WEBVTT

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Committee meets today to receive

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testimony from General Anthony Cotton ,

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Commander of us Strategic Command on

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Stratcom and General Stephen Whiting

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commander of us Space Com or uh command

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us Space Command or spacecom .

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Gentlemen , thank you for your service

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to the nation and please extend our

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thanks to the men and women who serve

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with you . As in the past , we've asked

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the commanders of Stratcom and Space

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Com to testify together until 2019 .

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Spacecom was a part of Strategic

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Command as spacecom continues its stand

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up as an independent command . It is

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important to identify any gaps or seams

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that have emerged during the transition

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on the global stage . Russia continues

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to behave recklessly with regard to its

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nuclear weapons strategy . Recent press

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reports state that Russia is

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considering violating international

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Space treaties and endangering the

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global use of space for vital

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communications and sensing . Further .

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Putin has sabotaged the strategic

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stability and arms control policies

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that both our nations have respected

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for decades . Over the past year ,

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Russell has suspended its participation

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in the new start treaty and withdrawn

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its ratification of the Comprehensive

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Test ban treaty . Russia continues to

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develop new third strike nuclear

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weapons ranging from multi megaton

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underwater torpedoes to nuclear powered

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cruise missiles . At the same time ,

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China is also advancing its missile

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capabilities . China is quickly

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expanding its land-based missile silos ,

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building new air and sea nuclear

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delivery platforms and completing its

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nuclear command control and

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communications or NC three . These

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developments may have significant

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impacts on stability in Indo Pacific

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and America's extended deterrence

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commitment to our allies in the region .

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Simply put we are now in a trilateral

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nuclear competitors era . General

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Cotton . I would ask for your thoughts

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on how your command is handling this

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challenge and how you plan to adjust

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your force structure to deter both

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Russia and China while minimizing the

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potential for escalation . The United

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States is also well underway in its

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nuclear modernization cycle . A once in

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a generation effort to renew the aging

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legs of our nuclear triad as part of

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that effort . I understand the

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department is encountering such large

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cost increases in the Sentinel ICBM

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replacement program that there has been

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a non Murry breach , which means the

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program must undergo statutory reviews

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and an analysis of reasons for cost

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overruns . The fiscal year 2024 NDA A

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required an assessment of the

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operational impacts of these

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acquisition delays . And we would ask

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for an update on the situation .

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General whiting the threats to the

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United States and allied space systems

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continue to increase as we are seeing

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in Ukraine dominance in the

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electromagnetic spectrum plays a vital

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role in modern warfare . We have seen

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large swaths of the battlefield in the

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Ukraine inoperable due to GPS denial

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for precision weapons as well as the

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disabling of commercial satellite

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systems that both militaries use .

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China for its part , has invested

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heavily in jamming the electronic and

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kinetic technologies that could be used

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to disable our military and civilian

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satellites . We are in a race to

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dominate this field because any future

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conflict will involve a constant battle

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to control the spectrum and cripple the

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adversaries communications and command

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and control general Whiting . And I

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would ask for your perspective on the

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roles and vulnerabilities of these

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space systems as well as lessons

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learned from the conflict in Ukraine .

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Space Command recently announced that

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it's reached full operational

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capability . However , in my view ,

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full operational capability does not

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necessarily mean full mission readiness

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as a warfighting domain space requires

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new battle management capabilities ,

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especially the ability to detect a

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threat on space and to relay that

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information to a weapon system . This

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battle management directly affects our

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ability to protect troops on the ground .

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And spacecom must continue to integrate

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fully with the other combat commanders

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general . I hope you will update us on

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this concept and what the committee can

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do to help bring it to fruition .

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Finally , I would note that the missile

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defense mission was recently

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transferred from Stratcom to spacecom .

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This mission set has never been more

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important for our troops around the

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world as we have seen threats

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increasing in the Red Sea , Middle East

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and Ukraine . I would like to know how

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you are integrating missile defense

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into your command and what capabilities

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you need to protect our war fighters .

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Thank you again to all witnesses for

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appearing today . I look forward to

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your testimonies . I would note from my

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colleagues that there will be a

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classified briefing immediately

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following this session in SVC 217 to

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continue our discussion . Let me now

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recognize some ranking member , Senator

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worker . Thank you , Mr Chairman and

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thank you to the witnesses for their

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service . Last year's Congressional

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Strategic Posture Commission issued a

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report that was disquieting its

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conclusion was that the United States

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must fundamentally update our nuclear

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and space programs if we have any hope

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of countering growing threats from

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Russia and China .

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Unfortunately , the current

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administration has naively maintained

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the status quo . I am choosing my

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words carefully in making this

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statement while the United States has

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stayed complacent . Russia and China

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have advanced by leaps and bounds in

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their nuclear and space programs . As

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we enter the third year of Putin's war

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against Ukraine . Russia remains a

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major strategic threat to the United

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States . Moscow owns the world's

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largest , most modern nuclear arsenal ,

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giving it a 10 to 1 advantage over the

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United States in tactical nuclear

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weapons . Russia has also developed new

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weapons unlike anything in the US

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inventory , it stocks nuclear powered

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trends , oceanic autonomous torpedoes

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and intercontinental cruise missiles

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against such weapons . We are currently

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defenseless as bad as this sounds .

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China is rapidly becoming an even

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greater threat . Beijing is modernizing

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and expanding its nuclear forces at

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breakneck speed . It will likely

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outpace the United States in the early

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20 thirties already . It successfully

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deployed an operational strategic triad

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of nuclear missiles , bombers and

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submarines over the past three years ,

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China has tripled the size of its

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nuclear arsenal and built an ICBM

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network larger than our own . The

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Chinese have flown a missile that can

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drop nuclear warheads from orbit

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anywhere on earth with virtually no

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warning . Both Russia and China are

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also openly developing and testing

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counter space capabilities . Each

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country has used kinetic weapons to

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obliterate orbiting satellites

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when this is done , the blasts scatter

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thousands of debris fragments endanger

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hundreds of other satellites and

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preview a frightening future .

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Unfortunately , these aggressive

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actions only scratch the surface of

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their real capabilities . One would

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expect these threats to generate a

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sense of urgency in Washington .

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Today's nuclear and space danger should

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prompt us to reassess our assumptions

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about the threat environment and

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realign our resources accordingly .

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This is the unanimous recommendation

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of the bipartisan Strategic Posture

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Commission . The unanimous

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recommendation of this bipartisan

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commission instead , we see more of the

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same . The current administration

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consistently delays nuclear and space

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modernization programs . It uses to

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dawdle instead of actively confront a

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pair of dire truths , the United States

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nuclear capabilities are falling behind

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and the future of war will extend to

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space . Collaboration with Congress and

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the White House could replace that

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inaction with progress . We can start

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reclaiming lost ground by following the

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recommendations of the Strategic

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Posture Commission . The unanimous

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recommendations of this bipartisan

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commission , we must accelerate the

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National Security , National Nuclear

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Security Administration restoration of

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our basic industrial capabilities . The

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current slow pace is out of touch with

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reality . Likewise , we must make

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progress on the Sentinel , ICBM and

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Columbia submarine programs . These

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programs require sustained investment

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and innovation but the benefit is worth

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the price tag and the elbow grease that

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it will require the advances made by

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our adversaries demand both defensive

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and offensive military solutions . I

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would like to hear from our witnesses

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about how this committee can help

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create a sense of urgency when it comes

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to accelerating the modernization of

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our strategic arsenal and adapting our

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forces to the new threat environment .

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Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you uh

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Senator Worker uh General Cotton . Your

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comments , please . Good morning ,

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Chairman Reed , ranking member , rer

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and distinguished members of this

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committee . It is an honor to be here

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today alongside General Whiting and a

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privilege to represent the service

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members and civilians of United States

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Strategic Command . This is my second

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year appearing before you as a stratcom

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commander . You know , I'd like to

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thank this committee and Congress for

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their support , not only to National

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Defense but to my portfolio . I have

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submitted my posture statement for the

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record . The most important message I

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want to deliver today is that the

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forces under my command are ready to

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deter our adversaries and respond

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decisively should deterrent fail . No

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ad adversary should ever doubt our

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capability today . As a global war

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fighting command stratcom sets

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conditions across the globe as the

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ultimate guarantor of national and

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allied security , our forces and

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capabilities underpin and enable all

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other joint forces operations . We do

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this in the face of challenges unlike

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anything America has ever encountered .

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We are confronting not one but two

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nuclear peers , the Russian Federation

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and the People's Republic of China .

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This reality combined by missile

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developments in North Korea , Iran's

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nuclear ambitions and the growing

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relationships amongst those nations

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adds new layers of complexity to our

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strategic calculus . It also raises the

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possibility of simultaneous conflicts

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with multiple nuclear armed adversaries .

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The PR C is surpassing the United

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States and its number of fixed

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intercontinental ballistic missile

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launchers and projections indicate its

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nuclear arsenal would encompass

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approximately 1000 warheads by 2030 .

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As Russia's unprovoked invasion of

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Ukraine enters its third year . Its

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reliance on nuclear forces increases as

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its conventional forces . A trip

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beyond Russia's traditional strategic

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triad , it is expanding and modernizing

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nuclear options that are not covered by

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international arms treaties . Last

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Friday , President Putin stated that

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95% of Russia's strategic

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nuclear forces have been modernized .

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In short . Our competitors are

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improving their position against the

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United States and its allies in

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multiple domains at rates that are far

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exceeding the pace we've seen just a

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few years ago while our legacy systems

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continue to hold potential adversaries

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at risk , it is absolutely critical .

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We continue to speed at speed

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with the modernization of our nuclear

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triad including land-based ICBM S the

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B 21 the B 52 the Columbia

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class submarine , the nuclear sea

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launched cruise missile and LRSO

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as well as numerous related systems .

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While also focusing on the NC three

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enterprise with its upgrades and cyber

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security . I urge

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Congress to continue supporting these

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critical national security capabilities ,

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their associated infrastructure and the

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sustainment of legacy systems during

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the modernization period . Let me be

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clear while modernization will

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continue to be the priority . Stratcom

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forces are ready to fight tonight and

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my components will always be ready to

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fight tonight . So I thank you and I

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look forward to your questions . Thank

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you , Chairman . Thank you , General

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Cotton . Uh General Whiting , please .

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Chairman Reed , ranking member Wicker

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and members of the committee . Thank

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you for this opportunity to testify and

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I'm pleased to be joined beside my

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longtime friend , General Tony Cotton .

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I'm honored to represent the 18,000

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joint military and civilian

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professionals of United States Space

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Command and our five service components .

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Indeed , our people are the most

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valuable asset of National Space Power ,

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us Space Command , working with allies

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and partners has a moral responsibility

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to the joint force , the nation and our

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allies to provide space capabilities

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through all levels of conflict . Since

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Desert Storm , the joint force has

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become reliant on these systems and

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force sized according to the assumption

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of always having access to space

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capabilities . This is why us space

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command must protect and defend our

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space systems to ensure they are

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available in the face of the growing

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threats arrayed against us . Inherent

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in this responsibility is our ability

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to protect the joint force from space

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enabled attack our principal strategic

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competitors , the People's Republic of

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China and the Russian Federation now

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hold at risk . United States and allied

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space capabilities because they know

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our joint force relies on space to

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fight the way we want precisely

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lethally effectively and efficiently .

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To put it plainly . The Pr CS and

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Russia's actions have transformed space

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into a contested war fighting domain .

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Additionally , pr C military operations

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in particular have become increasingly

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enabled by space at all levels of

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warfare . And the People's Liberation

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Army is improving their terrestrial

15:11.251 --> 15:13.630
forces lethality and effectiveness by

15:13.640 --> 15:16.130
leveraging space capabilities . As of

15:16.140 --> 15:19.479
January 2024 the Pr CS intelligence

15:19.489 --> 15:22.409
satellite fleet contained more than 359

15:22.419 --> 15:24.960
systems , more than tripling its on

15:24.969 --> 15:27.650
orbit collection presence since 2018

15:28.080 --> 15:30.024
with their space and counter space

15:30.024 --> 15:31.858
systems , they have dramatically

15:31.858 --> 15:33.802
increased their ability to monitor

15:33.802 --> 15:36.859
track and target us and allied forces

15:36.869 --> 15:38.758
both terrestrially and on orbit .

15:39.380 --> 15:41.969
Russia also continues to develop test

15:41.979 --> 15:43.979
and demonstrate their counter space

15:43.979 --> 15:45.868
capabilities . Despite not having

15:45.868 --> 15:47.849
achieved their war aims from their

15:47.859 --> 15:50.390
invasion of Ukraine . This ongoing

15:50.400 --> 15:52.233
ground war has revealed military

15:52.233 --> 15:54.233
reliance on space and space enabled

15:54.233 --> 15:57.020
capabilities to be sure . Russia's war

15:57.030 --> 15:59.599
in Ukraine has established space as an

15:59.609 --> 16:01.442
indelible enabler of terrestrial

16:01.442 --> 16:03.880
warfare . Today , us space Command

16:03.890 --> 16:06.320
seeks to expand competitive advantage

16:06.340 --> 16:09.000
over PR C and Russia by leveraging

16:09.010 --> 16:10.621
every available asset of the

16:10.621 --> 16:12.621
interagency , the rest of the joint

16:12.621 --> 16:15.090
force , our allies and our partners in

16:15.099 --> 16:17.321
us , commercial industry and academia ,

16:18.179 --> 16:20.123
the United States remains the best

16:20.123 --> 16:22.457
military space power in the world . Yet ,

16:22.457 --> 16:24.568
our current architecture is optimized

16:24.568 --> 16:26.401
for operations in a benign space

16:26.401 --> 16:28.799
environment to ensure success in the

16:28.809 --> 16:30.979
contested space . Uh space environment

16:30.989 --> 16:33.659
we now find ourselves in . It is vital

16:33.669 --> 16:35.725
that us . Space command is delivered

16:35.725 --> 16:37.780
improved capabilities and capacities

16:37.780 --> 16:39.947
fully tested and would train personnel

16:39.947 --> 16:43.349
by 2027 . While a conflict in space is

16:43.359 --> 16:45.526
not inevitable , it would certainly be

16:45.526 --> 16:47.470
devastating and disrupt our use of

16:47.470 --> 16:49.692
space for decades . So we must be ready

16:49.692 --> 16:52.450
if deterrence fails . Simply put the PR

16:52.460 --> 16:54.739
C is moving breathtakingly fast in

16:54.750 --> 16:57.619
space . America must rapidly increase

16:57.630 --> 17:00.409
the timeliness quality and quantity of

17:00.419 --> 17:02.641
our critical National Space and missile

17:02.641 --> 17:05.400
defense systems to match China's speed

17:05.410 --> 17:07.930
and maintain our advantage with the US

17:07.939 --> 17:10.439
Space Force as well as the Army Air

17:10.449 --> 17:13.319
Force , Navy and Marines and other

17:13.329 --> 17:15.551
combatant commands and other agencies .

17:15.551 --> 17:17.329
Us Space Command has determined

17:17.339 --> 17:19.800
priority military capabilities required

17:19.810 --> 17:22.089
by 2027 to dominate in space

17:22.630 --> 17:24.829
specifically us . Space command's top

17:24.839 --> 17:27.061
five priority requirements that are key

17:27.061 --> 17:29.117
to delivering on our unified command

17:29.117 --> 17:31.170
plan . Responsibilities are one

17:31.300 --> 17:33.510
resilient and timely operational

17:33.520 --> 17:36.119
command and control . Two integrated

17:36.130 --> 17:39.050
space fires and protection , three

17:39.060 --> 17:41.430
modernized agile electronic warfare

17:41.439 --> 17:44.180
architectures , four enhanced battle ,

17:44.189 --> 17:46.530
space awareness for space warfare and

17:46.540 --> 17:49.079
five cyber defense of space systems .

17:49.670 --> 17:51.540
Absent commitment to long term

17:51.550 --> 17:53.272
investment in these integrated

17:53.272 --> 17:56.119
requirements . We risk seeing advantage

17:56.130 --> 17:58.297
to our principal strategic competitors

17:58.297 --> 18:00.880
in the space domain with delivery of

18:00.890 --> 18:02.779
increased capability and capacity

18:02.779 --> 18:04.959
assured us space command will attain

18:04.969 --> 18:07.839
the required enduring advantage over

18:07.849 --> 18:10.250
any adversary determined to conduct war

18:10.260 --> 18:12.719
in outer space , thus ensuring defense

18:12.729 --> 18:14.840
of our homeland and protection of the

18:14.840 --> 18:16.729
joint force and our allies . I am

18:16.729 --> 18:18.951
grateful for Congress's support to us .

18:18.951 --> 18:20.785
Space Command and investments to

18:20.785 --> 18:23.319
advance America's leadership in space .

18:23.339 --> 18:25.530
With your continued backing United

18:25.540 --> 18:27.484
States , Space Command will ensure

18:27.484 --> 18:29.599
space remains sustainable , safe ,

18:29.609 --> 18:32.949
stable and secure for all . Chairman .

18:32.959 --> 18:35.070
I have submitted my posture statement

18:35.070 --> 18:37.126
for the record and I look forward to

18:37.126 --> 18:39.292
your questions . Thank you very much ,

18:39.292 --> 18:41.459
General Whiting uh General Cotton . Uh

18:41.459 --> 18:43.459
What force structure changes do you

18:43.459 --> 18:45.459
anticipate in order to maintain our

18:45.459 --> 18:47.126
deterrence now that we have a

18:47.126 --> 18:50.439
trilateral nuclear competition with

18:50.449 --> 18:52.489
Russia and China ? Uh

18:54.359 --> 18:56.137
Can you comment on that place ,

18:56.760 --> 18:59.630
Chairman ? Um Yeah , that , that's the

18:59.640 --> 19:02.410
limit that , that II I walked into when

19:02.420 --> 19:04.476
I , when I took command of , of , of

19:04.476 --> 19:07.359
stratcom and as I said in the last

19:07.369 --> 19:09.091
posture hearing and even at my

19:09.091 --> 19:11.258
confirmation . That was one that I was

19:11.258 --> 19:13.480
gonna jump on as soon as I took command

19:13.480 --> 19:15.647
and took the flag . Uh What we've done

19:15.647 --> 19:17.709
is uh along with the comments of the

19:17.719 --> 19:19.886
ranking member in , in , in what we're

19:19.886 --> 19:21.663
seeing in the Strategic Posture

19:21.663 --> 19:24.439
Commission . Uh We have done work um

19:24.449 --> 19:28.109
internal uh to stratcom to see what is

19:28.119 --> 19:30.175
going to be the requirements in , in

19:30.175 --> 19:32.189
regards to what we need um as a

19:32.199 --> 19:34.939
fighting force . Um The N Pr actually

19:34.949 --> 19:37.310
gives me the opportunity to do just

19:37.319 --> 19:40.869
that . So , um I am staying within the

19:40.880 --> 19:43.390
confines of uh the administration . Um

19:43.400 --> 19:45.456
when the N Pr says that , you know ,

19:45.456 --> 19:48.579
what we want to have is AAA try a try

19:48.589 --> 19:52.459
Triad . Um I absolutely agree

19:52.469 --> 19:54.636
with that notion that we must maintain

19:54.636 --> 19:57.540
a triad . Um I absolutely agree that

19:57.550 --> 20:00.489
there's time now time for us to look to

20:00.500 --> 20:02.760
see what do we do with the program of

20:02.770 --> 20:05.239
record that we currently have um to

20:05.250 --> 20:08.630
ensure that I can cover uh not only one

20:08.640 --> 20:11.680
nuclear adversary but two . So within

20:11.689 --> 20:13.859
all legs of the triad , we're having

20:13.869 --> 20:16.520
that conversation right now . Um And

20:16.530 --> 20:18.752
there's actually studies that are going

20:18.752 --> 20:21.020
on in which my teammates are part of um

20:21.030 --> 20:23.479
at Stratcom within the Department of

20:23.489 --> 20:26.050
Defense . Um that goes after looking at

20:26.060 --> 20:27.949
the recommendations um that the

20:27.959 --> 20:30.015
Strategic Posture Commission um that

20:30.015 --> 20:31.903
validates many of the , the , the

20:31.903 --> 20:34.270
notions that uh Stratcom came up with

20:34.280 --> 20:36.447
even before the release of the Posture

20:36.447 --> 20:38.447
Commission . Thank you . Uh General

20:38.447 --> 20:41.089
Whiting . Uh you reached a full

20:41.099 --> 20:44.569
operational uh capability in

20:44.579 --> 20:46.859
December , which is welcome . News .

20:46.869 --> 20:50.000
Congratulations . However , uh the

20:50.010 --> 20:52.689
question is adequate readiness far to

20:52.709 --> 20:55.020
support your operational capabilities .

20:55.349 --> 20:57.619
They are two different topics . Uh Are

20:57.630 --> 20:59.408
there particular areas that the

20:59.408 --> 21:01.574
committee should be aware of that ? Uh

21:01.574 --> 21:04.099
readiness must be enhanced ? Senator ?

