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What 

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good morning . The committee meets 

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today to consider the nomination of Mr 

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Derek Chole to be under Secretary of 

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Defense for Policy and Miss Kara 

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Abercrombie to be the Assistant 

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Secretary of Defense for acquisition . 

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I would like to thank the nominees for 

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their service in the United States and 

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their willingness to assume these 

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important roles . I would also like to 

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welcome the guests and family members 

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who are here today . Mr Charlet . I 

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welcome your wife Heather and Children , 

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Lucas and Erin , Miss Abercrombie . I 

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welcome your husband David , your 

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mother Michelle and father Scott . I 

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also want to recognize your daughter 

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Audrey who I know is very proud of her 

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mother . The committee is grateful to 

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your families for their continued 

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support of your service . Mr You have 

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been nominated for a critical position 

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in the Department of Defense . The 

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undersecretary of Defense for policy 

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serves as a principal advisor to the 

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Secretary of Defense leading the 

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creation and coordination of national 

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security policy within the department . 

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You are well qualified for this role . 

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Having served in a number of key 

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leadership positions in the Pentagon , 

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the State Department and the National 

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Security Council . I would like to know 

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how your interagency experience , 

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including your current role as 

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Counselor of the State Department has 

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prepared you for this role . If 

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confirmed , you would lead defense 

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policy at a consequential time . There 

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is a common understanding that the 

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future of our national security is tied 

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to the success of our competition with 

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China . This competition is occurring 

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across every field of national power , 

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military , economic , political , 

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technological , and more and across 

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every region of the world . To maintain 

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our edge . The Department of Defense 

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must dedicate urgent and sustained 

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attention to each of these efforts . In 

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particular us , defense leaders must 

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evolve the way we compete with China . 

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The Department of Defense has long 

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built its competitive mindset around 

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the idea of winning in an armed 

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conflict and deterring China through 

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military dominance that may no longer 

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be enough . The game has changed and 

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our capacity for outright victory 

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through military strength should not be 

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our only measure of success . The 

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defense department needs to better 

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understand how China is competing , 

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develop new tools for competition and 

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integrate our activities with those of 

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our allies and partners . Mr Charlet . 

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I would ask for your views on how the 

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department should pursue these efforts . 

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We also are in the midst of the 

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greatest test of the NATO alliance 

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since World War two . Throughout the 

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war in Ukraine , a formidable number of 

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our allies have joined together to 

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support Ukraine on the battlefield and 

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impose cost on Russia . We are at a 

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pivotal moment in the war . And I would 

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like to know your views on the US 

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military posture in Europe and how the 

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US and our allies should regard the 

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global security environment moving 

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forward in all of our potential 

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adversaries including China , Russia , 

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Iran and North Korea are seeking ways 

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to win without fighting against the 

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United States . The department recently 

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published its joint concept for 

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competing , which asserts that 

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strategic competition is an enduring 

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condition to be managed , not a problem 

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to be solved . I would ask for your 

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opinion on how this should be pushed 

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the department to pursue every 

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available opportunity to advance our 

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national interests including through 

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smart investments in infrastructure and 

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technology . MS Abercrombie , you are 

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nominated to be the Assistant Secretary 

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of Defense for acquisition . If 

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confirmed , you would serve as the 

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principal advisor to the undersecretary 

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of Defense for acquisition and 

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sustainment advising the undersecretary 

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on the defense acquisition system 

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acquisition policy and contracting . 

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You bring an extensive record of 

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government service to this role , 

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including decades of leadership 

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experience throughout the Department of 

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Defense . I would like to know how your 

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background has prepared you for this 

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position and how it would inform your 

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approach to defense acquisition . If 

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confirmed , one of your highest 

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priorities must be streamlining and 

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expediting the acquisition process . We 

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need to field equipment to our war 

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fighters quickly while also ensuring 

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acquisitions remain on budget . 

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Although some progress has been made in 

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recent years . The department 

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acquisition process still remains on 

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the government accountability office 

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high risk list . I would like to know 

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how you plan to implement acquisition 

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policy reforms such as the adaptive 

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acquisition framework to speed up the 

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process . Finally , in order for the 

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department to more effectively acquire 

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defense weapons systems , you will be 

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responsible for improving the data 

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available to the department . This 

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should include securing access to the 

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necessary data rights or intellectual 

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property as well as better 

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understanding , cost , pricing and 

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contractual data . MS Abercrombie . I 

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would like to know how you would plan 

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to address each of these issues . Thank 

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you again to our nominees and let me 

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now recognize the ranking member , 

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Senator Wicker . Thank you Mr Chairman . 

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Today we're here to consider two 

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positions that are um among those 

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important in the Department of Defense . 

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I wanna welcome you Miss Abercrombie as 

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well as your family . And I also 

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welcome Mr and your wife and Children . 

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Glad to have you here today . It's um 

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worth setting some context as we 

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begin this hearing . Recently , the 

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Marine Corps Commandant General Eric 

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Smith noted that our country is in 

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something of an interwar period . He's 

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right . And if we continue our current 

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course , we risk transforming this 

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moment from an interwar period to a pre 

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war period and we need to act and act 

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quickly to prevent a war as we face a 

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growing threat from communist China . 

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We need to pursue a policy of peace 

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through strength , strength . 

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Unfortunately , when it comes to 

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addressing our deterrence gaps , the 

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current administration demonstrates a 

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lack of urgency . It 

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was President George Hw Bush who said 

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when it comes to national defense , 

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finishing second means finishing last . 

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I agree with the former president . And 

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right now , we are finishing last when 

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it comes to the military balance in the 

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Western Pacific . So we must act 

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quickly . M , Amber Abercrombie , you 

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have been nominated the post of 

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Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

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acquisition . We've had decades of 

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experience and the Pentagon to prepare 

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yourself for this position . I hope I 

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can receive your commitment to work 

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together to accelerate many of our most 

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important procurement programs . For 

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example , we need to work together on 

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harpoon anti ship missiles . 

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So let's talk about that , Mr Chole , 

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you've been nominated to serve as 

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undersecretary of defense for policy , 

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the third ranking position in the 

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department . You will advise the 

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secretary on some of our most sensitive 

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national defense matters and you will 

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apprise Congress of the department's 

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work . Mr Chole , the 

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recent undersecretary of defense for 

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policy recently deflected House and 

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Senate Oversight efforts made partisan 

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comments unbecoming of his station and 

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demonstrated low regard for the 

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authorities under the constitution of 

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the legislative branch . Many of his 

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patterns of conduct were foreseeable . 

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Given his public record , the Senate 

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Republican conference subsequently 

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voted against his confirmation 

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members on my side of the aisle . Have 

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many questions still unanswered from 

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his tenure . Mr , I would like you to 

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articulate what you understand your 

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relationship with Congress ought to be 

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and how you intend to repair the 

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degraded relations with Congress , 

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particularly on this side of the aisle . 

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The important post to which you've been 

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nominated requires someone with 

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discretion and sound professional 

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judgment . Mr You exhibit an 

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indisputably impressive record of 

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public service . Yet , I need to note 

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that you've also made several comments 

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in the past that cause me some concern 

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and I hope you can clarify them for me 

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today . You have trivialized the 

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situation on our southern border . 

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You've claimed that the institutional 

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military is infected by systemic racism 

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and you've suggested that our decision 

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to leave Afghanistan was strategically 

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sound and these are just some of 

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the disturbing comments as this process 

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moves forward . Senators are going to 

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have to consider whether these views 

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are appropriate . Many senior general 

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and flag officers have told this 

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committee we are in the most dangerous 

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moment since World War two . I 

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appreciate the opportunity to discuss 

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these comments with you in more detail 

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and receive a full accounting of your 

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views and qualifications . But for now , 

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thank you both for being here and we 

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look forward to hearing your testimony . 

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Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you , 

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Senator uh Mr Recognized for your 

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opening statement . Well , thank you , 

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Chairman Reid and you can bring that as 

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close as possible . And ranking member 

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wicker and distinguished members of the 

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committee , I really appreciate the 

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opportunity to appear before you today . 

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I'd like to thank President Biden for 

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my nomination and Secretary Austin and 

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Deputy Secretary Hicks for their 

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confidence in me . I would also like to 

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thank Secretary of State Blinken and 

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all of my teammates at the Department 

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of State for being such terrific 

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colleagues over the last 2.5 years . 

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And for all they do every day around 

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the world on behalf of the American 

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people . But most importantly , I would 

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like to thank my family without whom I 

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would not be here today . And that 

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starts , of course , with my parents 

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who are watching from home in Nebraska 

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to my brother and sister to my terrific 

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in-laws , but most important . Of 

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course , I owe my greatest thanks to 

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the family that is with me here today . 

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My son Lucas , my daughter , Aaron and 

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my wife Heather Hostetter . Uh They 

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inspire me every day . They have given 

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me their full support and made so many 

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sacrifices as I have pursued this 

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career of public service . Quite simply , 

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I , I could not do this without them . 

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Mr Chairman , members of the committee , 

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there is no more sacred mission than 

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that of the US Department of Defense to 

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keep Americans safe and to protect our 

280
00:10:36,549 --> 00:10:39,590
interests abroad . I am deeply humbled 

281
00:10:39,599 --> 00:10:41,599
at the prospect of returning to the 

282
00:10:41,599 --> 00:10:43,821
Pentagon to work with the inspiring men 

283
00:10:43,821 --> 00:10:46,700
and women of our armed forces is the 

284
00:10:46,710 --> 00:10:48,654
administration's national security 

285
00:10:48,654 --> 00:10:50,929
strategy . Makes clear we are living in 

286
00:10:50,940 --> 00:10:54,380
a decisive decade . This is a moment as 

287
00:10:54,390 --> 00:10:57,140
challenging and complex as any we have 

288
00:10:57,150 --> 00:11:00,760
faced in our modern history . Foremost , 

289
00:11:00,770 --> 00:11:02,869
among those challenges is the pacing 

290
00:11:02,880 --> 00:11:05,570
threat posed by the People's Republic 

291
00:11:05,580 --> 00:11:08,320
of China , the one country today with 

292
00:11:08,330 --> 00:11:10,140
both the intent and the growing 

293
00:11:10,150 --> 00:11:12,400
capability to remake the world order 

294
00:11:12,409 --> 00:11:15,400
that we helped create . At the same 

295
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time , we must also address what the 

296
00:11:17,465 --> 00:11:19,465
national defense strategy correctly 

297
00:11:19,465 --> 00:11:21,929
calls is the acute threat posed by 

298
00:11:21,940 --> 00:11:24,469
Putin's aggressive Russia and Mr 

299
00:11:24,479 --> 00:11:26,646
Chairman members of the committee , if 

300
00:11:26,646 --> 00:11:28,479
confirmed , I will continue this 

301
00:11:28,479 --> 00:11:30,312
administration's work to provide 

302
00:11:30,312 --> 00:11:33,280
military support to Ukraine and rally 

303
00:11:33,289 --> 00:11:36,130
the world for Ukraine's self defense . 

304
00:11:36,140 --> 00:11:38,630
This has been an unprecedented effort 

305
00:11:38,710 --> 00:11:40,380
in which Congress has been an 

306
00:11:40,390 --> 00:11:43,250
indispensable partner . But as we all 

307
00:11:43,260 --> 00:11:45,482
heard last week from President Zalinsky 

308
00:11:45,482 --> 00:11:47,593
during his visit here to Washington , 

309
00:11:47,593 --> 00:11:51,440
our work is not yet over . We also must 

310
00:11:51,450 --> 00:11:53,394
remain vigilant against persistent 

311
00:11:53,394 --> 00:11:55,506
threats posed by countries like North 

312
00:11:55,506 --> 00:11:57,679
Korea and Iran supporting diplomacy by 

313
00:11:57,690 --> 00:11:59,579
maintaining a robust deterrence , 

314
00:11:59,579 --> 00:12:02,169
working with allies and partners and 

315
00:12:02,179 --> 00:12:04,123
being prepared to take action when 

316
00:12:04,123 --> 00:12:07,979
necessary to protect our troops 

317
00:12:08,080 --> 00:12:11,130
and defend our interests . Our forces 

318
00:12:11,140 --> 00:12:14,190
must be as modern and capable as 

319
00:12:14,200 --> 00:12:16,880
possible . That means having an urgency 

320
00:12:16,890 --> 00:12:19,001
to invest and innovate whether that's 

321
00:12:19,001 --> 00:12:21,223
ensuring that our undersea war fighting 

322
00:12:21,223 --> 00:12:23,279
capability remains second to none or 

323
00:12:23,279 --> 00:12:25,789
continuing to lead on A I . It also 

324
00:12:25,799 --> 00:12:28,359
means having a safe , reliable and 

325
00:12:28,369 --> 00:12:31,409
effective nuclear deterrent , investing 

326
00:12:31,419 --> 00:12:33,641
in our triad . So it remains robust and 

327
00:12:33,641 --> 00:12:35,475
credible in the eyes of both our 

328
00:12:35,475 --> 00:12:39,099
adversaries and our allies . Mr 

329
00:12:39,109 --> 00:12:41,276
Chairman , members of the committee to 

330
00:12:41,276 --> 00:12:43,387
be successful in meeting these and so 

331
00:12:43,387 --> 00:12:46,400
many other challenges we must work 

332
00:12:46,409 --> 00:12:48,979
together inside the executive branch . 

333
00:12:48,989 --> 00:12:50,822
That means the defense and state 

334
00:12:50,822 --> 00:12:53,045
departments working hand in hand as one 

335
00:12:53,045 --> 00:12:55,729
team to marry force and diplomacy , 

336
00:12:55,739 --> 00:12:57,628
which given my experience in both 

337
00:12:57,628 --> 00:12:59,628
buildings , I believe I can help do 

338
00:12:59,929 --> 00:13:01,762
inside the Pentagon . That means 

339
00:13:01,762 --> 00:13:03,929
working closely with the joint staff , 

340
00:13:03,929 --> 00:13:05,873
the combatant commands our service 

341
00:13:05,873 --> 00:13:07,985
chiefs and all of our war fighters to 

342
00:13:07,985 --> 00:13:10,207
get them what they need and to make the 

343
00:13:10,207 --> 00:13:12,650
best possible decisions , but no less 

344
00:13:12,659 --> 00:13:14,603
important , working together means 

345
00:13:14,603 --> 00:13:16,826
forging a close partnership with all of 

346
00:13:16,826 --> 00:13:19,200
you on this committee and the Congress 

347
00:13:19,210 --> 00:13:22,349
as a whole . I have long admired this 

348
00:13:22,359 --> 00:13:24,415
committee's bipartisan commitment to 

349
00:13:24,415 --> 00:13:26,137
our national security and it's 

350
00:13:26,137 --> 00:13:27,915
thoughtful and forward thinking 

351
00:13:27,919 --> 00:13:30,700
oversight of our military throughout my 

352
00:13:30,710 --> 00:13:32,710
career . I have tried to live up to 

353
00:13:32,710 --> 00:13:34,821
this example of bipartisanship in our 

354
00:13:34,821 --> 00:13:37,119
national security . It's an example set 

355
00:13:37,130 --> 00:13:39,239
by the two secretaries of defense in 

356
00:13:39,250 --> 00:13:41,361
which I previously worked . Secretary 

357
00:13:41,361 --> 00:13:43,361
Panetta and Secretary Hagel . And I 

358
00:13:43,361 --> 00:13:45,361
know it is a priority for Secretary 

359
00:13:45,361 --> 00:13:48,780
Austin . Today , I am proud and humbled 

360
00:13:48,789 --> 00:13:50,789
to have received the public support 

361
00:13:50,789 --> 00:13:53,011
from nearly three dozen senior national 

362
00:13:53,011 --> 00:13:55,178
security professionals who have served 

363
00:13:55,178 --> 00:13:56,849
in the past four Republican 

364
00:13:56,859 --> 00:13:58,989
administrations . These are former 

365
00:13:59,000 --> 00:14:01,659
bosses , mentors , colleagues and 

366
00:14:01,669 --> 00:14:03,849
friends of mine . So Mr chairman , 

367
00:14:03,859 --> 00:14:06,026
members of the committee , you have my 

368
00:14:06,026 --> 00:14:08,429
word that if confirmed , I will treat 

369
00:14:08,440 --> 00:14:10,650
you as the full partner that you need 

370
00:14:10,659 --> 00:14:12,881
to be , to be straight with you , to be 

371
00:14:12,881 --> 00:14:14,869
accessible , to be responsive in a 

372
00:14:14,880 --> 00:14:17,059
timely manner and to be as transparent 

373
00:14:17,070 --> 00:14:19,750
as I can possibly be all in our common 

374
00:14:19,760 --> 00:14:22,270
effort to meet our shared objectives to 

375
00:14:22,280 --> 00:14:24,869
make this country safe , secure and 

376
00:14:24,880 --> 00:14:26,769
prosperous . Thank you and I look 

377
00:14:26,769 --> 00:14:30,080
forward to your questions . Um Miss 

378
00:14:30,280 --> 00:14:32,950
Abercrombie , please . Good morning , 

379
00:14:32,960 --> 00:14:35,099
Chairman Reed , ranking member Wicker 

380
00:14:35,109 --> 00:14:36,942
and distinguished members of the 

381
00:14:36,942 --> 00:14:38,942
committee . It's an honor to appear 

382
00:14:38,942 --> 00:14:41,109
before you this morning . I am humbled 

383
00:14:41,109 --> 00:14:43,276
and grateful to have been nominated by 

384
00:14:43,276 --> 00:14:45,053
President Biden to serve as the 

385
00:14:45,053 --> 00:14:46,998
Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

386
00:14:46,998 --> 00:14:49,165
acquisition . I greatly appreciate the 

387
00:14:49,165 --> 00:14:51,387
trust that he Secretary Austin , Deputy 

388
00:14:51,387 --> 00:14:53,498
Secretary Hicks and undersecretary La 

389
00:14:53,498 --> 00:14:55,665
Plante have placed in me and thank you 

390
00:14:55,665 --> 00:14:57,998
for your consideration of my nomination . 

391
00:14:57,998 --> 00:15:00,053
I'd also like to thank the committee 

392
00:15:00,053 --> 00:14:59,669
for your tradition of bipartisan 

393
00:14:59,679 --> 00:15:01,900
support for the defense department in 

394
00:15:01,929 --> 00:15:04,179
this decisive decade when the United 

395
00:15:04,190 --> 00:15:06,770
States military must deter further 

396
00:15:06,780 --> 00:15:08,613
Russian aggression as well as an 

397
00:15:08,613 --> 00:15:10,780
increasingly capable People's Republic 

398
00:15:10,780 --> 00:15:12,780
of China . All while mitigating and 

399
00:15:12,780 --> 00:15:14,947
protecting against threats from Iran , 

400
00:15:14,947 --> 00:15:16,836
North Korea and violent extremist 

401
00:15:16,836 --> 00:15:18,979
organizations continued bipartisan 

402
00:15:18,989 --> 00:15:21,729
support is essential . I'd also like to 

403
00:15:21,739 --> 00:15:23,906
take a moment to thank my family whose 

404
00:15:23,906 --> 00:15:25,906
love and support have carried me to 

405
00:15:25,906 --> 00:15:28,017
this moment . My parents who are here 

406
00:15:28,017 --> 00:15:30,072
today , both instilled in my brother 

407
00:15:30,072 --> 00:15:32,183
and me , the spirit of service from a 

408
00:15:32,183 --> 00:15:34,017
young age . I'd like to thank my 

409
00:15:34,017 --> 00:15:36,183
brother who retired from the army this 

410
00:15:36,183 --> 00:15:36,049
year . He's been a source of 

411
00:15:36,059 --> 00:15:38,590
inspiration throughout my career . Most 

412
00:15:38,599 --> 00:15:40,932
of all I want to thank my husband David , 

413
00:15:40,932 --> 00:15:42,821
who's here today and our daughter 

414
00:15:42,821 --> 00:15:44,821
Audrey for their steadfast love and 

415
00:15:44,821 --> 00:15:47,043
encouragement to go for the challenging 

416
00:15:47,043 --> 00:15:49,266
jobs , even when it has meant sacrifice 

417
00:15:49,266 --> 00:15:51,321
at home . I'd also like to thank the 

418
00:15:51,321 --> 00:15:53,321
many mentors who've helped guide me 

419
00:15:53,321 --> 00:15:55,377
over the course of my career and the 

420
00:15:55,377 --> 00:15:57,432
distinguished public servants . I've 

421
00:15:57,432 --> 00:15:59,599
had the privilege to work alongside at 

422
00:15:59,599 --> 00:15:59,169
the National Security Council and in 

423
00:15:59,179 --> 00:16:02,039
the Department of Defense , I joined 

424
00:16:02,049 --> 00:16:03,771
the Department of Defense as a 

425
00:16:03,771 --> 00:16:05,993
Presidential management fellow 20 years 

426
00:16:05,993 --> 00:16:07,993
ago . With no expectation , I would 

427
00:16:07,993 --> 00:16:10,140
stay more than a few years . But the 

428
00:16:10,150 --> 00:16:12,109
sense of mission and purpose 

429
00:16:12,119 --> 00:16:14,429
particularly in the shadows of the 9 11 

430
00:16:14,440 --> 00:16:17,179
attacks pulled me in . And it is this 

431
00:16:17,190 --> 00:16:19,301
sense of mission that motivates me to 

432
00:16:19,301 --> 00:16:21,890
pursue this position in acquisition 

433
00:16:22,210 --> 00:16:24,330
acquisition policy has always been 

434
00:16:24,340 --> 00:16:26,562
extremely important to the department's 

435
00:16:26,562 --> 00:16:28,451
function but has taken on greater 

436
00:16:28,451 --> 00:16:30,229
significance in today's dynamic 

437
00:16:30,229 --> 00:16:32,284
security environment as war fighting 

438
00:16:32,284 --> 00:16:34,340
has expanded into newer domains like 

439
00:16:34,340 --> 00:16:36,320
space and cyber with innovation . 

