1 00:00:01,169 --> 00:00:03,910 All right , good afternoon . Everyone 2 00:00:04,039 --> 00:00:06,309 got a fair amount to pass along at the 3 00:00:06,320 --> 00:00:08,930 top here . So thank you in advance for 4 00:00:08,939 --> 00:00:12,250 your patience . Uh As you all know on 5 00:00:12,260 --> 00:00:14,079 January 8th , the Secretary of 6 00:00:14,090 --> 00:00:16,290 Defense's Chief of Staff directed the 7 00:00:16,299 --> 00:00:18,355 department's performance improvement 8 00:00:18,355 --> 00:00:20,521 officer and director of Administration 9 00:00:20,521 --> 00:00:22,466 and management to conduct a 30 day 10 00:00:22,466 --> 00:00:24,577 review to identify the relevant facts 11 00:00:24,577 --> 00:00:27,059 and circumstances related to Secretary 12 00:00:27,069 --> 00:00:29,250 Austin's hospitalization , January 1 13 00:00:29,260 --> 00:00:31,790 through five to evaluate the processes 14 00:00:31,799 --> 00:00:34,021 and procedures through which the Deputy 15 00:00:34,021 --> 00:00:36,188 Secretary of Defense was notified that 16 00:00:36,188 --> 00:00:38,299 she would carry out the functions and 17 00:00:38,299 --> 00:00:40,466 duties of the Secretary of Defense and 18 00:00:40,466 --> 00:00:42,188 to recommend recommend process 19 00:00:42,188 --> 00:00:44,410 improvements . The review was completed 20 00:00:44,410 --> 00:00:46,577 within the 30 day window and submitted 21 00:00:46,577 --> 00:00:48,632 to Secretary Austin who reviewed the 22 00:00:48,632 --> 00:00:50,799 document and signed out a memo today , 23 00:00:50,799 --> 00:00:52,799 February 26th to senior dod leaders 24 00:00:52,799 --> 00:00:54,577 outlining follow on actions the 25 00:00:54,577 --> 00:00:56,577 department will take in response to 26 00:00:56,577 --> 00:00:58,021 include implementation of 27 00:00:58,021 --> 00:01:00,243 recommendations contained in the review 28 00:01:00,909 --> 00:01:03,020 because the review includes sensitive 29 00:01:03,020 --> 00:01:04,742 details about the department's 30 00:01:04,742 --> 00:01:06,687 continuity of operations plans and 31 00:01:06,687 --> 00:01:08,742 personnel security . The drafters of 32 00:01:08,742 --> 00:01:10,742 the report wrote it as a classified 33 00:01:10,742 --> 00:01:12,849 document , classified version of the 34 00:01:12,860 --> 00:01:15,180 report has been shared with Congress as 35 00:01:15,190 --> 00:01:17,620 Secretary Austin has said we are 36 00:01:17,629 --> 00:01:19,685 committed to being as transparent as 37 00:01:19,685 --> 00:01:21,296 possible and sharing as much 38 00:01:21,296 --> 00:01:23,462 information about the 30 day review as 39 00:01:23,462 --> 00:01:25,573 possible . And today we are releasing 40 00:01:25,573 --> 00:01:27,740 unclassified summary of the classified 41 00:01:27,740 --> 00:01:29,907 30 day review written by the office of 42 00:01:29,907 --> 00:01:31,851 the Director of Administration and 43 00:01:31,851 --> 00:01:33,685 Management that summarizes their 44 00:01:33,685 --> 00:01:35,851 findings on the key events and related 45 00:01:35,851 --> 00:01:38,073 observations identified in the report . 46 00:01:38,250 --> 00:01:40,028 We are also releasing Secretary 47 00:01:40,028 --> 00:01:42,250 Austin's memo outlining the actions he 48 00:01:42,260 --> 00:01:44,038 is directing in response to the 49 00:01:44,038 --> 00:01:46,500 review's helpful recommendations . Of 50 00:01:46,510 --> 00:01:48,732 note . The review found that the Deputy 51 00:01:48,732 --> 00:01:50,843 Secretary was at all times positioned 52 00:01:50,843 --> 00:01:53,066 to perform all the functions and duties 53 00:01:53,066 --> 00:01:55,232 of the Secretary of Defense during the 54 00:01:55,232 --> 00:01:57,121 period of transfer from January 2 55 00:01:57,121 --> 00:02:00,029 through 5 2024 . It also identified 56 00:02:00,040 --> 00:02:01,980 several processes , process and 57 00:02:01,989 --> 00:02:04,100 procedural improvements that could be 58 00:02:04,100 --> 00:02:06,211 made as we highlighted . Last month , 59 00:02:06,211 --> 00:02:08,433 the department took immediate action to 60 00:02:08,433 --> 00:02:10,656 implement improvements to the processes 61 00:02:10,656 --> 00:02:12,378 and procedures employed when a 62 00:02:12,378 --> 00:02:14,156 designated official assumes the 63 00:02:14,156 --> 00:02:16,378 functions and duties of the secretary . 64 00:02:16,669 --> 00:02:18,891 The department also issued supplemental 65 00:02:18,891 --> 00:02:20,725 guidance to specifically require 66 00:02:20,725 --> 00:02:22,836 additional notifications to the White 67 00:02:22,836 --> 00:02:25,002 House and to clarify decision making . 68 00:02:25,002 --> 00:02:27,225 Regarding the need for an assumption of 69 00:02:27,225 --> 00:02:29,280 functions and duties , the Secretary 70 00:02:29,280 --> 00:02:31,169 and Deputy Secretary have already 71 00:02:31,169 --> 00:02:33,336 implemented two of the recommendations 72 00:02:33,336 --> 00:02:35,169 contained in the 30 day review , 73 00:02:35,169 --> 00:02:37,280 reaffirming their expectations around 74 00:02:37,280 --> 00:02:39,679 information sharing , staffing support , 75 00:02:39,690 --> 00:02:42,160 team relationships and understanding of 76 00:02:42,169 --> 00:02:45,279 any changes in process or staff support . 77 00:02:45,289 --> 00:02:47,511 When someone else assumes the functions 78 00:02:47,511 --> 00:02:49,400 and duties is Acting Secretary of 79 00:02:49,400 --> 00:02:51,729 Defense . Additionally , the chiefs of 80 00:02:51,740 --> 00:02:53,684 staff for The secretary and Deputy 81 00:02:53,684 --> 00:02:55,851 Secretary have issued written guidance 82 00:02:55,919 --> 00:02:58,210 and conveyed reporting expectations to 83 00:02:58,220 --> 00:03:00,679 make routine how information flowing to 84 00:03:00,690 --> 00:03:02,912 the secretary is shared with the Deputy 85 00:03:02,912 --> 00:03:05,440 secretary and immediate staff as 86 00:03:05,449 --> 00:03:07,505 outlined in his memo . There are six 87 00:03:07,505 --> 00:03:09,227 additional recommendations the 88 00:03:09,227 --> 00:03:10,838 secretary is directing to be 89 00:03:10,838 --> 00:03:12,838 implemented most within the next 90 90 00:03:12,838 --> 00:03:15,389 days . These actions are intended to 91 00:03:15,399 --> 00:03:17,910 ensure key department officials in the 92 00:03:17,919 --> 00:03:20,030 order of succession are familiar with 93 00:03:20,030 --> 00:03:22,899 relevant processes and procedures . And 94 00:03:22,910 --> 00:03:25,050 that mandatory reporting protocol is 95 00:03:25,059 --> 00:03:27,160 developed for personnel who provide 96 00:03:27,169 --> 00:03:29,179 support to the Secretary and Deputy 97 00:03:29,190 --> 00:03:31,190 Secretary of Defense related to 98 00:03:31,199 --> 00:03:33,380 situations or circumstances that might 99 00:03:33,389 --> 00:03:35,611 impact these leaders ability to perform 100 00:03:35,611 --> 00:03:37,389 their duties and functions . In 101 00:03:37,399 --> 00:03:39,455 addition , these actions require the 102 00:03:39,455 --> 00:03:41,649 department to review update and align 103 00:03:41,660 --> 00:03:43,438 internal reporting requirements 104 00:03:43,438 --> 00:03:45,660 associated with transfer of authorities 105 00:03:45,660 --> 00:03:47,827 situations relating to the Secretary , 106 00:03:48,119 --> 00:03:50,063 Deputy Secretary and others in the 107 00:03:50,063 --> 00:03:51,952 order of succession and to ensure 108 00:03:51,952 --> 00:03:53,897 continuity of operations plans are 109 00:03:53,897 --> 00:03:56,270 reviewed and updated as well . All of 110 00:03:56,279 --> 00:03:58,223 these actions demonstrate our deep 111 00:03:58,223 --> 00:04:00,001 commitment to strengthening our 112 00:04:00,001 --> 00:04:02,168 internal processes without delay . The 113 00:04:02,168 --> 00:04:04,335 Secretary Austin has repeatedly stated 114 00:04:04,335 --> 00:04:06,446 we are a learning organization and we 115 00:04:06,446 --> 00:04:08,223 will continue to strengthen our 116 00:04:08,223 --> 00:04:10,057 processes as we identify ways to 117 00:04:10,057 --> 00:04:12,399 improve upon existing procedures . The 118 00:04:12,410 --> 00:04:14,410 unclassified summary along with the 119 00:04:14,410 --> 00:04:16,466 secretary's memo can be found on the 120 00:04:16,466 --> 00:04:18,609 dod website . Finally , in support of 121 00:04:18,618 --> 00:04:20,618 multinational efforts to defend the 122 00:04:20,618 --> 00:04:22,618 lives of International Mariners and 123 00:04:22,618 --> 00:04:24,674 restore freedom of navigation in the 124 00:04:24,674 --> 00:04:26,896 Red Sea and surrounding waterways . The 125 00:04:26,896 --> 00:04:29,118 militaries of the United States and the 126 00:04:29,118 --> 00:04:30,951 United Kingdom with support from 127 00:04:30,951 --> 00:04:33,229 Australia , Bahrain , Canada , Denmark , 128 00:04:33,229 --> 00:04:32,959 the Netherlands and New Zealand 129 00:04:33,278 --> 00:04:35,789 conducted strikes February 23 against 130 00:04:35,799 --> 00:04:38,079 military targets in Houthi controlled 131 00:04:38,088 --> 00:04:40,779 areas in Yemen . Coalition forces 132 00:04:40,790 --> 00:04:43,140 targeted eight locations and struck 18 133 00:04:43,149 --> 00:04:44,820 targets which included Houthi 134 00:04:44,829 --> 00:04:47,051 underground weapon storage facilities , 135 00:04:47,051 --> 00:04:48,996 missile storage facilities one way 136 00:04:48,996 --> 00:04:51,329 attack unmanned aerial systems , air 137 00:04:51,339 --> 00:04:53,061 defense systems , radars and a 138 00:04:53,070 --> 00:04:54,959 helicopter to further disrupt and 139 00:04:54,959 --> 00:04:57,181 degrade the capabilities of the Iranian 140 00:04:57,181 --> 00:04:59,348 backed Houthi militia to conduct their 141 00:04:59,348 --> 00:05:01,514 stabilize , destabilizing and reckless 142 00:05:01,514 --> 00:05:03,681 attacks against us . And international 143 00:05:03,681 --> 00:05:06,014 vessels lawfully transiting the Red Sea , 144 00:05:06,014 --> 00:05:08,149 the Bab Al Mandeb Strait and the Gulf 145 00:05:08,160 --> 00:05:10,271 of Aden . It's important to highlight 146 00:05:10,271 --> 00:05:12,327 as well that the Houthis continue to 147 00:05:12,327 --> 00:05:14,327 demonstrate utter disregard for the 148 00:05:14,327 --> 00:05:16,327 regional and humanitarian impact of 149 00:05:16,327 --> 00:05:18,049 their indiscriminate attacks , 150 00:05:18,049 --> 00:05:19,993 threatening the fishing industry , 151 00:05:19,993 --> 00:05:22,216 coastal communities and imports of food 152 00:05:22,216 --> 00:05:24,079 supplies . As Secretary Austin 153 00:05:24,089 --> 00:05:25,867 underscored in his statement on 154 00:05:25,867 --> 00:05:27,978 Saturday , the United States will not 155 00:05:27,978 --> 00:05:30,033 hesitate to take action as needed to 156 00:05:30,033 --> 00:05:31,922 defend lives and the free flow of 157 00:05:31,922 --> 00:05:33,922 commerce in one of the world's most 158 00:05:33,922 --> 00:05:35,867 critical waterways . Again , we'll 159 00:05:35,867 --> 00:05:37,978 continue to make clear to the Houthis 160 00:05:37,978 --> 00:05:40,200 that they will bear the consequences if 161 00:05:40,200 --> 00:05:42,367 they do not stop their illegal attacks 162 00:05:42,367 --> 00:05:44,367 which harm Middle Eastern economies 163 00:05:44,367 --> 00:05:46,533 cause environmental damage and disrupt 164 00:05:46,533 --> 00:05:48,533 the delivery of humanitarian aid to 165 00:05:48,533 --> 00:05:50,756 Yemen and other countries . With that . 