21:04.109 --> 21:06.220
Thank you for the question . Uh Yes ,

21:06.220 --> 21:08.387
my predecessor , General Jim Dickinson

21:08.387 --> 21:10.720
declared uh full operational capability ,

21:10.720 --> 21:12.831
as you noted . And that was really to

21:12.831 --> 21:12.260
say that our headquarters now can

21:12.270 --> 21:14.048
function as the other combatant

21:14.048 --> 21:15.881
commands and execute our primary

21:15.881 --> 21:17.992
responsibilities as laid out in title

21:17.992 --> 21:20.048
10 and in the Unified Command plan .

21:20.050 --> 21:22.383
But as I noted in the opening statement ,

21:22.383 --> 21:24.800
our forces today are optimized for a

21:24.810 --> 21:27.729
benign space environment . The systems

21:27.739 --> 21:29.850
were either built or the requirements

21:29.850 --> 21:31.906
were largely laid down during a time

21:31.906 --> 21:33.961
when we didn't face the threats . We

21:33.961 --> 21:35.906
now see . So now we really have to

21:35.906 --> 21:37.739
focus on making sure we have the

21:37.739 --> 21:39.628
systems to protect and defend our

21:39.628 --> 21:41.795
existing architectures even as we make

21:41.795 --> 21:41.540
our current architectures more

21:41.550 --> 21:43.717
resilient and that we have the systems

21:43.717 --> 21:45.717
to protect the joint force from the

21:45.717 --> 21:47.772
space enabling capabilities . We now

21:47.772 --> 21:49.660
see the PR C uh developing , for

21:49.670 --> 21:51.837
example . And then we have to have the

21:51.837 --> 21:54.059
testing capabilities to assure us those

21:54.059 --> 21:56.170
new system will work and the training

21:56.170 --> 21:58.226
capabilities . So our personnel have

21:58.226 --> 22:00.392
the , the reps and sets if you will to

22:00.392 --> 22:02.614
be ready to go . So that's really where

22:02.614 --> 22:02.489
we need to focus is on continuing to

22:02.500 --> 22:04.689
deliver capability to allow us to

22:04.699 --> 22:06.755
operate in the contested domain . We

22:06.755 --> 22:08.921
now find ourselves in . Thank you . Uh

22:08.921 --> 22:12.329
General Go . Uh The Sentinel

22:12.339 --> 22:14.969
program is encountering difficulties .

22:14.979 --> 22:18.400
Um The uh Columbia program

22:18.410 --> 22:22.079
is uh uh slowing down

22:22.089 --> 22:25.560
rather than speeding up . Uh We have ,

22:25.569 --> 22:27.920
I think some good news with the B 21 .

22:28.199 --> 22:32.140
Uh But uh on the base of mission is

22:32.150 --> 22:34.800
to maintain a triad and not uh

22:35.630 --> 22:38.719
something less . Uh Can you comment as

22:38.729 --> 22:40.729
particularly with respect to the

22:41.199 --> 22:44.130
Sentinel program ? Uh in terms of what

22:44.140 --> 22:46.362
we have to do at this juncture , I know

22:46.362 --> 22:50.079
they're still evaluating it . Chairman ,

22:50.089 --> 22:52.200
thank you for the question in regards

22:52.200 --> 22:54.311
to Sentinel and , and where it stands

22:54.311 --> 22:56.533
with none MCC mccurdy . Um I think I'll

22:56.533 --> 22:59.260
answer it this way . Um There is no

22:59.270 --> 23:01.159
change in the requirements that I

23:01.159 --> 23:03.326
currently have on the modernization of

23:03.326 --> 23:05.159
all three legs of the triad that

23:05.159 --> 23:08.170
absolutely has to be done . And um and

23:08.180 --> 23:10.180
I think what's really important for

23:10.180 --> 23:12.124
folks to understand is I think I'm

23:12.124 --> 23:14.291
probably the only combatant command um

23:14.291 --> 23:16.790
that can't have a gap in my

23:16.800 --> 23:19.150
capabilities uh because a gap in my

23:19.160 --> 23:22.750
capabilities , um credibility um AAA as

23:22.760 --> 23:24.760
well as safe , secure and effective

23:24.760 --> 23:26.839
weapon systems um is key and

23:26.849 --> 23:30.800
foundational deterrence . Um So , so

23:30.920 --> 23:34.099
as you talk about all three legs um

23:34.109 --> 23:37.420
going into potential delays , we must

23:37.430 --> 23:39.900
ensure that we never have a gap in the

23:39.910 --> 23:41.966
cap capabilities amongst those three

23:41.966 --> 23:44.810
legs of the triad . Um And , and , and ,

23:44.819 --> 23:48.339
and that's what I um look and study

23:48.349 --> 23:50.293
every single day to ensure that we

23:50.293 --> 23:52.405
don't create a gap um in that mission

23:52.405 --> 23:54.571
set amongst whether it's land , sea or

23:54.571 --> 23:57.329
the air leg . Thank you , Senator

23:57.339 --> 24:01.239
Worker , please . Well , let's just

24:01.250 --> 24:04.209
follow up on that um with regard to the

24:04.219 --> 24:06.670
Triad General Cotton and I appreciate

24:06.680 --> 24:10.339
you meeting with us um earlier to

24:10.349 --> 24:13.410
discuss this . So we , so we , we've

24:13.420 --> 24:17.099
got the land based and um

24:17.119 --> 24:19.780
and , and the air based , let's talk

24:19.790 --> 24:23.339
about sea based and your testimony

24:23.349 --> 24:27.079
uh points out that it involves the Ohio

24:27.089 --> 24:30.329
class SSBN fleet , right ? And the

24:30.339 --> 24:33.819
trident to uh D five strategic weapon

24:33.829 --> 24:36.599
system SWS um

24:38.579 --> 24:41.050
where are we , where we need to be on

24:41.060 --> 24:42.060
that ?

24:45.170 --> 24:47.939
So all three legs of the triad are ,

24:47.949 --> 24:50.760
are , are , are past system life . Um

24:51.270 --> 24:53.492
The good news is the men and women that

24:53.492 --> 24:55.326
are , that are maintaining those

24:55.326 --> 24:57.569
systems um are are doing an incredible

24:57.579 --> 25:01.540
job uh to do that , the

25:01.550 --> 25:03.717
problem we face and the problem that I

25:03.717 --> 25:05.939
have to encounter every single day with

25:05.939 --> 25:08.161
legacy systems is to ensure that I have

25:08.161 --> 25:10.689
the required numbers of , of SSBNS that

25:10.699 --> 25:12.810
are available as well as the required

25:12.810 --> 25:14.866
number of weapons that are available

25:14.866 --> 25:17.739
for the SSBN fleet as we make the

25:17.750 --> 25:21.550
transition to the Columbia class . Um

25:21.560 --> 25:23.782
As I mentioned to the chairman , what's

25:23.782 --> 25:25.727
gonna be incredibly important . Um

25:25.727 --> 25:29.099
Senator is that we ensure that there's

25:29.109 --> 25:31.410
no gap between the transition of the

25:31.420 --> 25:33.859
Ohio class weapon system to the

25:33.869 --> 25:36.810
Columbia class weapon system . Well ,

25:36.819 --> 25:39.800
yes . And so there's uh at , at least

25:39.810 --> 25:43.369
with regard to this , there's no um ,

25:43.380 --> 25:46.329
talk or there's no feeling in your mind

25:46.339 --> 25:49.479
that we can divest so we can later

25:49.489 --> 25:51.979
invest . That's nonsense when it comes

25:51.989 --> 25:55.670
to what you're talking about . That .

25:55.680 --> 25:57.791
That is correct . That , that's why I

25:57.791 --> 25:59.958
made that statement on ensuring that I

25:59.958 --> 26:02.130
don't create a gap as we do the

26:02.140 --> 26:04.599
transition from legacy to a modernized

26:04.609 --> 26:06.776
system . I will always have to be able

26:06.776 --> 26:08.942
to cover down the requirement with the

26:08.942 --> 26:11.189
legacy systems . And on page 11 of your

26:11.199 --> 26:12.977
testimony , despite the fleet's

26:12.977 --> 26:14.921
accomplishments and its ability to

26:14.921 --> 26:16.977
achieve the mission today , it faces

26:16.977 --> 26:19.143
continuing with sustainment challenges

26:19.479 --> 26:22.479
that could impact its availability un

26:22.489 --> 26:25.339
until fully replaced by the Columbia

26:25.349 --> 26:27.939
class in 2042 .

26:29.800 --> 26:33.760
Are are we asking for enough

26:33.770 --> 26:37.010
resources for you to get where you need

26:37.020 --> 26:38.449
to get on time ?

26:42.420 --> 26:44.476
I I don't know that resources is nec

26:44.476 --> 26:46.560
necessarily the the issue here . I I

26:46.569 --> 26:48.900
think , I think what , what I really

26:48.910 --> 26:51.589
see is uh the ability for the

26:51.599 --> 26:53.710
industrial base to be able to produce

26:53.819 --> 26:57.739
and not drive the gaps . So , so as

26:57.750 --> 27:01.650
we look , so the extent that

27:01.660 --> 27:04.410
to the extent that we are that we're

27:04.420 --> 27:07.770
proposing to um appropriate some

27:07.780 --> 27:11.010
$3.4 billion extra for , for submarine

27:11.020 --> 27:13.187
industrial base that will be helpful ,

27:13.187 --> 27:15.131
will it not , it will be helpful .

27:15.131 --> 27:17.353
Absolutely , sir . On the modernization

27:17.353 --> 27:19.619
now , to your point , we also need to

27:19.630 --> 27:22.709
ensure that the legacy systems um have

27:22.719 --> 27:24.886
the sustainability that's available to

27:24.886 --> 27:27.599
them so I can maintain the legacy

27:27.609 --> 27:29.720
systems as well until the new systems

27:29.720 --> 27:33.150
arrive . Ok . Um Thank you very much um

27:35.540 --> 27:38.160
serious challenges in , in your

27:38.170 --> 27:40.390
Bailiwick , I would say uh general

27:40.400 --> 27:42.839
whiting you talk about a vulnerability

27:42.849 --> 27:46.439
wi uh window in uh on page

27:46.449 --> 27:48.880
three of your testimony , there's a

27:48.890 --> 27:50.946
vulnerability window communicated by

27:50.946 --> 27:53.339
our competitors and highlighted as we

27:53.349 --> 27:56.930
watch conflict unfold in Ukraine and is

27:56.989 --> 27:59.839
Israel and , and Israel . Uh what ,

27:59.849 --> 28:03.589
what are we learning there and ,

28:03.599 --> 28:07.260
and state for our audience , what the

28:07.270 --> 28:10.979
vulnerability window is ? Uh ranking

28:10.989 --> 28:13.045
member , the vulnerability window is

28:13.045 --> 28:15.349
the fact that our competitors . Um Pr C

28:15.359 --> 28:18.069
and Russia have invested in counter

28:18.079 --> 28:20.246
space capabilities , having studied us

28:20.246 --> 28:22.920
for decades to hold at risk , our

28:22.930 --> 28:25.208
ability to fight the way we would like .

28:25.380 --> 28:27.880
And so now we have to make our current

28:27.890 --> 28:29.668
space capabilities that provide

28:29.668 --> 28:31.946
satellite communications , positioning ,

28:31.946 --> 28:34.001
navigation and time . I mean missile

28:34.001 --> 28:36.168
warning , those kind of functions . We

28:36.168 --> 28:35.994
have to make them more resilient

28:36.005 --> 28:38.135
against those threats and provide

28:38.145 --> 28:40.295
protect and defend capability to help

28:40.305 --> 28:42.964
protect them . Um those investments

28:42.974 --> 28:45.030
have been made , but we , we need to

28:45.030 --> 28:47.085
make sure those programs deliver and

28:47.085 --> 28:49.141
that we continue to invest to assure

28:49.141 --> 28:51.141
that we can support the joint force

28:51.141 --> 28:53.307
with those kind of capabilities in the

28:53.307 --> 28:55.885
face of these threats and until they

28:55.895 --> 28:58.714
are delivered there is a window of

28:58.724 --> 29:01.040
vulnerability . That's correct Rey

29:01.209 --> 29:04.709
member . Ok . Are ,

29:07.140 --> 29:09.959
are the requesters asking for enough

29:09.969 --> 29:12.989
resources to address this

29:13.000 --> 29:15.900
vulnerability window ? Uh Senator , I

29:15.910 --> 29:17.521
think we've laid out all the

29:17.521 --> 29:19.632
requirements that we need and we know

29:19.632 --> 29:21.688
the programs that we need and now we

29:21.688 --> 29:23.854
need to make sure those are delivering

29:23.854 --> 29:25.854
on time and pulling them as , as mo

29:25.854 --> 29:28.021
much to the left as we can . They need

29:28.021 --> 29:30.188
to be pulled to the left . Yes , sir .

29:30.188 --> 29:32.410
I'd like to have all the cap explain to

29:32.410 --> 29:35.359
people uh who aren't uh aren't um

29:36.290 --> 29:39.270
accustomed to Washington ease . What

29:39.280 --> 29:41.169
pulling it to the left means ? Uh

29:41.459 --> 29:43.681
Senator , that means to deliver it even

29:43.681 --> 29:46.469
earlier than we expect . A a and that

29:46.479 --> 29:49.819
is a very important need . Is it not ?

29:50.000 --> 29:52.167
So I'd like to have as much capability

29:52.167 --> 29:54.111
as I could right now . Yes , sir .

29:54.111 --> 29:56.969
Thank you . Thank you , Senator Senator

29:56.979 --> 29:59.035
Cain , please . Thank you , Mr Chair

29:59.035 --> 30:01.035
and thank you to our witnesses . Um

30:01.035 --> 30:02.757
General Cotton in your posture

30:02.757 --> 30:04.479
statement . You mentioned that

30:04.479 --> 30:06.423
continued congressional support is

30:06.423 --> 30:08.201
critical to overhauling the sub

30:08.201 --> 30:10.349
industrial base to advance the navy

30:10.359 --> 30:12.599
shipbuilding efforts . And you also

30:12.609 --> 30:14.609
noted that the execution of the one

30:14.609 --> 30:16.498
plus two submarine bill plan is a

30:16.498 --> 30:18.665
national imperative . I'm following up

30:18.665 --> 30:20.579
on Senator Wicker's questions . I

30:20.589 --> 30:22.811
completely agree with this , especially

30:22.811 --> 30:24.978
given the additional commitments we've

30:24.978 --> 30:27.540
now taken on with Aus Pillar one . How

30:27.550 --> 30:29.661
critical are the submarine industrial

30:29.661 --> 30:31.828
based investments ? Like those that we

30:31.828 --> 30:33.606
included in the supplemental to

30:33.606 --> 30:35.439
ensuring that the Columbia class

30:35.439 --> 30:37.383
submarines are delivered on time .

30:39.079 --> 30:41.246
Thank you for the , for the question ,

30:41.246 --> 30:43.412
Senator Kane and , and I'd like to say

30:43.412 --> 30:45.579
thank you to , to I know there was a S

30:45.579 --> 30:47.579
A and even yesterday in regards and

30:47.579 --> 30:49.635
many of the members , uh , um , that

30:49.635 --> 30:51.635
are , that are before us today were

30:51.635 --> 30:53.746
part of that . So thank you for , for

30:53.746 --> 30:55.968
the support in , in , in addressing the

30:55.968 --> 30:58.023
uh industrial based problem . Um A a

30:58.023 --> 31:00.130
and using the Northeast , it is a

31:00.140 --> 31:03.209
wicked problem . Um So , um you know ,

31:03.219 --> 31:06.469
the , the , the ability I do not

31:06.479 --> 31:10.250
have capacity to lose one

31:10.260 --> 31:14.000
leg of the triad . I and the S

31:14.010 --> 31:17.420
the SSBN and the SLBN weapons

31:17.430 --> 31:21.229
system is critical um to the

31:21.239 --> 31:23.459
triad and , and , and , and my

31:23.469 --> 31:26.069
operational plans and , and , and , and

31:26.079 --> 31:28.310
the force and the forces that I must

31:28.319 --> 31:30.520
present to the , to the commander in

31:30.530 --> 31:34.329
chief if warranted critical . So as I

31:34.339 --> 31:36.450
would state for the land based leg as

31:36.450 --> 31:38.349
well as the air leg , absolutely

31:38.359 --> 31:41.130
critical uh that we continue to press

31:41.140 --> 31:43.849
and ensure um just like my colleague

31:43.859 --> 31:46.026
said , you know , if we can get things

31:46.026 --> 31:47.915
earlier that , that that would be

31:47.915 --> 31:50.479
incredibly uh advantageous to us . Um

31:50.489 --> 31:52.869
um As a fighting force , we , we did

31:52.880 --> 31:54.936
have a hearing yesterday on manpower

31:54.936 --> 31:56.991
issues generally . And when you were

31:56.991 --> 31:58.936
asked a question by Senator Wicker

31:58.936 --> 32:01.158
about whether you needed more resources

32:01.158 --> 32:03.102
and you said , it's not a resource

32:03.102 --> 32:05.324
problem . My colleague here said it's a

32:05.324 --> 32:04.489
welder problem . I mean , there's a

32:04.500 --> 32:06.778
manpower problem we're experiencing it .

32:06.910 --> 32:09.069
Australia is experiencing it , the UK

32:09.079 --> 32:11.079
is experiencing it . So we're gonna

32:11.079 --> 32:13.023
have to be very , very creative in

32:13.023 --> 32:15.023
addressing this manpower issue . If

32:15.023 --> 32:17.135
we're going to maintain the pace that

32:17.135 --> 32:19.246
you need to keep the triad intact and

32:19.246 --> 32:21.135
effective . Um You talked General

32:21.135 --> 32:23.357
Cotton in your , in your testimony here

32:23.357 --> 32:25.959
about the four allies , principally

32:25.969 --> 32:28.060
Russia and the Pr C but also in the

32:28.069 --> 32:30.236
nuclear space , Iran and North Korea .

32:30.270 --> 32:32.270
And then you said , and the growing

32:32.270 --> 32:34.103
relationships between these four

32:34.103 --> 32:35.603
nations , do you see those

32:35.603 --> 32:37.548
relationships growing in ways that

32:37.548 --> 32:40.650
really impact the stratcom domain or

32:40.660 --> 32:42.640
are there , are there um growing

32:42.650 --> 32:45.099
activities in concert more in other

32:45.119 --> 32:48.069
military domains ? Senator ? No , I see

32:48.079 --> 32:50.000
it in my domain as well because

32:50.010 --> 32:52.290
remember part of my portfolio is

32:52.300 --> 32:54.329
strategic deterrence that includes

32:54.339 --> 32:56.395
nuclear deterrence . But even in the

32:56.395 --> 32:58.450
nuclear deterrent space , uh let's ,

32:58.450 --> 33:00.339
let's just have a conversation in

33:00.339 --> 33:02.561
regards to the relationship that we see

33:02.561 --> 33:04.617
that that transactional relationship

33:04.617 --> 33:07.329
between Russia and the D Pr K um has

33:07.339 --> 33:09.339
manifested itself in different ways

33:09.339 --> 33:11.672
here over the past eight months . Um So ,

33:11.672 --> 33:13.672
you know , so we're looking at that

33:13.672 --> 33:15.783
differently on what that relationship

33:15.783 --> 33:17.839
is actually , you know , what does ,

33:17.839 --> 33:20.020
what does D Pr K gain uh with that new

33:20.030 --> 33:22.420
relationship that they have um with

33:22.430 --> 33:24.374
Russia as an example . Thank you ,

33:24.380 --> 33:26.540
General Whiting . Um in your written

33:26.550 --> 33:28.106
testimony . You highlighted

33:28.106 --> 33:30.328
collaboration with allies interagency ,

33:30.328 --> 33:32.930
partners and commercial stakeholders um

33:33.199 --> 33:35.770
as a key asymmetric , asymmetric

33:35.780 --> 33:38.010
advantage that we have in space . I was

33:38.020 --> 33:40.187
at Wallops Island recently and I had a

33:40.187 --> 33:42.242
great visit with NAS A , the NRO and

33:42.242 --> 33:44.640
the Navy and a private uh commercial

33:44.650 --> 33:46.372
provider rocket lab to discuss

33:46.372 --> 33:48.539
government capabilities in this area .

33:48.550 --> 33:50.439
Um How are you thinking about the

33:50.439 --> 33:52.680
importance of collaboration with the

33:52.689 --> 33:54.939
commercial space industry ? Senator ?