440
00:16:36,330 --> 00:16:38,510
Moving at an increasingly rapid clip 

441
00:16:38,609 --> 00:16:40,387
and with new technologies being 

442
00:16:40,387 --> 00:16:42,553
developed by non traditional sources , 

443
00:16:42,553 --> 00:16:44,776
we cannot be satisfied with business as 

444
00:16:44,776 --> 00:16:47,250
usual . We no longer can wait decades 

445
00:16:47,260 --> 00:16:49,950
to bring programs to fruition , our 

446
00:16:49,960 --> 00:16:52,016
ability to deliver capability to the 

447
00:16:52,016 --> 00:16:54,789
war fighter rapidly is absolutely 

448
00:16:54,799 --> 00:16:56,966
critical to ensuring the United States 

449
00:16:56,966 --> 00:16:59,021
military remains the finest fighting 

450
00:16:59,021 --> 00:17:01,440
force in the world and as the nature of 

451
00:17:01,450 --> 00:17:03,539
war , fighting evolves , so must our 

452
00:17:03,549 --> 00:17:06,000
acquisition policy become more agile , 

453
00:17:06,010 --> 00:17:08,569
more responsive and able to procure new 

454
00:17:08,579 --> 00:17:10,479
capabilities from a variety of 

455
00:17:10,489 --> 00:17:13,369
suppliers ? I believe my two decades of 

456
00:17:13,380 --> 00:17:15,380
government service have prepared me 

457
00:17:15,380 --> 00:17:17,602
well for this position , I've served in 

458
00:17:17,602 --> 00:17:19,824
multiple senior roles in the department 

459
00:17:19,824 --> 00:17:21,991
building and leading teams to tackle a 

460
00:17:21,991 --> 00:17:24,158
diverse range of issues from deepening 

461
00:17:24,158 --> 00:17:25,936
defense partnerships in Asia to 

462
00:17:25,936 --> 00:17:27,991
revamping management of the security 

463
00:17:27,991 --> 00:17:30,159
cooperation . Workforce in my current 

464
00:17:30,168 --> 00:17:32,057
capacity at the National Security 

465
00:17:32,057 --> 00:17:34,112
Council , I have worked closely with 

466
00:17:34,112 --> 00:17:36,224
leaders across the department helping 

467
00:17:36,224 --> 00:17:38,001
translate presidential national 

468
00:17:38,001 --> 00:17:39,779
security policy objectives into 

469
00:17:39,779 --> 00:17:41,969
concrete actions . I have a deep 

470
00:17:41,979 --> 00:17:44,090
understanding of defense strategy and 

471
00:17:44,090 --> 00:17:46,239
policy and the outcomes we need our 

472
00:17:46,250 --> 00:17:49,140
acquisition policy to achieve in my 

473
00:17:49,150 --> 00:17:51,270
years of working with our military as 

474
00:17:51,280 --> 00:17:53,336
well as the militaries of our allies 

475
00:17:53,336 --> 00:17:55,449
and partners . I have seen first hand 

476
00:17:55,459 --> 00:17:57,626
how the limitations of our acquisition 

477
00:17:57,626 --> 00:17:59,681
system and of our defense industrial 

478
00:17:59,681 --> 00:18:01,910
base such as severe barriers to entry 

479
00:18:01,920 --> 00:18:04,280
for non traditional suppliers , supply 

480
00:18:04,290 --> 00:18:06,170
chain and production delays and 

481
00:18:06,180 --> 00:18:08,180
workforce recruitment retention and 

482
00:18:08,180 --> 00:18:09,791
training challenges , create 

483
00:18:09,791 --> 00:18:11,791
complications , not only in getting 

484
00:18:11,791 --> 00:18:13,890
capability to ourselves but to the 

485
00:18:13,900 --> 00:18:16,011
partners . We need to fight alongside 

486
00:18:16,011 --> 00:18:18,099
us . I have an intimate knowledge of 

487
00:18:18,109 --> 00:18:20,276
the department and its processes and a 

488
00:18:20,276 --> 00:18:22,498
proven track record of working with and 

489
00:18:22,498 --> 00:18:24,498
across department components to get 

490
00:18:24,498 --> 00:18:26,720
things done , meeting objectives within 

491
00:18:26,720 --> 00:18:28,831
defined timelines if confirmed as the 

492
00:18:28,831 --> 00:18:30,776
Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

493
00:18:30,776 --> 00:18:32,887
acquisition I will bring to bear this 

494
00:18:32,887 --> 00:18:34,890
expertise , my personal credibility 

495
00:18:34,900 --> 00:18:37,122
with stakeholders across the department 

496
00:18:37,122 --> 00:18:39,011
and the leadership and management 

497
00:18:39,011 --> 00:18:41,067
experience to head the talented Os D 

498
00:18:41,067 --> 00:18:43,289
acquisitions team and ensure it evolves 

499
00:18:43,289 --> 00:18:45,530
and adapts policies and practices to 

500
00:18:45,540 --> 00:18:47,540
support not only the war fighter of 

501
00:18:47,540 --> 00:18:49,484
today , but the war fighter of the 

502
00:18:49,484 --> 00:18:51,670
future . I commit to this committee 

503
00:18:51,680 --> 00:18:53,736
that I will ensure the Department of 

504
00:18:53,736 --> 00:18:56,050
Defense embraces flexibility , adopts 

505
00:18:56,060 --> 00:18:58,004
new approaches to enable speed and 

506
00:18:58,004 --> 00:19:00,116
scale bringing the best capability to 

507
00:19:00,116 --> 00:19:02,338
the war fighter from a diverse range of 

508
00:19:02,338 --> 00:19:04,504
providers . All while maintaining good 

509
00:19:04,504 --> 00:19:06,540
oversight and transparency and 

510
00:19:06,550 --> 00:19:08,717
providing value to the US . Taxpayer . 

511
00:19:09,630 --> 00:19:11,797
Chairman Reid , I pledge to do this in 

512
00:19:11,797 --> 00:19:13,963
close partnership with stakeholders if 

513
00:19:13,963 --> 00:19:16,130
confirmed um with the committee across 

514
00:19:16,130 --> 00:19:18,241
the department and certainly with our 

515
00:19:18,241 --> 00:19:20,130
industry partners as well . Uh If 

516
00:19:20,130 --> 00:19:22,186
confirmed , I pledge to work closely 

517
00:19:22,186 --> 00:19:24,241
with this committee to maintain open 

518
00:19:24,241 --> 00:19:26,352
lines of communication and to provide 

519
00:19:26,352 --> 00:19:28,408
the transparency that you require to 

520
00:19:28,408 --> 00:19:30,630
exercise your oversight . Thank you and 

521
00:19:30,630 --> 00:19:32,574
I look forward to your questions . 

522
00:19:32,574 --> 00:19:32,290
Thank you very much . Uh I have a 

523
00:19:32,300 --> 00:19:34,522
series of standard questions uh for all 

524
00:19:34,522 --> 00:19:36,540
nominees who may respond together 

525
00:19:36,550 --> 00:19:39,300
appropriately . Have you adhered to 

526
00:19:39,310 --> 00:19:41,088
applicable laws and regulations 

527
00:19:41,088 --> 00:19:43,339
governing conflicts of interest ? Yes . 

528
00:19:43,579 --> 00:19:45,900
Yes . Have you assumed any duties are 

529
00:19:45,910 --> 00:19:48,132
taking any actions that would appear to 

530
00:19:48,132 --> 00:19:50,354
presume the outcome of the confirmation 

531
00:19:50,354 --> 00:19:52,599
process ? Senator exercising our 

532
00:19:52,609 --> 00:19:54,053
legislative and oversight 

533
00:19:54,053 --> 00:19:56,165
responsibilities , makes it important 

534
00:19:56,165 --> 00:19:58,387
that this committee , its subcommittees 

535
00:19:58,387 --> 00:20:00,387
and other appropriate committees of 

536
00:20:00,387 --> 00:20:02,553
Congress receive testimony briefings , 

537
00:20:02,553 --> 00:20:04,776
reports , records and other information 

538
00:20:04,776 --> 00:20:06,887
from the executive branch on a timely 

539
00:20:06,887 --> 00:20:08,942
basis . Do you agree if confirmed to 

540
00:20:08,942 --> 00:20:10,665
appear and testify before this 

541
00:20:10,665 --> 00:20:12,498
committee when requested ? Yes , 

542
00:20:12,498 --> 00:20:14,729
chairman . Yes . Do you agree when 

543
00:20:14,739 --> 00:20:16,739
asked before this committee to give 

544
00:20:16,739 --> 00:20:18,683
your personal views , even if your 

545
00:20:18,683 --> 00:20:20,850
views differ from the administration ? 

546
00:20:20,850 --> 00:20:23,072
Yes , Senator , do you agree to provide 

547
00:20:23,072 --> 00:20:25,017
records , documents and electronic 

548
00:20:25,017 --> 00:20:27,183
communications in a timely manner when 

549
00:20:27,183 --> 00:20:29,072
requested by this committee , its 

550
00:20:29,072 --> 00:20:31,017
subcommittees or other appropriate 

551
00:20:31,017 --> 00:20:33,128
committees of Congress and to consult 

552
00:20:33,128 --> 00:20:35,295
with the requester regarding the basis 

553
00:20:35,295 --> 00:20:37,350
or any good faith delay or denial in 

554
00:20:37,350 --> 00:20:39,406
providing such records ? Yes . Yes . 

555
00:20:39,406 --> 00:20:41,183
Will you ensure that your staff 

556
00:20:41,183 --> 00:20:43,350
complies with deadlines established by 

557
00:20:43,350 --> 00:20:45,406
this committee for the production of 

558
00:20:45,406 --> 00:20:47,628
reports , records and other information 

559
00:20:47,628 --> 00:20:49,795
including timely responding to hearing 

560
00:20:49,795 --> 00:20:51,961
questions for the record . Yes . Yes . 

561
00:20:51,961 --> 00:20:53,739
Will you cooperate in providing 

562
00:20:53,739 --> 00:20:55,850
witnesses and briefers in response to 

563
00:20:55,850 --> 00:20:57,850
congressional request ? Yes . Yes . 

564
00:20:57,850 --> 00:20:59,906
Will those witnesses and briefers be 

565
00:20:59,906 --> 00:21:01,683
protected from Reprisal for the 

566
00:21:01,683 --> 00:21:03,739
testimony of briefings ? Yes . Thank 

567
00:21:03,739 --> 00:21:06,250
you very much , Mr We are engaged in uh 

568
00:21:06,849 --> 00:21:08,905
supporting the government of Ukraine 

569
00:21:08,905 --> 00:21:11,127
and work for them and I think for , for 

570
00:21:11,127 --> 00:21:13,238
us it is an existential conflict . Um 

571
00:21:13,599 --> 00:21:16,130
The administration did a remarkable job 

572
00:21:16,140 --> 00:21:19,550
in assembling a strong worldwide 

573
00:21:19,560 --> 00:21:21,500
coalition but particularly NATO 

574
00:21:23,310 --> 00:21:26,829
what would be the impact if we began to 

575
00:21:26,839 --> 00:21:29,760
cut off funding to Ukraine , both to 

576
00:21:29,770 --> 00:21:32,180
the Ukrainians and to our alliance ? 

577
00:21:33,739 --> 00:21:35,795
Well , Chairman Reed , thank you for 

578
00:21:35,795 --> 00:21:38,128
the question and thank you for the time . 

579
00:21:38,128 --> 00:21:40,183
Uh You gave me the other day in your 

580
00:21:40,183 --> 00:21:42,406
office . I enjoyed the discussion . The 

581
00:21:42,406 --> 00:21:44,628
impact of the US were to stop providing 

582
00:21:44,628 --> 00:21:46,850
significant support to Ukraine would be 

583
00:21:46,850 --> 00:21:46,569
devastating . It'd be devastating . 

584
00:21:46,579 --> 00:21:48,690
First and foremost to Ukraine , which 

585
00:21:48,690 --> 00:21:50,609
is putting a good use of this 

586
00:21:50,619 --> 00:21:52,675
assistance we've been providing them 

587
00:21:52,675 --> 00:21:54,786
but also to this very very impressive 

588
00:21:54,786 --> 00:21:56,952
alliance that has been formed over the 

589
00:21:56,952 --> 00:21:59,790
last 20 months , 50 some countries are 

590
00:21:59,800 --> 00:22:02,130
contributing in some way to the effort 

591
00:22:02,140 --> 00:22:04,196
in Ukraine . And these are countries 

592
00:22:04,196 --> 00:22:06,029
not just from Europe , these are 

593
00:22:06,029 --> 00:22:08,251
countries all around the world that are 

594
00:22:08,251 --> 00:22:10,418
providing some , some form of military 

595
00:22:10,418 --> 00:22:12,584
assistance we are leading by example , 

596
00:22:12,584 --> 00:22:12,520
we are doing the most . Thanks to 

597
00:22:12,530 --> 00:22:14,920
Congress's strong support here . And so 

598
00:22:14,930 --> 00:22:17,097
I think it is absolutely vital that we 

599
00:22:17,097 --> 00:22:18,986
maintain our robust assistance to 

600
00:22:18,986 --> 00:22:22,160
Ukraine . Thank you uh Mr Abercrombie , 

601
00:22:22,170 --> 00:22:24,869
um sort of working backwards , 

602
00:22:24,880 --> 00:22:26,991
particularly in the Indo Pacific . Uh 

603
00:22:27,189 --> 00:22:29,356
we could have situations where we have 

604
00:22:29,356 --> 00:22:32,030
equipment uh that needs to be repaired . 

605
00:22:32,329 --> 00:22:35,239
But the prospect of getting uh civilian 

606
00:22:35,250 --> 00:22:37,540
contractors into islands in the 

607
00:22:37,550 --> 00:22:40,449
Philippines is not that feasible , 

608
00:22:40,770 --> 00:22:42,826
which drives me to the the point I'd 

609
00:22:42,826 --> 00:22:45,329
like to make is that we have to be able 

610
00:22:45,339 --> 00:22:47,880
to fix those types of equipment in very 

611
00:22:47,890 --> 00:22:50,112
difficult circumstances . That means we 

612
00:22:50,112 --> 00:22:52,112
need the intellectual property , we 

613
00:22:52,112 --> 00:22:54,223
need the data which the companies now 

614
00:22:54,223 --> 00:22:56,930
routinely keep . And I think also you 

615
00:22:56,939 --> 00:22:58,939
might comment on whether this would 

616
00:22:58,939 --> 00:23:00,939
help us with respect to sustainment 

617
00:23:00,939 --> 00:23:02,828
cost if the work is being done by 

618
00:23:02,828 --> 00:23:04,819
military personnel , uh , and not 

619
00:23:04,829 --> 00:23:07,079
exclusively by contractors . Go ahead . 

620
00:23:08,170 --> 00:23:10,392
Uh , Chairman Reed , thanks for raising 

621
00:23:10,392 --> 00:23:12,559
this very important question and , and 

622
00:23:12,559 --> 00:23:14,781
thank you for the time in your office , 

623
00:23:14,781 --> 00:23:17,003
uh , last week . Um , so I agree , uh , 

624
00:23:17,003 --> 00:23:18,837
intellectual property rights are 

625
00:23:18,837 --> 00:23:21,059
something that the department must take 

626
00:23:21,059 --> 00:23:23,281
a new approach to . Uh , it's different 

627
00:23:23,281 --> 00:23:25,392
than we have done in the past . And I 

628
00:23:25,392 --> 00:23:27,281
do believe that the department is 

629
00:23:27,281 --> 00:23:29,448
moving in the right direction . Uh But 

630
00:23:29,448 --> 00:23:31,448
if confirmed Senator , what I would 

631
00:23:31,448 --> 00:23:33,670
pledge to do is make sure the workforce 

632
00:23:33,670 --> 00:23:35,726
is taking adequate , making adequate 

633
00:23:35,726 --> 00:23:37,670
use of the flexible uh acquisition 

634
00:23:37,670 --> 00:23:39,781
policies that we do have in place for 

635
00:23:39,781 --> 00:23:41,948
software acquisition . Uh to make sure 

636
00:23:41,948 --> 00:23:44,003
we're building uh that discussion in 

637
00:23:44,003 --> 00:23:43,670
from the beginning of the contracting 

638
00:23:43,680 --> 00:23:45,902
process . I also think there's a way to 

639
00:23:45,902 --> 00:23:47,958
work in partnership with industry to 

640
00:23:47,958 --> 00:23:50,180
make sure we can have that IP IP access 

641
00:23:50,180 --> 00:23:52,124
to do just precisely what you have 

642
00:23:52,124 --> 00:23:54,180
suggested , which is to give the war 

643
00:23:54,180 --> 00:23:56,180
fighter access in the field and the 

644
00:23:56,180 --> 00:23:58,236
time of need without infringing upon 

645
00:23:58,236 --> 00:23:59,902
industry's investments in the 

646
00:23:59,902 --> 00:24:03,020
intellectual property itself . Uh Thank 

647
00:24:03,030 --> 00:24:06,510
you . Uh The um one of 

648
00:24:06,520 --> 00:24:09,880
the uh sense that I have is that the 

649
00:24:10,459 --> 00:24:13,839
Cocos have really specific graphic and 

650
00:24:13,849 --> 00:24:16,599
information about what they need in 

651
00:24:16,609 --> 00:24:18,553
your role . Will you stay in close 

652
00:24:18,553 --> 00:24:20,776
contact with the Cocos ? In fact , some 

653
00:24:20,776 --> 00:24:22,665
of them have resources to develop 

654
00:24:22,819 --> 00:24:25,459
systems that might be very effective if 

655
00:24:25,469 --> 00:24:27,636
it's deployed throughout the service . 

656
00:24:27,636 --> 00:24:29,858
Will you uh maintain that kind of close 

657
00:24:29,858 --> 00:24:32,420
cooperation . Senator , if confirmed , 

658
00:24:32,430 --> 00:24:34,597
I think it's my duty to make sure I've 

659
00:24:34,597 --> 00:24:36,486
got good connections with all the 

660
00:24:36,486 --> 00:24:38,319
sources of innovation across the 

661
00:24:38,319 --> 00:24:37,859
department , including the Cocos . 

662
00:24:38,520 --> 00:24:41,790
Thank you . Uh Mr uh 

663
00:24:41,800 --> 00:24:44,839
China is the facing threat . Taiwan is 

664
00:24:44,849 --> 00:24:48,260
the most uh significant issue among 

665
00:24:48,270 --> 00:24:51,479
many uh that divides us . Um Our 

666
00:24:51,500 --> 00:24:53,780
strategy so far has been deemed 

667
00:24:53,790 --> 00:24:56,430
strategic ambiguity . Uh People have 

668
00:24:56,439 --> 00:24:59,329
suggested we abandon that and declare 

669
00:24:59,339 --> 00:25:01,561
much more forcefully and explicitly our 

670
00:25:01,561 --> 00:25:04,420
commitment to Taiwan , April Hanes . Uh 

671
00:25:04,430 --> 00:25:07,910
before uh has commented that this would 

672
00:25:07,920 --> 00:25:10,869
be deeply destabilizing and would 

673
00:25:10,880 --> 00:25:12,991
solidify Chinese perceptions that the 

674
00:25:12,991 --> 00:25:15,560
US has been on constraining their rise 

675
00:25:16,180 --> 00:25:19,410
uh and pro produce more aggressive 

676
00:25:19,420 --> 00:25:22,069
behavior . What is your sort of take on 

677
00:25:22,079 --> 00:25:25,339
that ? Thank you , Chairman Reed . Uh I 

678
00:25:25,349 --> 00:25:27,310
agree with the DN I uh on the 

679
00:25:27,319 --> 00:25:29,486
importance of strategic ambiguity . It 

680
00:25:29,486 --> 00:25:31,560
has served us quite well for several 

681
00:25:31,569 --> 00:25:33,989
decades . Now , as we have worked to 

682
00:25:34,000 --> 00:25:36,469
provide uh critical military support to 

683
00:25:36,479 --> 00:25:38,829
Taiwan , guided by the Taiwan Relations 

684
00:25:38,839 --> 00:25:41,250
Act . I should say that this is an area 

685
00:25:41,260 --> 00:25:43,427
where Congress has been a leader since 

686
00:25:43,427 --> 00:25:45,538
1979 and the , and the passage of the 

687
00:25:45,538 --> 00:25:47,816
Taiwan Relations Act . So if confirmed , 

688
00:25:47,816 --> 00:25:49,871
I would look forward to working with 

689
00:25:49,871 --> 00:25:51,982
all of you to ensure that we're doing 

690
00:25:51,982 --> 00:25:54,093
whatever we can to provide support to 

691
00:25:54,093 --> 00:25:56,038
Taiwan because the freedom of that 

692
00:25:56,038 --> 00:25:58,260
democracy is absolutely critical to our 

693
00:25:58,260 --> 00:26:00,316
interests . There's uh I have just a 

694
00:26:00,316 --> 00:26:02,427
few seconds left . So this may may be 

695
00:26:02,427 --> 00:26:04,482
more a comment on the question , but 

696
00:26:04,482 --> 00:26:06,538
there's an in very difficult dynamic 

697
00:26:06,538 --> 00:26:08,760
going on to the extent that we build up 

698
00:26:08,760 --> 00:26:10,927
Taiwan . And it looks as if it becomes 

699
00:26:10,927 --> 00:26:13,619
more and more impregnable , it might 

700
00:26:13,729 --> 00:26:16,479
force the Chinese to do something 

701
00:26:16,489 --> 00:26:19,699
dramatic and aggressive . Um 

702
00:26:20,300 --> 00:26:23,170
How do you want to balance that very 

703
00:26:23,229 --> 00:26:26,569
difficult dynamic ? It is a very 

704
00:26:26,579 --> 00:26:28,579
difficult dynamic . But I think the 

705
00:26:28,579 --> 00:26:30,801
facts show that the PR C is building up 

706
00:26:30,801 --> 00:26:32,912
capability at a very alarming rate to 

707
00:26:32,912 --> 00:26:34,968
threaten Taiwan . It's important for 

708
00:26:34,968 --> 00:26:37,079
the United States to work with Taiwan 

709
00:26:37,079 --> 00:26:38,968
to maintain deterrence across the 

710
00:26:38,968 --> 00:26:41,190
Taiwan strait . And if confirmed , that 

711
00:26:41,190 --> 00:26:43,357
will be one of my missions . Thank you 

712
00:26:43,357 --> 00:26:43,079
very much , Senator Worker . Please . 