166 00:05:50,756 --> 00:05:50,440 I'm happy to take your questions . 167 00:05:50,929 --> 00:05:53,207 We'll start with Associated press Tara . 168 00:05:53,549 --> 00:05:55,605 Hi general writer , thanks for doing 169 00:05:55,605 --> 00:05:58,220 this . Um First on the 30 day review of 170 00:05:58,230 --> 00:06:00,510 reading the unclassified summary , 171 00:06:01,160 --> 00:06:03,160 you're left with an impression that 172 00:06:03,160 --> 00:06:05,382 this was just somewhat blameless , like 173 00:06:05,382 --> 00:06:07,549 just couldn't be helped due to privacy 174 00:06:07,549 --> 00:06:09,438 laws , but the secretary is not a 175 00:06:09,438 --> 00:06:11,382 private person . He six in line in 176 00:06:11,382 --> 00:06:13,660 succession to the presidency . How did 177 00:06:13,670 --> 00:06:16,299 privacy keep this information from 178 00:06:16,309 --> 00:06:18,829 getting to the commander in chief uh 179 00:06:18,839 --> 00:06:21,061 and getting , you know , why was that a 180 00:06:21,061 --> 00:06:24,399 reason ? Well , Tara , the , as the 181 00:06:24,410 --> 00:06:26,470 secretary has said , the buck stops 182 00:06:26,480 --> 00:06:28,647 with him and he's taken responsibility 183 00:06:28,647 --> 00:06:30,369 for not notifying in the , the 184 00:06:30,369 --> 00:06:32,702 President uh and the White House sooner . 185 00:06:32,702 --> 00:06:35,820 Uh and the review is also clear uh that 186 00:06:35,829 --> 00:06:37,773 there can be more guidance for how 187 00:06:37,773 --> 00:06:39,940 determinations are made , executed and 188 00:06:39,940 --> 00:06:42,959 communicated . Um But again , as the uh 189 00:06:42,970 --> 00:06:44,414 office of the Director of 190 00:06:44,414 --> 00:06:46,637 Administration and Management conducted 191 00:06:46,637 --> 00:06:48,637 this review , they found nothing uh 192 00:06:48,637 --> 00:06:50,859 during the review that demonstrated any 193 00:06:50,859 --> 00:06:52,970 indication of ill attempt , intent or 194 00:06:52,970 --> 00:06:55,192 attempt to obfuscate by the individuals 195 00:06:55,192 --> 00:06:57,269 involved . So , uh as you saw us do 196 00:06:57,279 --> 00:06:59,001 very quickly , uh we took some 197 00:06:59,001 --> 00:07:02,809 immediate steps to ensure that there 198 00:07:02,820 --> 00:07:05,049 were actions taken to improve 199 00:07:05,059 --> 00:07:07,489 communication with organizations such 200 00:07:07,500 --> 00:07:09,667 as the White House and the President . 201 00:07:09,667 --> 00:07:11,722 And you saw us demonstrate that most 202 00:07:11,722 --> 00:07:13,899 recently uh when the secretary visited 203 00:07:13,910 --> 00:07:15,970 Walter Reed on February 11 . And 204 00:07:16,000 --> 00:07:18,200 secondly , you know , yesterday , an 205 00:07:18,209 --> 00:07:20,450 active duty service member settled 206 00:07:20,459 --> 00:07:22,700 himself on fire in front of the Israeli 207 00:07:22,709 --> 00:07:25,899 embassy in protest of us support for 208 00:07:25,910 --> 00:07:28,350 Israel's operations in Gaza . Has the 209 00:07:28,359 --> 00:07:30,692 secretary been briefed on airman Vishal ? 210 00:07:30,692 --> 00:07:33,170 And is he concerned that maybe this 211 00:07:33,179 --> 00:07:36,250 airman's actions uh may indicate 212 00:07:36,260 --> 00:07:38,410 there's a bigger issue within the 213 00:07:38,420 --> 00:07:40,690 military as far as us support for this 214 00:07:40,700 --> 00:07:43,779 ongoing operation . Yeah . So uh the 215 00:07:43,790 --> 00:07:45,957 secretary is following the situation , 216 00:07:45,957 --> 00:07:48,123 I know the Air Force has confirmed the 217 00:07:48,123 --> 00:07:50,123 airman's death . Uh They do plan to 218 00:07:50,123 --> 00:07:52,346 provide additional information 24 hours 219 00:07:52,346 --> 00:07:54,346 after next of kin notifications are 220 00:07:54,346 --> 00:07:56,940 complete . Uh It certainly is a tragic 221 00:07:56,950 --> 00:07:59,440 event . Uh We do extend our condolences 222 00:07:59,450 --> 00:08:01,820 to the airman's family uh in terms of 223 00:08:01,829 --> 00:08:03,996 the incident itself , Tara , uh as you 224 00:08:03,996 --> 00:08:05,885 know , the DC Metropolitan Police 225 00:08:05,885 --> 00:08:08,051 Department has the lead for responding 226 00:08:08,051 --> 00:08:10,273 to questions about that incident . So , 227 00:08:10,273 --> 00:08:12,385 so anything on that , uh I , I'd have 228 00:08:12,385 --> 00:08:15,299 to refer you to , to them . But is the 229 00:08:15,309 --> 00:08:17,309 secretary concerned that this might 230 00:08:17,459 --> 00:08:19,403 indicate that there's a , a deeper 231 00:08:19,403 --> 00:08:21,880 issue , maybe the US military being , 232 00:08:21,890 --> 00:08:23,668 uh military personnel are being 233 00:08:23,668 --> 00:08:25,890 concerned about how uh weapons and 234 00:08:25,899 --> 00:08:27,899 support for Israel is being used on 235 00:08:27,899 --> 00:08:30,066 civilians in Gaza . Well , look from a 236 00:08:30,066 --> 00:08:32,010 department of Defense standpoint , 237 00:08:32,010 --> 00:08:35,150 since Hamas's brutal attacks on October 238 00:08:35,159 --> 00:08:37,215 7th , we've been focused on the four 239 00:08:37,215 --> 00:08:39,270 key areas that the secretary set out 240 00:08:39,270 --> 00:08:41,270 from the onset that's protecting us 241 00:08:41,270 --> 00:08:43,270 forces and citizens in the region . 242 00:08:43,729 --> 00:08:46,119 Supporting Israel's inherent right to 243 00:08:46,129 --> 00:08:48,296 defend itself from terrorist attacks , 244 00:08:48,296 --> 00:08:50,539 working closely with Israel to support 245 00:08:50,549 --> 00:08:52,771 and secure the release of hostages from 246 00:08:52,771 --> 00:08:54,827 Hamas and ensuring that the crisis , 247 00:08:54,827 --> 00:08:57,028 the conflict between Hamas and Israel 248 00:08:57,189 --> 00:08:58,967 doesn't escalate into a broader 249 00:08:58,967 --> 00:09:01,398 regional conflict . And so those 250 00:09:01,638 --> 00:09:03,999 objectives are what continue to inform 251 00:09:04,008 --> 00:09:06,064 our approach to the situation in the 252 00:09:06,064 --> 00:09:08,286 Middle East . And as we've talked about 253 00:09:08,286 --> 00:09:10,508 before , while our support for Israel's 254 00:09:10,508 --> 00:09:12,452 inherent right to defend itself is 255 00:09:12,452 --> 00:09:14,397 ironclad . We've also continued to 256 00:09:14,397 --> 00:09:16,508 actively communicate our expectations 257 00:09:16,508 --> 00:09:18,564 that Israel take civilian safety and 258 00:09:18,564 --> 00:09:20,619 humanitarian assistance into account 259 00:09:20,619 --> 00:09:22,675 into their operations . You see that 260 00:09:22,675 --> 00:09:24,730 incorporated into every conversation 261 00:09:24,730 --> 00:09:26,897 the secretary has with his counterpart 262 00:09:26,897 --> 00:09:29,230 in Israel as well as other us officials . 263 00:09:29,230 --> 00:09:31,119 And we expect them to continue to 264 00:09:31,119 --> 00:09:33,286 adhere to the law of armed conflict in 265 00:09:33,286 --> 00:09:35,452 international humanitarian law . We'll 266 00:09:35,452 --> 00:09:35,440 continue to do that , Jennifer uh 267 00:09:35,450 --> 00:09:37,672 General Ryder , what is the name of the 268 00:09:37,672 --> 00:09:40,309 person who conducted this investigation ? 269 00:09:40,500 --> 00:09:42,969 And is it a political appointee ? Uh 270 00:09:42,979 --> 00:09:45,799 the uh director of the Office of 271 00:09:45,809 --> 00:09:48,580 Administration and Management uh is 272 00:09:48,590 --> 00:09:51,229 Jennifer Walsh uh career civil servant . 273 00:09:51,409 --> 00:09:54,380 Uh so her and a small team of uh civil 274 00:09:54,390 --> 00:09:57,320 uh servants conducted this review , but 275 00:09:57,330 --> 00:09:59,500 it's independent of the defense 276 00:09:59,510 --> 00:10:01,399 secretary's office . It's not the 277 00:10:01,399 --> 00:10:03,621 office investigating itself , correct . 278 00:10:03,780 --> 00:10:06,890 Why was Secretary Hicks not told it 279 00:10:06,900 --> 00:10:09,067 would be a good idea to return to DC ? 280 00:10:09,609 --> 00:10:11,776 Well , as we've highlighted previously 281 00:10:11,776 --> 00:10:13,998 and again , the the unclassified review 282 00:10:13,998 --> 00:10:16,340 talks about this . Uh it was not 283 00:10:16,349 --> 00:10:18,405 uncommon under the procedures at the 284 00:10:18,405 --> 00:10:21,140 time to not include an explanation for 285 00:10:21,150 --> 00:10:23,317 the reason for transfer of authority . 286 00:10:23,419 --> 00:10:25,252 And again , as this unclassified 287 00:10:25,252 --> 00:10:27,475 summary highlights the secretary's team 288 00:10:27,475 --> 00:10:29,252 was faced with an unprecedented 289 00:10:29,252 --> 00:10:31,197 situation . And so they executed a 290 00:10:31,197 --> 00:10:33,308 transfer of authority in the same way 291 00:10:33,308 --> 00:10:35,419 that they had previously done . And , 292 00:10:35,419 --> 00:10:37,530 and I would also highlight there were 293 00:10:37,530 --> 00:10:39,697 several factors that came into play uh 294 00:10:39,697 --> 00:10:41,808 that the the review found limited the 295 00:10:41,808 --> 00:10:43,975 secretary staff , first of all medical 296 00:10:43,975 --> 00:10:46,049 privacy laws uh to include hipaa 297 00:10:46,059 --> 00:10:48,340 prevented medical providers from 298 00:10:48,349 --> 00:10:50,349 sharing candid information with the 299 00:10:50,349 --> 00:10:52,460 secretary staff about his condition . 