33:54.949 --> 33:57.171
Thank you for the question . Uh I think

33:57.171 --> 33:59.729
us commercial space industry is not

33:59.739 --> 34:01.850
just an advantage in space , it is an

34:01.850 --> 34:04.072
advantage for this nation period and it

34:04.072 --> 34:06.183
is an advantage that is widening over

34:06.183 --> 34:08.406
our competitors . So we absolutely need

34:08.406 --> 34:10.128
to continue to partner with us

34:10.128 --> 34:12.239
commercial space industry to leverage

34:12.239 --> 34:14.183
the cost curves that they're on to

34:14.183 --> 34:16.183
leverage the speed at which they're

34:16.183 --> 34:18.350
operating to take advantage of as much

34:18.350 --> 34:20.461
of that capability as we can . Um The

34:20.461 --> 34:22.628
Space Command is uh partnered with the

34:22.628 --> 34:24.850
Space Force as they look , get new ways

34:24.850 --> 34:26.739
of contracting with uh commercial

34:26.739 --> 34:29.185
industry , uh such as the commercial uh

34:29.195 --> 34:31.306
commercial augmentation Space Reserve

34:31.306 --> 34:33.528
that they're looking to start next year

34:33.528 --> 34:35.473
and we're very excited about those

34:35.473 --> 34:37.695
opportunities . Um I'll just offer this

34:37.695 --> 34:39.806
question for the record . But if , if

34:39.806 --> 34:42.028
in the course of us working on the ND A

34:42.028 --> 34:44.251
this year , there are any policies that

34:44.251 --> 34:46.473
you think we should embrace in the ND A

34:46.473 --> 34:48.528
that would uh enhance our ability to

34:48.528 --> 34:50.695
collaborate in the way you described ,

34:50.695 --> 34:52.917
we would love to hear that from you and

34:52.917 --> 34:52.354
with that , I'll hand it back , Mr

34:52.364 --> 34:54.618
Chair . Thank you very much . Uh

34:54.628 --> 34:56.906
Senator Kane , Senator Fisher , please .

34:56.906 --> 34:59.329
Thank you , Mr Chairman , last October .

34:59.339 --> 35:02.069
The bipartisan bicameral congressional

35:02.079 --> 35:04.408
Commission on the Strategic Posture of

35:04.418 --> 35:06.585
the United States released their final

35:06.585 --> 35:09.368
report on America's Strategic Posture .

35:09.749 --> 35:13.039
Its findings were sobering . We face

35:13.049 --> 35:15.299
two major nuclear adversaries for the

35:15.309 --> 35:17.299
first time in history and we are

35:17.309 --> 35:20.239
woefully underprepared to address this

35:20.249 --> 35:22.879
future threat environment . In their

35:22.889 --> 35:24.879
report , the commissioners also

35:24.889 --> 35:27.959
unanimously endorsed 81 recommendations .

35:28.219 --> 35:30.879
If we can act upon most of these , the

35:30.889 --> 35:32.879
United States should retain the

35:32.889 --> 35:36.800
capability and the capacity to maintain

35:36.810 --> 35:39.584
a safe , reliable , effective and

35:39.594 --> 35:41.854
credible nuclear deterrent throughout

35:41.864 --> 35:44.235
the next several decades . Over the

35:44.245 --> 35:46.467
coming months , I'm going to be working

35:46.467 --> 35:48.844
with my colleagues on this committee to

35:48.854 --> 35:51.314
include many of these recommendations

35:51.324 --> 35:55.179
in fy 2025 NDA A General

35:55.189 --> 35:57.078
Cotton . I appreciate our earlier

35:57.078 --> 35:59.320
conversations about the Strategic

35:59.330 --> 36:01.840
Posture Commission's report and your

36:01.850 --> 36:04.550
very careful review and consideration

36:04.560 --> 36:07.439
of their findings and recommendations .

36:07.860 --> 36:09.916
Do you agree with the commissioner's

36:09.916 --> 36:11.860
statement that quote , the nuclear

36:11.860 --> 36:14.639
force modernization programs of record

36:14.649 --> 36:17.780
is absolutely essential , although not

36:17.790 --> 36:19.959
sufficient to meet the new threats

36:19.969 --> 36:22.889
posed by Russia and China and that the

36:22.899 --> 36:25.310
elements of the programs of records

36:25.320 --> 36:28.320
should be completed on time expedited ,

36:28.330 --> 36:30.330
wherever possible and expanded is

36:30.340 --> 36:34.250
needed . I do senator and can you

36:34.260 --> 36:36.659
please uh provide the committee with

36:36.669 --> 36:39.100
your views on which of those

36:39.110 --> 36:41.770
commissioners recommendations you think

36:41.780 --> 36:44.189
are the most important or that we

36:44.199 --> 36:47.760
should be prioritizing ? Thank you for

36:47.770 --> 36:50.489
the question , Senator Fisher . Yeah ,

36:50.500 --> 36:52.709
I was probably one of the first , uh ,

36:52.719 --> 36:54.929
uh , to , to receive the brief from

36:54.939 --> 36:56.939
Honorable Creeden and , and Senator

36:56.939 --> 36:59.409
Cole , uh , when it came to , uh , the

36:59.419 --> 37:01.641
results of , of the , of the commission

37:01.929 --> 37:04.409
and it validated , uh , many of the

37:04.419 --> 37:06.752
things that we were looking in house in ,

37:06.752 --> 37:08.975
in strategic Command in regards to what

37:08.975 --> 37:11.086
do we do with the cur current arsenal

37:11.086 --> 37:14.280
in the stockpile ? Um II , I have

37:14.290 --> 37:16.659
memorized what I would consider pages

37:16.669 --> 37:19.550
48 and 49 of the , of the commission

37:19.560 --> 37:22.879
which has the 81 recommendations um of

37:22.889 --> 37:26.189
those um I have prioritized and , and

37:26.199 --> 37:28.088
what , what I think should be the

37:28.088 --> 37:30.550
things that we get after first . Um I

37:30.560 --> 37:33.020
do believe that we need to take serious

37:33.030 --> 37:35.252
consideration and seeing what uploading

37:35.252 --> 37:38.010
and , and removing , um , the ICBM

37:38.020 --> 37:40.076
looks like and what does that , what

37:40.076 --> 37:42.298
does it take to potentially do that ? I

37:42.298 --> 37:44.449
do believe that we need to have a

37:44.459 --> 37:47.250
conversation in regards to how do we

37:47.260 --> 37:49.729
have ? Because part of that report also

37:49.739 --> 37:52.699
says , um the importance of having a

37:52.709 --> 37:56.169
credible and effective conventional uh

37:56.449 --> 37:59.939
uh force . Um Part of that is um

38:00.169 --> 38:02.909
looking at and ensuring that we have

38:02.919 --> 38:04.850
the right long range standoff ,

38:04.860 --> 38:07.770
conventional weapons as well . Um um

38:07.780 --> 38:10.219
that can be placed on a bomber as , as

38:10.229 --> 38:13.354
an example . And then the , the look at

38:13.364 --> 38:15.905
what does all legs of the , of the

38:15.915 --> 38:18.665
triad look like in regards of capacity

38:18.675 --> 38:21.125
and how can you expand capacity and how

38:21.135 --> 38:23.435
do you build the modernized force that

38:23.445 --> 38:25.612
has modularity and where we can always

38:25.612 --> 38:27.745
keep pace as opposed to the current

38:27.754 --> 38:29.921
system that we have , that it's really

38:29.921 --> 38:32.143
hard to do that . You know , Senator uh

38:32.143 --> 38:34.834
King , and I often refer to uh NC three

38:34.844 --> 38:37.745
as the fourth leg of our nuclear triad

38:38.100 --> 38:40.560
and the president's ability to command

38:40.570 --> 38:42.540
control and communicate with our

38:42.550 --> 38:46.090
nuclear forces that that's essential in

38:46.100 --> 38:49.320
maintaining that credible nuclear

38:49.330 --> 38:51.830
deterrent that we must have . If , if

38:51.840 --> 38:54.580
NC three fails , then the deterrent

38:54.590 --> 38:58.010
fails . We've previously discussed

38:58.020 --> 39:00.010
general , the importance of moving

39:00.020 --> 39:02.260
forward quickly with NC three

39:02.270 --> 39:04.530
modernization and , and building out

39:04.540 --> 39:08.500
that road map with a clear and

39:08.510 --> 39:11.939
achievable near and long term goals .

39:11.949 --> 39:13.870
And I appreciate you briefing our

39:13.879 --> 39:17.209
sub-committee uh on that earlier this

39:17.219 --> 39:19.360
week about your plan . But in this

39:19.370 --> 39:21.919
setting , can you please share with the

39:21.929 --> 39:24.590
committee how stratcom is working with

39:24.600 --> 39:27.639
the services with the undersecretaries

39:27.649 --> 39:30.100
of acquisition and sustainment and

39:30.110 --> 39:33.020
research and engineering to integrate

39:33.030 --> 39:36.330
new technologies and new systems into

39:36.340 --> 39:39.629
that NC three , architecture , Senator

39:39.639 --> 39:43.199
I'd love to uh one of the things that

39:43.209 --> 39:45.431
uh was , was first on the agenda for us

39:45.431 --> 39:47.600
was to ensure that as we articulate uh

39:47.610 --> 39:49.832
the modernization of the NC Three Force

39:49.832 --> 39:51.999
that we look at it in different bins .

39:51.999 --> 39:53.943
The first thing we must do to your

39:53.943 --> 39:56.239
point is ensure that the NC three

39:56.250 --> 39:58.361
system that is currently available to

39:58.361 --> 40:00.528
the president of the United States and

40:00.528 --> 40:02.750
to decision makers in the United States

40:02.750 --> 40:04.969
um has the ability to fight through .

40:05.419 --> 40:07.363
Um So we want to make sure that we

40:07.363 --> 40:09.820
looked at systems uh today and ensure

40:09.830 --> 40:11.997
that we're , we're , we're taking care

40:11.997 --> 40:14.219
of systems today . The other piece that

40:14.219 --> 40:16.330
we wanted to make sure that we did is

40:16.330 --> 40:18.441
look at the midterm and , and to your

40:18.441 --> 40:21.159
point , um We have collaborated and ,

40:21.169 --> 40:23.280
and , and , and , and , and thank you

40:23.280 --> 40:26.189
for , for uh hosting us to pre present

40:26.199 --> 40:28.719
that um you and , and Senator King for

40:28.729 --> 40:30.959
allowing us to present that um to the

40:30.969 --> 40:33.320
subcomittee and show the relationship

40:33.415 --> 40:35.995
that I have with A NS with our

40:36.004 --> 40:38.524
acquisition and sustainment . Um Doctor

40:38.534 --> 40:42.274
LaPlante , um the increased um

40:42.284 --> 40:45.425
relationship that I have with um R and

40:45.435 --> 40:47.754
E , Doctor Heidi Xu um that was

40:47.764 --> 40:51.614
actually missing prior . Um And then

40:51.625 --> 40:53.736
the relationship that I have with our

40:53.736 --> 40:57.000
cio Mr John Sherman , because of that ,

40:57.050 --> 40:59.250
we're able to coalesce and be able to

40:59.260 --> 41:01.520
come up with a plan that's executable .

41:01.649 --> 41:03.705
Uh We were able to brief that to the

41:03.705 --> 41:05.927
Deputy Secretary of Defense last summer

41:05.927 --> 41:08.429
um in which the service components were

41:08.439 --> 41:11.260
also in the room . And now they have

41:11.270 --> 41:15.260
measured um um milestones to , to , to

41:15.270 --> 41:17.820
grade themselves against uh where that

41:17.830 --> 41:20.370
was missing in the past . So , um we

41:20.379 --> 41:22.601
still have a lot of work to go though ,

41:22.601 --> 41:24.435
Senator . Um but , but I'm , I'm

41:24.435 --> 41:26.546
pleased with the , with the work that

41:26.546 --> 41:29.169
we've done so far . Thank you . Thank

41:29.179 --> 41:31.290
you , Senator Fisher , Senator King ,

41:31.290 --> 41:33.560
please . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Uh

41:33.989 --> 41:36.156
We think about what's going on here in

41:36.156 --> 41:38.378
this room . This hearing is undoubtedly

41:38.378 --> 41:41.169
being watched in real time in Moscow

41:41.179 --> 41:44.330
and Beijing and General Cotton . The

41:44.340 --> 41:46.610
focus of this hearing will naturally be

41:46.620 --> 41:49.590
on gaps and work that's under progress

41:49.600 --> 41:51.767
and what the problems are . But I want

41:51.767 --> 41:53.933
you to restate what you stated in your

41:53.933 --> 41:55.989
opening testimony for the benefit of

41:55.989 --> 41:59.919
our audience . Far away . You are

41:59.929 --> 42:02.679
ready to fight tonight with an awesome

42:03.310 --> 42:05.850
response to anyone who attacks this

42:05.860 --> 42:09.159
country . Is that correct ? The men and

42:09.169 --> 42:11.113
women that represent United States

42:11.113 --> 42:13.225
Strategic Command are ready to defend

42:13.225 --> 42:15.879
if , if uh if uh strategic deterrence

42:15.889 --> 42:18.639
failure happens tonight , we are ready

42:18.649 --> 42:22.239
today and the capacity of the triad

42:22.580 --> 42:26.070
right now is at a , at an

42:26.080 --> 42:28.320
actionable level . We are not . I I

42:28.330 --> 42:30.290
don't want anybody to get the

42:30.300 --> 42:32.467
impression that we're somehow crippled

42:32.467 --> 42:34.689
in terms of our nuclear deterrent . You

42:34.689 --> 42:36.856
have the forces you need to defend the

42:36.856 --> 42:39.489
country and also to impose uh

42:39.699 --> 42:42.300
unthinkable costs on a potential

42:42.310 --> 42:44.421
adversary . Isn't that correct ? I do

42:44.500 --> 42:48.330
thank you . Uh One of the

42:48.340 --> 42:50.340
problems on the budget that we have

42:50.340 --> 42:52.284
here is that this country that has

42:52.284 --> 42:54.396
always surprised me . We don't have a

42:54.396 --> 42:56.500
capital budget . Our budget of the

42:56.510 --> 42:58.677
United States government is a , is a ,

42:58.677 --> 43:01.120
is a cash flow budget . And really the

43:01.129 --> 43:03.240
recapitalization of the nuclear triad

43:03.240 --> 43:05.462
is a capital investment . We're talking

43:05.462 --> 43:08.340
4050 year assets . And so one of the

43:08.350 --> 43:10.517
problems we're facing in our budget is

43:10.520 --> 43:12.631
it all comes out . It looks like it's

43:12.631 --> 43:14.853
in the defense budget , but I I call it

43:14.853 --> 43:16.909
the pig in the Python , there's this

43:16.909 --> 43:18.909
bulge of nuclear modernization that

43:18.909 --> 43:20.909
really should be considered capital

43:20.909 --> 43:22.798
investment . So uh I think that's

43:22.798 --> 43:24.853
important for people to realize when

43:24.853 --> 43:26.687
you look at the defense budget ,

43:26.687 --> 43:28.742
there's a piece of it that is really

43:28.742 --> 43:30.742
something that probably should have

43:30.742 --> 43:32.853
been done over the past 30 years that

43:32.853 --> 43:34.964
we're trying to do in a hurry . Uh Is

43:34.964 --> 43:34.709
that , is that your reading General ?

43:35.530 --> 43:37.752
It is sir II , I , you know , the , the

43:37.752 --> 43:41.699
way I like to describe it is um um I

43:41.709 --> 43:44.330
am I am responsible for maintaining and

43:44.340 --> 43:47.280
the components under me are responsible

43:47.290 --> 43:49.860
for maintaining national systems on

43:49.870 --> 43:51.981
behalf of the President of the United

43:51.981 --> 43:54.203
States . Thank you . Uh General Whiting

43:54.203 --> 43:56.537
you , you talked about we , we have the ,

43:56.537 --> 43:58.703
the best space capability and have for

43:58.703 --> 44:00.703
many , many years . That's the good

44:00.703 --> 44:03.159
news . The bad news is the dependency

44:03.169 --> 44:05.989
that we have on space which makes us uh

44:06.000 --> 44:08.590
asymmetrically vulnerable in terms of

44:08.600 --> 44:10.830
the relationship with these potential

44:10.840 --> 44:14.699
adversaries . Uh What are we doing to

44:14.709 --> 44:17.419
think about alternatives to space ? For

44:17.429 --> 44:21.139
example , I understand recently they're

44:21.149 --> 44:23.340
now teaching celestial navigation at ,

44:23.350 --> 44:25.409
at Annapolis . Again , we need to be

44:25.419 --> 44:27.419
thinking about how do we reduce our

44:27.419 --> 44:31.260
reliance on space assets , given the uh

44:31.270 --> 44:33.639
development of anti space capabilities

44:33.649 --> 44:35.689
of our adversaries . Ta talk to me

44:35.699 --> 44:38.239
about how we mitigate this risk .

44:38.250 --> 44:40.417
Senator . Thank you for the question .

44:40.417 --> 44:42.528
Uh We've gone to space because of the

44:42.528 --> 44:44.694
advantages it brings us , it allows us

44:44.694 --> 44:46.583
to operate globally untethered to

44:46.583 --> 44:48.750
terrestrial networks and that , and we

44:48.750 --> 44:50.917
were unopposed for years . Yes , sir .

44:50.917 --> 44:50.840
And , and that gives us a unique

44:50.850 --> 44:53.017
advantage but to your point , uh and ,

44:53.017 --> 44:54.794
and I know all the services are

44:54.794 --> 44:57.080
thinking about this . Um What do we do

44:57.090 --> 44:59.146
when our , our primary capability uh

44:59.146 --> 45:01.146
may not be available ? Now in space

45:01.146 --> 45:03.146
command , it's our job to make sure

45:03.146 --> 45:05.257
that , that that doesn't happen . But

45:05.257 --> 45:07.423
uh no doubt the services have to train

45:07.423 --> 45:09.479
what their uh secondary uh plans are

45:09.479 --> 45:11.479
and , and all of them have those uh

45:11.479 --> 45:13.646
those plans in place and to your point

45:13.646 --> 45:15.868
are , are training to their people . Um

45:15.868 --> 45:17.868
Several of the services such as the

45:17.868 --> 45:19.923
army , the Navy and the Marines also

45:19.923 --> 45:22.820
have uh relatively small but dedicated

45:22.830 --> 45:26.000
cadres of uh space personnel to help

45:26.010 --> 45:27.788
their commanders understand the

45:27.788 --> 45:29.899
benefits and the vulnerabilities of ,

45:29.899 --> 45:32.066
of space . So they can understand when

45:32.066 --> 45:34.121
those times might be that they would

45:34.121 --> 45:35.954
have to go to those secondary or

45:35.954 --> 45:38.066
tertiary plans . Well , now I'm going

45:38.066 --> 45:37.679
to talk about those gaps that we've ,

45:37.689 --> 45:39.745
that I mentioned at the beginning uh

45:39.745 --> 45:41.800
that I don't want to overemphasize .

45:41.800 --> 45:44.379
But uh you have partial responsibility

45:44.389 --> 45:47.540
for missile defense . It bothers me

45:47.550 --> 45:50.010
that we've been very slow on the issue

45:50.020 --> 45:53.550
of directed energy . We're using , uh ,

45:53.760 --> 45:56.610
$2 million or $5 million missiles to

45:56.620 --> 45:59.540
knock down two or $300,000 drones .

45:59.600 --> 46:01.544
This should be a task for directed

46:01.544 --> 46:03.860
energy . I hope that that's part of

46:03.989 --> 46:06.479
missile defense , missile awareness and

46:06.489 --> 46:09.270
that all branches , not you necessarily ,

46:09.280 --> 46:11.447
but all the branches should be working

46:11.447 --> 46:13.336
on two things missile defense and

46:13.336 --> 46:15.058
hypersonic defense . Those are

46:15.058 --> 46:17.224
strategic game chamber changers that I

46:17.224 --> 46:19.969
think we've been slow uh to , uh , to

46:19.979 --> 46:23.219
develop you're gonna , is ,

46:23.280 --> 46:25.550
is , is directed energy going to be

46:25.560 --> 46:27.782
part of the future of missile defense ,

46:27.782 --> 46:29.949
sir . Just two weeks ago , I was in uh

46:29.949 --> 46:31.782
Huntsville meeting with uh , the

46:31.782 --> 46:33.782
missile defense agency and , and we

46:33.782 --> 46:35.893
talked about uh directed energy and I

46:35.893 --> 46:38.116
know that is something , uh , they're ,

46:38.116 --> 46:40.449
they're looking at and I agree with you ,

46:40.449 --> 46:39.209
Senator , I think it needs to be part

46:39.219 --> 46:41.052
of our future . I want more than

46:41.052 --> 46:43.120
looking at , I want development and

46:43.129 --> 46:46.070
soon , uh I think we should be having a

46:46.080 --> 46:48.191
capability in the Red Sea right now .

46:48.429 --> 46:51.389
Uh That , that this is an opportunity

46:51.399 --> 46:54.139
to use that capacity . Uh And finally ,

46:54.149 --> 46:56.371
I just want to associate myself with my

46:56.371 --> 46:58.590
co-chair , uh , Senator Fisher on NC

46:58.600 --> 47:00.729
three . That is part of the triad . I

47:00.739 --> 47:02.628
congratulate you on the work that

47:02.628 --> 47:04.628
you're doing , but urge you to , to

47:04.628 --> 47:06.929
accelerate and continue because the

47:06.939 --> 47:08.995
whole idea is the cornerstone of the

47:08.995 --> 47:11.106
defense of this country is deterrence

47:11.106 --> 47:14.360
and to the adversary detect a weakness

47:14.370 --> 47:16.592
in our deterrence . And NC three is the

47:16.592 --> 47:18.648
glue that holds it all together . Uh

47:18.648 --> 47:22.239
We're vulnerable . And so , uh II I say

47:22.250 --> 47:24.679
I congratulate you but want to prod you

47:24.689 --> 47:27.879
to keep going earnestly and , and , and

47:27.889 --> 47:30.111
accelerate the progress on that issue .