713
00:26:44,260 --> 00:26:46,371
Thank you very much to try to cover a 

714
00:26:46,371 --> 00:26:48,482
lot of things , MS Abercrombie . Um , 

715
00:26:48,930 --> 00:26:50,708
more than $44 billion have been 

716
00:26:50,708 --> 00:26:52,959
appropriated for weapons to support 

717
00:26:52,989 --> 00:26:55,260
Ukraine since the start of the conflict 

718
00:26:55,270 --> 00:26:57,159
a year and a half ago , you had a 

719
00:26:57,159 --> 00:26:59,381
recent fact sheet fact sheet shows that 

720
00:26:59,381 --> 00:27:02,790
62% of the funds have not even been put 

721
00:27:02,890 --> 00:27:06,540
on contract . Uh Do you think this is 

722
00:27:06,550 --> 00:27:09,089
correct ? And if confirmed , will you 

723
00:27:09,099 --> 00:27:11,290
take steps to clear this backlog as 

724
00:27:11,300 --> 00:27:14,829
soon as possible ? Uh Senator Wicker . 

725
00:27:14,839 --> 00:27:16,895
Thank you for your question . Uh And 

726
00:27:16,895 --> 00:27:19,006
thank you for the time in your office 

727
00:27:19,006 --> 00:27:21,061
last week . If confirmed Senator , I 

728
00:27:21,061 --> 00:27:23,117
will absolutely commit to you that I 

729
00:27:23,117 --> 00:27:24,950
will focus on ensuring we are uh 

730
00:27:24,950 --> 00:27:27,006
contracting using all the funds that 

731
00:27:27,006 --> 00:27:28,895
Congress has appropriated for the 

732
00:27:28,895 --> 00:27:31,117
Ukraine backfill effort and for Ukraine 

733
00:27:31,117 --> 00:27:33,228
itself in getting those on contract . 

734
00:27:33,228 --> 00:27:35,283
My understanding in speaking uh with 

735
00:27:35,283 --> 00:27:37,506
the Department of the Army is that they 

736
00:27:37,506 --> 00:27:39,672
have uh at least a 60% contracted rate 

737
00:27:39,672 --> 00:27:41,895
going forward . But Senator I pledge to 

738
00:27:41,895 --> 00:27:44,061
look into that if confirmed across all 

739
00:27:44,061 --> 00:27:46,228
the service , we can solve that . Um A 

740
00:27:46,228 --> 00:27:49,180
few , I I understand from our experts 

741
00:27:49,189 --> 00:27:53,040
that a few 100 harpoons on Taiwan could 

742
00:27:53,050 --> 00:27:55,750
significantly blunt Chinese amphibious 

743
00:27:55,760 --> 00:27:58,160
advances . But the contracting 

744
00:27:58,170 --> 00:28:00,226
timelines for Harpoons have been far 

745
00:28:00,226 --> 00:28:02,439
too long and senior leadership has not 

746
00:28:02,449 --> 00:28:05,310
exerted any pressure to fix this 

747
00:28:05,319 --> 00:28:07,541
problem . How can we fix this problem ? 

748
00:28:07,541 --> 00:28:09,989
And do you agree that the uh just a few 

749
00:28:10,170 --> 00:28:14,010
100 harpoons would be um a significant 

750
00:28:14,020 --> 00:28:16,380
help to Taiwan Senator ? My 

751
00:28:16,390 --> 00:28:18,489
understanding is based on prior uh 

752
00:28:18,500 --> 00:28:20,739
positions is that indeed Harpoons would 

753
00:28:20,750 --> 00:28:23,510
be a very effective weapon system for 

754
00:28:23,520 --> 00:28:25,650
Taiwan and agree with you that the 

755
00:28:25,660 --> 00:28:27,771
contracting process has taken far too 

756
00:28:27,771 --> 00:28:29,969
long if confirmed , I pledge to take a 

757
00:28:29,979 --> 00:28:32,500
hard look at the F MS programs with 

758
00:28:32,510 --> 00:28:34,677
Taiwan and look at ways we can shorten 

759
00:28:34,677 --> 00:28:36,566
the contracting timelines through 

760
00:28:36,566 --> 00:28:38,732
conversations with industry as well as 

761
00:28:38,732 --> 00:28:40,732
with the partner and take a look at 

762
00:28:40,732 --> 00:28:42,677
foreign military sales improvement 

763
00:28:42,677 --> 00:28:44,843
overall . Ok . I , I hope you will get 

764
00:28:44,843 --> 00:28:47,010
back to us quickly on that . Uh And uh 

765
00:28:47,010 --> 00:28:49,177
I'll , I'll make that specific request 

766
00:28:49,574 --> 00:28:53,214
uh in , in writing uh for this hearing . 

767
00:28:53,224 --> 00:28:56,564
Now , uh Mr uh you and I had a very 

768
00:28:56,574 --> 00:28:59,305
nice conversation too . Um , 

769
00:29:00,439 --> 00:29:03,680
you had a role , uh , in , with the 

770
00:29:03,689 --> 00:29:05,729
state department with regard to the 

771
00:29:05,739 --> 00:29:07,850
withdrawal from Afghanistan . Is that 

772
00:29:07,850 --> 00:29:10,660
correct ? Uh , Senator again ? Thanks 

773
00:29:10,670 --> 00:29:13,003
again for the time . Uh , the other day , 

774
00:29:13,003 --> 00:29:15,226
I really appreciate the conversation as 

775
00:29:15,226 --> 00:29:17,448
a senior adviser to Secretary Blinken . 

776
00:29:17,448 --> 00:29:19,670
I'm sort of an utility infielder , uh , 

777
00:29:19,670 --> 00:29:21,670
for the secretary . So , during the 

778
00:29:21,670 --> 00:29:23,837
evacuation it was an all hands on deck 

779
00:29:23,837 --> 00:29:25,781
exercise and , uh I did whatever I 

780
00:29:25,781 --> 00:29:27,837
could to try to solve problems which 

781
00:29:27,837 --> 00:29:29,837
included uh working mainly with our 

782
00:29:29,837 --> 00:29:29,550
allies and partners as we were 

783
00:29:29,560 --> 00:29:32,199
coordinating this multinational effort 

784
00:29:32,209 --> 00:29:35,979
of the evacuation . In an interview 

785
00:29:35,989 --> 00:29:37,822
with George Stephanopoulos , the 

786
00:29:37,822 --> 00:29:39,711
president said , and I quote , if 

787
00:29:39,711 --> 00:29:41,878
there's American citizens left , we're 

788
00:29:41,878 --> 00:29:44,030
going to stay and get them out . The 

789
00:29:44,040 --> 00:29:46,262
question was , would the US troops stay 

790
00:29:46,262 --> 00:29:48,869
beyond August 31st ? If there were 

791
00:29:48,880 --> 00:29:51,050
still Americans to evacuate the 

792
00:29:51,060 --> 00:29:53,510
president's response was in the 

793
00:29:53,520 --> 00:29:56,239
affirmative . When did you realize that 

794
00:29:56,250 --> 00:29:58,959
the president was not going to do this ? 

795
00:30:00,109 --> 00:30:02,400
Senator ? Thanks for the question . Uh 

796
00:30:02,410 --> 00:30:04,188
My memory is that the president 

797
00:30:04,188 --> 00:30:06,188
received a unanimous recommendation 

798
00:30:06,188 --> 00:30:08,243
from his advisers to have all of our 

799
00:30:08,243 --> 00:30:10,354
troops out by August 31st , which was 

800
00:30:10,354 --> 00:30:12,299
of course several months after the 

801
00:30:12,299 --> 00:30:14,410
original May 1st deadline to have all 

802
00:30:14,410 --> 00:30:17,089
of our troops uh uh out under the Doha 

803
00:30:17,099 --> 00:30:21,030
agreement that did not happen . Sorry , 

804
00:30:21,040 --> 00:30:23,207
sir , that , that said all of our work 

805
00:30:23,207 --> 00:30:25,880
to get uh the people out of Afghanistan 

806
00:30:25,890 --> 00:30:28,057
who have wanted to leave and there was 

807
00:30:28,057 --> 00:30:30,279
100 and 20,000 during the evacuation in 

808
00:30:30,279 --> 00:30:32,168
August of 2021 . It's been in the 

809
00:30:32,168 --> 00:30:34,390
neighborhood of 15,000 since then . And 

810
00:30:34,390 --> 00:30:36,557
that's in a situation where the United 

811
00:30:36,557 --> 00:30:38,723
States does not have a presence on the 

812
00:30:38,723 --> 00:30:40,834
ground . There's no embassy , there's 

813
00:30:40,834 --> 00:30:43,057
no Americans there and it's been a very 

814
00:30:43,057 --> 00:30:44,946
intensive effort to get those who 

815
00:30:44,946 --> 00:30:46,723
served alongside with us out of 

816
00:30:46,723 --> 00:30:48,946
Afghanistan . Ok . Well , the fact is , 

817
00:30:48,946 --> 00:30:51,168
and I'd like for you to supplement your 

818
00:30:51,168 --> 00:30:50,469
answer on the record , please , sir . 

819
00:30:50,760 --> 00:30:54,329
The president did in fact withdraw all 

820
00:30:54,339 --> 00:30:57,250
us troops without evacuating all the 

821
00:30:57,260 --> 00:30:59,660
Americans who wanted to leave . So , uh 

822
00:30:59,709 --> 00:31:02,699
I'll ask you uh to supplement that 

823
00:31:02,709 --> 00:31:05,609
answer on the record . Um 

824
00:31:06,800 --> 00:31:10,729
Did you say in a response to an 

825
00:31:10,739 --> 00:31:14,109
associated press quote , um about the 

826
00:31:14,119 --> 00:31:17,989
Southern border quote that this is a 

827
00:31:18,000 --> 00:31:20,670
security threat is preposterous and not 

828
00:31:20,680 --> 00:31:22,902
supported by the evidence unquote . Did 

829
00:31:22,902 --> 00:31:25,013
you say that Senator Wicker ? I don't 

830
00:31:25,013 --> 00:31:27,130
recall that comment . But what I can 

831
00:31:27,140 --> 00:31:29,362
tell you is , I believe that we need to 

832
00:31:29,362 --> 00:31:31,529
have a safe and secure border . We are 

833
00:31:31,529 --> 00:31:33,251
not there yet that the defense 

834
00:31:33,251 --> 00:31:35,680
department plays a critical supporting 

835
00:31:35,689 --> 00:31:37,633
role to the Department of Homeland 

836
00:31:37,633 --> 00:31:39,300
Security , Customs and Border 

837
00:31:39,300 --> 00:31:41,356
Protection . I know Secretary Austin 

838
00:31:41,356 --> 00:31:43,467
just recently has augmented the , the 

839
00:31:43,467 --> 00:31:45,467
troops down to help assist with the 

840
00:31:45,467 --> 00:31:47,689
southern border . And so if confirmed , 

841
00:31:47,689 --> 00:31:49,800
that is something I would continue to 

842
00:31:49,800 --> 00:31:52,010
work on . Ok . So you at least now you 

843
00:31:52,020 --> 00:31:55,599
do believe that the that the situation 

844
00:31:55,609 --> 00:31:57,665
on the southern border is a security 

845
00:31:57,665 --> 00:32:01,040
threat and you , um , that 

846
00:32:01,050 --> 00:32:04,619
you at dod now will , uh , have a 

847
00:32:04,630 --> 00:32:07,520
specific role to counter the cartels 

848
00:32:07,530 --> 00:32:10,310
there on the southern border . Senator . 

849
00:32:10,400 --> 00:32:12,859
Yes . What I believe is the dod plays a 

850
00:32:12,869 --> 00:32:14,758
critical supporting role to other 

851
00:32:14,758 --> 00:32:16,869
agencies and state and local partners 

852
00:32:16,869 --> 00:32:18,813
in helping secure that border . If 

853
00:32:18,813 --> 00:32:21,036
confirmed , I will , I will continue to 

854
00:32:21,036 --> 00:32:23,202
ensure that it plays that role . Thank 

855
00:32:23,202 --> 00:32:22,739
you , sir . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

856
00:32:22,800 --> 00:32:25,599
Thank you , Senator uh Senator Sheen , 

857
00:32:25,609 --> 00:32:28,439
please . Um Thank you . Congratulations , 

858
00:32:28,449 --> 00:32:31,270
Mr Shale , Miss Abercrombie . Excuse me . 

859
00:32:31,510 --> 00:32:33,732
Um Congratulations on your nomination . 

860
00:32:33,732 --> 00:32:36,060
Thank you to both of you . Um and your 

861
00:32:36,069 --> 00:32:37,902
families for your willingness to 

862
00:32:37,902 --> 00:32:40,180
continue to serve this country . Um Mr 

863
00:32:40,760 --> 00:32:43,050
I really have appreciated your 

864
00:32:43,060 --> 00:32:44,949
engagement in the Western Balkans 

865
00:32:44,949 --> 00:32:47,060
during your time at the Department of 

866
00:32:47,060 --> 00:32:48,893
State . It's not lost on me that 

867
00:32:48,893 --> 00:32:52,550
another conflict in Europe at this 

868
00:32:52,560 --> 00:32:54,239
time would be particularly 

869
00:32:55,420 --> 00:32:59,189
problematic . And um I , I know that 

870
00:32:59,199 --> 00:33:01,770
you were very important in helping to 

871
00:33:01,780 --> 00:33:04,069
bring Kosovo and Serbia to the table to 

872
00:33:04,079 --> 00:33:07,959
try and um address uh 

873
00:33:08,250 --> 00:33:10,199
the conflict between those two 

874
00:33:10,209 --> 00:33:13,569
countries and part of ensuring that 

875
00:33:13,579 --> 00:33:17,319
peace in the region is nato's K 

876
00:33:17,329 --> 00:33:20,189
four force . And I wonder if you could 

877
00:33:20,199 --> 00:33:22,229
talk about how you see working with 

878
00:33:22,239 --> 00:33:25,630
General Cali and us European command to 

879
00:33:25,640 --> 00:33:27,869
ensure that K four both has the 

880
00:33:27,880 --> 00:33:29,959
resources that it needs and looks at 

881
00:33:29,969 --> 00:33:32,080
whether there needs to be an expanded 

882
00:33:32,080 --> 00:33:34,189
mission given the recent violence in 

883
00:33:34,349 --> 00:33:37,709
the northern part of Kosovo , Senator 

884
00:33:37,719 --> 00:33:39,780
Shaheen . Thank you again for the 

885
00:33:39,790 --> 00:33:41,846
question . Thank you for all of your 

886
00:33:41,846 --> 00:33:43,901
leadership uh in this effort because 

887
00:33:43,901 --> 00:33:46,012
the engagement of the Congress in the 

888
00:33:46,012 --> 00:33:48,012
Western Balkans has been absolutely 

889
00:33:48,012 --> 00:33:49,901
critical to our overall efforts . 

890
00:33:49,901 --> 00:33:51,957
Unfortunately , the situation across 

891
00:33:51,957 --> 00:33:53,790
the Western Balkans remains very 

892
00:33:53,790 --> 00:33:55,846
unstable . As you know , we both had 

893
00:33:55,846 --> 00:33:57,790
the opportunity to see the Bosnian 

894
00:33:57,790 --> 00:33:59,790
Foreign Minister a few days ago who 

895
00:33:59,790 --> 00:33:59,579
said to me , we need to be worried 

896
00:33:59,589 --> 00:34:01,811
about a Russian bear being in the belly 

897
00:34:01,811 --> 00:34:03,922
of Europe . And so instability in the 

898
00:34:03,922 --> 00:34:06,033
in the Western Balkans would not stay 

899
00:34:06,033 --> 00:34:08,200
in the Western Balkans . And so that's 

900
00:34:08,200 --> 00:34:10,200
why it's important for all of us to 

901
00:34:10,200 --> 00:34:12,422
work to see that we can bring a lasting 

902
00:34:12,422 --> 00:34:14,645
peace to that region . The situation in 

903
00:34:14,645 --> 00:34:16,700
Kosovo and Serbia has been troubling 

904
00:34:16,700 --> 00:34:18,700
for some time and there was another 

905
00:34:18,700 --> 00:34:20,922
flare up of violence over the weekend , 

906
00:34:20,922 --> 00:34:20,750
I spoke just a few days ago with the 

907
00:34:20,760 --> 00:34:23,090
President of Serbia as well as the 

908
00:34:23,100 --> 00:34:25,322
Prime Minister of Kosovo to try to tamp 

909
00:34:25,322 --> 00:34:27,649
down some of those tensions . But the 

910
00:34:27,659 --> 00:34:29,437
important role that the defense 

911
00:34:29,437 --> 00:34:31,659
department plays in supporting K four . 

912
00:34:31,659 --> 00:34:33,770
The NATO mission in Kosovo , which is 

913
00:34:33,770 --> 00:34:35,881
helping to keep the peace in Northern 

914
00:34:35,881 --> 00:34:38,370
Kosovo is absolutely essential . So if 

915
00:34:38,379 --> 00:34:40,490
confirmed , I would work with General 

916
00:34:40,639 --> 00:34:42,750
Kali and the entire UC family as well 

917
00:34:42,750 --> 00:34:44,750
as our NATO partners to ensure that 

918
00:34:44,750 --> 00:34:46,972
we're doing what we need to have enough 

919
00:34:46,972 --> 00:34:49,195
capability so that K four can help keep 

920
00:34:49,195 --> 00:34:51,361
the peace in this critical part of the 

921
00:34:51,361 --> 00:34:53,417
world . Well , thank you . And as we 

922
00:34:53,417 --> 00:34:55,139
think about the need for other 

923
00:34:55,139 --> 00:34:57,195
peacekeeping forces in the Balkans . 

924
00:34:57,195 --> 00:34:59,361
Obviously , the U four mission is very 

925
00:34:59,361 --> 00:35:01,583
important in Bosnia , Herzegovina . And 

926
00:35:01,583 --> 00:35:03,250
they are coming up on another 

927
00:35:03,250 --> 00:35:05,898
reauthorization that needs to happen at 

928
00:35:05,908 --> 00:35:08,075
the UN at the end of October . Can you 

929
00:35:08,079 --> 00:35:10,269
talk about the prospects for that 

930
00:35:10,279 --> 00:35:13,330
reauthorization ? Sure . Thank you , 

931
00:35:13,340 --> 00:35:15,562
Senator Sheen . I had an opportunity to 

932
00:35:15,562 --> 00:35:17,784
speak with the Bosnian Foreign Minister 

933
00:35:17,784 --> 00:35:19,951
about this the other day . I think the 

934
00:35:19,951 --> 00:35:22,173
prospects are looking better , although 

935
00:35:22,173 --> 00:35:21,909
we are not there yet , we still have 

936
00:35:21,919 --> 00:35:23,919
some time before that authorization 

937
00:35:23,919 --> 00:35:26,141
will happen . Uh Last year , it was a , 

938
00:35:26,141 --> 00:35:28,363
it was a close run thing . And so I can 

939
00:35:28,363 --> 00:35:30,586
tell you that from the state Department 

940
00:35:30,586 --> 00:35:32,752
perspective right now , we are working 

941
00:35:32,752 --> 00:35:34,975
hard to ensure that that U four mandate 

942
00:35:34,975 --> 00:35:36,975
gets expanded or gets renewed uh in 

943
00:35:36,975 --> 00:35:39,409
Bosnia thinking about if confirmed 

944
00:35:39,419 --> 00:35:41,363
defense department angle , it's to 

945
00:35:41,363 --> 00:35:43,419
ensure that we are doing whatever we 

946
00:35:43,419 --> 00:35:45,475
can from a dod perspective to ensure 

947
00:35:45,475 --> 00:35:47,641
that we're trying to keep the peace in 

948
00:35:47,641 --> 00:35:49,586
Bosnia . Well , and as the Foreign 

949
00:35:49,586 --> 00:35:52,379
Minister pointed out , um , if U four 

950
00:35:52,419 --> 00:35:55,110
fails , then NATO would be a last 

951
00:35:55,120 --> 00:35:58,370
resort , which I assume would not be um 

952
00:35:58,959 --> 00:36:01,850
something that some of the elements in 

953
00:36:01,860 --> 00:36:03,860
Bosnia , Herzegovina would be 

954
00:36:03,870 --> 00:36:06,510
interested in seeing Senator . That's 

955
00:36:06,520 --> 00:36:09,379
absolutely right . Thank you . Um Miss 

956
00:36:09,389 --> 00:36:13,199
Abercrombie , you've , you've talked 

957
00:36:13,209 --> 00:36:16,370
about the challenge of balancing the 

958
00:36:16,379 --> 00:36:20,179
commercial um technology 

959
00:36:20,189 --> 00:36:22,133
services that are available in the 

960
00:36:22,133 --> 00:36:24,300
departments need to use those . One of 

961
00:36:24,300 --> 00:36:26,750
those efforts . I that got a lot of 

962
00:36:26,760 --> 00:36:29,310
attention was Starlink um 

963
00:36:30,060 --> 00:36:33,879
role in the Ukraine War . So how can 

964
00:36:33,889 --> 00:36:37,219
we , how can we ensure that if there 

965
00:36:37,229 --> 00:36:39,879
are um commercial contracts with the 

966
00:36:39,889 --> 00:36:43,419
department that the decisions made 

967
00:36:43,429 --> 00:36:45,540
about how those services are used are 

968
00:36:45,540 --> 00:36:48,639
based on policy that the department and 

969
00:36:48,689 --> 00:36:50,745
this country believe are in the best 

970
00:36:50,745 --> 00:36:52,800
interests of the department , not in 

971
00:36:52,800 --> 00:36:54,745
the best interests of a commercial 

972
00:36:54,745 --> 00:36:58,010
entity . Senator Shaheen , uh if 

973
00:36:58,020 --> 00:36:59,853
confirmed , my first priority is 

974
00:36:59,853 --> 00:37:02,131
looking after the American war fighter . 