300 00:10:52,530 --> 00:10:54,474 Second , for privacy reasons , his 301 00:10:54,474 --> 00:10:56,586 staff were hesitant to prior or share 302 00:10:56,586 --> 00:10:59,109 information that they did learn . And 303 00:10:59,119 --> 00:11:01,059 third , the secretary's medical 304 00:11:01,070 --> 00:11:03,950 situation uh was in a state of flux . 305 00:11:03,960 --> 00:11:06,182 Uh And so , for example , you know , it 306 00:11:06,182 --> 00:11:08,293 wasn't clear in the beginning if this 307 00:11:08,293 --> 00:11:10,349 was gonna be a one day visit , a two 308 00:11:10,349 --> 00:11:12,127 day visit . And so , uh we find 309 00:11:12,127 --> 00:11:14,182 ourselves several days later uh in a 310 00:11:14,182 --> 00:11:16,349 situation where again , the deputy was 311 00:11:16,349 --> 00:11:18,627 notified on , on the fourth of January , 312 00:11:18,627 --> 00:11:21,640 we've obviously , and as this summary 313 00:11:21,650 --> 00:11:24,030 highlights uh realize that there was a 314 00:11:24,039 --> 00:11:26,260 process improvement required . We took 315 00:11:26,270 --> 00:11:28,381 immediate steps on January 8th to fix 316 00:11:28,381 --> 00:11:30,381 that . And as you saw most recently 317 00:11:30,381 --> 00:11:32,714 when the secretary went to the hospital , 318 00:11:32,714 --> 00:11:34,809 uh of course , the reason uh that he 319 00:11:34,820 --> 00:11:36,653 was transferring authorities was 320 00:11:36,653 --> 00:11:39,250 communicated , but in terms of uh hi a 321 00:11:39,260 --> 00:11:41,371 it seems like this is a misreading of 322 00:11:41,371 --> 00:11:43,450 Hia , did his staff not know he had 323 00:11:43,460 --> 00:11:46,320 been moved to the IC U on January 2nd . 324 00:11:46,330 --> 00:11:48,580 And how many hours was there a gap 325 00:11:48,599 --> 00:11:50,821 between transfer the authority and when 326 00:11:50,821 --> 00:11:53,043 he was in the IC U , how many hours was 327 00:11:53,043 --> 00:11:55,159 there ? No head , uh no person at the 328 00:11:55,169 --> 00:11:57,391 helm of the defense department ? Yeah , 329 00:11:57,391 --> 00:11:59,960 there , there was no gap . Uh in terms 330 00:11:59,969 --> 00:12:03,159 of um when the uh 331 00:12:03,369 --> 00:12:06,530 transfer of authorities occurred . Um 332 00:12:06,849 --> 00:12:09,799 The secretary's team um 333 00:12:10,890 --> 00:12:14,799 recognized that uh because he was being 334 00:12:14,809 --> 00:12:17,739 admitted uh into the critical care unit . 335 00:12:17,979 --> 00:12:20,146 Uh and his doctor , first of all , let 336 00:12:20,146 --> 00:12:22,368 me back up . So on January 2nd , uh the 337 00:12:22,368 --> 00:12:24,760 secretary's doctor recommended that the 338 00:12:24,770 --> 00:12:27,030 secretary be moved into the critical 339 00:12:27,039 --> 00:12:29,206 care unit to receive a higher level of 340 00:12:29,206 --> 00:12:31,261 care . And so given the inability to 341 00:12:31,261 --> 00:12:32,872 provide the secretary timely 342 00:12:32,872 --> 00:12:35,150 communications in that medical setting , 343 00:12:35,150 --> 00:12:37,317 uh the secretary's aides agreed that a 344 00:12:37,317 --> 00:12:39,428 transfer of authorities to the deputy 345 00:12:39,428 --> 00:12:41,595 Secretary was necessary . So there was 346 00:12:41,599 --> 00:12:44,770 never any gap in authorities or command 347 00:12:44,780 --> 00:12:46,447 and control . The transfer of 348 00:12:46,447 --> 00:12:48,613 authorities was initiated , the deputy 349 00:12:48,613 --> 00:12:50,780 secretary was notified of the transfer 350 00:12:50,780 --> 00:12:52,724 and throughout the duration of the 351 00:12:52,724 --> 00:12:54,613 secretary's care at Walter Reed , 352 00:12:54,613 --> 00:12:56,558 either the secretary or the deputy 353 00:12:56,558 --> 00:12:58,669 secretary was at all times positioned 354 00:12:58,669 --> 00:13:00,891 to perform all the functions and duties 355 00:13:00,891 --> 00:13:03,169 of the Secretary of Defense . So again , 356 00:13:03,169 --> 00:13:05,224 just to underscore the secretary and 357 00:13:05,224 --> 00:13:07,336 the deputy Deputy were fully prepared 358 00:13:07,336 --> 00:13:09,447 to support the president as commander 359 00:13:09,447 --> 00:13:11,447 in chief at all times . Thank you , 360 00:13:11,447 --> 00:13:13,502 David . So the way you describe that 361 00:13:14,049 --> 00:13:17,979 it's the secretary's aides making this 362 00:13:17,989 --> 00:13:21,169 decision to turn it over was it was the 363 00:13:21,179 --> 00:13:24,880 secretary not in a condition where he 364 00:13:24,890 --> 00:13:27,700 could make the decision that oh , I'm 365 00:13:27,710 --> 00:13:29,821 going into the critical care unit . I 366 00:13:29,830 --> 00:13:32,059 won't have communications . I better 367 00:13:32,070 --> 00:13:35,840 turn it over . Uh again , uh 368 00:13:35,869 --> 00:13:38,799 The secretary's aides found themselves 369 00:13:38,809 --> 00:13:41,039 in an unprecedented situation . And so 370 00:13:41,049 --> 00:13:44,489 they uh once they recognized again that 371 00:13:44,500 --> 00:13:46,479 the secretary would not have the 372 00:13:46,489 --> 00:13:49,599 ability to access communications , uh 373 00:13:49,609 --> 00:13:52,130 They agreed that a transfer of 374 00:13:52,140 --> 00:13:54,251 authority to the deputy secretary was 375 00:13:54,251 --> 00:13:56,739 necessary . Uh And so again , they 376 00:13:56,750 --> 00:13:58,880 executed that transfer authority in 377 00:13:58,890 --> 00:14:00,890 accordance with the procedures that 378 00:14:00,890 --> 00:14:03,001 they had used previously . And at the 379 00:14:03,001 --> 00:14:05,168 time , they were making the decision , 380 00:14:05,168 --> 00:14:07,299 not the correct . And why wasn't the 381 00:14:07,309 --> 00:14:10,250 secretary again , as the secretary was 382 00:14:10,260 --> 00:14:13,159 admitted to the critical care uh unit , 383 00:14:13,309 --> 00:14:15,900 the aides recognized that he would not 384 00:14:15,909 --> 00:14:18,130 have access to secure coms . And so 385 00:14:18,140 --> 00:14:20,196 once there was a recognition that he 386 00:14:20,196 --> 00:14:22,196 was going to not have acc access to 387 00:14:22,196 --> 00:14:25,619 secure coms , they did uh a what 388 00:14:25,630 --> 00:14:27,741 standard procedure at the time was if 389 00:14:27,741 --> 00:14:30,019 the secretary is not gonna have access , 390 00:14:30,019 --> 00:14:32,186 let's go ahead and initiate a transfer 391 00:14:32,186 --> 00:14:34,241 of authorities which they did to the 392 00:14:34,241 --> 00:14:36,408 deputy secretary . So , again , no gap 393 00:14:36,408 --> 00:14:38,559 in command and control . Um And you 394 00:14:38,570 --> 00:14:40,919 know , the the bottom line here is that 395 00:14:41,099 --> 00:14:43,432 uh we to get kind of what you're asking , 396 00:14:43,659 --> 00:14:45,437 we take civilian control of the 397 00:14:45,437 --> 00:14:47,437 military , incredibly serious . And 398 00:14:47,437 --> 00:14:49,437 again , either the secretary or the 399 00:14:49,437 --> 00:14:51,326 deputy secretary was at all times 400 00:14:51,326 --> 00:14:53,548 positioned to perform all functions and 401 00:14:53,548 --> 00:14:55,492 duties of the Secretary of Defense 402 00:14:55,492 --> 00:14:57,826 throughout his duration in the hospital , 403 00:14:57,826 --> 00:14:59,881 there was , and again , there was no 404 00:14:59,881 --> 00:15:01,937 gaps we've obviously learned through 405 00:15:01,937 --> 00:15:04,103 this process uh and have made steps to 406 00:15:04,103 --> 00:15:06,326 ensure uh that processes and procedures 407 00:15:06,326 --> 00:15:09,530 are improved and out as outlined in the 408 00:15:09,539 --> 00:15:12,080 secretary's memo making the decision to 409 00:15:12,090 --> 00:15:14,034 transfer . He made the decision to 410 00:15:14,200 --> 00:15:15,969 transfer again . This was an 411 00:15:15,979 --> 00:15:18,750 unprecedented situation and the staff 412 00:15:18,760 --> 00:15:21,950 was doing uh the pro using the process 413 00:15:21,960 --> 00:15:24,127 and procedures that they have employed 414 00:15:24,127 --> 00:15:26,127 previously and again to the best of 415 00:15:26,127 --> 00:15:28,349 their abilities , ensuring that command 416 00:15:28,349 --> 00:15:30,516 and control uh that there were no gaps 417 00:15:30,516 --> 00:15:33,239 in command and control or no . I think 418 00:15:33,250 --> 00:15:36,500 I did answer the question . He was a 419 00:15:36,760 --> 00:15:39,580 compass able to make 420 00:15:41,409 --> 00:15:43,576 he was not unconscious at any point in 421 00:15:43,576 --> 00:15:45,742 time . But again , as his doctors made 422 00:15:45,742 --> 00:15:47,742 the decision to put him in critical 423 00:15:47,742 --> 00:15:50,690 care as the unclassified , unclassified 424 00:15:50,700 --> 00:15:53,609 summary highlights his aides recognized 425 00:15:53,619 --> 00:15:55,940 the fact that he would not have access 426 00:15:55,950 --> 00:15:57,909 to secure coms . So they made the 427 00:15:57,919 --> 00:16:00,280 decision to contact the deputy staff 428 00:16:00,349 --> 00:16:02,739 and to begin the transfer of authority 429 00:16:02,750 --> 00:16:06,539 process . One follow up on this on the 430 00:16:06,549 --> 00:16:08,438 question of time here and another 431 00:16:08,438 --> 00:16:10,660 question , how long did this process of 432 00:16:10,660 --> 00:16:12,827 realization take ? Because this points 433 00:16:12,827 --> 00:16:14,882 out that when he was in the critical 434 00:16:14,882 --> 00:16:17,105 care unit , quote , timely , security , 435 00:16:17,105 --> 00:16:19,327 communications could not be assured was 436 00:16:19,327 --> 00:16:21,271 this instantaneous ? Because if it 437 00:16:21,271 --> 00:16:23,327 wasn't , it seems there there was at 438 00:16:23,327 --> 00:16:25,438 least a a gap in complete command and 439 00:16:25,438 --> 00:16:25,380 control . As you said , there wasn't , 440 00:16:25,640 --> 00:16:27,973 yeah , there , there was no gap . Again , 441 00:16:27,973 --> 00:16:29,696 the review is pretty clear and 442 00:16:29,696 --> 00:16:31,862 everything that they looked at that at 443 00:16:31,862 --> 00:16:33,918 no time , was there a gap in command 444 00:16:33,918 --> 00:16:36,029 and control ? Either the secretary uh 445 00:16:36,029 --> 00:16:38,029 had the authorities as Secretary of 446 00:16:38,029 --> 00:16:40,251 Defense or the deputy secretary had the 447 00:16:40,251 --> 00:16:42,307 authorities and again , the staff uh 448 00:16:42,307 --> 00:16:43,973 was executing this process in 449 00:16:43,973 --> 00:16:45,584 accordance with the transfer 450 00:16:45,584 --> 00:16:47,640 authorities procedures that they had 451 00:16:47,640 --> 00:16:49,862 used at the time . Uh And so , um it is 452 00:16:49,862 --> 00:16:51,918 crystal clear in this report in this 453 00:16:51,918 --> 00:16:54,029 review that there was never any gap , 454 00:16:54,429 --> 00:16:56,485 will you be able to tell us how long 455 00:16:56,485 --> 00:16:58,651 between him going to critical care and 456 00:16:58,651 --> 00:17:00,873 the transfer of authority ? I , I'm not 457 00:17:00,873 --> 00:17:02,818 gonna get into a specific timeline 458 00:17:02,818 --> 00:17:04,929 other than there was no gap in the in 459 00:17:04,929 --> 00:17:06,985 the review uh made that very clear . 