47:30.111 --> 47:32.222
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you ,

47:32.222 --> 47:34.500
Senator King , Senator Cotton , please .

47:34.500 --> 47:36.333
General Cotton General Whiting .

47:36.333 --> 47:38.500
Welcome . Thank you for your testimony

47:38.500 --> 47:37.969
this morning . And I send my thanks to

47:37.979 --> 47:40.090
all the men and women who serve under

47:40.090 --> 47:42.449
your commands . General Cotton , since

47:42.520 --> 47:44.689
Xi Jinping uh took power a little over

47:44.699 --> 47:46.866
a decade ago , China's nuclear arsenal

47:46.866 --> 47:49.620
has increased by more than 100% by

47:49.629 --> 47:52.330
2035 . The department anticipates that

47:52.340 --> 47:54.229
China's nuclear arsenal will have

47:54.229 --> 47:56.719
increased by 500% . How would you

47:56.729 --> 47:58.785
characterize the threat posed to the

47:58.785 --> 48:00.618
United States by China's rapidly

48:00.618 --> 48:02.062
growing nuclear arsenal ?

48:05.370 --> 48:07.592
You know , as my predecessor said , and

48:07.592 --> 48:09.703
I love using this terminology because

48:09.703 --> 48:12.469
it is um um the , the breakout that we

48:12.479 --> 48:14.909
saw and , and the , the advancements

48:14.919 --> 48:17.086
and , and how quickly the advancements

48:17.086 --> 48:19.830
that we're seeing um on China to uh

48:19.840 --> 48:23.449
rapidly create a viable triad um is

48:23.459 --> 48:26.959
breathtaking unprecedented ,

48:27.600 --> 48:29.378
the , the pace at which they're

48:29.378 --> 48:32.260
expanding it is ok . Um

48:32.969 --> 48:35.270
And your statement says that they have

48:35.280 --> 48:37.939
a triad today , is that correct ? That

48:37.949 --> 48:40.005
is correct , Senator . It may not be

48:40.005 --> 48:42.171
the most cutting edge versions of it .

48:42.171 --> 48:44.005
The bombers may require standoff

48:44.005 --> 48:45.838
weapons , but they're working on

48:45.838 --> 48:45.709
stealth bombers . Is that correct ?

48:45.919 --> 48:49.810
That is correct . Um , do you

48:49.820 --> 48:52.709
think that a nation that multiplies its

48:52.719 --> 48:55.290
nuclear arsenal as rapidly as China

48:55.300 --> 48:57.189
does ? Especially one governed by

48:57.189 --> 48:59.479
communists is doing so with peaceful

48:59.489 --> 49:03.120
intent . I think the

49:03.129 --> 49:05.600
minimum deterrent strategy , um , that

49:05.610 --> 49:08.879
we used to hear that uh China um , um ,

49:08.889 --> 49:11.689
um links themselves with as far as

49:11.699 --> 49:13.588
their strategic , their strategic

49:13.588 --> 49:15.979
policy . Um I find hard to believe that

49:15.989 --> 49:18.045
that's that can still be a policy uh

49:18.045 --> 49:20.100
with the , with the way that they're

49:20.100 --> 49:22.156
building out there for years , China

49:22.156 --> 49:23.822
had pursued so-called minimum

49:23.822 --> 49:26.739
deterrence . Um But uh they also are

49:26.879 --> 49:29.101
well known for a policy called hide and

49:29.101 --> 49:31.323
bide , hide your strength and bide your

49:31.323 --> 49:33.379
time . Do you think it's fair to say

49:33.379 --> 49:35.379
that China is shedding the hide and

49:35.379 --> 49:37.820
Bide strategy now uh center that are

49:37.830 --> 49:39.830
showing us they're showing us their

49:39.830 --> 49:42.052
capability and showing us how fast they

49:42.052 --> 49:45.850
can grow . Um They also have had a long

49:45.889 --> 49:49.340
declared at least formal policy of no

49:49.350 --> 49:51.689
first use . Does it make sense to

49:51.699 --> 49:55.409
expand your nuclear program by 500% and

49:55.419 --> 49:57.141
retain a no first use policy ?

49:59.419 --> 50:02.989
I'll go back to using that as

50:03.000 --> 50:05.959
the opening for a minimum of terror

50:05.969 --> 50:08.320
strategy um that probably is in

50:08.330 --> 50:10.386
alignment . Um But what we're seeing

50:10.386 --> 50:12.274
probably not so much a pretty big

50:12.274 --> 50:14.274
investment of national resources to

50:14.274 --> 50:16.441
expand your nuclear weapons by so much

50:16.441 --> 50:18.552
if you're planning to keep a no first

50:18.552 --> 50:20.608
use policy , wouldn't you say ? Even

50:20.608 --> 50:22.719
though we haven't heard them say that

50:22.719 --> 50:24.830
you're absolutely correct and it will

50:24.830 --> 50:26.830
shock everyone to hear that Chinese

50:26.830 --> 50:28.886
communists have a history of lying ,

50:29.500 --> 50:31.667
not just about their nuclear weapons .

50:33.100 --> 50:35.389
The Tibetans would probably have

50:35.399 --> 50:37.979
something to say about that . Um ,

50:41.120 --> 50:43.009
let's look at what we're doing to

50:43.009 --> 50:45.064
counteract this threat . Um , well ,

50:45.064 --> 50:46.953
first , actually let's say on the

50:46.953 --> 50:49.939
threat . Um , how does China's nuclear

50:49.949 --> 50:51.860
arsenal compare to ours today

50:55.139 --> 50:57.361
today ? We're still superior in there .

50:57.361 --> 50:59.472
But um like I said , I think , uh you

50:59.472 --> 51:01.695
know , the , the reality is we're gonna

51:01.695 --> 51:03.583
have to continue to modernize our

51:03.583 --> 51:05.639
current systems . We are superior to

51:05.639 --> 51:07.861
them today uh Today . Yes . Uh If China

51:07.861 --> 51:09.806
continues on the pace on which the

51:09.806 --> 51:11.917
department projects by 2035 will they

51:11.917 --> 51:13.972
have achieved parity with the United

51:13.972 --> 51:17.919
States in the , in the

51:17.929 --> 51:21.310
realm of their land based systems ? Yes .

51:21.449 --> 51:24.449
Ok . Um And what if you combined the

51:24.459 --> 51:26.909
total forces of China and Russia by

51:26.919 --> 51:29.449
2035 ? Would those two countries

51:29.459 --> 51:31.409
combined have nuclear over match

51:31.419 --> 51:33.252
against the United States on the

51:33.252 --> 51:35.475
current pace ? Well , the weapons count

51:35.475 --> 51:37.363
would uh would be larger than our

51:37.363 --> 51:41.100
weapons count . Ok . What we're doing

51:41.550 --> 51:44.129
uh is the V 21 moving quickly enough to

51:44.139 --> 51:45.989
meet your future deterrence

51:46.000 --> 51:47.000
requirements .

51:50.229 --> 51:52.510
The limited production rate of the B 21

51:52.520 --> 51:54.631
is , is the only thing that I wish we

51:54.631 --> 51:56.687
could do a little quicker . Um The ,

51:56.687 --> 51:58.853
the fact that , um , that , that is an

51:58.853 --> 52:01.187
incredible six generation platform . Um ,

52:01.187 --> 52:03.242
all indications are that that weapon

52:03.242 --> 52:05.879
system is moving along , um , at a , at

52:05.889 --> 52:08.729
a great pace as far as delivery . Um ,

52:08.739 --> 52:11.600
the , the ability for production and

52:11.610 --> 52:13.729
the number of production , um , as a

52:13.739 --> 52:15.850
war fighter . Obviously , I would , I

52:15.850 --> 52:18.017
would love to have , nice to have more

52:18.017 --> 52:20.459
than 100 . Yes , sir . Ok . Um , final

52:20.469 --> 52:22.691
topic . Let , let's look at a , I guess

52:22.691 --> 52:24.525
you'd call it a first generation

52:24.525 --> 52:27.260
aircraft , the B 52 . Um I think it's

52:27.270 --> 52:29.469
79 years old now .

52:30.520 --> 52:33.949
7070 . All right , almost as old as

52:33.959 --> 52:36.739
some senators . Um But you know , we

52:36.750 --> 52:40.570
often hear , we , we

52:40.580 --> 52:42.691
often hear criticism . They're like ,

52:42.691 --> 52:44.802
well , we're flying aircraft that are

52:44.802 --> 52:46.691
older than general cotton . We're

52:46.691 --> 52:46.679
flying aircraft that started when these

52:46.689 --> 52:48.856
pilots , grandparents were flying it .

52:48.856 --> 52:50.856
I , I kind of subscribe to it if it

52:50.856 --> 52:53.320
ain't broke , don't fix it . Uh

52:53.330 --> 52:55.739
Philosophy , it's , it can't go into a

52:55.750 --> 52:57.639
denied environment , but once air

52:57.639 --> 52:59.806
defenses have been reduced and with uh

52:59.806 --> 53:02.159
extended range standoff weapons , it's

53:02.169 --> 53:05.239
highly effective . Um Why is it

53:05.250 --> 53:08.090
critical that the Air Force also reen

53:08.100 --> 53:10.510
engine , the B 52 for your deterrence

53:10.520 --> 53:13.239
needs . So , thanks for that question ,

53:13.250 --> 53:16.030
ce P is absolutely an imperative as

53:16.040 --> 53:18.580
part of the nuclear modernization . Um

53:18.590 --> 53:21.219
as you mentioned . Um Yes , it , it

53:21.229 --> 53:23.500
gets picked on quite a bit on its age .

53:23.610 --> 53:26.419
But um as , as we look at what the

53:26.429 --> 53:28.939
capacity and , and , and what the

53:28.949 --> 53:31.060
capability is of that weapon system ,

53:31.060 --> 53:33.649
that platform . Um It's amazing and ,

53:33.659 --> 53:35.995
and that will be able to do for us .

53:36.004 --> 53:38.314
And I said earlier , uh we need to

53:38.324 --> 53:41.274
think about um the ability for it to

53:41.284 --> 53:43.340
carry LRSO . It is the platform that

53:43.344 --> 53:46.514
will carry LRSO . Um It is the platform

53:46.524 --> 53:49.114
that has um a lot of mass as far as

53:49.125 --> 53:51.949
capability . Um And I want it to be

53:51.959 --> 53:53.792
able to have a long range strike

53:53.792 --> 53:55.909
standoff capability even greater than

53:55.919 --> 53:57.969
it has to . It is old . But if it's

53:57.979 --> 54:00.201
well maintained , modernized , it seems

54:00.201 --> 54:02.257
to me that , you know , it's still a

54:02.257 --> 54:04.312
vital part of our triad . Absolutely

54:04.312 --> 54:06.257
correct . A lot of , a lot of your

54:06.257 --> 54:08.479
troopers would probably love to drive a

54:08.479 --> 54:07.989
Chevy Bel Air or Ford Thunderbird from

54:08.000 --> 54:10.167
the 19 fifties as well . So maybe they

54:10.167 --> 54:12.333
should be . Well , I call it a rest of

54:12.333 --> 54:15.570
mod . Uh Thank you , Senator Cotton ,

54:15.580 --> 54:17.691
Senator Warren , please . Thank you ,

54:17.691 --> 54:19.802
Mr Chairman . So Strategic Command is

54:19.802 --> 54:21.969
responsible for strategic deterrence ,

54:21.969 --> 54:24.649
including our nuclear weapons . We were

54:24.659 --> 54:28.270
already planning to spend $2 trillion

54:28.409 --> 54:30.631
to modernize and maintain those weapons

54:30.639 --> 54:33.270
over the next 30 years . Now , we are

54:33.280 --> 54:35.113
learning that the cost for those

54:35.113 --> 54:37.469
programs are going to be even higher

54:37.479 --> 54:40.090
than we anticipated . General Cotton .

54:40.219 --> 54:42.441
I know that you are not responsible for

54:42.441 --> 54:45.050
managing these programs , but we turn

54:45.060 --> 54:47.850
to your command for your best military

54:47.860 --> 54:51.060
advice on what these programs will mean

54:51.070 --> 54:53.510
for our national security . General

54:53.520 --> 54:56.090
cotton . Do you agree that decisions

54:56.100 --> 54:59.449
about how to build our nuclear posture

54:59.560 --> 55:02.070
should be based on the most accurate

55:02.080 --> 55:04.689
information we have at the time .

55:09.110 --> 55:11.580
Senator , can you rephrase ? I , I

55:11.590 --> 55:13.701
don't quite understand . It sounds so

55:13.701 --> 55:15.757
easy . The point is , should we have

55:15.757 --> 55:17.979
the most , should we base our decisions

55:17.979 --> 55:20.146
based on the most accurate information

55:20.146 --> 55:21.923
we've got when we're making the

55:21.923 --> 55:25.179
decision ? Ok . Good . Because Dod did

55:25.290 --> 55:27.389
not do that for the Sentinel program

55:27.580 --> 55:30.000
which will replace all land-based

55:30.010 --> 55:32.121
intercontinental ballistic missiles .

55:32.121 --> 55:34.870
The Air Force has already concluded

55:35.110 --> 55:37.054
that the basic assumptions for the

55:37.054 --> 55:39.719
program's cost estimates quote weren't

55:39.729 --> 55:43.090
particularly valid when I requested

55:43.100 --> 55:46.899
that Dod contract with a respected

55:46.909 --> 55:50.290
group of outside experts in 2021 to

55:50.300 --> 55:52.467
determine the technical feasibility of

55:52.467 --> 55:54.578
extending the Minuteman three missile

55:54.578 --> 55:57.449
program instead of buying expensive new

55:57.459 --> 55:59.850
weapons . I was told that they didn't

55:59.860 --> 56:03.010
have contract authority to do so . That

56:03.020 --> 56:05.189
was not true . They didn't want an

56:05.199 --> 56:08.090
honest assessment of the real risks of

56:08.100 --> 56:11.399
Sentinel . And since then , the cost of

56:11.409 --> 56:14.149
the program has soared . We initially

56:14.159 --> 56:16.381
thought the price for Sentinel would be

56:16.381 --> 56:19.840
about $95 billion . Now , the Air Force

56:19.850 --> 56:22.560
reports that it will be 100 and $32

56:22.570 --> 56:26.439
billion nearly 40% more by law ,

56:26.449 --> 56:28.570
that kind of increase triggers a

56:28.580 --> 56:30.929
mandatory review of the program's

56:30.939 --> 56:33.469
viability . Now , I'm glad that this

56:33.479 --> 56:35.899
review is happening , but we need

56:35.909 --> 56:38.030
independent experts , people who will

56:38.040 --> 56:41.199
ask hard questions , we need to ask

56:41.209 --> 56:43.580
about the Sentinel program . Taking a

56:43.590 --> 56:46.620
look as well . General Cotton , would

56:46.629 --> 56:49.520
you oppose an outside review of the

56:49.530 --> 56:51.586
Sentinel program if it helps enhance

56:51.590 --> 56:55.580
our national security ? Senator Warren ?

56:56.379 --> 56:58.157
You know , I , I agree with the

56:58.157 --> 57:00.323
previous assessments that were done um

57:00.323 --> 57:02.490
with the last three administrations in

57:02.490 --> 57:04.101
regards to where we are on a

57:04.101 --> 57:06.212
replacement of the , of the Minuteman

57:06.212 --> 57:08.268
program . Um As I said earlier in my

57:08.268 --> 57:10.770
opening comments , um what , what I

57:10.780 --> 57:14.760
cannot endure as a

57:14.770 --> 57:17.159
combatant commander that has to provide

57:17.419 --> 57:21.010
um coas to the commander in chief is I

57:21.020 --> 57:24.770
cannot endure having a gap or a or a

57:24.780 --> 57:27.820
drop in the reliability of a current

57:27.830 --> 57:30.040
platform that we currently have .

57:30.050 --> 57:32.080
That's part of the triad and I

57:32.090 --> 57:34.257
appreciate that what I'm talking about

57:34.257 --> 57:36.368
here is I want to make sure that what

57:36.368 --> 57:38.479
we're gonna be replacing it with has

57:38.489 --> 57:40.550
been fully vetted and is the right

57:40.560 --> 57:42.639
direction for us to go . You know ,

57:42.649 --> 57:45.919
even before this latest cost

57:45.929 --> 57:48.909
breach , there were bright blinking

57:48.919 --> 57:51.560
warnings that this program was not on

57:51.570 --> 57:54.080
track . The air Force's aggressive

57:54.090 --> 57:56.129
schedule meant they were relying on

57:56.139 --> 57:58.969
immature technology which the GAO

57:58.979 --> 58:01.600
warned at the time created additional

58:01.610 --> 58:04.330
risks of cost increases and schedule

58:04.340 --> 58:07.229
delays . Now , best practices for

58:07.239 --> 58:09.072
budgeting these types of complex

58:09.072 --> 58:11.429
programs is to develop what's called an

58:11.439 --> 58:13.310
integrated master schedule , an

58:13.320 --> 58:16.379
analysis that's going to break down the

58:16.389 --> 58:19.110
project into steps , resources and

58:19.120 --> 58:21.770
budget needed to complete it . Sort of

58:21.780 --> 58:25.449
budgeting 101 Sentinel did not have

58:25.459 --> 58:28.189
that general cotton . You've warned

58:28.199 --> 58:30.199
that the complexity of the sentinel

58:30.199 --> 58:32.439
program , I'm quoting you here will

58:32.449 --> 58:34.939
challenge Air Force and industry

58:34.949 --> 58:37.649
partners in ways not seen for a

58:37.659 --> 58:40.399
generation . So let me ask , do you

58:40.409 --> 58:42.409
think it is important to have basic

58:42.409 --> 58:45.379
program management guardrails in place

58:45.389 --> 58:48.239
to help us prevent delays and cost

58:48.250 --> 58:51.590
overruns ? The

58:52.489 --> 58:54.545
Senator . The rest of that statement

58:54.545 --> 58:56.656
was , you're absolutely right because

58:56.656 --> 58:58.878
I've said it numerous times that , that

58:58.878 --> 58:58.870
it's going to be a mega project that ,

58:59.010 --> 59:01.232
that we haven't seen since actually the

59:01.232 --> 59:03.121
onset of the minute man three and

59:03.121 --> 59:05.343
placement in the early sixties . Um I ,

59:05.343 --> 59:07.870
you know , I'm a taxpayer as well and ,

59:07.879 --> 59:09.990
and , and , and I want , you know , I

59:09.990 --> 59:12.212
want to ensure that , that , that we're

59:12.212 --> 59:14.379
that one , I have a weapon system that

59:14.379 --> 59:16.379
can deliver the capabilities that I

59:16.379 --> 59:18.379
need to deliver . Um I also need to

59:18.379 --> 59:20.546
make sure that uh that we don't create

59:20.546 --> 59:22.379
a larger gap in , in , in having

59:22.379 --> 59:25.250
assessments that would , would drive um

59:25.260 --> 59:29.020
us to , to now question uh one leg of

59:29.030 --> 59:31.610
the triad in regards of uh how I can

59:31.709 --> 59:34.330
produce or , or , or have forces go to ,

59:34.340 --> 59:36.600
to meet the need and I appreciate that

59:36.610 --> 59:38.840
general , but , but we gotta have a

59:38.850 --> 59:41.159
plan here that is actually gonna work .

59:41.409 --> 59:44.120
We can't just keep burning money and

59:44.129 --> 59:46.185
saying at some point , we hope we're

59:46.185 --> 59:48.407
gonna be able to deliver this thing . I

59:48.407 --> 59:51.070
am very concerned that Pentagon

59:51.080 --> 59:53.429
officials are already saying they're

59:53.439 --> 59:56.879
already saying quote , they will make

59:56.889 --> 59:59.669
the trades it takes to keep the

59:59.679 --> 01:00:02.600
sentinel program funded analysis . Be

01:00:02.610 --> 01:00:05.879
damned . I'll be watching closely to

01:00:05.889 --> 01:00:08.350
see if the dod takes this review that

01:00:08.360 --> 01:00:11.050
is required now by law because of the

01:00:11.060 --> 01:00:13.469
cost overruns . I will be looking to

01:00:13.479 --> 01:00:16.060
see if they take this review seriously

01:00:16.229 --> 01:00:18.399
or if it's just another paperwork

01:00:18.409 --> 01:00:21.570
exercise to justify throwing more money

01:00:21.979 --> 01:00:24.540
at more expensive nuclear programs .