975
00:37:02,131 --> 00:37:04,298
And absolutely , I think uh going into 

976
00:37:04,298 --> 00:37:06,409
the contracting process , baking that 

977
00:37:06,409 --> 00:37:08,242
in from the get go is absolutely 

978
00:37:08,242 --> 00:37:10,353
necessary . And you know , this is an 

979
00:37:10,353 --> 00:37:12,409
evolving uh environment where we are 

980
00:37:12,409 --> 00:37:14,464
working more closely with commercial 

981
00:37:14,464 --> 00:37:14,370
providers and that's , that's a 

982
00:37:14,379 --> 00:37:16,601
discussion we need to have up front and 

983
00:37:16,601 --> 00:37:18,657
to be mindful of the requirements we 

984
00:37:18,657 --> 00:37:20,768
have going into the conversation with 

985
00:37:20,768 --> 00:37:22,879
industry . Thank you . Thank you , Mr 

986
00:37:22,879 --> 00:37:25,046
Chairman . Thank you , Senator Senator 

987
00:37:25,046 --> 00:37:26,879
Fisher , please . Thank you , Mr 

988
00:37:26,879 --> 00:37:28,601
Chairman and thank you uh Miss 

989
00:37:28,699 --> 00:37:32,449
Abercrombie and Mr and your families 

990
00:37:32,459 --> 00:37:35,280
for stepping forward to continue to 

991
00:37:35,290 --> 00:37:37,729
serve your country . I appreciate that . 

992
00:37:38,030 --> 00:37:41,270
Um Mr Chole China remains the pacing 

993
00:37:41,280 --> 00:37:43,113
threat that we face . And do you 

994
00:37:43,120 --> 00:37:45,679
believe that the department is 

995
00:37:45,689 --> 00:37:47,919
appropriately postured to meet that 

996
00:37:47,929 --> 00:37:50,600
threat ? Senator Fisher ? Thanks for 

997
00:37:50,610 --> 00:37:52,666
the question and thanks for the time 

998
00:37:52,666 --> 00:37:54,888
the other day in your office . I really 

999
00:37:54,888 --> 00:37:56,943
appreciate the conversation . I know 

1000
00:37:56,943 --> 00:37:58,832
that uh the defense department is 

1001
00:37:58,832 --> 00:38:01,110
working hard at getting at that threat . 

1002
00:38:01,110 --> 00:38:03,054
Uh If confirmed , one of the first 

1003
00:38:03,054 --> 00:38:05,221
things I will do on the job is open up 

1004
00:38:05,221 --> 00:38:07,388
the hood and make my own assessment of 

1005
00:38:07,388 --> 00:38:06,790
how we are doing . But I know that 

1006
00:38:06,800 --> 00:38:08,800
there's been a tremendous amount of 

1007
00:38:08,800 --> 00:38:10,911
investment and energy put into this . 

1008
00:38:10,911 --> 00:38:13,133
But the pr C , as you said , uh is , is 

1009
00:38:13,133 --> 00:38:15,379
rapidly innovating and modernizing and 

1010
00:38:15,389 --> 00:38:17,500
that's why it is the pacing challenge 

1011
00:38:17,500 --> 00:38:19,611
we face for this century . How do you 

1012
00:38:19,611 --> 00:38:22,179
believe the department should balance 

1013
00:38:22,189 --> 00:38:24,419
the readiness that's needed today with 

1014
00:38:24,429 --> 00:38:26,689
the modernization that we have to look 

1015
00:38:26,699 --> 00:38:29,530
for in the long term . Thanks for the 

1016
00:38:29,540 --> 00:38:31,889
question , we have to have the urgency 

1017
00:38:31,899 --> 00:38:34,010
to innovate and invest and we need to 

1018
00:38:34,010 --> 00:38:36,010
ensure that we are investing in the 

1019
00:38:36,010 --> 00:38:37,955
future . So it is a very difficult 

1020
00:38:37,955 --> 00:38:40,066
balancing act . It's one that will be 

1021
00:38:40,066 --> 00:38:42,066
foremost on my mind if confirmed in 

1022
00:38:42,066 --> 00:38:44,121
this position because of course , we 

1023
00:38:44,121 --> 00:38:46,343
have the threats of today that are very 

1024
00:38:46,343 --> 00:38:48,790
urgent and complex , but even more 

1025
00:38:48,800 --> 00:38:50,856
concerning the threats of tomorrow . 

1026
00:38:50,856 --> 00:38:52,744
How do you , how do you think the 

1027
00:38:52,744 --> 00:38:54,689
department should prioritize those 

1028
00:38:54,689 --> 00:38:56,744
investments ? Well , I think it's in 

1029
00:38:56,744 --> 00:38:58,800
some ways it's gonna be case by case 

1030
00:38:58,800 --> 00:39:00,856
because it's gonna be balancing risk 

1031
00:39:00,856 --> 00:39:02,967
across regions across uh priorities . 

1032
00:39:02,967 --> 00:39:05,078
Uh I my sense from looking at it from 

1033
00:39:05,078 --> 00:39:07,300
the outside , across the river over the 

1034
00:39:07,300 --> 00:39:09,022
last several years is has been 

1035
00:39:09,022 --> 00:39:11,022
balancing it relatively effectively 

1036
00:39:11,022 --> 00:39:13,133
thanks to the cooperation and support 

1037
00:39:13,133 --> 00:39:13,060
and the leadership of many in the 

1038
00:39:13,070 --> 00:39:15,126
Congress , I think in the end of the 

1039
00:39:15,126 --> 00:39:17,126
Pacific , for example , the Pacific 

1040
00:39:17,126 --> 00:39:19,237
deterrence initiative has been a very 

1041
00:39:19,237 --> 00:39:21,126
great innovation and I'm glad the 

1042
00:39:21,126 --> 00:39:23,348
defense department has invested so much 

1043
00:39:23,348 --> 00:39:23,050
in this recent budget in PD I , how 

1044
00:39:23,060 --> 00:39:25,820
much risk , um how much risk 

1045
00:39:26,899 --> 00:39:29,360
would you be willing to assume ? And 

1046
00:39:29,370 --> 00:39:31,592
how do you , how do you balance that or 

1047
00:39:31,592 --> 00:39:35,040
are you risk averse ? Oh , we're gonna 

1048
00:39:35,050 --> 00:39:37,217
have to balance some risk . There's no 

1049
00:39:37,217 --> 00:39:39,217
question . I mean , there's risk in 

1050
00:39:39,217 --> 00:39:38,850
whether we're looking at what we're 

1051
00:39:38,860 --> 00:39:41,540
doing in Europe to help support Ukraine , 

1052
00:39:41,550 --> 00:39:43,606
whether what we're doing in the Indo 

1053
00:39:43,606 --> 00:39:45,717
Pacific building up our alliances and 

1054
00:39:45,717 --> 00:39:47,939
partnerships and posturing ourselves to 

1055
00:39:47,939 --> 00:39:50,161
deter the PR C or the risk we live with 

1056
00:39:50,161 --> 00:39:52,169
every day in the Middle East . We , 

1057
00:39:52,179 --> 00:39:54,346
it's a , it's a constant effort to try 

1058
00:39:54,346 --> 00:39:56,512
to balance the risk and get it right . 

1059
00:39:56,689 --> 00:39:58,856
What are your thoughts on the national 

1060
00:39:58,856 --> 00:40:01,260
defense strategy ? I think the 2022 

1061
00:40:01,270 --> 00:40:03,530
national defense strategy is quite 

1062
00:40:03,540 --> 00:40:05,709
strong and I think it's a nat natural 

1063
00:40:05,719 --> 00:40:08,639
continuation of the 2018 national 

1064
00:40:08,649 --> 00:40:10,830
defense strategy which would , to my 

1065
00:40:10,840 --> 00:40:13,062
mind was a , was a pivot point from the 

1066
00:40:13,062 --> 00:40:15,270
counter terrorism global war on terror 

1067
00:40:15,610 --> 00:40:17,820
two decades , more or less to this new 

1068
00:40:17,830 --> 00:40:19,941
era of great power competition . So I 

1069
00:40:19,941 --> 00:40:22,330
see continuity between 2018 strategy 

1070
00:40:22,340 --> 00:40:25,020
and 2022 . I know that the National 

1071
00:40:25,030 --> 00:40:27,340
Defense Commission is getting its work 

1072
00:40:27,350 --> 00:40:29,919
under way to assess our implementation 

1073
00:40:29,929 --> 00:40:31,560
of the strategy . I know the 

1074
00:40:31,570 --> 00:40:33,126
commissioners , many of the 

1075
00:40:33,126 --> 00:40:35,014
commissioners quite well . I have 

1076
00:40:35,014 --> 00:40:37,070
spoken to them at length and so I'll 

1077
00:40:37,070 --> 00:40:37,050
look forward to cooperating with their 

1078
00:40:37,060 --> 00:40:40,790
efforts as their work proceeds . The um 

1079
00:40:41,840 --> 00:40:44,062
let me continue on the national defense 

1080
00:40:44,062 --> 00:40:46,284
strategy and then I'll get to the , the 

1081
00:40:46,284 --> 00:40:48,300
commission also some of the main 

1082
00:40:48,310 --> 00:40:50,389
tenants that we see in the national 

1083
00:40:50,399 --> 00:40:52,889
defense strategy . Um for example , the 

1084
00:40:52,899 --> 00:40:56,040
importance of campaigning or exercising 

1085
00:40:56,060 --> 00:40:58,649
with partners in the Indo Pacific . Uh 

1086
00:40:58,659 --> 00:41:00,860
those have been been undercut , I 

1087
00:41:00,870 --> 00:41:03,699
believe by budget requests that don't 

1088
00:41:03,709 --> 00:41:06,409
come close to fully funding these 

1089
00:41:06,419 --> 00:41:09,699
planned exercises . If confirmed , will 

1090
00:41:09,709 --> 00:41:12,760
you advocate for additional resources 

1091
00:41:12,770 --> 00:41:15,120
when they're needed ? Uh When you have 

1092
00:41:15,129 --> 00:41:16,629
those discussions with the 

1093
00:41:16,629 --> 00:41:19,040
administration , Senator Fisher ? 

1094
00:41:19,050 --> 00:41:21,340
Thanks for the question . Yes . Uh I 

1095
00:41:21,350 --> 00:41:23,517
believe that one of the most important 

1096
00:41:23,517 --> 00:41:25,739
things we can do in the Indo Pacific is 

1097
00:41:25,739 --> 00:41:27,794
to ensure that we have the strongest 

1098
00:41:27,794 --> 00:41:29,906
alliances and partnerships possible . 

1099
00:41:29,906 --> 00:41:29,820
There has been a lot of progress made 

1100
00:41:29,830 --> 00:41:31,774
over the last two years to develop 

1101
00:41:31,774 --> 00:41:33,941
those relationships further and create 

1102
00:41:33,941 --> 00:41:35,886
new configurations of partnerships 

1103
00:41:35,886 --> 00:41:37,941
through A and the , the Indo Pacific 

1104
00:41:37,941 --> 00:41:40,300
Quad . But absolutely , I will fight 

1105
00:41:40,310 --> 00:41:42,477
for those resources if confirmed . How 

1106
00:41:42,477 --> 00:41:44,770
are you , how do you think we can 

1107
00:41:44,780 --> 00:41:47,739
better strengthen those alliances when 

1108
00:41:47,750 --> 00:41:50,229
we're watching , what's going on in 

1109
00:41:50,239 --> 00:41:53,850
Ukraine and the NATO alliance that we 

1110
00:41:53,860 --> 00:41:57,239
have there ? My concern is when 

1111
00:41:57,250 --> 00:41:59,417
something would take place in the Indo 

1112
00:41:59,417 --> 00:42:03,290
Pacific region , we won't 

1113
00:42:03,300 --> 00:42:05,469
have the strength of , of as many 

1114
00:42:05,479 --> 00:42:07,810
allies as we currently have . And you 

1115
00:42:07,820 --> 00:42:09,987
brought it up in your opening comments 

1116
00:42:09,987 --> 00:42:12,600
that we currently have um , have seemed 

1117
00:42:12,610 --> 00:42:16,020
formed and strengthened in Europe with 

1118
00:42:16,030 --> 00:42:17,863
Ukraine . So how are we going to 

1119
00:42:17,863 --> 00:42:20,620
strengthen those partnerships in the 

1120
00:42:20,629 --> 00:42:24,020
Indo Pacific to make sure that not only 

1121
00:42:24,030 --> 00:42:26,419
they continue but that they continue to 

1122
00:42:26,429 --> 00:42:30,409
be built . Senator 

1123
00:42:30,419 --> 00:42:32,252
Fisher . I think it's absolutely 

1124
00:42:32,252 --> 00:42:34,363
critical that we strengthen and build 

1125
00:42:34,370 --> 00:42:36,610
the muscle tissue of those alliances 

1126
00:42:36,620 --> 00:42:38,787
and partnerships in the Indo Pacific . 

1127
00:42:38,787 --> 00:42:40,953
I'll just cite three examples . Recent 

1128
00:42:40,953 --> 00:42:43,120
ones , the , the work we've been doing 

1129
00:42:43,120 --> 00:42:45,231
with the Japanese and the Koreans and 

1130
00:42:45,231 --> 00:42:47,009
the trilateral format trying to 

1131
00:42:47,009 --> 00:42:49,176
strengthen the ties between the two of 

1132
00:42:49,176 --> 00:42:48,520
them . But also trilateral has been 

1133
00:42:48,530 --> 00:42:50,870
critically important . 2nd August , of 

1134
00:42:50,879 --> 00:42:53,489
course , is a innovative game changer , 

1135
00:42:53,500 --> 00:42:55,833
you know , strategic pivot that is very , 

1136
00:42:55,833 --> 00:42:57,667
very important . We need to work 

1137
00:42:57,667 --> 00:42:59,833
together to implement that and get the 

1138
00:42:59,833 --> 00:43:01,944
the optimal pathway off and running . 

1139
00:43:01,944 --> 00:43:04,000
Uh And then third , the Indo Pacific 

1140
00:43:04,000 --> 00:43:05,944
Quad which this administration has 

1141
00:43:05,944 --> 00:43:08,111
elevated to the leaders level and it's 

1142
00:43:08,111 --> 00:43:10,222
become more and more an engine of our 

1143
00:43:10,222 --> 00:43:12,278
work in the Indo Pacific . Those are 

1144
00:43:12,278 --> 00:43:11,850
three examples . There's many others 

1145
00:43:11,860 --> 00:43:13,971
that if confirmed , I need to work to 

1146
00:43:13,971 --> 00:43:16,027
ensure that we're , we're moving the 

1147
00:43:16,027 --> 00:43:18,304
ball downfield . Thank you . Thank you . 

1148
00:43:18,304 --> 00:43:20,416
Thank you , Senator uh Senator King , 

1149
00:43:20,416 --> 00:43:22,620
please . Thank you , Mr Chairman 

1150
00:43:24,169 --> 00:43:27,169
Mr . Uh you're in a key position and it 

1151
00:43:27,179 --> 00:43:29,419
seems to me that policy , we're at a 

1152
00:43:29,429 --> 00:43:31,739
moment , you you talked about 18 and 

1153
00:43:31,750 --> 00:43:33,939
then 22 the strategies and the shift , 

1154
00:43:34,080 --> 00:43:36,247
but we need to have a shift toward the 

1155
00:43:36,247 --> 00:43:38,469
new kind of warfare . And I'm concerned 

1156
00:43:38,469 --> 00:43:41,000
that electronic warfare , cyber and the 

1157
00:43:41,010 --> 00:43:42,954
vulnerability of some of our major 

1158
00:43:42,954 --> 00:43:46,469
assets have to be , uh , taken into 

1159
00:43:46,479 --> 00:43:48,646
account . I , I just , I mean , it's a 

1160
00:43:48,646 --> 00:43:50,757
cliche but I worry that we're , we're 

1161
00:43:50,757 --> 00:43:53,739
preparing for the last war . Uh , what 

1162
00:43:53,750 --> 00:43:56,310
is your sense in terms of our , uh the 

1163
00:43:56,320 --> 00:43:59,709
adequacy of our defense uh in terms of 

1164
00:43:59,719 --> 00:44:03,070
electronic warfare , cyber , hypersonic , 

1165
00:44:04,219 --> 00:44:06,052
Senator King , thank you for the 

1166
00:44:06,052 --> 00:44:08,275
question and thanks for your leadership 

1167
00:44:08,275 --> 00:44:10,330
and advocacy on that issue said it's 

1168
00:44:10,330 --> 00:44:12,330
very , very important . I think the 

1169
00:44:12,330 --> 00:44:14,441
national defense strategy does stress 

1170
00:44:14,441 --> 00:44:16,552
the importance of those domains and , 

1171
00:44:16,552 --> 00:44:18,719
and ensuring the United States is both 

1172
00:44:18,719 --> 00:44:20,886
investing the resources and having the 

1173
00:44:20,886 --> 00:44:23,108
right strategy to get at the threats in 

1174
00:44:23,108 --> 00:44:25,275
those areas . I remember , well , from 

1175
00:44:25,275 --> 00:44:27,052
when I previously served in the 

1176
00:44:27,052 --> 00:44:28,941
Pentagon 10 years ago , Secretary 

1177
00:44:28,941 --> 00:44:31,108
Panetta giving a very important speech 

1178
00:44:31,108 --> 00:44:33,052
talking about Cyber Pearl Harbor , 

1179
00:44:33,052 --> 00:44:35,219
which is one of the first efforts of a 

1180
00:44:35,219 --> 00:44:37,386
to talk about cyber security uh from a 

1181
00:44:37,386 --> 00:44:39,608
defense department perspective . I know 

1182
00:44:39,608 --> 00:44:39,399
there's been a lot of good work 

1183
00:44:39,409 --> 00:44:41,830
underway thanks to the support and 

1184
00:44:41,840 --> 00:44:43,840
leadership of the Congress on these 

1185
00:44:43,840 --> 00:44:45,951
issues . And so if confirmed , I look 

1186
00:44:45,951 --> 00:44:48,118
forward to working with you and seeing 

1187
00:44:48,118 --> 00:44:50,007
how we can advance this issue . I 

1188
00:44:50,007 --> 00:44:52,007
remember using the image of a Cyber 

1189
00:44:52,007 --> 00:44:51,949
Pearl Harbor myself . I'm not sure 

1190
00:44:51,959 --> 00:44:54,070
whether I stole it from Panetta or he 

1191
00:44:54,070 --> 00:44:56,126
stole it from me , but in any case , 

1192
00:44:56,126 --> 00:44:58,403
it's an absolutely critical element of , 

1193
00:44:58,403 --> 00:45:00,626
of looking forward . I think one of the 

1194
00:45:00,626 --> 00:45:02,626
strengths you bring to this is your 

1195
00:45:02,626 --> 00:45:04,681
experience in the State department . 

1196
00:45:04,681 --> 00:45:06,909
Alliances are asymmetric advantage . 

1197
00:45:07,389 --> 00:45:09,929
China has customers , we have allies 

1198
00:45:10,260 --> 00:45:12,316
and to the extent we can continue to 

1199
00:45:12,316 --> 00:45:14,538
build on those alliances , particularly 

1200
00:45:14,538 --> 00:45:17,219
in Asia and in the Pacific . Uh do you 

1201
00:45:17,229 --> 00:45:19,118
agree that that's one of the most 

1202
00:45:19,118 --> 00:45:21,030
important strategic and policy 

1203
00:45:21,100 --> 00:45:23,340
developments , both from the Defense 

1204
00:45:23,350 --> 00:45:25,350
Department point of view , but also 

1205
00:45:25,350 --> 00:45:27,572
from the Department of State and the US 

1206
00:45:27,572 --> 00:45:29,850
government ? Absolutely , Senator King , 

1207
00:45:29,850 --> 00:45:32,128
this is our strategic advantage . It's , 

1208
00:45:32,128 --> 00:45:34,461
it's an enduring advantage that we have . 

1209
00:45:34,461 --> 00:45:36,350
We need to not just tend to those 

1210
00:45:36,350 --> 00:45:38,572
alliances and partnerships to make them 

1211
00:45:38,572 --> 00:45:38,449
stronger and expand them out when I 

1212
00:45:38,459 --> 00:45:41,139
previously served at the Pentagon as 

1213
00:45:41,149 --> 00:45:42,705
the Assistant Secretary for 

1214
00:45:42,705 --> 00:45:44,649
International Security Affairs , I 

1215
00:45:44,649 --> 00:45:46,816
covered the Middle East and Europe and 

1216
00:45:46,816 --> 00:45:49,038
the Western hemisphere and Africa and I 

1217
00:45:49,038 --> 00:45:51,149
spent most of my waking hours working 

1218
00:45:51,149 --> 00:45:53,370
with our foreign partners on those are 

1219
00:45:53,379 --> 00:45:55,546
what we're doing together , you know , 

1220
00:45:55,546 --> 00:45:57,546
through alliances or through strong 

1221
00:45:57,546 --> 00:45:59,601
partnerships . I think there's a big 

1222
00:45:59,601 --> 00:45:59,530
piece of the job that I have been 

1223
00:45:59,540 --> 00:46:01,596
nominated for . And if confirmed , I 

1224
00:46:01,596 --> 00:46:03,707
would do that , I think of as defense 

1225
00:46:03,707 --> 00:46:05,929
diplomacy , working with our allies and 

1226
00:46:05,929 --> 00:46:08,096
partners in conjunction with the State 

1227
00:46:08,096 --> 00:46:10,096
Department uh to ensure that we are 

1228
00:46:10,096 --> 00:46:12,639
doing what we can to cooperate to give 

1229
00:46:12,649 --> 00:46:14,816
them resources and to find ways we can 

1230
00:46:14,816 --> 00:46:17,093
work together to solve common problems . 

1231
00:46:17,093 --> 00:46:18,927
One of the most important policy 

1232
00:46:18,927 --> 00:46:21,093
questions you've already touched on is 

1233
00:46:21,093 --> 00:46:23,316
Taiwan and the , the , the challenge it 

1234
00:46:23,316 --> 00:46:22,699
seems to me and we can discuss this 

1235
00:46:22,709 --> 00:46:26,020
further . Uh not in this setting is 

1236
00:46:26,030 --> 00:46:28,086
that the line between deterrence and 

1237
00:46:28,086 --> 00:46:31,000
provocation . Uh We want to deter uh 

1238
00:46:31,010 --> 00:46:33,350
the Chinese communist from any kind of 

1239
00:46:33,360 --> 00:46:36,590
uh violent attack on , on Taiwan . On 

1240
00:46:36,600 --> 00:46:38,767
the other hand , we don't want to take 

1241
00:46:38,767 --> 00:46:40,933
steps that would provoke it . Let me , 

1242
00:46:40,933 --> 00:46:43,044
let me turn to you . Mm Abercrombie . 

