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The committee meets today to consider 

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the nomination of Admiral Samuel Varro 

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to be the next Commander of us Indo 

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Pacific Command or Indo Paycom . 

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Admiral . Congratulations on your 

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nomination and thank you for stepping 

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forward to lead at this critical time . 

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We'd also like to recognize your family , 

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particularly your daughter Regina who 

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was scheduled to be here . Uh And um 

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in a few moments , Senator Roo will 

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formally introduce you and let me thank 

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your family for all of the years 

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they've dedicated to the service of 

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this nation and the navy . I'd also 

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like to thank the cor endo page com 

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commander Admiral John Aquilino , who 

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will retire later this spring , Admiral 

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Aquilino has served the nation with 

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skill and honor for nearly four decades 

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and we congratulate him on his 

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retirement . Admiral P . You are well 

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qualified to lean in O Paycom as the 

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current commander of the US Pacific 

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Fleet . You have led our maritime 

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forces in the region during a momentous 

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time . You bring a record of successful 

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leadership around the globe and command 

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experience at all levels of our 

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military . If confirmed , you will lead 

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America's military forces in the most 

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consequential theater in the world . 

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The Indo Pacific , there is a common 

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understanding that the future of our 

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national security is tied to our 

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competition with China . This 

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competition is occurring right now 

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across every field of national power , 

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military , economic , political , 

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technological , and more maintaining 

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America's advantage will require a 

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whole of government effort . But Indo 

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Paycom will continue to hold the 

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leading edge of our strategy . As Indo 

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Paycom commander , you will need to 

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understand China's competitive tactics , 

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develop new competitive tools of our 

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own and integrate our activities with 

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those of our allies and partners . For 

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several decades , the People's 

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Liberation Army has studied America's 

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way of war and focused their efforts on 

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countering our advantages . China has 

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invested in offsetting technologies 

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like an access and area denial systems , 

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artificial intelligence , unmanned 

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vehicles , hypersonics and of course 

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nuclear weapons . Further Beijing has 

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leveraged a combination of military and 

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civil power against its neighbors , 

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including state graft , economic 

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pressure , coercion and deception . 

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China has sought ways to achieve its 

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national objectives while avoiding a 

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direct confrontation with the United 

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States military . As the defense 

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department's new joint concept for 

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competing states , China seeks to win 

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without fighting . The strategy warns 

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that we do not adapt our approach to 

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compete more effectively . The United 

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States risks ceding strategic influence 

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advantage and leverage while preparing 

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for a war that never occurs . Indeed , 

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the document warns that the US could 

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lose without fighting just as Chinese 

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leaders have studied America's way of 

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war we need to study theirs . With that 

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in mind . A I would ask for your 

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assessment of how China is evolving its 

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competitive strategies and objectives . 

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I would also appreciate your views on 

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what military and non-military factors 

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are most likely to impact Chinese 

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decision making with respect to 

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potential action against Taiwan and our 

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regional partners . Indeed , our 

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network of allies and partners will be 

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the decisive factor in this competition . 

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We have seen the power of this approach 

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through the coalition effort to support 

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Ukraine and this strategy should 

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continue to be pursued in the Indo 

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Pacific as well , particularly as we 

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strive to deter Chinese aggression 

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against Taiwan . We are making good 

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progress through networks like Aus and 

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the Quad which is made up of the United 

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States , Australia , India and Japan . 

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Each of these partnerships provide 

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valuable bru for the future . There has 

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also been momentum in a number of other 

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relationships including our new basin 

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agreement with the Philippines , a 

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remarkable transformation of Japan's 

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defense strategy and and historical 

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cooper operation announcement between 

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South Korea and Japan Admiral . I would 

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ask for your views on how we can build 

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upon these multilateral efforts and 

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pursue more opportunities to engage our 

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partners in the Indo Pacific Admiral 

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PPAR . If confirmed , you will lead 

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Indo paycom at a critical time . I am 

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grateful for your willingness to step 

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forward and meet this challenge . Thank 

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you and I look forward to your 

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testimony . Uh When Senator Wicker 

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arrives Uh I will ask for his testimony 

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uh if you want to deliver it or to 

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submit it for the record . Uh At this 

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point , I would like to call upon 

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Senator Runo to introduce you for your 

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opening statement . Admir PPAR . Thank 

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you , Mr Chairman and welcome Admiral 

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and uh to you and your family . 

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Congratulations on your nomination . 

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I'm here to today to introduce uh 

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Admiral Samuel PPAR . President Biden's 

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nomination for the next Commander of us 

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Indo Paycom . And as the chairman noted , 

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this area of res responsibility is one 

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of the most critical to our national 

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defense . As Commander of Indo Paycom , 

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Admiral P Power would be responsible 

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for all military operations in the 

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Pacific . A priority theater with great 

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and growing strategic importance for 

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the US and our partners and allies . If 

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confirmed , Admiral P power will be 

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responsible for operations in the 

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Pacific and integrating multiple 

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components including US , forces in 

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Korea and Japan Us Special Operations 

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Command , Pacific , the US , Pacific 

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Fleet , US Marine Forces , Pacific , 

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us , Pacific Air Forces and US . 

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Army Pacific . He will , he 

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will continue protecting 65% of 

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the world's oceans . This is 

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why the Indo Pacific area of 

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responsibility is so important because 

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it is geographically the largest 

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combatant command . So in addition to 

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65% of the world's oceans that you have 

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to oversee , uh you will be overseeing 

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66 significant defense sites which 

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are home to 375,000 US 

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military and civilian personnel serving 

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in the region . In this role , Emir 

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Popara would also be in charge of 

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overseeing the military's presence in 

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Hawaii which is home to all branches of 

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the military with 14 key military 

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installations and more than 

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55,000 active duty service 

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members and their families . Hawaii's 

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Central Pacific lo location has been a 

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significant military location since 

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Pearl Harbor was established in 1899 

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and continues to be invaluable for 

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strategic defense in the Pacific . As a 

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senior military officer on island , I 

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will look to arm PPAR to lead on all 

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issues in Hawaii including the 

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successful permanent closure of the Red 

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Hill bulk fuel storage facility on Oahu 

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and transparent open communications 

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with the community . While we have made 

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great progress in safely refueling Red 

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Hill just this week , new reports have 

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emerged regarding tap water and air 

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quality issues from navy water system 

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users near Red Hill leading to testing 

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of the water . I continue to hear from 

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families impacted by Red Hill and the 

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continuing impacts they face 

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underscoring the need for an Indo 

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paycom commander , familiar with this 

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issue and the work that lies ahead to 

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permanently safely close Red Hill and 

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remediate the area while protecting our 

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communities . I have shared these 

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concerns with Admiral Paro and my 

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expectations for him if he is confirmed . 

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Indo Paycom Command is a critical role 

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especially as we work to counter 

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threats across the region from Russia , 

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China , North Korea and others and 

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that's why it is important . We have a 

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commander who understands the region , 

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the threats we face and the communities 

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in which our troops serve . Mr Chairman 

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Admiral P Paro has dedicated his adult 

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life to serving our nation with more 

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than 37 years of service in the navy . 

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And as us Pacific fleet commander based 

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in Hawaii , he currently oversees all 

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naval operations in the Pacific before 

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becoming PAC Fleet commander . Admiral 

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PPAR served on numerous operational and 

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staff tours around the world and was 

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also a top gun fighter pilot . I 

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know he will speak more about his 

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background and his remarks , but 

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suffice to say his experience is 

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extensive , that experience informs his 

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leadership mentality to quote him never 

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ready enough end quote , which I 

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appreciate as chair of the readiness 

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sub-committee of S ac that mentality 

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will serve him well , if confirmed as 

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the next Indo Paycom commander , he 

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will have his work cut out for him . 

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In addition to ensuring the readiness 

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and operational capabilities of troops 

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in our priority theater . The next Indo 

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Paycom commander will face many issues 

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with wide impacts on the state of 

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Hawaii . In addition to Red Hills 

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closure , Admiral Papa will also play 

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an important role in the renegotiation 

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of land leases between the department 

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and the state of Hawaii for several 

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critical training areas including 

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Pohakuloa training area on the big 

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island . These negotiations will 

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significantly impact the way that 

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training is conducted in the state and 

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could put at risk . The continued 

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training of land forces in Hawaii , if 

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not successfully and mutually concluded 

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an understanding of and appreciation 

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for Hawaii's unique culture and history 

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are vital to any Indo Pean Commander's 

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success . Having lived and worked in 

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Hawaii for several years . Admiral Papa 

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has shared with me his interest in 

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developing Hawaii's defense industrial 

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workforce and collaborating more 

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closely with Hawaii . These 

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universities and institutions . I've 

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appreciated having strong working 

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relationships with Amo Aquilino and his 

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predecessors at Indo Paycom . And if 

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confirmed , I look forward to working 

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with Amir Papa to support our troops , 

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our communities and our national 

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security . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

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Thank you , Senator Rono . Uh Admiral 

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Mc Farrell , uh Senator Wicker has 

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arrived . I'll recognize the statement , 

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then I'll recognize you for your 

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statement , Senator Wicker , what he's 

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saying is you're eventually going to 

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get to talk Admiral . Uh Let me , first 

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of all say though , um that this is a 

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special day in the life of one of our 

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committee members . Um Senator Sullivan 

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will be retiring from the Marine Corps 

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this afternoon . He's certainly not 

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retiring from the Senate or from this 

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committee . But I want to uh mention 

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that to our fellow members of the 

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committee and to congratulate um 

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Senator Sullivan on his service to the 

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00:11:09,690 --> 00:11:10,520
United States 

278
00:11:15,219 --> 00:11:17,441
and , and I wanna welcome you and thank 

279
00:11:17,441 --> 00:11:19,552
you for your service . You're clearly 

280
00:11:19,552 --> 00:11:21,719
carrying on a proud tradition . Your 

281
00:11:21,729 --> 00:11:23,719
grandfather served as an enlisted 

282
00:11:23,729 --> 00:11:26,349
sailor during World war two . Your 

283
00:11:26,359 --> 00:11:29,549
father served as an enlisted marine . I 

284
00:11:29,559 --> 00:11:31,559
speak for everyone . When I say I'm 

285
00:11:31,559 --> 00:11:33,919
grateful for the legacy of service . 

286
00:11:33,929 --> 00:11:35,750
I'm confident that you are 

287
00:11:35,760 --> 00:11:37,789
exceptionally qualified to lead our 

288
00:11:37,799 --> 00:11:40,119
forces in the Pacific . We need another 

289
00:11:40,130 --> 00:11:42,599
great leader to take the Baton from 

290
00:11:42,609 --> 00:11:45,059
Admiral Aquilino for this important 

291
00:11:45,070 --> 00:11:47,400
command . Senior defense leaders have 

292
00:11:47,409 --> 00:11:49,830
stated before this committee that the 

293
00:11:49,840 --> 00:11:51,673
United States is facing the most 

294
00:11:51,673 --> 00:11:53,896
dangerous national security environment 

295
00:11:53,896 --> 00:11:56,320
since World war two , nowhere is that 

296
00:11:56,330 --> 00:11:58,530
fact more evident than in the in the 

297
00:11:59,039 --> 00:12:02,799
paycom theater . Beijing has conducted 

298
00:12:02,890 --> 00:12:05,260
the largest and most rapid military 

299
00:12:05,270 --> 00:12:07,492
build up in modern history . Surpassing 

300
00:12:07,492 --> 00:12:10,229
our own military in many categories . 

301
00:12:10,330 --> 00:12:12,969
The Pentagon's most pressing task 

302
00:12:12,979 --> 00:12:16,659
remains deterring conflict in the indo 

303
00:12:16,700 --> 00:12:18,929
pacific failure to prevent aggression . 

304
00:12:18,940 --> 00:12:20,996
There would have an enormous , would 

305
00:12:20,996 --> 00:12:23,162
have enormous consequences . Trillions 

306
00:12:23,162 --> 00:12:25,218
of dollars would be wiped away . The 

307
00:12:25,218 --> 00:12:27,107
loss of lives would be enormous . 

308
00:12:27,820 --> 00:12:30,042
Admiral . If confirmed , you would take 

309
00:12:30,042 --> 00:12:32,098
command at a time of great challenge 

310
00:12:32,330 --> 00:12:35,280
and you would be a crucial part of our 

311
00:12:35,289 --> 00:12:38,109
ability to overcome these difficulties . 

312
00:12:38,119 --> 00:12:41,059
You'll be part of history , sir . In 

313
00:12:41,070 --> 00:12:43,070
the South China Sea , Beijing wants 

314
00:12:43,070 --> 00:12:45,690
total control . China continues to 

315
00:12:45,700 --> 00:12:47,756
undermine the Philippines legitimate 

316
00:12:47,756 --> 00:12:51,260
maritime claims at uh second Thomas 

317
00:12:51,750 --> 00:12:54,760
shoal firing water cannons and lasers 

318
00:12:54,770 --> 00:12:57,799
at Filipino vessels . China is also 

319
00:12:57,809 --> 00:13:00,330
intent on destabilizing the Korean 

320
00:13:00,340 --> 00:13:02,530
Peninsula by refusing to enforce 

321
00:13:02,539 --> 00:13:04,940
sanctions or apply any pressure to the 

322
00:13:04,950 --> 00:13:06,969
Kim regime . China is actively 

323
00:13:06,979 --> 00:13:09,590
encouraging an arms race between North 

324
00:13:09,599 --> 00:13:12,260
and South Korea , the United States 

325
00:13:12,270 --> 00:13:14,492
must be prepared to meet that challenge 

326
00:13:14,492 --> 00:13:16,859
through resolute support for our allies . 

327
00:13:17,070 --> 00:13:19,849
South Korea and Japan . This will 

328
00:13:19,859 --> 00:13:21,692
require our uniformed leaders to 

329
00:13:21,692 --> 00:13:23,303
provide honest and realistic 

330
00:13:23,303 --> 00:13:26,010
assessments of the relevant threats and 

331
00:13:26,020 --> 00:13:28,650
enemy capabilities . Congress has 

332
00:13:28,659 --> 00:13:31,309
required the commander of Indo paycom 

333
00:13:31,619 --> 00:13:34,070
to provide an independent assessment of 

334
00:13:34,080 --> 00:13:36,309
the resources necessary to meet the 

335
00:13:36,320 --> 00:13:39,099
challenge . If confirmed , I trust you 

336
00:13:39,109 --> 00:13:41,165
would continue to be open and direct 

337
00:13:41,165 --> 00:13:44,080
about what you need . There is much 

338
00:13:44,090 --> 00:13:47,119
more that we can and should do . The 

339
00:13:47,130 --> 00:13:49,520
Pacific deterrence initiative has 

340
00:13:49,530 --> 00:13:52,419
failed to transition into a real tool 

341
00:13:52,429 --> 00:13:55,080
of budgetary change . At the Pentagon . 

342
00:13:55,880 --> 00:13:58,280
We've made minimal progress in 

343
00:13:58,289 --> 00:14:00,345
bolstering deterrents in the Western 

344
00:14:00,345 --> 00:14:02,460
Pacific . The United States must also 

345
00:14:02,469 --> 00:14:05,469
improve our munitions procurement and 

346
00:14:05,479 --> 00:14:07,659
production . Deterring conflict will 

347
00:14:07,669 --> 00:14:10,210
require the defense industrial base and 

348
00:14:10,219 --> 00:14:12,820
the Pentagon to build the right systems 

349
00:14:13,210 --> 00:14:16,229
in sufficient quantity at the speed of 

350
00:14:16,239 --> 00:14:19,789
relevance . We need an operational 

351
00:14:19,799 --> 00:14:23,630
joint task force but so 

352
00:14:23,640 --> 00:14:27,619
far that wish that directive in fact 

353
00:14:27,909 --> 00:14:30,750
remains unfulfilled . The enabling 

354
00:14:30,760 --> 00:14:32,816
infrastructure is not expanding fast 

355
00:14:32,816 --> 00:14:35,599
enough to support distributed military 

356
00:14:35,609 --> 00:14:38,570
operations in the near future . We have 

357
00:14:38,580 --> 00:14:40,520
barely begun building contested 

358
00:14:40,530 --> 00:14:42,919
logistics plants . This will include 

359
00:14:42,929 --> 00:14:45,130
taking a hard nosed look at what we 

360
00:14:45,140 --> 00:14:46,960
need in order to maximize our 

361
00:14:46,969 --> 00:14:50,780
operational capacity on strategically 

362
00:14:50,789 --> 00:14:54,789
vital Guam and on other islands 

363
00:14:54,799 --> 00:14:57,380
in the 1st and 2nd island chains that 

364
00:14:57,390 --> 00:14:59,279
would be essential in a contested 

365
00:14:59,279 --> 00:15:01,710
logistics scenario . The United States 

366
00:15:01,719 --> 00:15:03,590
alliance structure needs further 

367
00:15:03,599 --> 00:15:05,890
modernization and we should include 

368
00:15:05,900 --> 00:15:08,067
command and control and joint planning 

369
00:15:08,067 --> 00:15:10,349
operations . We cannot wait for 

370
00:15:10,359 --> 00:15:13,650
conflict to begin to make these 

371
00:15:13,659 --> 00:15:17,520
updates . Congress can help deter war 

372
00:15:17,530 --> 00:15:20,890
in the Pacific but our window to do so 

373
00:15:20,900 --> 00:15:23,619
is rapidly closing . We need to build 

374
00:15:23,630 --> 00:15:27,479
on last year's work uh with um 

375
00:15:27,489 --> 00:15:30,150
this year's NDA A 

376
00:15:31,349 --> 00:15:33,679
Admiral Porro . I think you're 

377
00:15:33,840 --> 00:15:35,784
exceptionally qualified and I look 

378
00:15:35,784 --> 00:15:38,118
forward to working with you . Thank you , 

379
00:15:38,118 --> 00:15:40,007
Mr Chairman . Thank you , Senator 

380
00:15:40,007 --> 00:15:42,340
Worker , Admiral Parro . Your statement , 

381
00:15:42,340 --> 00:15:44,451
please . Good morning to all chairman 

382
00:15:44,451 --> 00:15:45,951
Reed ranking member wicker 

383
00:15:46,070 --> 00:15:48,348
distinguished members of the committee . 

384
00:15:48,369 --> 00:15:50,591
Thank you very much for the opportunity 

385
00:15:50,591 --> 00:15:52,929
to appear . Senator Hirono . Thank you 

386
00:15:52,940 --> 00:15:54,940
for the kind introduction . Senator 

387
00:15:54,940 --> 00:15:57,218
Sullivan U ra Marine . Congratulations , 

388
00:15:57,218 --> 00:15:59,218
sir . I thank the president and the 

389
00:15:59,218 --> 00:16:01,384
Secretary of Defense for the Trust and 

390
00:16:01,384 --> 00:16:03,551
confidence in this nomination . I have 

391
00:16:03,551 --> 00:16:05,760
great admiration and gratitude for my 

392
00:16:05,770 --> 00:16:09,159
friend and mentor , Admiral John C and 

393
00:16:09,169 --> 00:16:12,510
Laura Aquilino . Uh as they transition 

394
00:16:12,520 --> 00:16:15,679
from 40 years of dedicated service to 

395
00:16:15,690 --> 00:16:17,869
the nation . I'm grateful to the 

396
00:16:17,880 --> 00:16:19,824
committee and to Congress for your 

397
00:16:19,824 --> 00:16:22,349
continued support of the members of the 

398
00:16:22,359 --> 00:16:25,679
armed services , their families and dod 

399
00:16:25,690 --> 00:16:28,849
civilians . They are our nation's very 

400
00:16:28,859 --> 00:16:31,549
best and your support enables their 

401
00:16:31,559 --> 00:16:35,239
success . I serve as commander of 

402
00:16:35,250 --> 00:16:37,989
us Pacific Fleet . I'm a sailor , a 

403
00:16:38,000 --> 00:16:40,222
naval officer and a fighter pilot , but 

404
00:16:40,222 --> 00:16:42,289
foremost , I'm a husband to Maureen 

405
00:16:42,299 --> 00:16:45,010
Connolly Paro and father to our six 

406
00:16:45,020 --> 00:16:47,239
Children , Regina , her husband 

407
00:16:47,250 --> 00:16:49,940
Christopher Samuel , his soon to be 

408
00:16:49,950 --> 00:16:53,140
wife Katie Elizabeth John Joseph and 

409
00:16:53,150 --> 00:16:56,270
Michael . Together we've served at 15 

410
00:16:56,280 --> 00:16:59,049
duty stations around the world and each 

411
00:16:59,059 --> 00:17:01,226
of our Children has attended more than 

412
00:17:01,226 --> 00:17:03,226
five schools . Most of our Children 

413
00:17:03,226 --> 00:17:05,699
have attended three high schools . I'm 

414
00:17:05,709 --> 00:17:08,800
so very grateful for their wisdom . In 

415
00:17:08,810 --> 00:17:10,699
the case of mentors . My greatest 

416
00:17:10,699 --> 00:17:13,339
mentor is Maureen , whose wisdom and 

417
00:17:13,349 --> 00:17:15,071
serenity have been my greatest 

418
00:17:15,071 --> 00:17:18,098
influence throughout my life . Our 

419
00:17:18,109 --> 00:17:19,942
family is from Delaware County , 

420
00:17:19,942 --> 00:17:21,720
Pennsylvania and Philadelphia , 

421
00:17:21,720 --> 00:17:23,760
Pennsylvania . My single mother , 

422
00:17:23,770 --> 00:17:26,060
Suzanne PPAR as a young mother gave up 

423
00:17:26,069 --> 00:17:28,900
her dreams uh to raise my brother and 

424
00:17:28,910 --> 00:17:31,132
my sister and I working in a barbershop 

425
00:17:31,132 --> 00:17:33,880
in South Philly and a makeup counter . 

426
00:17:34,030 --> 00:17:36,640
My dear father , a former enlisted 

427
00:17:36,650 --> 00:17:39,670
marine and a shipyard worker also had 

428
00:17:39,680 --> 00:17:42,180
tremendous influence in my service . 

429
00:17:42,400 --> 00:17:44,567
I'd like to also acknowledge Maureen's 

430
00:17:44,567 --> 00:17:46,630
late parents , her father , an army 

431
00:17:46,640 --> 00:17:49,280
veteran , the late Jim and Regina 

432
00:17:49,290 --> 00:17:52,900
Connolly and our sisters and brothers , 

433
00:17:52,910 --> 00:17:55,290
all of whom are located in that 

434
00:17:55,300 --> 00:17:57,300
southeastern Pennsylvania area . We 

435
00:17:57,300 --> 00:17:59,979
have a very close knit and rooted 

436
00:17:59,989 --> 00:18:02,260
family that give us strength and keep 

437
00:18:02,270 --> 00:18:04,540
us rooted through the many moves around 

438
00:18:04,550 --> 00:18:07,849
the world . I'd like to acknowledge my 

439
00:18:07,859 --> 00:18:10,869
mentors in all services uh above the 

440
00:18:10,880 --> 00:18:12,824
chain of command and maybe most uh 

441
00:18:12,824 --> 00:18:15,339
assuredly below the chain of command , 

442
00:18:15,349 --> 00:18:17,609
my commanding officers , but also 

443
00:18:17,619 --> 00:18:20,290
leaders from the hardest working , most 

444
00:18:20,300 --> 00:18:22,810
dedicated young and listed to the 

445
00:18:22,819 --> 00:18:24,969
senior most admirals and generals who 

446
00:18:24,979 --> 00:18:28,000
guided and mentored me . Most of all , 

447
00:18:28,020 --> 00:18:30,079
I'd like to thank the senior non 

448
00:18:30,089 --> 00:18:32,569
commissioned leaders , the chief petty 

449
00:18:32,579 --> 00:18:35,839
officers , the sergeants major , the 

450
00:18:35,849 --> 00:18:38,869
Gunns and the first shirts who've 

451
00:18:38,880 --> 00:18:42,510
guided me . The senior NCO core is the 

452
00:18:42,520 --> 00:18:45,109
strength of the joint force and is the 

453
00:18:45,119 --> 00:18:47,770
asymmetric advantage of the American 

454
00:18:47,780 --> 00:18:51,359
joint force as commander 

455
00:18:51,369 --> 00:18:53,369
United States Pacific fleet for the 

456
00:18:53,369 --> 00:18:55,630
last three years . I have led Indo 

457
00:18:55,640 --> 00:18:58,329
Paycom maritime component and 

458
00:18:58,339 --> 00:19:00,459
integrated operations of the joint 

459
00:19:00,469 --> 00:19:02,760
force for deterrence in the Indo 

460
00:19:02,780 --> 00:19:05,290
Pacific . Other operational tours 

461
00:19:05,300 --> 00:19:07,411
include United States Central Command 

462
00:19:07,411 --> 00:19:09,560
Director of Operations , Director of 

463
00:19:09,569 --> 00:19:11,736
the Air and Space Operations Center in 

464
00:19:11,800 --> 00:19:14,410
Al Qar . I've served with the US Air 

465
00:19:14,420 --> 00:19:17,439
Force flying the mighty F-15 Sea Eagle . 

466
00:19:17,520 --> 00:19:19,880
I've also served with the US Army as a 

467
00:19:19,890 --> 00:19:21,612
provincial reconstruction team 

468
00:19:21,612 --> 00:19:23,446
commander in the eastern zone of 

469
00:19:23,446 --> 00:19:25,739
Afghanistan and the Nuristan province 

470
00:19:25,800 --> 00:19:27,522
and have had operational tours 

471
00:19:27,522 --> 00:19:30,630
including operational command in Japan 

472
00:19:30,800 --> 00:19:34,430
and having deployed flied and flown 

473
00:19:34,660 --> 00:19:37,219
and served uh throughout the Pacific 

474
00:19:37,229 --> 00:19:40,380
and the Indian Ocean region . Um as 

475
00:19:40,390 --> 00:19:42,689
stated by the chairman , ranking member 

476
00:19:42,699 --> 00:19:45,329
and Senator Roo , it has never been 

477
00:19:45,339 --> 00:19:48,380
more critical for the joint force along 

478
00:19:48,390 --> 00:19:51,060
critically with our allies and partners 

479
00:19:51,069 --> 00:19:54,750
to operate confidently professionally 

480
00:19:54,920 --> 00:19:58,500
and responsibly together . We strive to 

481
00:19:58,510 --> 00:20:00,739
maintain regional stability in this 

482
00:20:00,750 --> 00:20:04,569
consequential theater and safeguard the 

483
00:20:04,579 --> 00:20:06,849
sovereign rights of nations through 

484
00:20:06,859 --> 00:20:09,729
posture and dynamic operations and 

485
00:20:09,739 --> 00:20:12,609
exercise our joint and combined 

486
00:20:12,619 --> 00:20:15,609
operations are increasingly frequent 

487
00:20:15,930 --> 00:20:18,609
complex multilateral 

488
00:20:18,810 --> 00:20:21,880
interoperable and interchangeable . But 

489
00:20:21,890 --> 00:20:25,209
as Senator Hirono stated , we must 

490
00:20:25,219 --> 00:20:27,739
never consider ourselves ready enough . 

491
00:20:27,750 --> 00:20:29,528
We must always be improving our 

492
00:20:29,528 --> 00:20:33,119
position if confirmed . I pledge to 

493
00:20:33,130 --> 00:20:35,352
work with this committee to ensure that 

494
00:20:35,352 --> 00:20:37,463
we meet the top defense priorities in 

495
00:20:37,463 --> 00:20:39,839
the national defense strategy and most 

496
00:20:39,849 --> 00:20:42,719
especially deterring conflict . As the 

497
00:20:42,729 --> 00:20:46,109
Pr C , our pacing challenge continues 

498
00:20:46,119 --> 00:20:48,959
to escalate its aggressive behavior . 

499
00:20:49,449 --> 00:20:53,199
The PR C is our only competitor with 

500
00:20:53,209 --> 00:20:55,640
the will and with the capability to 

501
00:20:55,650 --> 00:20:58,569
reshape the international order to suit 

502
00:20:58,579 --> 00:21:01,969
its autocratic preferences . We'll work 

503
00:21:01,979 --> 00:21:04,040
closely with our interagency , 

504
00:21:04,050 --> 00:21:06,170
teammates and our allies and partners 

505
00:21:06,180 --> 00:21:09,390
as we also face the challenge of Russia 

506
00:21:09,400 --> 00:21:11,910
of North Korea and violent extremist 

507
00:21:11,920 --> 00:21:14,849
groups . If confirmed , I will ensure 

508
00:21:14,859 --> 00:21:17,630
that we maintain the overmatch that 

509
00:21:17,640 --> 00:21:21,010
preserves stability today tomorrow , 

510
00:21:21,270 --> 00:21:23,670
next week and for the decades to come . 

511
00:21:23,760 --> 00:21:25,760
Thank you , Chairman Reed , ranking 

512
00:21:25,760 --> 00:21:28,050
member . Thank you very much , Admiral . 

513
00:21:28,060 --> 00:21:30,060
Uh I have a series of standard 

514
00:21:30,069 --> 00:21:32,439
questions that nominees must respond to . 