01:00:25.300 --> 01:00:27.850
Thank you , General . Thanks Senator

01:00:27.860 --> 01:00:30.639
Warren Senator Rounds , please . Thank

01:00:30.649 --> 01:00:32.816
you , Mr Chairman . First of all , let

01:00:32.816 --> 01:00:34.982
me just say to both of you , thank you

01:00:34.982 --> 01:00:37.149
for your service to our country and to

01:00:37.149 --> 01:00:40.000
your teams as well . Uh Today we're

01:00:40.010 --> 01:00:42.260
talking about a , about some of the

01:00:42.270 --> 01:00:44.492
most strategic weapons systems that our

01:00:44.492 --> 01:00:47.189
country has while our conventional

01:00:47.199 --> 01:00:49.459
forces are absolutely critical , our

01:00:49.469 --> 01:00:51.729
conventional forces are only effective

01:00:51.739 --> 01:00:54.530
because we have the nuclear deterrence

01:00:54.540 --> 01:00:56.699
in our strategic weapon systems to

01:00:56.709 --> 01:01:00.419
support them . Uh General Whiting

01:01:00.639 --> 01:01:03.840
China and Russia both understand how

01:01:03.850 --> 01:01:06.719
vital our space capabilities are to the

01:01:06.729 --> 01:01:08.951
joint force and they've been developing

01:01:08.951 --> 01:01:10.840
capabilities to counter our space

01:01:10.840 --> 01:01:13.580
assets for years . Are we currently

01:01:13.590 --> 01:01:17.370
postured to win a conflict that

01:01:17.379 --> 01:01:20.770
begins in or extends into space ?

01:01:21.340 --> 01:01:24.080
Can we , I mean , when we take a look

01:01:24.090 --> 01:01:26.370
at this right now , I I and , and I

01:01:26.379 --> 01:01:28.419
really appreciated Senator King's

01:01:28.659 --> 01:01:30.810
comments with regard to the fact that

01:01:30.820 --> 01:01:34.689
we're ready to fight tonight . But can

01:01:34.699 --> 01:01:37.959
we win that battle ? And what about

01:01:37.969 --> 01:01:40.270
five and 10 years from now on the

01:01:40.280 --> 01:01:43.770
current trajectories , Senator . Thank

01:01:43.780 --> 01:01:46.360
you for the question . Uh Today , I am

01:01:46.370 --> 01:01:48.370
uh completely clear in saying we do

01:01:48.370 --> 01:01:50.426
have the world's best military space

01:01:50.426 --> 01:01:52.570
capabilities . Uh I will use the same

01:01:52.580 --> 01:01:54.691
word that general cotton used when we

01:01:54.691 --> 01:01:57.024
look at what China and Russia are doing ,

01:01:57.024 --> 01:01:59.024
uh particularly building with their

01:01:59.024 --> 01:01:58.899
counter space weapons , they are moving

01:01:58.909 --> 01:02:02.100
breathtakingly fast . Um And , and so

01:02:02.110 --> 01:02:03.721
we , we must ensure that the

01:02:03.721 --> 01:02:05.888
investments that have been made and we

01:02:05.888 --> 01:02:07.499
thank the Congress for those

01:02:07.499 --> 01:02:09.645
investments continue um to , to those

01:02:09.655 --> 01:02:11.711
programs continue to execute that we

01:02:11.711 --> 01:02:13.877
continue to invest , to make sure that

01:02:13.877 --> 01:02:15.877
we keep pace with that breathtaking

01:02:15.877 --> 01:02:18.024
pace . Part of that I suspect you had

01:02:18.034 --> 01:02:19.867
provided and you will provide an

01:02:19.867 --> 01:02:22.655
unfunded priorities list that will

01:02:22.665 --> 01:02:24.665
likely be sent to Congress over the

01:02:24.665 --> 01:02:28.639
next month or so . Um If

01:02:28.649 --> 01:02:31.280
we were to fully fund that , that upl

01:02:31.290 --> 01:02:33.520
that that unfunded priorities list ,

01:02:33.739 --> 01:02:37.149
how would that impact your readiness in

01:02:37.159 --> 01:02:40.580
the near term ? Uh Yes , sir . The

01:02:40.590 --> 01:02:42.949
priorities that I expect will be on our

01:02:42.959 --> 01:02:45.429
unfunded priorities list are about

01:02:45.919 --> 01:02:48.489
improving our posture for the contested

01:02:48.500 --> 01:02:51.260
domain and to , to move at the pace

01:02:51.270 --> 01:02:53.437
that and ahead of the pace that Russia

01:02:53.437 --> 01:02:55.437
and China are moving . So that will

01:02:55.437 --> 01:02:57.048
give us the capacity and the

01:02:57.048 --> 01:02:59.719
capabilities that we believe we need in

01:02:59.729 --> 01:03:03.270
35 and 10 years . Thank you , General

01:03:03.280 --> 01:03:05.502
Cotton . I understand that by law , the

01:03:05.502 --> 01:03:07.613
Department of Defense Services cannot

01:03:07.613 --> 01:03:09.613
invest funds into a program that is

01:03:09.613 --> 01:03:12.469
going to be retired within five years .

01:03:12.689 --> 01:03:14.800
This is known as a sunset provision .

01:03:15.070 --> 01:03:17.070
Do you have any concerns about your

01:03:17.070 --> 01:03:18.903
legacy systems potentially being

01:03:18.903 --> 01:03:21.780
divested too early ? And the service

01:03:21.790 --> 01:03:23.957
secretaries can offer a waiver but are

01:03:23.957 --> 01:03:26.012
not required to and your replacement

01:03:26.012 --> 01:03:28.179
programs will not start to come online

01:03:28.179 --> 01:03:30.669
until the 20 thirties if they are on

01:03:30.679 --> 01:03:33.790
time . Uh If this policy is not changed ,

01:03:33.800 --> 01:03:36.629
how will it impact strategic deterrence ?

01:03:38.560 --> 01:03:40.560
Senator rounds ? Thank you for that

01:03:40.560 --> 01:03:42.671
question . And you're referring to uh

01:03:42.671 --> 01:03:46.270
title 10 Us code 2244 alpha . Imagine

01:03:46.280 --> 01:03:48.391
that you were waiting for that one or

01:03:48.391 --> 01:03:50.447
something that talks about equipment

01:03:50.447 --> 01:03:52.724
scheduled for retirement and dispersal .

01:03:52.724 --> 01:03:54.669
Um You're absolutely right because

01:03:54.669 --> 01:03:57.002
we've been talking about it all morning .

01:03:57.002 --> 01:03:59.439
Um You know , you always have plans

01:03:59.449 --> 01:04:01.790
that show overlap between legacy

01:04:01.800 --> 01:04:04.070
systems and new modernized systems .

01:04:04.149 --> 01:04:06.820
And as I stated earlier , when it comes

01:04:06.830 --> 01:04:09.570
to strategic deterrence , um

01:04:10.270 --> 01:04:13.300
credibility um is , is foundational to

01:04:13.310 --> 01:04:15.810
that and , and credibility is ensuring

01:04:15.820 --> 01:04:17.987
that the transition from legacy system

01:04:18.100 --> 01:04:19.933
um that there's no gap between a

01:04:19.933 --> 01:04:22.100
transition between legacy system and a

01:04:22.100 --> 01:04:24.211
modernized system . But we're talking

01:04:24.211 --> 01:04:26.378
about modernizing significant parts of

01:04:26.378 --> 01:04:28.489
the triad right now and there's gonna

01:04:28.489 --> 01:04:28.239
be a time period in which we're gonna

01:04:28.250 --> 01:04:30.417
have to have both systems , the legacy

01:04:30.417 --> 01:04:32.699
system and the new system operating and

01:04:32.709 --> 01:04:34.931
it for more than five years . Correct ?

01:04:34.931 --> 01:04:36.987
And that is correct , sir . So right

01:04:36.987 --> 01:04:39.153
now that that law would stipulate that

01:04:39.153 --> 01:04:41.465
you wouldn't um modernize components of

01:04:41.475 --> 01:04:43.419
the lega legacy system . If you're

01:04:43.419 --> 01:04:46.094
within five years of what you initially

01:04:46.104 --> 01:04:48.695
saw as a transition to the new system

01:04:48.705 --> 01:04:50.594
and that could be , that could be

01:04:50.594 --> 01:04:52.705
troublesome . The Sentinel program is

01:04:52.705 --> 01:04:56.614
critical to our deterrent capability ,

01:04:56.625 --> 01:05:00.469
correct . A modernized replacement to

01:05:00.479 --> 01:05:02.646
the Minuteman three system is actually

01:05:02.646 --> 01:05:04.757
foundational to , to , to the triad .

01:05:04.757 --> 01:05:07.149
Can we afford to delay the

01:05:07.159 --> 01:05:09.790
implementation of the Sentinel program ?

01:05:10.060 --> 01:05:12.171
We are late to need on all three legs

01:05:12.171 --> 01:05:14.116
of the triad . What do you mean by

01:05:14.116 --> 01:05:16.919
being late to need ? Um I would much

01:05:16.929 --> 01:05:19.040
rather and I think I , I think all my

01:05:19.040 --> 01:05:21.151
colleagues would agree . I would much

01:05:21.151 --> 01:05:23.373
rather not have to have a transition of

01:05:23.373 --> 01:05:25.596
legacy system to modernize systems that

01:05:25.596 --> 01:05:27.762
already passed their service date . So

01:05:27.762 --> 01:05:29.929
I , I wanna just get back in and I , I

01:05:29.929 --> 01:05:29.600
know my time is running out , but I'm

01:05:29.610 --> 01:05:31.721
gonna ask this , I I don't think that

01:05:31.721 --> 01:05:33.888
you necessarily had the opportunity to

01:05:33.888 --> 01:05:36.110
completely respond to the last comments

01:05:36.110 --> 01:05:38.332
with regard to the Sentinel program and

01:05:38.332 --> 01:05:40.666
the reason why it needs to move forward ,

01:05:40.666 --> 01:05:43.610
even if the cost goes up and the review

01:05:43.620 --> 01:05:45.676
is completed . This is not something

01:05:45.676 --> 01:05:47.731
that we can simply sit back and take

01:05:47.731 --> 01:05:49.689
our time on . Could you respond ,

01:05:49.699 --> 01:05:51.755
please ? If the chairman would allow

01:05:51.755 --> 01:05:55.669
that ? We , we , we

01:05:55.679 --> 01:05:59.229
cannot uh uh center around um

01:06:01.040 --> 01:06:03.207
the analysis and assessments have been

01:06:03.207 --> 01:06:05.373
done . We need to make the decision on

01:06:05.373 --> 01:06:07.596
regards to uh what we want to do as far

01:06:07.596 --> 01:06:09.318
as the modernization of a very

01:06:09.318 --> 01:06:11.429
important leg of the triad and that's

01:06:11.429 --> 01:06:13.596
the , the land leg and the ICBM leg of

01:06:13.596 --> 01:06:15.818
the , of the system . Thank you . Thank

01:06:15.818 --> 01:06:18.040
you , Mr Chairman . Thank you , Senator

01:06:18.040 --> 01:06:20.040
Rounds . Uh Senator Haro , please .

01:06:21.709 --> 01:06:23.042
Thank you Mr Chairman .

01:06:26.250 --> 01:06:29.939
The this is for , well , both of you ,

01:06:29.949 --> 01:06:32.830
both of the witnesses , the 2024 NDA A

01:06:32.840 --> 01:06:36.790
directs the dod to develop a plan for

01:06:36.800 --> 01:06:38.689
the missile defense of Hawaii and

01:06:38.689 --> 01:06:40.830
military construction projects that

01:06:40.840 --> 01:06:42.896
will enable the timely deployment of

01:06:42.896 --> 01:06:45.840
missile defense capabilities across all

01:06:45.850 --> 01:06:49.169
locations in Indo paycom . I believe

01:06:49.179 --> 01:06:51.550
the president signed the NDA A in

01:06:51.560 --> 01:06:54.780
December . So you have uh some 90 days

01:06:54.790 --> 01:06:58.370
or so to complete and provide this plan .

01:06:58.550 --> 01:07:01.139
How is uh how is that plan coming along

01:07:01.149 --> 01:07:04.340
for either one of you , Senator , I'll ,

01:07:04.350 --> 01:07:06.461
I'll take that question since uh last

01:07:06.469 --> 01:07:08.747
year . We took on Unified Command Plan ,

01:07:08.747 --> 01:07:10.636
responsibility for trans regional

01:07:10.636 --> 01:07:12.802
missile defense , uh operation support

01:07:12.802 --> 01:07:15.040
and planning . Um Ma'am at this time ,

01:07:15.050 --> 01:07:17.161
I'm not familiar with where that plan

01:07:17.161 --> 01:07:19.328
is . And if I could take that question

01:07:19.328 --> 01:07:21.383
for the record , I could get back to

01:07:21.383 --> 01:07:23.494
you with specifics on , on where that

01:07:23.494 --> 01:07:25.717
is . I've been very concerned over time

01:07:25.717 --> 01:07:27.661
about the missile defense of uh of

01:07:27.661 --> 01:07:29.883
Hawaii . Uh And so I'd also like you to

01:07:29.883 --> 01:07:31.772
contemplate whether we need to uh

01:07:31.772 --> 01:07:33.883
mitigate any potential risks from our

01:07:33.883 --> 01:07:36.639
near peer competitors as you both have

01:07:36.649 --> 01:07:39.250
discussed before , we have this plan ,

01:07:39.260 --> 01:07:41.780
missile defense plan in place because

01:07:41.790 --> 01:07:44.320
as you as you know , we had a major

01:07:44.330 --> 01:07:47.320
mishap in Hawaii which led to my

01:07:47.330 --> 01:07:49.497
ongoing concerns about missile defense

01:07:49.497 --> 01:07:53.280
of Hawaii for General Whiting . They um

01:07:53.290 --> 01:07:56.830
2024 nd A required a study on the

01:07:56.840 --> 01:08:00.350
consolidation or transfer of the space

01:08:00.360 --> 01:08:03.229
functions of the National National

01:08:03.239 --> 01:08:05.729
Guard , which must include a cost

01:08:05.739 --> 01:08:07.572
benefit analysis for each of the

01:08:07.572 --> 01:08:11.330
potential features of these units . The

01:08:11.340 --> 01:08:14.110
options are the creation of a space

01:08:14.120 --> 01:08:17.209
National Guard keeping the status quo

01:08:17.220 --> 01:08:19.439
or transferring the space functions

01:08:19.520 --> 01:08:22.279
into the space force general . Whiting ,

01:08:22.290 --> 01:08:24.068
what is the current role of the

01:08:24.068 --> 01:08:27.160
National Guard in Space ? And how would

01:08:27.169 --> 01:08:29.899
you transfer the space functions into

01:08:29.910 --> 01:08:31.966
the space force ? And what would you

01:08:31.966 --> 01:08:33.910
need if that is the finding of the

01:08:33.910 --> 01:08:35.966
study ? And the , the reason for the

01:08:35.966 --> 01:08:38.132
study was that there was some decision

01:08:38.132 --> 01:08:40.569
made as to what would happen to uh the

01:08:40.580 --> 01:08:43.000
National Guard Space , you could call

01:08:43.009 --> 01:08:45.009
it space units . Uh There were some

01:08:45.009 --> 01:08:47.176
decisions made without this kind of uh

01:08:47.176 --> 01:08:50.339
plan or study or cost benefit analysis

01:08:50.589 --> 01:08:53.370
that would lead to the three options

01:08:53.379 --> 01:08:56.620
that I mentioned . So , um what , what ,

01:08:56.850 --> 01:09:00.029
what , what is being contemplated for

01:09:00.040 --> 01:09:02.529
the National Guard Space Force Senator ?

01:09:02.540 --> 01:09:04.540
Thank you for the question from a a

01:09:04.540 --> 01:09:07.589
space command perspective . Uh We very

01:09:07.600 --> 01:09:09.656
much appreciate the great support we

01:09:09.656 --> 01:09:11.767
get from a number of states that have

01:09:11.767 --> 01:09:14.310
uh their guards uh units have space and

01:09:14.319 --> 01:09:17.310
it's vital to us that however , those

01:09:17.319 --> 01:09:20.169
options are resolved that we don't have

01:09:20.180 --> 01:09:22.291
an interruption to those missions . I

01:09:22.291 --> 01:09:24.180
would have to defer to the United

01:09:24.180 --> 01:09:26.402
States Space Force for the specifics of

01:09:26.402 --> 01:09:28.513
what options are being analyzed and ,

01:09:28.513 --> 01:09:30.680
and where they're headed . Uh But it's

01:09:30.680 --> 01:09:32.513
vital to us that we not have any

01:09:32.513 --> 01:09:34.736
interruption to those missions . As you

01:09:34.736 --> 01:09:36.958
are probably aware , we do have a space

01:09:36.958 --> 01:09:38.847
function in the National Guard in

01:09:38.847 --> 01:09:40.736
Hawaii and these are very skilled

01:09:40.736 --> 01:09:43.048
people . And so I think we need to make

01:09:43.059 --> 01:09:45.170
sure that whatever decisions are made

01:09:45.170 --> 01:09:48.519
based on uh an assessment

01:09:48.778 --> 01:09:51.358
that uh that takes all of these issues

01:09:51.369 --> 01:09:54.339
in consideration for general lighting .

01:09:54.350 --> 01:09:56.572
Previously , space was only used by the

01:09:56.572 --> 01:09:58.628
government but has become the domain

01:09:58.628 --> 01:10:01.180
for new waves of commercial satellites ,

01:10:01.290 --> 01:10:03.959
for broadband communications and remote

01:10:03.970 --> 01:10:07.450
sensing . Uh generating our dod and us

01:10:07.459 --> 01:10:09.339
space command specifically and

01:10:09.350 --> 01:10:11.540
appropriately leveraging commercial

01:10:11.549 --> 01:10:15.410
space capabilities . Senator ,

01:10:15.419 --> 01:10:17.641
thanks for the question . Uh I think us

01:10:17.641 --> 01:10:19.863
commercial space industry is one of our

01:10:19.863 --> 01:10:21.863
absolute national advantages and we

01:10:21.863 --> 01:10:23.863
have leveraged that in the past , I

01:10:23.863 --> 01:10:25.919
think we can find uh even better and

01:10:25.919 --> 01:10:27.919
more innovative ways to leverage it

01:10:27.919 --> 01:10:30.229
going forward . Uh us commercial space

01:10:30.240 --> 01:10:32.296
industry is moving incredibly fast .

01:10:32.296 --> 01:10:34.018
They're widening their lead in

01:10:34.018 --> 01:10:36.080
commercial space services over other

01:10:36.089 --> 01:10:38.200
countries . And so we wanna make sure

01:10:38.200 --> 01:10:40.145
that we are partnered with them as

01:10:40.145 --> 01:10:42.200
tightly as possible and what

01:10:42.209 --> 01:10:44.319
protections exist for the commercial

01:10:44.330 --> 01:10:46.052
satellites against physical or

01:10:46.052 --> 01:10:49.430
cyberattacks . Yes , ma'am . As part of

01:10:49.439 --> 01:10:50.990
my uh unified command plan

01:10:51.000 --> 01:10:52.611
responsibilities . I do have

01:10:52.611 --> 01:10:54.667
responsibility to protect and defend

01:10:54.667 --> 01:10:56.879
commercial assets as directed . So as

01:10:56.890 --> 01:10:58.830
we work with these uh commercial

01:10:58.839 --> 01:11:00.672
companies , we have already have

01:11:00.672 --> 01:11:02.839
information sharing agreements with uh

01:11:02.839 --> 01:11:05.069
the companies that we uh are already

01:11:05.080 --> 01:11:07.850
contracted with for capability . And we

01:11:07.859 --> 01:11:10.026
uh they actually sit with us at one of

01:11:10.026 --> 01:11:12.137
our operation centers in California ,

01:11:12.137 --> 01:11:14.137
California at the highest levels of

01:11:14.137 --> 01:11:13.810
intelligence to know what those threats

01:11:13.819 --> 01:11:15.930
are . And we share that information .

01:11:15.930 --> 01:11:18.041
Uh and then we want to work with them

01:11:18.041 --> 01:11:20.097
as well to help them harden their um

01:11:20.097 --> 01:11:22.490
cyber infrastructure so that they're

01:11:22.500 --> 01:11:24.444
not denied through the cyber um uh

01:11:24.444 --> 01:11:26.500
domain because that would impact our

01:11:26.500 --> 01:11:28.667
ability to leverage their services . I

01:11:28.667 --> 01:11:30.722
think that aspect of protections and

01:11:30.722 --> 01:11:32.833
the cyber domain , I have talked with

01:11:32.833 --> 01:11:35.160
uh with private entities where they ,

01:11:35.169 --> 01:11:37.620
they need to be sure that they are up

01:11:37.629 --> 01:11:39.740
on what kind of protections they need

01:11:39.740 --> 01:11:42.140
to put in place uh as they work with

01:11:42.149 --> 01:11:44.371
you to make sure that we are all on the

01:11:44.371 --> 01:11:47.029
same page in terms of uh cybersecurity

01:11:47.040 --> 01:11:50.740
issues . Thank you . Thank you very

01:11:50.750 --> 01:11:52.694
much , uh Senator Ronald , Senator

01:11:52.694 --> 01:11:54.528
Corman , please . Thank you , Mr

01:11:54.528 --> 01:11:56.528
Chairman and thank you generals for

01:11:56.528 --> 01:11:58.750
your service . Thank you for being here

01:11:58.750 --> 01:11:58.350
and thank you to , to all the troops

01:11:58.359 --> 01:12:00.470
under your command . Um I'm gonna get

01:12:00.470 --> 01:12:02.470
right to it because I need a little

01:12:02.470 --> 01:12:04.526
more context on a couple of previous

01:12:04.526 --> 01:12:06.415
points . I'm gonna start with you

01:12:06.415 --> 01:12:08.470
General Cotton in , in response to a

01:12:08.470 --> 01:12:10.415
sort of a general question from uh

01:12:10.415 --> 01:12:12.637
Senator Fisher you , you said something

01:12:12.637 --> 01:12:15.580
effect um adequate standoff capa

01:12:15.620 --> 01:12:17.879
capability . Could you drill down on

01:12:17.890 --> 01:12:19.946
that a little bit ? In other words ,

01:12:19.946 --> 01:12:22.029
are we short in that capacity , um

01:12:22.040 --> 01:12:24.370
particularly on the conventional

01:12:24.379 --> 01:12:27.520
weapons ? And if so , do , do you have

01:12:27.529 --> 01:12:29.585
a , do you have a solution in mind ?

01:12:30.990 --> 01:12:32.934
Senator Kremer ? Thank you for the

01:12:32.934 --> 01:12:34.990
question . Um So I can , yeah , so I

01:12:34.990 --> 01:12:37.157
can get a little more detail than what

01:12:37.157 --> 01:12:40.009
I meant by that . Um I , I think as we

01:12:40.020 --> 01:12:42.189
look at who our adversaries are , I

01:12:42.200 --> 01:12:44.700
think we would all agree that having

01:12:44.709 --> 01:12:46.765
standoff fires and long range strike

01:12:46.765 --> 01:12:49.549
capability um will be beneficial uh uh

01:12:49.560 --> 01:12:53.229
for us against the adversary . Um And

01:12:53.240 --> 01:12:54.907
then what I mean by that more

01:12:54.907 --> 01:12:56.740
specifically , and this is not a

01:12:56.740 --> 01:12:58.629
parochial statement . It's just a

01:12:58.629 --> 01:13:01.910
matter of fact , um is that I think ,

01:13:01.919 --> 01:13:04.899
um the utilization of , of bombers and

01:13:04.910 --> 01:13:07.299
being able to have a bomber carry a

01:13:07.310 --> 01:13:11.069
long range strike weapon because range

01:13:11.080 --> 01:13:14.029
is , is dependent on size because it's

01:13:14.040 --> 01:13:16.970
fuel capacity of the weapon , um ,

01:13:16.979 --> 01:13:20.279
would be a very beneficial for us as a

01:13:20.290 --> 01:13:22.457
nation to be able to have that type of

01:13:22.457 --> 01:13:25.089
uh capability uh for our bomber force .

01:13:25.100 --> 01:13:27.211
Uh not just weapons that , that could

01:13:27.211 --> 01:13:29.930
be used for mirrored of , of weapon

01:13:29.939 --> 01:13:31.717
systems , but one that could be

01:13:31.717 --> 01:13:33.970
specifically used um in a conventional

01:13:33.979 --> 01:13:36.564
sense or the bomber that gives it um

01:13:36.575 --> 01:13:39.064
incredible out um incredible standoff

01:13:39.075 --> 01:13:41.131
and incredible range . And what that

01:13:41.131 --> 01:13:43.242
does for us is that actually makes it

01:13:43.242 --> 01:13:45.353
so it doesn't have to hit a tanker as

01:13:45.353 --> 01:13:47.845
often as well . Um So , and , and , and ,

01:13:47.854 --> 01:13:50.305
and actually keep the , the , the , the

01:13:50.314 --> 01:13:52.481
air crew and , and the platform out of

01:13:52.481 --> 01:13:55.560
harm's way . Well said , thank you for

01:13:55.569 --> 01:13:57.291
that . And then in response to

01:13:57.291 --> 01:14:00.129
something that Senator King using his

01:14:00.140 --> 01:14:03.100
usual um great illustrations of a pig

01:14:03.109 --> 01:14:05.165
in a Python I believe is what it was

01:14:05.165 --> 01:14:07.470
referencing , referencing . Um The lack

01:14:07.479 --> 01:14:09.819
of capital budgeting in , in our system ,

01:14:10.200 --> 01:14:11.922
the transparency of budgets is

01:14:11.922 --> 01:14:14.033
something that's always frustrated me

01:14:14.033 --> 01:14:13.959
on this committee , particularly as it

01:14:13.970 --> 01:14:16.026
relates to my favorite service , the

01:14:16.026 --> 01:14:18.810
Air Force . Thank you . Um You

01:14:18.819 --> 01:14:21.169
referenced the role of , of the , of

01:14:21.180 --> 01:14:24.500
your command um as

01:14:24.509 --> 01:14:26.839
national , as a national role . Uh uh

01:14:26.850 --> 01:14:28.683
understandably , you know , your

01:14:28.683 --> 01:14:31.509
command . Can you flesh that out a

01:14:31.520 --> 01:14:33.742
little bit for me as well ? Because I ,

01:14:33.742 --> 01:14:35.853
I have long been concerned that we're

01:14:35.853 --> 01:14:37.909
not adequately , I don't want to say

01:14:37.909 --> 01:14:40.076
appropriating but appropriating credit

01:14:40.076 --> 01:14:42.298
where credit is due and then cost where

01:14:42.298 --> 01:14:45.970
cost is due . Thank you , Senator

01:14:45.979 --> 01:14:48.290
Kremer . I think Yyy , you know ,

01:14:48.299 --> 01:14:50.466
there's , there's a lot of times where

01:14:50.466 --> 01:14:52.632
there can be a confusion even within a

01:14:52.632 --> 01:14:54.743
component , service component um that

01:14:54.743 --> 01:14:56.855
they're advocating for , for a weapon

01:14:56.855 --> 01:14:59.120
system or a platform um that that is

01:14:59.129 --> 01:15:01.799
utilized um in their operational domain .

01:15:01.810 --> 01:15:04.600
It absolutely is . Um but when it comes

01:15:04.609 --> 01:15:08.040
to strategic deterrent weapons um and

01:15:08.049 --> 01:15:11.560
strategic deterrence platforms , um I

01:15:11.620 --> 01:15:14.560
think that those are national systems

01:15:14.740 --> 01:15:16.962
um , and what I mean by that is that we

01:15:16.962 --> 01:15:19.319
are , uh , you know , we are doing the

01:15:19.330 --> 01:15:21.219
car and feed on the behalf of the

01:15:21.219 --> 01:15:23.386
systems that ultimately belong . And I

01:15:23.386 --> 01:15:25.608
got it all weapon systems belong to the

01:15:25.608 --> 01:15:27.830
president of the United States . But in

01:15:27.830 --> 01:15:27.115
particular , when we talk about

01:15:27.125 --> 01:15:29.674
strategic deterrent weapons , um , that

01:15:29.685 --> 01:15:31.907
it's , it's much more than the Colombia

01:15:31.907 --> 01:15:34.734
being part of the United States Navy or ,

01:15:34.745 --> 01:15:37.765
or the bomber ICBM be becoming a part

01:15:37.825 --> 01:15:39.936
of , of the United States Air Force .

01:15:39.936 --> 01:15:41.769
And um and , and I think there's

01:15:41.769 --> 01:15:43.881
probably room for conversation on how

01:15:43.881 --> 01:15:45.936
do we make that ? So we can not have

01:15:45.936 --> 01:15:47.936
these conversations on , on funding

01:15:47.936 --> 01:15:50.047
that was therapeutic for me . Because

01:15:50.047 --> 01:15:52.549
if , if , if members , you know silos

01:15:52.560 --> 01:15:54.782
within the same services are confused ,

01:15:54.782 --> 01:15:56.949
I feel better about my confusion now .

01:15:56.949 --> 01:15:59.282
Um But thank you for that clarification .

01:15:59.282 --> 01:16:01.449
You know , I can't look at both of you

01:16:01.449 --> 01:16:03.671
without noticing um general cotton that

01:16:03.671 --> 01:16:05.838
there's a lack of space folk in your ,

01:16:05.838 --> 01:16:08.200
in your um sort of leadership chart .

01:16:08.209 --> 01:16:10.431
Can you speak to that a little bit ? Um

01:16:10.431 --> 01:16:12.653
As I , I look at the two of you side by

01:16:12.653 --> 01:16:14.820
side and realizing the history of , of

01:16:14.820 --> 01:16:16.931
both commands . Well , I'll start off

01:16:16.931 --> 01:16:19.250
real quickly . So as the UCP changed ,

01:16:19.359 --> 01:16:21.526
um we lost , we lost our space billets

01:16:21.529 --> 01:16:23.585
if you will or , and the majority of

01:16:23.585 --> 01:16:25.939
our airmen who are are space specific .

01:16:26.040 --> 01:16:28.580
Um I will tell you that . Uh but my

01:16:28.589 --> 01:16:31.189
colleague here . Um uh General Whiting

01:16:31.200 --> 01:16:33.939
does have a joint uh joint force uh

01:16:33.950 --> 01:16:36.819
team that assists us . What I'm missing

01:16:36.830 --> 01:16:39.910
though is a space component um

01:16:39.919 --> 01:16:41.863
officer you know , like a one star

01:16:41.863 --> 01:16:43.641
general that can , that is um a

01:16:43.641 --> 01:16:46.120
component linkage to the space

01:16:46.129 --> 01:16:48.351
component . My component sees is I have

01:16:48.351 --> 01:16:50.629
a direct linkage with the air component

01:16:50.729 --> 01:16:52.896
um and Air Force Global Strike Command

01:16:52.896 --> 01:16:55.240
and I have a direct linkage with uh

01:16:55.250 --> 01:16:57.250
with the Navy component with uh the

01:16:57.250 --> 01:16:59.417
Joint Force of Maritime Command . I do

01:16:59.417 --> 01:17:01.528
not have a direct linkage . Um We are

01:17:01.528 --> 01:17:03.694
in works though the , the , you know ,

01:17:03.694 --> 01:17:05.917
to I am in works with Journal Saltman ,

01:17:05.917 --> 01:17:08.430
for example , um to , to fill that

01:17:08.439 --> 01:17:10.661
billet because you are also part of the

01:17:10.661 --> 01:17:13.850
NC three meeting that we had here

01:17:13.859 --> 01:17:16.009
recently . And what , what we really

01:17:16.020 --> 01:17:18.660
want to do is you saw a lot of that was

01:17:18.669 --> 01:17:20.970
a space layer and how can you have ,

01:17:20.979 --> 01:17:23.201
you know , I want to be able to have an

01:17:23.201 --> 01:17:25.350
expert . Um and one that is at a

01:17:25.359 --> 01:17:27.660
general officer level to be able to

01:17:27.669 --> 01:17:29.336
articulate the requirements ,

01:17:29.336 --> 01:17:31.502
especially when it comes to NC three ,

01:17:31.502 --> 01:17:33.502
if you will um on the space layer ,

01:17:33.502 --> 01:17:35.725
well , and general whiting and I talked

01:17:35.725 --> 01:17:37.891
about the vulnerability of SAT COM for

01:17:37.891 --> 01:17:39.780
example , to , to space warfare .

01:17:39.780 --> 01:17:41.891
Generally I I'm over time but if , if

01:17:41.891 --> 01:17:43.891
you could elaborate a little bit to

01:17:43.891 --> 01:17:46.113
General Cotton's point , if you would .

01:17:46.113 --> 01:17:48.280
Senator . Yes , it's important that uh

01:17:48.280 --> 01:17:50.391
that we ensure that strategic command

01:17:50.391 --> 01:17:52.558
has all the insights they need as they

01:17:52.558 --> 01:17:54.447
rely on the space layer for early

01:17:54.447 --> 01:17:55.891
warning and for protected

01:17:55.891 --> 01:17:57.891
communications and , and as general

01:17:57.891 --> 01:17:59.725
cotton noted uh today , us Space

01:17:59.725 --> 01:18:01.725
Command provides a joint integrated

01:18:01.725 --> 01:18:03.836
space team in his headquarters . They

01:18:03.836 --> 01:18:06.002
sit in Omaha to assist with that plane

01:18:06.002 --> 01:18:08.058
um and make sure that that he has uh

01:18:08.058 --> 01:18:10.058
insight into what we're doing uh so

01:18:10.058 --> 01:18:12.169
that we can best coordinate our plans

01:18:12.169 --> 01:18:14.280
together . Thank you . Thank you , Mr

01:18:14.280 --> 01:18:13.709
Chairman . Thank you , Senator Kremer .

01:18:13.939 --> 01:18:15.939
While I recognize Senator Kelly , I

01:18:15.939 --> 01:18:17.939
want to apologize because I did not

01:18:17.939 --> 01:18:20.050
realize you were in the room prior to

01:18:20.050 --> 01:18:22.106
recognizing Senator Ron . So Senator

01:18:22.106 --> 01:18:24.161
kill , it's ok , Mr Chairman , I was

01:18:24.161 --> 01:18:26.383
actually about 10 ft away , so I wasn't

01:18:26.383 --> 01:18:30.229
actually at my seat . Uh I um I

01:18:30.240 --> 01:18:32.779
want to follow up on uh what Senator

01:18:32.790 --> 01:18:35.700
Kramer was um asking about uh standoff

01:18:35.709 --> 01:18:38.859
capability . General Cotton . Um

01:18:39.430 --> 01:18:41.930
So two years since Russia's invaded

01:18:41.939 --> 01:18:45.060
Ukraine , um we've been forced to

01:18:45.069 --> 01:18:48.720
rethink our nuclear posture and how our

01:18:48.729 --> 01:18:51.410
own deterrence , you know , works with

01:18:51.419 --> 01:18:53.308
growing nuclear capability of our

01:18:53.308 --> 01:18:55.520
adversaries . Um And Russia has

01:18:55.529 --> 01:18:58.580
recently rejected a proposal to reopen

01:18:58.640 --> 01:19:01.890
by uh lateral nuclear arms control

01:19:01.899 --> 01:19:04.430
talks , their behavior , their rhetoric

01:19:04.439 --> 01:19:06.550
along with Chinese aggression , North

01:19:06.550 --> 01:19:08.606
Korea's regular testing of ballistic

01:19:08.660 --> 01:19:11.279
missiles and those kind of capabilities .

01:19:11.399 --> 01:19:15.319
Iran um increasing its supply of

01:19:15.330 --> 01:19:17.163
enriched uranium . I mean , this

01:19:17.163 --> 01:19:19.330
underscores the importance of having a

01:19:19.330 --> 01:19:21.709
strong deterrence ourself , the LRSO

01:19:21.720 --> 01:19:24.000
the long range standoff missile system

01:19:24.009 --> 01:19:26.176
it's uh developed in Tucson Arizona at

01:19:26.176 --> 01:19:28.569
Raytheon . This is gonna be a critical

01:19:28.959 --> 01:19:31.359
feature of our future deterrence . The

01:19:31.370 --> 01:19:33.537
ability to forward deploy this missile

01:19:33.537 --> 01:19:35.759
and us bombers is a powerful message to

01:19:35.759 --> 01:19:38.339
our allies . So general , beyond what

01:19:38.350 --> 01:19:40.406
Senator Kramer was asking just about

01:19:40.406 --> 01:19:42.890
standoff . Um more broadly , can you

01:19:42.899 --> 01:19:45.010
expand on your , on the importance of

01:19:45.010 --> 01:19:48.569
the LRSO to our overall deterrence and

01:19:48.580 --> 01:19:50.479
give any updates you have on its

01:19:50.490 --> 01:19:53.950
fielding ? Senator Kelly ? Thank you

01:19:53.959 --> 01:19:56.080
for the question . You know , when we

01:19:56.089 --> 01:19:58.200
talk about the air leg of the triad ,

01:19:58.200 --> 01:20:00.256
the air leg of the triad composes of

01:20:00.256 --> 01:20:02.311
two mission essential tasks that the

01:20:02.311 --> 01:20:04.145
bomber is , is supposed to do in

01:20:04.145 --> 01:20:06.311
regards of what , what my mission said

01:20:06.311 --> 01:20:07.978
is , um that's a gravity bomb

01:20:07.978 --> 01:20:09.811
deployment and , and , and , and

01:20:09.811 --> 01:20:11.978
release and the ability to have a long

01:20:11.978 --> 01:20:14.060
range standoff strike weapon . Um um

01:20:14.799 --> 01:20:18.700
LRSO is absolutely critical uh

01:20:18.709 --> 01:20:22.500
for my mission set um as a long range

01:20:22.509 --> 01:20:25.990
standoff uh nuclear weapon . Um It will

01:20:26.000 --> 01:20:28.109
replace the uh the outcome that is

01:20:28.120 --> 01:20:31.419
currently uh that we currently carry um

01:20:32.459 --> 01:20:34.459
from the reports that I'm receiving

01:20:34.459 --> 01:20:37.839
from , from the component is the uh

01:20:37.850 --> 01:20:41.089
that Rayon is doing a great job in , in ,

01:20:41.100 --> 01:20:43.100
in manufacturing that , that , that

01:20:43.100 --> 01:20:45.819
weapon for us . Um Once again , just

01:20:45.830 --> 01:20:48.108
like everything else . II I , you know ,

01:20:48.108 --> 01:20:50.052
if I get it sooner than later , uh

01:20:50.052 --> 01:20:52.274
Senator that , that's , that's , that's

01:20:52.274 --> 01:20:54.330
good for us . Um And , and , and for

01:20:54.330 --> 01:20:56.386
maintaining the , is the IOC of this

01:20:56.386 --> 01:20:58.108
weapon ? Is it public or is it

01:20:58.108 --> 01:21:00.108
something we'd have to talk about ?

01:21:00.108 --> 01:21:02.219
Downstairs ? II , I would rather have

01:21:02.219 --> 01:21:04.330
that conversation with you downstairs

01:21:04.330 --> 01:21:04.279
and then we can talk , we can talk

01:21:04.290 --> 01:21:06.457
about that if it's ok with you , sir .

01:21:06.457 --> 01:21:09.430
Beyond LRSO , what else do you think we

01:21:09.439 --> 01:21:11.879
could be doing to deter our adversaries

01:21:11.890 --> 01:21:15.649
that we are currently not doing ? Well ?

01:21:15.660 --> 01:21:17.493
I think , um , it was an earlier

01:21:17.493 --> 01:21:19.660
conversation on what do we look as far

01:21:19.660 --> 01:21:21.716
as posture and sizing of the current

01:21:21.716 --> 01:21:23.771
triad and what does that look like ?

01:21:23.771 --> 01:21:25.771
It's in alignment with uh the study

01:21:25.771 --> 01:21:28.459
results uh of the uh Posture Commission .

01:21:28.729 --> 01:21:30.919
Um It's also in alignment to the work

01:21:30.930 --> 01:21:32.874
that to be Frank , the Pentagon is

01:21:32.874 --> 01:21:34.986
doing in , in response to the Posture

01:21:34.986 --> 01:21:36.930
Commission . Um and it's work that

01:21:36.930 --> 01:21:39.041
we're doing in in stratcom . Um I can

01:21:39.041 --> 01:21:42.240
elaborate uh in incredible detail um in

01:21:42.250 --> 01:21:45.200
the in the secure session uh to let you

01:21:45.209 --> 01:21:47.376
know the work that we're doing in that

01:21:47.376 --> 01:21:49.209
regard . Thank you . Thank you ,

01:21:49.209 --> 01:21:51.265
General uh general Whiting different

01:21:51.265 --> 01:21:53.431
subject here . Um The space priorities

01:21:53.431 --> 01:21:56.450
framework aims to secure our space

01:21:56.459 --> 01:21:59.580
industrial base uh including improving

01:21:59.589 --> 01:22:02.160
supply chains for crucial satellite

01:22:02.169 --> 01:22:04.169
components like traveling wave wave

01:22:04.169 --> 01:22:06.439
tubes and traveling wave wave tube

01:22:06.450 --> 01:22:09.660
amplifiers . Uh in the United States .

01:22:09.669 --> 01:22:11.836
Here , we face some challenges in this

01:22:11.836 --> 01:22:14.450
area with limited domestic capabilities

01:22:14.459 --> 01:22:16.759
and also competition from China that's

01:22:16.770 --> 01:22:19.899
often heavily subsidized . Um And this

01:22:19.910 --> 01:22:21.966
situation leads to supply chain risk

01:22:21.966 --> 01:22:23.966
for essential national security and

01:22:23.966 --> 01:22:26.077
commercial satellites . I've got a uh

01:22:26.077 --> 01:22:27.910
amendment to the defense bill to

01:22:27.910 --> 01:22:29.521
support the development of a

01:22:29.521 --> 01:22:31.299
competitive US source for these

01:22:31.299 --> 01:22:33.521
components . And I'm gonna keep working

01:22:33.521 --> 01:22:35.577
on that this year . General . Do you

01:22:35.577 --> 01:22:37.299
believe it's important for the

01:22:37.299 --> 01:22:39.466
Department of Defense to have reliable

01:22:39.466 --> 01:22:41.990
US source for these critical satellite

01:22:42.000 --> 01:22:44.500
components to ensure quality , timely

01:22:44.509 --> 01:22:47.129
delivery and fair pricing ? And what

01:22:47.140 --> 01:22:50.109
other risk do you see uh from having

01:22:50.120 --> 01:22:52.689
inadequate domestic supply chains for

01:22:52.700 --> 01:22:55.700
key satellite components ? Uh Senator ,

01:22:55.709 --> 01:22:57.876
thank you for the question . Yes , I ,

01:22:57.876 --> 01:23:00.042
I do think it's important that we have

01:23:00.042 --> 01:23:02.098
uh robust supply chains from um from

01:23:02.098 --> 01:23:04.265
trusted sources in the United States .

01:23:04.265 --> 01:23:06.265
If we don't have that , I think the

01:23:06.265 --> 01:23:08.320
risk is that this widening lead that

01:23:08.320 --> 01:23:08.040
our commercial space industry has

01:23:08.049 --> 01:23:10.899
created for us , um that might be

01:23:10.910 --> 01:23:13.077
stymied and , and then that would give

01:23:13.077 --> 01:23:15.077
uh our competitors a chance to , to

01:23:15.077 --> 01:23:17.132
catch up . So we want to ensure that

01:23:17.132 --> 01:23:19.299
doesn't happen . Yeah , traveling wave

01:23:19.299 --> 01:23:21.521
tubes and wave tube amplifiers are kind

01:23:21.521 --> 01:23:23.743
of obscure components . Most folks have

01:23:23.743 --> 01:23:25.854
not actually heard of them , but they

01:23:25.854 --> 01:23:28.660
are important to us maintaining our

01:23:28.669 --> 01:23:31.700
edge in , in space technology . So ,

01:23:31.709 --> 01:23:35.220
thank you . Thank you , Senator Kelly .

01:23:35.229 --> 01:23:37.479
Uh Senator Scott , please . Thank you ,

01:23:37.490 --> 01:23:40.770
Chairman first . Thank both of you for

01:23:40.779 --> 01:23:42.946
being here . Um Thank you for what you

01:23:42.946 --> 01:23:44.946
do . General Whiting . Can you talk

01:23:44.946 --> 01:23:48.649
about the um how much dependence

01:23:48.660 --> 01:23:51.990
um our defense capabilities or

01:23:52.000 --> 01:23:54.520
offensive capabilities are on our

01:23:54.529 --> 01:23:57.549
satellite systems ? Yes , Senator .

01:23:57.560 --> 01:23:59.782
Thank you . For the question , um , the

01:23:59.782 --> 01:24:01.504
Army Navy Air Force Marines or

01:24:01.504 --> 01:24:03.671
Terrestrial Forces , if you will , are

01:24:03.671 --> 01:24:05.893
sized with the implicit assumption they

01:24:05.893 --> 01:24:08.171
will have access to space capabilities .

01:24:08.171 --> 01:24:10.282
And because of that , we've been able

01:24:10.282 --> 01:24:12.504
to , uh you know , reduce the number of

01:24:12.504 --> 01:24:14.449
forces that we have and we can now

01:24:14.449 --> 01:24:16.338
prosecute targets with much fewer

01:24:16.338 --> 01:24:18.560
assets than we would have decades ago .

01:24:18.560 --> 01:24:20.727
If we don't have access to those space

01:24:20.727 --> 01:24:22.838
capabilities , if those forces do not

01:24:22.838 --> 01:24:25.171
have access to those space capabilities ,

01:24:25.171 --> 01:24:27.227
we don't have the force structure uh

01:24:27.227 --> 01:24:27.209
that we , we would need to fight

01:24:27.220 --> 01:24:29.442
without them . So that's why we have to

01:24:29.442 --> 01:24:31.053
protect and defend the space

01:24:31.053 --> 01:24:33.164
capabilities against the threats . We

01:24:33.164 --> 01:24:35.220
now see a raid against us . How many

01:24:35.220 --> 01:24:37.164
different satellite systems are we

01:24:37.164 --> 01:24:39.276
depending on Senator ? I don't have a

01:24:39.276 --> 01:24:41.164
number but I can talk to you just

01:24:41.164 --> 01:24:43.276
quickly about the capabilities . It's

01:24:43.276 --> 01:24:45.498
our satellite communications , it's our

01:24:45.498 --> 01:24:47.720
uh global positioning system , it's our

01:24:47.720 --> 01:24:47.350
intelligence systems , it's our weather

01:24:47.359 --> 01:24:49.303
systems , it's our missile warning

01:24:49.303 --> 01:24:51.526
systems . There's a , there's a host of

01:24:51.526 --> 01:24:53.692
different capabilities we provide from

01:24:53.692 --> 01:24:56.459
space . So if our adversary was able to

01:24:56.700 --> 01:24:59.779
um demolish 10 of them ,

01:25:01.589 --> 01:25:03.478
all right . Would you create much

01:25:03.478 --> 01:25:05.740
debris ? Almost certainly . Yes ,

01:25:05.750 --> 01:25:08.459
Senator . And how much , if , if that ,

01:25:08.470 --> 01:25:10.720
if that , if that debris was floating

01:25:10.729 --> 01:25:12.896
out there , how much , how much of our

01:25:12.896 --> 01:25:15.062
satellites would be at risk because of

01:25:15.062 --> 01:25:17.839
just the debris hitting them , Senator .

01:25:17.850 --> 01:25:20.017
Uh , that is a concern and it's why we

01:25:20.017 --> 01:25:22.239
monitor the 45,000 trackable objects on

01:25:22.240 --> 01:25:23.899
orbit to watch for potential

01:25:23.910 --> 01:25:26.399
conjunctions . Uh But we don't want to

01:25:26.410 --> 01:25:29.080
proliferate um , debris on orbit which

01:25:29.089 --> 01:25:31.367
would increase the risk to our systems .

01:25:31.367 --> 01:25:33.145
So , if you were an adversary ,

01:25:33.145 --> 01:25:35.311
wouldn't that be the cheapest thing to

01:25:35.311 --> 01:25:37.367
do if you want to , if you wanted to

01:25:37.367 --> 01:25:39.422
cripple , uh our ability wouldn't be

01:25:39.422 --> 01:25:41.589
the cheap , cheapest thing to do is go

01:25:41.600 --> 01:25:45.259
blow up 10 or 12 of these

01:25:45.270 --> 01:25:47.381
large satellites that are out there .

01:25:48.069 --> 01:25:50.870
Uh So I don't know the cost of that ,

01:25:50.879 --> 01:25:52.601
but it , it would certainly be

01:25:52.601 --> 01:25:54.657
incredibly reckless because it would

01:25:54.657 --> 01:25:56.546
pollute the very domain . They're

01:25:56.546 --> 01:25:58.212
probably trying to operate in

01:25:58.212 --> 01:26:00.490
themselves because it's indiscriminate ,

01:26:00.490 --> 01:26:02.712
it impacts , it impacts potentially our

01:26:02.712 --> 01:26:02.129
satellites , their satellites , uh

01:26:02.140 --> 01:26:04.196
other countries' , satellites and it

01:26:04.196 --> 01:26:06.418
would be incredibly reckless behavior .

01:26:06.418 --> 01:26:08.751
Let's take , let's take Russia's forces .

01:26:09.020 --> 01:26:12.470
So if you look at , you know , our uh

01:26:12.479 --> 01:26:14.423
our forces as compared to Russia ,

01:26:14.423 --> 01:26:16.423
Russia's forces , how dependent are

01:26:16.423 --> 01:26:18.257
they on the satellite systems as

01:26:18.257 --> 01:26:20.257
compared to us , Senator , they are

01:26:20.257 --> 01:26:22.479
less dependent . Uh for the reason that

01:26:22.479 --> 01:26:24.590
they are a continental power and they

01:26:24.590 --> 01:26:26.669
expect to be able to run fiber and ,

01:26:26.680 --> 01:26:28.847
and to do uh microwave shots and those

01:26:28.847 --> 01:26:31.013
kind of things and they don't have the

01:26:31.013 --> 01:26:33.180
same global type military that we do .

01:26:33.180 --> 01:26:35.347
So they are less dependent . How about

01:26:35.347 --> 01:26:37.569
China ? So they have replicated in many

01:26:37.569 --> 01:26:39.791
ways what we have done in space because

01:26:39.791 --> 01:26:41.791
as they try to push us out from the

01:26:41.791 --> 01:26:43.680
first island chain and the second

01:26:43.680 --> 01:26:45.902
island chain in the Pacific , they have

01:26:45.902 --> 01:26:45.850
gone to space for the advantages it

01:26:45.859 --> 01:26:47.859
brings . So in many ways , they are

01:26:47.859 --> 01:26:49.859
working to replicate the dependency

01:26:49.859 --> 01:26:53.049
that we have . So if , if um if they ,

01:26:53.060 --> 01:26:54.949
if they were able to , you know ,

01:26:54.949 --> 01:26:57.171
hamper our ability to use our satellite

01:26:57.171 --> 01:27:00.450
system , let's take China . And um um

01:27:00.459 --> 01:27:02.850
they were only focused on Taiwan or

01:27:02.859 --> 01:27:05.689
Japan or are , well for sure , Korea .

01:27:05.700 --> 01:27:07.867
Right . And then they don't need their

01:27:07.867 --> 01:27:09.922
satellite system to do anything with

01:27:09.922 --> 01:27:11.756
regard to Korea . Right . Uh But

01:27:13.350 --> 01:27:15.517
Senator , I , I think China , they are

01:27:15.517 --> 01:27:17.689
getting to the point where um all of

01:27:17.700 --> 01:27:20.033
their forces are becoming space enabled .

01:27:20.033 --> 01:27:22.144
And so I think in any conflict , they

01:27:22.144 --> 01:27:24.422
would be reliant on space capabilities .

01:27:24.422 --> 01:27:26.533
Ok ? But if they , if they all , they

01:27:26.533 --> 01:27:28.756
all only the power they want to project

01:27:28.756 --> 01:27:32.399
was uh Korea , Taiwan , Japan . And

01:27:32.410 --> 01:27:34.632
that's all they cared about , then they

01:27:34.632 --> 01:27:36.577
probably wouldn't need their space

01:27:36.577 --> 01:27:38.743
capabilities as much , would they ? Um

01:27:39.120 --> 01:27:41.342
Senator , I think they would need those

01:27:41.342 --> 01:27:43.287
space capabilities because they're

01:27:43.287 --> 01:27:45.231
looking beyond those countries and

01:27:45.231 --> 01:27:47.398
looking at the US and looking at where

01:27:47.398 --> 01:27:49.620
the US would be flowing forces from and

01:27:49.620 --> 01:27:51.842
that has required them to go to space .

01:27:51.842 --> 01:27:53.953
Ok . How about Iran ? They don't need

01:27:53.953 --> 01:27:56.990
it , right . Um Iran is not a space

01:27:57.000 --> 01:27:59.056
enabled military and they , and they

01:27:59.056 --> 01:28:01.111
don't really do , they even have the

01:28:01.111 --> 01:28:03.222
ability to have any impact on us with

01:28:03.222 --> 01:28:04.944
in space today . They have not

01:28:04.944 --> 01:28:06.889
demonstrated that capability , but

01:28:06.889 --> 01:28:09.000
certainly we are watching their space

01:28:09.000 --> 01:28:08.669
program and their ballistic missile

01:28:08.680 --> 01:28:11.240
program very carefully . Um , and , and

01:28:11.250 --> 01:28:13.472
can only think about what they might be

01:28:13.472 --> 01:28:15.694
thinking about in the future . And what

01:28:15.694 --> 01:28:18.069
about North Korea ? Uh , North Korea

01:28:18.080 --> 01:28:19.959
has demonstrated an , um ,

01:28:19.970 --> 01:28:22.359
electromagnetic warfare capability that

01:28:22.370 --> 01:28:24.370
could have impact against our , our

01:28:24.370 --> 01:28:26.370
space systems . And then we're also

01:28:26.370 --> 01:28:28.370
very carefully watching their space

01:28:28.370 --> 01:28:30.481
systems . Of course , they should not

01:28:30.481 --> 01:28:30.410
be launching into space because of the

01:28:30.419 --> 01:28:32.979
UN um resolutions that say they can't

01:28:32.990 --> 01:28:35.046
use ballistic missile technology for

01:28:35.046 --> 01:28:37.046
that . And so again , we're , we're

01:28:37.046 --> 01:28:38.990
having to keep an eye on what they

01:28:38.990 --> 01:28:41.323
might be thinking of , of in the future .

01:28:41.323 --> 01:28:43.323
But our troops in Korea would are ,

01:28:43.323 --> 01:28:45.490
they need access to space capabilities

01:28:45.490 --> 01:28:47.657
in North Korea . They probably don't .

01:28:47.657 --> 01:28:49.768
Uh North Korea is not a space enabled

01:28:49.768 --> 01:28:52.101
military today , but we , but our , our ,

01:28:52.101 --> 01:28:54.157
our troops in , in South Korea would

01:28:54.157 --> 01:28:56.323
need it . Absolutely , Senator . Thank

01:28:56.323 --> 01:28:56.189
you . Thank you , Senator Scott ,

01:28:56.200 --> 01:28:58.279
Senator Rosen , please . Uh Well ,

01:28:58.290 --> 01:29:00.623
thank you , Chairman Reed and of course ,

01:29:00.623 --> 01:29:02.679
uh ranking member Wicker for holding

01:29:02.679 --> 01:29:04.734
this hearing . And I'd like to thank

01:29:04.734 --> 01:29:06.901
General Cotton and General Whiting for

01:29:06.901 --> 01:29:08.901
testifying today and for your great

01:29:08.901 --> 01:29:11.012
service to our country . I'm going to

01:29:11.012 --> 01:29:12.846
continue on this electromagnetic

01:29:12.846 --> 01:29:15.020
spectrum uh on the operations we have

01:29:15.029 --> 01:29:16.751
because General Cotton in your

01:29:16.751 --> 01:29:18.973
nomination hearing , you indicated that

01:29:18.973 --> 01:29:20.696
electromagnetic spectrum opera

01:29:20.696 --> 01:29:23.560
operations are a top priority . So your

01:29:23.569 --> 01:29:25.625
forces have done amazing work at the

01:29:25.625 --> 01:29:27.560
joint center for electromagnetic

01:29:27.569 --> 01:29:29.810
readiness at Nellis Air Force Base in

01:29:29.819 --> 01:29:31.830
my home state of Nevada . I'm very

01:29:31.839 --> 01:29:34.439
proud of N I and uh but even with the

01:29:34.450 --> 01:29:37.189
efforts made so far , I am sure that

01:29:37.200 --> 01:29:39.422
there's probably more work to be done .

01:29:39.422 --> 01:29:41.589
So what actions do you need to take to

01:29:41.589 --> 01:29:43.811
ensure that the United States can deter

01:29:43.811 --> 01:29:46.600
if needed and defeat threats across the

01:29:46.609 --> 01:29:49.450
electromagnetic spectrum ? And how can

01:29:49.459 --> 01:29:52.419
we help with that ? Senator Rosen ?

01:29:52.430 --> 01:29:54.541
Thank you for the question and thanks

01:29:54.541 --> 01:29:56.708
for um um acknowledging the incredible

01:29:56.708 --> 01:29:58.819
work that that team is doing . Um I'd

01:29:58.819 --> 01:30:00.986
like to highlight uh some of that work

01:30:00.986 --> 01:30:03.097
that that team is doing . Um And that

01:30:03.097 --> 01:30:05.152
includes specifically the support to

01:30:05.152 --> 01:30:07.486
the uconn commander and the U and , and ,

01:30:07.486 --> 01:30:09.374
and what we're seeing in the um U

01:30:09.374 --> 01:30:11.759
Ukrainian efforts as well as a support

01:30:11.770 --> 01:30:14.459
to um to Israel in the fight that we're

01:30:14.470 --> 01:30:17.180
seeing there . So that team um is

01:30:17.189 --> 01:30:19.410
coming out of the blocks um doing

01:30:19.419 --> 01:30:21.363
incredible work . So thank you for

01:30:21.363 --> 01:30:23.729
acknowledging them . Um as you know ,

01:30:23.740 --> 01:30:26.270
on the 26th of July last year is when

01:30:26.279 --> 01:30:29.839
we stood up . Um The J and that's when

01:30:29.850 --> 01:30:32.189
um I was giving the responsibility on I

01:30:32.200 --> 01:30:34.680
MS O . And as you've heard throughout

01:30:34.810 --> 01:30:37.359
um um the testimony today , um

01:30:37.370 --> 01:30:39.537
electromagnetic spectrum is incredibly

01:30:39.537 --> 01:30:42.770
important for us . It is a domain um

01:30:42.779 --> 01:30:46.209
that uh was uncontested for us over the

01:30:46.220 --> 01:30:49.024
past 30 years . Um Now that we have a

01:30:49.035 --> 01:30:51.234
fight , a potential fight with the

01:30:51.245 --> 01:30:54.134
adversaries that one understand that

01:30:54.145 --> 01:30:57.075
that's a domain that we rely on and to

01:30:57.084 --> 01:30:59.354
have the capability to do something to

01:30:59.365 --> 01:31:01.634
counter um having dominance in that

01:31:01.645 --> 01:31:03.756
domain and spectrum . It's incredibly

01:31:03.756 --> 01:31:06.674
important . And as the uh the the lead

01:31:06.685 --> 01:31:09.464
component or com combatant command to

01:31:09.475 --> 01:31:11.808
ensure that we have the proper training ,

01:31:11.808 --> 01:31:14.790
um the proper live virtual and

01:31:14.799 --> 01:31:17.600
collaborative um training techniques

01:31:17.720 --> 01:31:21.089
because uh as you know , um some of

01:31:21.100 --> 01:31:23.100
what we want to be able to test and

01:31:23.100 --> 01:31:26.669
train to um can't be done in the live

01:31:26.680 --> 01:31:29.390
environment . Um So we continue to work

01:31:29.399 --> 01:31:31.810
on how do we um I call them reps and

01:31:31.819 --> 01:31:33.986
sets to our men and women in the armed

01:31:33.986 --> 01:31:36.339
forces . How do we give them the reps

01:31:36.350 --> 01:31:39.633
and sets in a virtual um environment

01:31:39.644 --> 01:31:42.074
that shows all ranges of how they can

01:31:42.083 --> 01:31:44.423
contest that . Uh My team's gonna

01:31:44.434 --> 01:31:46.656
follow up with you on that so we can uh

01:31:46.656 --> 01:31:48.503
as we work on next year's NDA A

01:31:48.624 --> 01:31:50.791
thinking about what we need to do here

01:31:50.791 --> 01:31:53.013
incredibly important . Uh what we do at

01:31:53.013 --> 01:31:55.363
N I and I'm gonna move on to reps and

01:31:55.374 --> 01:31:57.430
sets and of course , that's modeling

01:31:57.430 --> 01:31:59.763
simulation . We have that for space too ,

01:31:59.763 --> 01:32:01.985
right ? So General Whiting uh I'm gonna

01:32:01.985 --> 01:32:03.985
keep on N I here for a bit . As you

01:32:03.985 --> 01:32:05.818
know , space Delta One trains uh

01:32:05.818 --> 01:32:07.930
weapons officers and Nellis Air Force

01:32:07.930 --> 01:32:10.152
Base in Nevada . These weapons officers

01:32:10.152 --> 01:32:12.318
graduate from the pinnacle of training

01:32:12.318 --> 01:32:14.430
offered by the Space Force to prepare

01:32:14.430 --> 01:32:16.485
guardians for what they may need and

01:32:16.485 --> 01:32:19.078
more so building on what you may need ,

01:32:19.087 --> 01:32:21.254
what you have now the ability to model

01:32:21.254 --> 01:32:23.309
and simulate . How does this prepare

01:32:23.309 --> 01:32:25.627
your forces and what can we continue to

01:32:25.638 --> 01:32:28.277
do to give you that simulation you need

01:32:28.288 --> 01:32:30.647
because you , uh may not be able to go

01:32:30.658 --> 01:32:32.769
up there ? Yeah . Thank you , Senator

01:32:32.769 --> 01:32:34.880
for the question . I know exactly the

01:32:34.880 --> 01:32:36.991
great work that happens at Nellis . I

01:32:36.991 --> 01:32:36.921
was stationed there a decade ago as the

01:32:36.932 --> 01:32:39.154
Vice Commander of the Air Force Warfare

01:32:39.154 --> 01:32:41.043
Center , uh Vital capability , uh

01:32:41.043 --> 01:32:43.154
modeling and simulation is absolutely

01:32:43.154 --> 01:32:45.488
foundational for us in space because as ,

01:32:45.488 --> 01:32:47.599
as you allude to , it's expensive for

01:32:47.599 --> 01:32:49.876
us to get there . And so we can't just ,

01:32:49.876 --> 01:32:49.481
uh you know , launch all sorts of

01:32:49.492 --> 01:32:51.381
things just to , to do training .

01:32:51.381 --> 01:32:53.492
Although there's an aspect of that we

01:32:53.492 --> 01:32:55.159
need to do . But modeling and

01:32:55.159 --> 01:32:57.103
simulation allow us to do multiple

01:32:57.103 --> 01:32:59.325
iterations of various activities and to

01:32:59.325 --> 01:33:01.492
simulate the threats that we now see ,

01:33:01.492 --> 01:33:03.436
uh a raid against us so that these

01:33:03.436 --> 01:33:05.548
weapons officers have the skills that

01:33:05.548 --> 01:33:07.714
when they go back to their operational

01:33:07.714 --> 01:33:09.825
squadrons , they can share that among

01:33:09.825 --> 01:33:11.714
uh the , the crew force . So that

01:33:11.714 --> 01:33:13.492
modeling and simulation is , is

01:33:13.492 --> 01:33:15.714
absolutely critical to us . And we want

01:33:15.714 --> 01:33:17.936
to continue to grow that capability for

01:33:17.936 --> 01:33:19.936
uh uh all space forces because that

01:33:19.936 --> 01:33:22.048
will support space command as we move

01:33:22.048 --> 01:33:24.270
forward . Oh , perfect . Well , we'll ,

01:33:24.270 --> 01:33:24.005
we'll , we'll work with you on that

01:33:24.016 --> 01:33:26.183
moving forward . But speaking of space

01:33:26.183 --> 01:33:28.294
I'm gonna continue with you , General

01:33:28.294 --> 01:33:30.405
Whiting . Um Considering the reported

01:33:30.405 --> 01:33:32.572
collaboration between Iran and Russian

01:33:32.572 --> 01:33:34.794
space activities that could potentially

01:33:34.794 --> 01:33:36.589
challenge our interest , our us

01:33:36.600 --> 01:33:38.433
interests and security . Can you

01:33:38.433 --> 01:33:42.160
elaborate a little bit on um what's

01:33:42.169 --> 01:33:44.759
happening in Iran ? Given Iran's

01:33:44.770 --> 01:33:46.826
progress on their ballistic missiles

01:33:46.826 --> 01:33:48.548
and space programs ? How might

01:33:48.548 --> 01:33:50.659
additional sharing between the United

01:33:50.659 --> 01:33:52.770
States and our partners in the Middle

01:33:52.770 --> 01:33:52.580
East ? We know there's increasing

01:33:52.990 --> 01:33:54.768
challenges going on there , the

01:33:54.768 --> 01:33:57.069
emerging threats , uh and particularly

01:33:57.080 --> 01:33:59.191
the Iranian threat . Can you speak to

01:33:59.191 --> 01:34:00.691
that ? Yes , Senator , our

01:34:00.691 --> 01:34:02.913
relationships across the globe with our

01:34:02.913 --> 01:34:05.136
allies and partners is truly one of our

01:34:05.136 --> 01:34:07.080
asymmetric advantages . Uh We have

01:34:07.080 --> 01:34:09.339
signed a number of uh space situational

01:34:09.350 --> 01:34:11.350
awareness sharing agreements as you

01:34:11.350 --> 01:34:13.461
allude to uh with over 30 countries ,

01:34:13.461 --> 01:34:15.572
three of those are in the Middle East

01:34:15.572 --> 01:34:17.517
and we have ongoing discussions to

01:34:17.517 --> 01:34:19.572
expand that . But as we partner more

01:34:19.572 --> 01:34:21.572
closely with those countries in the

01:34:21.572 --> 01:34:21.319
Middle East , it helps us to have a

01:34:21.330 --> 01:34:24.015
better understanding of , of what is

01:34:24.024 --> 01:34:26.246
going on in space . And so that when we

01:34:26.246 --> 01:34:28.302
see potential bad actors acting , we

01:34:28.302 --> 01:34:30.615
can call out that behavior and it also

01:34:30.625 --> 01:34:32.854
builds a set of partnerships to deny

01:34:32.865 --> 01:34:34.921
those partnerships to countries like

01:34:34.921 --> 01:34:36.921
Russia and Iran . So those are very

01:34:36.921 --> 01:34:38.976
important for us that we continue to

01:34:38.976 --> 01:34:40.976
grow them . Senator . Thank you , I

01:34:40.976 --> 01:34:42.809
appreciate it . Thank you , Rosa

01:34:42.809 --> 01:34:44.976
Senator Schmidt , please . Thank you ,

01:34:44.976 --> 01:34:47.149
Mr Chairman . Um So I think um I , I

01:34:47.160 --> 01:34:49.382
believe this is if not the most , one ,

01:34:49.382 --> 01:34:51.382
certainly one of the most important

01:34:51.382 --> 01:34:53.660
committees in , in , in the Senate for ,

01:34:53.660 --> 01:34:55.438
for a variety of reasons . Um ,

01:34:55.438 --> 01:34:57.549
certainly our role in , in advocating

01:34:57.549 --> 01:34:59.771
for the national defense is important .

01:34:59.771 --> 01:35:01.771
But I also think , you know , going

01:35:01.771 --> 01:35:03.882
back home and , and talking to , um ,

01:35:03.882 --> 01:35:05.549
constituents and having those

01:35:05.549 --> 01:35:07.382
conversations about what are the

01:35:07.382 --> 01:35:09.438
threats hearing from them , but also

01:35:09.438 --> 01:35:11.604
explaining the things that we learn up

01:35:11.604 --> 01:35:13.382
here . And , um , and so my two

01:35:13.382 --> 01:35:13.169
questions are , are related to that ,

01:35:13.180 --> 01:35:14.680
that would be more sort of

01:35:14.680 --> 01:35:16.799
conversational about . Um , maybe a

01:35:16.810 --> 01:35:18.921
question I would get from somebody at

01:35:18.921 --> 01:35:20.810
home that I'd like both of you to

01:35:20.810 --> 01:35:23.143
address first . Um And we heard earlier ,

01:35:23.160 --> 01:35:25.509
um , you know , as far as nuclear

01:35:25.520 --> 01:35:28.740
modernization , the price tag of , you

01:35:28.750 --> 01:35:31.839
know , $2 trillion potentially over 30

01:35:31.850 --> 01:35:34.669
years , a number of something like that

01:35:35.419 --> 01:35:37.641
could both of you sort of address , you

01:35:37.641 --> 01:35:39.586
know , I , I think the , the , the

01:35:39.586 --> 01:35:41.641
perception is that the United States

01:35:41.641 --> 01:35:44.120
has right now , all the nuclear weapons

01:35:44.129 --> 01:35:46.600
we need to blow up the world into

01:35:46.609 --> 01:35:49.759
oblivion 1000 times over . Right ? So

01:35:49.770 --> 01:35:51.659
if you were trying to explain the

01:35:51.659 --> 01:35:53.992
importance of this modernization effort ,

01:35:53.992 --> 01:35:56.520
how would each one of you describe that

01:35:56.529 --> 01:35:59.000
to folks back home ? Why it's important

01:35:59.009 --> 01:36:01.120
and specifically why it's important ,

01:36:02.930 --> 01:36:05.041
Senator Smith , I'll , I'll start off

01:36:05.041 --> 01:36:07.208
and first of all , I want to say thank

01:36:07.208 --> 01:36:09.263
you . Um , because the , the , the ,

01:36:09.263 --> 01:36:11.374
the men and women of Tinker Air Force

01:36:11.374 --> 01:36:13.597
Base and the work that they're doing in

01:36:13.597 --> 01:36:15.486
regards to um you know , just the

01:36:15.486 --> 01:36:17.541
bomber campus that's being built out

01:36:17.541 --> 01:36:19.763
there for , for , you know , one leg of

01:36:19.763 --> 01:36:21.930
the triad is incredibly important . Um

01:36:21.930 --> 01:36:24.097
Going back to , you know , your , your

01:36:24.097 --> 01:36:25.986
comment , I think what the way we

01:36:25.986 --> 01:36:28.152
should be able to frame it is um one ,

01:36:28.152 --> 01:36:30.430
it's not a one for one , you know , so ,

01:36:30.430 --> 01:36:32.597
so it's not , it's not one of these um

01:36:32.597 --> 01:36:34.486
conversations where , where we're

01:36:34.486 --> 01:36:36.541
talking about how you have to have a

01:36:36.541 --> 01:36:39.450
one for one or over match of those type

01:36:39.459 --> 01:36:41.979
of things . Um As we already know , um

01:36:41.990 --> 01:36:44.212
you know , the , the Russians have more

01:36:44.212 --> 01:36:46.323
weapons than we have today , but we ,

01:36:46.323 --> 01:36:48.490
we absolutely hold them at risk . So ,

01:36:48.490 --> 01:36:51.120
so the , the way I would describe it to

01:36:51.129 --> 01:36:53.669
people as you need to understand , you

01:36:53.680 --> 01:36:56.709
know , I i it's a , it's a , it's a

01:36:56.720 --> 01:37:00.569
proposition in regards to um a a cost

01:37:00.580 --> 01:37:02.802
analysis , you know , I want to be able

01:37:02.802 --> 01:37:05.299
to deter because my adversary

01:37:05.310 --> 01:37:07.520
understands that the risk of them

01:37:07.529 --> 01:37:10.919
taking action um would , would , would

01:37:10.930 --> 01:37:13.041
fail upon arrival for them to be able

01:37:13.041 --> 01:37:15.979
to meet their ultimate needs . Um So

01:37:15.990 --> 01:37:18.089
it's a cost benefit cost benefit

01:37:18.100 --> 01:37:20.322
analysis model if you will . And that's

01:37:20.322 --> 01:37:22.544
what , that's what strategic deterrence

01:37:22.544 --> 01:37:24.711
truly is . And the way we , the way we

01:37:24.711 --> 01:37:27.390
use that cost benefit analysis tool is

01:37:27.399 --> 01:37:29.621
three legs of the triad . But as far as

01:37:29.621 --> 01:37:31.899
the modernization itself , right ? How ,

01:37:31.899 --> 01:37:33.788
how would you describe why that's

01:37:33.788 --> 01:37:35.455
important because if , if the

01:37:35.455 --> 01:37:37.566
perception is that we have everything

01:37:37.566 --> 01:37:39.677
we need to deter because we can , you

01:37:39.677 --> 01:37:41.899
know , wipe out a country off the , you

01:37:41.899 --> 01:37:41.680
know , the face of the earth because we ,

01:37:41.689 --> 01:37:44.250
we must have the ability to have a

01:37:44.259 --> 01:37:46.439
weapons to have weapons systems and

01:37:46.450 --> 01:37:49.000
platforms , um , a training environment ,

01:37:49.009 --> 01:37:52.080
et cetera that , that the adversary

01:37:52.089 --> 01:37:54.256
because for deterrence , the adversary

01:37:54.256 --> 01:37:56.540
always gets a vote , um , for the

01:37:56.549 --> 01:38:00.520
adversary to understand , um that the

01:38:00.529 --> 01:38:03.069
cost benefit of them taking action

01:38:03.080 --> 01:38:04.969
won't outweigh and , and that the

01:38:04.969 --> 01:38:06.969
modernized systems can hold them at

01:38:06.969 --> 01:38:10.290
risk . Senator , thank you for the

01:38:10.299 --> 01:38:12.410
question uh For space . The challenge

01:38:12.410 --> 01:38:14.577
is , is that the American people can't

01:38:14.577 --> 01:38:16.799
look up and see the space systems . And

01:38:16.799 --> 01:38:18.910
so they , they don't even realize the

01:38:18.910 --> 01:38:20.910
way it's enabling the modern way of

01:38:20.910 --> 01:38:23.243
life . Um And so I think it's important ,

01:38:23.243 --> 01:38:23.229
we remind the American people of all

01:38:23.240 --> 01:38:25.240
the great advantages space gives us

01:38:25.240 --> 01:38:27.351
that we're never lost anymore because

01:38:27.351 --> 01:38:29.462
of gps that we can synchronize global

01:38:29.462 --> 01:38:31.462
stock markets and point of sale and

01:38:31.462 --> 01:38:33.640
precision farming . And if we lost all

01:38:33.649 --> 01:38:35.760
of that , our really , our modern way

01:38:35.760 --> 01:38:37.871
of life would be at risk . And that's

01:38:37.871 --> 01:38:40.093
why we have to protect and defend those

01:38:40.093 --> 01:38:40.060
capabilities and make those investments .

01:38:40.180 --> 01:38:42.347
So I think it's incumbent on all of us

01:38:42.347 --> 01:38:44.513
to help the American people understand

01:38:44.513 --> 01:38:46.847
how space truly is a part of their life ,

01:38:46.847 --> 01:38:46.580
even if they can't see it . And for

01:38:46.589 --> 01:38:48.589
each one of you , then in your , in

01:38:48.589 --> 01:38:51.109
your domains here . Um If you could

01:38:51.120 --> 01:38:53.231
identify one thing in an unclassified

01:38:53.240 --> 01:38:55.407
setting , of course , here , one thing

01:38:55.407 --> 01:38:57.629
that really keeps you up at night about

01:38:57.629 --> 01:38:59.573
China's capabilities . If you were

01:38:59.573 --> 01:39:01.740
wanted to explain that threat to folks

01:39:01.740 --> 01:39:03.907
back home , who maybe don't understand

01:39:03.907 --> 01:39:06.073
the , the specifics of what would that

01:39:06.073 --> 01:39:09.169
be for me is , is their

01:39:09.450 --> 01:39:13.100
capacity , capability um to ,

01:39:13.109 --> 01:39:15.399
to build out their weapon systems and

01:39:15.410 --> 01:39:17.410
their arsenal . Um It's , it's that

01:39:17.410 --> 01:39:19.990
simple sir . The pace , the pace in

01:39:20.000 --> 01:39:22.779
which and the pace in which they can or

01:39:22.790 --> 01:39:25.012
the , the the levers that they drive or

01:39:25.012 --> 01:39:27.234
do not drive on whether they go idle or

01:39:27.234 --> 01:39:29.529
they accelerate , they control that

01:39:29.540 --> 01:39:32.229
throttle . And Senator , my answer is

01:39:32.240 --> 01:39:33.907
very similar . Uh What's most

01:39:33.907 --> 01:39:35.684
concerning is the way China has

01:39:35.684 --> 01:39:37.351
clinically studied us and our

01:39:37.351 --> 01:39:39.351
dependency on space and figured out

01:39:39.351 --> 01:39:40.907
exactly what they think our

01:39:40.907 --> 01:39:42.851
architecture looks like and now is

01:39:42.851 --> 01:39:44.684
rapidly are are rapidly building

01:39:44.684 --> 01:39:46.740
systems to hold that architecture at

01:39:46.740 --> 01:39:48.740
risk . Thank you . Thank you , Mr .

01:39:49.069 --> 01:39:51.490
Thank you , Mr Chairman . I would , I

01:39:51.500 --> 01:39:54.040
would suggest the simplest answer is we

01:39:54.049 --> 01:39:56.105
want our adversaries to be scared so

01:39:56.105 --> 01:39:58.271
they don't try anything . No , I agree

01:39:58.271 --> 01:40:00.327
with that . I just want to make sure

01:40:00.327 --> 01:40:02.660
that as we talk about the modernization ,

01:40:02.660 --> 01:40:04.660
right ? Like how does that fit into

01:40:04.660 --> 01:40:06.827
that discussion ? We want them to stay

01:40:06.827 --> 01:40:09.200
scared . Senator Shaheen , please .

01:40:09.660 --> 01:40:11.827
Thank you Mr Chairman and thank you uh

01:40:11.827 --> 01:40:14.100
General Cotton General Whiting um to

01:40:14.109 --> 01:40:16.331
both of you for being here this morning

01:40:16.331 --> 01:40:19.379
and for your service . Um , Senator

01:40:19.390 --> 01:40:22.189
Kelly asked what we could be doing to

01:40:22.200 --> 01:40:25.120
deter our adversaries , what else we

01:40:25.129 --> 01:40:27.351
could be doing to deter our adversaries

01:40:27.351 --> 01:40:29.518
and general Cotton . I appreciated the

01:40:29.518 --> 01:40:31.850
time we spent yesterday . And one of

01:40:31.859 --> 01:40:34.081
the things we talked about was just how

01:40:34.081 --> 01:40:37.819
critical passing the supplemental

01:40:38.160 --> 01:40:41.620
bill and getting a budget process

01:40:41.629 --> 01:40:43.740
that's regular , that can be depended

01:40:43.740 --> 01:40:46.740
on is to ensuring that you can

01:40:46.879 --> 01:40:48.839
accomplish your mission . Is that

01:40:48.850 --> 01:40:52.290
correct ? Senator Shaheen ? Yes , it

01:40:52.299 --> 01:40:54.355
was , it was great speaking with you

01:40:54.355 --> 01:40:56.521
yesterday and , and , and you're right

01:40:56.521 --> 01:40:58.632
and I think I would even uh capture ,

01:40:58.632 --> 01:41:00.743
you know , CRS continuing resolutions

01:41:00.743 --> 01:41:02.899
for us . Um especially in my platform

01:41:02.910 --> 01:41:05.129
where everything that I own is being

01:41:05.140 --> 01:41:07.919
modernized . I think folks are quick to

01:41:08.149 --> 01:41:10.759
quick to not realize that that there's

01:41:10.770 --> 01:41:13.120
new star programs that are embedded in

01:41:13.129 --> 01:41:15.351
these large , these large programs that

01:41:15.351 --> 01:41:17.573
folks will think are already underway .

01:41:17.715 --> 01:41:19.493
And , and you know , I had just

01:41:19.493 --> 01:41:21.715
mentioned that to Senator Schmidt , for

01:41:21.715 --> 01:41:23.493
example , um you know , they're

01:41:23.493 --> 01:41:26.645
building a new bomber campus um for

01:41:26.655 --> 01:41:29.895
sustainment , not only of , of the B 52

01:41:30.226 --> 01:41:32.835
but the B 21 moving forward , you know ,

01:41:32.846 --> 01:41:34.976
continued resolution could actually

01:41:34.985 --> 01:41:37.395
perturb that if you perturb anything

01:41:37.405 --> 01:41:39.576
within a larger program , it actually

01:41:39.585 --> 01:41:41.585
subsequently can affect the program

01:41:41.585 --> 01:41:43.307
overall . And then we have the

01:41:43.307 --> 01:41:45.111
conversations of , of a program

01:41:45.122 --> 01:41:48.682
slipping . So yes , uh stable budget on

01:41:48.691 --> 01:41:51.512
time budgets um are are incredibly

01:41:51.521 --> 01:41:53.577
critical for us as we're making this

01:41:53.577 --> 01:41:55.521
modernization , not only across my

01:41:55.521 --> 01:41:57.299
portfolio but across the entire

01:41:57.299 --> 01:41:59.465
department of defense portfolios . And

01:41:59.465 --> 01:42:02.832
can you speak to what's in the uh sub

01:42:02.841 --> 01:42:04.841
national security supplemental bill

01:42:04.841 --> 01:42:07.063
that we passed out of the Senate that's

01:42:07.063 --> 01:42:09.397
critical to our defense industrial base .

01:42:09.397 --> 01:42:11.563
And why that matters is you're looking

01:42:11.563 --> 01:42:15.060
at um rebuilding , ensuring that the

01:42:15.069 --> 01:42:18.740
nuclear triad remains credible . Yes ,

01:42:18.750 --> 01:42:20.694
Senator , as we , as we um had the

01:42:20.694 --> 01:42:22.639
conversation embedded in that even

01:42:22.639 --> 01:42:24.750
though the majority , not necessarily

01:42:24.750 --> 01:42:28.069
part of my part of my portfolio . Um

01:42:28.080 --> 01:42:30.350
but it does touch on the industrial

01:42:30.359 --> 01:42:32.415
base , the defense industrial base ,

01:42:32.415 --> 01:42:34.689
which touches all of our portfolios if

01:42:34.700 --> 01:42:36.979
you will in regards of how do we , how

01:42:36.990 --> 01:42:39.212
do we strengthen that ? Because I think

01:42:39.212 --> 01:42:41.268
that's foundational for our nation .

01:42:41.268 --> 01:42:43.268
It's more than , even a , more than

01:42:43.268 --> 01:42:45.601
even a uh a department of defense issue .

01:42:45.601 --> 01:42:48.589
And one of the things that um

01:42:49.720 --> 01:42:52.299
I think you alluded to was the ,

01:42:54.799 --> 01:42:57.939
the sort of end game that we're at with

01:42:57.950 --> 01:42:59.600
Russia in terms of bilateral

01:42:59.609 --> 01:43:02.890
negotiations on um any sort of uh

01:43:03.819 --> 01:43:06.879
new start treaty or uh an effort to

01:43:06.890 --> 01:43:10.279
reduce nuclear weapons . But can you

01:43:10.290 --> 01:43:11.919
talk about um

01:43:14.100 --> 01:43:17.209
Putin's conversate , Putin's recent

01:43:17.250 --> 01:43:20.020
rhetoric around using nuclear weapons

01:43:20.029 --> 01:43:22.196
and how concerned you are about that ?

01:43:24.080 --> 01:43:26.080
Yes , thank you , