's go to uh Missy Ryan Washington 36:12.810 --> 36:16.649 Post . You there , 36:16.659 --> 36:18.879 Missy . Hi . Sorry , I just turned to 36:18.889 --> 36:21.056 unmute . Uh Thanks Pat . I just wanted 36:21.056 --> 36:23.000 to follow up um related to the A P 36:23.000 --> 36:25.056 report about the straight of her . I 36:25.056 --> 36:27.222 know you , you can't confirm that . Um 36:27.222 --> 36:30.360 but um it on uh just to provide a 36:30.370 --> 36:33.280 little bit of information um on um the 36:33.290 --> 36:36.689 existing operations related to trying 36:36.699 --> 36:40.159 to deter Iranian maritime aggression in 36:40.169 --> 36:42.949 that area . Um Can you talk about the 36:42.959 --> 36:45.237 department's current approach for that ? 36:45.237 --> 36:47.830 And also give us any more detail about 36:47.840 --> 36:51.110 the baton groups um activities , what 36:51.120 --> 36:53.342 exactly they are going to be doing once 36:53.342 --> 36:55.689 they all arrive in theater ? Um Just so 36:55.699 --> 36:57.866 we have an understanding of what the , 36:57.866 --> 37:00.088 the current status is . Thanks . Yeah , 37:00.088 --> 37:02.255 thanks , Missy . Um So , so we'll come 37:02.255 --> 37:04.366 back to you , uh you know , with some 37:04.366 --> 37:06.421 more specifics in terms of once they 37:06.421 --> 37:08.469 arrive in theater . Uh but broadly 37:08.479 --> 37:10.860 speaking , uh as as we've talked about 37:10.870 --> 37:14.250 before , by increasing the presence uh 37:14.260 --> 37:17.870 by working with our partners in the 37:17.879 --> 37:20.360 region . Uh and , and stepping up the 37:20.370 --> 37:23.899 tempo and pace of our patrols , uh writ 37:23.909 --> 37:25.965 large around the region . The intent 37:25.965 --> 37:29.750 again is to uh be closer uh to be 37:29.760 --> 37:32.169 able to respond quicker to any 37:32.179 --> 37:34.760 potential provocations and to deter uh 37:34.790 --> 37:38.320 any type of Iranian aggression . And so 37:38.439 --> 37:40.899 uh we will continue to , to be focused 37:40.909 --> 37:43.110 on that . Uh But as I just highlighted 37:43.120 --> 37:45.064 uh to the previous question , it's 37:45.064 --> 37:47.287 important to see it through the lens of 37:47.287 --> 37:49.287 we're not doing this by ourselves . 37:49.287 --> 37:51.176 We're doing this as part of a , a 37:51.176 --> 37:53.231 coalition in the region uh to ensure 37:53.231 --> 37:55.398 that the strait of Hormuz remains open 37:55.398 --> 37:57.620 that there's freedom of navigation . Uh 37:57.620 --> 37:59.676 And that we're deterring any type of 37:59.676 --> 38:02.330 malign activity . OK . Let me go to um 38:02.340 --> 38:03.340 will dunlop . 38:10.340 --> 38:13.899 Will , are you there ? OK . Uh Laura 38:14.120 --> 38:15.120 Sigman , 38:20.659 --> 38:24.639 hey , sorry was just unm muting . Um I 38:24.649 --> 38:27.050 wanted to see if there's anything you 38:27.060 --> 38:30.580 tell us about dod concern regarding the 38:30.590 --> 38:33.750 possible presence of Wagner forces um 38:33.760 --> 38:36.189 into . I know there are some concerns 38:36.199 --> 38:39.000 about Wagner in Mali and elsewhere in 38:39.010 --> 38:42.050 Africa . I'm wondering whether you have 38:42.060 --> 38:44.379 any information that the Wagner forces 38:44.389 --> 38:46.610 are moving into and what are the 38:46.620 --> 38:49.770 ramifications there ? Yeah . Uh Thanks 38:49.780 --> 38:52.120 are so I , I don't have anything uh new 38:52.129 --> 38:54.429 to provide beyond what I uh briefed 38:54.439 --> 38:57.159 earlier this week , no indication that 38:57.169 --> 39:00.729 Wagner uh was any uh how associated 39:00.939 --> 39:04.040 with uh this attempt to seize power ? 