515
00:21:32,449 --> 00:21:35,079
Please uh respond appropriately . Have 

516
00:21:35,089 --> 00:21:37,033
you adhered to applicable laws and 

517
00:21:37,033 --> 00:21:38,978
regulations governing conflicts of 

518
00:21:38,978 --> 00:21:40,978
interest ? Yes , Senator , have you 

519
00:21:40,978 --> 00:21:42,811
assumed any duties or taking any 

520
00:21:42,811 --> 00:21:44,867
actions that would appear to presume 

521
00:21:44,867 --> 00:21:47,200
the outcome of the confirmation process ? 

522
00:21:47,200 --> 00:21:49,311
No , sir . Exercising our legislative 

523
00:21:49,311 --> 00:21:51,478
and oversight responsibilities , makes 

524
00:21:51,478 --> 00:21:53,645
it important that this committee , its 

525
00:21:53,645 --> 00:21:53,469
subcommittees and other appropriate 

526
00:21:53,479 --> 00:21:55,201
committees of Congress receive 

527
00:21:55,201 --> 00:21:57,090
testimony , briefings , reports , 

528
00:21:57,090 --> 00:21:59,257
records and other information from the 

529
00:21:59,257 --> 00:22:01,579
executive branch on a timely basis . Do 

530
00:22:01,589 --> 00:22:04,079
you agree if confirmed to appear and 

531
00:22:04,089 --> 00:22:06,033
testify before this committee when 

532
00:22:06,033 --> 00:22:08,949
requested ? Yes , sir . Do you agree 

533
00:22:08,959 --> 00:22:10,959
when asked before this committee to 

534
00:22:10,959 --> 00:22:13,181
give your personal views , even if your 

535
00:22:13,181 --> 00:22:15,348
views differ from the administration ? 

536
00:22:15,348 --> 00:22:17,570
Yes , Senator , do you agree to provide 

537
00:22:17,570 --> 00:22:19,515
records , documents and electronic 

538
00:22:19,515 --> 00:22:21,681
communications in a timely manner when 

539
00:22:21,681 --> 00:22:21,670
requested by this committee , its 

540
00:22:21,680 --> 00:22:23,624
subcommittees or other appropriate 

541
00:22:23,624 --> 00:22:25,736
committees of Congress and to consult 

542
00:22:25,736 --> 00:22:27,902
with the requester regarding the basis 

543
00:22:27,902 --> 00:22:30,013
for any good faith delay or denial in 

544
00:22:30,013 --> 00:22:32,395
providing such records . Will you 

545
00:22:32,405 --> 00:22:34,461
ensure that your staff complies with 

546
00:22:34,461 --> 00:22:36,683
deadlines established by this committee 

547
00:22:36,683 --> 00:22:38,905
for the production of reports , records 

548
00:22:38,905 --> 00:22:41,072
and other information including timely 

549
00:22:41,072 --> 00:22:43,294
responding to hearing questions for the 

550
00:22:43,294 --> 00:22:45,183
record . Yes , Senator , will you 

551
00:22:45,183 --> 00:22:47,072
cooper in providing witnesses and 

552
00:22:47,072 --> 00:22:46,974
briefs in response to congressional 

553
00:22:46,984 --> 00:22:49,699
requests ? Yes , sir . Will these 

554
00:22:49,709 --> 00:22:51,880
witnesses and briefers be protected 

555
00:22:51,890 --> 00:22:53,890
from Reprisal for their testimonial 

556
00:22:53,890 --> 00:22:56,001
briefings ? Yes , Senator , thank you 

557
00:22:56,001 --> 00:22:58,660
very much admirable Burrow . Uh We are 

558
00:22:58,670 --> 00:23:00,869
in the moment uh a historic moment uh 

559
00:23:00,880 --> 00:23:03,119
conflict in Ukraine conflict in the 

560
00:23:03,130 --> 00:23:06,030
Middle East tensions in the Indo 

561
00:23:06,060 --> 00:23:08,650
Pacific . One of the issues uh 

562
00:23:08,660 --> 00:23:11,569
revolving around Ukraine 

563
00:23:11,880 --> 00:23:14,530
is uh I think China is looking very 

564
00:23:14,540 --> 00:23:16,540
closely at what we're doing and our 

565
00:23:16,540 --> 00:23:19,050
current difficulty in providing 

566
00:23:19,060 --> 00:23:20,949
resources to Ukraine is not going 

567
00:23:20,949 --> 00:23:24,469
unnoticed in China as the CIA director 

568
00:23:24,479 --> 00:23:27,339
burns pointed out , no one is watching 

569
00:23:27,349 --> 00:23:29,349
us support for Ukraine more closely 

570
00:23:29,349 --> 00:23:31,560
than Chinese leaders . One of the 

571
00:23:31,569 --> 00:23:33,410
surest ways to rekindle Chinese 

572
00:23:33,420 --> 00:23:35,729
perceptions of American fecklessness 

573
00:23:35,739 --> 00:23:37,869
and stoke . Chinese aggressiveness 

574
00:23:37,880 --> 00:23:40,213
would be to abandon support for Ukraine . 

575
00:23:40,213 --> 00:23:43,430
Do you concur in that observation , sir , 

576
00:23:43,439 --> 00:23:46,589
I do concur uh Russian failure to 

577
00:23:46,599 --> 00:23:48,829
achieve its aggressive , uh its 

578
00:23:48,839 --> 00:23:51,760
aggressive uh uh actions 

579
00:23:51,770 --> 00:23:55,359
directly , a deterrence in the Western 

580
00:23:55,369 --> 00:23:58,719
Pacific and directly reassure partners 

581
00:23:58,729 --> 00:24:02,010
our key strategic uh competitive 

582
00:24:02,020 --> 00:24:05,069
advantage . And so uh the most decisive 

583
00:24:05,079 --> 00:24:07,189
thing we can do in a mo moment and 

584
00:24:07,199 --> 00:24:09,199
absolutely necessary is to pass the 

585
00:24:09,199 --> 00:24:11,560
supplemental in your view , sir . I do 

586
00:24:11,569 --> 00:24:13,569
agree . Thank you . Uh What are the 

587
00:24:13,569 --> 00:24:15,625
lessons do you believe that China is 

588
00:24:15,625 --> 00:24:17,625
taking from the battle in Ukraine ? 

589
00:24:20,170 --> 00:24:22,599
The first is uh the fir the first 

590
00:24:22,609 --> 00:24:26,579
lesson is uh instead of seeing the 

591
00:24:26,589 --> 00:24:29,790
Ukraine conflict and decide this is too 

592
00:24:29,800 --> 00:24:32,410
hard uh their intention . On the other 

593
00:24:32,420 --> 00:24:35,170
hand , is , is to take note of the 

594
00:24:35,180 --> 00:24:38,689
actions of Russia in order to effect a 

595
00:24:38,699 --> 00:24:41,780
short sharp fait accompli 

596
00:24:41,790 --> 00:24:45,020
conflict that presents a fait accompli 

597
00:24:45,030 --> 00:24:47,550
to all of the world . And so rather 

598
00:24:47,560 --> 00:24:49,760
than take the strategic lesson of the 

599
00:24:49,770 --> 00:24:52,920
futility of aggression , instead , it 

600
00:24:52,930 --> 00:24:55,530
is doubling down on their ability to 

601
00:24:55,540 --> 00:24:58,339
shrink strategic operational and 

602
00:24:58,349 --> 00:25:02,199
tactical warning and act quickly . Now , 

603
00:25:02,209 --> 00:25:04,699
uh another aspect of the supplemental 

604
00:25:04,709 --> 00:25:08,319
is the direct support to our military 

605
00:25:08,329 --> 00:25:11,579
$2 billion in military financing for 

606
00:25:11,589 --> 00:25:13,910
the Indo Pacific uh which I presume is 

607
00:25:13,920 --> 00:25:15,976
absolutely critical . I also want to 

608
00:25:15,976 --> 00:25:18,031
commend Senator worker . He's worked 

609
00:25:18,031 --> 00:25:20,087
very hard to get uh additional money 

610
00:25:20,087 --> 00:25:21,864
for our industrial base and our 

611
00:25:21,864 --> 00:25:24,520
submarine industrial base . Um This is 

612
00:25:24,530 --> 00:25:26,750
necessary I presume in fact critical . 

613
00:25:27,420 --> 00:25:29,753
Is that your view ? Absolutely critical . 

614
00:25:29,753 --> 00:25:31,976
Yes , sir . And in the Indo paycom that 

615
00:25:31,976 --> 00:25:35,199
will help you dramatically help Taiwan 

616
00:25:35,209 --> 00:25:39,119
to uh take the lessons of 

617
00:25:39,130 --> 00:25:41,390
Ukraine themselves and turn them on the 

618
00:25:41,400 --> 00:25:44,849
Chinese . Yes sir . Taiwan itself is 

619
00:25:44,859 --> 00:25:47,680
taking the lessons of uh of uh Ukraine 

620
00:25:47,689 --> 00:25:49,959
and they're acting with dispatch and I 

621
00:25:49,969 --> 00:25:53,040
have great admiration for that and it , 

622
00:25:53,050 --> 00:25:56,479
it will directly aid deterrence in the 

623
00:25:56,489 --> 00:25:58,760
Pacific with tremendous leverage . 

624
00:25:58,770 --> 00:26:00,819
Thank you , sir . Uh One of the 

625
00:26:00,829 --> 00:26:03,051
perennial questions with respect to the 

626
00:26:03,051 --> 00:26:05,218
United States relations with Taiwan is 

627
00:26:05,218 --> 00:26:08,030
the issue of strategic ambiguity . You 

628
00:26:08,040 --> 00:26:09,762
are operating under the Taiwan 

629
00:26:09,762 --> 00:26:12,329
Relations Act which is ambiguous at 

630
00:26:12,339 --> 00:26:16,069
best . Um This question came up , 

631
00:26:16,079 --> 00:26:18,630
came up repeatedly . Uh when Avril 

632
00:26:18,640 --> 00:26:20,529
Haines was here , the Director of 

633
00:26:20,529 --> 00:26:22,584
National Intelligence , he said it's 

634
00:26:22,584 --> 00:26:25,079
adopting an explicit commitment would 

635
00:26:25,089 --> 00:26:27,280
be deeply destabilizing , would 

636
00:26:27,290 --> 00:26:29,540
solidify Chinese perceptions that the 

637
00:26:29,550 --> 00:26:31,589
US has been on constraining China's 

638
00:26:31,599 --> 00:26:33,920
rise including through military force 

639
00:26:34,280 --> 00:26:36,280
and would probably cause Beijing to 

640
00:26:36,280 --> 00:26:38,280
aggressively undermine us interests 

641
00:26:38,280 --> 00:26:40,447
worldwide and in fact accelerate their 

642
00:26:40,447 --> 00:26:42,669
their interest . What's your perception 

643
00:26:42,669 --> 00:26:45,229
of the this issue ? My view , Senator 

644
00:26:45,239 --> 00:26:47,550
is that the Taiwan Relations Act , the 

645
00:26:47,560 --> 00:26:49,227
three communiques and the six 

646
00:26:49,227 --> 00:26:51,393
assurances have served the nation well 

647
00:26:51,393 --> 00:26:53,650
for the last 45 years and there is no 

648
00:26:53,660 --> 00:26:55,882
ambiguity for the joint force . There's 

649
00:26:55,882 --> 00:26:57,827
just the mission clarity contained 

650
00:26:57,827 --> 00:26:59,890
within the Taiwan Relations Act that 

651
00:26:59,900 --> 00:27:02,170
the department will aid Taiwan's 

652
00:27:02,180 --> 00:27:05,290
ability to defend itself from having 

653
00:27:05,300 --> 00:27:08,680
matters that uh that resolve the Taiwan 

654
00:27:08,689 --> 00:27:11,530
straight issue with force or the logic 

655
00:27:11,540 --> 00:27:14,229
of force and that the department will 

656
00:27:14,239 --> 00:27:16,989
be ready to come to Taiwan's aid . So 

657
00:27:17,000 --> 00:27:19,770
in a sense , uh at the diplomatic 

658
00:27:19,780 --> 00:27:21,780
presidential level there , there is 

659
00:27:21,780 --> 00:27:23,724
this their ambiguity , but in your 

660
00:27:23,724 --> 00:27:26,479
command , you're preparing for every 

661
00:27:26,489 --> 00:27:29,020
potential , which includes uh active 

662
00:27:29,030 --> 00:27:31,750
combat Yes , sir , clarity and mission 

663
00:27:31,760 --> 00:27:35,369
focus . Uh Senator 

664
00:27:35,380 --> 00:27:37,658
Wicker raised an interesting , in fact , 

665
00:27:37,658 --> 00:27:39,880
very important question about the joint 

666
00:27:39,880 --> 00:27:41,839
all domain command and control . I 

667
00:27:41,849 --> 00:27:43,960
presume he's gonna raise that again . 

668
00:27:43,960 --> 00:27:46,839
So I will defer uh and uh 

669
00:27:48,300 --> 00:27:50,467
at this point again , I will thank you 

670
00:27:50,467 --> 00:27:52,300
for your service and your family 

671
00:27:52,300 --> 00:27:55,660
service . And uh um I will 

672
00:27:55,670 --> 00:27:58,160
respond , I will refrain from many 

673
00:27:58,170 --> 00:28:00,770
comments on the football game . So then 

674
00:28:00,780 --> 00:28:03,939
a workers uh thank thank you , Mr 

675
00:28:03,949 --> 00:28:07,880
Chairman . And um it 

676
00:28:07,890 --> 00:28:11,770
II , I hope it's clear that I , I would 

677
00:28:11,780 --> 00:28:13,947
have asked the very same questions the 

678
00:28:13,947 --> 00:28:15,947
chair has asked , we , we're really 

679
00:28:15,947 --> 00:28:19,680
totally united on the issues that he 

680
00:28:19,689 --> 00:28:22,022
brought forward . Let me just make this , 

681
00:28:22,022 --> 00:28:24,189
see if I can understand clearly and if 

682
00:28:24,189 --> 00:28:26,319
those listening outside the hearing 

683
00:28:26,329 --> 00:28:29,760
room , um understand this clearly , we 

684
00:28:29,770 --> 00:28:33,040
can do what we're doing to help our 

685
00:28:33,050 --> 00:28:36,859
Ukrainian friends and still not miss a 

686
00:28:36,869 --> 00:28:39,699
beat in managing risk in the Indo 

687
00:28:39,800 --> 00:28:42,579
Pacific . Is that correct ? Yes , sir . 

688
00:28:42,589 --> 00:28:46,250
In two years or the force capabilities 

689
00:28:46,260 --> 00:28:48,890
that are relevant to deterring and the 

690
00:28:48,900 --> 00:28:51,459
force capabilities that are relevant to 

691
00:28:51,489 --> 00:28:54,280
prevailing in a , in major combat or 

692
00:28:54,290 --> 00:28:57,199
operations in the Pacific . Uh I've not 

693
00:28:57,209 --> 00:29:00,479
seen a single force element that has 

694
00:29:00,489 --> 00:29:02,959
been that had where uh in the Indo 

695
00:29:02,979 --> 00:29:05,300
Pacific for any other theater that's 

696
00:29:05,310 --> 00:29:08,130
contributed to uh deterrence in any of 

697
00:29:08,140 --> 00:29:10,251
the , any of the other theaters ? And 

698
00:29:10,251 --> 00:29:12,362
can we manage risk in the Middle East 

699
00:29:13,449 --> 00:29:17,099
um without harming in any way your job 

700
00:29:17,109 --> 00:29:20,170
in the Indo Pacific . I believe we can . 

701
00:29:20,180 --> 00:29:23,589
Senator . Uh , but however , uh , the 

702
00:29:23,599 --> 00:29:26,530
expenditures of some capabilities 

703
00:29:26,560 --> 00:29:30,530
against a global inventory , uh , will 

704
00:29:30,540 --> 00:29:32,589
increase some of the demand for 

705
00:29:32,599 --> 00:29:34,766
particularly precision weapons . And , 

706
00:29:34,766 --> 00:29:36,670
and so we need to give attention 

707
00:29:37,359 --> 00:29:39,470
immediately to that inventory , do we 

708
00:29:39,470 --> 00:29:41,581
not ? Yes , sir , we do . All right . 

709
00:29:41,581 --> 00:29:44,239
Now , let me then get to the joint task 

710
00:29:44,250 --> 00:29:48,030
force structure . Um , I , I 

711
00:29:48,040 --> 00:29:51,369
don't know what more we need to 

712
00:29:51,380 --> 00:29:54,290
do on our Authorization 

713
00:29:54,650 --> 00:29:57,790
Act annually to make it clear that we'd 

714
00:29:57,800 --> 00:30:01,630
like for the department to carry out 

715
00:30:02,300 --> 00:30:04,356
the creation of a standing permanent 

716
00:30:04,356 --> 00:30:06,467
joint task force structure with three 

717
00:30:06,467 --> 00:30:09,339
star general or three star admiral 

718
00:30:09,459 --> 00:30:13,459
under the OPA com commander to focus 

719
00:30:13,469 --> 00:30:15,580
on command and control war fighting . 

720
00:30:15,640 --> 00:30:18,680
Now , um you uh um A 

721
00:30:18,689 --> 00:30:22,089
as Pacific Fleet commander , you were 

722
00:30:22,099 --> 00:30:24,390
dual headed as the joint task force 

723
00:30:24,400 --> 00:30:26,760
commander within , within indo paycom . 

724
00:30:26,770 --> 00:30:30,339
That's correct . I am uh I continually 

725
00:30:30,349 --> 00:30:32,719
qualify the Pacific fleet headquarters 

726
00:30:32,729 --> 00:30:34,979
as AJ TF headquarters . As I utter 

727
00:30:34,989 --> 00:30:37,219
these words , we're executing a command 

728
00:30:37,229 --> 00:30:39,660
post exercise along with Australia and 

729
00:30:39,670 --> 00:30:42,219
Japan joint operations command . Uh I 

730
00:30:42,229 --> 00:30:44,839
have not operated as the joint task 

731
00:30:44,849 --> 00:30:46,960
force commander but under a different 

732
00:30:46,960 --> 00:30:48,905
command arrangement as a supported 

733
00:30:48,905 --> 00:30:51,469
commander , a term in doctrine and have 

734
00:30:51,479 --> 00:30:53,368
integrated the operations and the 

735
00:30:53,368 --> 00:30:55,859
activities of the joint force for 

736
00:30:55,869 --> 00:30:58,579
deterrence . Are you familiar with what 

737
00:30:59,050 --> 00:31:01,530
we believe we've mandated in , in the 

738
00:31:01,540 --> 00:31:05,510
NDA A ? Yes , sir . And uh have 

739
00:31:05,520 --> 00:31:08,859
you , do you have any dedicated staff 

740
00:31:08,869 --> 00:31:10,900
to carry out the joint task force 

741
00:31:10,910 --> 00:31:14,650
responsibilities . Um The chair 

742
00:31:14,660 --> 00:31:16,780
and I and I think the members of this 

743
00:31:16,790 --> 00:31:18,859
committee overwhelmingly are united 

744
00:31:18,869 --> 00:31:21,619
that we need a three star billet and 

745
00:31:21,630 --> 00:31:24,729
staff actually in the hundreds to carry 

746
00:31:24,739 --> 00:31:28,430
this out . Yes , sir . I augmented the 

747
00:31:28,439 --> 00:31:30,750
staff , we augment the staff with 

748
00:31:30,760 --> 00:31:33,459
reservists and with M BEDS from the 

749
00:31:33,469 --> 00:31:36,530
other services when we execute as A as 

750
00:31:36,540 --> 00:31:40,209
AJ TF staff and for the US Pacific 

751
00:31:40,219 --> 00:31:43,250
fleet uh in order to achieve at scale 

752
00:31:43,260 --> 00:31:44,927
and in time would require the 

753
00:31:44,927 --> 00:31:48,630
augmentation of several 100 permanent 

754
00:31:48,640 --> 00:31:50,790
staff across all services . 

755
00:31:52,829 --> 00:31:54,880
Uh It seems to me we're really not 

756
00:31:54,890 --> 00:31:57,260
ready unless we do that . Is that 

757
00:31:57,270 --> 00:32:00,500
correct ? We'll be readier when we do , 

758
00:32:00,510 --> 00:32:03,729
sir . Ok . So uh what more do you need 

759
00:32:03,739 --> 00:32:05,795
from the Congress ? What more do you 

760
00:32:05,795 --> 00:32:08,017
need from the members of this committee 

761
00:32:08,017 --> 00:32:11,500
in this regard , sir ? Uh I have 

762
00:32:11,859 --> 00:32:15,050
clear guidance from the Congress uh 

763
00:32:15,060 --> 00:32:18,390
from the NDA A and uh if confirmed , I 

764
00:32:18,400 --> 00:32:20,739
pledge to work with this committee and 

765
00:32:20,750 --> 00:32:22,639
the department with dispatch , Mr 

766
00:32:22,639 --> 00:32:24,528
Chairman , I think we have a very 

767
00:32:24,528 --> 00:32:26,750
explicit statement from the witness . I 

768
00:32:26,750 --> 00:32:29,239
concur . Thank you . Thank you . Thank 

769
00:32:29,250 --> 00:32:31,528
you , Senator Worker , Senator Shaheen , 

770
00:32:31,528 --> 00:32:34,459
please . Thank you and congratulations 

771
00:32:34,469 --> 00:32:36,636
Admiral on your nomination . Thank you 

772
00:32:36,636 --> 00:32:39,099
to you and your family for all of your 

773
00:32:39,109 --> 00:32:41,053
years of service and thank you for 

774
00:32:41,053 --> 00:32:43,276
taking time to meet with me yesterday . 

775
00:32:43,520 --> 00:32:46,650
Um I wanna , I appreciated both 

776
00:32:46,660 --> 00:32:48,979
senators Reid and wicker's questions 

777
00:32:48,989 --> 00:32:52,319
about Ukraine and as I 

778
00:32:52,329 --> 00:32:56,160
understood . Um Senator Wicker asked if 

779
00:32:56,170 --> 00:32:58,170
we can do what we need to do in the 

780
00:32:58,170 --> 00:33:00,520
Indo Pacific and still help Ukraine . I 

781
00:33:00,530 --> 00:33:03,459
actually understood you to say that um 

782
00:33:03,530 --> 00:33:07,109
not only can we still do what we need 

783
00:33:07,119 --> 00:33:09,489
to do in the Indo Pacific , but it 

784
00:33:09,500 --> 00:33:12,339
actually helps us with deterrence from 

785
00:33:12,349 --> 00:33:15,170
China if we support Ukraine in their 

786
00:33:15,180 --> 00:33:17,719
efforts against Putin . Is that , is 

787
00:33:17,729 --> 00:33:20,400
that an accurate assessment of what you 

788
00:33:20,410 --> 00:33:23,849
said ? I am sure it has a direct and 

789
00:33:23,859 --> 00:33:27,229
positive impact on deterrence in the 

790
00:33:27,239 --> 00:33:30,310
Indo Pacific . Thank you . Um One of 

791
00:33:30,319 --> 00:33:32,097
the things I appreciated in our 

792
00:33:32,097 --> 00:33:33,819
conversation yesterday was our 

793
00:33:33,819 --> 00:33:35,986
discussion about the importance of our 

794
00:33:35,986 --> 00:33:38,439
diplomats um in countries throughout 

795
00:33:38,449 --> 00:33:40,650
the Indo Pacific . Can you talk about 

796
00:33:40,660 --> 00:33:43,369
why that's helpful to you as somebody 

797
00:33:43,380 --> 00:33:46,050
who's trying to help maintain stability , 

798
00:33:48,079 --> 00:33:51,650
both Chairman uh Reed and uh ranking 

799
00:33:51,660 --> 00:33:54,469
member wicker among all noted that the , 

800
00:33:54,479 --> 00:33:57,449
that the asymmetric advantage among the 

801
00:33:57,459 --> 00:34:00,369
allies and partners is our alliances 

802
00:34:00,380 --> 00:34:03,489
and partners and accordingly , the 

803
00:34:03,500 --> 00:34:06,660
chiefs of mission are the prime 

804
00:34:06,670 --> 00:34:09,709
movers in affecting those 

805
00:34:09,719 --> 00:34:12,949
alliances and partnerships and not just 

806
00:34:13,229 --> 00:34:16,250
the chief of mission , but all of the 

807
00:34:16,260 --> 00:34:18,919
heroic foreign service officers and all 

808
00:34:18,929 --> 00:34:21,550
of the people uh that work there uh at 

809
00:34:21,560 --> 00:34:23,489
the embassy , I have close 

810
00:34:23,500 --> 00:34:26,489
relationships and tremendous admiration 

811
00:34:26,679 --> 00:34:28,735
uh for the diplomatic corps and they 

812
00:34:28,735 --> 00:34:31,830
are our first mover in our key 

813
00:34:31,840 --> 00:34:34,360
asymmetric advantage . Um Thank you , I 

814
00:34:34,370 --> 00:34:36,314
agree with that and it does send a 

815
00:34:36,314 --> 00:34:39,600
message to those countries if we go for 

816
00:34:39,610 --> 00:34:41,221
long periods of time without 

817
00:34:41,221 --> 00:34:43,554
ambassadors in place . Does it not , it , 

818
00:34:43,554 --> 00:34:45,560
it raises concerns in the countries 

819
00:34:45,570 --> 00:34:47,850
about how important we think they are 

820
00:34:47,860 --> 00:34:51,350
to the United States . It certainly 

821
00:34:51,360 --> 00:34:53,582
doesn't , uh , demonstrate commitment . 

822
00:34:53,830 --> 00:34:57,760
Thank you . Um , our public shipyards , 

823
00:34:57,770 --> 00:34:59,939
um , such as Portsmouth , the 

824
00:34:59,949 --> 00:35:02,171
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard are expanding 

825
00:35:02,171 --> 00:35:04,719
and modernizing facilities for us , 

826
00:35:04,729 --> 00:35:07,790
domestic and Aus efforts . Um , it's 

827
00:35:07,800 --> 00:35:10,439
one of the areas where we still have a 

828
00:35:10,449 --> 00:35:13,189
competitive advantage with our undersea 

829
00:35:13,199 --> 00:35:15,929
warfare . And I wonder if you could 

830
00:35:15,939 --> 00:35:19,699
talk about how um important Aus is 

831
00:35:19,709 --> 00:35:21,487
going to be . You mentioned the 

832
00:35:21,487 --> 00:35:23,598
importance of our allies and partners 

833
00:35:23,598 --> 00:35:25,765
and how is that going to be helpful as 

834
00:35:25,765 --> 00:35:27,876
we're thinking about deterrence ? And 

835
00:35:27,876 --> 00:35:29,931
what do we need to do to ensure that 

836
00:35:29,931 --> 00:35:31,876
that continues to move along in an 

837
00:35:31,876 --> 00:35:34,360
expeditious way ? Aus is a generational 

838
00:35:34,370 --> 00:35:37,429
partnership that combines all of the 

839
00:35:37,439 --> 00:35:40,179
talent of the United Kingdom of 

840
00:35:40,189 --> 00:35:42,429
Australia , the United States against a 

841
00:35:42,439 --> 00:35:45,340
key asymmetric advantage in our 

842
00:35:45,350 --> 00:35:47,969
undersea dominance . It's absolutely 

843
00:35:47,979 --> 00:35:50,780
critical for deterrence in the 21st 

844
00:35:50,790 --> 00:35:54,129
century and we must affect the 

845
00:35:54,139 --> 00:35:55,899
improvements in the shipyard , 

846
00:35:55,909 --> 00:35:59,090
integrated optimization program to 

847
00:35:59,100 --> 00:36:01,969
bring our public shipyards with this 

848
00:36:01,979 --> 00:36:05,469
world class workforce up to 21st 

849
00:36:05,479 --> 00:36:07,929
century industrial standards so we can 

850
00:36:07,939 --> 00:36:10,510
meet the threat at scale . Well , thank 

851
00:36:10,520 --> 00:36:12,576
you . I know Senator King and I both 

852
00:36:12,576 --> 00:36:14,530
agree with that . Um 

853
00:36:17,510 --> 00:36:20,879
Last night and this morning , um FBI , 

854
00:36:20,889 --> 00:36:22,919
Director Ray was all over the news 

855
00:36:22,929 --> 00:36:25,300
talking about the um 

856
00:36:26,020 --> 00:36:29,120
irregular um and cyber 

857
00:36:29,300 --> 00:36:31,419
intrusions that China is prepared to 

858
00:36:31,429 --> 00:36:33,318
make in our infrastructure in the 

859
00:36:33,318 --> 00:36:35,540
United States and the advantage that it 

860
00:36:35,540 --> 00:36:37,485
would give them one of those other 

861
00:36:37,485 --> 00:36:40,340
areas is around the information um 

862
00:36:40,350 --> 00:36:43,560
sphere and information warfare . Can 

863
00:36:43,570 --> 00:36:46,929
you talk about how important you think 

864
00:36:46,939 --> 00:36:50,189
it is for us to engage in um 

865
00:36:50,949 --> 00:36:53,850
being able to respond to disinformation . 

866
00:36:55,909 --> 00:36:58,570
It is uh you know , absolutely critical . 