460 00:17:06,985 --> 00:17:09,151 And my other question was quickly on , 461 00:17:09,151 --> 00:17:11,207 on February 1st , when the secretary 462 00:17:11,207 --> 00:17:10,969 came here , he said there was no 463 00:17:10,979 --> 00:17:12,979 culture of secrecy . And yet as you 464 00:17:12,979 --> 00:17:15,090 pointed out , this says , quote , the 465 00:17:15,090 --> 00:17:17,312 staff were hesitant to pry or share any 466 00:17:17,312 --> 00:17:19,535 information that they did learn . Isn't 467 00:17:19,535 --> 00:17:21,868 that a culture of secrecy ? Yeah , look , 468 00:17:21,868 --> 00:17:24,189 I'm not gonna speak for why any 469 00:17:24,199 --> 00:17:26,439 individuals did or did not , you know , 470 00:17:26,449 --> 00:17:28,969 take certain and specific actions . I 471 00:17:28,979 --> 00:17:31,146 think we can all agree , you know , it 472 00:17:31,146 --> 00:17:33,849 is not uncommon for a natural human 473 00:17:33,859 --> 00:17:35,915 response when it comes to thing like 474 00:17:35,915 --> 00:17:38,380 things like medical care to default to 475 00:17:38,390 --> 00:17:40,849 a privacy setting . But the secretary 476 00:17:40,859 --> 00:17:42,748 also made clear during that press 477 00:17:42,748 --> 00:17:44,915 briefing that he acknowledges we could 478 00:17:44,915 --> 00:17:47,081 do better , that we will do better and 479 00:17:47,081 --> 00:17:49,303 that his office has a responsibility to 480 00:17:49,303 --> 00:17:51,248 be more transparent , which is why 481 00:17:51,248 --> 00:17:53,248 you've seen us significantly change 482 00:17:53,248 --> 00:17:55,470 procedures and processes to include the 483 00:17:55,470 --> 00:17:57,692 rec uh implementing the recommendations 484 00:17:57,692 --> 00:17:59,970 that have been outlined in this review . 485 00:17:59,970 --> 00:18:01,970 So just getting back to what , what 486 00:18:01,970 --> 00:18:04,137 David was , was asking , I'm trying to 487 00:18:04,137 --> 00:18:06,359 understand . So the secretary is in the 488 00:18:06,359 --> 00:18:08,581 hospital , I'm guessing he's being kind 489 00:18:08,581 --> 00:18:10,803 of whooshed into the critical care unit 490 00:18:10,803 --> 00:18:10,109 and is it because they couldn't reach 491 00:18:10,119 --> 00:18:12,341 him that he couldn't be the one to make 492 00:18:12,341 --> 00:18:14,119 the decision ? I mean , I don't 493 00:18:14,119 --> 00:18:13,989 understand why it is that the Secretary 494 00:18:14,000 --> 00:18:16,540 of Defense couldn't decide ? Ok , my 495 00:18:16,550 --> 00:18:18,717 deputy has to take over or was it that 496 00:18:18,717 --> 00:18:20,772 he was unwilling to cede command and 497 00:18:20,772 --> 00:18:22,883 that his staff intervened against his 498 00:18:22,883 --> 00:18:24,772 wishes or ? Yeah , I , I , I'd be 499 00:18:24,772 --> 00:18:26,828 careful about , you know , uh making 500 00:18:26,828 --> 00:18:28,828 assumptions as , as I understand it 501 00:18:28,828 --> 00:18:30,883 here . As I highlighted the doctor , 502 00:18:30,883 --> 00:18:33,150 the secretary's doctors recommended 503 00:18:33,270 --> 00:18:35,437 that he go into the critical care unit 504 00:18:35,437 --> 00:18:37,548 for a higher , higher level of care . 505 00:18:37,548 --> 00:18:40,300 At that point , his staff recognizing 506 00:18:40,310 --> 00:18:42,421 that he was going to be in a separate 507 00:18:42,421 --> 00:18:45,310 area , made the decision that because 508 00:18:45,319 --> 00:18:47,375 they would not be able to get to him 509 00:18:47,375 --> 00:18:49,375 with , with secure communications , 510 00:18:49,375 --> 00:18:51,319 they did what they typically do in 511 00:18:51,319 --> 00:18:53,375 these kinds of situations where he's 512 00:18:53,375 --> 00:18:55,541 not gonna have access to coms to say , 513 00:18:55,541 --> 00:18:58,260 ok , let's go ahead and initiate this 514 00:18:58,270 --> 00:19:00,869 process , contact the deputy secretary 515 00:19:00,880 --> 00:19:03,047 staff and start the procedures going , 516 00:19:03,047 --> 00:19:05,089 taking the initiative . Recognizing 517 00:19:05,099 --> 00:19:07,043 that , you know , the secretary is 518 00:19:07,043 --> 00:19:09,099 focused on getting health care right 519 00:19:09,099 --> 00:19:11,266 now and they just did what they needed 520 00:19:11,266 --> 00:19:12,988 to do . And again , the review 521 00:19:12,988 --> 00:19:15,321 highlighted that there can be some , uh , 522 00:19:15,321 --> 00:19:17,377 process improvements , uh , to , you 523 00:19:17,377 --> 00:19:19,488 know , and again , I'd refer you back 524 00:19:19,488 --> 00:19:21,710 to that . So they did what they thought 525 00:19:21,710 --> 00:19:23,877 they needed to do to ensure that there 526 00:19:23,877 --> 00:19:26,155 was no gap in command and control , uh , 527 00:19:26,155 --> 00:19:28,266 contacted the deputy secretary , uh , 528 00:19:28,266 --> 00:19:30,321 staff and initiated that process . I 529 00:19:30,321 --> 00:19:32,488 guess . What , what's weird is that it 530 00:19:32,488 --> 00:19:34,655 seems like it's the staff that decides 531 00:19:34,655 --> 00:19:36,821 who's the secretary of Defense at that 532 00:19:36,821 --> 00:19:39,043 moment and not the Secretary of Defense 533 00:19:39,043 --> 00:19:42,219 again , unprecedented situation . The 534 00:19:42,229 --> 00:19:44,229 secret is in the hospital receiving 535 00:19:44,229 --> 00:19:46,451 care . His doctors decide that it would 536 00:19:46,451 --> 00:19:48,562 make uh make sense for him to go into 537 00:19:48,562 --> 00:19:50,510 the critical care unit . The staff 538 00:19:50,520 --> 00:19:52,770 demonstrating initiative recognized if 539 00:19:52,780 --> 00:19:55,058 he's not gonna have access to his coms , 540 00:19:55,058 --> 00:19:57,224 let's go ahead and initiate a transfer 541 00:19:57,224 --> 00:19:59,391 of authority . Again , we've gone back 542 00:19:59,391 --> 00:20:01,558 and looked at this , we recognize that 543 00:20:01,558 --> 00:20:03,891 there are areas for process improvement . 544 00:20:03,891 --> 00:20:05,836 We've implemented those to include 545 00:20:05,836 --> 00:20:07,947 ensuring that there are uh you know , 546 00:20:07,947 --> 00:20:10,058 procedures in place for notifying why 547 00:20:10,058 --> 00:20:12,113 things are being transferred , who's 548 00:20:12,113 --> 00:20:14,280 making those decisions . Um So , and , 549 00:20:14,280 --> 00:20:16,447 and again , we've already demonstrated 550 00:20:16,447 --> 00:20:18,502 that as evidenced by his most recent 551 00:20:18,502 --> 00:20:21,069 hospital visit . Let me on Tara's 552 00:20:21,079 --> 00:20:23,760 question on , on , on the Air Force . I 553 00:20:23,829 --> 00:20:26,107 mean , or more broadly in the military . 554 00:20:26,107 --> 00:20:28,329 Have there been other acts of protest ? 555 00:20:28,329 --> 00:20:30,551 I mean , we know maybe not rising , the 556 00:20:30,551 --> 00:20:32,496 level of self immolation have been 557 00:20:32,496 --> 00:20:36,030 other services . I just wanted to ask 558 00:20:36,040 --> 00:20:39,719 about the report . Is there anything 559 00:20:39,729 --> 00:20:42,010 more that you can tell us or , or that 560 00:20:42,020 --> 00:20:45,109 it delved into or learned about the , 561 00:20:45,119 --> 00:20:48,989 um , the delay in notifying the 562 00:20:49,000 --> 00:20:51,209 White House specifically and why the 563 00:20:51,219 --> 00:20:53,052 President's staff didn't do that 564 00:20:53,052 --> 00:20:55,689 because it , it , you know , it , this 565 00:20:55,699 --> 00:20:57,477 doesn't seem to me like it , it 566 00:20:57,477 --> 00:20:59,477 necessarily addresses that UN , you 567 00:20:59,477 --> 00:21:01,589 know , is it just that this wasn't a 568 00:21:01,599 --> 00:21:03,710 requirement ? And that , so then that 569 00:21:03,710 --> 00:21:06,310 was part of the established , um , 570 00:21:06,319 --> 00:21:09,589 mechanism for , to a , it's II , I feel 571 00:21:09,599 --> 00:21:11,432 like that's one thing that isn't 572 00:21:11,432 --> 00:21:13,599 directly addressed and that seems like 573 00:21:13,599 --> 00:21:15,821 it was a significant part of that . And 574 00:21:15,821 --> 00:21:18,043 then I guess my second thing would be , 575 00:21:18,043 --> 00:21:20,099 you know , in terms of the questions 576 00:21:20,099 --> 00:21:22,210 about like , you know , the tiktok of 577 00:21:22,210 --> 00:21:24,432 the different moments and the questions 578 00:21:24,432 --> 00:21:27,390 that like , um um or in had , I mean , 579 00:21:27,400 --> 00:21:29,622 you know , if we can get some of that , 580 00:21:29,622 --> 00:21:31,900 that would be great because , you know , 581 00:21:31,900 --> 00:21:34,122 for the last five weeks or so we , we , 582 00:21:34,122 --> 00:21:36,178 the answer when we ask those kind of 583 00:21:36,178 --> 00:21:38,122 questions has been , this is under 584 00:21:38,122 --> 00:21:40,233 review , I can't address this because 585 00:21:40,233 --> 00:21:42,400 it's under review . And now this , the 586 00:21:42,400 --> 00:21:44,289 review is done and it adds no new 587 00:21:44,289 --> 00:21:46,344 information for us about the Tic tac 588 00:21:46,344 --> 00:21:46,280 and there's some pretty significant 589 00:21:46,290 --> 00:21:48,179 detail . So I don't know what the 590 00:21:48,179 --> 00:21:50,457 mechanism for that would be , but like , 591 00:21:50,457 --> 00:21:52,679 it doesn't seem like that should be the 592 00:21:52,679 --> 00:21:54,790 end of the conversation because , you 593 00:21:54,790 --> 00:21:56,846 know , we've been told now for , for 594 00:21:56,846 --> 00:21:58,957 weeks that that's the reason we can't 595 00:21:58,957 --> 00:22:01,012 get those , those facts and I just , 596 00:22:01,012 --> 00:22:03,179 I'm , I'm , I'm making an appeal for , 597 00:22:03,179 --> 00:22:05,346 for more information . Um either as it 598 00:22:05,346 --> 00:22:07,457 comes up or is it , you know , we sit 599 00:22:07,457 --> 00:22:09,679 down and we get the answers to those in 600 00:22:09,679 --> 00:22:09,000 a dedicated session or something like 601 00:22:09,010 --> 00:22:11,010 that . But it just feels like , you 602 00:22:11,010 --> 00:22:12,899 know , if , if , if the spirit of 603 00:22:12,899 --> 00:22:15,819 transparency , you know , is , is um 604 00:22:16,040 --> 00:22:18,290 supposed to be forthcoming , then , you 605 00:22:18,300 --> 00:22:20,522 know , I , I feel like we need a little 606 00:22:20,522 --> 00:22:23,900 bit more . That's ok . Thanks , Missy . 