39:04.050 --> 39:07.020 Uh And so that that continues to be um 39:07.050 --> 39:09.272 the situation , obviously , Wagner does 39:09.272 --> 39:11.106 have a presence in Africa . It's 39:11.106 --> 39:13.328 something that we're continuing to keep 39:13.328 --> 39:15.606 a close eye on . But , but beyond that , 39:15.606 --> 39:17.828 I don't have any additional information 39:17.828 --> 39:19.772 to provide . OK , let me just do a 39:19.772 --> 39:21.828 couple more John and then we'll come 39:21.828 --> 39:24.050 here is the uh northern strike exercise 39:24.050 --> 39:26.272 that you mentioned at the top connected 39:26.272 --> 39:28.383 with the global information dominance 39:28.383 --> 39:30.606 experiments that the combatant commands 39:30.606 --> 39:30.429 and CD A O have been conducting or is 39:30.439 --> 39:32.360 this kind of a separate contained 39:32.370 --> 39:35.020 exercise ? Um John , let me , let me 39:35.030 --> 39:37.300 make sure that we uh we'll come back to 39:37.310 --> 39:39.477 you on that one . I don't believe that 39:39.477 --> 39:41.588 they're connected , but I don't wanna 39:41.588 --> 39:43.699 give you bad info . So OK . Uh Let me 39:43.699 --> 39:46.449 go to Carl Ba Bo A Hey , thanks Pat for 39:46.459 --> 39:48.626 doing this . Tima actually answered my 39:48.626 --> 39:50.737 question , Missy followed up a little 39:50.737 --> 39:52.848 bit , but um I just want to follow up 39:52.848 --> 39:52.389 one more time . I know you can't make a 39:52.399 --> 39:55.040 policy announcement on saying that the 39:55.050 --> 39:57.250 US is putting armed personnel on ships 39:57.260 --> 39:59.427 traveling through the straight of home 39:59.427 --> 40:01.593 route . But can you at least give us a 40:01.593 --> 40:03.760 feeling is the US military considering 40:03.760 --> 40:05.871 that , is that under consideration at 40:05.871 --> 40:07.982 this time ? Yeah , thanks . Uh Carl , 40:07.982 --> 40:09.593 I'm , I'm not gonna get into 40:09.593 --> 40:11.593 discussions about , um , you know , 40:11.593 --> 40:13.704 what we may or may not be considering 40:13.704 --> 40:15.871 it . I if and when there's anything to 40:15.871 --> 40:18.038 announce , you know , as it relates to 40:18.038 --> 40:20.260 our force posture , um we'll , we'll do 40:20.260 --> 40:22.427 that as appropriate . Thank you . Ok . 40:22.427 --> 40:24.260 Just two more . Yes , sir , Sean 40:24.260 --> 40:26.316 Carberry National Defense magazine . 40:26.316 --> 40:28.593 Regarding over the course of this week , 40:28.593 --> 40:32.219 has this caused any pauses , changes to 40:32.229 --> 40:35.139 other partner force uh arrangements or 40:35.149 --> 40:38.060 activities across Africa , Syria , 40:38.070 --> 40:40.126 other places where there are similar 40:40.126 --> 40:43.340 train , advise , assist . Um anything 40:43.350 --> 40:47.050 in terms of uh greater monitoring uh 40:47.060 --> 40:50.010 of partner forces , things like that , 40:50.020 --> 40:52.350 I'm , I'm not aware of any changes uh 40:52.360 --> 40:55.030 as it relates to other activities um 40:55.169 --> 40:58.209 within the A Aor . So 40:58.879 --> 41:01.800 thank you and Rio , thanks General um 41:01.810 --> 41:04.250 yesterday , Assistant Secretary for 41:04.500 --> 41:06.919 Pacific Security Affairs . Doctor um 41:06.929 --> 41:09.850 met the TRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 41:09.860 --> 41:11.971 Department of North American Director 41:11.971 --> 41:15.729 General Tao . Um and said that doctor 41:16.070 --> 41:19.120 emphasized the us ongoing commitment to 41:19.129 --> 41:21.354 maintaining lines of military dmitry 41:21.685 --> 41:24.254 communication between us and China . So 41:24.264 --> 41:26.544 what was the reaction from Chinese uh 41:26.554 --> 41:28.554 Chinese side ? And did you find any 41:28.564 --> 41:30.564 positive sign for future military ? 41:31.594 --> 41:33.764 Thank you . Um As I'm I'm sure you can 41:33.774 --> 41:35.854 appreciate um the extent of what we 41:35.864 --> 41:38.086 have to provide on that was what was in 41:38.086 --> 41:40.142 the read out . I don't want to speak 41:40.142 --> 41:42.314 for uh the , the PR C on that front 41:42.324 --> 41:45.395 again . I will just that we continue to 41:45.405 --> 41:47.627 emphasize the importance of military to 41:47.627 --> 41:50.090 military communication uh for all of 41:50.100 --> 41:52.267 the reasons that we've talked about to 41:52.267 --> 41:53.822 reduce uh the potential for 41:53.822 --> 41:56.129 miscalculation . Uh And so we remain 41:56.139 --> 41:58.500 committed , uh , to keeping those lines 41:58.510 --> 42:00.510 of communication open . All right . 42:00.510 --> 42:02.399 Thank you very much . Everybody . 42:02.399 --> 42:01.879 Appreciate it .