867
00:36:58,580 --> 00:37:01,790
Uh It , you know , we as an open 

868
00:37:01,800 --> 00:37:05,060
society with freedom of speech have an 

869
00:37:05,070 --> 00:37:08,489
inherent vulnerability to this . Uh The 

870
00:37:08,500 --> 00:37:11,250
PR C sees that vulnerability to 

871
00:37:11,260 --> 00:37:13,204
information operations , that is a 

872
00:37:13,204 --> 00:37:15,500
societal strength , is freedom of 

873
00:37:15,510 --> 00:37:18,040
speech and our values . And we've got 

874
00:37:18,050 --> 00:37:20,328
to work . Uh We have to work very hard . 

875
00:37:20,328 --> 00:37:23,399
And uh Director Ray also talked about 

876
00:37:23,409 --> 00:37:26,590
uh the um talked about the penetration 

877
00:37:26,699 --> 00:37:29,199
of much of our critical infrastructure 

878
00:37:29,330 --> 00:37:31,459
uh throughout the country , also 

879
00:37:31,469 --> 00:37:33,909
critical that we close those gaps and 

880
00:37:33,919 --> 00:37:36,030
we're ready to counter . Um Well , 

881
00:37:36,040 --> 00:37:37,929
thank you very much . My time has 

882
00:37:37,929 --> 00:37:39,873
expired , but I also wanna again , 

883
00:37:39,873 --> 00:37:42,120
commend you and everyone at Indo paycom 

884
00:37:42,129 --> 00:37:44,570
for all of your efforts on women , 

885
00:37:44,580 --> 00:37:46,747
peace and security and recognizing how 

886
00:37:46,747 --> 00:37:50,149
important that is to stability . Thank 

887
00:37:50,159 --> 00:37:52,437
you , Senator Shaheen , Senator Fisher , 

888
00:37:52,437 --> 00:37:54,429
please . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

889
00:37:54,580 --> 00:37:56,747
Welcome Admiral and thank you for your 

890
00:37:56,747 --> 00:37:58,747
service to this country and that of 

891
00:37:58,747 --> 00:38:02,209
your family . The 24 National Defense 

892
00:38:02,219 --> 00:38:04,790
Authorization Act . It extended the 

893
00:38:04,800 --> 00:38:07,820
Pacific deterrence initiative as well 

894
00:38:07,830 --> 00:38:10,052
as the requirement for the Commander of 

895
00:38:10,052 --> 00:38:12,530
Indo Paycom to provide an independent 

896
00:38:12,540 --> 00:38:15,040
assessment on resources for the Indo 

897
00:38:15,209 --> 00:38:17,639
Pacific if confirmed , how would you 

898
00:38:17,649 --> 00:38:20,669
use those tools to work to effectively 

899
00:38:20,679 --> 00:38:23,270
communicate , not just with Congress , 

900
00:38:23,280 --> 00:38:26,250
but also to the American people on what 

901
00:38:26,260 --> 00:38:28,679
investments are needed in the Indo 

902
00:38:28,830 --> 00:38:31,110
Pacific and why they are needed . 

903
00:38:33,820 --> 00:38:35,689
Senator , as the , the Pacific 

904
00:38:35,699 --> 00:38:38,219
deterrent initiative is a uh is uh 

905
00:38:38,229 --> 00:38:40,810
different in its makeup than the 

906
00:38:40,820 --> 00:38:43,770
European defense initiative , European 

907
00:38:43,780 --> 00:38:46,790
deterrence initiative . And accordingly , 

908
00:38:46,840 --> 00:38:49,270
the expression of those priorities goes 

909
00:38:49,280 --> 00:38:51,590
through the prism of the integrated 

910
00:38:51,600 --> 00:38:53,770
priorities list of each of the 

911
00:38:53,780 --> 00:38:57,409
components , a tight connection between 

912
00:38:57,659 --> 00:39:01,290
us indo paycom and to ensure the 

913
00:39:01,300 --> 00:39:03,985
coherency of the service . Uh 

914
00:39:03,995 --> 00:39:06,435
expressions of those elements within 

915
00:39:06,445 --> 00:39:08,445
the Pacific deterrent initiative is 

916
00:39:08,445 --> 00:39:12,205
important . I submit a specific Indo 

917
00:39:12,324 --> 00:39:15,024
Pacific integrated priority list to the 

918
00:39:15,034 --> 00:39:17,034
Chief of Naval Operations that is 

919
00:39:17,044 --> 00:39:20,679
focused on the Pacific uh for that , 

920
00:39:20,689 --> 00:39:23,399
for those elements that are uh not 

921
00:39:23,409 --> 00:39:26,060
within that uh in accordance with title 

922
00:39:26,070 --> 00:39:29,360
10 US code section 222 

923
00:39:29,370 --> 00:39:32,959
alpha . Uh I I am required if 

924
00:39:32,969 --> 00:39:36,689
confirmed to submit a 12 xx report this 

925
00:39:36,699 --> 00:39:40,489
year . It will be 1202 that explicates 

926
00:39:40,570 --> 00:39:43,320
those unfilled requirements that do not 

927
00:39:43,330 --> 00:39:46,439
go through the components in a , in a 

928
00:39:46,449 --> 00:39:50,129
tight lash up . And uh and so uh uh 

929
00:39:50,139 --> 00:39:52,959
following my oath and the letter I 

930
00:39:52,969 --> 00:39:54,747
signed and the pledge I made to 

931
00:39:54,747 --> 00:39:57,489
Chairman Reed , um I will do so with a 

932
00:39:57,500 --> 00:39:59,111
strict focus on our military 

933
00:39:59,111 --> 00:40:01,222
capabilities and and submit that same 

934
00:40:01,222 --> 00:40:03,278
report to the department as required 

935
00:40:03,530 --> 00:40:06,469
without presupposing the outcome of our 

936
00:40:06,479 --> 00:40:10,010
fiscal year 25 budgetary decisions 

937
00:40:10,629 --> 00:40:13,739
are there capabilities ? Um , and you 

938
00:40:13,750 --> 00:40:16,189
have alluded to the priorities that are 

939
00:40:16,199 --> 00:40:18,739
out there . But are you looking at 

940
00:40:18,750 --> 00:40:21,780
things like munitions specific other , 

941
00:40:21,790 --> 00:40:24,929
uh , weapons systems that you would 

942
00:40:24,939 --> 00:40:28,110
prioritize based on your experience 

943
00:40:28,120 --> 00:40:32,060
that you've had with pack fleet ? Yes , 

944
00:40:32,070 --> 00:40:34,360
Senator . And , uh , if confirmed , 

945
00:40:34,370 --> 00:40:36,426
I'll , I will meet my obligations to 

946
00:40:36,426 --> 00:40:38,481
share those many are at a classified 

947
00:40:38,481 --> 00:40:40,648
level and I will make myself available 

948
00:40:40,648 --> 00:40:43,820
to the members . Thank you . Uh When we , 

949
00:40:44,530 --> 00:40:46,474
when we look at what's going on in 

950
00:40:46,474 --> 00:40:48,586
North Korea , you know , last month , 

951
00:40:48,586 --> 00:40:50,530
they announced that it , that they 

952
00:40:50,530 --> 00:40:52,530
would no longer strive for peaceful 

953
00:40:52,530 --> 00:40:55,080
reunification with South Korea and it 

954
00:40:55,090 --> 00:40:58,550
continues to advance its nuclear weapon 

955
00:40:58,560 --> 00:41:00,860
program and develop their strike 

956
00:41:00,870 --> 00:41:03,580
capabilities with recent development 

957
00:41:03,590 --> 00:41:07,030
developments in mind . Can you comment 

958
00:41:07,040 --> 00:41:10,320
on how important our extended nuclear 

959
00:41:10,330 --> 00:41:13,570
deterrence commitment is to the United 

960
00:41:13,580 --> 00:41:15,760
States and South Korea alliance ? 

961
00:41:17,000 --> 00:41:20,139
Senator absolutely critical the 

962
00:41:20,149 --> 00:41:23,169
Republic of Korea is the linchpin of 

963
00:41:23,179 --> 00:41:25,290
peace , stability and security in the 

964
00:41:25,290 --> 00:41:28,879
Pacific . We seek a denuclearized 

965
00:41:29,080 --> 00:41:32,149
Korean Peninsula , whatever the public 

966
00:41:32,159 --> 00:41:35,929
statements uh as , as a military 

967
00:41:35,939 --> 00:41:38,590
commander , I must look at the 

968
00:41:38,600 --> 00:41:41,189
capability development and to be able 

969
00:41:41,199 --> 00:41:44,360
to pace that to deter that extended 

970
00:41:44,370 --> 00:41:46,370
deterrence , particularly with us , 

971
00:41:46,370 --> 00:41:49,669
strategic forces is absolutely 

972
00:41:49,679 --> 00:41:53,209
essential . Do you assess that 

973
00:41:53,219 --> 00:41:56,899
the security dynamic on the peninsula 

974
00:41:56,909 --> 00:41:58,965
is changing in any way ? And if so , 

975
00:41:58,965 --> 00:42:01,270
can you tell us a little bit about what 

976
00:42:01,280 --> 00:42:04,600
you see ? Uh 

977
00:42:06,000 --> 00:42:08,111
I can't speak fully to it because I'm 

978
00:42:08,111 --> 00:42:10,333
still the Pacific Fleet commander . And 

979
00:42:10,333 --> 00:42:12,669
in my current role , I would support uh 

980
00:42:12,679 --> 00:42:15,840
General LA Camera uh in a , in a , you 

981
00:42:15,850 --> 00:42:17,794
know , in a uh General LA Camera , 

982
00:42:17,794 --> 00:42:20,550
United States Forces forces cor uh but 

983
00:42:20,560 --> 00:42:23,830
the changing dynamic is , is continued 

984
00:42:23,840 --> 00:42:26,229
saber rattling , continued 

985
00:42:26,239 --> 00:42:30,010
proliferation , uh a greater volume 

986
00:42:30,020 --> 00:42:33,090
of uh of testing and weapons 

987
00:42:33,100 --> 00:42:36,469
demonstrations on the part of the North . 

988
00:42:36,479 --> 00:42:40,050
And in response uh South , South Korea 

989
00:42:40,060 --> 00:42:43,219
has uh has increased its 

990
00:42:43,229 --> 00:42:45,007
intelligence , surveillance and 

991
00:42:45,007 --> 00:42:47,520
reconnaissance activities in the 

992
00:42:47,530 --> 00:42:50,590
vicinity of the North . And so despite 

993
00:42:50,600 --> 00:42:52,822
the public statements , it continues to 

994
00:42:52,822 --> 00:42:54,969
be tense . What , what's your 

995
00:42:54,979 --> 00:42:58,850
assessment on the deepening security 

996
00:42:58,860 --> 00:43:02,070
assistance ties between Russia and 

997
00:43:02,080 --> 00:43:05,370
North Korea ? It is concerning uh 

998
00:43:05,479 --> 00:43:09,110
deeply , it is symbiotic . It closes 

999
00:43:09,120 --> 00:43:11,629
gaps each for the other providing 

1000
00:43:11,639 --> 00:43:14,389
conventional weapons to Russia from 

1001
00:43:14,399 --> 00:43:17,350
North Korean industry , uh providing 

1002
00:43:17,360 --> 00:43:21,030
sanctions , evading uh materials and 

1003
00:43:21,040 --> 00:43:23,040
high end potentially high end 

1004
00:43:23,050 --> 00:43:26,389
technology to North Korea . In all 

1005
00:43:26,399 --> 00:43:28,550
cases , it runs counter to the 

1006
00:43:28,560 --> 00:43:31,360
principles of peace and stability in 

1007
00:43:31,370 --> 00:43:34,090
the Indo Pacific and globally . Thank 

1008
00:43:34,100 --> 00:43:37,060
you , sir . Thank you , Senator Fisher , 

1009
00:43:37,070 --> 00:43:39,126
Senator Hirono . Please thank you Mr 

1010
00:43:39,126 --> 00:43:42,350
Chairman to ensure the fitness of 

1011
00:43:42,360 --> 00:43:44,416
nominees to serve . I also following 

1012
00:43:44,416 --> 00:43:46,550
two initial questions of all nominees 

1013
00:43:46,560 --> 00:43:48,782
who appear before any of the committees 

1014
00:43:48,782 --> 00:43:51,209
on which I sit since you became a legal 

1015
00:43:51,219 --> 00:43:53,389
adult . Have you ever made unwanted 

1016
00:43:53,399 --> 00:43:55,621
requests for sexual favors or committed 

1017
00:43:55,621 --> 00:43:57,790
any verbal or physical harassment or 

1018
00:43:57,800 --> 00:43:59,860
assault of a sexual nature ? No , 

1019
00:43:59,870 --> 00:44:01,590
Senator , have you ever faced 

1020
00:44:01,600 --> 00:44:03,822
discipline or entered into a settlement 

1021
00:44:03,822 --> 00:44:06,100
related to this kind of conduct . No , 

1022
00:44:06,110 --> 00:44:09,770
Senator Emer , you noted the importance 

1023
00:44:09,780 --> 00:44:13,330
of , of our allies and partners 

1024
00:44:13,340 --> 00:44:16,469
as uh a very critical aspect of our 

1025
00:44:16,479 --> 00:44:18,850
asymmetric advantage and uh this 

1026
00:44:18,860 --> 00:44:20,530
includes our compact nations 

1027
00:44:20,540 --> 00:44:22,429
partnerships . So I'd like you to 

1028
00:44:22,429 --> 00:44:24,096
acknowledge the importance of 

1029
00:44:24,096 --> 00:44:26,262
congressional action in support of our 

1030
00:44:26,262 --> 00:44:27,984
negotiated compacts with Palau 

1031
00:44:27,984 --> 00:44:30,159
Micronesia and the Marshall Islands . 

1032
00:44:31,830 --> 00:44:34,489
The compact of free association is 

1033
00:44:34,500 --> 00:44:36,649
absolutely critical for multiple 

1034
00:44:36,659 --> 00:44:39,290
reasons . Uh The first is the People's 

1035
00:44:39,300 --> 00:44:41,610
Republic of China is attempting to 

1036
00:44:41,620 --> 00:44:44,330
drive a wedge through traditional 

1037
00:44:44,340 --> 00:44:45,951
partnerships and through tra 

1038
00:44:45,951 --> 00:44:48,820
traditional people to people ties um 

1039
00:44:48,830 --> 00:44:51,419
across the Pacific , they employ 

1040
00:44:51,429 --> 00:44:54,679
corruption and elite capture to do so . 

1041
00:44:54,979 --> 00:44:57,870
Uh the COFA States on top of a moral 

1042
00:44:57,879 --> 00:45:01,489
duty as a result of uh years and 

1043
00:45:01,500 --> 00:45:05,290
years of partnership uh with the COFA 

1044
00:45:05,300 --> 00:45:08,310
States are historical ties , our people 

1045
00:45:08,320 --> 00:45:11,120
to people ties . In fact , a a little 

1046
00:45:11,129 --> 00:45:14,209
known point is that uh young people 

1047
00:45:14,219 --> 00:45:16,729
from the Cofa States enlist in the US 

1048
00:45:16,739 --> 00:45:20,239
armed services at higher rates uh than 

1049
00:45:20,250 --> 00:45:22,629
us citizens do . And I've had the honor 

1050
00:45:22,639 --> 00:45:24,989
of serving with uh Yap Islanders , 

1051
00:45:25,000 --> 00:45:27,540
truck , Islanders and Pompeii Islanders 

1052
00:45:27,550 --> 00:45:29,772
uh throughout the course of my career . 

1053
00:45:29,860 --> 00:45:32,679
And uh and then finally , uh in 

1054
00:45:32,689 --> 00:45:35,989
accordance with the sovereign wishes of 

1055
00:45:36,000 --> 00:45:38,520
the COFA States , they offer tremendous 

1056
00:45:38,530 --> 00:45:41,770
potential for a theater posture that 

1057
00:45:41,780 --> 00:45:44,300
will aid the joint force and the Allied 

1058
00:45:44,310 --> 00:45:46,379
force in achieving the principles of 

1059
00:45:46,389 --> 00:45:48,750
expanded maneuver in conflict in the 

1060
00:45:48,760 --> 00:45:50,949
Western Pacific . Thank you for 

1061
00:45:50,959 --> 00:45:53,070
acknowledging the importance . And we 

1062
00:45:53,070 --> 00:45:55,489
have this year of we have the important 

1063
00:45:55,500 --> 00:45:57,969
duty to um approve these compacts and 

1064
00:45:57,979 --> 00:46:00,679
let's get it done . I know that you are 

1065
00:46:00,689 --> 00:46:03,790
aware of my focus on infrastructure . 

1066
00:46:04,520 --> 00:46:06,742
Uh I've had discussions with you and of 

1067
00:46:06,742 --> 00:46:08,959
course , I mentioned uh the what 

1068
00:46:08,969 --> 00:46:11,136
happened at Red Hill . And so over the 

1069
00:46:11,136 --> 00:46:13,302
last few years in Hawaii alone , there 

1070
00:46:13,302 --> 00:46:15,302
have been water main breaks , power 

1071
00:46:15,302 --> 00:46:17,191
outages and spills , including of 

1072
00:46:17,191 --> 00:46:19,570
course the catastrophic events at Red 

1073
00:46:19,580 --> 00:46:22,100
Hill as well as unnecessary dry dock 

1074
00:46:22,120 --> 00:46:24,520
replacement . Although you will not be 

1075
00:46:24,530 --> 00:46:26,474
directly responsible for improving 

1076
00:46:26,474 --> 00:46:28,586
infrastructure in Hawaii . Yours will 

1077
00:46:28,586 --> 00:46:30,530
be an important voice on the issue 

1078
00:46:30,530 --> 00:46:33,209
especially as it impacts readiness if 

1079
00:46:33,219 --> 00:46:35,052
confirmed . How do you intend to 

1080
00:46:35,052 --> 00:46:37,219
approach the infrastructure challenges 

1081
00:46:37,219 --> 00:46:39,399
in the region including in Hawaii ? 

1082
00:46:40,959 --> 00:46:43,070
Senator if confirmed ? The first is a 

1083
00:46:43,070 --> 00:46:45,770
critical eye with worst case thinking 

1084
00:46:46,149 --> 00:46:48,205
and that's a critical eye to look at 

1085
00:46:48,205 --> 00:46:50,739
the at the critical infrastructure and 

1086
00:46:50,750 --> 00:46:54,100
uh have a risk management standpoint 

1087
00:46:54,110 --> 00:46:56,409
that looks instead instead of saying , 

1088
00:46:56,419 --> 00:46:58,610
I hope it's going to be ok . The 

1089
00:46:58,620 --> 00:47:01,659
approach to say , how can this go wrong ? 

1090
00:47:01,919 --> 00:47:04,086
You mentioned the water main . Uh when 

1091
00:47:04,086 --> 00:47:06,399
we unearth that water main , uh we 

1092
00:47:06,409 --> 00:47:09,580
found that it was 75 years old . Uh Red 

1093
00:47:09,590 --> 00:47:12,570
Hill itself was 80 years old at the 

1094
00:47:12,580 --> 00:47:14,780
time . This focus on critical 

1095
00:47:14,790 --> 00:47:16,568
infrastructure is gonna require 

1096
00:47:16,568 --> 00:47:18,457
critical thinking . It's going to 

1097
00:47:18,457 --> 00:47:21,149
require integration among the 

1098
00:47:21,159 --> 00:47:24,350
components and leaders holding each 

1099
00:47:24,360 --> 00:47:26,389
other to account . And holding the 

1100
00:47:26,399 --> 00:47:29,590
services to account to ensure that the 

1101
00:47:29,600 --> 00:47:32,370
foundation of the joint forces , the 

1102
00:47:32,379 --> 00:47:35,850
bases , the pier , the airfields , uh 

1103
00:47:35,860 --> 00:47:38,250
the refueling points are going to 

1104
00:47:38,260 --> 00:47:41,209
support uh combat operations . And by 

1105
00:47:41,219 --> 00:47:43,909
doing so , support deterrence , you 

1106
00:47:43,919 --> 00:47:45,752
mentioned that your father was a 

1107
00:47:45,752 --> 00:47:48,189
shipyard worker . So II I know that you 

1108
00:47:48,199 --> 00:47:50,366
have an appreciation of the importance 

1109
00:47:50,366 --> 00:47:52,679
of the four public shipyards including 

1110
00:47:52,689 --> 00:47:54,879
Pearl Harbor . And one of the biggest 

1111
00:47:54,889 --> 00:47:57,250
uh uh issues that we're gonna face is 

1112
00:47:57,260 --> 00:47:59,371
the dry dock replacement to enable us 

1113
00:47:59,371 --> 00:48:01,482
to repair and maintain our ships . So 

1114
00:48:01,570 --> 00:48:05,540
that is uh an , an uh an infrastructure 

1115
00:48:05,810 --> 00:48:07,810
uh that I , I would like you to pay 

1116
00:48:07,810 --> 00:48:09,643
particular attention to as we go 

1117
00:48:09,643 --> 00:48:13,229
forward . I uh mentioned Red Hill 

1118
00:48:13,239 --> 00:48:15,530
as a symptomatic of the importance of 

1119
00:48:15,540 --> 00:48:17,719
public engagement . And uh you know , 

1120
00:48:17,729 --> 00:48:19,896
I'd like your commitment that you will 

1121
00:48:19,896 --> 00:48:22,320
continue to focus on how important it 

1122
00:48:22,330 --> 00:48:25,540
is to basically repair the breakdown in 

1123
00:48:25,550 --> 00:48:27,659
trust and questions that arose as a 

1124
00:48:27,669 --> 00:48:29,836
result of the handling of the Red Hill 

1125
00:48:29,836 --> 00:48:32,058
situation . So I would like your public 

1126
00:48:32,058 --> 00:48:34,280
commitment that you will be uh you will 

1127
00:48:34,280 --> 00:48:36,899
continue to focus on restoring trust 

1128
00:48:36,909 --> 00:48:39,679
between the people of Hawaii and our 

1129
00:48:39,689 --> 00:48:42,689
military in Hawaii . If confirmed , I 

1130
00:48:42,699 --> 00:48:44,949
commit myself to it . Senator . Thank 

1131
00:48:44,959 --> 00:48:47,229
you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank 

1132
00:48:47,239 --> 00:48:49,072
you very much , Senator Roo , uh 

1133
00:48:49,072 --> 00:48:50,961
Colonel Sullivan . Thank you , Mr 

1134
00:48:50,961 --> 00:48:53,239
Chairman uh Admiral . Great to see you . 

1135
00:48:53,239 --> 00:48:55,580
Thank you in your family for your 

1136
00:48:55,590 --> 00:48:57,860
exceptional service . I think you're 

1137
00:48:57,870 --> 00:49:00,899
extremely well qualified . I certainly 

1138
00:49:00,909 --> 00:49:03,350
plan to provide my strong support for 

1139
00:49:03,360 --> 00:49:05,840
your confirmation . I also appreciate 

1140
00:49:05,850 --> 00:49:07,906
what the chairman said about Admiral 

1141
00:49:07,906 --> 00:49:10,989
Aquilino and his wife , Laura . They 

1142
00:49:11,000 --> 00:49:13,750
have also undertaken exceptional 

1143
00:49:13,760 --> 00:49:16,189
service to our country . I hope when 

1144
00:49:16,199 --> 00:49:18,199
your change of command comes , that 

1145
00:49:18,340 --> 00:49:21,030
Admiral Aquino's service to America is 

1146
00:49:21,040 --> 00:49:23,989
not over . I highly doubt it will be 

1147
00:49:24,000 --> 00:49:27,570
over . Let me um focus on an issue . I 

1148
00:49:27,580 --> 00:49:29,580
know you're focused on now and your 

1149
00:49:29,580 --> 00:49:32,189
current bill , it , the Pr CS focused 

1150
00:49:32,199 --> 00:49:34,270
and rapid naval build up has 

1151
00:49:34,280 --> 00:49:36,113
highlighted our own shipbuilding 

1152
00:49:36,113 --> 00:49:38,989
deficiencies . Numerically , they now 

1153
00:49:39,000 --> 00:49:42,629
have a larger navy , roughly 370 ships 

1154
00:49:43,030 --> 00:49:46,389
to our 291 ships last year . They added 

1155
00:49:46,399 --> 00:49:49,570
30 ships to their fleet . 15 were large 

1156
00:49:49,580 --> 00:49:51,802
surface combatants including cruisers , 

1157
00:49:51,802 --> 00:49:54,136
destroyers and another aircraft carrier . 

1158
00:49:54,136 --> 00:49:57,810
We added two at the same time are the 

1159
00:49:57,820 --> 00:50:00,969
current Biden budget shrinks the navy . 

1160
00:50:00,979 --> 00:50:03,201
It's going to be shrinking our navy for 

1161
00:50:03,201 --> 00:50:05,510
some time if deterrence fails and we go 

1162
00:50:05,520 --> 00:50:07,742
to war in the near term with China , we 

1163
00:50:07,742 --> 00:50:09,798
have to fight with the fleet we have 

1164
00:50:09,798 --> 00:50:11,687
today . You're very aware of that 

1165
00:50:11,687 --> 00:50:14,350
fleet's capabilities . Can you describe 

1166
00:50:14,360 --> 00:50:16,527
the impact of the Prc's naval build up 

1167
00:50:16,527 --> 00:50:18,471
and how we need to equip the joint 

1168
00:50:18,471 --> 00:50:21,479
force to deter and defeat the PL A navy 

1169
00:50:21,489 --> 00:50:23,280
today should conflict occur . 

1170
00:50:26,110 --> 00:50:28,620
So the the PL A navy has been on a 

1171
00:50:28,629 --> 00:50:32,520
histo an historic trajectory these 

1172
00:50:32,530 --> 00:50:35,629
last 25 years and uh and uh 

1173
00:50:35,639 --> 00:50:39,290
while we are , I am confident 

1174
00:50:39,570 --> 00:50:42,850
that we would prevail uh in combat . It 

1175
00:50:42,860 --> 00:50:45,580
is a concerning trajectory . We 

1176
00:50:45,729 --> 00:50:48,330
overmatched in the indo , we are not 

1177
00:50:48,340 --> 00:50:51,010
overmatched , but I don't like the pace 

1178
00:50:51,020 --> 00:50:53,129
of the trajectory . And in answering 

1179
00:50:53,139 --> 00:50:55,449
the question on the other capabilities 

1180
00:50:55,459 --> 00:50:57,709
that could be brought to bear is uh 

1181
00:50:57,719 --> 00:51:00,510
we're , we're a joint force that thinks 

1182
00:51:00,520 --> 00:51:04,389
in a multi domain mindset and that 

1183
00:51:04,399 --> 00:51:08,010
is the kind of formations in maritime 

1184
00:51:08,020 --> 00:51:10,909
terrain , those are forces on land that 

1185
00:51:10,919 --> 00:51:13,830
can affect events at the maritime that 

1186
00:51:13,840 --> 00:51:16,669
can shoot , move , communicate and 

1187
00:51:16,679 --> 00:51:19,790
impose costs against the naval force to 

1188
00:51:19,800 --> 00:51:23,469
augment the na the Navy force at sea . 

1189
00:51:23,699 --> 00:51:26,949
And then further the 21st century 

1190
00:51:26,959 --> 00:51:29,520
capabilities , unmanned capabilities 

1191
00:51:29,530 --> 00:51:33,110
from the sea bed uh to the heavens that 

1192
00:51:33,120 --> 00:51:36,649
can also also uh effect . Let me 

1193
00:51:37,229 --> 00:51:39,285
sorry to interrupt . I , I got a few 

1194
00:51:39,285 --> 00:51:41,507
more questions . I I want to talk about 

1195
00:51:41,507 --> 00:51:43,729
some of those forces uh while test that 

1196
00:51:43,729 --> 00:51:45,673
you're gonna be in charge of while 

1197
00:51:45,673 --> 00:51:47,840
testifying in front of the Congress in 

1198
00:51:47,840 --> 00:51:49,729
1935 General Billy Mitchell often 

1199
00:51:49,729 --> 00:51:51,951
referred to as the father of the US Air 

1200
00:51:51,951 --> 00:51:54,173
Force said this , I believe that in the 

1201
00:51:54,173 --> 00:51:56,173
future whoever controls and then he 

1202
00:51:56,173 --> 00:51:58,419
said a piece of strategic territory , 

1203
00:51:58,429 --> 00:52:01,699
this territory , this land um controls 

1204
00:52:01,709 --> 00:52:03,879
the world . It is the most strategic 

1205
00:52:03,889 --> 00:52:07,280
place on the planet . Do you know what 

1206
00:52:07,290 --> 00:52:09,510
piece of terrain Billy Mitchell was 

1207
00:52:09,520 --> 00:52:12,729
talking about Alaska , correct ? 

1208
00:52:13,179 --> 00:52:17,000
Um Now with regard to Alaska , 

1209
00:52:17,330 --> 00:52:20,010
you will own the forces in Alaska that 

1210
00:52:20,020 --> 00:52:22,610
includes over 105th generation fighters , 

1211
00:52:23,169 --> 00:52:26,389
uh the 11th airborne division of the US 

1212
00:52:26,399 --> 00:52:28,929
army . Those will be under your command . 

1213
00:52:28,939 --> 00:52:31,659
I , I like to do just a quick geography 

1214
00:52:31,669 --> 00:52:34,169
test because sometimes even our four 

1215
00:52:34,199 --> 00:52:36,366
star admirals and generals miss this , 

1216
00:52:36,520 --> 00:52:40,179
which forces are closer to Japan , the 

1217
00:52:40,189 --> 00:52:43,659
joint force in Alaska or joint force in 

1218
00:52:43,669 --> 00:52:46,379
Hawaii , Alaska . How about which 

1219
00:52:46,389 --> 00:52:49,550
forces are closer to Korea forces in 

1220
00:52:49,879 --> 00:52:53,350
Hawaii or Alaska Alaska Center and one 

1221
00:52:53,360 --> 00:52:55,709
more Taiwan Strait , which forces are 

1222
00:52:55,719 --> 00:52:57,620
closer to the Taiwan Strait , the 

1223
00:52:57,629 --> 00:52:59,796
Alaska Senator . Thank you , admiral . 

1224
00:52:59,796 --> 00:53:01,796
Um You'd be amazed how many uh four 

1225
00:53:01,800 --> 00:53:03,911
star admirals and generals don't pass 

1226
00:53:03,911 --> 00:53:07,540
that simple geography test . So , um 

1227
00:53:09,110 --> 00:53:11,899
did you get those very quickly ? Two 

1228
00:53:11,909 --> 00:53:14,419
summers ago , we had a joint Russia 

1229
00:53:14,429 --> 00:53:17,260
China naval task force , seven ships 

1230
00:53:17,600 --> 00:53:19,870
that was off the coast of Alaska . We 

1231
00:53:19,879 --> 00:53:22,659
sent 150 ft coast guard cutter to 

1232
00:53:23,449 --> 00:53:25,560
intercept it . Was that appropriate ? 

1233
00:53:25,850 --> 00:53:28,250
Was that a show of American deterrence ? 

1234
00:53:28,540 --> 00:53:31,939
You had , it was a risk that the joint 

1235
00:53:31,949 --> 00:53:34,100
force to took in putting force 

1236
00:53:34,110 --> 00:53:36,221
elsewhere and it's a risk we'd rather 

1237
00:53:36,221 --> 00:53:38,332
not take . So this summer , we had an 

1238
00:53:38,332 --> 00:53:41,280
11 ship joint Russia China task force 

1239
00:53:41,290 --> 00:53:43,260
naval task force off the coast of 

1240
00:53:43,270 --> 00:53:46,199
Alaska , we sent four destroyers and P 

1241
00:53:46,209 --> 00:53:48,542
eight . Si think that's a better answer . 

1242
00:53:48,542 --> 00:53:50,765
Could you commit to if we do that again 

1243
00:53:50,765 --> 00:53:52,765
and they'll do it again next summer 

1244
00:53:52,765 --> 00:53:54,987
with a bigger joint task force hit them 

1245
00:53:54,987 --> 00:53:57,870
with an appropriate size response . I 

1246
00:53:57,879 --> 00:54:00,139
will intend to do so and we'll do so 

1247
00:54:00,149 --> 00:54:02,093
across the joint force . Senator . 

1248
00:54:02,093 --> 00:54:03,982
Thank you . Uh , final question , 

1249
00:54:03,982 --> 00:54:06,260
Admiral . I know you're very well read . 

1250
00:54:06,260 --> 00:54:08,590
Very , very smart . Um Have you 

1251
00:54:08,719 --> 00:54:11,659
happened to read this book , this Kind 

1252
00:54:11,669 --> 00:54:14,260
of War by Tr Fehrenbach , the classic 

1253
00:54:14,270 --> 00:54:16,270
Korean War history . Yes , sir . My 

1254
00:54:16,270 --> 00:54:18,159
dear son , uh , gave it to me for 

1255
00:54:18,159 --> 00:54:20,381
Christmas . He was , when he was at the 

1256
00:54:20,381 --> 00:54:22,603
naval academy . I have it on my shelf . 

1257
00:54:22,603 --> 00:54:22,560
Well , he beat me to it because I was 

1258
00:54:22,570 --> 00:54:24,792
gonna give it to you . But um every one 

1259
00:54:24,792 --> 00:54:28,270
of your Marine Corps and army senior 

1260
00:54:28,280 --> 00:54:31,360
officers will have read it . The lesson 

1261
00:54:31,370 --> 00:54:33,426
is very simple and it , it's a great 

1262
00:54:33,426 --> 00:54:35,537
book . I highly recommend it . I give 

1263
00:54:35,537 --> 00:54:37,537
it to everybody who's up for senior 

1264
00:54:37,537 --> 00:54:39,703
positions , particularly civilians who 

1265
00:54:39,703 --> 00:54:41,703
don't know a lot about readiness in 

1266
00:54:41,703 --> 00:54:44,020
this administration . But the lesson is 

1267
00:54:44,030 --> 00:54:46,909
this 1945 we had the most fearsome 

1268
00:54:47,209 --> 00:54:50,159
lethal military probably in the history 

1269
00:54:50,169 --> 00:54:53,629
of the world . Five years later in 1950 

1270
00:54:53,639 --> 00:54:55,629
our military couldn't stop a third 

1271
00:54:55,639 --> 00:54:58,909
world peasant army as an invaded South 

1272
00:54:58,919 --> 00:55:00,975
Korea , literally . And thousands of 

1273
00:55:00,975 --> 00:55:03,110
young Americans died in the summer of 

1274
00:55:03,120 --> 00:55:07,010
1950 because we had weak civilian and 

1275
00:55:07,020 --> 00:55:10,489
weak uniform , military leadership . So 

1276
00:55:10,689 --> 00:55:13,159
I would just commend you to read this 

1277
00:55:13,169 --> 00:55:15,336
compliments to your son for getting it 

1278
00:55:15,336 --> 00:55:17,558
to you before I did . But it's a really 

1279
00:55:17,558 --> 00:55:19,669
important book . And I worry as we're 

1280
00:55:19,669 --> 00:55:21,891
shrinking the army shrinking the navy , 

1281
00:55:21,891 --> 00:55:23,947
shrinking the Marine Corps at one of 

1282
00:55:23,947 --> 00:55:26,058
the most dangerous periods we've seen 

1283
00:55:26,058 --> 00:55:27,891
since World War Two . Not enough 

1284
00:55:27,891 --> 00:55:30,058
members of the Pentagon know what's in 

1285
00:55:30,058 --> 00:55:32,209
this , have read history . We can't 

1286
00:55:32,219 --> 00:55:34,386
repeat history . We can't have another 

1287
00:55:34,386 --> 00:55:37,860
task force Smith and um , appreciate 

1288
00:55:37,870 --> 00:55:40,092
you , uh , taking a look at this book , 

1289
00:55:40,092 --> 00:55:42,314
I'll reread and he , he stole it back , 

1290
00:55:42,314 --> 00:55:44,426
so I'll accept it . If you give it to 

1291
00:55:44,426 --> 00:55:46,703
me , I will give it to you . Thank you . 

1292
00:55:46,703 --> 00:55:48,703
Now that we've settled that Senator 

1293
00:55:48,703 --> 00:55:52,000
Rosen , please . Well , uh thank you , 

1294
00:55:52,010 --> 00:55:54,429
Chairman Reed for holding this hearing . 

1295
00:55:54,439 --> 00:55:56,550
And admiral , I want to thank you for 

1296
00:55:56,550 --> 00:55:58,161
your service to our nation . 

1297
00:55:58,161 --> 00:56:00,383
Congratulations on your nomination . We 

1298
00:56:00,383 --> 00:56:02,217
had such a great visit last week 

1299
00:56:02,217 --> 00:56:03,939
talking about uh computing and 

1300
00:56:03,939 --> 00:56:05,840
cybersecurity . My civilian Cyber 

1301
00:56:05,850 --> 00:56:08,080
reserve pilot program , I look forward 

1302
00:56:08,090 --> 00:56:10,146
to working with you on all of that , 

1303
00:56:10,146 --> 00:56:12,368
but I really want to focus . Um Now for 

1304
00:56:12,368 --> 00:56:14,719
a moment on space and cyber resilience . 

1305
00:56:14,879 --> 00:56:16,935
So in our meeting last week said the 

1306
00:56:16,935 --> 00:56:18,905
first battle in future conflict is 

1307
00:56:18,915 --> 00:56:20,971
likely to be fought in the cyber and 

1308
00:56:20,971 --> 00:56:23,854
space domains . And so could you 

1309
00:56:23,864 --> 00:56:26,215
elaborate on what steps you would take 

1310
00:56:26,225 --> 00:56:28,225
if confirmed to further prepare our 

1311
00:56:28,225 --> 00:56:30,169
forces for the challenges in these 

1312
00:56:30,169 --> 00:56:32,281
domains and how you would ensure that 

1313
00:56:32,281 --> 00:56:34,392
our capabilities are not just current 

1314
00:56:34,392 --> 00:56:36,324
but also adaptable to the rapidly 

1315
00:56:36,334 --> 00:56:38,364
evolving nature of cyber and space 

1316
00:56:38,375 --> 00:56:40,597
warfare . And I don't know how I follow 

1317
00:56:40,597 --> 00:56:42,653
up . I don't have a book to give you 

1318
00:56:43,149 --> 00:56:45,290
computer program perhaps 

1319
00:56:47,919 --> 00:56:50,229
Senator uh in saying that the the first 

1320
00:56:50,239 --> 00:56:52,295
battle will be space in Cyber . It's 

1321
00:56:52,295 --> 00:56:54,461
because in the 21st century , the next 

1322
00:56:54,461 --> 00:56:56,572
advantage is who can see , decide and 

1323
00:56:56,572 --> 00:56:59,889
act faster . And increasingly we're 

1324
00:56:59,899 --> 00:57:02,800
dependent on our cyber networks . And 

1325
00:57:02,810 --> 00:57:05,780
in our constellations uh to be able to 

1326
00:57:05,790 --> 00:57:09,060
see , understand , make sense of and to 

1327
00:57:09,070 --> 00:57:13,000
act and accordingly , we must build 

1328
00:57:13,010 --> 00:57:16,919
the resiliency of our constellation of 

1329
00:57:16,929 --> 00:57:20,840
sensors on orbit uh as well as 

1330
00:57:20,850 --> 00:57:23,790
our constellation of or of sensors from 

1331
00:57:23,800 --> 00:57:26,239
the seabed to the , to the Carmen Line . 

1332
00:57:26,570 --> 00:57:28,989
It must be resilient and there must be 

1333
00:57:29,000 --> 00:57:31,389
redundant . It must include the 

1334
00:57:31,399 --> 00:57:33,600
elements of graceful degradation . So 

1335
00:57:33,610 --> 00:57:35,777
that when one thing is out , it's just 

1336
00:57:35,777 --> 00:57:38,510
a small loss uh incapability , but it's 

1337
00:57:38,520 --> 00:57:42,100
still , it still provides uh enough and 

1338
00:57:42,110 --> 00:57:44,350
we've got to work tirelessly to close 

1339
00:57:44,360 --> 00:57:47,560
those gaps . Um Thank you . Well , and 

1340
00:57:47,570 --> 00:57:49,459
I want to build on that uh Brazil 

1341
00:57:49,459 --> 00:57:52,439
resiliency , particularly in uh Taiwan . 

1342
00:57:52,449 --> 00:57:55,379
So this last year's NDA A includes the 

1343
00:57:55,389 --> 00:57:59,139
Taiwan Cybersecurity resiliency Act 

1344
00:57:59,149 --> 00:58:01,010
bipartisan legislation that I 

1345
00:58:01,020 --> 00:58:02,959
introduced alongside with Senator 

1346
00:58:02,969 --> 00:58:05,330
rounds to expand military cyber 

1347
00:58:05,340 --> 00:58:07,739
security with Taiwan to help them 

1348
00:58:07,750 --> 00:58:10,419
counter these cyberattacks from China 

1349
00:58:10,639 --> 00:58:12,306
building in that resiliency , 

1350
00:58:12,306 --> 00:58:14,417
redundancy , all of those things . So 

1351
00:58:14,417 --> 00:58:16,472
if confirmed , what other allies and 

1352
00:58:16,472 --> 00:58:18,583
partners in the Indo Pacific region , 

1353
00:58:18,583 --> 00:58:20,528
would you prioritize for our cyber 

1354
00:58:20,528 --> 00:58:24,290
collaboration , Japan uh Republic of 

1355
00:58:24,300 --> 00:58:27,030
Korea Australia , of course , and 

1356
00:58:27,040 --> 00:58:29,151
there's already tight partnerships uh 

1357
00:58:29,151 --> 00:58:31,207
among them all , but we can never be 

1358
00:58:31,207 --> 00:58:34,100
satisfied . Uh II I work really with 

1359
00:58:34,110 --> 00:58:36,649
every state that is an ally and partner . 

1360
00:58:36,659 --> 00:58:38,989
And that's a deep list . Now , that's 

1361
00:58:39,000 --> 00:58:41,899
the key advantage . But all allies and 

1362
00:58:41,909 --> 00:58:44,076
partners that are willing to work with 

1363
00:58:44,076 --> 00:58:47,860
us um are , are , are , you know , key 

1364
00:58:47,870 --> 00:58:50,340
focus of that effort , creating this 

1365
00:58:50,350 --> 00:58:52,850
broad net of cyber resiliency really 

1366
00:58:52,860 --> 00:58:55,860
important . And again , you work with 

1367
00:58:55,870 --> 00:58:57,703
everyone , so you're a coalition 

1368
00:58:57,703 --> 00:58:59,870
builder and this is really important , 

1369
00:58:59,870 --> 00:59:01,759
not just in this region but every 

1370
00:59:01,759 --> 00:59:03,814
region . And of course , the Houthis 

1371
00:59:03,814 --> 00:59:05,926
recent attacks on commercial shipping 

1372
00:59:05,926 --> 00:59:08,148
in the Red Sea . It highlights how less 

1373
00:59:08,148 --> 00:59:10,259
sophisticated adversaries can disrupt 

1374
00:59:10,259 --> 00:59:12,314
international commerce and challenge 

1375
00:59:12,314 --> 00:59:14,537
the freedom of our navigation . And I'm 

1376
00:59:14,537 --> 00:59:16,370
increasingly concerned about the 

1377
00:59:16,370 --> 00:59:18,481
capabilities , of course , as you are 

1378
00:59:18,481 --> 00:59:20,370
and everyone's been talking about 

1379
00:59:20,370 --> 00:59:21,981
sophisticate , sophisticated 

1380
00:59:21,981 --> 00:59:24,639
adversaries , China , for example , to 

1381
00:59:24,649 --> 00:59:27,040
take similar aggressive actions like 

1382
00:59:27,050 --> 00:59:29,820
they're doing um in the Red Sea in the 

1383
00:59:29,830 --> 00:59:32,129
Indo Pacific . So how does in Indo 

1384
00:59:32,139 --> 00:59:34,195
Paycom , how would you plan to co uh 

1385
00:59:34,195 --> 00:59:36,417
collaborate with allies and partners in 

1386
00:59:36,417 --> 00:59:37,750
the region to share the 

1387
00:59:37,750 --> 00:59:40,679
responsibilities and resources ? So 

1388
00:59:40,689 --> 00:59:42,879
there is freedom of navigation in the 

1389
00:59:42,889 --> 00:59:45,111
Indo Pacific . We see the challenges we 

1390
00:59:45,111 --> 00:59:48,780
have now co coalition 

1391
00:59:48,790 --> 00:59:51,159
building . And uh one of the key 

1392
00:59:51,169 --> 00:59:53,719
efforts within this is uh currently 

1393
00:59:53,729 --> 00:59:55,840
under the current under under Admiral 

1394
00:59:55,840 --> 00:59:59,179
Aquilino is the Indo Paycom mission 

1395
00:59:59,189 --> 01:00:02,649
network that is going to create secure 

1396
01:00:02,659 --> 01:00:06,340
layers of intel sharing where it's just 

1397
01:00:06,350 --> 01:00:09,219
not us sharing with allies and partners , 

1398
01:00:09,229 --> 01:00:11,120
but it is all of the allies and 

1399
01:00:11,129 --> 01:00:14,229
partners sharing to build a common 

1400
01:00:14,239 --> 01:00:17,739
picture of malign activity at sea which 

1401
01:00:17,750 --> 01:00:19,989
will give all of the allies and 

1402
01:00:20,000 --> 01:00:22,840
partners the ability to act quickly and 

1403
01:00:22,850 --> 01:00:25,469
to counter the threats . Like you said , 

1404
01:00:25,479 --> 01:00:27,535
intelligence cybersecurity , this is 

1405
01:00:27,535 --> 01:00:29,919
key for our maritime defense . So could 

1406
01:00:29,929 --> 01:00:32,340
you talk a little bit um in my last few 

1407
01:00:32,350 --> 01:00:34,239
seconds about how increased joint 

1408
01:00:34,239 --> 01:00:36,406
training programs could really benefit 

1409
01:00:36,409 --> 01:00:38,939
our mutual defense capabilities and 

1410
01:00:38,949 --> 01:00:41,000
this op interoperability and 

1411
01:00:41,010 --> 01:00:44,199
collaboration that it supports our 

1412
01:00:44,209 --> 01:00:46,320
joint , our joint training programs . 

1413
01:00:46,320 --> 01:00:48,042
And I , I'd like to especially 

1414
01:00:48,042 --> 01:00:49,931
acknowledge our state partnership 

1415
01:00:49,931 --> 01:00:52,189
programs in being absolutely critical 

1416
01:00:52,199 --> 01:00:54,870
in raising the capability in bringing 

1417
01:00:54,879 --> 01:00:57,050
skill sets to each other and learning 

1418
01:00:57,060 --> 01:00:59,790
from each other as well as building the 

1419
01:00:59,800 --> 01:01:01,856
people to people ties that will help 

1420
01:01:01,856 --> 01:01:05,120
speed the coalition along when we reach 

1421
01:01:05,129 --> 01:01:07,351
that unforgiving hour when we need it . 

1422
01:01:07,360 --> 01:01:09,582
Yeah . Thank you very much , Mr Chair . 

1423
01:01:09,582 --> 01:01:11,749
You'll back . Thank you , Senator Rose 

1424
01:01:11,749 --> 01:01:14,027
and Senator Scott , please . Thank you , 

1425
01:01:14,027 --> 01:01:16,027
Chairman Emerald . Thanks for being 

1426
01:01:16,027 --> 01:01:18,027
here . Thank you for your service . 

1427
01:01:18,027 --> 01:01:19,971
Thank you for your commitment . Uh 

1428
01:01:19,971 --> 01:01:22,193
Thanks . Uh We had a great conversation 

1429
01:01:22,193 --> 01:01:24,304
the other day , so the world's pretty 

1430
01:01:24,304 --> 01:01:26,360
dangerous . Um uh We weren't able to 

1431
01:01:26,360 --> 01:01:29,370
deter Russia in Ukraine . We walked out 

1432
01:01:29,379 --> 01:01:31,546
of Afghanistan . Now we got the hoodie 

1433
01:01:31,546 --> 01:01:34,580
shooting at us . We've lost uh two 

1434
01:01:35,090 --> 01:01:37,969
seals , three servicemen and women . Um 

1435
01:01:38,290 --> 01:01:41,260
We watch what Hamas did . Um We watch 

1436
01:01:41,270 --> 01:01:44,969
how much money Iran has . Um We look at 

1437
01:01:44,979 --> 01:01:47,189
the what uh Senator Sullivan said the 

1438
01:01:47,199 --> 01:01:49,669
size of the Chinese military versus , 

1439
01:01:49,679 --> 01:01:51,457
you know , what we're doing the 

1440
01:01:51,457 --> 01:01:53,780
trajectory . So if you're , if you're 

1441
01:01:53,830 --> 01:01:55,886
Xi Jinping , what are you thinking ? 

1442
01:01:57,050 --> 01:01:59,217
Well , first Senator , I'll share with 

1443
01:01:59,217 --> 01:02:01,217
you and acknowledge the surface and 

1444
01:02:01,217 --> 01:02:03,217
sacrifice of our five fallen heroes 

1445
01:02:03,217 --> 01:02:06,639
along with their family . I , I think 

1446
01:02:06,649 --> 01:02:08,780
uh you know , I , I can't , I can't 

1447
01:02:08,790 --> 01:02:11,469
directly express Xi Jinping's uh 

1448
01:02:11,479 --> 01:02:14,830
attitude , but I do see the actions of 

1449
01:02:14,840 --> 01:02:18,790
the People's Liberation Army and I see 

1450
01:02:19,010 --> 01:02:21,310
uh a all I see a 

1451
01:02:21,320 --> 01:02:24,699
undaunted effort to 

1452
01:02:24,709 --> 01:02:28,030
extend its aggression as a Revon , 

1453
01:02:28,679 --> 01:02:32,469
revisionist and expansionist state to 

1454
01:02:32,479 --> 01:02:36,310
reset the borders based on the logic 

1455
01:02:36,479 --> 01:02:39,790
of their military power . And I think 

1456
01:02:39,800 --> 01:02:43,229
we re we we are in a global environment 

1457
01:02:43,239 --> 01:02:45,750
that has increasingly disordered , 

1458
01:02:46,030 --> 01:02:49,030
increasingly chaotic . The logic of 

1459
01:02:49,040 --> 01:02:51,870
rules is being replaced with the logic 

1460
01:02:51,879 --> 01:02:55,850
of power and we must as a nation 

1461
01:02:55,879 --> 01:02:58,590
uh counter that logic with 

1462
01:02:58,600 --> 01:03:01,510
comprehensive national power across all 

1463
01:03:01,520 --> 01:03:04,270
levers of statecraft . So we have a lot 

1464
01:03:04,280 --> 01:03:06,336
of servicemen and women stationed in 

1465
01:03:06,336 --> 01:03:08,447
the Inter Pacific . Uh We spend a lot 

1466
01:03:08,447 --> 01:03:10,669
of money in the , in the Pacific . So 

1467
01:03:10,679 --> 01:03:12,735
if you're talking to just an average 

1468
01:03:12,735 --> 01:03:14,846
American , that's writing the check . 

1469
01:03:14,846 --> 01:03:17,469
What would you tell him why ? First uh 

1470
01:03:18,409 --> 01:03:22,350
60% of the world population , 60% of 

1471
01:03:22,360 --> 01:03:24,620
the world's economy and seven of the 

1472
01:03:24,629 --> 01:03:27,330
world's 10 largest militaries is in the 

1473
01:03:27,340 --> 01:03:30,580
Indo Pacific . And if that disorder 

1474
01:03:30,590 --> 01:03:32,919
extends to aggression in the Indo 

1475
01:03:32,929 --> 01:03:36,110
Pacific , we risk greater conflict , we 

1476
01:03:36,120 --> 01:03:38,510
risk proliferation that makes the world 

1477
01:03:38,520 --> 01:03:41,350
a more dangerous place . And so success 

1478
01:03:41,360 --> 01:03:44,239
in aggression . Uh uh Anywhere in the 

1479
01:03:44,250 --> 01:03:46,659
Western Pacific has a direct effect on 

1480
01:03:46,669 --> 01:03:49,959
the security of the United States . The 

1481
01:03:49,969 --> 01:03:52,330
uh the integration of the economies 

1482
01:03:52,340 --> 01:03:54,830
particularly in semiconductors . Uh 

1483
01:03:54,840 --> 01:03:57,399
According to many think tanks could 

1484
01:03:57,409 --> 01:04:00,120
result in uh up to a double digit 

1485
01:04:00,129 --> 01:04:03,320
contraction in GDP , greatly affecting 

1486
01:04:03,330 --> 01:04:05,850
people's lives and their well being . 

1487
01:04:06,060 --> 01:04:08,959
And then finally democracy and our 

1488
01:04:08,969 --> 01:04:11,750
values , which is the ties that connect 

1489
01:04:12,010 --> 01:04:14,669
uh for all of those reasons . it is in 

1490
01:04:14,679 --> 01:04:17,949
America's direct physical 

1491
01:04:18,239 --> 01:04:21,310
interest to deter conflict by being 

1492
01:04:21,320 --> 01:04:23,909
ready to fight and to win . How 

1493
01:04:23,919 --> 01:04:27,909
important is Taiwan uh critical 

1494
01:04:27,919 --> 01:04:30,209
for the reasons that I spoke to earlier 

1495
01:04:30,219 --> 01:04:33,290
even more so , uh in the case of the 

1496
01:04:33,300 --> 01:04:35,780
economy . So if China continues to 

1497
01:04:35,790 --> 01:04:37,846
build their economy and eventually , 

1498
01:04:37,846 --> 01:04:40,012
you know , they would have about three 

1499
01:04:40,012 --> 01:04:41,957
times the number of people if they 

1500
01:04:41,957 --> 01:04:43,957
continue to build their economy and 

1501
01:04:43,957 --> 01:04:43,860
they build economy bigger than ours , 

1502
01:04:43,929 --> 01:04:46,151
is that a threat to the United States , 

1503
01:04:48,679 --> 01:04:52,320
one would hope not . Uh You know , I uh 

1504
01:04:52,340 --> 01:04:54,396
I , I wouldn't think , I don't think 

1505
01:04:54,396 --> 01:04:57,010
we're competing on who has the bigger 

1506
01:04:57,020 --> 01:04:59,850
economy , we're competing on 

1507
01:04:59,860 --> 01:05:03,189
values . And uh for me , what I'm 

1508
01:05:03,199 --> 01:05:05,032
looking at is I'm looking at the 

1509
01:05:05,032 --> 01:05:07,719
military instrument and in many ways , 

1510
01:05:07,729 --> 01:05:09,729
the military instrument is directly 

1511
01:05:09,729 --> 01:05:13,379
related to the economy and , and what I 

1512
01:05:13,389 --> 01:05:16,879
see uh is generational and concerning 

1513
01:05:16,889 --> 01:05:19,000
in terms of the activity in the build 

1514
01:05:19,000 --> 01:05:21,729
up of the PR C . We talked about this a 

1515
01:05:21,739 --> 01:05:23,479
little bit last week on the um 

1516
01:05:23,489 --> 01:05:25,770
recapitalization of the C one thirties . 

1517
01:05:25,780 --> 01:05:27,836
I think the Air Force has done about 

1518
01:05:27,836 --> 01:05:31,139
50% National Guard has done about 35% 

1519
01:05:31,149 --> 01:05:33,371
marines are 100 . Uh but the Navy is at 

1520
01:05:33,379 --> 01:05:35,101
zero . Does that concern you ? 

1521
01:05:37,439 --> 01:05:39,161
Yes , sir . We , our logistics 

1522
01:05:39,161 --> 01:05:41,272
enterprise is built on the principles 

1523
01:05:41,272 --> 01:05:43,939
of efficiency over , you know , over 

1524
01:05:43,949 --> 01:05:46,239
the , over a time when we were focused 

1525
01:05:46,250 --> 01:05:48,620
on regional conflicts now under the 

1526
01:05:48,629 --> 01:05:51,189
contestation that we see from actors , 

1527
01:05:51,419 --> 01:05:54,280
um we've got to build a logistics 

1528
01:05:54,290 --> 01:05:56,012
enterprise that's based on the 

1529
01:05:56,012 --> 01:05:58,290
principles of effectiveness under fire . 

1530
01:05:58,820 --> 01:06:00,709
Can you tell me the importance of 

1531
01:06:00,709 --> 01:06:02,653
having a defense alliance with the 

1532
01:06:02,653 --> 01:06:06,179
Philippines ? Uh It is one of our 

1533
01:06:06,189 --> 01:06:09,600
oldest alliances . It's based on close 

1534
01:06:09,610 --> 01:06:12,860
people to people ties . It is key 

1535
01:06:12,870 --> 01:06:15,889
geography within the Western Pacific 

1536
01:06:16,110 --> 01:06:18,929
and uh and uh our 

1537
01:06:18,939 --> 01:06:22,679
continued commitment to our defense 

1538
01:06:22,689 --> 01:06:25,050
alliance with the Philippines has the 

1539
01:06:25,060 --> 01:06:27,659
same effect as our alliances and our 

1540
01:06:27,669 --> 01:06:29,613
security guarantees throughout the 

1541
01:06:29,620 --> 01:06:32,100
Western Pacific that . But uh the , the 

1542
01:06:32,110 --> 01:06:33,979
people to people ties are very 

1543
01:06:33,989 --> 01:06:36,100
important to us . The values ties are 

1544
01:06:36,100 --> 01:06:38,100
important to us and the geography . 

1545
01:06:38,270 --> 01:06:40,649
Thank you , Emma . Thank you , Senator 

1546
01:06:40,659 --> 01:06:42,770
Scott , Senator King , please . Thank 

1547
01:06:42,770 --> 01:06:44,548
you , Mr Chair , Admiral PPAR . 

1548
01:06:44,548 --> 01:06:46,659
Congratulations . I enjoyed our visit 

1549
01:06:46,659 --> 01:06:48,548
the other day . Um The chairman's 

1550
01:06:48,548 --> 01:06:50,860
opening comments referred to AC CP 

1551
01:06:50,870 --> 01:06:54,270
strategy drawn from uh Chinese military 

1552
01:06:54,280 --> 01:06:57,300
tradition of uh to win without fighting . 

1553
01:06:57,679 --> 01:07:01,270
Um And he referred to the danger of , 

1554
01:07:01,280 --> 01:07:03,280
of losing without fighting . Uh I'm 

1555
01:07:03,280 --> 01:07:05,502
also worried about the danger of losing 

1556
01:07:05,502 --> 01:07:07,613
while fighting . I think our fighting 

1557
01:07:07,613 --> 01:07:10,409
forces uh second to none and yet you 

1558
01:07:10,419 --> 01:07:12,475
can lose while fighting if you fight 

1559
01:07:12,475 --> 01:07:14,689
the wrong war and if you allow wrong 

1560
01:07:14,699 --> 01:07:17,260
wars to di direct resources and 

1561
01:07:17,270 --> 01:07:19,492
attention away from the most critical , 

1562
01:07:19,679 --> 01:07:22,540
I'm very , very concerned about the 

1563
01:07:22,550 --> 01:07:24,883
escalation of the Middle East right now . 

1564
01:07:24,883 --> 01:07:27,489
Um I think we need to provide support 

1565
01:07:27,500 --> 01:07:30,060
for allies . Certainly , I think 

1566
01:07:30,070 --> 01:07:32,699
alliances are strong but the US being 

1567
01:07:32,709 --> 01:07:34,931
involved in an escalating war without a 

1568
01:07:34,931 --> 01:07:37,360
congressional dialogue for the American 

1569
01:07:37,370 --> 01:07:40,169
public about whether that would be wise 

1570
01:07:40,189 --> 01:07:43,209
is really troubling me . The US is 

1571
01:07:43,219 --> 01:07:45,386
protecting global shipping through the 

1572
01:07:45,386 --> 01:07:47,608
Red Sea only the UK is joining with the 

1573
01:07:47,608 --> 01:07:49,830
US and our military efforts against the 

1574
01:07:49,830 --> 01:07:51,997
Houthis . The transit of ships through 

1575
01:07:51,997 --> 01:07:54,219
the Red Sea is global . Uh There aren't 

1576
01:07:54,219 --> 01:07:56,386
a lot of us flag ships that go through 

1577
01:07:56,386 --> 01:07:58,330
the Red Sea and so protecting us , 

1578
01:07:58,330 --> 01:08:00,449
ships , us , flag ships , us military 

1579
01:08:00,649 --> 01:08:02,593
assets , of course is something we 

1580
01:08:02,593 --> 01:08:05,030
should do . But when we take on the , 

1581
01:08:05,040 --> 01:08:07,750
the global burden of protecting others 

1582
01:08:07,929 --> 01:08:10,096
and they are not participating in it , 

1583
01:08:10,096 --> 01:08:12,207
that's the kind of thing that diverts 

1584
01:08:12,207 --> 01:08:14,373
attention and resources away . Uh from 

1585
01:08:14,373 --> 01:08:16,373
what I believe our most significant 

1586
01:08:16,373 --> 01:08:18,589
challenges should be that should be 

1587
01:08:18,600 --> 01:08:20,711
directing our efforts going forward . 

1588
01:08:21,009 --> 01:08:23,229
Uh Let me move now to some questions . 

1589
01:08:23,560 --> 01:08:25,549
Um Your next position involves 

1590
01:08:25,560 --> 01:08:28,009
commanding personnel for multiple 

1591
01:08:28,020 --> 01:08:30,187
services to maintain the free and open 

1592
01:08:30,187 --> 01:08:32,459
Indo Pacific . You've just commanded 

1593
01:08:32,470 --> 01:08:35,350
the naval component of Indo Paycom . So 

1594
01:08:35,669 --> 01:08:38,160
brag about the service members dod 

1595
01:08:38,169 --> 01:08:40,225
civilians and their families and the 

1596
01:08:40,225 --> 01:08:42,113
value that they bring to the Indo 

1597
01:08:42,113 --> 01:08:45,988
Pacific region . I Yeah . And um for 

1598
01:08:45,999 --> 01:08:48,166
all members of the committee , I would 

1599
01:08:48,166 --> 01:08:52,019
welcome you to join us on a ship visit 

1600
01:08:52,389 --> 01:08:54,738
and to see what you can see in the 

1601
01:08:54,749 --> 01:08:56,916
young people's eyes that stare back at 

1602
01:08:56,916 --> 01:09:00,298
you and the commitment and at fleet and 

1603
01:09:00,309 --> 01:09:02,142
family service centers and child 

1604
01:09:02,142 --> 01:09:04,142
development centers just to see the 

1605
01:09:04,142 --> 01:09:06,619
dedication of our service members and 

1606
01:09:06,628 --> 01:09:09,599
the dedication of their families and uh 

1607
01:09:09,608 --> 01:09:12,458
what they do within their families uh 

1608
01:09:12,469 --> 01:09:15,200
in order to bring their licensure to 

1609
01:09:15,209 --> 01:09:17,060
places and to find meaningful 

1610
01:09:17,069 --> 01:09:19,799
employment for working families . But 

1611
01:09:19,810 --> 01:09:22,169
um for all the discussions about the , 

1612
01:09:22,180 --> 01:09:25,240
the joint force um that your brain 

1613
01:09:25,250 --> 01:09:28,000
chemistry is instantly transformed when 

1614
01:09:28,009 --> 01:09:31,450
you see the intellect , the dedication , 

1615
01:09:31,459 --> 01:09:34,089
the esprit de corps , the cohesiveness 

1616
01:09:34,250 --> 01:09:36,729
of the joint force . And so , um it's 

1617
01:09:36,740 --> 01:09:39,100
just such , it's a and , and uh it's 

1618
01:09:39,109 --> 01:09:41,053
great . It's just great to get out 

1619
01:09:41,053 --> 01:09:43,276
there and to visit with the fleet uh to 

1620
01:09:43,276 --> 01:09:45,359
hear their concerns and always their 

1621
01:09:45,370 --> 01:09:48,209
concerns are not . Can I have this or 

1622
01:09:48,220 --> 01:09:50,660
can I have that ? But it is how can we 

1623
01:09:50,669 --> 01:09:52,669
do our job better ? It's absolutely 

1624
01:09:52,669 --> 01:09:54,725
inspiring . Thank you , Admiral . Um 

1625
01:09:54,725 --> 01:09:56,725
Senator Shaheen asked you questions 

1626
01:09:56,725 --> 01:09:58,947
about August . I'm very focused on that 

1627
01:09:58,947 --> 01:10:01,058
as well . A lot of the work on pillar 

1628
01:10:01,058 --> 01:10:03,058
one with respect to submarines will 

1629
01:10:03,058 --> 01:10:05,280
happen in Virginia . Um And she already 

1630
01:10:05,280 --> 01:10:07,447
asked you a little bit about that . Uh 

1631
01:10:07,447 --> 01:10:09,613
Let me ask about pillar two . A lot of 

1632
01:10:09,613 --> 01:10:11,780
the discussion has been about prepping 

1633
01:10:11,780 --> 01:10:14,002
for the pillar one submarine industrial 

1634
01:10:14,002 --> 01:10:15,947
base and working with Australia on 

1635
01:10:15,947 --> 01:10:18,002
first Virginia class subs . But then 

1636
01:10:18,002 --> 01:10:20,225
their development of an own , their own 

1637
01:10:20,225 --> 01:10:22,391
industrial capacity to produce nuclear 

1638
01:10:22,391 --> 01:10:24,391
submarines . Talk about the kind of 

1639
01:10:24,391 --> 01:10:26,447
more open ended but equally exciting 

1640
01:10:26,447 --> 01:10:28,613
pillar two capabilities in this uh AUS 

1641
01:10:28,740 --> 01:10:31,830
framework . Very exciting cyber 

1642
01:10:31,839 --> 01:10:35,770
unmanned seabed warfare among them , uh 

1643
01:10:35,779 --> 01:10:38,870
unmanned capabilities . A I um all of 

1644
01:10:38,879 --> 01:10:42,089
these are have important , important , 

1645
01:10:42,100 --> 01:10:45,310
key leverage , making effects on the 

1646
01:10:45,319 --> 01:10:47,319
ability of the joint and the allied 

1647
01:10:47,319 --> 01:10:50,790
force to fight . Uh just in November . 

1648
01:10:50,799 --> 01:10:53,810
I was in Sydney Harbor where US Pacific 

1649
01:10:53,819 --> 01:10:55,708
fleet conducted integrated battle 

1650
01:10:55,708 --> 01:10:59,649
problem 23.1 uh where sailors , 

1651
01:10:59,660 --> 01:11:01,930
marines , airmen , soldiers from the 

1652
01:11:01,939 --> 01:11:04,970
United Kingdom , from Australia and 

1653
01:11:04,979 --> 01:11:07,259
from uh and from the uh from Indo 

1654
01:11:07,270 --> 01:11:10,450
paycom , all assembled uh to begin the 

1655
01:11:10,459 --> 01:11:12,779
real work of sharing technology of 

1656
01:11:12,790 --> 01:11:15,129
sharing information of combining the 

1657
01:11:15,140 --> 01:11:18,819
talent to achieve those key 21st 

1658
01:11:18,830 --> 01:11:22,660
century advantages that will augment uh 

1659
01:11:22,669 --> 01:11:24,720
the asymmetric advantage of our 

1660
01:11:24,729 --> 01:11:27,529
submarine forces . Um exciting every 

1661
01:11:27,540 --> 01:11:29,709
bit as critical as pillar one . Let me 

1662
01:11:29,720 --> 01:11:31,831
ask one last question . You've talked 

1663
01:11:31,831 --> 01:11:33,998
about alliances . Aus the quad Senator 

1664
01:11:33,998 --> 01:11:36,164
Scott asked you about the improving us 

1665
01:11:36,164 --> 01:11:38,387
Philippines mill to mill relationship . 

1666
01:11:38,387 --> 01:11:40,609
What's the reaction in the Indo Pacific 

1667
01:11:40,609 --> 01:11:42,729
region to the US Japan Republic of 

1668
01:11:42,740 --> 01:11:45,149
Korea summit that was held in 2023 at 

1669
01:11:45,160 --> 01:11:48,979
Camp David I think that at first , I 

1670
01:11:48,990 --> 01:11:51,950
applaud the courage of the leaders in 

1671
01:11:51,959 --> 01:11:55,029
the Pacific who came to that , that 

1672
01:11:55,040 --> 01:11:57,549
accord . And we have implemented it 

1673
01:11:57,810 --> 01:12:01,189
directly now in advance in uh 

1674
01:12:01,200 --> 01:12:04,470
of uh of North Korean threats . Uh 

1675
01:12:04,490 --> 01:12:07,589
frequently being postured in position 

1676
01:12:08,049 --> 01:12:10,160
uh to count to be able to be ready to 

1677
01:12:10,160 --> 01:12:13,040
defend . If instead of a test , it's an 

1678
01:12:13,049 --> 01:12:15,600
attack . We're seeing the fruits of it 

1679
01:12:15,790 --> 01:12:19,629
at the operational level already every 

1680
01:12:19,640 --> 01:12:22,660
day . It's historic and it's inspiring . 

1681
01:12:22,799 --> 01:12:24,799
Thank you very much . I yell back . 

1682
01:12:24,799 --> 01:12:26,632
Thank you , Senator Kin . I will 

1683
01:12:26,632 --> 01:12:28,688
recognize Senator Tuberville , but I 

1684
01:12:28,688 --> 01:12:30,521
will also uh ask Senator King to 

1685
01:12:30,521 --> 01:12:32,243
preside as I go to the banking 

1686
01:12:32,243 --> 01:12:34,188
committee . Uh Thank you , Admiral 

1687
01:12:34,188 --> 01:12:36,521
Senator Tuberville , please . Thank you , 

1688
01:12:36,521 --> 01:12:36,220
Mr Chairman . Thank you , Admiral for 

1689
01:12:36,229 --> 01:12:38,229
being here . Congratulations . Good 

1690
01:12:38,229 --> 01:12:41,919
visit yesterday . 375,000 military and 

1691
01:12:41,930 --> 01:12:44,379
civilian personnel . That's a huge , 

1692
01:12:44,580 --> 01:12:47,049
huge undertaking . Uh We're glad you're 

1693
01:12:47,060 --> 01:12:49,509
willing to take that on . Uh We talked 

1694
01:12:49,520 --> 01:12:53,330
about the uh KC 46 . Uh We 

1695
01:12:53,339 --> 01:12:57,120
have a uh I think about 10 or 12 1 

1696
01:12:57,129 --> 01:12:59,185
30 fives in my state of Birmingham . 

1697
01:12:59,185 --> 01:13:02,370
Looking forward to the KC 46 given with 

1698
01:13:02,379 --> 01:13:04,490
the issues and delays with delivering 

1699
01:13:04,490 --> 01:13:06,435
the 46 . What concerns do you have 

1700
01:13:06,435 --> 01:13:08,601
about the availability and the quality 

1701
01:13:08,601 --> 01:13:12,140
of these aircraft ? No concerns about 

1702
01:13:12,149 --> 01:13:15,910
the quality . Uh And uh uh uh I'm 

1703
01:13:15,919 --> 01:13:19,109
not yet in the duty position but uh uh 

1704
01:13:19,149 --> 01:13:21,609
for the airmen who maintain them , I 

1705
01:13:21,620 --> 01:13:24,160
have perfect faith that no aircraft is 

1706
01:13:24,169 --> 01:13:26,709
going to fly until it's ready to fly . 

1707
01:13:26,959 --> 01:13:29,350
Uh I do , I do have concerns if 

1708
01:13:29,359 --> 01:13:32,029
confirmed uh about the ability of the 

1709
01:13:32,040 --> 01:13:35,180
joint force to refuel what will be a 

1710
01:13:35,189 --> 01:13:38,740
dynamic force operating in the air from 

1711
01:13:38,750 --> 01:13:42,290
bases on land and at sea ? And we've 

1712
01:13:42,299 --> 01:13:44,810
got to have a consistent critical eye 

1713
01:13:44,819 --> 01:13:47,229
and if confirmed , I'll work with you 

1714
01:13:47,240 --> 01:13:49,351
and with the members of the committee 

1715
01:13:49,351 --> 01:13:51,518
to be clear about the requirements are 

1716
01:13:51,518 --> 01:13:53,573
and we can close those gaps . Do you 

1717
01:13:53,573 --> 01:13:55,684
think the 46 has the range that we're 

1718
01:13:55,684 --> 01:13:57,907
gonna need in the Indo Pacific with all 

1719
01:13:57,907 --> 01:14:01,140
refueling aircraft , uh air tankers can 

1720
01:14:01,149 --> 01:14:04,740
bucket brigade themselves . Um II I , 

1721
01:14:04,750 --> 01:14:07,819
I'm not , I'm not savvy on the , on the 

1722
01:14:07,830 --> 01:14:09,997
precise range and it's always a choice 

1723
01:14:09,997 --> 01:14:12,470
between how much gas it takes to get to 

1724
01:14:12,479 --> 01:14:14,535
the point where you're refueling and 

1725
01:14:14,535 --> 01:14:17,200
how much give there is uh at that point . 

1726
01:14:17,379 --> 01:14:20,500
But uh I am concerned about uh about 

1727
01:14:20,509 --> 01:14:22,689
the joint forces ability to refuel a 

1728
01:14:22,700 --> 01:14:25,470
dynamic force operating in the air . We 

1729
01:14:25,479 --> 01:14:27,701
talked with switch gears a little bit , 

1730
01:14:27,701 --> 01:14:29,535
we talked a little bit about the 

1731
01:14:29,535 --> 01:14:31,590
Philippines . Uh What's your biggest 

1732
01:14:31,590 --> 01:14:31,549
concerns at the moment there ? What do 

1733
01:14:31,560 --> 01:14:33,890
we need to do more or less for the 

1734
01:14:33,899 --> 01:14:36,910
Philippines ? Philippines are under 

1735
01:14:36,919 --> 01:14:40,109
intense pressure with uh uh aggression 

1736
01:14:40,259 --> 01:14:42,950
against uh their lawful sovereign 

1737
01:14:42,959 --> 01:14:46,790
rights and their eez . Uh And uh 

1738
01:14:46,890 --> 01:14:49,669
because the Philippines are a sovereign 

1739
01:14:49,680 --> 01:14:53,149
partner , our uh our charge 

1740
01:14:53,279 --> 01:14:56,410
is to be ready to come to their aid as 

1741
01:14:56,419 --> 01:14:59,089
they desire as they navigate that 

1742
01:14:59,100 --> 01:15:01,509
problem along with us , for them to 

1743
01:15:01,520 --> 01:15:04,700
know that we have their back uh at all 

1744
01:15:04,709 --> 01:15:06,820
times . And we've got capability that 

1745
01:15:06,820 --> 01:15:09,189
is ready to assist them in their 

1746
01:15:09,200 --> 01:15:11,569
defense of their lawful claims and 

1747
01:15:11,580 --> 01:15:13,870
they're not claims their rights and 

1748
01:15:13,879 --> 01:15:17,020
they are settled in law . How is the uh 

1749
01:15:18,029 --> 01:15:21,509
uh us Vietnam Security 

1750
01:15:21,520 --> 01:15:24,750
Corporation regarding what's happened 

1751
01:15:24,759 --> 01:15:26,870
in the South China Sea ? How has that 

1752
01:15:26,870 --> 01:15:30,200
changed in your eyes ? We applaud the 

1753
01:15:30,209 --> 01:15:32,640
uh the essential double elevation to 

1754
01:15:32,649 --> 01:15:34,649
strategic comprehensive partnership 

1755
01:15:34,649 --> 01:15:37,600
with , with , with Vietnam . Uh the the 

1756
01:15:37,609 --> 01:15:39,700
main areas for our cooper operation 

1757
01:15:39,709 --> 01:15:42,279
presently right now are in the manner 

1758
01:15:42,290 --> 01:15:45,680
of medical and uh unexploded ordinance 

1759
01:15:45,689 --> 01:15:49,040
removal and medical training . We stand 

1760
01:15:49,049 --> 01:15:51,649
ready to partner with them more deeply 

1761
01:15:51,660 --> 01:15:54,759
as they uh and we're ready to partner 

1762
01:15:54,770 --> 01:15:57,479
with Vietnam as deeply as , as they 

1763
01:15:57,490 --> 01:16:01,020
want . I remember asking uh Admiral 

1764
01:16:01,049 --> 01:16:03,105
Aquilina when he took over , getting 

1765
01:16:03,105 --> 01:16:05,216
ready to take over uh what his number 

1766
01:16:05,220 --> 01:16:08,040
one want and need was for the Indo 

1767
01:16:08,120 --> 01:16:10,231
Pacific . And he said an aegis system 

1768
01:16:10,231 --> 01:16:13,520
at Guam . Do you have any thoughts ? A 

1769
01:16:13,640 --> 01:16:17,379
multi layered , effective , capable , 

1770
01:16:18,069 --> 01:16:20,609
integrated air and missile defense 

1771
01:16:20,620 --> 01:16:24,500
system uh from the surface of the ski 

1772
01:16:24,509 --> 01:16:27,330
sea to the heavens to defend the 

1773
01:16:27,339 --> 01:16:30,970
170,000 Americans in Guam , the 

1774
01:16:30,979 --> 01:16:32,923
American homeland . It would be my 

1775
01:16:32,930 --> 01:16:35,620
number one priority if confirmed , you 

1776
01:16:35,629 --> 01:16:37,629
know , being the PAC commander . Uh 

1777
01:16:37,850 --> 01:16:39,961
what was your thoughts ? And when did 

1778
01:16:39,961 --> 01:16:42,350
you first find out about the balloon 

1779
01:16:42,359 --> 01:16:45,529
that came from uh China uh I guess 

1780
01:16:45,540 --> 01:16:48,560
about a year ago um 

1781
01:16:48,660 --> 01:16:52,080
represents um aggression . It was 

1782
01:16:52,089 --> 01:16:55,209
brazen . Uh it was 

1783
01:16:55,490 --> 01:16:58,509
collecting information to give the PR C 

1784
01:16:58,520 --> 01:17:00,970
an advantage . It violated the 

1785
01:17:00,979 --> 01:17:03,229
sovereignty of the United States . It 

1786
01:17:03,240 --> 01:17:05,296
was deeply concerning . When did you 

1787
01:17:05,296 --> 01:17:07,462
first find out about where was it at ? 

1788
01:17:07,462 --> 01:17:09,684
Where was it located ? When they , when 

1789
01:17:09,684 --> 01:17:09,200
you got the call ? Hey , we got a 

1790
01:17:09,209 --> 01:17:12,870
balloon flying over . I was 

1791
01:17:12,879 --> 01:17:15,129
the Pacific Fleet commander and 

1792
01:17:15,140 --> 01:17:17,649
accordingly was not in the air defense 

1793
01:17:17,660 --> 01:17:19,810
business and it was over the 

1794
01:17:19,819 --> 01:17:21,986
continental United States when it came 

1795
01:17:21,986 --> 01:17:23,986
to light . And that was a different 

1796
01:17:23,986 --> 01:17:25,986
area of responsibility , the United 

1797
01:17:25,986 --> 01:17:28,152
States . When you found out not in the 

1798
01:17:28,152 --> 01:17:31,439
Pacific , I , I did not have a close 

1799
01:17:31,450 --> 01:17:34,839
view of the balloons trajectory . Thank 

1800
01:17:34,970 --> 01:17:38,859
you a on 

1801
01:17:38,870 --> 01:17:41,148
behalf of the chairman , Senator Kelly . 

1802
01:17:41,148 --> 01:17:43,649
Thank you , Mr Chairman and uh admiral . 

1803
01:17:43,660 --> 01:17:46,229
Good to see you again . Uh My uh 

1804
01:17:46,240 --> 01:17:50,160
brother Scott and your training command 

1805
01:17:50,169 --> 01:17:52,740
classmates since his regards . Um 

1806
01:17:53,270 --> 01:17:56,009
Admiral uh being the only US merchant 

1807
01:17:56,020 --> 01:17:58,379
marine academy graduate uh in the 

1808
01:17:58,390 --> 01:18:01,419
Congress , I play pay close attention 

1809
01:18:01,430 --> 01:18:04,859
to our maritime strength . China 

1810
01:18:05,140 --> 01:18:08,810
is the world's largest shipbuilder and 

1811
01:18:08,819 --> 01:18:10,986
controls most of the merchant ships in 

1812
01:18:10,986 --> 01:18:14,379
the world with over 5500 

1813
01:18:14,390 --> 01:18:17,140
vessels in the United States flying 

1814
01:18:17,149 --> 01:18:19,930
under the American flag . Uh We have 

1815
01:18:19,939 --> 01:18:23,330
about 80 ocean going merchant ships 

1816
01:18:23,779 --> 01:18:27,580
and I'm concerned about the size 

1817
01:18:27,689 --> 01:18:29,939
and the capacity of our US merchant 

1818
01:18:29,950 --> 01:18:33,509
fleet . And how this is a risk 

1819
01:18:33,520 --> 01:18:36,609
to our national security . Uh Admiral 

1820
01:18:36,620 --> 01:18:38,453
as you know , an in insufficient 

1821
01:18:38,453 --> 01:18:41,359
commercial maritime capacity impacts 

1822
01:18:41,370 --> 01:18:45,279
peacetime trade and supply chains . But 

1823
01:18:45,290 --> 01:18:47,401
the more important part of this is it 

1824
01:18:47,401 --> 01:18:49,779
will hamper our ability to supply our 

1825
01:18:49,790 --> 01:18:53,120
own troops in a conflict . And this is 

1826
01:18:53,439 --> 01:18:56,100
a capability that we can just turn on 

1827
01:18:56,109 --> 01:18:58,220
overnight with a switch . I mean , we 

1828
01:18:58,220 --> 01:19:01,609
need investments now to be ready for 

1829
01:19:01,620 --> 01:19:03,959
tomorrow . So admiral , how do you 

1830
01:19:03,970 --> 01:19:06,879
assess the challenge of China's 

1831
01:19:06,890 --> 01:19:10,520
numerical advantage uh 

1832
01:19:11,759 --> 01:19:15,419
in a conflict ? Uh in the Indo 

1833
01:19:15,529 --> 01:19:19,509
Pacific Senator . Uh I 

1834
01:19:19,520 --> 01:19:21,979
believe that the current size and scope 

1835
01:19:21,990 --> 01:19:24,700
of the US merchant fleet um is a 

1836
01:19:24,709 --> 01:19:27,540
vulnerability uh as discussed earlier . 

1837
01:19:27,549 --> 01:19:29,740
I believe that uh we have a force 

1838
01:19:29,750 --> 01:19:33,049
that's sized for efficiency but uh has 

1839
01:19:33,060 --> 01:19:35,171
not been examined from the standpoint 

1840
01:19:35,171 --> 01:19:38,439
of effectiveness under fire . And is 

1841
01:19:38,450 --> 01:19:42,240
that uh affect how you plan for 

1842
01:19:42,250 --> 01:19:44,361
operations today ? And how do you how 

1843
01:19:44,361 --> 01:19:46,970
you project power across the Pacific 

1844
01:19:46,979 --> 01:19:50,729
Ocean ? It does , it 

1845
01:19:50,740 --> 01:19:53,370
does in fact , and it is a limitation 

1846
01:19:53,589 --> 01:19:55,649
for how forward we could put combat 

1847
01:19:55,660 --> 01:19:57,890
capability and sustain combat 

1848
01:19:57,899 --> 01:20:00,450
capability that was in maritime terrain 

1849
01:20:01,109 --> 01:20:04,930
and as the future Indo Paycom commander . 

1850
01:20:05,640 --> 01:20:08,020
Um how do you plan to address this 

1851
01:20:08,029 --> 01:20:09,362
maritime capacity issue 

1852
01:20:12,290 --> 01:20:14,457
in close partnership with my fellow uh 

1853
01:20:14,457 --> 01:20:17,520
COCOM uh if confirmed uh us trans 

1854
01:20:17,609 --> 01:20:20,790
Transportation Command um identify 

1855
01:20:20,799 --> 01:20:24,509
those shortfalls uh along with my , 

1856
01:20:24,520 --> 01:20:26,742
with my through the integrated priority 

1857
01:20:26,742 --> 01:20:29,770
lists of our components , not just sea 

1858
01:20:29,779 --> 01:20:33,589
lift and airlift and then uh a as 

1859
01:20:33,600 --> 01:20:36,410
necessary um communicate as required by 

1860
01:20:36,419 --> 01:20:39,390
law . So in recent years , Congress has 

1861
01:20:39,399 --> 01:20:42,390
focused on rebuilding domestic 

1862
01:20:42,399 --> 01:20:44,779
industries like uh you know , critical 

1863
01:20:44,790 --> 01:20:46,623
minerals , microelectronics . Uh 

1864
01:20:46,623 --> 01:20:48,790
manufacturing is semiconductor chips . 

1865
01:20:48,790 --> 01:20:51,240
It's been a big focus of , of the uh of 

1866
01:20:51,250 --> 01:20:53,759
the Congress and we've made , you know , 

1867
01:20:53,770 --> 01:20:55,881
some great progress there . We've got 

1868
01:20:55,881 --> 01:20:58,229
more to do . Uh and this , you know , 

1869
01:20:58,240 --> 01:21:00,018
certainly supports our national 

1870
01:21:00,018 --> 01:21:02,184
security needs , but also our domestic 

1871
01:21:02,184 --> 01:21:04,919
economic security . Would you agree 

1872
01:21:04,930 --> 01:21:08,009
that there could be national security 

1873
01:21:08,020 --> 01:21:10,720
benefits to a similar kind of focus on 

1874
01:21:10,729 --> 01:21:12,507
the maritime industry ? I would 

1875
01:21:12,507 --> 01:21:15,000
strongly agree . Thank you , Admiral 

1876
01:21:15,290 --> 01:21:18,370
and admirals , you know , logistics uh 

1877
01:21:18,379 --> 01:21:20,323
will be , you know , it's gonna be 

1878
01:21:20,323 --> 01:21:22,323
critical to , you know , any future 

1879
01:21:22,323 --> 01:21:26,089
conflict . And uh um what else 

1880
01:21:26,100 --> 01:21:29,609
besides , you know , a focus like we're 

1881
01:21:29,620 --> 01:21:31,842
doing with microelectronics , what else 

1882
01:21:31,842 --> 01:21:33,564
do you think we could do to be 

1883
01:21:33,564 --> 01:21:36,200
addressing this strategic vulnerability 

1884
01:21:36,209 --> 01:21:39,419
now , with the force we currently have 

1885
01:21:39,430 --> 01:21:42,799
today ? Uh I 

1886
01:21:42,810 --> 01:21:45,009
think there are a number of uh of 

1887
01:21:45,020 --> 01:21:47,131
initiatives such as the Department of 

1888
01:21:47,131 --> 01:21:49,870
Defense's replicator initiative that uh 

1889
01:21:49,879 --> 01:21:53,169
seeks to gain scale with innovative 

1890
01:21:53,180 --> 01:21:56,479
practices and by and by uh 

1891
01:21:56,680 --> 01:21:59,689
um closing on design and invoking small 

1892
01:21:59,700 --> 01:22:01,660
business in increasing the defense 

1893
01:22:01,669 --> 01:22:04,640
industrial . Um I think another key 

1894
01:22:04,649 --> 01:22:08,209
point is uh to understand the opacity 

1895
01:22:08,220 --> 01:22:11,089
of the uh financial community and the 

1896
01:22:11,100 --> 01:22:13,669
extent to which investments in the PR C 

1897
01:22:13,680 --> 01:22:15,779
through their civil military fusion 

1898
01:22:16,020 --> 01:22:18,490
directly could confer to weapons 

1899
01:22:18,500 --> 01:22:20,899
building that could affect and uh could 

1900
01:22:20,910 --> 01:22:22,910
harm Americans on the battlefield . 