607 00:22:23,910 --> 00:22:26,132 Um So a few things . So , uh you know , 608 00:22:26,132 --> 00:22:28,180 in his press briefing earlier this 609 00:22:28,189 --> 00:22:31,380 month , Secretary Austin highlighted uh 610 00:22:31,390 --> 00:22:34,140 and took responsibility for the 611 00:22:34,160 --> 00:22:36,327 shortcomings when it came to notifying 612 00:22:36,327 --> 00:22:38,549 the President and the White House about 613 00:22:38,549 --> 00:22:40,660 his cancer diagnosis and acknowledged 614 00:22:40,660 --> 00:22:42,771 that we , the department can and need 615 00:22:42,771 --> 00:22:44,993 to do and will do a better job in terms 616 00:22:44,993 --> 00:22:47,104 of not notifying the White House . So 617 00:22:47,104 --> 00:22:49,049 we've learned from that we've made 618 00:22:49,049 --> 00:22:51,160 changes to those procedures and those 619 00:22:51,160 --> 00:22:54,010 are in place today . Um in terms of the 620 00:22:54,270 --> 00:22:57,630 uh transparency as it as it relates to 621 00:22:57,640 --> 00:23:00,329 this review . Uh as the secretary has 622 00:23:00,339 --> 00:23:02,172 said , we are committed to being 623 00:23:02,172 --> 00:23:04,061 transparent and providing as much 624 00:23:04,061 --> 00:23:07,000 information as possible . Um This 625 00:23:07,250 --> 00:23:09,760 unclassified summary was prepared by 626 00:23:09,770 --> 00:23:11,530 the office of the Director of 627 00:23:11,540 --> 00:23:13,979 Administration and management to uh 628 00:23:13,989 --> 00:23:17,079 capture unclassified information in the 629 00:23:17,109 --> 00:23:19,969 classified report . Uh The secretary 630 00:23:19,979 --> 00:23:22,930 came and talked to you uh earlier this 631 00:23:22,939 --> 00:23:25,410 month . Uh He'll be testifying on the 632 00:23:25,420 --> 00:23:28,229 hill to the hak later this week . Uh 633 00:23:28,239 --> 00:23:30,350 and as you know , there is an ongoing 634 00:23:30,350 --> 00:23:32,461 dod IG review which we are supporting 635 00:23:32,461 --> 00:23:34,810 and cooperating with Foley . Uh some of 636 00:23:34,819 --> 00:23:36,719 which may get to some of the the 637 00:23:36,729 --> 00:23:39,007 questions uh that , that you're asking . 638 00:23:39,130 --> 00:23:41,352 Um But again , I'd have to refer you to 639 00:23:41,352 --> 00:23:43,352 them . Follow up on the secretary , 640 00:23:43,352 --> 00:23:45,241 what Secretary Austin said in the 641 00:23:45,241 --> 00:23:47,352 briefing was that he did not instruct 642 00:23:47,352 --> 00:23:49,463 anyone on his staff not to inform the 643 00:23:49,463 --> 00:23:49,180 White House . So I still have the 644 00:23:49,189 --> 00:23:51,411 question of , you know what he said was 645 00:23:51,411 --> 00:23:53,522 he did not direct anyone on his staff 646 00:23:53,522 --> 00:23:55,578 to keep his hospitalization secret . 647 00:23:55,578 --> 00:23:57,800 And as we've as , as we've talked about 648 00:23:57,800 --> 00:24:00,022 uh in multiple briefings to include his 649 00:24:00,022 --> 00:24:02,089 briefing to include the findings of 650 00:24:02,099 --> 00:24:04,266 this review , there were shortfalls in 651 00:24:04,266 --> 00:24:07,729 the processes . And so again , uh we , 652 00:24:07,739 --> 00:24:10,530 we have acknowledged those uh all eight 653 00:24:10,540 --> 00:24:12,596 recommendations that are outlined in 654 00:24:12,596 --> 00:24:14,959 the 30 day review uh are highlighted in 655 00:24:14,969 --> 00:24:17,136 the secretary's memo which we provided 656 00:24:17,136 --> 00:24:19,302 today to include his direction that we 657 00:24:19,302 --> 00:24:21,469 will implement those recommendations . 658 00:24:21,550 --> 00:24:24,119 Nancy . I , I'm , I'm sorry , Pat I , I 659 00:24:24,130 --> 00:24:25,908 wanna just follow up on Missy's 660 00:24:25,908 --> 00:24:28,019 question and with all due respect , I 661 00:24:28,019 --> 00:24:29,852 don't think those questions were 662 00:24:29,852 --> 00:24:31,963 answered . You keep saying that there 663 00:24:31,963 --> 00:24:31,599 were shortfalls that you've made 664 00:24:31,609 --> 00:24:33,831 determinations . But I think what we're 665 00:24:33,831 --> 00:24:35,998 all saying is , I don't think it's for 666 00:24:35,998 --> 00:24:37,498 the department to make the 667 00:24:37,498 --> 00:24:39,720 determinations of what those shortfalls 668 00:24:39,720 --> 00:24:41,720 were . We were asking for the basic 669 00:24:41,720 --> 00:24:43,831 facts about what happened and what we 670 00:24:43,831 --> 00:24:45,887 keep hearing is , you've just said , 671 00:24:45,887 --> 00:24:48,109 now , a dod ig investigation is looking 672 00:24:48,109 --> 00:24:49,942 into this and therefore we can't 673 00:24:49,942 --> 00:24:52,165 release things . I think what we're all 674 00:24:52,165 --> 00:24:54,331 asking for is as precise as possible . 675 00:24:54,331 --> 00:24:57,380 Who knew what when ? And I , I think 676 00:24:57,390 --> 00:24:59,557 the challenge that we're all having is 677 00:24:59,557 --> 00:25:01,446 what we keep hearing both in this 678 00:25:01,446 --> 00:25:03,668 report and in your comments is that the 679 00:25:03,668 --> 00:25:03,439 department has made the determination 680 00:25:03,449 --> 00:25:05,560 that the head shortfalls , the dear , 681 00:25:05,560 --> 00:25:07,616 the department has assessed how it's 682 00:25:07,616 --> 00:25:09,560 going to address those . And we're 683 00:25:09,560 --> 00:25:11,505 never given an opportunity to just 684 00:25:11,505 --> 00:25:13,782 independently understand what happened . 685 00:25:13,782 --> 00:25:15,949 And so I , I just think we're owed the 686 00:25:15,949 --> 00:25:18,171 respect of the answer to the question . 687 00:25:18,171 --> 00:25:20,227 Why can't we know who knew what when 688 00:25:20,227 --> 00:25:22,393 and who made the determination of when 689 00:25:22,393 --> 00:25:22,189 information would be shared ? Because 690 00:25:22,199 --> 00:25:24,719 neither you uh answers with all due 691 00:25:24,729 --> 00:25:26,750 respect nor did this report answers 692 00:25:26,760 --> 00:25:29,290 that ? Yeah . No , thanks , Nancy again . 693 00:25:29,689 --> 00:25:31,689 You know , we are working to try to 694 00:25:31,689 --> 00:25:33,911 provide you with as much information as 695 00:25:33,911 --> 00:25:35,745 possible to be as transparent as 696 00:25:35,745 --> 00:25:37,689 possible about the findings of the 697 00:25:37,689 --> 00:25:40,589 review . Uh A again , I know it doesn't 698 00:25:40,599 --> 00:25:42,839 necessarily address your specific 699 00:25:42,849 --> 00:25:45,959 questions . But if we take a step back 700 00:25:45,969 --> 00:25:47,802 and look at what this review was 701 00:25:47,802 --> 00:25:50,000 focused on the relevant facts uh 702 00:25:50,010 --> 00:25:51,640 regarding the secretary's 703 00:25:51,650 --> 00:25:54,239 hospitalization and the process by 704 00:25:54,250 --> 00:25:56,520 which uh authorities were transferred 705 00:25:56,530 --> 00:25:58,586 from the Secretary of Defense to the 706 00:25:58,586 --> 00:26:00,252 Deputy Secretary of Defense . 707 00:26:00,252 --> 00:26:02,819 Recognizing by virtue of the fact that 708 00:26:02,829 --> 00:26:04,959 we initiated a review that there were 709 00:26:04,969 --> 00:26:07,136 some process shortfalls that needed to 710 00:26:07,136 --> 00:26:10,530 be addressed . And so uh we have tried 711 00:26:10,540 --> 00:26:12,429 to provide as much information as 712 00:26:12,429 --> 00:26:14,484 possible about why the secretary was 713 00:26:14,484 --> 00:26:16,262 hospitalized , the care that he 714 00:26:16,262 --> 00:26:19,020 received the process that was taken to 715 00:26:19,030 --> 00:26:22,000 transfer those authorities . Uh And to 716 00:26:22,010 --> 00:26:24,920 ensure that at all times , there was um 717 00:26:25,449 --> 00:26:28,069 uh a solid chain of command in terms of 718 00:26:28,079 --> 00:26:30,412 command and control with the department . 719 00:26:30,412 --> 00:26:32,790 Uh But then importantly , uh a primary 720 00:26:32,800 --> 00:26:34,911 focus of this review was where can we 721 00:26:34,911 --> 00:26:36,911 improve process wise to ensure that 722 00:26:36,911 --> 00:26:39,244 this kind of thing doesn't happen again . 723 00:26:39,244 --> 00:26:41,467 And again , I , I know this doesn't get 724 00:26:41,467 --> 00:26:43,578 to your specific questions . Um But I 725 00:26:43,578 --> 00:26:45,689 would just highlight it recently when 726 00:26:45,689 --> 00:26:47,967 the secretary went back to Walter Reed , 727 00:26:47,967 --> 00:26:50,078 uh you saw those process improvements 728 00:26:50,078 --> 00:26:52,133 playing themselves out . It's not to 729 00:26:52,133 --> 00:26:54,078 say that there's not additional uh 730 00:26:54,078 --> 00:26:56,300 process improvements uh in the future . 731 00:26:56,300 --> 00:26:58,522 Uh But again , you know , we'll , we'll 732 00:26:58,522 --> 00:26:58,290 keep you updated on that front , the 733 00:26:58,300 --> 00:27:00,467 determination , whether the guidelines 734 00:27:00,467 --> 00:27:02,689 spelled out are sufficient to make sure 735 00:27:02,689 --> 00:27:05,219 that this doesn't happen again . What 736 00:27:05,229 --> 00:27:06,896 do you mean ? There are eight 737 00:27:06,896 --> 00:27:09,062 recommendations . They include various 738 00:27:09,062 --> 00:27:11,173 forms of , we need to be more precise 739 00:27:11,173 --> 00:27:13,507 in our guidelines of transfer authority , 740 00:27:13,507 --> 00:27:15,118 how it works . Who makes the 741 00:27:15,118 --> 00:27:16,840 determination that's if that's 742 00:27:16,840 --> 00:27:19,062 sufficient or if they're not followed ? 743 00:27:19,062 --> 00:27:21,285 Yeah , you'll see in the memo , it , it 744 00:27:21,285 --> 00:27:23,118 talks about that there will be a 745 00:27:23,118 --> 00:27:25,285 regular review process . The secretary 746 00:27:25,285 --> 00:27:27,118 and the Deputy Secretary will be 747 00:27:27,118 --> 00:27:28,951 briefed by those responsible for 748 00:27:28,951 --> 00:27:31,007 implementing these recommendations . 749 00:27:31,007 --> 00:27:33,173 The implement is not happening the way 750 00:27:33,173 --> 00:27:35,229 it should . Well , the secretary and 751 00:27:35,229 --> 00:27:37,959 the deputy secretary . Ok . But I can , 752 00:27:37,969 --> 00:27:39,802 can I just ask that you take the 753 00:27:39,802 --> 00:27:41,747 following questions ? When did the 754 00:27:41,747 --> 00:27:43,913 chief of staff know that the secretary 755 00:27:43,913 --> 00:27:46,080 was hospitalized ? Who was , who did , 756 00:27:46,080 --> 00:27:48,302 who did the chief of staff inform , who 757 00:27:48,302 --> 00:27:51,050 else knew ? Well , you , so we already 758 00:27:51,060 --> 00:27:53,282 talked about that . She was notified on 759 00:27:53,282 --> 00:27:55,420 the second of January . Uh , it , it 760 00:27:55,430 --> 00:27:57,859 talks about in the unclassified summary . 761 00:27:57,869 --> 00:28:00,290 Um , the senior military assistant 762 00:28:00,300 --> 00:28:02,859 notified the chief of staff and , and 763 00:28:02,869 --> 00:28:05,036 I'd refer you back to the unclassified 764 00:28:05,036 --> 00:28:06,925 summary , but it , it talks about 765 00:28:06,925 --> 00:28:06,900 notified the chief of staff . She 766 00:28:06,910 --> 00:28:09,819 notified the deputy secretary staff on 767 00:28:09,829 --> 00:28:11,996 the , the fourth of January . Let me , 768 00:28:11,996 --> 00:28:14,760 let me get to Laura . Uh Thank you . Um 769 00:28:14,959 --> 00:28:16,959 I'm wondering , you keep , you keep 770 00:28:16,959 --> 00:28:18,681 saying , you know , there were 771 00:28:18,681 --> 00:28:18,599 shortfalls in the process and the 772 00:28:18,609 --> 00:28:20,776 review says there were shortfalls . So 773 00:28:20,939 --> 00:28:23,170 is anyone going to be reprimanded or 774 00:28:23,180 --> 00:28:25,290 fired because something clearly went 775 00:28:25,300 --> 00:28:27,660 wrong ? And I'm just wondering if , and 776 00:28:27,670 --> 00:28:29,670 there will be any repercussions for 777 00:28:29,670 --> 00:28:31,670 anyone that failed in their tasks ? 778 00:28:31,680 --> 00:28:33,624 Yeah , thanks Laura . So , so as I 779 00:28:33,624 --> 00:28:36,109 highlighted , uh , as the secretary 780 00:28:36,119 --> 00:28:38,319 said , the buck stops with him . Uh , 781 00:28:38,329 --> 00:28:40,589 he has said , and he recognizes that we 782 00:28:40,599 --> 00:28:42,543 should have done a much better job 783 00:28:42,543 --> 00:28:44,599 notifying those who should have been 784 00:28:44,599 --> 00:28:46,321 notified . I will say that the 785 00:28:46,321 --> 00:28:48,321 secretary is very proud of the team 786 00:28:48,321 --> 00:28:48,199 that he has supporting him . When you 787 00:28:48,209 --> 00:28:50,339 look at the review , it highlighted 788 00:28:50,349 --> 00:28:54,260 that there was uh no findings of ill 789 00:28:54,569 --> 00:28:57,060 uh will or , or ill intent or 790 00:28:57,069 --> 00:29:00,550 obstruction . Um but that people , 791 00:29:00,650 --> 00:29:02,594 public servants , dedicated public 792 00:29:02,594 --> 00:29:04,706 servants were doing what they thought 793 00:29:04,706 --> 00:29:06,650 was the right thing uh in order to 794 00:29:06,650 --> 00:29:08,761 continue to carry out the , the dod S 795 00:29:08,761 --> 00:29:11,369 national security mission . Uh And so , 796 00:29:11,380 --> 00:29:13,658 um I'll just leave it at that . Thanks . 797 00:29:14,219 --> 00:29:16,552 Then I'll get to the phone here , Megan . 798 00:29:16,552 --> 00:29:18,979 So the privacy concerns here , it seems 799 00:29:18,989 --> 00:29:21,045 like there's maybe a little bit of a 800 00:29:21,045 --> 00:29:23,211 misunderstanding about who is bound by 801 00:29:23,211 --> 00:29:25,267 HIPAA . The senior military aide was 802 00:29:25,267 --> 00:29:27,322 able to tell the chief of staff that 803 00:29:27,322 --> 00:29:30,800 wasn't a HIPAA violation . Um But so it 804 00:29:30,810 --> 00:29:33,032 would stand a reason , it wouldn't be a 805 00:29:33,032 --> 00:29:35,254 HIPAA violation to then turn around and 806 00:29:35,254 --> 00:29:34,479 tell the Congress or tell the White 807 00:29:34,489 --> 00:29:38,310 House . So my question is , what , what 808 00:29:38,829 --> 00:29:41,000 privacy laws are people adhering to ? 809 00:29:41,010 --> 00:29:43,420 Is there a change a clarification for 810 00:29:43,430 --> 00:29:45,597 what these privacy laws actually are ? 811 00:29:45,599 --> 00:29:48,599 Um And I if all of this was in place 812 00:29:48,609 --> 00:29:50,720 and these privacy concerns were still 813 00:29:50,720 --> 00:29:52,720 in place , what changed on Thursday 814 00:29:52,720 --> 00:29:54,942 when Os D then turned around and said , 815 00:29:54,942 --> 00:29:54,719 ok , now we tell the White House , now 816 00:29:54,729 --> 00:29:56,840 we tell Congress , now we tell Pat to 817 00:29:56,840 --> 00:29:59,118 put out a statement what changed there . 818 00:29:59,118 --> 00:30:01,340 Yeah , so to be clear what , what I'm , 819 00:30:01,340 --> 00:30:03,660 what I'm citing here is the review's 820 00:30:03,670 --> 00:30:05,719 findings in terms of how we got to 821 00:30:05,729 --> 00:30:08,719 where we got right , perceptions of 822 00:30:08,739 --> 00:30:11,530 medical laws , perceptions of , you 823 00:30:11,540 --> 00:30:14,579 know , I I need to protect the boss's 824 00:30:14,589 --> 00:30:17,160 privacy . Um And so again , we've 825 00:30:17,170 --> 00:30:20,010 learned from that and we've , the , the 826 00:30:20,020 --> 00:30:22,130 secretary himself has recognized the 827 00:30:22,140 --> 00:30:24,729 need for more transparency as it 828 00:30:24,739 --> 00:30:26,906 relates to the office of the Secretary 829 00:30:26,906 --> 00:30:29,017 of Defense and his duties . Uh And so 830 00:30:29,017 --> 00:30:31,880 again , you've seen us since this work 831 00:30:31,890 --> 00:30:34,930 very hard , uh particularly , for 832 00:30:34,939 --> 00:30:37,050 example , you know , working with his 833 00:30:37,050 --> 00:30:38,939 doctors to try to provide as much 834 00:30:38,939 --> 00:30:40,995 information about his medical status 835 00:30:40,995 --> 00:30:43,050 and condition when he does go to the 836 00:30:43,050 --> 00:30:44,883 hospital . Uh So again , I'm I'm 837 00:30:44,883 --> 00:30:47,050 offering what I'm highlighting here is 838 00:30:47,050 --> 00:30:49,161 what the review found in terms of why 839 00:30:49,161 --> 00:30:51,272 we got to where we get . So there was 840 00:30:51,272 --> 00:30:53,439 confusion about privacy and who should 841 00:30:53,439 --> 00:30:55,606 tell what when , what I also wanna lay 842 00:30:55,606 --> 00:30:57,328 out here is that it seems like 843 00:30:57,328 --> 00:30:59,383 throughout this entire process at no 844 00:30:59,383 --> 00:31:01,739 point , did the secretary think someone 845 00:31:01,750 --> 00:31:03,806 should tell my boss I'm not going to 846 00:31:03,806 --> 00:31:05,972 work tomorrow or possibly for the rest 847 00:31:05,972 --> 00:31:08,189 of the week ? Um And when he was going 848 00:31:08,199 --> 00:31:10,479 to be admitted to the IC U at no point , 849 00:31:10,489 --> 00:31:12,433 did he say someone should tell the 850 00:31:12,433 --> 00:31:14,489 Deputy Secretary of Defense that I'm 851 00:31:14,489 --> 00:31:16,822 going to be in the hospital for a while ? 852 00:31:16,822 --> 00:31:19,100 But this was all back to David's point . 853 00:31:19,100 --> 00:31:20,989 This is all being made by outside 854 00:31:20,989 --> 00:31:23,211 forces . I know the secretary has taken 855 00:31:23,211 --> 00:31:25,100 responsibility for what he did or 856 00:31:25,100 --> 00:31:27,267 didn't do , but I just want to be very 857 00:31:27,267 --> 00:31:29,489 clear that at no point , did he think I 858 00:31:29,489 --> 00:31:29,079 should tell my boss I'm not going to 859 00:31:29,089 --> 00:31:31,680 work and I should get my deputy um my 860 00:31:31,689 --> 00:31:33,800 authorities because I'm gonna be here 861 00:31:33,800 --> 00:31:35,800 for a while . Yeah , Megan . Well , 862 00:31:35,800 --> 00:31:38,022 again , I in part point you back to his 863 00:31:38,022 --> 00:31:40,245 comments in his press briefing where he 864 00:31:40,245 --> 00:31:42,356 highlighted the rationale , he wasn't 865 00:31:42,356 --> 00:31:44,467 making excuses . He was just offering 866 00:31:44,467 --> 00:31:46,356 an explanation in terms of why he 867 00:31:46,356 --> 00:31:48,356 didn't want to bother the president 868 00:31:48,356 --> 00:31:50,578 with that information . He also again , 869 00:31:50,578 --> 00:31:52,522 did not direct anybody to keep his 870 00:31:52,522 --> 00:31:54,633 hospitalization secret and counted on 871 00:31:54,633 --> 00:31:56,949 the staff to do , you know the jobs 872 00:31:56,959 --> 00:31:59,015 they do . And in terms , again , not 873 00:31:59,015 --> 00:32:00,737 making excuses , just offering 874 00:32:00,737 --> 00:32:02,792 explanations in terms of the staff . 875 00:32:02,792 --> 00:32:05,099 Again , recognizing through past 876 00:32:05,109 --> 00:32:07,165 procedures that were in place at the 877 00:32:07,165 --> 00:32:09,220 time when the secretary doesn't have 878 00:32:09,220 --> 00:32:11,442 access to secure communications , we're 879 00:32:11,442 --> 00:32:13,276 gonna do what we do , you know , 880 00:32:13,276 --> 00:32:15,498 military take initiative , go ahead and 881 00:32:15,498 --> 00:32:17,665 start doing this without necessarily , 882 00:32:17,665 --> 00:32:19,776 you know , uh thinking through uh the 883 00:32:19,776 --> 00:32:22,439 broader picture here . So again , uh we 884 00:32:22,449 --> 00:32:24,199 recognize there are areas for 885 00:32:24,209 --> 00:32:26,599 improvement . Uh The secretary's memo 886 00:32:26,609 --> 00:32:29,599 highlights the unclassified uh summary , 887 00:32:29,609 --> 00:32:31,665 highlights where those areas are and 888 00:32:31,665 --> 00:32:33,776 the steps that we're taking to ensure 889 00:32:33,776 --> 00:32:35,831 these kinds of things don't happen . 