1243
00:46:43,044 --> 00:46:45,100
Uh I was trying to get a hold of Tom 

1244
00:46:45,100 --> 00:46:47,290
Tillis handgun spec which is a , an 

1245
00:46:47,300 --> 00:46:50,699
eight inch stack of paper . Uh We've 

1246
00:46:50,709 --> 00:46:53,370
got to do more off the shelf 

1247
00:46:53,379 --> 00:46:56,120
acquisition and not pay ridiculous 

1248
00:46:56,129 --> 00:46:58,300
amounts of money for custom uh uh 

1249
00:46:58,310 --> 00:47:01,860
platforms and devices and whatever it 

1250
00:47:01,870 --> 00:47:04,037
is the military needs . Do you agree ? 

1251
00:47:04,760 --> 00:47:07,070
Absolutely . Senator , yes , I , I 

1252
00:47:07,080 --> 00:47:10,129
think we have so many uh innovations 

1253
00:47:10,139 --> 00:47:12,083
happening in the commercial sector 

1254
00:47:12,083 --> 00:47:14,083
today that it is incumbent upon the 

1255
00:47:14,083 --> 00:47:16,195
defense department to look outside uh 

1256
00:47:16,195 --> 00:47:18,083
for those developments as well as 

1257
00:47:18,083 --> 00:47:20,306
inside . I hope you start with what can 

1258
00:47:20,306 --> 00:47:22,590
we find off the shelf rather than what 

1259
00:47:22,600 --> 00:47:24,822
can we design and have custom built ? I 

1260
00:47:24,822 --> 00:47:27,010
hope that you want to flip that , that 

1261
00:47:27,020 --> 00:47:29,820
premise uh you've touched on this , but 

1262
00:47:29,830 --> 00:47:31,997
I think it's essential that we buy the 

1263
00:47:31,997 --> 00:47:34,270
IP along with the platform , not just 

1264
00:47:34,280 --> 00:47:36,429
for software but for the design of a 

1265
00:47:36,439 --> 00:47:39,860
valve . So that my vision is every , 

1266
00:47:39,870 --> 00:47:42,389
every depot , every hangar , every ship 

1267
00:47:42,399 --> 00:47:44,709
has a 3D printer and we don't have to 

1268
00:47:44,719 --> 00:47:46,830
wait for somebody to make AAA missing 

1269
00:47:46,830 --> 00:47:49,090
valve or a missing bolt or something 

1270
00:47:49,100 --> 00:47:51,580
that's necessary because we don't have 

1271
00:47:51,590 --> 00:47:55,340
very good uh uh availability , 

1272
00:47:55,350 --> 00:47:57,406
both in terms of our aircraft and in 

1273
00:47:57,406 --> 00:48:00,449
terms of our naval facilities . So not 

1274
00:48:00,459 --> 00:48:02,459
just IP of software , I hope you'll 

1275
00:48:02,459 --> 00:48:04,737
commit . When you're buying a platform , 

1276
00:48:04,737 --> 00:48:06,848
you should buy the IP for the whole , 

1277
00:48:06,848 --> 00:48:09,580
for the whole uh project uh so that we 

1278
00:48:09,590 --> 00:48:12,120
can then build on that ourselves . Do 

1279
00:48:12,129 --> 00:48:14,580
you agree ? Senator , if confirmed , I 

1280
00:48:14,590 --> 00:48:16,757
will make it a priority to , to ensure 

1281
00:48:16,757 --> 00:48:19,060
the acquisition community is working to 

1282
00:48:19,070 --> 00:48:21,237
bake that into the contracting process 

1283
00:48:21,237 --> 00:48:23,590
from the outset . Thank you very much . 

1284
00:48:23,600 --> 00:48:25,711
I'll have several other questions for 

1285
00:48:25,711 --> 00:48:27,878
the record . I want to , I hope to see 

1286
00:48:27,878 --> 00:48:29,544
you do more work with smaller 

1287
00:48:29,544 --> 00:48:31,711
businesses who tell us the Pentagon is 

1288
00:48:31,711 --> 00:48:33,711
just so much trouble to deal with . 

1289
00:48:33,711 --> 00:48:35,433
They don't , they don't submit 

1290
00:48:35,433 --> 00:48:37,544
applications . We're missing a lot of 

1291
00:48:37,544 --> 00:48:39,822
innovations . So please attend to that . 

1292
00:48:39,822 --> 00:48:41,822
Thank you . Thank you . Thank you , 

1293
00:48:41,822 --> 00:48:41,649
Senator King , Senator Cotton , please , 

1294
00:48:42,120 --> 00:48:44,449
Mr Shirley . In the summer of 2020 you 

1295
00:48:44,459 --> 00:48:46,709
said the army is a pretty bubba 

1296
00:48:46,719 --> 00:48:48,886
oriented system . Do you still believe 

1297
00:48:48,886 --> 00:48:51,659
that ? Uh Senator , I think the , the , 

1298
00:48:51,669 --> 00:48:54,010
the comment you're referring to was one 

1299
00:48:54,020 --> 00:48:55,687
where I was talking about the 

1300
00:48:55,687 --> 00:48:57,909
importance of leadership and mentorship 

1301
00:48:57,909 --> 00:49:00,020
and it was a colloquial way of saying 

1302
00:49:00,020 --> 00:49:02,076
that's very , very important . So do 

1303
00:49:02,076 --> 00:49:04,242
you still believe the army is a pretty 

1304
00:49:04,242 --> 00:49:06,409
bubba oriented system ? I believe that 

1305
00:49:06,409 --> 00:49:05,860
leadership and mentorship in the army 

1306
00:49:05,870 --> 00:49:08,092
is critical as it is critical in all of 

1307
00:49:08,092 --> 00:49:10,203
our services . Do you think that that 

1308
00:49:10,203 --> 00:49:12,037
is a term of praise or a term of 

1309
00:49:12,037 --> 00:49:14,760
criticism ? It's a colloquial phrase to 

1310
00:49:14,770 --> 00:49:16,992
talk about the importance of mentorship 

1311
00:49:16,992 --> 00:49:18,992
and leaders . Why didn't you say in 

1312
00:49:18,992 --> 00:49:18,570
that New York Times interview in the 

1313
00:49:18,580 --> 00:49:20,469
summer of 2020 that leadership is 

1314
00:49:20,469 --> 00:49:22,469
important in the army . Why did you 

1315
00:49:22,469 --> 00:49:24,524
call it a bubba oriented system ? My 

1316
00:49:24,524 --> 00:49:26,691
recollection is that article was about 

1317
00:49:26,691 --> 00:49:28,858
the importance of having diversity and 

1318
00:49:28,858 --> 00:49:31,024
leadership throughout the armed forces 

1319
00:49:31,024 --> 00:49:33,136
and I was stressing the importance of 

1320
00:49:33,136 --> 00:49:35,191
leaders making that a priority . The 

1321
00:49:35,191 --> 00:49:34,770
article you also implied pretty 

1322
00:49:34,780 --> 00:49:36,669
strongly that criticism of Barack 

1323
00:49:36,669 --> 00:49:38,724
Obama's foreign policy was driven in 

1324
00:49:38,724 --> 00:49:40,891
part by systemic racism . Do you still 

1325
00:49:40,891 --> 00:49:42,724
believe that criticism of Barack 

1326
00:49:42,724 --> 00:49:44,613
Obama's foreign policy is in part 

1327
00:49:44,613 --> 00:49:46,669
racist ? I think there's no question 

1328
00:49:46,669 --> 00:49:48,724
that there were arguments made about 

1329
00:49:48,724 --> 00:49:50,750
President Obama that were rooted in 

1330
00:49:50,760 --> 00:49:52,949
race . No question about it . Let's 

1331
00:49:52,959 --> 00:49:54,959
consider some of those decisions on 

1332
00:49:54,959 --> 00:49:57,015
which you played a part you defended 

1333
00:49:57,015 --> 00:49:59,181
strongly the Syrian red line fiasco as 

1334
00:49:59,181 --> 00:50:01,348
late as 2016 . Do you still believe it 

1335
00:50:01,348 --> 00:50:03,515
was correct for President Obama not to 

1336
00:50:03,515 --> 00:50:03,500
enforce his own red line in Syria ? I 

1337
00:50:03,510 --> 00:50:05,566
believe it was an accomplishment for 

1338
00:50:05,566 --> 00:50:07,399
the United States working with a 

1339
00:50:07,399 --> 00:50:09,399
multinational coalition to get 1300 

1340
00:50:09,399 --> 00:50:11,510
tons of chemical weapons out of Syria 

1341
00:50:11,550 --> 00:50:14,360
rely , relying on Vladimir Putin . It 

1342
00:50:14,370 --> 00:50:16,537
was an accomplishment to get 1300 tons 

1343
00:50:16,537 --> 00:50:18,481
of chemical weapons out of Syria . 

1344
00:50:18,481 --> 00:50:20,703
Senator . Um , you obviously didn't get 

1345
00:50:20,703 --> 00:50:22,814
it all out of Syria because Bashar Al 

1346
00:50:22,814 --> 00:50:22,639
Assad later gassed his own people again , 

1347
00:50:22,649 --> 00:50:25,719
didn't he ? He used chemical weapons 

1348
00:50:25,729 --> 00:50:27,562
that were made out of chlorine , 

1349
00:50:27,562 --> 00:50:29,562
industrial chemicals , which is not 

1350
00:50:29,562 --> 00:50:29,280
part of these chemicals . Do you 

1351
00:50:29,290 --> 00:50:31,512
believe , do you believe it was correct 

1352
00:50:31,512 --> 00:50:33,457
for Donald Trump to enforce Barack 

1353
00:50:33,457 --> 00:50:35,457
Obama's own red line when he bombed 

1354
00:50:35,457 --> 00:50:37,568
Bashar Al Assad after gassing his own 

1355
00:50:37,568 --> 00:50:39,790
people . I believe it was important for 

1356
00:50:39,790 --> 00:50:41,734
the United States to engage in the 

1357
00:50:41,734 --> 00:50:43,790
counter ISIL campaign which began in 

1358
00:50:43,790 --> 00:50:46,068
the fall of 2014 . Yes or no . Did you , 

1359
00:50:46,068 --> 00:50:48,290
did you support Donald Trump's decision 

1360
00:50:48,290 --> 00:50:48,189
to enforce Barack Obama's own red line ? 

1361
00:50:48,199 --> 00:50:50,760
I don't recall that decision . You 

1362
00:50:50,770 --> 00:50:53,090
don't recall bombing Syria during 

1363
00:50:53,100 --> 00:50:55,060
Donald Trump's presidency in that 

1364
00:50:55,070 --> 00:50:57,070
specific incident , Senator I don't 

1365
00:50:57,070 --> 00:50:59,689
recall . Um So one thing that Barack 

1366
00:50:59,699 --> 00:51:01,699
Obama did 10 years ago was toss the 

1367
00:51:01,699 --> 00:51:03,643
decision to bomb Syria to Congress 

1368
00:51:03,643 --> 00:51:06,330
looking for a scapegoat . Um Obviously 

1369
00:51:06,340 --> 00:51:08,507
he did not submit the decision to bomb 

1370
00:51:08,507 --> 00:51:10,780
Libya to Congress in 2011 . What's the 

1371
00:51:10,790 --> 00:51:12,401
difference ? Why did we need 

1372
00:51:12,401 --> 00:51:14,623
congressional approval to bomb Syria in 

1373
00:51:14,623 --> 00:51:16,790
2013 but not Libya in 2011 ? Senator , 

1374
00:51:16,790 --> 00:51:18,846
I can't speak for President Obama on 

1375
00:51:18,846 --> 00:51:20,790
this . You were on the White House 

1376
00:51:20,790 --> 00:51:22,901
staff at the time in 2011 , right ? I 

1377
00:51:22,901 --> 00:51:22,899
was Senator . I was not part of that 

1378
00:51:22,909 --> 00:51:25,076
decision with , with President Obama . 

1379
00:51:25,076 --> 00:51:27,242
I can say what , what is your , what's 

1380
00:51:27,242 --> 00:51:29,242
your view of that question ? Do you 

1381
00:51:29,242 --> 00:51:28,860
think we needed congressional approval 

1382
00:51:28,870 --> 00:51:31,379
to bomb Syria at the time ? I supported 

1383
00:51:31,389 --> 00:51:33,611
the , wasn't part of the decision but I 

1384
00:51:33,611 --> 00:51:35,833
supported President Obama coming to the 

1385
00:51:35,833 --> 00:51:37,778
Congress to get the support of the 

1386
00:51:37,778 --> 00:51:39,833
American people to whether or not we 

1387
00:51:39,833 --> 00:51:42,056
were we the United States were going to 

1388
00:51:42,056 --> 00:51:43,889
intervene ? And do you think the 

1389
00:51:43,889 --> 00:51:46,111
intervention in Libya was wise policy ? 

1390
00:51:46,111 --> 00:51:48,360
Senator I've written extensively about 

1391
00:51:48,600 --> 00:51:51,510
the lessons learned of our industry at 

1392
00:51:51,649 --> 00:51:53,649
the time . I did believe it was the 

1393
00:51:53,649 --> 00:51:55,538
right policy . Yes . So you don't 

1394
00:51:55,538 --> 00:51:57,649
believe it anymore . I believe at the 

1395
00:51:57,649 --> 00:51:59,871
time given the circumstances we face it 

1396
00:51:59,871 --> 00:52:02,038
was the right policy given . So Barack 

1397
00:52:02,038 --> 00:52:04,260
Obama has said publicly that Libya is a 

1398
00:52:04,260 --> 00:52:06,316
mess privately . I won't say what he 

1399
00:52:06,316 --> 00:52:08,482
said since there are young Children in 

1400
00:52:08,482 --> 00:52:10,538
the audience , but it ends with show 

1401
00:52:10,538 --> 00:52:12,760
and it starts with sh do you agree with 

1402
00:52:12,760 --> 00:52:12,760
President Obama's retrospective 

1403
00:52:12,770 --> 00:52:14,770
assessment ? I believe what kind of 

1404
00:52:14,770 --> 00:52:16,992
mess Libya is . Thanks , Senator . Uh I 

1405
00:52:16,992 --> 00:52:18,881
believe that the aftermath of the 

1406
00:52:18,881 --> 00:52:20,826
Libyan War , including uh up until 

1407
00:52:20,826 --> 00:52:22,714
today , unfortunately , with this 

1408
00:52:22,714 --> 00:52:24,826
terrible devastating natural disaster 

1409
00:52:24,826 --> 00:52:26,992
with the earth with the dam breaking , 

1410
00:52:26,992 --> 00:52:28,937
killing thousands of Libyans is an 

1411
00:52:28,937 --> 00:52:31,270
aftermath of that . But let me ask this . 

1412
00:52:31,270 --> 00:52:33,381
So we , we withdrew support for a pro 

1413
00:52:33,381 --> 00:52:35,603
American ruler in Egypt , Hosni Mubarak 

1414
00:52:35,603 --> 00:52:37,603
and he was toppled . We bombed a de 

1415
00:52:37,603 --> 00:52:39,548
facto pro American leader in Libya 

1416
00:52:39,548 --> 00:52:41,659
Muammar Gaddafi and he was ultimately 

1417
00:52:41,659 --> 00:52:43,881
removed from power . We did not bomb an 

1418
00:52:43,881 --> 00:52:45,770
anti American dictator in Syria . 

1419
00:52:45,770 --> 00:52:47,992
Bashar Al Assad . Can , can you explain 

1420
00:52:48,149 --> 00:52:50,205
that series of decisions in the Arab 

1421
00:52:50,205 --> 00:52:52,379
Spring ? Why ? It seems like we always 

1422
00:52:52,389 --> 00:52:54,500
toppled the pro American rulers there 

1423
00:52:54,500 --> 00:52:56,722
and we sided with the anti American pro 

1424
00:52:56,722 --> 00:52:59,239
Iran rulers . Senator again . Thanks 

1425
00:52:59,250 --> 00:53:01,361
for the question . And I have thought 

1426
00:53:01,361 --> 00:53:03,528
and written extensively about this , I 

1427
00:53:03,528 --> 00:53:05,750
believe , uh I believed at the time and 

1428
00:53:05,750 --> 00:53:07,972
I believe now it's , it was the correct 

1429
00:53:07,972 --> 00:53:10,083
decision not to intervene directly in 

1430
00:53:10,083 --> 00:53:12,306
that Syrian civil War , but it was also 

1431
00:53:12,306 --> 00:53:14,194
the correct decision to intervene 

1432
00:53:14,194 --> 00:53:16,250
directly to conduct the counter isil 

1433
00:53:16,250 --> 00:53:18,417
campaign which the United States began 

1434
00:53:18,417 --> 00:53:20,417
with the support of Congress in the 

1435
00:53:20,417 --> 00:53:22,583
fall of 20 . Ok . Let me , let me turn 

1436
00:53:22,583 --> 00:53:21,979
to your judgment on a contemporary 

1437
00:53:21,989 --> 00:53:24,050
matter . So the Obama or the Biden 

1438
00:53:24,060 --> 00:53:25,949
administration has been racked by 

1439
00:53:25,949 --> 00:53:28,004
unwarranted anxiety about threats of 

1440
00:53:28,004 --> 00:53:30,340
escalation in Ukraine . So members of 

1441
00:53:30,350 --> 00:53:32,350
this committee in both parties have 

1442
00:53:32,350 --> 00:53:34,572
repeatedly pointed out there's been one 

1443
00:53:34,572 --> 00:53:36,461
weapon system after another . The 

1444
00:53:36,461 --> 00:53:38,628
latest one being at attack him is that 

1445
00:53:38,628 --> 00:53:38,219
President Biden has refused to send to 

1446
00:53:38,229 --> 00:53:40,520
Ukraine only to reverse himself three 

1447
00:53:40,530 --> 00:53:43,209
or six or nine months later . Um , a 

1448
00:53:43,290 --> 00:53:46,129
long standing pattern in retrospect . 

1449
00:53:46,139 --> 00:53:48,306
Do you agree there's any weapon system 

1450
00:53:48,306 --> 00:53:50,361
that the Biden administration should 

1451
00:53:50,361 --> 00:53:52,583
have sent earlier than it finally ended 

1452
00:53:52,583 --> 00:53:54,695
up sending him ? Or do you think it's 

1453
00:53:54,695 --> 00:53:53,889
pitched a perfect game on every 

1454
00:53:53,899 --> 00:53:56,100
decision . Oh , I don't think anyone 

1455
00:53:56,110 --> 00:53:58,110
presume there's been a perfect game 

1456
00:53:58,110 --> 00:54:01,560
pitch for sure . But I am satisfied 

1457
00:54:01,570 --> 00:54:03,580
with the amount of assistance the 

1458
00:54:03,590 --> 00:54:05,701
United States with the support of the 

1459
00:54:05,701 --> 00:54:07,923
Congress satisfied . Or the overall I'm 

1460
00:54:07,923 --> 00:54:09,979
saying that there's been probably at 

1461
00:54:09,979 --> 00:54:09,820
least a dozen different weapon systems . 

1462
00:54:09,830 --> 00:54:12,699
The latest attack F-16s , Abram tanks , 

1463
00:54:12,709 --> 00:54:15,219
cluster munitions in which the Biden 

1464
00:54:15,229 --> 00:54:17,396
administration has ruled them out only 

1465
00:54:17,396 --> 00:54:19,507
to turn around and deliver them . 369 

1466
00:54:19,507 --> 00:54:21,562
months later . Is there any specific 

1467
00:54:21,562 --> 00:54:23,729
weapon system that you think the Biden 

1468
00:54:23,729 --> 00:54:25,840
administration made a mistake on that 

1469
00:54:25,840 --> 00:54:27,951
it ultimately delivered and it should 

1470
00:54:27,951 --> 00:54:30,007
have delivered earlier . Senator I'm 

1471
00:54:30,007 --> 00:54:32,229
proud of the administration's record on 

1472
00:54:32,229 --> 00:54:34,285
providing an unprecedented amount of 

1473
00:54:34,285 --> 00:54:36,451
assistance to Ukraine $44 billion . My 

1474
00:54:36,451 --> 00:54:38,618
time is up . I would take that as a no 

1475
00:54:38,618 --> 00:54:38,600
and yet another example of the bad 

1476
00:54:38,610 --> 00:54:40,666
judgment you've displayed for a very 

1477
00:54:40,666 --> 00:54:42,666
long time on these critical foreign 

1478
00:54:42,666 --> 00:54:45,540
policy questions . Thank you , Senator 

1479
00:54:45,659 --> 00:54:47,881
Senator Moron , please . Thank you , Mr 

1480
00:54:47,881 --> 00:54:49,937
Chairman . I asked the following two 

1481
00:54:49,937 --> 00:54:52,300
initial questions of all nominees who 

1482
00:54:52,310 --> 00:54:55,010
come before any of my committees . So I 

1483
00:54:55,020 --> 00:54:57,800
will ask these questions of you . I 

1484
00:54:57,810 --> 00:55:00,810
will start with uh this uh since you 

1485
00:55:00,820 --> 00:55:02,876
became a legal adult . Have you ever 

1486
00:55:02,876 --> 00:55:04,764
made unwanted requests for sexual 

1487
00:55:04,764 --> 00:55:07,300
favors or committed any verbal or 

1488
00:55:07,310 --> 00:55:09,310
physical harassment or assault of a 

1489
00:55:09,310 --> 00:55:12,899
sexual nature ? Miss Abercrombie . No , 

1490
00:55:12,909 --> 00:55:15,050
Senator . Have you ever faced 

1491
00:55:15,060 --> 00:55:17,282
discipline or entered into a settlement 

1492
00:55:17,282 --> 00:55:19,629
related to this kind of conduct . No 

1493
00:55:19,639 --> 00:55:23,510
sir . No , Senator for Mr Shelley , 

1494
00:55:23,879 --> 00:55:26,510
the compacts of Free Association and 

1495
00:55:26,520 --> 00:55:29,919
the monetary assistance within them are 

1496
00:55:30,679 --> 00:55:34,580
in inextricably uh 

1497
00:55:34,590 --> 00:55:37,510
tied to U SNP composure and national 

1498
00:55:37,520 --> 00:55:39,729
security . Are you familiar with the 

1499
00:55:39,739 --> 00:55:41,760
compacts and , and their purposes ? 

1500
00:55:42,570 --> 00:55:44,681
Senator ? Thanks for the question . I 

1501
00:55:44,681 --> 00:55:46,737
really appreciate our time the other 

1502
00:55:46,737 --> 00:55:48,959
week , uh , talking about this and many 

1503
00:55:48,959 --> 00:55:51,181
other issues in your office . I am very 

1504
00:55:51,181 --> 00:55:51,120
familiar with the so called co 

1505
00:55:51,270 --> 00:55:53,048
agreements and they're critical 

1506
00:55:53,048 --> 00:55:55,048
importance to our security . Good , 

1507
00:55:55,048 --> 00:55:57,048
because can you expand a little bit 

1508
00:55:57,048 --> 00:55:59,159
more about why uh that these compacts 

1509
00:55:59,159 --> 00:56:01,326
are of critical importance and even as 

1510
00:56:01,326 --> 00:56:03,629
we are uh pretty much negotiating those 

1511
00:56:03,639 --> 00:56:06,729
compacts , even as we speak , we need 

1512
00:56:06,739 --> 00:56:08,628
to learn a little bit more on why 

1513
00:56:08,628 --> 00:56:10,850
they're so important . Sure , senator , 

1514
00:56:10,850 --> 00:56:12,906
these compacts help provide critical 

1515
00:56:12,906 --> 00:56:14,949
access to our forces and personnel 

1516
00:56:14,959 --> 00:56:17,070
throughout the Pacific Islands which 

1517
00:56:17,169 --> 00:56:19,280
given the challenges we are facing in 

1518
00:56:19,280 --> 00:56:21,058
the Indo Pacific , particularly 

1519
00:56:21,058 --> 00:56:23,225
emanating from the PR C that access uh 

1520
00:56:23,225 --> 00:56:25,391
is absolutely critical to our security 

1521
00:56:26,020 --> 00:56:28,131
and especially as we are very focused 

1522
00:56:28,131 --> 00:56:31,219
on the end up a RR that uh 

1523
00:56:31,709 --> 00:56:35,550
our uh agreements with the compact 

1524
00:56:35,560 --> 00:56:39,540
nations , Halal Micronesia and um 

1525
00:56:41,850 --> 00:56:44,419
I'm sorry , silence . Very important . 

1526
00:56:44,919 --> 00:56:48,350
Thank you . So for you again , missile 

1527
00:56:48,360 --> 00:56:50,959
technology has rapidly developed and 

1528
00:56:50,969 --> 00:56:54,570
perhaps now has even outpaced our 

1529
00:56:54,580 --> 00:56:57,090
policy process . As our adversaries 

1530
00:56:57,100 --> 00:56:59,820
modernize , we must adapt to ensure 

1531
00:56:59,830 --> 00:57:01,969
strategic locations like Hawaii are 

1532
00:57:01,979 --> 00:57:04,739
protected . How do you believe that dod 

1533
00:57:04,750 --> 00:57:06,719
can improve its policies regarding 

1534
00:57:06,729 --> 00:57:09,860
cruise and hypersonic missile defense 

1535
00:57:09,870 --> 00:57:13,550
of the homeland Senator . Thank you and 

1536
00:57:13,560 --> 00:57:15,671
thank you for your continued advocacy 

1537
00:57:15,671 --> 00:57:17,727
on this issue . Said obviously , the 

1538
00:57:17,727 --> 00:57:19,838
defense of Hawaii and defense of Guam 

1539
00:57:19,838 --> 00:57:22,171
are absolutely critical to our security . 

1540
00:57:22,171 --> 00:57:24,116
My understanding , Senator is that 

1541
00:57:24,116 --> 00:57:26,227
Hawaii has the same protection as the 

1542
00:57:26,227 --> 00:57:28,227
49 other states . Uh And I know the 

1543
00:57:28,227 --> 00:57:30,004
department has been making some 

1544
00:57:30,004 --> 00:57:32,116
critical investments in upgrading our 

1545
00:57:32,116 --> 00:57:34,116
missile defense posture uh to cover 

1546
00:57:34,116 --> 00:57:36,227
Hawaii if confirmed , I can pledge to 

1547
00:57:36,227 --> 00:57:38,449
you that I will continue to remain very 

1548
00:57:38,449 --> 00:57:40,560
focused on this . And we look forward 

1549
00:57:40,560 --> 00:57:42,671
if confirmed and working with you and 

1550
00:57:42,671 --> 00:57:44,893
your team to ensure we're doing what we 

1551
00:57:44,893 --> 00:57:44,129
need to do to ensure Hawaii's 

1552
00:57:44,139 --> 00:57:46,209
protection . Thank you very much 

1553
00:57:46,219 --> 00:57:48,386
because there was a time when uh there 

1554
00:57:48,386 --> 00:57:50,497
was a particular kind of radar system 

1555
00:57:50,497 --> 00:57:52,608
that was going to be placed in Hawaii 

1556
00:57:52,608 --> 00:57:54,663
and that is no longer the case and , 

1557
00:57:54,663 --> 00:57:56,719
and that is why I continue to pursue 

1558
00:57:56,719 --> 00:57:58,886
missile defense of Hawaii . And I will 

1559
00:57:58,886 --> 00:57:58,770
work with you . Of course , should you 

1560
00:57:58,780 --> 00:58:00,979
be confirmed for you again ? I 

1561
00:58:00,989 --> 00:58:02,711
introduced a bill last year to 

1562
00:58:02,711 --> 00:58:05,090
establish embassies in several Pacific 

1563
00:58:05,100 --> 00:58:07,850
Islands . So I particularly appreciate 

1564
00:58:07,860 --> 00:58:09,971
the administration's announcements at 

1565
00:58:09,971 --> 00:58:12,100
the Pacific Island Forum Summit this 

1566
00:58:12,110 --> 00:58:14,610
week . Improving relationships in the 

1567
00:58:14,620 --> 00:58:17,120
Pacific both diplomatically and with 

1568
00:58:17,129 --> 00:58:19,629
military to military engagements is is 

1569
00:58:19,639 --> 00:58:22,020
foundational to national security if 

1570
00:58:22,030 --> 00:58:24,197
nominated or you have been nominated . 

1571
00:58:24,197 --> 00:58:26,419
How would you use your State Department 

1572
00:58:26,419 --> 00:58:29,100
and the dod experience to build on dod 

1573
00:58:29,110 --> 00:58:31,659
s efforts in campaigning and 

1574
00:58:31,669 --> 00:58:34,110
demonstrating our commitment to allies 

1575
00:58:34,120 --> 00:58:36,659
in the region . Thank you , Senator Ron . 

1576
00:58:37,260 --> 00:58:39,482
Our work to strengthen our partnerships 

1577
00:58:39,482 --> 00:58:41,538
with the Pacific Islands uh has been 

1578
00:58:41,538 --> 00:58:43,482
quite intense over the last year , 

1579
00:58:43,482 --> 00:58:45,593
President Biden , as you noted , just 

1580
00:58:45,593 --> 00:58:47,704
on Monday hosted his second summit of 

1581
00:58:47,704 --> 00:58:49,649
Pacific Island leaders . Secretary 

1582
00:58:49,649 --> 00:58:51,871
Blinken just two days ago , met with uh 

1583
00:58:51,871 --> 00:58:54,093
the Pacific Island leaders from Palau , 

1584
00:58:54,093 --> 00:58:55,927
the Marshall Islands and Michael 

1585
00:58:55,927 --> 00:58:58,038
Indonesia to talk about the process . 

1586
00:58:58,038 --> 00:58:59,982
So I can tell you if confirmed , I 

1587
00:58:59,982 --> 00:59:01,871
would certainly carry this effort 

1588
00:59:01,871 --> 00:59:04,093
forward at the Pentagon because this is 

1589
00:59:04,093 --> 00:59:05,704
a critical , critical set of 

1590
00:59:05,704 --> 00:59:07,704
relationships for the Department of 

1591
00:59:07,704 --> 00:59:07,580
Defense . The state Department has been 

1592
00:59:07,590 --> 00:59:09,423
in the lead in negotiating these 

1593
00:59:09,423 --> 00:59:11,312
agreements , but the benefits are 

1594
00:59:11,312 --> 00:59:13,146
really uh with the Department of 

1595
00:59:13,146 --> 00:59:15,201
Defense . And I think that the , the 

1596
00:59:15,201 --> 00:59:17,257
more we are diplomatically engaged , 

1597
00:59:17,257 --> 00:59:19,312
not just militarily engaged with our 

1598
00:59:19,312 --> 00:59:21,479
island nation friends . It's important 

1599
00:59:21,479 --> 00:59:23,590
because for example , places like the 

1600
00:59:23,590 --> 00:59:25,812
Solomon Islands that China is very much 

1601
00:59:25,812 --> 00:59:28,034
engaged in what is going on there . And 

1602
00:59:28,034 --> 00:59:30,257
uh I would note that with regard to the 

1603
00:59:30,257 --> 00:59:32,423
for negotiations , we need to complete 

1604
00:59:32,423 --> 00:59:34,745
our agreements with the Marshall . And 

1605
00:59:34,754 --> 00:59:36,844
uh my hope is that we're going to uh 

1606
00:59:36,854 --> 00:59:39,514
see our way through to enable them to 

1607
00:59:39,524 --> 00:59:43,284
sign on to this uh 20 year compact 

1608
00:59:43,294 --> 00:59:45,127
that is critical to our national 

1609
00:59:45,127 --> 00:59:47,127
defense . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

1610
00:59:47,669 --> 00:59:50,159
Thank you , Senator uh Senator , please . 

1611
00:59:50,260 --> 00:59:53,500
Thank you , Mr Chairman , Mr Aber , Mr 

1612
00:59:53,510 --> 00:59:55,566
Abercrombie , and Mr Chalet First of 

1613
00:59:55,566 --> 00:59:57,788
all , thank you to both of you for your 

1614
00:59:57,788 --> 01:00:00,239
service to our country . Um Mr , shall 

1615
01:00:00,250 --> 01:00:03,120
I we discussed the impact of auctioning 

1616
01:00:03,129 --> 01:00:06,590
off the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz band of 

1617
01:00:06,600 --> 01:00:08,709
the spectrum and the impact it would 

1618
01:00:08,719 --> 01:00:10,886
have on dod capabilities when you were 

1619
01:00:10,886 --> 01:00:14,419
in my office briefly . Um Most 

1620
01:00:14,429 --> 01:00:16,969
importantly , we have now asked 22 

1621
01:00:16,979 --> 01:00:19,070
separate uniformed officers in a row 

1622
01:00:19,320 --> 01:00:21,780
about their opinion as to whether or 

1623
01:00:21,790 --> 01:00:23,610
not that particular part of the 

1624
01:00:23,620 --> 01:00:26,550
spectrum should be sold or shared 

1625
01:00:26,870 --> 01:00:30,560
with commercial interests . Not one of 

1626
01:00:30,570 --> 01:00:33,030
them has been supportive of that 

1627
01:00:33,040 --> 01:00:35,800
approach . In fact , the Navy stated 

1628
01:00:35,810 --> 01:00:37,532
that transitioning the systems 

1629
01:00:37,532 --> 01:00:39,699
operating on the lower band would cost 

1630
01:00:39,699 --> 01:00:42,790
over $260 billion . Additionally , the 

1631
01:00:42,800 --> 01:00:44,800
impact to homeland defense would be 

1632
01:00:44,800 --> 01:00:47,679
dramatic and span several decades based 

1633
01:00:47,689 --> 01:00:50,199
on your knowledge of this issue and the 

1634
01:00:50,209 --> 01:00:52,520
testimony of senior uniformed officers . 

1635
01:00:53,149 --> 01:00:54,982
What would be your advice to the 

1636
01:00:54,982 --> 01:00:57,149
Secretary of Defense on the auctioning 

1637
01:00:57,149 --> 01:00:59,459
of the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz portion of 

1638
01:00:59,469 --> 01:01:02,189
the spectrum ? Thank you , Senator 

1639
01:01:02,199 --> 01:01:04,421
Rounds and I really appreciate the time 

1640
01:01:04,421 --> 01:01:06,643
you gave me uh the other day , uh speak 

1641
01:01:06,643 --> 01:01:08,810
in your office . Uh You first and also 

1642
01:01:08,810 --> 01:01:10,977
thank you for what you have been doing 

1643
01:01:10,977 --> 01:01:13,088
to champion this issue and , and make 

1644
01:01:13,088 --> 01:01:15,143
sure that we all understand that the 

1645
01:01:15,143 --> 01:01:15,060
implications of the importance of these , 

1646
01:01:15,070 --> 01:01:17,350
this part of the spectrum based on 

1647
01:01:17,360 --> 01:01:19,249
everything I have heard , I would 

1648
01:01:19,249 --> 01:01:21,471
associate myself with the concerns that 

1649
01:01:21,471 --> 01:01:23,582
have been expressed to this committee 

1650
01:01:23,582 --> 01:01:25,638
about the , the , the auctioning off 

1651
01:01:25,638 --> 01:01:27,749
and the importance of those that part 

1652
01:01:27,749 --> 01:01:29,527
of the spectrum to our national 

1653
01:01:29,527 --> 01:01:31,582
security . And so I would advise the 

1654
01:01:31,582 --> 01:01:33,860
secretary to tread very carefully here . 

1655
01:01:33,860 --> 01:01:36,027
Uh And , and , and I know that there's 

1656
01:01:36,027 --> 01:01:38,138
been a report done uh that I have not 

1657
01:01:38,138 --> 01:01:40,304
yet had a chance to see if confirmed . 

1658
01:01:40,304 --> 01:01:42,416
I would ask to see that on day one to 

1659
01:01:42,416 --> 01:01:44,638
better understand about how we can move 

1660
01:01:44,638 --> 01:01:46,638
forward on this , but I fully fully 

1661
01:01:46,638 --> 01:01:45,919
appreciate the national security 

1662
01:01:45,929 --> 01:01:48,330
implications . Ok . Thank you . Uh Let 

1663
01:01:48,340 --> 01:01:51,010
me just ask and , uh , Miss Abercrombie , 

1664
01:01:51,020 --> 01:01:53,131
I've appreciated the discussions that 

1665
01:01:53,131 --> 01:01:55,131
we have had . I don't have a lot of 

1666
01:01:55,131 --> 01:01:57,076
questions for you today , but I do 

1667
01:01:57,076 --> 01:01:59,298
wanna follow up Mr chalet with a couple 

1668
01:01:59,298 --> 01:02:01,353
of questions specific with regard to 

1669
01:02:01,353 --> 01:02:03,464
reports . Uh I agree that that report 

1670
01:02:03,464 --> 01:02:05,631
needs to come out and I think the more 

1671
01:02:05,631 --> 01:02:07,687
we share , you've indicated that you 

1672
01:02:07,687 --> 01:02:09,576
would be very open in sharing the 

1673
01:02:09,576 --> 01:02:11,298
information back and forth you 

1674
01:02:11,298 --> 01:02:13,298
currently in , in the Department of 

1675
01:02:13,298 --> 01:02:15,409
State have the opportunities to share 

1676
01:02:15,409 --> 01:02:18,439
information as well . Um You've already 

1677
01:02:18,449 --> 01:02:20,616
had a beginning discussion with regard 

1678
01:02:20,616 --> 01:02:22,727
to what happened in Afghanistan and I 

1679
01:02:22,727 --> 01:02:24,949
don't think there's anybody that thinks 

1680
01:02:24,949 --> 01:02:27,005
that that was a perfect operation in 

1681
01:02:27,005 --> 01:02:29,227
any way , shape or form we were able to 

1682
01:02:29,227 --> 01:02:31,282
discuss briefly in , in our office , 

1683
01:02:31,282 --> 01:02:33,393
the withdrawal from Afghanistan . And 

1684
01:02:33,393 --> 01:02:33,100
as I mentioned before , many of us 

1685
01:02:33,110 --> 01:02:36,070
still have unanswered questions about 

1686
01:02:36,080 --> 01:02:38,136
the sequence of events and decisions 

1687
01:02:38,136 --> 01:02:40,302
that were made over a period of time , 

1688
01:02:40,302 --> 01:02:42,302
literally of months and days as the 

1689
01:02:42,302 --> 01:02:44,909
State Department's counselor . Do you 

1690
01:02:44,919 --> 01:02:48,830
commit to making the State Department's 

1691
01:02:48,840 --> 01:02:51,629
classified after action report in 

1692
01:02:51,639 --> 01:02:54,429
Afghanistan available to the members of 

1693
01:02:54,439 --> 01:02:57,060
this committee ? Well , thank you , 

1694
01:02:57,070 --> 01:02:59,070
Senator , uh , for the question and 

1695
01:02:59,070 --> 01:03:01,126
you're absolutely right . We need to 

1696
01:03:01,126 --> 01:03:03,126
have accountability and , and learn 

1697
01:03:03,126 --> 01:03:05,292
lessons from not just what happened in 

1698
01:03:05,292 --> 01:03:07,889
August of 2021 but the 20 year war that 

1699
01:03:07,899 --> 01:03:09,689
the United States fought with 

1700
01:03:09,699 --> 01:03:12,040
Afghanistan . I look , I look , I I'm 

1701
01:03:12,050 --> 01:03:14,050
gonna run out of time , but this is 

1702
01:03:14,050 --> 01:03:16,300
important because you're moving into a 

1703
01:03:16,310 --> 01:03:18,421
position in the Department of Defense 

1704
01:03:18,421 --> 01:03:20,421
where you're gonna be making policy 

1705
01:03:20,421 --> 01:03:22,477
recommendations . Part of that means 

1706
01:03:22,477 --> 01:03:24,588
sharing good information with members 

1707
01:03:24,588 --> 01:03:24,469
of this committee to either gain 

1708
01:03:24,479 --> 01:03:27,280
support or to literally revisit whether 

1709
01:03:27,290 --> 01:03:29,123
or not those recommendations are 

1710
01:03:29,123 --> 01:03:30,568
appropriate or not pretty 

1711
01:03:30,568 --> 01:03:32,790
straightforward as to whether or not as 

1712
01:03:32,790 --> 01:03:34,790
the counselor for the Department of 

1713
01:03:34,790 --> 01:03:36,623
State . Are you prepared in your 

1714
01:03:36,623 --> 01:03:38,679
current position to make that report 

1715
01:03:38,679 --> 01:03:40,568
available ? I'm not asking you to 

1716
01:03:40,568 --> 01:03:42,679
declassify it , but it should be made 

1717
01:03:42,679 --> 01:03:44,734
available to members here so that we 

1718
01:03:44,734 --> 01:03:46,846
can see it . What's your opinion as a 

1719
01:03:46,846 --> 01:03:49,068
policy maker in your current position ? 

1720
01:03:49,350 --> 01:03:51,760
Are you prepared to make that available 

1721
01:03:51,770 --> 01:03:54,048
to members of this committee ? Senator ? 

1722
01:03:54,048 --> 01:03:56,270
As you know , we , the State Department 

1723
01:03:56,270 --> 01:03:58,048
has provided that report to the 

1724
01:03:58,048 --> 01:03:57,479
Oversight Committee , the Senate 

1725
01:03:57,489 --> 01:03:59,656
Foreign Relations Committee as well as 

1726
01:03:59,656 --> 01:04:01,711
on the House side and also published 

1727
01:04:01,711 --> 01:04:03,780
portions of that report uh on the on 

1728
01:04:03,790 --> 01:04:05,679
the web , on the state department 

1729
01:04:05,679 --> 01:04:07,623
website . I would commit to you to 

1730
01:04:07,623 --> 01:04:09,734
taking it back to my state department 

1731
01:04:09,734 --> 01:04:11,790
colleagues and noting your desire to 

1732
01:04:11,790 --> 01:04:14,012
accept that . And would you be prepared 

1733
01:04:14,012 --> 01:04:15,901
to take that back and to have the 

1734
01:04:15,901 --> 01:04:17,957
report back to us prior to a vote on 

1735
01:04:17,957 --> 01:04:20,123
your confirmation Senator ? I it's not 

1736
01:04:20,123 --> 01:04:22,290
my decision on whether or not to share 

1737
01:04:22,290 --> 01:04:24,346
these reports , but I certainly will 

1738
01:04:24,346 --> 01:04:24,139
take back your question and , and 

1739
01:04:24,149 --> 01:04:26,038
advocate on behalf . I believe we 

1740
01:04:26,038 --> 01:04:28,260
should be as transparent as we can be . 

1741
01:04:28,260 --> 01:04:30,316
We believe that that should be avail 

1742
01:04:30,316 --> 01:04:29,629
made available to this committee . It 

1743
01:04:29,639 --> 01:04:31,472
was members of the Department of 

1744
01:04:31,472 --> 01:04:32,972
Defense that actually were 

1745
01:04:32,972 --> 01:04:35,083
participating that day in Afghanistan 

1746
01:04:35,083 --> 01:04:37,306
when we lost 13 . Absolutely . And we , 

1747
01:04:37,306 --> 01:04:39,417
I think every day about the 2400 lost 

1748
01:04:39,417 --> 01:04:41,306
and the reason , the reason , the 

1749
01:04:41,306 --> 01:04:43,528
reason why I ask it is this is a test , 

1750
01:04:43,528 --> 01:04:45,639
this is a test to find out whether or 

1751
01:04:45,639 --> 01:04:47,750
not in the future you would also work 

1752
01:04:47,750 --> 01:04:47,739
with us on getting the information that 

1753
01:04:47,750 --> 01:04:50,199
we need to either question the policy 

1754
01:04:50,209 --> 01:04:52,469
recommendations that you've made or to 

1755
01:04:52,479 --> 01:04:54,535
support those policies . I , I think 

1756
01:04:54,535 --> 01:04:56,590
this committee does a great job on a 

1757
01:04:56,590 --> 01:04:58,757
bipartisan basis , but we've got to be 

1758
01:04:58,757 --> 01:05:00,812
able to have the information to make 

1759
01:05:00,812 --> 01:05:02,812
those recommendations and learn the 

1760
01:05:02,812 --> 01:05:04,535
reasoning behind them . Do you 

1761
01:05:04,535 --> 01:05:06,590
understand the reason why I'm asking 

1762
01:05:06,590 --> 01:05:08,701
for that ? Report to be made public . 

1763
01:05:08,701 --> 01:05:08,689
And the reason why I think it's so 

1764
01:05:08,699 --> 01:05:11,469
important that you be in a position to 

1765
01:05:11,479 --> 01:05:13,590
comfortably be able to go back to the 

1766
01:05:13,590 --> 01:05:15,646
bosses and say we need to make these 

1767
01:05:15,646 --> 01:05:17,590
reports available so that they can 

1768
01:05:17,590 --> 01:05:19,701
either support or ask questions about 

1769
01:05:19,701 --> 01:05:21,923
the decisions that are made . Senator , 

1770
01:05:21,923 --> 01:05:23,979
I can commit to you that I will take 

1771
01:05:23,979 --> 01:05:25,812
that back to my state department 

1772
01:05:25,812 --> 01:05:27,812
colleagues and make the case . Ok . 

1773
01:05:27,812 --> 01:05:27,600
Thank you , Mr Chair . Thank you , Mr 

1774
01:05:27,709 --> 01:05:29,949
Chairman . Thank you , Senator Warren . 

1775
01:05:29,959 --> 01:05:33,120
Please . Uh Thank you , Mr Chairman Mr 

1776
01:05:33,409 --> 01:05:35,576
MS Abercrombie . It is good to see you 

1777
01:05:35,580 --> 01:05:37,580
both here . Congratulations on your 

1778
01:05:37,580 --> 01:05:40,229
nomination . Welcome to your family and 

1779
01:05:40,250 --> 01:05:42,417
thank you very much for the many years 

1780
01:05:42,417 --> 01:05:44,306
that you've both put in to public 

1781
01:05:44,306 --> 01:05:47,060
service . Um when the US military 

1782
01:05:47,070 --> 01:05:50,610
operations kill civilians , we damage 

1783
01:05:50,620 --> 01:05:52,790
our reputation and it becomes a 

1784
01:05:52,800 --> 01:05:55,540
national security liability . And 

1785
01:05:55,550 --> 01:05:57,810
that's why I worked with Dod to create 

1786
01:05:57,820 --> 01:05:59,610
civilian protection center of 

1787
01:05:59,620 --> 01:06:02,379
Excellence as part of a comprehensive 

1788
01:06:02,389 --> 01:06:04,820
plan to address this problem . The 

1789
01:06:04,830 --> 01:06:06,929
state department is also enhancing 

1790
01:06:06,939 --> 01:06:09,810
oversight to make sure that us provided 

1791
01:06:09,820 --> 01:06:12,620
weapons don't contribute to civilian 

1792
01:06:12,629 --> 01:06:15,870
harm . This is progress , real progress , 

1793
01:06:16,129 --> 01:06:18,351
but there's still more that needs to be 

1794
01:06:18,351 --> 01:06:21,320
done in May . Centcom conducted a 

1795
01:06:21,330 --> 01:06:25,100
strike in Syria that may have resulted 

1796
01:06:25,110 --> 01:06:27,221
in the death of a farmer and a father 

1797
01:06:27,229 --> 01:06:30,959
of 10 . It took a litany of press 

1798
01:06:30,969 --> 01:06:33,669
coverage to convince the joint Special 

1799
01:06:33,679 --> 01:06:37,040
Operations command to finally open up a 

1800
01:06:37,050 --> 01:06:39,179
civilian casualty credibility 

1801
01:06:39,189 --> 01:06:41,899
assessment report . Two weeks later , 

1802
01:06:42,520 --> 01:06:45,629
this approach is only one of the many 

1803
01:06:45,639 --> 01:06:48,110
instances where the public have come to 

1804
01:06:48,120 --> 01:06:52,050
doubt dod s credibility . Mr Do 

1805
01:06:52,060 --> 01:06:54,229
you agree that it is important for our 

1806
01:06:54,239 --> 01:06:57,169
investigations to be regarded as 

1807
01:06:57,179 --> 01:07:00,290
credible around the world ? Senator 

1808
01:07:00,300 --> 01:07:02,578
Warren ? Uh Thank you for the question . 

1809
01:07:02,578 --> 01:07:04,689
Thank you for the time in your office 

1810
01:07:04,689 --> 01:07:06,911
the other day and , and your leadership 

1811
01:07:06,911 --> 01:07:08,744
on this issue as we've discussed 

1812
01:07:08,744 --> 01:07:10,689
multiple times , ensuring that the 

1813
01:07:10,689 --> 01:07:12,911
United States military uh does whatever 

1814
01:07:12,911 --> 01:07:15,078
it can and has the capabilities it can 

1815
01:07:15,078 --> 01:07:17,244
to prevent civilian casualties is , is 

1816
01:07:17,244 --> 01:07:17,090
critical . I believe the US military is 

1817
01:07:17,100 --> 01:07:19,156
the most effective fighting force in 

1818
01:07:19,156 --> 01:07:21,211
the world in doing so . But whenever 

1819
01:07:21,211 --> 01:07:23,378
there are instances in which there may 

1820
01:07:23,378 --> 01:07:25,433
have been civilian casualties , it's 

1821
01:07:25,433 --> 01:07:25,219
important to have a credible 

1822
01:07:25,229 --> 01:07:27,750
investigation of that . Um you know , 

1823
01:07:27,760 --> 01:07:30,709
key way that these investigations could 

1824
01:07:30,719 --> 01:07:34,350
be improved and the results um more 

1825
01:07:34,360 --> 01:07:36,719
trusted by communities that were 

1826
01:07:36,729 --> 01:07:39,820
affected by casualties is for dod 

1827
01:07:39,830 --> 01:07:41,810
investigators to work with civil 

1828
01:07:41,820 --> 01:07:45,739
society organizations on the ground as 

1829
01:07:45,750 --> 01:07:47,969
they work to uncover what actually 

1830
01:07:47,979 --> 01:07:50,949
happened . When I visited Ukraine last 

1831
01:07:50,959 --> 01:07:54,010
month , I was impressed by how closely 

1832
01:07:54,020 --> 01:07:56,620
their military works with civil society 

1833
01:07:56,629 --> 01:08:00,449
organizations to prevent and respond to 

1834
01:08:00,459 --> 01:08:03,239
civilian casualties . It can help 

1835
01:08:03,250 --> 01:08:06,189
improve investigations and it can help 

1836
01:08:06,199 --> 01:08:10,050
save lives in the long run . Mr Will 

1837
01:08:10,060 --> 01:08:13,449
you commit to ensuring that dod works 

1838
01:08:13,459 --> 01:08:16,319
more closely with civil society 

1839
01:08:16,330 --> 01:08:18,560
organizations when reviewing and 

1840
01:08:18,569 --> 01:08:21,470
responding to allegations of civilian 

1841
01:08:21,479 --> 01:08:24,159
casualties , Senator Warren Thanks for 

1842
01:08:24,168 --> 01:08:26,057
the question . I know the defense 

1843
01:08:26,057 --> 01:08:28,224
department has revamped uh its efforts 

1844
01:08:28,224 --> 01:08:30,446
and tried to add some , some capability 

1845
01:08:30,446 --> 01:08:32,335
to understand , uh , the civilian 

1846
01:08:32,335 --> 01:08:34,446
casualty uh , question whenever there 

1847
01:08:34,446 --> 01:08:36,501
is , is an instance with that , that 

1848
01:08:36,501 --> 01:08:38,668
may have occurred , working with civil 

1849
01:08:38,668 --> 01:08:40,612
society organization is absolutely 

1850
01:08:40,612 --> 01:08:42,835
critical if confirmed , I will dig into 

1851
01:08:42,835 --> 01:08:41,778
this and , and work toward that 

1852
01:08:41,789 --> 01:08:44,349
objective . Ok . Um , you know , in 

1853
01:08:44,358 --> 01:08:47,938
2018 , joint staff review found that 

1854
01:08:47,949 --> 01:08:51,409
58% of acknowledged cases of 

1855
01:08:51,418 --> 01:08:55,149
civilian harm originated from civil 

1856
01:08:55,160 --> 01:08:58,359
society organizations and external 

1857
01:08:58,370 --> 01:09:01,299
investigations . More than half . And 

1858
01:09:01,310 --> 01:09:05,029
yet too often dod has seen 

1859
01:09:05,040 --> 01:09:08,520
outsiders as the enemy rather than as 

1860
01:09:08,529 --> 01:09:11,189
the valuable resource that they can be . 

1861
01:09:11,620 --> 01:09:14,180
It's clear that we still need more 

1862
01:09:14,189 --> 01:09:17,540
progress that dod needs to do more on 

1863
01:09:17,549 --> 01:09:20,509
engaging civil society and helping 

1864
01:09:20,520 --> 01:09:23,560
improve its credibility in this area . 

1865
01:09:23,899 --> 01:09:26,939
I am very glad to hear you say that you 

1866
01:09:26,950 --> 01:09:28,894
will take the lead in this because 

1867
01:09:28,894 --> 01:09:30,930
we're depending on you to get this 

1868
01:09:30,939 --> 01:09:33,209
right . Ultimately , this is good for 

1869
01:09:33,220 --> 01:09:35,331
America's military . This is good for 

1870
01:09:35,331 --> 01:09:38,080
our nation and it helps us all around 

1871
01:09:38,089 --> 01:09:40,256
the world . Thank you very much , Mr , 

1872
01:09:41,079 --> 01:09:43,023
thank you Senator Warren , Senator 

1873
01:09:43,023 --> 01:09:45,135
Ernst , please . Yes , thank you , Mr 

1874
01:09:45,135 --> 01:09:47,135
Chair and uh thank you Mr Chole and 

1875
01:09:47,135 --> 01:09:49,858
Miss Abercrombie for uh for being in 

1876
01:09:49,869 --> 01:09:52,091
front of us today . And I want to thank 

1877
01:09:52,091 --> 01:09:54,036
your families as well uh for their 

1878
01:09:54,036 --> 01:09:56,849
support . So Mr Chole , um I'll start 

1879
01:09:56,858 --> 01:09:59,345
with you . Um I have consistently 

1880
01:09:59,354 --> 01:10:02,214
worked hard to lead bipartisan and 

1881
01:10:02,225 --> 01:10:05,314
bicameral efforts to counter Iran . And 

1882
01:10:05,325 --> 01:10:07,314
I am very upset that the Biden 

1883
01:10:07,325 --> 01:10:10,075
administration continues to put more 

1884
01:10:10,084 --> 01:10:11,862
Americans at risk through their 

1885
01:10:11,862 --> 01:10:14,145
strategy of appeasement which has 

1886
01:10:14,154 --> 01:10:16,634
emboldened to Iranian aggression . So 

1887
01:10:16,645 --> 01:10:18,955
Mr Chole , you currently serve as the 

1888
01:10:18,964 --> 01:10:21,884
State Department counselor and during 

1889
01:10:21,895 --> 01:10:23,904
your tenure uh with the state 

1890
01:10:23,915 --> 01:10:27,770
Department hired a Miss a Tabi 

1891
01:10:28,299 --> 01:10:31,910
Tabi whom we've recently learned was 

1892
01:10:31,919 --> 01:10:34,160
part of an Iranian government in 

1893
01:10:34,430 --> 01:10:38,379
information operation . And according 

1894
01:10:38,390 --> 01:10:41,950
to reports , MS Tabata sought feedback 

1895
01:10:41,959 --> 01:10:45,089
from Iran's Foreign Minister on 

1896
01:10:45,100 --> 01:10:47,279
conferences she attended and in 

1897
01:10:47,290 --> 01:10:50,609
testimony she provided before Congress . 

1898
01:10:50,790 --> 01:10:53,160
She now serves in the office of the 

1899
01:10:53,169 --> 01:10:55,859
Assistant Secretary of Defense for soli 

1900
01:10:56,290 --> 01:10:58,950
special operations , low intensity 

1901
01:10:58,959 --> 01:11:01,930
conflict which you will oversee if you 

1902
01:11:01,939 --> 01:11:04,680
are confirmed as undersecretary . Do 

1903
01:11:04,689 --> 01:11:06,745
you believe it is prudent to have an 

1904
01:11:06,745 --> 01:11:08,967
individual with a history of conferring 

1905
01:11:08,967 --> 01:11:11,229
with Iranian officials in a highly 

1906
01:11:11,240 --> 01:11:14,390
sensitive role related to counter 

1907
01:11:14,399 --> 01:11:17,350
terrorism and special operations ? 

1908
01:11:19,040 --> 01:11:21,207
Thank you , Senator for the question . 

1909
01:11:21,207 --> 01:11:22,984
I appreciated the time we spent 

1910
01:11:22,984 --> 01:11:25,370
together in your office last week . I 

1911
01:11:25,379 --> 01:11:27,323
know nothing about this particular 

1912
01:11:27,323 --> 01:11:29,546
instance . I only know what I have read 

1913
01:11:29,546 --> 01:11:31,657
in the press . All I can say is given 

1914
01:11:31,657 --> 01:11:33,879
my experience at the Defense department 

1915
01:11:33,879 --> 01:11:36,101
as well as the State Department and the 

1916
01:11:36,101 --> 01:11:35,529
National Security Council . Anyone who 

1917
01:11:35,540 --> 01:11:37,373
serves in a position of national 

1918
01:11:37,373 --> 01:11:39,484
security has to go through a rigorous 

1919
01:11:39,484 --> 01:11:41,540
background check . But uh other than 

1920
01:11:41,540 --> 01:11:43,762
that , I , I know nothing about this uh 

1921
01:11:43,762 --> 01:11:45,984
episode , right . So let's , let's talk 

1922
01:11:45,984 --> 01:11:49,060
a little bit um about that . So she 

1923
01:11:49,069 --> 01:11:51,259
does have a clearance . Um Do you 

1924
01:11:51,270 --> 01:11:53,437
believe it would be prudent to suspend 

1925
01:11:53,437 --> 01:11:55,492
her clearance then pending review in 

1926
01:11:55,492 --> 01:11:57,492
light of these allegations that she 

1927
01:11:57,492 --> 01:11:59,919
participated in an Iranian information 

1928
01:11:59,930 --> 01:12:01,870
operation to mislead the American 

1929
01:12:01,879 --> 01:12:04,819
public Senator again , I know nothing 

1930
01:12:04,830 --> 01:12:07,629
about this , this allegation . So I'm , 

1931
01:12:07,640 --> 01:12:09,918
I'm not in a position to comment on it . 

1932
01:12:09,918 --> 01:12:12,029
Ok . It would be my opinion that it , 

1933
01:12:12,029 --> 01:12:15,390
it should be suspended . And so we'll 

1934
01:12:15,399 --> 01:12:17,649
talk about the , the security clearance 

1935
01:12:17,660 --> 01:12:21,589
process as well . Um It's widely known 

1936
01:12:21,600 --> 01:12:23,767
and , and you just stated that they go 

1937
01:12:23,767 --> 01:12:26,049
through , you know , a rigorous vetting 

1938
01:12:26,060 --> 01:12:28,470
process . So it's known that security 

1939
01:12:28,479 --> 01:12:30,368
clearances require individuals to 

1940
01:12:30,370 --> 01:12:32,729
report personal interactions with 

1941
01:12:32,740 --> 01:12:35,379
foreign equities . And as the chief 

1942
01:12:35,390 --> 01:12:38,040
adviser to the Secretary of State , you 

1943
01:12:38,049 --> 01:12:39,827
have access to records of State 

1944
01:12:39,827 --> 01:12:42,620
department employees and you've stated 

1945
01:12:42,629 --> 01:12:45,240
to the best of your knowledge then that 

1946
01:12:45,250 --> 01:12:47,970
um that uh this individual , Miss Tata 

1947
01:12:48,470 --> 01:12:51,140
disclosed this relationship uh when she 

1948
01:12:51,149 --> 01:12:53,316
worked for you at the State Department 

1949
01:12:53,316 --> 01:12:56,939
or not , Senator , I have no knowledge 

1950
01:12:56,950 --> 01:12:59,180
of this case at all . I would assume 

1951
01:12:59,189 --> 01:13:01,356
that all of the normal procedures were 

1952
01:13:01,356 --> 01:13:03,411
followed here , but I don't have any 

1953
01:13:03,411 --> 01:13:05,589
direct knowledge of that . So I would 

1954
01:13:05,600 --> 01:13:09,310
um then suspect that maybe she didn't 

1955
01:13:09,319 --> 01:13:11,689
disclose this information , but we need 

1956
01:13:11,700 --> 01:13:13,700
to , we need to find this out . And 

1957
01:13:13,700 --> 01:13:15,867
again , because we don't know this , I 

1958
01:13:15,867 --> 01:13:18,759
think the uh the uh clearance should be 

1959
01:13:18,770 --> 01:13:21,330
suspended . So if confirmed , do you 

1960
01:13:21,339 --> 01:13:23,720
commit to sharing M Tabata security 

1961
01:13:23,729 --> 01:13:25,507
clearance information with this 

1962
01:13:25,507 --> 01:13:28,330
committee . Senator , thanks for the 

1963
01:13:28,339 --> 01:13:30,729
question . If confirmed , I'm not sure 

1964
01:13:30,740 --> 01:13:32,851
I would have the authority to do that 

1965
01:13:32,851 --> 01:13:34,907
necessarily . But I if confirmed , I 

1966
01:13:34,907 --> 01:13:36,962
pledge to you that I would look into 

1967
01:13:36,962 --> 01:13:39,184
any instance in which there's questions 

1968
01:13:39,184 --> 01:13:41,640
about the security inside the office of 

1969
01:13:41,649 --> 01:13:43,538
the undersecretary of Defense for 

1970
01:13:43,538 --> 01:13:45,371
policy . And if confirmed , what 

1971
01:13:45,371 --> 01:13:47,205
actions do you intend to take to 

1972
01:13:47,205 --> 01:13:49,093
prevent department officials from 

1973
01:13:49,093 --> 01:13:52,620
further engaging in unauthorized 

1974
01:13:52,629 --> 01:13:54,870
collaboration with Iranians ? 

1975
01:13:56,450 --> 01:13:58,799
Well , Senator , I think it's , it's uh 

1976
01:13:58,850 --> 01:14:01,017
you know , part of the deal and having 

1977
01:14:01,017 --> 01:14:03,072
a security clearance , that one does 

1978
01:14:03,072 --> 01:14:05,128
not do that . So I would expect that 

1979
01:14:05,128 --> 01:14:07,294
that sort of behavior would stop if it 

1980
01:14:07,294 --> 01:14:07,180
was ever uncovered . I would expect 

1981
01:14:07,189 --> 01:14:10,529
that as well . Mr Chole Iran continues 

1982
01:14:10,540 --> 01:14:12,596
to threaten us military personnel in 

1983
01:14:12,596 --> 01:14:14,707
the Middle East and remains intent on 

1984
01:14:14,707 --> 01:14:17,209
assassinating American citizens here in 

1985
01:14:17,220 --> 01:14:19,220
the United States . Why is it 

1986
01:14:19,229 --> 01:14:21,109
acceptable in your view for the 

1987
01:14:21,120 --> 01:14:23,180
administration to continue offering 

1988
01:14:23,189 --> 01:14:26,120
Iran substantial sanctions relief while 

1989
01:14:26,129 --> 01:14:28,069
Iran continues to target American 

1990
01:14:28,080 --> 01:14:30,830
citizens for murder ? Senator ? I think 

1991
01:14:30,839 --> 01:14:32,228
one of the most foremost 

1992
01:14:32,228 --> 01:14:34,061
responsibilities I would have if 

1993
01:14:34,061 --> 01:14:36,283
confirmed for this position is ensuring 

1994
01:14:36,283 --> 01:14:38,339
that we are doing whatever we can to 

1995
01:14:38,339 --> 01:14:40,228
deter Iran and push back from its 

1996
01:14:40,228 --> 01:14:42,450
malign behavior across the board in the 

1997
01:14:42,450 --> 01:14:44,561
region and around the world . I think 

1998
01:14:44,561 --> 01:14:46,339
we have restored some degree of 

1999
01:14:46,339 --> 01:14:48,672
deterrence over the last several months . 

2000
01:14:48,672 --> 01:14:50,672
There has not been an attack on our 

2001
01:14:50,672 --> 01:14:50,649
forces in Syria since March , there's 

2002
01:14:50,660 --> 01:14:52,660
not been an attack on our forces in 

2003
01:14:52,660 --> 01:14:54,882
Iraq for over a year . But every day we 

2004
01:14:54,882 --> 01:14:56,993
need to wake up and make sure that we 

2005
01:14:56,993 --> 01:14:59,160
are doing what we can to deter Iran so 

2006
01:14:59,160 --> 01:15:01,382
that they don't think that today is the 

2007
01:15:01,382 --> 01:15:03,459
day . And obviously Mr Chole , the 

2008
01:15:03,470 --> 01:15:05,526
administration's view of Iran and my 

2009
01:15:05,526 --> 01:15:08,200
view of Iran is very , very different . 

2010
01:15:08,479 --> 01:15:10,368
Um I know this will be a point of 

2011
01:15:10,368 --> 01:15:12,479
contention as we move forward through 

2012
01:15:12,479 --> 01:15:14,368
your confirmation process , but I 

2013
01:15:14,368 --> 01:15:16,368
appreciate your answers . Thank you 

2014
01:15:16,368 --> 01:15:18,312
very much . Thank you , Mr Chair . 

2015
01:15:18,312 --> 01:15:20,590
Thank you , Senator Senator Blumenthal , 

2016
01:15:20,590 --> 01:15:22,812
please . Thank you , Mr Chairman and uh 

2017
01:15:22,812 --> 01:15:24,979
thank you both for your public service 

2018
01:15:24,979 --> 01:15:27,430
and your families . Uh Miss Abercrombie , 

2019
01:15:27,439 --> 01:15:31,040
I'm deeply concerned about the 

2020
01:15:31,049 --> 01:15:33,220
apparent shortfall that we are seeing 

2021
01:15:33,229 --> 01:15:36,459
in ammunition going to Ukraine . Uh I 

2022
01:15:36,470 --> 01:15:40,200
share and I've expressed very vocally 

2023
01:15:41,350 --> 01:15:44,520
some of the reservations about 

2024
01:15:45,310 --> 01:15:48,669
the past administration delivery 

2025
01:15:48,680 --> 01:15:50,791
sometimes later than we would like to 

2026
01:15:50,791 --> 01:15:52,791
see of critical weapons platforms , 

2027
01:15:53,100 --> 01:15:56,609
whether they are armored vehicles , 

2028
01:15:56,620 --> 01:16:00,120
tanks F-16s , 

2029
01:16:00,479 --> 01:16:03,649
uh and now a tacos which I think are 

2030
01:16:03,660 --> 01:16:07,459
vital , but there should be no question 

2031
01:16:07,470 --> 01:16:10,939
that the 155 millimeter artillery 

2032
01:16:10,950 --> 01:16:14,830
shells are needed to produce at a much 

2033
01:16:14,839 --> 01:16:17,759
heightened rate . We're now 

2034
01:16:18,509 --> 01:16:21,040
producing them . I think at about 1/10 

2035
01:16:21,310 --> 01:16:23,470
the volume that the Ukrainians are 

2036
01:16:23,479 --> 01:16:25,970
using them and they're going to run out 

2037
01:16:25,979 --> 01:16:28,201
of them , we're gonna run out of them . 

2038
01:16:28,201 --> 01:16:30,709
That's just one example . What would 

2039
01:16:30,720 --> 01:16:33,859
you do ? Uh in your role as 

2040
01:16:34,850 --> 01:16:37,680
in effect , the main Pentagon official 

2041
01:16:37,689 --> 01:16:40,180
in charge of acquisition to speed and 

2042
01:16:40,189 --> 01:16:43,740
increase the production of key 

2043
01:16:44,180 --> 01:16:46,689
defense supplies that are needed by the 

2044
01:16:46,700 --> 01:16:50,419
Ukrainians . And would one of those 

2045
01:16:51,149 --> 01:16:54,240
possible measures include building more 

2046
01:16:55,270 --> 01:16:58,520
production capacity in Ukraine . 

2047
01:16:59,140 --> 01:17:01,430
I've spoken to both the White House and 

2048
01:17:01,439 --> 01:17:03,661
I've talked to President Zelinsky about 

2049
01:17:03,661 --> 01:17:06,339
it , talked to him in Ukraine when I 

2050
01:17:06,350 --> 01:17:09,870
visited last number of weeks ago and 

2051
01:17:09,879 --> 01:17:12,189
here when he visited , and the 

2052
01:17:12,200 --> 01:17:15,350
Ukrainians are ready to build what they 

2053
01:17:15,359 --> 01:17:17,990
need is the investment to build . They 

2054
01:17:18,000 --> 01:17:20,222
were once the hub of the Soviet Union's 

2055
01:17:20,479 --> 01:17:23,709
defense capabilities as you know , and 

2056
01:17:23,720 --> 01:17:26,430
they could be again if provided with 

2057
01:17:26,439 --> 01:17:29,569
the capital and the air defense . So 

2058
01:17:30,209 --> 01:17:32,098
two questions , what would you do 

2059
01:17:32,098 --> 01:17:34,750
generally and what can we do to 

2060
01:17:34,759 --> 01:17:37,180
increase the capacity of Ukraine to 

2061
01:17:37,189 --> 01:17:39,799
build its own production capacity ? 

2062
01:17:41,229 --> 01:17:43,285
Senator , thank you for raising this 

2063
01:17:43,285 --> 01:17:45,451
extremely important question . I think 

2064
01:17:45,451 --> 01:17:47,562
from the United States standpoint , a 

2065
01:17:47,562 --> 01:17:49,785
robust and resilient defense industrial 

2066
01:17:49,785 --> 01:17:52,007
base is critical , not just in terms of 

2067
01:17:52,007 --> 01:17:54,062
providing us with capability that we 

2068
01:17:54,062 --> 01:17:56,229
need at providing capability to allies 

2069
01:17:56,229 --> 01:17:55,870
and partners , but sending a strong 

2070
01:17:55,879 --> 01:17:58,101
deterrent signal that we can be agile . 

2071
01:17:58,101 --> 01:18:00,046
And so one way we could do that if 

2072
01:18:00,046 --> 01:18:02,157
confirmed Senator in my role would be 

2073
01:18:02,157 --> 01:18:04,939
uh signaling to industry , the demand 

2074
01:18:04,950 --> 01:18:07,520
signal to expand that capacity by 

2075
01:18:07,529 --> 01:18:09,696
putting things on contract into that . 

2076
01:18:09,696 --> 01:18:11,696
I'd like to thank this committee in 

2077
01:18:11,696 --> 01:18:13,362
particular for the multi year 

2078
01:18:13,362 --> 01:18:15,473
procurement authority authorized last 

2079
01:18:15,473 --> 01:18:17,696
year for munitions . I think that helps 

2080
01:18:17,696 --> 01:18:19,696
the Department of Defense send that 

2081
01:18:19,696 --> 01:18:21,807
demand signal to industry to put some 

2082
01:18:21,807 --> 01:18:21,680
of their own skin in the game to build 

2083
01:18:21,689 --> 01:18:23,770
out capacity . Uh But in terms of 

2084
01:18:23,779 --> 01:18:26,001
working with allies and partners , um I 

2085
01:18:26,001 --> 01:18:28,419
think we can see uh an opportunity for 

2086
01:18:28,430 --> 01:18:30,541
expanding the pie if you will working 

2087
01:18:30,541 --> 01:18:32,374
with allies and partners to more 

2088
01:18:32,374 --> 01:18:34,486
broadly expand our collective defense 

2089
01:18:34,486 --> 01:18:36,819
industrial base . And so Senator , um I , 

2090
01:18:36,819 --> 01:18:38,652
I do think looking at industrial 

2091
01:18:38,652 --> 01:18:40,597
cooperation with Ukraine is a very 

2092
01:18:40,597 --> 01:18:42,819
compelling uh idea and initiative . And 

2093
01:18:42,819 --> 01:18:44,986
if confirmed , I would look to support 

2094
01:18:44,986 --> 01:18:47,041
that the , the president , I believe 

2095
01:18:47,041 --> 01:18:50,779
announced an agreement , um a joint 

2096
01:18:50,790 --> 01:18:52,901
weapons production agreement with the 

2097
01:18:52,901 --> 01:18:54,846
Ukrainian government . Last week , 

2098
01:18:54,846 --> 01:18:56,846
three Ukrainian corporations signed 

2099
01:18:56,846 --> 01:18:58,879
agreements with more than 2000 us 

2100
01:18:58,890 --> 01:19:02,740
defense companies to rebuild Ukraine's 

2101
01:19:02,919 --> 01:19:05,086
defense capacity . What can be done to 

2102
01:19:05,086 --> 01:19:09,060
expedite those agreements and to arrive 

2103
01:19:09,069 --> 01:19:11,620
at more of them . Senator . Yes . Um I 

2104
01:19:11,629 --> 01:19:14,370
think the , the White House uh was made 

2105
01:19:14,379 --> 01:19:16,379
that announcement uh when President 

2106
01:19:16,379 --> 01:19:18,435
Zelinsky was here , as you noted , I 

2107
01:19:18,435 --> 01:19:20,870
think one thing we can do is use our um 

2108
01:19:20,899 --> 01:19:23,589
uh engagement with us American industry 

2109
01:19:23,600 --> 01:19:25,156
to facilitate some of those 

2110
01:19:25,156 --> 01:19:27,322
partnerships . We can't make decisions 

2111
01:19:27,322 --> 01:19:29,433
on behalf of industry certainly , but 

2112
01:19:29,433 --> 01:19:31,544
we can lend the US government support 

2113
01:19:31,544 --> 01:19:33,656
uh for any potential co-production or 

2114
01:19:33,970 --> 01:19:36,689
changes in the Defense Production Act 

2115
01:19:36,700 --> 01:19:39,370
that need to be done to increase both 

2116
01:19:39,379 --> 01:19:41,890
the production capacity in the United 

2117
01:19:41,899 --> 01:19:45,839
States of our own industrial 

2118
01:19:45,850 --> 01:19:49,040
base . Uh as well as those of , for 

2119
01:19:49,049 --> 01:19:52,959
example , our allied nations that the 

2120
01:19:52,970 --> 01:19:56,399
NDA A of 2024 includes now Australia 

2121
01:19:56,410 --> 01:19:59,160
and the UK . But what about Ukraine ? 

2122
01:19:59,500 --> 01:20:01,611
Um Senator , I think if confirmed , I 

2123
01:20:01,611 --> 01:20:03,667
pledge you to look into that working 

2124
01:20:03,667 --> 01:20:05,722
with my colleagues in the industrial 

2125
01:20:05,722 --> 01:20:07,778
based policy office . Thank you , Mr 

2126
01:20:07,778 --> 01:20:09,500
Chairman . Thank you , Senator 

2127
01:20:09,500 --> 01:20:11,611
Blumenthal . Senator Scott . Please , 

2128
01:20:11,611 --> 01:20:13,889
sir . Thank you , Chairman . First off . 

2129
01:20:13,889 --> 01:20:16,167
Uh congratulations on your nominations . 

2130
01:20:16,167 --> 01:20:15,569
Thanks for your willingness to serve . 

2131
01:20:16,430 --> 01:20:18,652
So my first question is for Mr Chalet . 

2132
01:20:18,839 --> 01:20:20,728
So you spent a great deal of your 

2133
01:20:20,728 --> 01:20:22,728
career at the State Department . So 

2134
01:20:22,728 --> 01:20:24,839
congratulations on that . And I think 

2135
01:20:24,839 --> 01:20:24,370
you've served the entire Biden 

2136
01:20:24,379 --> 01:20:26,399
administration during the Biden 

2137
01:20:26,410 --> 01:20:28,299
administration's time in office . 

2138
01:20:28,299 --> 01:20:30,299
Here's what's happened . Russia has 

2139
01:20:30,299 --> 01:20:32,521
waged a war in Europe with its horrible 

2140
01:20:32,521 --> 01:20:34,743
invasion of Ukraine . The United States 

2141
01:20:34,743 --> 01:20:37,700
was humiliated , humiliated by um uh by 

2142
01:20:37,709 --> 01:20:39,765
President Biden's botched withdrawal 

2143
01:20:39,765 --> 01:20:41,987
from Afghanistan which left $80 billion 

2144
01:20:41,987 --> 01:20:44,098
of us military equipment in the hands 

2145
01:20:44,098 --> 01:20:46,265
of the Taliban communist China to gain 

2146
01:20:46,265 --> 01:20:48,487
an even stronger foothold in the Middle 

2147
01:20:48,487 --> 01:20:50,431
East and took the lives of 13 US . 

2148
01:20:50,431 --> 01:20:52,487
Service members . Commerce China has 

2149
01:20:52,487 --> 01:20:54,653
increased its unacceptable bullying of 

2150
01:20:54,653 --> 01:20:56,653
our allies and partners in the Indo 

2151
01:20:56,653 --> 01:20:58,820
Pacific . They're threatening Taiwan . 

2152
01:20:58,820 --> 01:21:00,931
They're disrespecting the sovereignty 

2153
01:21:00,931 --> 01:21:02,987
of the Philippines with illegal land 

2154
01:21:02,987 --> 01:21:05,153
use in the West Philippine Sea , North 

2155
01:21:05,153 --> 01:21:07,153
Korea has resumed ballistic missile 

2156
01:21:07,153 --> 01:21:09,320
testing and , and while all of this is 

2157
01:21:09,320 --> 01:21:11,487
happening , the US military is now has 

2158
01:21:11,487 --> 01:21:13,709
a hard time recruiting people I believe 

2159
01:21:13,709 --> 01:21:13,669
these issues are a reflection of 

2160
01:21:13,680 --> 01:21:15,736
unacceptable failure by the civilian 

2161
01:21:15,736 --> 01:21:17,569
leadership at the Pentagon . Our 

2162
01:21:17,569 --> 01:21:19,624
service members are patriots who are 

2163
01:21:19,624 --> 01:21:21,624
willing to give their lives for our 

2164
01:21:21,624 --> 01:21:23,736
freedom , but they're being failed by 

2165
01:21:23,736 --> 01:21:26,013
current civilian leadership and policy . 

2166
01:21:26,013 --> 01:21:28,236
So , here's my question . As the number 

2167
01:21:28,236 --> 01:21:27,899
three at dod , what changes would you 

2168
01:21:27,910 --> 01:21:30,330
start making on day one to fix these 

2169
01:21:30,339 --> 01:21:33,669
problems ? Well , Senator Scott , thank 

2170
01:21:33,680 --> 01:21:36,600
you for the question . Uh Look , I , I 

2171
01:21:36,609 --> 01:21:38,276
think that I see things a bit 

2172
01:21:38,276 --> 01:21:40,498
differently in terms of where we are in 

2173
01:21:40,498 --> 01:21:42,665
the world , in terms of our posture in 

2174
01:21:42,665 --> 01:21:44,609
the world . I look across the Indo 

2175
01:21:44,609 --> 01:21:46,776
Pacific , the Middle East and Europe . 

2176
01:21:46,776 --> 01:21:48,831
And I see in Europe and NATO that is 

2177
01:21:48,831 --> 01:21:50,998
stronger , larger and more united than 

2178
01:21:50,998 --> 01:21:53,331
it has been in my professional lifetime . 

2179
01:21:53,331 --> 01:21:56,120
I was happy there . Maybe . Would we be 

2180
01:21:56,129 --> 01:21:58,351
better off ? They weren't united and we 

2181
01:21:58,351 --> 01:22:00,518
weren't at war . Oh , I mean , because 

2182
01:22:00,518 --> 01:22:02,518
look , I mean , we're sitting there 

2183
01:22:02,518 --> 01:22:04,740
think of how we got . We got , um , you 

2184
01:22:04,740 --> 01:22:06,907
know , we're in Europe , right ? We're 

2185
01:22:06,907 --> 01:22:09,073
spending billions of dollars , right ? 

2186
01:22:09,073 --> 01:22:11,185
So I like the fact that we're unified 

2187
01:22:11,185 --> 01:22:13,296
but golly , look at where we are . We 

2188
01:22:13,296 --> 01:22:15,462
got people dying every day in Russia , 

2189
01:22:15,462 --> 01:22:17,573
didn't do this before . Well , Russia 

2190
01:22:17,573 --> 01:22:19,740
has done it before . It did it in 2008 

2191
01:22:19,740 --> 01:22:21,851
in Georgia and in 2014 in Ukraine and 

2192
01:22:21,851 --> 01:22:24,073
it's done it again in 2022 in Ukraine . 

2193
01:22:24,073 --> 01:22:26,240
And so , yes , the United , the United 

2194
01:22:26,240 --> 01:22:26,160
States we tried to prevent this war 

2195
01:22:26,169 --> 01:22:28,391
from happening . We tried to uh release 

2196
01:22:28,391 --> 01:22:30,447
intelligence to expose what Vladimir 

2197
01:22:30,447 --> 01:22:32,336
Putin was up to . But I think the 

2198
01:22:32,336 --> 01:22:34,569
result again , due to uh in large part 

2199
01:22:34,580 --> 01:22:36,691
to us , leader side of the question , 

2200
01:22:36,691 --> 01:22:39,500
would you do something different ? So I 

2201
01:22:39,509 --> 01:22:41,676
think there's a very strong foundation 

2202
01:22:41,676 --> 01:22:43,842
in terms of alliances and partnerships 

2203
01:22:43,842 --> 01:22:45,898
around the world that I will seek to 

2204
01:22:45,898 --> 01:22:48,065
build on . And , but obviously , we're 

2205
01:22:48,065 --> 01:22:50,287
always looking for ways to innovate and 

2206
01:22:50,287 --> 01:22:52,398
go further . So there's not , there's 

2207
01:22:52,398 --> 01:22:54,620
nothing you would do different . Well , 

2208
01:22:54,620 --> 01:22:54,540
there will be things I'll do different . 

2209
01:22:54,850 --> 01:22:57,939
Getting worse . Right . North Korea is 

2210
01:22:57,950 --> 01:23:00,970
getting worse . Russia is worse . So 

2211
01:23:00,979 --> 01:23:03,201
there's nothing you would change . Ad D 

2212
01:23:03,779 --> 01:23:06,669
oh The what if confirmed , one of the 

2213
01:23:06,680 --> 01:23:08,624
first things I'll do is assess the 

2214
01:23:08,624 --> 01:23:10,791
situation and fully understand what we 

2215
01:23:10,791 --> 01:23:12,402
could be doing differently , 

2216
01:23:12,402 --> 01:23:14,624
particularly when it comes to advancing 

2217
01:23:14,624 --> 01:23:16,624
our alliances and partnerships . We 

2218
01:23:16,624 --> 01:23:18,680
can't change China or North Korea or 

2219
01:23:18,680 --> 01:23:20,680
Russia . But we can do is make sure 

2220
01:23:20,680 --> 01:23:22,736
that we are better positioned by the 

2221
01:23:22,736 --> 01:23:24,902
United States alone , but also working 

2222
01:23:24,902 --> 01:23:24,799
with our allies and partners to deal 

2223
01:23:24,810 --> 01:23:26,810
with the challenges those countries 

2224
01:23:26,810 --> 01:23:28,810
pose . You don't think we can deter 

2225
01:23:28,810 --> 01:23:30,810
them . Oh , we absolutely can deter 

2226
01:23:30,810 --> 01:23:32,977
them . We must deter them in fact . So 

2227
01:23:32,977 --> 01:23:35,088
what would you do ? What would you do 

2228
01:23:35,088 --> 01:23:37,088
to deter them ? Well , so it starts 

2229
01:23:37,088 --> 01:23:36,979
with investing in ourselves and 

2230
01:23:36,990 --> 01:23:39,046
ensuring that the defense department 

2231
01:23:39,046 --> 01:23:41,212
and the US military , our war fighters 

2232
01:23:41,212 --> 01:23:43,268
have what they need to be a modern , 

2233
01:23:43,268 --> 01:23:46,080
lethal capable force . It all starts 

2234
01:23:46,089 --> 01:23:47,756
with deterrence . We need our 

2235
01:23:47,756 --> 01:23:49,811
adversaries to wake up every day and 

2236
01:23:49,811 --> 01:23:52,089
say to themselves today is not the day . 

2237
01:23:52,089 --> 01:23:53,867
What would you do to change the 

2238
01:23:53,867 --> 01:23:56,033
recruitment ? Well , Senator , I would 

2239
01:23:56,033 --> 01:23:58,145
work closely with uh my colleague and 

2240
01:23:58,145 --> 01:24:00,311
personnel and readiness as well as the 

2241
01:24:00,311 --> 01:24:02,533
services to understand what role policy 

2242
01:24:02,533 --> 01:24:04,700
would play in trying to help meet this 

2243
01:24:04,700 --> 01:24:06,533
recruitment challenge , which no 

2244
01:24:06,533 --> 01:24:08,756
question there is across uh uh three of 

2245
01:24:08,756 --> 01:24:10,867
the five services or four of the five 

2246
01:24:10,867 --> 01:24:13,033
services . Yeah , for the five . Thank 

2247
01:24:13,033 --> 01:24:15,819
you , Miss , um , Miss Abercrombie . So , 

2248
01:24:15,830 --> 01:24:17,886
so I've been up here 4.5 years every 

2249
01:24:17,886 --> 01:24:20,219
time somebody comes up from dod , I ask , 

2250
01:24:20,219 --> 01:24:22,274
why can't you , why can't you figure 

2251
01:24:22,274 --> 01:24:24,149
out how to get our um , military 

2252
01:24:24,160 --> 01:24:26,493
providers to get equipment done quicker ? 

2253
01:24:27,029 --> 01:24:29,085
Everybody says they're gonna go back 

2254
01:24:29,085 --> 01:24:31,418
and look at it . Oh , they're gonna try . 

2255
01:24:31,418 --> 01:24:33,529
We've passed a whole bunch of changes 

2256
01:24:33,529 --> 01:24:35,362
in the ND A . Is there a culture 

2257
01:24:35,362 --> 01:24:37,473
problem at the dod ? Why ? And if you 

2258
01:24:37,473 --> 01:24:39,585
did this , if in private business , I 

2259
01:24:39,585 --> 01:24:41,807
mean , you , you wouldn't keep your job 

2260
01:24:41,807 --> 01:24:43,862
if , because it's not getting , it's 

2261
01:24:43,862 --> 01:24:45,918
not , doesn't seem like it's getting 

2262
01:24:45,918 --> 01:24:47,973
better . Senator . Thank you for the 

2263
01:24:47,973 --> 01:24:50,140
question . I , I do think Dod has made 

2264
01:24:50,140 --> 01:24:52,307
some improvements in large part due to 

2265
01:24:52,307 --> 01:24:54,362
flexible authorities authorized by , 

2266
01:24:54,362 --> 01:24:56,473
you know , provided by the Congress . 

2267
01:24:56,473 --> 01:24:58,640
And so we have confirmed what I pledge 

2268
01:24:58,640 --> 01:25:00,751
to do is go in and assess . Are those 

2269
01:25:00,751 --> 01:25:02,862
flexi are those new authorities being 

2270
01:25:02,862 --> 01:25:05,085
effectively utilized across the board ? 

2271
01:25:05,085 --> 01:25:07,307
Uh If not , uh I will work to make sure 

2272
01:25:07,307 --> 01:25:09,418
the workforce is getting the training 

2273
01:25:09,418 --> 01:25:11,585
and the signals from the top that this 

2274
01:25:11,585 --> 01:25:13,640
is important for us to do . Uh And I 

2275
01:25:13,640 --> 01:25:13,279
would also further assess if any 

2276
01:25:13,290 --> 01:25:15,346
additional changes might be required 

2277
01:25:15,346 --> 01:25:17,234
and we pledge to come back to the 

2278
01:25:17,234 --> 01:25:19,401
Congress seeking those changes . Thank 

2279
01:25:19,401 --> 01:25:18,520
you .