1901
01:22:22,910 --> 01:22:25,132
Well , Admiral , thank you . And I look 

1902
01:22:25,132 --> 01:22:27,243
forward to working with you on trying 

1903
01:22:27,243 --> 01:22:29,243
to solve this problem . It'll , you 

1904
01:22:29,243 --> 01:22:28,750
know , clearly , if we can , if we can 

1905
01:22:28,759 --> 01:22:30,970
make some progress here , it'll be in 

1906
01:22:30,979 --> 01:22:32,812
furtherance of , uh , you know , 

1907
01:22:32,812 --> 01:22:35,035
stronger , you know , operations in the 

1908
01:22:35,035 --> 01:22:37,146
Pacific and the ability to sustain if 

1909
01:22:37,146 --> 01:22:39,201
we ever do , you know , wind up in a 

1910
01:22:39,201 --> 01:22:42,120
conflict . Thank you on behalf of the 

1911
01:22:42,129 --> 01:22:44,270
chairman , Senator Cotton Admiral . 

1912
01:22:44,279 --> 01:22:46,446
Congratulations on your nomination and 

1913
01:22:46,446 --> 01:22:48,612
thanks for your service . Uh There was 

1914
01:22:48,612 --> 01:22:50,612
a report in Bloomberg last month uh 

1915
01:22:50,612 --> 01:22:52,779
leaked from uh intelligence assessment 

1916
01:22:52,779 --> 01:22:54,668
saying that Xi Jinping had purged 

1917
01:22:54,668 --> 01:22:56,939
numerous of his military commanders 

1918
01:22:56,950 --> 01:22:59,006
especially and his rocket forces for 

1919
01:22:59,006 --> 01:23:01,609
corruption . It further said uh that 

1920
01:23:01,620 --> 01:23:04,270
American officials had concluded that 

1921
01:23:04,279 --> 01:23:07,390
uh Xi was so doubtful about uh the 

1922
01:23:07,399 --> 01:23:09,790
capabilities of the PL A to execute an 

1923
01:23:09,799 --> 01:23:11,799
operation against Taiwan given this 

1924
01:23:11,799 --> 01:23:14,021
corruption . But now that operation was 

1925
01:23:14,021 --> 01:23:16,649
less likely to happen um without 

1926
01:23:16,660 --> 01:23:18,750
commenting on the veracity of the 

1927
01:23:18,759 --> 01:23:20,870
intelligence report that was leaked . 

1928
01:23:20,870 --> 01:23:22,939
Ca can you say does that corruption 

1929
01:23:22,950 --> 01:23:25,061
which I I think everyone would accept 

1930
01:23:25,061 --> 01:23:27,172
happens in the PL A and in China writ 

1931
01:23:27,172 --> 01:23:29,580
large um influence your thinking about 

1932
01:23:29,589 --> 01:23:31,311
what you need to deter Chinese 

1933
01:23:31,311 --> 01:23:33,870
aggression towards Taiwan . It does not , 

1934
01:23:33,879 --> 01:23:36,709
sir . And it must not . Uh I I've got 

1935
01:23:36,720 --> 01:23:39,540
to adjust to the capability that we see . 

1936
01:23:39,779 --> 01:23:43,410
I see more activity further a field , 

1937
01:23:43,419 --> 01:23:46,009
greater force assembling in objective 

1938
01:23:46,020 --> 01:23:48,529
areas . A shrinking of strategic and 

1939
01:23:48,540 --> 01:23:50,740
operational warnings and I must be 

1940
01:23:50,750 --> 01:23:53,290
focused on capability instead of 

1941
01:23:53,299 --> 01:23:55,410
intentions if confirmed . I , I think 

1942
01:23:55,410 --> 01:23:57,632
that's very important . I think part of 

1943
01:23:57,632 --> 01:23:59,855
our role , um when we read intelligence 

1944
01:23:59,855 --> 01:24:01,966
reports , whether we read them in the 

1945
01:24:01,966 --> 01:24:04,188
intelligence reports or in the media is 

1946
01:24:04,188 --> 01:24:05,910
to always express some healthy 

1947
01:24:05,910 --> 01:24:08,077
skepticism . Um as Churchill said , uh 

1948
01:24:08,077 --> 01:24:10,243
about civil military relations , it is 

1949
01:24:10,243 --> 01:24:12,410
always right to probe . I think that's 

1950
01:24:12,410 --> 01:24:14,021
especially true whenever the 

1951
01:24:14,021 --> 01:24:16,077
conclusions and intelligence reports 

1952
01:24:16,077 --> 01:24:18,132
are comforting or reassuring what we 

1953
01:24:18,132 --> 01:24:20,180
would like to believe and and maybe 

1954
01:24:20,189 --> 01:24:22,078
most true when those comforting , 

1955
01:24:22,078 --> 01:24:24,245
reassuring conclusions are then leaked 

1956
01:24:24,245 --> 01:24:26,270
to the media , um you mentioned 

1957
01:24:26,279 --> 01:24:29,060
capabilities . Um We've spoken in the 

1958
01:24:29,069 --> 01:24:32,089
past about the very challenging 

1959
01:24:32,430 --> 01:24:34,890
strategic and tactical situation you 

1960
01:24:34,899 --> 01:24:36,788
would encounter in a fight in the 

1961
01:24:36,788 --> 01:24:38,677
Pacific ranging from logistics to 

1962
01:24:38,677 --> 01:24:40,455
intelligence , surveillance and 

1963
01:24:40,455 --> 01:24:42,299
reconnaissance . Uh What us 

1964
01:24:42,310 --> 01:24:45,080
capabilities gap gaps currently exist 

1965
01:24:45,089 --> 01:24:47,640
in your theater and what capabilities 

1966
01:24:47,649 --> 01:24:49,649
will you prioritize most highly ? 

1967
01:24:51,339 --> 01:24:55,000
The um Raisin posture that I spoke of 

1968
01:24:55,009 --> 01:24:58,759
with ? The Pr C increasingly requires 

1969
01:24:58,770 --> 01:25:02,620
persistent stare . Uh And ISR 

1970
01:25:02,629 --> 01:25:06,470
is uh inherently due to the ephemera of 

1971
01:25:06,479 --> 01:25:09,990
the capability blinking , the closer we 

1972
01:25:10,000 --> 01:25:12,890
can come to a persistent stare from the 

1973
01:25:12,899 --> 01:25:15,430
sea bed to the surface of the sea , 

1974
01:25:15,439 --> 01:25:18,529
distributed throughout geography uh in 

1975
01:25:18,540 --> 01:25:20,899
the air and in the constellation , all 

1976
01:25:20,910 --> 01:25:24,490
of it , you must sum to a 

1977
01:25:24,500 --> 01:25:28,040
persistent stare of uh of Pr C 

1978
01:25:28,049 --> 01:25:30,830
forces in response to this shrinking 

1979
01:25:30,839 --> 01:25:33,129
strategic operational , tactical 

1980
01:25:33,140 --> 01:25:35,084
warning . And how about countering 

1981
01:25:35,084 --> 01:25:37,649
their ability to do so . It is uh 

1982
01:25:37,660 --> 01:25:40,529
counter what's called C five ISR 

1983
01:25:40,540 --> 01:25:42,373
Command control , intelligence , 

1984
01:25:42,373 --> 01:25:44,262
surveillance , reconnaissance and 

1985
01:25:44,262 --> 01:25:47,490
targeting um behind homeland defense uh 

1986
01:25:47,500 --> 01:25:50,020
is the number one priority for us . 

1987
01:25:50,029 --> 01:25:52,149
Indo paycom . It has been the number 

1988
01:25:52,160 --> 01:25:54,327
one priority that I've communicated to 

1989
01:25:54,327 --> 01:25:56,327
the chief of naval operations in my 

1990
01:25:56,327 --> 01:25:58,216
integrated priority list . And if 

1991
01:25:58,216 --> 01:26:00,890
confirmed , uh it is , it is the 

1992
01:26:00,899 --> 01:26:03,439
enabling capability to counter that , 

1993
01:26:03,540 --> 01:26:05,762
that will bring victory to the allies . 

1994
01:26:05,950 --> 01:26:09,939
Thank you , Admiral . On behalf of the 

1995
01:26:09,950 --> 01:26:11,930
chairman , Senator Warner Warren . 

1996
01:26:11,939 --> 01:26:15,109
Sorry . Thank you , Mr Chairman and 

1997
01:26:15,120 --> 01:26:17,680
congratulations Admiral Popara on your 

1998
01:26:17,689 --> 01:26:20,580
nomination . So if confirmed , you will 

1999
01:26:20,589 --> 01:26:23,290
oversee one of the most dangerous 

2000
01:26:23,299 --> 01:26:25,979
national security threats . North Korea 

2001
01:26:26,419 --> 01:26:29,100
reports indicate that North Korea has 

2002
01:26:29,109 --> 01:26:31,430
shifted to a more aggressive posture 

2003
01:26:31,439 --> 01:26:34,220
against American troops and allies in 

2004
01:26:34,229 --> 01:26:36,500
the region . And in just the last few 

2005
01:26:36,509 --> 01:26:38,459
months , the country has fired off 

2006
01:26:38,669 --> 01:26:41,459
hundreds of missiles as it has 

2007
01:26:41,470 --> 01:26:43,819
increased its military capabilities . 

2008
01:26:44,410 --> 01:26:47,049
North Korea is one of the most heavily 

2009
01:26:47,060 --> 01:26:50,779
sanctioned countries in the world . So 

2010
01:26:50,790 --> 01:26:53,870
one question is where the heck are they 

2011
01:26:53,879 --> 01:26:56,060
getting the money to test these new 

2012
01:26:56,069 --> 01:26:58,250
weapons ? You know , this is not free 

2013
01:26:58,500 --> 01:27:01,220
and one answer is Cryptocurrency . 

2014
01:27:01,660 --> 01:27:04,359
North Korea uses Cryptocurrency both to 

2015
01:27:04,370 --> 01:27:06,939
evade sanctions and to raise revenues 

2016
01:27:07,020 --> 01:27:09,410
from cyber hacks against banks to 

2017
01:27:09,419 --> 01:27:11,930
strikes on crypto exchanges to 

2018
01:27:11,939 --> 01:27:14,620
ransomware attacks against American 

2019
01:27:14,629 --> 01:27:17,930
businesses and hospitals . North Korea 

2020
01:27:17,959 --> 01:27:20,390
has been using crypto to generate 

2021
01:27:20,399 --> 01:27:23,529
revenue over the past five years . It 

2022
01:27:23,540 --> 01:27:27,319
has stolen at least $3.3 

2023
01:27:27,330 --> 01:27:29,830
billion worth of crypto and those 

2024
01:27:29,839 --> 01:27:32,649
dollars matter . Experts estimate that 

2025
01:27:32,660 --> 01:27:35,700
half its missile program is paid for 

2026
01:27:35,709 --> 01:27:38,109
through crypto crime . So Admiral 

2027
01:27:38,479 --> 01:27:41,370
Popara is North Korea's reliance on 

2028
01:27:41,379 --> 01:27:44,310
Cryptocurrency to evade sanctions and 

2029
01:27:44,319 --> 01:27:46,910
fund its illegal nuclear and missile 

2030
01:27:46,919 --> 01:27:49,669
programs , a threat to our national 

2031
01:27:49,680 --> 01:27:52,220
security and the security of our allies 

2032
01:27:52,229 --> 01:27:54,759
in the Indo Pacific . Yes . Senator 

2033
01:27:54,770 --> 01:27:57,439
most certainly . All righty . You are 

2034
01:27:57,450 --> 01:27:59,589
not the only one to recognize this 

2035
01:27:59,600 --> 01:28:01,899
threat . Your predecessors have been 

2036
01:28:01,910 --> 01:28:05,589
ringing the alarm for years . Uh Former 

2037
01:28:05,600 --> 01:28:07,589
Indo paycom commander , Admiral 

2038
01:28:07,600 --> 01:28:09,378
Davidson , who was appointed by 

2039
01:28:09,378 --> 01:28:11,700
President Trump warned his committee in 

2040
01:28:11,709 --> 01:28:14,680
2021 that North Korea's crypto crime 

2041
01:28:14,689 --> 01:28:18,129
allows it to quote , raise illicit 

2042
01:28:18,140 --> 01:28:20,229
revenue to support its weapons 

2043
01:28:20,240 --> 01:28:23,740
development program . To underscore the 

2044
01:28:23,750 --> 01:28:26,399
sheer scale of North Korea's reliance 

2045
01:28:26,410 --> 01:28:29,459
on crypto . Consider that nearly a 

2046
01:28:29,470 --> 01:28:33,060
third of all crypto stolen last year 

2047
01:28:33,180 --> 01:28:36,399
was stolen by North Korea and that its 

2048
01:28:36,410 --> 01:28:39,799
hacks are on average 10 

2049
01:28:39,810 --> 01:28:43,140
times more lucrative than those linked 

2050
01:28:43,149 --> 01:28:45,899
to other actors . You know , no one 

2051
01:28:45,910 --> 01:28:49,279
needs crypto more than Kim Jong Un . 

2052
01:28:50,020 --> 01:28:52,660
North Korea's success in evading 

2053
01:28:52,669 --> 01:28:54,558
sanctions and funding its weapons 

2054
01:28:54,558 --> 01:28:57,029
program with crypto also undermines our 

2055
01:28:57,040 --> 01:28:59,709
security elsewhere , North Korea is 

2056
01:28:59,720 --> 01:29:01,664
selling missiles and ammunition to 

2057
01:29:01,664 --> 01:29:03,930
Russia helping Russia evade sanctions 

2058
01:29:04,200 --> 01:29:06,422
so that it can continue its war against 

2059
01:29:06,422 --> 01:29:09,040
Ukraine . So let me ask you , Admiral 

2060
01:29:09,049 --> 01:29:11,959
Papa would cutting off North Korea's 

2061
01:29:11,970 --> 01:29:15,240
access to crypto and making it harder 

2062
01:29:15,250 --> 01:29:18,319
for other countries to evade sanctions , 

2063
01:29:18,330 --> 01:29:22,000
strengthen our global security . Yes , 

2064
01:29:22,009 --> 01:29:24,520
Senator directly would you like to say 

2065
01:29:24,529 --> 01:29:28,129
more about that uh Cryptocurrency 

2066
01:29:28,140 --> 01:29:32,080
inherently with its opaqueness uh is um 

2067
01:29:32,089 --> 01:29:35,040
is a key enabler worldwide for 

2068
01:29:35,049 --> 01:29:39,000
proliferation uh for terror for 

2069
01:29:39,009 --> 01:29:41,569
illicit trafficking , including illicit 

2070
01:29:41,580 --> 01:29:45,160
trafficking in drugs . While Blockchain 

2071
01:29:45,169 --> 01:29:48,140
methodologies are if uh have have 

2072
01:29:48,149 --> 01:29:50,149
promised for assurance of financial 

2073
01:29:50,149 --> 01:29:52,700
transactions , this particular use of 

2074
01:29:52,709 --> 01:29:55,399
it usage of crypto which is backed by 

2075
01:29:55,410 --> 01:29:59,399
nothing but emotion uh directly 

2076
01:29:59,410 --> 01:30:02,609
aids illicit trafficking , terror 

2077
01:30:03,029 --> 01:30:06,160
crime , uh human trafficking 

2078
01:30:06,350 --> 01:30:09,720
and uh and proliferation of weapons and 

2079
01:30:09,729 --> 01:30:12,500
makes the world less secure . Well , 

2080
01:30:12,509 --> 01:30:14,509
that's , that's pretty definitive . 

2081
01:30:14,509 --> 01:30:16,731
Admiral . Can I just ask you what is it 

2082
01:30:16,731 --> 01:30:18,453
that you think makes crypto so 

2083
01:30:18,453 --> 01:30:20,399
attractive to countries like North 

2084
01:30:20,410 --> 01:30:23,640
Korea and uh illicit arms dealers . 

2085
01:30:24,770 --> 01:30:28,069
People can make money outside the eyes 

2086
01:30:28,080 --> 01:30:30,669
of the law and it provides a moral 

2087
01:30:30,680 --> 01:30:33,319
hazard whereby people can do bad things 

2088
01:30:33,330 --> 01:30:35,552
without fear of punishment because it's 

2089
01:30:35,552 --> 01:30:37,497
opaque . All right . So you hit it 

2090
01:30:37,497 --> 01:30:39,608
right on the head outside the eyes of 

2091
01:30:39,608 --> 01:30:42,220
the law . In November . Treasury asked 

2092
01:30:42,229 --> 01:30:44,779
Congress to give it more tools to crack 

2093
01:30:44,790 --> 01:30:46,799
down on crypto crime and money 

2094
01:30:46,810 --> 01:30:49,419
laundering . 20 senators , Democrats 

2095
01:30:49,430 --> 01:30:51,430
and Republicans have put together a 

2096
01:30:51,430 --> 01:30:53,779
bill that delivers exactly what 

2097
01:30:53,790 --> 01:30:55,950
treasury called for . You know , it's 

2098
01:30:55,959 --> 01:30:58,430
not about who should regulate crypto to 

2099
01:30:58,439 --> 01:31:00,606
protect investors . It's about dealing 

2100
01:31:00,606 --> 01:31:02,970
with the most urgent crypto problem in 

2101
01:31:02,979 --> 01:31:05,470
front of us ensuring that countries 

2102
01:31:05,479 --> 01:31:08,470
like North Korea and terrorists , drug 

2103
01:31:08,479 --> 01:31:11,169
traffickers and other criminals can't 

2104
01:31:11,180 --> 01:31:13,540
use crypto to undermine America's 

2105
01:31:13,549 --> 01:31:15,438
security . I'm looking forward to 

2106
01:31:15,439 --> 01:31:17,161
working on that bill . With my 

2107
01:31:17,161 --> 01:31:19,050
colleagues and looking forward to 

2108
01:31:19,050 --> 01:31:21,328
working with you , Admiral . Thank you . 

2109
01:31:21,328 --> 01:31:23,495
Thank you very much , Senator Warren , 

2110
01:31:23,495 --> 01:31:25,661
Senator King , please . Thank you , Mr 

2111
01:31:25,661 --> 01:31:27,883
Chairman Admiral . Your testimony today 

2112
01:31:27,883 --> 01:31:29,606
has been extremely important , 

2113
01:31:29,606 --> 01:31:31,970
informative and important . And one of 

2114
01:31:31,979 --> 01:31:34,146
the aspects that was so important were 

2115
01:31:34,146 --> 01:31:36,257
your initial answers to the questions 

2116
01:31:36,257 --> 01:31:38,368
from the chair and the , and the vice 

2117
01:31:38,368 --> 01:31:41,080
chair in terms of the undermining of 

2118
01:31:41,089 --> 01:31:43,270
our deterrence in terms of the , the 

2119
01:31:43,279 --> 01:31:45,810
People's Republic of China by 

2120
01:31:45,819 --> 01:31:48,240
unilaterally abandoning Ukraine . Uh 

2121
01:31:48,250 --> 01:31:51,549
Just to confirm you view our 

2122
01:31:51,660 --> 01:31:54,819
leaving Ukraine to be a 

2123
01:31:54,830 --> 01:31:57,779
significant diminution of the deterrent 

2124
01:31:58,520 --> 01:32:00,520
that we're presenting to China . Is 

2125
01:32:00,520 --> 01:32:02,870
that correct ? Yes , sir . I think that 

2126
01:32:02,879 --> 01:32:04,879
is very important . Now , one other 

2127
01:32:04,879 --> 01:32:07,950
aspect of that is the effect of this , 

2128
01:32:07,959 --> 01:32:10,870
of leaving Ukraine unilaterally on our 

2129
01:32:10,879 --> 01:32:13,270
allies . How would Japan and South 

2130
01:32:13,279 --> 01:32:15,470
Korea react to that action ? 

2131
01:32:19,279 --> 01:32:21,990
All of our allies and partners are 

2132
01:32:22,000 --> 01:32:25,589
under pressure . They're under coercion 

2133
01:32:25,720 --> 01:32:27,830
from other a from actors such as the 

2134
01:32:27,839 --> 01:32:30,729
People's Republic of China . And uh 

2135
01:32:30,740 --> 01:32:33,740
frequently it's not just coercion in 

2136
01:32:33,750 --> 01:32:37,109
the military sphere but uh across all 

2137
01:32:37,120 --> 01:32:40,930
levers of state craft . And uh and 

2138
01:32:40,939 --> 01:32:43,729
they're staying with the alliance , 

2139
01:32:43,740 --> 01:32:47,129
they're enjoining their national power 

2140
01:32:47,140 --> 01:32:49,450
to the United States is directly 

2141
01:32:49,459 --> 01:32:52,229
related to their confidence in us 

2142
01:32:52,240 --> 01:32:55,770
partnership when it is so committed and 

2143
01:32:55,779 --> 01:32:58,729
accordingly , uh our US security 

2144
01:32:58,740 --> 01:33:01,740
partnerships worldwide have a direct 

2145
01:33:01,750 --> 01:33:04,799
impact on the cohesion of our alliances 

2146
01:33:04,810 --> 01:33:07,729
and partnerships and any effect on that 

2147
01:33:07,740 --> 01:33:09,518
imposes costs on the quality of 

2148
01:33:09,518 --> 01:33:11,399
deterrence . As our allies and 

2149
01:33:11,410 --> 01:33:13,430
partnerships are have our greatest 

2150
01:33:13,439 --> 01:33:15,620
leverage in deterrent . The important 

2151
01:33:15,629 --> 01:33:17,629
deterrence has probably been used . 

2152
01:33:17,629 --> 01:33:19,740
I've been counting . I think we're up 

2153
01:33:19,740 --> 01:33:21,740
to about 25 times in this hearing , 

2154
01:33:21,740 --> 01:33:23,851
deterrence is based upon two things , 

2155
01:33:23,851 --> 01:33:25,962
capacity and will . We can be usually 

2156
01:33:25,962 --> 01:33:28,540
we talk about weapons , but Ukraine is 

2157
01:33:28,549 --> 01:33:31,959
all about will we , we're , we can 

2158
01:33:31,970 --> 01:33:34,081
supply the capacity . The question is 

2159
01:33:34,081 --> 01:33:36,248
will . And as you point out , it would 

2160
01:33:36,248 --> 01:33:38,414
undermine the deterrence . Not only of 

2161
01:33:38,414 --> 01:33:40,526
the actions of China , perhaps toward 

2162
01:33:40,526 --> 01:33:42,748
Taiwan , it would certainly change Xi's 

2163
01:33:42,748 --> 01:33:44,914
calculus . Will the Americans actually 

2164
01:33:44,914 --> 01:33:47,081
be there , which would be an important 

2165
01:33:47,081 --> 01:33:49,040
part of his consideration but also 

2166
01:33:49,049 --> 01:33:51,271
undermine , as you say , the confidence 

2167
01:33:51,271 --> 01:33:54,879
of our allies . Short question , 

2168
01:33:55,209 --> 01:33:57,487
we've talked about the South China Sea . 

2169
01:33:57,487 --> 01:33:59,542
We've talked about dis disputes with 

2170
01:33:59,542 --> 01:34:01,542
China . Would it be in the national 

2171
01:34:01,542 --> 01:34:03,598
interest for this body to ratify the 

2172
01:34:03,598 --> 01:34:05,899
law of the sea treaty ? Yes , sir . 

2173
01:34:06,910 --> 01:34:08,970
You're , you're about the 20th flag 

2174
01:34:08,979 --> 01:34:11,090
officer has answered that question in 

2175
01:34:11,090 --> 01:34:13,146
exactly that way . I hope the Senate 

2176
01:34:13,146 --> 01:34:15,529
will start to listen uh to the to our 

2177
01:34:15,540 --> 01:34:17,762
people that are on the front lines that 

2178
01:34:17,762 --> 01:34:20,040
understand how important that would be . 

2179
01:34:20,040 --> 01:34:22,569
Uh One of the things that concerns me 

2180
01:34:22,580 --> 01:34:25,609
most urgently about the relationship 

2181
01:34:25,620 --> 01:34:27,676
with China in the South China Sea is 

2182
01:34:27,676 --> 01:34:29,620
the danger of miscalculation , the 

2183
01:34:29,620 --> 01:34:31,787
danger of mistake , the danger of , of 

2184
01:34:31,787 --> 01:34:34,890
some uh uh misunderstanding that would 

2185
01:34:34,899 --> 01:34:37,279
lead to an escalating conflict . Do you 

2186
01:34:37,290 --> 01:34:39,068
feel that we have sufficient uh 

2187
01:34:39,068 --> 01:34:41,600
military to military communications 

2188
01:34:41,819 --> 01:34:44,189
with uh the People's Republic of China 

2189
01:34:44,200 --> 01:34:47,759
in order to deconflict a potential uh a 

2190
01:34:47,770 --> 01:34:51,709
potential uh situation that should 

2191
01:34:51,720 --> 01:34:53,390
not be escalated but could be 

2192
01:34:55,850 --> 01:34:59,089
Senator as yet . I've had no contact 

2193
01:34:59,100 --> 01:35:01,156
mill to mill as the US Pacific fleet 

2194
01:35:01,156 --> 01:35:03,919
commander . And uh my boss and my 

2195
01:35:03,930 --> 01:35:07,259
mentor , Admiral Aquilino uh has had 

2196
01:35:07,270 --> 01:35:10,660
limited and seeks more for the that's a 

2197
01:35:10,669 --> 01:35:12,558
danger to not have those kinds of 

2198
01:35:12,558 --> 01:35:16,209
communication links . We're left with 

2199
01:35:16,220 --> 01:35:20,169
their activity with uh the uh with the , 

2200
01:35:20,180 --> 01:35:22,124
with the guidance that we give the 

2201
01:35:22,129 --> 01:35:24,790
force and their public statement and 

2202
01:35:24,799 --> 01:35:26,830
accordingly , we must divine their 

2203
01:35:26,839 --> 01:35:29,430
attentions , divine their intentions 

2204
01:35:29,439 --> 01:35:31,370
and act accordingly with better 

2205
01:35:31,379 --> 01:35:34,129
information . We have lower risk of 

2206
01:35:34,140 --> 01:35:36,307
miscalculation . I would rather have , 

2207
01:35:36,307 --> 01:35:38,196
I would rather have us understand 

2208
01:35:38,196 --> 01:35:40,196
directly from communication , their 

2209
01:35:40,196 --> 01:35:42,307
intentions rather than trying to read 

2210
01:35:42,307 --> 01:35:44,251
the tea leaves or divine it as you 

2211
01:35:44,251 --> 01:35:47,870
suggest . Uh Finally , uh the nature of 

2212
01:35:47,879 --> 01:35:50,101
war and the nature of war is changing , 

2213
01:35:50,101 --> 01:35:52,268
fundamentally , hypersonics , directed 

2214
01:35:52,268 --> 01:35:54,509
energy . Cyber uh clearly the , the 

2215
01:35:54,520 --> 01:35:56,750
next conflict will begin with with , 

2216
01:35:56,759 --> 01:35:59,990
with Cyber . Are you satisfied that the 

2217
01:36:00,000 --> 01:36:04,000
Navy and the joint force in the Pacific 

2218
01:36:04,479 --> 01:36:06,740
is at a place where it needs to be in 

2219
01:36:06,750 --> 01:36:08,972
order to fight the next war rather than 

2220
01:36:08,972 --> 01:36:11,149
based upon strategies and tactics from 

2221
01:36:11,160 --> 01:36:13,500
the last war . Senator , I'm never 

2222
01:36:13,509 --> 01:36:15,939
satisfied with our readiness , I'm 

2223
01:36:15,950 --> 01:36:19,689
confident , but I'm paranoid and we're 

2224
01:36:19,700 --> 01:36:22,180
working constantly . And if and when re 

2225
01:36:22,189 --> 01:36:25,339
additional resources are required uh to 

2226
01:36:25,350 --> 01:36:27,509
be more resilient in that first 

2227
01:36:27,520 --> 01:36:29,859
battlefield , you'll know it from me . 

2228
01:36:30,560 --> 01:36:32,899
I , I hope you really press on that 

2229
01:36:32,910 --> 01:36:35,132
because all of the aircraft carriers in 

2230
01:36:35,132 --> 01:36:37,243
the world aren't gonna work if they , 

2231
01:36:37,243 --> 01:36:39,354
if GPS is gone , if there's no way to 

2232
01:36:39,354 --> 01:36:41,720
navigate , if , if they're uh targeted 

2233
01:36:41,729 --> 01:36:44,779
for by hypersonic . So , uh this is , I 

2234
01:36:44,790 --> 01:36:46,901
think one of the most important areas 

2235
01:36:46,901 --> 01:36:49,930
is to press the entire military 

2236
01:36:49,939 --> 01:36:52,759
establishment on electronic warfare , 

2237
01:36:52,819 --> 01:36:54,930
hypersonics , directed energy and I I 

2238
01:36:54,930 --> 01:36:57,208
appreciate your answers . Uh Thank you , 

2239
01:36:57,208 --> 01:36:59,486
Mr Chairman . Thank you , Senator King , 

2240
01:36:59,486 --> 01:37:01,597
Senator Fit , please . Thank you , Mr 

2241
01:37:01,597 --> 01:37:01,350
Chairman . Good to see you Admiral and 

2242
01:37:01,359 --> 01:37:03,692
really appreciate our time in my office . 