890 00:32:35,831 --> 00:32:37,942 Again , the secretary address that he 891 00:32:37,942 --> 00:32:37,229 didn't want to share his cancer 892 00:32:37,239 --> 00:32:39,849 diagnosis with President Biden as as so 893 00:32:39,859 --> 00:32:41,915 as not to burden him , but he didn't 894 00:32:41,915 --> 00:32:45,530 address that , that whether he , 895 00:32:45,540 --> 00:32:47,707 whether he thought it would make sense 896 00:32:47,707 --> 00:32:50,530 for him to have his staff say , hey , 897 00:32:50,760 --> 00:32:52,760 if you're looking for the secretary 898 00:32:52,760 --> 00:32:54,760 tomorrow President Biden , he's not 899 00:32:54,760 --> 00:32:56,927 here . Uh That's different than , than 900 00:32:56,927 --> 00:32:59,093 saying he didn't want to tell him that 901 00:32:59,093 --> 00:32:59,040 he had cancer . He , that was , this is 902 00:32:59,050 --> 00:33:01,217 a simple issue of saying I'm not going 903 00:33:01,217 --> 00:33:03,217 to show up to work tomorrow and you 904 00:33:03,217 --> 00:33:05,328 need to let my boss know all the rest 905 00:33:05,328 --> 00:33:04,930 of us . If we're not showing up to work , 906 00:33:04,939 --> 00:33:07,050 would be the first thing is you gotta 907 00:33:07,050 --> 00:33:09,383 make sure your boss knows where you are . 908 00:33:09,383 --> 00:33:11,383 Yeah . Again , look , I'd point you 909 00:33:11,383 --> 00:33:13,383 back to the classified summary that 910 00:33:13,383 --> 00:33:15,439 talks about some of the factors that 911 00:33:15,439 --> 00:33:17,606 contributed to that . Um Again , there 912 00:33:17,606 --> 00:33:19,550 was no finding of ill intent or an 913 00:33:19,550 --> 00:33:21,717 attempt to obstruct . Uh A lot of this 914 00:33:21,717 --> 00:33:23,839 was procedural . A lot of this was uh 915 00:33:23,849 --> 00:33:26,660 again , recognizing that , that we were 916 00:33:26,670 --> 00:33:28,900 doing things the way we had done them . 917 00:33:29,180 --> 00:33:31,469 Uh And so , you know , we're working 918 00:33:31,479 --> 00:33:33,701 hard to fix that and have already taken 919 00:33:33,701 --> 00:33:35,923 significant action uh to address that . 920 00:33:35,923 --> 00:33:38,090 Let , let me get a couple on the phone 921 00:33:38,090 --> 00:33:40,312 here . Uh Let me go to , uh Jeff Shog . 922 00:33:41,800 --> 00:33:45,250 Thank you . If Congress doesn't pass a 923 00:33:45,260 --> 00:33:47,630 spending bill by March 1st or March 8th . 924 00:33:47,640 --> 00:33:49,949 At what point do troops stop getting 925 00:33:49,959 --> 00:33:52,500 paid and death gratuities and other 926 00:33:52,510 --> 00:33:54,719 benefits for service members who die ? 927 00:33:54,790 --> 00:33:58,140 Would they cease ? Thank you . Yeah , 928 00:33:58,150 --> 00:34:00,428 thanks , Jeff . Um , obviously I don't , 929 00:34:00,428 --> 00:34:02,039 I don't want to get into the 930 00:34:02,039 --> 00:34:04,317 hypotheticals at this point . You know , 931 00:34:04,317 --> 00:34:04,209 we'll , we'll certainly , uh , you know , 932 00:34:04,219 --> 00:34:06,479 continue to work closely with Congress 933 00:34:06,489 --> 00:34:09,219 and hope , uh , that there is a budget 934 00:34:09,229 --> 00:34:12,310 passed . Um , I , I'd refer you to omb 935 00:34:12,320 --> 00:34:15,500 uh for any potential ramifications on 936 00:34:15,510 --> 00:34:17,843 the US government . But needless to say , 937 00:34:17,843 --> 00:34:20,010 uh , you know , we will certainly hope 938 00:34:20,010 --> 00:34:22,121 that a budget is passed . Um , let me 939 00:34:22,121 --> 00:34:25,388 go to Courtney . When did the S ma know , 940 00:34:25,398 --> 00:34:27,620 because I was under the impression that 941 00:34:27,620 --> 00:34:29,787 he found out . Well , I guess it's not 942 00:34:29,787 --> 00:34:31,731 clear in here , do you know ? Um , 943 00:34:31,731 --> 00:34:33,787 Courtney ? I don't , I don't have it 944 00:34:33,787 --> 00:34:35,842 right in front of me . But , uh , if 945 00:34:35,842 --> 00:34:38,176 you go back to the unclassified summary , 946 00:34:38,176 --> 00:34:40,231 I believe it , it highlights when he 947 00:34:40,231 --> 00:34:42,287 was notified . See it here . It says 948 00:34:42,287 --> 00:34:44,342 the secretary and deputy secretaries 949 00:34:44,342 --> 00:34:46,231 were team , um , multiple calls . 950 00:34:46,231 --> 00:34:48,342 Secretary , senior military assistant 951 00:34:48,342 --> 00:34:48,330 informed secretary's chief of staff and 952 00:34:48,340 --> 00:34:50,507 chairman of the joint chiefs about the 953 00:34:50,507 --> 00:34:52,396 hospitalization and to a , and he 954 00:34:52,396 --> 00:34:54,451 informed Deputy Secretary of Defense 955 00:34:54,451 --> 00:34:54,310 for public affairs , but I don't see 956 00:34:54,679 --> 00:34:57,429 when he was actually notified , did he ? 957 00:34:57,439 --> 00:34:59,495 And because we , we found out in the 958 00:34:59,495 --> 00:35:01,709 day or two after that he was , he did 959 00:35:01,719 --> 00:35:03,886 not go to the hospital that it was the 960 00:35:03,886 --> 00:35:05,663 junior military who went to the 961 00:35:05,663 --> 00:35:07,941 hospital with Secretary Austin . Right . 962 00:35:07,941 --> 00:35:09,608 Courtney , what I have in the 963 00:35:09,608 --> 00:35:11,830 unclassified summary is , is what I can 964 00:35:11,830 --> 00:35:11,689 provide at this point . It's just that , 965 00:35:11,699 --> 00:35:13,810 that seems like a strange one . We're 966 00:35:13,810 --> 00:35:15,699 finding out when other people are 967 00:35:15,699 --> 00:35:15,439 notified , why it's not included , 968 00:35:15,449 --> 00:35:17,671 right , when he was notified . Yeah , I 969 00:35:17,671 --> 00:35:20,005 think the , the key point here is again , 970 00:35:20,005 --> 00:35:22,620 uh we recognize procedurally process 971 00:35:22,629 --> 00:35:25,469 wise , uh improvements could be made . 972 00:35:25,770 --> 00:35:27,909 Uh and we are taking steps and have 973 00:35:27,919 --> 00:35:30,086 taken steps to improve those processes 974 00:35:30,090 --> 00:35:32,146 and procedures . But I think you can 975 00:35:32,146 --> 00:35:34,368 understand why that we still have a lot 976 00:35:34,368 --> 00:35:36,257 of like the press , you know , we 977 00:35:36,257 --> 00:35:35,770 covered this . Well , we still have 978 00:35:35,780 --> 00:35:38,002 questions about the timeline here and , 979 00:35:38,002 --> 00:35:40,224 and with all due respect this answers , 980 00:35:40,224 --> 00:35:42,224 none of them . I mean , most of the 981 00:35:42,224 --> 00:35:41,989 information about the timeline in here 982 00:35:42,000 --> 00:35:44,209 we were already aware of . So , II , I 983 00:35:44,219 --> 00:35:46,497 mean , unless I'm , I don't see . Well , 984 00:35:46,497 --> 00:35:48,663 again , I mean , part of this , uh you 985 00:35:48,663 --> 00:35:50,719 know , is the fact that we have been 986 00:35:50,719 --> 00:35:52,830 trying to provide as much information 987 00:35:52,830 --> 00:35:54,886 as we can as , as we get it . Um And 988 00:35:54,886 --> 00:35:57,108 you know , this uh unclassified summary 989 00:35:57,108 --> 00:35:59,330 is again , uh an effort to try to be as 990 00:35:59,330 --> 00:36:01,600 transparent as possible uh and provide 991 00:36:01,610 --> 00:36:03,832 you as much information as possible . I 992 00:36:03,832 --> 00:36:05,943 appreciate that . But again , I think 993 00:36:05,943 --> 00:36:08,166 the , the glaring question that remains 994 00:36:08,166 --> 00:36:10,277 is where was the vulnerability here ? 995 00:36:10,277 --> 00:36:09,810 So who was the person who knew that 996 00:36:09,820 --> 00:36:11,876 Secretary Austin was at the hospital 997 00:36:11,876 --> 00:36:14,042 had been taken by ambulance and didn't 998 00:36:14,042 --> 00:36:16,570 notify whomever it is . And we still 999 00:36:16,580 --> 00:36:18,802 even with , with , with this , we still 1000 00:36:18,802 --> 00:36:20,969 don't have an answer to that . And the 1001 00:36:20,969 --> 00:36:23,080 only thing that we know is that there 1002 00:36:23,080 --> 00:36:25,247 were some communications personnel and 1003 00:36:25,247 --> 00:36:27,302 security who went with them and then 1004 00:36:27,302 --> 00:36:29,524 fast forward to the next day when the S 1005 00:36:29,524 --> 00:36:31,747 MA is notifying people . Yeah , again , 1006 00:36:31,747 --> 00:36:31,600 at the , at this point , Courtney , I'm 1007 00:36:31,610 --> 00:36:33,721 not going to have anything to provide 1008 00:36:33,721 --> 00:36:35,777 beyond what's , what's in the review 1009 00:36:35,777 --> 00:36:37,999 there . Yeah . The other thing that the 1010 00:36:37,999 --> 00:36:40,054 report doesn't mention is whether or 1011 00:36:40,054 --> 00:36:42,166 not there was a transfer of authority 1012 00:36:42,166 --> 00:36:43,721 um December 22nd during his 1013 00:36:43,721 --> 00:36:45,832 hospitalization when I believe he was 1014 00:36:45,832 --> 00:36:48,054 under anesthesia . Can you confirm that 1015 00:36:48,054 --> 00:36:50,166 there was a transfer there was and we 1016 00:36:50,166 --> 00:36:52,277 have talked about that uh publicly in 1017 00:36:52,277 --> 00:36:54,443 the past , it's also included there in 1018 00:36:54,443 --> 00:36:56,666 the review . Uh And uh but yes , it was 1019 00:36:56,666 --> 00:36:58,666 and I'm assuming there is no gap in 1020 00:36:58,666 --> 00:37:00,832 authority and all of that . So then my 1021 00:37:00,832 --> 00:37:02,832 other question is there are several 1022 00:37:02,832 --> 00:37:05,054 mentions um in this and elsewhere about 1023 00:37:05,054 --> 00:37:06,943 uh the secretary being online and 1024 00:37:06,943 --> 00:37:09,054 responding to emails . Was there ever 1025 00:37:09,054 --> 00:37:11,195 any confusion about who was making 1026 00:37:11,205 --> 00:37:13,385 decisions when there was a transfer of 1027 00:37:13,395 --> 00:37:15,395 authority ? Yet , the secretary was 1028 00:37:15,395 --> 00:37:17,284 online answering emails and , and 1029 00:37:17,284 --> 00:37:19,506 working ? No , when , when the transfer 1030 00:37:19,506 --> 00:37:21,395 of authorities were made from the 1031 00:37:21,395 --> 00:37:24,610 secretary to the Deputy Secretary uh B 1032 00:37:24,790 --> 00:37:27,012 account , she's the acting Secretary of 1033 00:37:27,012 --> 00:37:29,439 Defense during that time . So , uh no 1034 00:37:29,449 --> 00:37:31,790 confusion in terms of who those 1035 00:37:31,800 --> 00:37:34,300 authorities uh were with . And then of 1036 00:37:34,310 --> 00:37:36,588 course , on the evening of January 5th , 1037 00:37:36,588 --> 00:37:38,754 the Secretary of Defense resumed those 1038 00:37:38,754 --> 00:37:40,532 authorities . And then one last 1039 00:37:40,532 --> 00:37:42,477 question , did she ever the deputy 1040 00:37:42,477 --> 00:37:44,532 secretary ever ask why she was given 1041 00:37:44,532 --> 00:37:46,477 the responsibilities ? Well , look 1042 00:37:46,477 --> 00:37:48,532 again as we've talked about uh under 1043 00:37:48,532 --> 00:37:50,754 the procedures at the time , it was not 1044 00:37:50,754 --> 00:37:52,810 uncommon for transfer authorities to 1045 00:37:52,810 --> 00:37:54,921 occur uh without an explanation . And 1046 00:37:54,921 --> 00:37:57,199 so uh as we've highlighted before this , 1047 00:37:57,199 --> 00:37:59,310 the Deputy Secretary was not informed 1048 00:37:59,310 --> 00:38:01,254 of the secretary's hospitalization 1049 00:38:01,254 --> 00:38:02,977 until January 4th . Again , we 1050 00:38:02,977 --> 00:38:05,088 recognize uh that there was a process 1051 00:38:05,088 --> 00:38:07,143 improvement to be made and made that 1052 00:38:07,143 --> 00:38:09,534 change uh right at the initiation of 1053 00:38:09,544 --> 00:38:11,544 this review . So any time there's a 1054 00:38:11,544 --> 00:38:13,766 transfer of authority now , it includes 1055 00:38:13,766 --> 00:38:16,215 uh an explanation as to why uh that 1056 00:38:16,225 --> 00:38:18,225 transfer has happened . And so that 1057 00:38:18,225 --> 00:38:20,336 will continue to be the process going 1058 00:38:20,336 --> 00:38:22,503 forward . I have time for a few more . 