2243
01:37:03,692 --> 01:37:05,637
We had a chance to visit . Um as I 

2244
01:37:05,637 --> 01:37:07,415
mentioned in the office , as we 

2245
01:37:07,415 --> 01:37:09,526
consider your nomination , the threat 

2246
01:37:09,526 --> 01:37:11,748
posed by uh Communist China grows every 

2247
01:37:11,748 --> 01:37:13,970
single day in my view . I I think you , 

2248
01:37:13,970 --> 01:37:16,026
you share that assessment , this and 

2249
01:37:16,026 --> 01:37:18,248
other challenges around the world . Put 

2250
01:37:18,248 --> 01:37:20,470
the navy at an inflection point and the 

2251
01:37:20,470 --> 01:37:22,581
tone set by the next commander of the 

2252
01:37:22,581 --> 01:37:24,803
US . Indo Paycom will prove critical in 

2253
01:37:24,803 --> 01:37:26,859
strengthening our relationships with 

2254
01:37:26,859 --> 01:37:26,759
important partners in the region . So 

2255
01:37:26,770 --> 01:37:28,881
we can collectively deter the rise of 

2256
01:37:28,881 --> 01:37:31,060
China your potential future actions . 

2257
01:37:31,069 --> 01:37:33,069
As Commander of Indo Paycom will be 

2258
01:37:33,069 --> 01:37:35,236
watched and judged by the world as you 

2259
01:37:35,236 --> 01:37:37,458
know , uh we trust , you understand the 

2260
01:37:37,458 --> 01:37:39,569
weight of the task that you're taking 

2261
01:37:39,569 --> 01:37:41,791
on and if confirmed uh must demonstrate 

2262
01:37:41,791 --> 01:37:44,013
the United States resolve in the region 

2263
01:37:44,013 --> 01:37:46,290
by ensuring peace through strength I 

2264
01:37:46,299 --> 01:37:48,879
have three questions . So uh you know , 

2265
01:37:48,890 --> 01:37:50,890
limited time we have here , but the 

2266
01:37:50,890 --> 01:37:53,729
first is um uh just a few short years 

2267
01:37:53,740 --> 01:37:55,907
ago , Admiral Davidson was in front of 

2268
01:37:55,907 --> 01:37:57,919
Congress uh and made an alarming 

2269
01:37:57,930 --> 01:38:00,240
assessment that China uh would have the 

2270
01:38:00,250 --> 01:38:02,472
necessary capabilities to invade Taiwan 

2271
01:38:02,472 --> 01:38:05,930
by 2027 . Uh Do you share 

2272
01:38:06,419 --> 01:38:07,419
that assessment ? 

2273
01:38:11,399 --> 01:38:14,419
I know that in public statements , uh 

2274
01:38:14,450 --> 01:38:18,430
uh the PR C intends , intends to be 

2275
01:38:18,439 --> 01:38:21,799
ready by 2027 but that's related to 

2276
01:38:21,810 --> 01:38:23,421
nothing other than the 1/100 

2277
01:38:23,421 --> 01:38:25,588
anniversary of the People's Liberation 

2278
01:38:25,588 --> 01:38:27,680
Army . In fact , I think they're 

2279
01:38:27,689 --> 01:38:30,220
working to be ready every day and they 

2280
01:38:30,229 --> 01:38:32,839
could go and we've got to be constantly 

2281
01:38:32,850 --> 01:38:36,680
vigilant . There's no holiday between 

2282
01:38:36,689 --> 01:38:39,439
now and when they may go and we must be 

2283
01:38:39,450 --> 01:38:41,720
ready now next week , next month and in 

2284
01:38:41,729 --> 01:38:43,896
the decades to come , what more do you 

2285
01:38:43,896 --> 01:38:47,819
need um to effectively deter that uh 

2286
01:38:47,830 --> 01:38:49,719
if confirmed , I'll work with the 

2287
01:38:49,719 --> 01:38:52,359
committee across the joint force uh And 

2288
01:38:52,370 --> 01:38:55,540
with the department to ensure that I'm , 

2289
01:38:55,640 --> 01:38:58,569
I'm clear in what those requirements 

2290
01:38:58,580 --> 01:39:01,439
are in accordance with my oath . Thank 

2291
01:39:01,450 --> 01:39:03,879
you . Um In addition to this invasion 

2292
01:39:03,890 --> 01:39:06,979
scenario , uh one of my concerns uh is 

2293
01:39:06,990 --> 01:39:09,040
where the CCP starts ratcheting up 

2294
01:39:09,049 --> 01:39:11,680
tensions through a blockade of Taiwan . 

2295
01:39:11,990 --> 01:39:14,850
Um The island nation imports 98% of its 

2296
01:39:14,859 --> 01:39:17,439
energy and is heavily reliant on food 

2297
01:39:17,450 --> 01:39:19,783
imports to feed its population . If the , 

2298
01:39:19,783 --> 01:39:21,600
if the pl A navy was able to 

2299
01:39:21,609 --> 01:39:24,439
successfully implement a blockade it 

2300
01:39:24,450 --> 01:39:27,240
would not only uh um be a problem , I 

2301
01:39:27,250 --> 01:39:29,620
think for , for that island but creates 

2302
01:39:29,629 --> 01:39:32,029
a ripple effect um around the world . 

2303
01:39:32,359 --> 01:39:34,810
How would you as Indo Paycom Commander ? 

2304
01:39:34,819 --> 01:39:36,819
Make sure that China knows that the 

2305
01:39:36,819 --> 01:39:38,986
costs of imposing a blockade like that 

2306
01:39:38,986 --> 01:39:41,000
or other acts of war against China 

2307
01:39:41,009 --> 01:39:43,270
would be deterred or about how dire it 

2308
01:39:43,279 --> 01:39:46,810
would be . Senator . You're bringing up 

2309
01:39:46,819 --> 01:39:48,986
a great point , which is that if we're 

2310
01:39:48,986 --> 01:39:51,350
just planning for an evasion invasion , 

2311
01:39:51,490 --> 01:39:53,810
we're leaving a , a wide range of 

2312
01:39:53,819 --> 01:39:57,660
military options unplanned for . And 

2313
01:39:57,669 --> 01:40:01,189
so planning for deterrence and planning 

2314
01:40:01,200 --> 01:40:05,149
on response uh across the range 

2315
01:40:05,160 --> 01:40:08,069
of military operations and plans are 

2316
01:40:08,080 --> 01:40:10,799
nothing planning is everything . As 

2317
01:40:10,810 --> 01:40:14,290
Dwight D Eisenhower said um is , is 

2318
01:40:14,299 --> 01:40:17,520
critically important and the Taiwan 

2319
01:40:17,529 --> 01:40:20,169
Relations Act provides the department 

2320
01:40:20,180 --> 01:40:24,169
no limits on what we should plan to . 

2321
01:40:24,180 --> 01:40:26,569
We should plan across that range of 

2322
01:40:26,580 --> 01:40:28,950
military operations if so ordered by 

2323
01:40:28,959 --> 01:40:31,220
the commander in chief . And then 

2324
01:40:31,229 --> 01:40:33,285
lastly one question I wanted to , to 

2325
01:40:33,285 --> 01:40:35,396
touch on , I think we talked about it 

2326
01:40:35,396 --> 01:40:37,673
in the office a little bit , but we've , 

2327
01:40:37,673 --> 01:40:39,951
we've seen recently increased activity , 

2328
01:40:39,951 --> 01:40:41,840
I think in this sort of gray zone 

2329
01:40:41,840 --> 01:40:44,220
aggression uh by the PL Navy in the 

2330
01:40:44,229 --> 01:40:46,160
South China Sea and particularly 

2331
01:40:46,169 --> 01:40:48,391
directed against the Philippines . Uh a 

2332
01:40:48,391 --> 01:40:50,779
key ally of ours in my view uh in areas 

2333
01:40:50,790 --> 01:40:53,100
like the , the Second Thomas Shoal . 

2334
01:40:53,459 --> 01:40:56,839
How do you see uh that gray zone 

2335
01:40:56,850 --> 01:40:59,790
harassment aggression evolving over the 

2336
01:40:59,799 --> 01:41:02,549
next few years ? And uh do you see it 

2337
01:41:02,560 --> 01:41:04,671
growing in complexity and frequency . 

2338
01:41:04,671 --> 01:41:07,379
What's your assessment of that ? I do 

2339
01:41:07,390 --> 01:41:10,390
see these gray zone operations which is 

2340
01:41:10,399 --> 01:41:13,589
uh malign activity that does not 

2341
01:41:13,600 --> 01:41:16,919
necessarily risk uh full 

2342
01:41:16,930 --> 01:41:20,540
blown acknowledged combat . Uh This is 

2343
01:41:20,549 --> 01:41:22,459
done in the form of law fair . Uh 

2344
01:41:22,609 --> 01:41:25,709
Declare a law , wait a minute , wait 

2345
01:41:25,720 --> 01:41:27,942
until people think that it's symbolic . 

2346
01:41:28,020 --> 01:41:31,250
Then push maritime militia into the 

2347
01:41:31,259 --> 01:41:34,459
space uh under the fig leaf of Fisher 

2348
01:41:34,470 --> 01:41:36,930
folk or something like that , then push 

2349
01:41:36,939 --> 01:41:40,029
law enforcement into the space under 

2350
01:41:40,040 --> 01:41:42,819
the fig leaf of protecting the maritime 

2351
01:41:42,830 --> 01:41:45,359
militia and then comes the uniform 

2352
01:41:45,370 --> 01:41:49,250
military as it tries to uh wrap 

2353
01:41:49,259 --> 01:41:52,450
with its tentacles uh through its its 

2354
01:41:52,459 --> 01:41:56,049
expansionist desires . And we must 

2355
01:41:56,060 --> 01:41:59,569
close every asymmetry with 

2356
01:41:59,580 --> 01:42:02,180
symmetry , us coast guard partnerships 

2357
01:42:02,189 --> 01:42:05,169
are absolutely critical uh and uh 

2358
01:42:05,180 --> 01:42:08,109
indispensable to our success and then 

2359
01:42:08,120 --> 01:42:10,459
strengthening our allies and partners 

2360
01:42:10,470 --> 01:42:12,629
uh in intel sharing for what those 

2361
01:42:12,640 --> 01:42:15,185
activities are . To me , law fair with 

2362
01:42:15,194 --> 01:42:17,564
law fair , gray zone with gray zone . 

2363
01:42:17,575 --> 01:42:20,154
And it must be across all agencies 

2364
01:42:20,165 --> 01:42:22,221
within the Department of Defense and 

2365
01:42:22,221 --> 01:42:24,305
all of the levers of state craft for 

2366
01:42:24,314 --> 01:42:26,370
the United States of America and our 

2367
01:42:26,370 --> 01:42:28,481
allies and our partners . Thank you , 

2368
01:42:28,481 --> 01:42:30,758
Admiral and thank you for your service . 

2369
01:42:30,758 --> 01:42:32,758
Thank you , Senator Smith , Senator 

2370
01:42:32,758 --> 01:42:35,036
Manchin , please . Thank you very much , 

2371
01:42:35,036 --> 01:42:34,895
Admiral . Thank you very much . It was 

2372
01:42:34,904 --> 01:42:37,071
enjoyed to visit also and uh thank you 

2373
01:42:37,071 --> 01:42:39,293
for your service to our great country . 

2374
01:42:39,293 --> 01:42:41,794
Uh uh First of all , I want , I want to 

2375
01:42:41,805 --> 01:42:44,910
uh reaffirm what I think , uh , Senator 

2376
01:42:44,919 --> 01:42:47,479
Hirono about Taco A and you and I spoke 

2377
01:42:47,490 --> 01:42:49,490
about how important that is and you 

2378
01:42:49,490 --> 01:42:51,601
laid out to me about how important it 

2379
01:42:51,601 --> 01:42:53,712
is and also the service of the people 

2380
01:42:53,712 --> 01:42:53,660
from those areas have given to our 

2381
01:42:53,669 --> 01:42:55,725
country . I appreciate all that . We 

2382
01:42:55,725 --> 01:42:57,947
really need to double down to make sure 

2383
01:42:57,947 --> 01:43:00,225
they understand that we're behind them . 

2384
01:43:00,225 --> 01:42:59,850
I'd like to talk to them a little bit 

2385
01:42:59,859 --> 01:43:02,081
about technology and that's going to be 

2386
01:43:02,081 --> 01:43:05,000
project pele , it's basically a small 

2387
01:43:05,009 --> 01:43:07,419
marginal reactors . We're talking about 

2388
01:43:07,430 --> 01:43:09,600
micro reactors now . And really , I 

2389
01:43:09,609 --> 01:43:11,720
haven't seen dod kick in the way they 

2390
01:43:11,720 --> 01:43:13,553
should have kicked in because it 

2391
01:43:13,553 --> 01:43:15,442
tremendously helps . I think , um 

2392
01:43:15,442 --> 01:43:17,459
especially in the Pacific , we have 

2393
01:43:18,089 --> 01:43:20,256
your supply chains can be a little bit 

2394
01:43:20,256 --> 01:43:22,478
challenging at times . This reactor can 

2395
01:43:22,478 --> 01:43:24,811
be housed in a 20 ft shipping container . 

2396
01:43:24,811 --> 01:43:26,811
It provides five megawatts of power 

2397
01:43:26,811 --> 01:43:29,000
continuously for three years . Uh In 

2398
01:43:29,009 --> 01:43:31,220
comparison , uh you need six diesel , 

2399
01:43:31,229 --> 01:43:34,089
large diesel generators and 9 million 

2400
01:43:34,100 --> 01:43:37,169
gallons of fuel to do the same job . So 

2401
01:43:37,180 --> 01:43:39,291
I'm hoping that you can bring that to 

2402
01:43:39,291 --> 01:43:41,069
the attention and the urgency , 

2403
01:43:41,069 --> 01:43:43,291
especially into Pacific , what it would 

2404
01:43:43,291 --> 01:43:45,402
do because technology is almost there 

2405
01:43:45,402 --> 01:43:45,390
and we've been doing , we've been 

2406
01:43:45,399 --> 01:43:47,288
running the entire military fleet 

2407
01:43:47,288 --> 01:43:50,220
almost on these uh micro reactors for 

2408
01:43:50,229 --> 01:43:52,819
many times on our ships , submarines 

2409
01:43:52,830 --> 01:43:56,720
and all that . So I don't know how high 

2410
01:43:56,729 --> 01:43:58,785
and that's on your priority list . I 

2411
01:43:58,785 --> 01:44:00,840
don't know if that's been brought to 

2412
01:44:00,840 --> 01:44:03,007
your attention . It's , it's , uh , it 

2413
01:44:03,007 --> 01:44:05,029
is compelling and , and , um , of 

2414
01:44:05,040 --> 01:44:07,729
course , um , uh , as a naval officer , 

2415
01:44:07,740 --> 01:44:09,729
um , I've got some , I've got deep 

2416
01:44:09,740 --> 01:44:12,649
connection with naval reactors and , um , 

2417
01:44:12,660 --> 01:44:16,310
if confirmed , uh , you , you can count 

2418
01:44:16,319 --> 01:44:19,290
on , uh , uh , inquiry and as able uh , 

2419
01:44:19,310 --> 01:44:22,459
support for feasible solutions across 

2420
01:44:22,819 --> 01:44:24,910
sectors , try as much as they can to 

2421
01:44:24,919 --> 01:44:27,030
advance this technology as quickly as 

2422
01:44:27,030 --> 01:44:29,086
possible . But in the military , the 

2423
01:44:29,086 --> 01:44:31,141
way you all would have the amount of 

2424
01:44:31,141 --> 01:44:33,197
needs you would have showing in most 

2425
01:44:33,197 --> 01:44:35,308
harsh and adverse conditions would be 

2426
01:44:35,308 --> 01:44:37,419
tremendously , tremendously important 

2427
01:44:37,419 --> 01:44:39,641
for our country to be able to have that 

2428
01:44:39,641 --> 01:44:41,808
opportunity . But also showing that it 

2429
01:44:41,808 --> 01:44:44,030
works and the savings , I think in burn 

2430
01:44:44,030 --> 01:44:43,000
pits and everything else we've been 

2431
01:44:43,009 --> 01:44:45,231
going through and the Pay Act we've had 

2432
01:44:45,231 --> 01:44:47,287
to do and all the different things . 

2433
01:44:47,287 --> 01:44:49,120
It's just , this is a tremendous 

2434
01:44:49,120 --> 01:44:51,342
opportunity for us to cure a lot of our 

2435
01:44:51,342 --> 01:44:53,398
eels . The other thing I'm concerned 

2436
01:44:53,398 --> 01:44:53,390
about is efforts such as Force Design 

2437
01:44:53,399 --> 01:44:55,520
2030 for the Marine Corps . Uh they 

2438
01:44:55,529 --> 01:44:57,751
demonstrate modernization in deliberate 

2439
01:44:57,751 --> 01:44:59,973
manner , but also trying to continue to 

2440
01:44:59,973 --> 01:45:02,220
outpace us and uh building of ships and 

2441
01:45:02,229 --> 01:45:04,340
uh munition output and things of this 

2442
01:45:04,340 --> 01:45:06,451
sort . What's your concerns on that ? 

2443
01:45:06,451 --> 01:45:08,507
Are we going to be able to meet that 

2444
01:45:08,507 --> 01:45:11,220
challenge or do you think that uh this 

2445
01:45:11,229 --> 01:45:13,779
is the proper way to go ? Well , first 

2446
01:45:13,790 --> 01:45:17,750
I uh for Force Design 2030 does not 

2447
01:45:17,759 --> 01:45:20,089
relieve the joint force of its crisis 

2448
01:45:20,100 --> 01:45:22,189
response capabilities nor to my 

2449
01:45:22,200 --> 01:45:24,669
awareness uh has the Marine Corps in 

2450
01:45:24,680 --> 01:45:27,540
any way walked away from the crisis 

2451
01:45:27,549 --> 01:45:30,689
response mission and uh particularly 

2452
01:45:30,700 --> 01:45:32,870
the Marine Corps in close partnership 

2453
01:45:32,879 --> 01:45:36,020
within the Navy Marine to Marine Corps 

2454
01:45:36,029 --> 01:45:38,890
team crisis response isn't uh a Marine 

2455
01:45:38,899 --> 01:45:40,899
Corps mission . It's a Navy Marine 

2456
01:45:40,910 --> 01:45:44,229
Corps mission and it's also uh a joint 

2457
01:45:44,240 --> 01:45:47,180
force uh mission . And so , uh I 

2458
01:45:47,189 --> 01:45:50,939
think uh conceptually , uh 

2459
01:45:50,950 --> 01:45:53,279
we should be always challenging our 

2460
01:45:53,290 --> 01:45:55,669
assumptions about our force designs . 

2461
01:45:55,680 --> 01:45:57,958
When we're looking off into the future , 

2462
01:45:57,958 --> 01:45:59,958
we should be planning to worst case 

2463
01:45:59,958 --> 01:46:02,379
scenarios and closing gaps . And if 

2464
01:46:02,390 --> 01:46:06,100
confirmed , I'll work uh continuously . 

2465
01:46:06,109 --> 01:46:08,276
Let me ask you this question as far as 

2466
01:46:08,276 --> 01:46:10,109
you know , you're going into the 

2467
01:46:10,109 --> 01:46:12,220
hottest area . I think we have as far 

2468
01:46:12,220 --> 01:46:14,442
as direct engagement if you will in the 

2469
01:46:14,442 --> 01:46:16,442
Indo Pacific right now , what's the 

2470
01:46:16,442 --> 01:46:18,553
greatest challenge ? I mean , we hear 

2471
01:46:18,553 --> 01:46:18,160
about and I know they've asked you 

2472
01:46:18,169 --> 01:46:20,359
questions concerning the timing on 

2473
01:46:20,370 --> 01:46:24,149
Taiwan , maybe uh coming to uh whatever 

2474
01:46:24,160 --> 01:46:26,339
uh that uh outcome is going to be and 

2475
01:46:26,350 --> 01:46:28,370
what time period , but also what 

2476
01:46:28,379 --> 01:46:30,323
they've been building up as far as 

2477
01:46:30,323 --> 01:46:32,379
China and shutting down the shipping 

2478
01:46:32,379 --> 01:46:34,601
lanes , making it almost impossible for 

2479
01:46:34,601 --> 01:46:36,712
the Philippines to be able to what is 

2480
01:46:36,712 --> 01:46:36,549
the greatest challenge we have that 

2481
01:46:36,560 --> 01:46:38,671
you're gonna be able to be faced with 

2482
01:46:38,671 --> 01:46:40,838
and think you have to meet the highest 

2483
01:46:40,838 --> 01:46:44,819
priority , the trajectory and the 

2484
01:46:44,830 --> 01:46:47,899
aggression , the trajectory of the pl a 

2485
01:46:48,140 --> 01:46:51,009
the People's Liberation Army across all 

2486
01:46:51,020 --> 01:46:54,759
of its services and uh its activity 

2487
01:46:54,770 --> 01:46:58,390
and its aggression . That itself is the 

2488
01:46:58,399 --> 01:47:01,839
greatest challenge and to be able to uh 

2489
01:47:01,850 --> 01:47:05,209
day to day deter conflict by the 

2490
01:47:05,220 --> 01:47:08,339
dynamic demonstration of allied and 

2491
01:47:08,350 --> 01:47:10,859
joint operations to show the ability to 

2492
01:47:10,879 --> 01:47:14,509
impose costs . And if and when conflict 

2493
01:47:14,520 --> 01:47:18,229
comes , it is that C five ISR in space 

2494
01:47:18,240 --> 01:47:21,350
and cyber that shall be the first 

2495
01:47:21,359 --> 01:47:24,589
battle and will be either the enabling 

2496
01:47:24,600 --> 01:47:27,109
capability for the joint force or the 

2497
01:47:27,120 --> 01:47:29,890
Achilles Heel for the PL A . If that 

2498
01:47:29,899 --> 01:47:32,010
day comes one real quick , if I can , 

2499
01:47:32,279 --> 01:47:34,790
uh I get mixed signals on , basically , 

2500
01:47:34,799 --> 01:47:37,021
we have said that we're going to defend 

2501
01:47:37,021 --> 01:47:39,243
Taiwan if they're attacked , but yet we 

2502
01:47:39,243 --> 01:47:41,243
don't acknowledge them and we still 

2503
01:47:41,243 --> 01:47:44,229
acknowledge a one China policy . People 

2504
01:47:44,240 --> 01:47:46,296
back home asked me . So why are we , 

2505
01:47:46,296 --> 01:47:48,518
why do we have a one China policy ? But 

2506
01:47:48,518 --> 01:47:50,684
yet we don't recognize them and yet we 

2507
01:47:50,684 --> 01:47:52,907
said we're going to fight for them . Is 

2508
01:47:52,907 --> 01:47:55,129
that confusing ? Not to the joint force 

2509
01:47:55,140 --> 01:47:57,362
senator ? Because the joint force , our 

2510
01:47:57,362 --> 01:47:59,473
mandate is the Taiwan Relations Act , 

2511
01:47:59,473 --> 01:48:01,584
which is the department shall support 

2512
01:48:01,584 --> 01:48:03,696
Taiwan with defensive systems and the 

2513
01:48:03,696 --> 01:48:05,918
defense department shall be prepared to 

2514
01:48:05,918 --> 01:48:09,100
thwart uh an invasion of Taiwan . Um 

2515
01:48:09,160 --> 01:48:12,180
And , and that mission clarity for the 

2516
01:48:12,189 --> 01:48:14,356
joint force . Yes , sir . We're behind 

2517
01:48:14,356 --> 01:48:18,049
Taiwan . The joint force is ready to 

2518
01:48:18,060 --> 01:48:20,689
defend Taiwan and must be critical 

2519
01:48:20,700 --> 01:48:22,867
thinking and continuing to make itself 

2520
01:48:23,140 --> 01:48:26,830
uh in the , in the face of uh of a , of 

2521
01:48:26,839 --> 01:48:29,830
a uh of a concerning PR C . Thank you , 

2522
01:48:29,839 --> 01:48:31,950
Admiral . I appreciate it . Thank you 

2523
01:48:31,950 --> 01:48:34,006
very much . Sorry , Mr Chairman . Uh 

2524
01:48:34,006 --> 01:48:35,895
thank you , Senator Senator . But 

2525
01:48:35,895 --> 01:48:38,117
please thank you , Chairman , Admiral . 

2526
01:48:38,117 --> 01:48:38,040
Good to see you again . Uh enjoy the 

2527
01:48:38,049 --> 01:48:40,271
conversation in my office and even more 

2528
01:48:40,271 --> 01:48:42,549
in your office out in the Indo Pacific . 

2529
01:48:42,549 --> 01:48:44,660
You're a wonderful host . It was very 

2530
01:48:44,660 --> 01:48:44,589
insightful . Uh you know , some seem to 

2531
01:48:44,600 --> 01:48:46,310
seem to think that if China 

2532
01:48:46,319 --> 01:48:48,910
successfully seizes Taiwan , then the 

2533
01:48:48,919 --> 01:48:51,141
China problem that we have is it's over 

2534
01:48:51,141 --> 01:48:53,252
and that the United States won't have 

2535
01:48:53,252 --> 01:48:55,586
to worry about China anymore . You know , 

2536
01:48:55,586 --> 01:48:57,530
in these people's view , Taiwan is 

2537
01:48:57,530 --> 01:49:00,049
really all that Beijing wants . So do 

2538
01:49:00,060 --> 01:49:02,282
you agree with this line of thinking or 

2539
01:49:02,282 --> 01:49:04,393
do you worry that Beijing's ambitions 

2540
01:49:04,393 --> 01:49:06,750
go beyond Taiwan ? And if China seizes 

2541
01:49:06,759 --> 01:49:08,759
control of Taiwan , do you think it 

2542
01:49:08,759 --> 01:49:10,759
will consolidate its gains and then 

2543
01:49:10,759 --> 01:49:12,981
seek to use force to expand its control 

2544
01:49:12,981 --> 01:49:16,819
in other areas ? I I do not agree 

2545
01:49:16,830 --> 01:49:19,240
by which I mean , I do not agree that 

2546
01:49:19,250 --> 01:49:22,479
all the problems are over if and if the 

2547
01:49:22,490 --> 01:49:25,890
Taiwan matter would be settled by force . 

2548
01:49:26,729 --> 01:49:30,419
Uh uh I and that is evident in their uh 

2549
01:49:30,430 --> 01:49:34,180
in the Pr C's behavior uh 

2550
01:49:34,189 --> 01:49:36,270
in the kind of force that they're 

2551
01:49:36,279 --> 01:49:39,020
building uh is a force that lends 

2552
01:49:39,029 --> 01:49:43,009
itself to power projection and not just 

2553
01:49:43,020 --> 01:49:46,529
Taiwan . Yes sir . Uh in the Senkaku 

2554
01:49:47,740 --> 01:49:50,339
in the South China Sea . Uh And then 

2555
01:49:50,350 --> 01:49:53,149
even in the maps that they publish in 

2556
01:49:53,160 --> 01:49:57,060
open source is an ever expanding zone ? 

2557
01:49:58,609 --> 01:50:01,060
Admiral , would it be harder for the US 

2558
01:50:01,069 --> 01:50:03,291
and its allied forces , the joint force 

2559
01:50:03,291 --> 01:50:05,513
to deter defeat Chinese aggression . If 

2560
01:50:05,513 --> 01:50:07,513
Beijing is able to seize control of 

2561
01:50:07,513 --> 01:50:10,140
Taiwan and station forces on Taiwan , 

2562
01:50:10,790 --> 01:50:13,290
it would be a challenge geographically 

2563
01:50:13,660 --> 01:50:16,089
and uh it would also be a challenge in 

2564
01:50:16,100 --> 01:50:19,129
terms of the cohesion of our 

2565
01:50:19,140 --> 01:50:22,100
alliances and partnerships who would 

2566
01:50:22,109 --> 01:50:24,970
have seen a um who had , who have seen 

2567
01:50:24,979 --> 01:50:27,250
the potential failure of an American 

2568
01:50:27,259 --> 01:50:30,069
security agreement . How would the 

2569
01:50:30,080 --> 01:50:32,540
Chinese threat to us territories in the 

2570
01:50:32,549 --> 01:50:34,850
Western Pacific like Guam and the 

2571
01:50:34,859 --> 01:50:36,915
Northern Marianas change if China is 

2572
01:50:36,915 --> 01:50:38,803
able to seize Taiwan and position 

2573
01:50:38,803 --> 01:50:41,290
forces there ? Northern Ame , Northern 

2574
01:50:41,299 --> 01:50:44,040
Marianas and Guam are America and it 

2575
01:50:44,049 --> 01:50:45,938
would be under greater and direct 

2576
01:50:45,938 --> 01:50:49,740
threat . Thank you . Uh Former Chairman 

2577
01:50:49,750 --> 01:50:51,694
of the Joint Chiefs General Millie 

2578
01:50:51,694 --> 01:50:53,806
testified that strengthening Taiwan's 

2579
01:50:53,806 --> 01:50:55,917
asymmetric defenses is vital not only 

2580
01:50:55,917 --> 01:50:57,972
to bolster deterrent against China , 

2581
01:50:57,972 --> 01:51:00,139
but also to reduce operational risk to 

2582
01:51:00,139 --> 01:51:02,139
us forces who may be called to help 

2583
01:51:02,139 --> 01:51:04,680
defend Taiwan ? Do you agree with the 

2584
01:51:04,689 --> 01:51:06,967
former chairman's testimony ? I do sir . 

2585
01:51:06,967 --> 01:51:08,522
Would you elaborate on that 

2586
01:51:11,870 --> 01:51:14,479
actions that Taiwan takes to strengthen 

2587
01:51:14,490 --> 01:51:17,859
its own defenses , have a 3 to 1 

2588
01:51:17,870 --> 01:51:21,060
leverage against aggression . This is 

2589
01:51:21,069 --> 01:51:24,379
military doctrine on uh assault ratios 

2590
01:51:24,729 --> 01:51:27,959
and uh accordingly to the extent that 

2591
01:51:27,970 --> 01:51:31,229
Taiwan can make itself uh a porcupine 

2592
01:51:31,399 --> 01:51:34,470
with sea denial capabilities with the 

2593
01:51:34,479 --> 01:51:38,310
ability to uh to defeat an invader 

2594
01:51:38,339 --> 01:51:41,750
um at sea under sea in the 

2595
01:51:41,759 --> 01:51:44,259
air uh to the , to the invasion . 

2596
01:51:44,270 --> 01:51:46,859
Beaches has 3 to 1 level in the 

2597
01:51:46,939 --> 01:51:50,129
investment in its ability to defend 

2598
01:51:50,140 --> 01:51:52,790
itself and ensure that the strait , the 

2599
01:51:52,799 --> 01:51:55,290
the tension in the straits are resolved 

2600
01:51:55,299 --> 01:51:58,069
peacefully and not by coercion . Thank 

2601
01:51:58,080 --> 01:52:00,080
you . So is it fair to say that the 

2602
01:52:00,080 --> 01:52:01,747
United States should be doing 

2603
01:52:01,747 --> 01:52:03,969
everything possible to get Taiwan , the 

2604
01:52:03,969 --> 01:52:05,969
asymmetric defense capabilities and 

2605
01:52:05,969 --> 01:52:08,080
associated training and other support 

2606
01:52:08,080 --> 01:52:07,950
required to defend itself against the 

2607
01:52:07,959 --> 01:52:11,600
Chinese invasion . The scale of the 

2608
01:52:11,609 --> 01:52:15,229
support is a decision of the commander 

2609
01:52:15,240 --> 01:52:17,259
in chief and of the Congress . I 

2610
01:52:17,270 --> 01:52:19,359
support any effort that makes Taiwan 

2611
01:52:19,370 --> 01:52:22,160
stronger . Is it fair to say that 

2612
01:52:22,169 --> 01:52:23,836
Taipei also needs to be doing 

2613
01:52:23,836 --> 01:52:25,725
everything possible to strengthen 

2614
01:52:25,725 --> 01:52:27,558
Taiwan's defenses , including by 

2615
01:52:27,558 --> 01:52:29,669
increasing Taiwanese defense spending 

2616
01:52:29,669 --> 01:52:31,836
and making necessary defense reforms , 

2617
01:52:31,836 --> 01:52:33,780
for instance , to Taiwan's reserve 

2618
01:52:33,780 --> 01:52:35,947
forces and cons conscription program . 

2619
01:52:35,947 --> 01:52:38,270
Yes , sir . I agree . And if confirmed , 

2620
01:52:38,600 --> 01:52:41,220
um I will stress that . Thank you , 

2621
01:52:41,229 --> 01:52:43,396
Admiral . Appreciate your time today . 

2622
01:52:43,396 --> 01:52:45,229
Chairman . Thank you very much , 

2623
01:52:45,229 --> 01:52:47,229
Senator Budd . Uh I'm informed that 

2624
01:52:47,229 --> 01:52:49,451
Senator Duckworth is on her way here as 

2625
01:52:49,451 --> 01:52:51,618
a result . I will take the opportunity 

2626
01:52:51,618 --> 01:52:53,562
to ask an additional question . Um 

2627
01:52:53,629 --> 01:52:55,573
We've talked a lot about equipment 

2628
01:52:55,573 --> 01:52:57,629
funding , et cetera , but one of the 

2629
01:52:57,629 --> 01:52:59,759
essential factors is the will of the 

2630
01:52:59,770 --> 01:53:03,370
people to resist and to fight . Uh 

2631
01:53:03,629 --> 01:53:06,379
can you evaluate uh the situation on 

2632
01:53:06,390 --> 01:53:09,990
Taiwan in terms of their uh commitment 

2633
01:53:10,000 --> 01:53:11,990
uh and their capabilities 

2634
01:53:14,200 --> 01:53:17,330
in my uh in my discussions with uh with 

2635
01:53:17,339 --> 01:53:21,149
the Taiwan forces , I have seen um 

2636
01:53:21,430 --> 01:53:24,529
a , a greater focus on the kinds of 

2637
01:53:24,540 --> 01:53:26,740
operational capabilities that would 

2638
01:53:26,750 --> 01:53:30,330
make Taiwan more able to defend itself . 

2639
01:53:30,580 --> 01:53:32,950
I see those investments as well . And 

2640
01:53:32,959 --> 01:53:36,229
so I am seeing it conceptually , I'm 

2641
01:53:36,240 --> 01:53:40,209
seeing shifts in the culture of 

2642
01:53:40,220 --> 01:53:43,169
uh of , of Taiwan's military doctrine , 

2643
01:53:43,180 --> 01:53:46,740
uh becoming more joint of seeing the 

2644
01:53:46,750 --> 01:53:49,810
problem clearly with defensive uh 

2645
01:53:49,819 --> 01:53:53,549
capabilities and in a will uh 

2646
01:53:53,560 --> 01:53:56,160
to mobilize their young people , you 

2647
01:53:56,169 --> 01:53:58,280
know , they've recently increased the 

2648
01:53:58,280 --> 01:54:00,502
levels of their , the , the the time of 

2649
01:54:00,502 --> 01:54:02,613
their uh conscript conscription . And 

2650
01:54:02,620 --> 01:54:05,890
so at , at uh at the levels for my uh 

2651
01:54:05,899 --> 01:54:08,830
for the , for the uh my interlocutors , 

2652
01:54:08,839 --> 01:54:10,950
uh I am seeing that manifest itself . 

2653
01:54:11,589 --> 01:54:14,450
Let me uh further ask , you've 

2654
01:54:14,459 --> 01:54:16,348
mentioned this before and I think 

2655
01:54:16,348 --> 01:54:19,229
you're exactly right . The uh key 

2656
01:54:19,240 --> 01:54:22,339
factor in our military competence is 

2657
01:54:22,350 --> 01:54:25,279
the skilled professionals and noncom 

2658
01:54:25,290 --> 01:54:27,819
commissional officers . Um We owe them 

2659
01:54:27,830 --> 01:54:30,709
a lot uh to what extent are we focusing 

2660
01:54:30,720 --> 01:54:32,899
on developing that skill and expertise 

2661
01:54:32,910 --> 01:54:36,720
in Taiwanese forces ? I am seeing that 

2662
01:54:36,729 --> 01:54:39,520
Senator and if confirmed , um I think 

2663
01:54:39,529 --> 01:54:41,720
we should redouble it um particularly 

2664
01:54:41,729 --> 01:54:44,270
with our command sergeants major , our 

2665
01:54:44,279 --> 01:54:47,660
fleet master chiefs um at that level 

2666
01:54:47,669 --> 01:54:50,490
and uh the relationships that we have 

2667
01:54:50,500 --> 01:54:53,990
at senior levels , we must mimic if not 

2668
01:54:54,140 --> 01:54:56,600
redouble our efforts among uh the 

2669
01:54:56,609 --> 01:54:59,240
professional NCO Corp . It strikes me 

2670
01:54:59,250 --> 01:55:01,750
one of the reasons that the Ukrainian 

2671
01:55:01,759 --> 01:55:03,981
forces resisted so well and had so much 

2672
01:55:03,981 --> 01:55:07,839
flexibility and initiative uh at 

2673
01:55:07,850 --> 01:55:10,220
the company level and below is that 

2674
01:55:10,229 --> 01:55:12,649
they've been trained by us special 

2675
01:55:12,660 --> 01:55:15,080
forces since 2014 . And that I think 

2676
01:55:15,089 --> 01:55:17,779
showed itself uh one of the greatest 

2677
01:55:17,790 --> 01:55:19,957
issues and it's been mentioned several 

2678
01:55:19,957 --> 01:55:22,189
times . Here is congested , contested 

2679
01:55:22,200 --> 01:55:24,890
logistics that has been wholly and said 

2680
01:55:24,899 --> 01:55:27,089
an army moves on its stomach . II A 

2681
01:55:27,350 --> 01:55:29,689
navy swims on its stomach , I guess is 

2682
01:55:29,700 --> 01:55:33,279
the analogy . But uh this could be the 

2683
01:55:33,290 --> 01:55:36,729
real choke point in terms of operations 

2684
01:55:36,740 --> 01:55:39,100
in the Pacific . And can you tell us 

2685
01:55:39,109 --> 01:55:42,660
what your uh plans would be , what your 

2686
01:55:42,669 --> 01:55:45,002
emphasis would be in terms of logistics ? 

2687
01:55:45,002 --> 01:55:48,890
So we avoid that Senator I , we're 

2688
01:55:48,899 --> 01:55:51,839
gaming at uh we're gaming modeling and 

2689
01:55:51,850 --> 01:55:54,830
simulating at every level to identify 

2690
01:55:55,040 --> 01:55:58,520
those gaps . And um it's , it's almost 

2691
01:55:58,529 --> 01:56:00,779
a misnomer . We talk about contested 

2692
01:56:00,790 --> 01:56:03,350
logistics as if it never were contested . 

2693
01:56:04,000 --> 01:56:06,589
Logistics are always contested and 

2694
01:56:06,600 --> 01:56:09,390
executing . The joint function of 

2695
01:56:09,399 --> 01:56:12,470
sustainment comes under all of the same 

2696
01:56:12,479 --> 01:56:14,930
pressures and all of the same fog and 

2697
01:56:14,939 --> 01:56:17,919
friction that maneuver , that fires 

2698
01:56:17,930 --> 01:56:19,652
that all that all of the joint 

2699
01:56:19,652 --> 01:56:22,779
functions uh come at uh at the service 

2700
01:56:22,790 --> 01:56:25,220
level . Uh We're seeing invaluable 

2701
01:56:25,229 --> 01:56:26,951
games and simulations that are 

2702
01:56:26,951 --> 01:56:30,430
informing our ability to sustain the 

2703
01:56:30,439 --> 01:56:33,500
force in conflict . And if confirmed , 

2704
01:56:33,509 --> 01:56:35,287
I'll continue to work with this 

2705
01:56:35,287 --> 01:56:37,398
committee to identify what those gaps 

2706
01:56:37,398 --> 01:56:39,959
are for rapid closure . I would assume 

2707
01:56:39,970 --> 01:56:42,009
your experience in a provincial 

2708
01:56:42,020 --> 01:56:45,080
reconstruction team reinforce the the 

2709
01:56:45,089 --> 01:56:48,060
nature of logistics and the fact that 

2710
01:56:48,069 --> 01:56:51,290
they all are contested . That's that 

2711
01:56:51,350 --> 01:56:54,660
experience you draw did did indeed it 

2712
01:56:54,669 --> 01:56:57,649
was um it was uh kind of 

2713
01:56:58,609 --> 01:57:01,279
essential to my formation as a joint 

2714
01:57:01,290 --> 01:57:03,529
officer . I think you're , that's an 

2715
01:57:03,540 --> 01:57:06,180
excellent uh experience to have when 

2716
01:57:06,189 --> 01:57:08,740
you assume the joint command . Uh We've 

2717
01:57:08,750 --> 01:57:11,709
also uh talked about the 

2718
01:57:12,069 --> 01:57:15,080
uh developing relationships between the 

2719
01:57:15,089 --> 01:57:16,879
Japanese and the Koreans . I've 

2720
01:57:16,890 --> 01:57:20,390
traveled over there uh uh several times 

2721
01:57:20,399 --> 01:57:23,290
and there was until very recently , uh 

2722
01:57:23,930 --> 01:57:27,759
lingering distrust because of 

2723
01:57:27,770 --> 01:57:30,600
the history of those two countries over 

2724
01:57:30,609 --> 01:57:33,850
this century in the previous century . 

2725
01:57:34,100 --> 01:57:37,009
Um uh You're seeing though I presume a 

2726
01:57:37,020 --> 01:57:40,330
real uh cooper spirit 

2727
01:57:40,540 --> 01:57:43,250
and uh a new generation of leaders that 

2728
01:57:43,259 --> 01:57:45,640
understand the threat is not from 

2729
01:57:45,649 --> 01:57:47,593
either of those countries but from 

2730
01:57:47,593 --> 01:57:50,620
China . Is that correct ? I do see it 

2731
01:57:50,629 --> 01:57:52,899
firsthand . Uh Senator at the senior 

2732
01:57:52,910 --> 01:57:55,370
level , there's no faking the chemistry 

2733
01:57:55,459 --> 01:57:57,515
uh between the senior leaders that I 

2734
01:57:57,515 --> 01:58:00,450
see and more directly and probably more 

2735
01:58:00,459 --> 01:58:02,609
tellingly . Uh the Pacific Fleet 

2736
01:58:02,620 --> 01:58:04,680
headquarters is a deeply partnered 

2737
01:58:04,689 --> 01:58:07,479
environment with not liaison officers 

2738
01:58:07,490 --> 01:58:11,330
but uh embeds officers uh from other 

2739
01:58:11,339 --> 01:58:13,506
countries with enhanced clearances who 

2740
01:58:13,506 --> 01:58:17,270
do us jobs for a US command Pacific 

2741
01:58:17,279 --> 01:58:19,830
fleet . And to see the chemistry 

2742
01:58:19,839 --> 01:58:23,180
between the multiple uh J MS D at the 

2743
01:58:23,189 --> 01:58:25,078
Japanese officers that are in the 

2744
01:58:25,078 --> 01:58:27,250
headquarters and the Korean officers . 

2745
01:58:27,549 --> 01:58:30,930
And um and although it , although it is 

2746
01:58:30,939 --> 01:58:34,029
a complicated and difficult history , I 

2747
01:58:34,040 --> 01:58:37,750
see a bright future . Wonderful . Thank 

2748
01:58:37,759 --> 01:58:39,592
you with that . Let me recognize 

2749
01:58:39,592 --> 01:58:41,703
Senator do horses for her questions . 

2750
01:58:41,703 --> 01:58:43,870
Thank you , Mr Chairman for uh waiting 

2751
01:58:43,870 --> 01:58:45,981
on me , Admiral PPAR . So good to see 

2752
01:58:45,981 --> 01:58:47,926
you again . Good morning . It's um 

2753
01:58:48,129 --> 01:58:50,180
welcome to you and your family and 

2754
01:58:50,189 --> 01:58:52,470
congratulations on your nomination . Um 

2755
01:58:52,479 --> 01:58:54,423
And thank you for our wide ranging 

2756
01:58:54,423 --> 01:58:56,689
discussion uh on Tuesday . Should you 

2757
01:58:56,700 --> 01:58:58,533
be confirmed ? I look forward to 

2758
01:58:58,533 --> 01:59:00,033
working with you to deepen 

2759
01:59:00,033 --> 01:59:02,144
relationships and integration between 

2760
01:59:02,144 --> 01:59:03,756
the Indo Pacific Command and 

2761
01:59:03,756 --> 01:59:05,922
Transportation Command . We had a good 

2762
01:59:05,922 --> 01:59:07,922
discussion on that . Transportation 

2763
01:59:07,922 --> 01:59:09,867
Command plays an important role in 

2764
01:59:09,867 --> 01:59:11,422
providing unique logistical 

2765
01:59:11,422 --> 01:59:13,478
capabilities to geographic combatant 

2766
01:59:13,478 --> 01:59:15,644
commanders like Indo Pacific Command . 

2767
01:59:15,644 --> 01:59:17,867
Any conflict in the Indo Pacific region 

2768
01:59:17,867 --> 01:59:19,978
would pose significant logistical and 

2769
01:59:19,978 --> 01:59:22,311
maneuver challenges for the joint force . 

2770
01:59:22,311 --> 01:59:24,144
Further complicating trans com's 

2771
01:59:24,144 --> 01:59:26,089
already difficult mission . I will 

2772
01:59:26,089 --> 01:59:28,089
always be this committee's fiercest 

2773
01:59:28,089 --> 01:59:28,040
advocate for resourcing Transportation 

2774
01:59:28,049 --> 01:59:30,271
Command and ensuring that the command's 

2775
01:59:30,271 --> 01:59:32,438
hard working men and women are able to 

2776
01:59:32,438 --> 01:59:34,459
in any circumstance . Admiral . If 

2777
01:59:34,470 --> 01:59:36,303
confirm , how will you work with 

2778
01:59:36,303 --> 01:59:38,359
Transportation Command to ensure the 

2779
01:59:38,359 --> 01:59:40,470
two combatant commands , war fighting 

2780
01:59:40,470 --> 01:59:42,692
requirements and planning f factors are 

2781
01:59:42,692 --> 01:59:44,748
integrated and supported by rigorous 

2782
01:59:44,748 --> 01:59:47,080
exercises and experimentation center . 

2783
01:59:47,089 --> 01:59:49,479
Absolutely indispensable this 

2784
01:59:49,490 --> 01:59:52,359
relationship and the intellect , the 

2785
01:59:52,370 --> 01:59:55,779
energy , the drive the expertise 

2786
01:59:56,220 --> 01:59:58,560
at us Transportation Command at Scott 

2787
01:59:58,569 --> 02:00:01,310
Air Force Base . Those relationships 

2788
02:00:01,319 --> 02:00:04,359
are absolutely critical . They must be 

2789
02:00:04,419 --> 02:00:08,229
uh honest relationships uh where we 

2790
02:00:08,240 --> 02:00:11,979
hold each other to account . Um you 

2791
02:00:11,990 --> 02:00:14,910
know , in the best in the best and most 

2792
02:00:14,919 --> 02:00:18,500
team oriented way . But um in 

2793
02:00:18,509 --> 02:00:22,140
deterrence in competition in crisis and 

2794
02:00:22,149 --> 02:00:25,370
conflict , uh it's , it is very likely 

2795
02:00:25,379 --> 02:00:27,580
the most important COCOM Cocom 

2796
02:00:27,850 --> 02:00:30,830
relationship we have . Can you expand 

2797
02:00:30,839 --> 02:00:34,270
on that with um uh how you would ensure 

2798
02:00:34,459 --> 02:00:37,140
a unified and coherent plan to address 

2799
02:00:37,149 --> 02:00:39,260
the logistical challenges that forces 

2800
02:00:39,260 --> 02:00:41,482
operating in Indo Paycom A O would face 

2801
02:00:41,482 --> 02:00:43,816
in a contested environment specifically . 

2802
02:00:45,000 --> 02:00:48,270
Yeah , as Eisenhower said , plans are 

2803
02:00:48,279 --> 02:00:50,001
nothing planning is everything 

2804
02:00:50,080 --> 02:00:53,520
continued planning within the two 

2805
02:00:53,529 --> 02:00:56,279
commands is what builds the habits of 

2806
02:00:56,290 --> 02:00:59,169
mind and habits of action that not only 

2807
02:00:59,180 --> 02:01:01,870
allows the force to plan for every 

2808
02:01:01,879 --> 02:01:05,669
contingency but to also execute against 

2809
02:01:05,680 --> 02:01:09,029
every contingency when every plan 

2810
02:01:09,040 --> 02:01:12,120
fails at first contact with the enemy . 

2811
02:01:12,229 --> 02:01:14,995
And so it's that habit planning 

2812
02:01:15,004 --> 02:01:17,875
relationship , the critical thinking , 

2813
02:01:18,064 --> 02:01:21,555
uh the uh combining on a common vision 

2814
02:01:21,564 --> 02:01:23,774
of the operational environment that 

2815
02:01:23,785 --> 02:01:26,595
consistent planning is that that's 

2816
02:01:26,604 --> 02:01:29,234
gonna deliver not just a resilient 

2817
02:01:29,245 --> 02:01:32,274
plans for conflict across the spectrum , 

2818
02:01:32,384 --> 02:01:34,944
but also effective execution and 

2819
02:01:34,955 --> 02:01:36,899
teamwork when the unforgiving hour 

2820
02:01:36,899 --> 02:01:39,115
comes . Thank you . Uh I'm part of the 

2821
02:01:39,125 --> 02:01:41,347
teamwork that works in the Indo Pacific 

2822
02:01:41,354 --> 02:01:44,529
region . Um uh is the State Partnership 

2823
02:01:44,540 --> 02:01:46,810
for Peace Program . Um It's really 

2824
02:01:46,819 --> 02:01:48,819
important to maintaining a free and 

2825
02:01:48,819 --> 02:01:51,410
open Indo Pacific . Um And I think it's 

2826
02:01:51,419 --> 02:01:54,589
a great opportunity that uh uh is 

2827
02:01:54,600 --> 02:01:56,129
existing that will enhance 

2828
02:01:56,140 --> 02:01:58,140
interoperability and strengthen our 

2829
02:01:58,140 --> 02:02:00,140
allies and partners in mail to mail 

2830
02:02:00,140 --> 02:02:02,307
engagement . Um Can you chat with us a 

2831
02:02:02,307 --> 02:02:04,473
little bit about how you would plan to 

2832
02:02:04,473 --> 02:02:06,879
use the National Guards uh SPP program 

2833
02:02:06,890 --> 02:02:08,946
to strengthen both our relationships 

2834
02:02:08,946 --> 02:02:10,946
with our allies and partners in the 

2835
02:02:10,946 --> 02:02:12,890
Indo Pacific , but also to just in 

2836
02:02:12,890 --> 02:02:14,834
greater engagement uh um and , and 

2837
02:02:14,834 --> 02:02:17,779
exercises as well . Center across the 

2838
02:02:17,790 --> 02:02:21,069
Pacific , across the Indian Ocean . Uh 

2839
02:02:21,109 --> 02:02:24,140
These state partnership programs have 

2840
02:02:24,149 --> 02:02:27,009
got tremendous leverage to build those 

2841
02:02:27,020 --> 02:02:29,470
partnerships to build partner capacity 

2842
02:02:29,479 --> 02:02:32,220
for us to learn from each other . And 

2843
02:02:32,229 --> 02:02:35,330
one of the unappreciated benefits of 

2844
02:02:35,339 --> 02:02:37,506
the National Guard is that in addition 

2845
02:02:37,506 --> 02:02:40,270
to excellence in the military 

2846
02:02:40,279 --> 02:02:43,029
occupation , specialty of each of the 

2847
02:02:43,040 --> 02:02:45,200
Guard service members , they also 

2848
02:02:45,209 --> 02:02:47,799
frequently bring to bear other civilian 

2849
02:02:47,810 --> 02:02:51,620
skill sets that just add value uh to 

2850
02:02:51,629 --> 02:02:54,390
the program . So uh in the Indian Ocean 

2851
02:02:54,399 --> 02:02:58,149
region uh in Bangladesh , in Sri Lanka , 

2852
02:02:58,160 --> 02:03:01,450
uh across the Southeast Asia , across 

2853
02:03:01,459 --> 02:03:03,859
the South Pacific , uh it pays 

2854
02:03:03,870 --> 02:03:07,509
dividends every single day has huge 

2855
02:03:07,759 --> 02:03:10,270
um impact on the ability of the theater 

2856
02:03:10,279 --> 02:03:12,390
to operate . And this , I say just at 

2857
02:03:12,390 --> 02:03:14,873
the appreciation level as the Pat Fleet 

2858
02:03:14,882 --> 02:03:17,772
Commander , if confirmed , I'll learn 

2859
02:03:17,783 --> 02:03:20,092
even more and go even deeper into the 

2860
02:03:20,103 --> 02:03:22,433
state partnership program . But as as 

2861
02:03:22,442 --> 02:03:24,498
Chairman Reed said , you know , I've 

2862
02:03:24,498 --> 02:03:26,331
got a lot of experience with the 

2863
02:03:26,331 --> 02:03:28,498
National Guard . So kind of a a lot as 

2864
02:03:28,498 --> 02:03:30,720
a function of the my time in Nuristan . 

2865
02:03:30,720 --> 02:03:32,275
So already a kind of a deep 

2866
02:03:32,275 --> 02:03:34,442
appreciation for what the Guard brings 

2867
02:03:34,442 --> 02:03:36,720
to the fight . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

2868
02:03:36,720 --> 02:03:36,542
Would you indulge me with one last 

2869
02:03:36,553 --> 02:03:39,292
question on aeromedical um evacuations ? 

2870
02:03:39,303 --> 02:03:41,414
Thank you , Admiral . I would love to 

2871
02:03:41,414 --> 02:03:43,556
talk about if um a medical evacuation 

2872
02:03:43,565 --> 02:03:46,985
of uh wounded um during uh uh a kinetic 

2873
02:03:46,996 --> 02:03:49,107
conflict , I would love to hear about 

2874
02:03:49,107 --> 02:03:51,218
your ideas to leverage our allies and 

2875
02:03:51,218 --> 02:03:53,385
partners in the region to address indo 

2876
02:03:53,385 --> 02:03:55,385
um pay coms a medical care capacity 

2877
02:03:55,385 --> 02:03:57,552
constraint if there were a conflict in 

2878
02:03:57,552 --> 02:03:57,516
the region because we talked at length 

2879
02:03:57,525 --> 02:03:59,414
about the tyranny of distance and 

2880
02:03:59,414 --> 02:04:01,525
there's no golden hour because it's , 

2881
02:04:01,525 --> 02:04:03,692
you're gonna have to fight your way in 

2882
02:04:03,692 --> 02:04:03,645
to get the wounded . You have to fight 

2883
02:04:03,655 --> 02:04:06,855
your way out . And even Guam or Tripler 

2884
02:04:06,866 --> 02:04:09,950
is still hours and hours away , sent it 

2885
02:04:09,959 --> 02:04:11,959
through wide travel throughout the 

2886
02:04:11,970 --> 02:04:15,120
theater . You know , over 37 years just 

2887
02:04:15,299 --> 02:04:17,355
haven't had the honor of visiting so 

2888
02:04:17,355 --> 02:04:19,859
many places . Uh And then uh among 

2889
02:04:19,870 --> 02:04:22,859
countries that actually have licensure 

2890
02:04:22,930 --> 02:04:25,049
uh here in the United States , we 

2891
02:04:25,060 --> 02:04:27,379
should be creative about how we're 

2892
02:04:27,390 --> 02:04:29,890
gonna think about delivering care uh 

2893
02:04:29,899 --> 02:04:32,259
particularly in environments with mass 

2894
02:04:32,270 --> 02:04:35,100
casualty among allies and partners . 

2895
02:04:35,240 --> 02:04:38,149
And so , in addition to looking after 

2896
02:04:38,160 --> 02:04:40,629
uh our capability at our naval and our 

2897
02:04:40,640 --> 02:04:43,700
military hospitals , uh we should also 

2898
02:04:43,709 --> 02:04:47,270
be constantly gaming on uh our medevac 

2899
02:04:47,279 --> 02:04:50,049
capability , our casa a capability , 

2900
02:04:50,060 --> 02:04:52,870
our csar capability , our getting 

2901
02:04:52,879 --> 02:04:55,212
patients to role two ro role one , role , 

2902
02:04:55,212 --> 02:04:57,720
two , role three care and being uh 

2903
02:04:57,740 --> 02:05:01,410
creative in the ways that we partner um 

2904
02:05:01,419 --> 02:05:03,586
across the theater . And you mentioned 

2905
02:05:03,586 --> 02:05:05,240
in our office call , uh the 

2906
02:05:05,250 --> 02:05:07,472
opportunities that could be gained from 

2907
02:05:07,472 --> 02:05:10,060
a partnership standpoint uh to train 

2908
02:05:10,069 --> 02:05:12,040
more deeply across that . And if 

2909
02:05:12,049 --> 02:05:14,319
confirmed , uh I pledged to work with 

2910
02:05:14,330 --> 02:05:17,080
you uh to bring that kind of creativity 

2911
02:05:17,089 --> 02:05:19,310
to bear against this . Really , our 

2912
02:05:19,319 --> 02:05:22,299
first duty as commanders is to look 

2913
02:05:22,310 --> 02:05:25,180
after our people . Thank you , Admiral . 

2914
02:05:25,319 --> 02:05:27,430
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you , 

2915
02:05:27,430 --> 02:05:29,541
Senator Duckworth Admiral . Thank you 

2916
02:05:29,541 --> 02:05:31,708
for your testimony today . Thank you , 

2917
02:05:31,708 --> 02:05:33,763
particularly you and your family for 

2918
02:05:33,763 --> 02:05:35,930
your distinguished service to the Navy 

2919
02:05:35,930 --> 02:05:37,763
and the nation . Uh We will move 

2920
02:05:37,763 --> 02:05:39,819
aggressively on this nomination . Uh 

2921
02:05:39,819 --> 02:05:41,640
With that , the hearing is concluded .