1059 00:38:22,580 --> 00:38:24,802 You keep calling , you keep saying that 1060 00:38:24,802 --> 00:38:26,858 this is an unprecedented situation . 1061 00:38:26,858 --> 00:38:29,080 But then you also keep saying that they 1062 00:38:29,080 --> 00:38:31,191 did what they typically do . I mean , 1063 00:38:31,191 --> 00:38:33,360 can you can you ? Absolutely . So , so 1064 00:38:33,370 --> 00:38:36,010 just to kind of give you an example . 1065 00:38:36,020 --> 00:38:38,209 Um and , and I , I know I've used this 1066 00:38:38,219 --> 00:38:40,275 in the past . So just bear with me . 1067 00:38:40,275 --> 00:38:42,497 But when the secretary was traveling uh 1068 00:38:42,497 --> 00:38:44,552 in the Middle East and went to visit 1069 00:38:44,552 --> 00:38:46,386 the US S Ford and he transferred 1070 00:38:46,386 --> 00:38:48,552 authority to the transport authorities 1071 00:38:48,552 --> 00:38:50,663 to the deputy secretary . So here's a 1072 00:38:50,663 --> 00:38:53,429 situation where his staff uh identifies 1073 00:38:53,439 --> 00:38:55,383 the fact that hey , you know , the 1074 00:38:55,383 --> 00:38:57,495 secretary is not going to have access 1075 00:38:57,495 --> 00:38:59,550 to secure communications . Uh And so 1076 00:38:59,550 --> 00:39:01,750 the the standard procedure would be uh 1077 00:39:01,760 --> 00:39:05,239 to initiate a transfer of authority . 1078 00:39:05,360 --> 00:39:07,360 So here's a situation now where the 1079 00:39:07,360 --> 00:39:09,360 secretary is in the hospital , he's 1080 00:39:09,360 --> 00:39:11,860 been admitted to the IC U uh and he's 1081 00:39:11,870 --> 00:39:14,037 not gonna have access to secure coms , 1082 00:39:14,040 --> 00:39:16,290 that , that's not what you would call a 1083 00:39:16,300 --> 00:39:18,600 precedented situation . He's not going 1084 00:39:18,610 --> 00:39:20,666 to the hospital into a critical care 1085 00:39:20,666 --> 00:39:22,943 unit , uh , on a regular basis . Right . 1086 00:39:22,943 --> 00:39:25,166 And I'm being facetious there . So , so 1087 00:39:25,166 --> 00:39:27,332 that's what I mean by an unprecedented 1088 00:39:27,332 --> 00:39:30,669 situation . But , uh , air of the , uh , 1089 00:39:31,179 --> 00:39:33,909 the , uh , airman Erin Bushnell , would 1090 00:39:33,919 --> 00:39:36,169 he be considered an extremist under the 1091 00:39:36,179 --> 00:39:38,840 Pentagon's definition of extremism ? 1092 00:39:38,850 --> 00:39:41,128 That , because I know this has been an , 1093 00:39:41,128 --> 00:39:43,350 it's been an issue for the Pentagon and 1094 00:39:43,350 --> 00:39:45,572 has he ever come up on the radar at all 1095 00:39:45,572 --> 00:39:47,979 in the past , Mike at , at this point 1096 00:39:47,989 --> 00:39:50,250 again ? Um You know , like I said 1097 00:39:50,260 --> 00:39:52,371 earlier , the air , the Air Force has 1098 00:39:52,371 --> 00:39:54,482 confirmed his death . I'm not able to 1099 00:39:54,482 --> 00:39:56,593 provide additional details about this 1100 00:39:56,593 --> 00:39:58,649 particular airman . Uh The Air Force 1101 00:39:58,649 --> 00:40:01,560 will uh after 24 hours from next of kin 1102 00:40:01,570 --> 00:40:03,737 notification . Uh Again , I would just 1103 00:40:03,737 --> 00:40:05,792 highlight that it , it's certainly a 1104 00:40:05,792 --> 00:40:07,681 tragic event . Um And again , our 1105 00:40:07,681 --> 00:40:09,459 condolences go to the film that 1106 00:40:09,459 --> 00:40:11,626 determines whether or not he's a quote 1107 00:40:11,626 --> 00:40:13,626 unquote extremist . I mean , at the 1108 00:40:13,626 --> 00:40:13,379 Pentagon . Yeah , I'm not going to 1109 00:40:13,389 --> 00:40:15,611 characterize the situation other than , 1110 00:40:15,611 --> 00:40:18,020 again , it's very , very tragic . Hey , 1111 00:40:18,030 --> 00:40:20,252 welcome back . I just want to follow up 1112 00:40:20,252 --> 00:40:22,560 quickly on Mike's first question um in 1113 00:40:22,570 --> 00:40:24,681 calling this unprecedented while this 1114 00:40:24,681 --> 00:40:26,903 particular case may not have happened . 1115 00:40:26,903 --> 00:40:28,626 Um It seems surely the sort of 1116 00:40:28,626 --> 00:40:30,681 contingency the Secretary of Defense 1117 00:40:30,681 --> 00:40:32,626 having to be out of pocket for any 1118 00:40:32,626 --> 00:40:35,750 unforeseen reasons is predictable one . 1119 00:40:35,760 --> 00:40:37,649 So you're saying that there is no 1120 00:40:37,649 --> 00:40:39,969 policy , no procedures in place in such 1121 00:40:39,979 --> 00:40:42,889 a contingency that no , I'm not , I'm 1122 00:40:42,899 --> 00:40:44,788 not saying that what I , what I'm 1123 00:40:44,788 --> 00:40:46,843 saying is , uh I mean , we certainly 1124 00:40:46,843 --> 00:40:49,010 have processes and procedures but this 1125 00:40:49,010 --> 00:40:51,679 particular situation highlighted uh 1126 00:40:51,689 --> 00:40:53,760 that some improvements needed to be 1127 00:40:53,770 --> 00:40:57,149 made . Uh And so we have embarked on uh 1128 00:40:57,159 --> 00:40:59,600 and this review was a key , that was a 1129 00:40:59,610 --> 00:41:01,610 key reason for this review is to go 1130 00:41:01,610 --> 00:41:03,666 back and look at those processes and 1131 00:41:03,666 --> 00:41:06,500 procedures uh and see where we could 1132 00:41:06,580 --> 00:41:08,802 potentially need to make some changes . 1133 00:41:08,802 --> 00:41:10,691 And , and as I've highlighted the 1134 00:41:10,691 --> 00:41:13,149 review found eight areas where we can 1135 00:41:13,159 --> 00:41:15,159 improve . And the secretary and the 1136 00:41:15,159 --> 00:41:16,992 deputy secretary have already uh 1137 00:41:16,992 --> 00:41:19,103 implemented two of those . Uh and the 1138 00:41:19,110 --> 00:41:21,221 secretary has directed that the other 1139 00:41:21,221 --> 00:41:24,370 six recommendations uh be implemented 1140 00:41:24,379 --> 00:41:26,601 and I highlighted some of those in , in 1141 00:41:26,601 --> 00:41:28,657 the top . Thanks , the unprecedented 1142 00:41:28,657 --> 00:41:30,949 nature of the situation and that being 1143 00:41:30,959 --> 00:41:32,959 the excuse for why people didn't do 1144 00:41:32,959 --> 00:41:35,100 certain things . It seems to me if it 1145 00:41:35,110 --> 00:41:36,943 was unprecedented and you have a 1146 00:41:36,943 --> 00:41:39,979 defense secretary in an IC U , who was 1147 00:41:39,989 --> 00:41:41,969 it who called down to the deputy 1148 00:41:41,979 --> 00:41:44,689 defense secretary who was on a beach in 1149 00:41:44,699 --> 00:41:47,409 Puerto Rico and not say it might be 1150 00:41:47,419 --> 00:41:49,290 time to come back even without 1151 00:41:49,620 --> 00:41:51,620 violating HIPAA . And talking about 1152 00:41:51,620 --> 00:41:54,290 what the uh secretary's condition was . 1153 00:41:54,300 --> 00:41:57,229 Why didn't anybody think to say it 1154 00:41:57,239 --> 00:41:59,461 might be a good idea to come back given 1155 00:41:59,461 --> 00:42:01,517 that it was unprecedented . Well , a 1156 00:42:01,517 --> 00:42:03,517 again , uh , Jennifer , I , I'm not 1157 00:42:03,517 --> 00:42:05,795 gonna have much to provide beyond , uh , 1158 00:42:05,795 --> 00:42:07,850 what's in the unclassified summary , 1159 00:42:07,850 --> 00:42:10,239 other than to say , uh , that when the 1160 00:42:10,250 --> 00:42:12,719 transfer of authority occurred , uh , 1161 00:42:12,729 --> 00:42:15,280 the secretary's , uh , military aides 1162 00:42:15,290 --> 00:42:17,800 notified the deputy secretary's staff , 1163 00:42:18,129 --> 00:42:20,073 uh , that a transfer authority was 1164 00:42:20,073 --> 00:42:22,185 going to occur . The deputy secretary 1165 00:42:22,185 --> 00:42:24,240 had full access to all the coms that 1166 00:42:24,240 --> 00:42:27,399 she needed , uh , to execute her duties , 1167 00:42:27,409 --> 00:42:29,742 uh , as the acting Secretary of Defense . 1168 00:42:29,979 --> 00:42:33,389 Uh And , um , you know , again , I , I 1169 00:42:33,399 --> 00:42:35,510 won't go over everything we've talked 1170 00:42:35,510 --> 00:42:37,677 about in the past in terms of when she 1171 00:42:37,677 --> 00:42:39,621 was notified about the secretary's 1172 00:42:39,621 --> 00:42:41,732 hospitalization , you know , she took 1173 00:42:41,732 --> 00:42:43,677 uh subsequent actions . Um , but I 1174 00:42:43,677 --> 00:42:45,955 think the key point here is at no time , 1175 00:42:45,955 --> 00:42:45,790 was there any gap in command and 1176 00:42:45,800 --> 00:42:47,967 control of the Department of Defense ? 1177 00:42:47,967 --> 00:42:49,911 We , again , as I've highlighted , 1178 00:42:49,911 --> 00:42:51,967 learned from this experience , we've 1179 00:42:51,967 --> 00:42:54,189 made changes already and we'll continue 1180 00:42:54,189 --> 00:42:56,356 to make additional changes to ensure , 1181 00:42:56,356 --> 00:42:58,522 uh , that we have better processes and 1182 00:42:58,522 --> 00:43:00,689 procedures going forward . All right . 1183 00:43:00,689 --> 00:43:02,578 Thank you very much . Everybody . 1184 00:43:02,578 --> 00:43:01,550 Appreciate it .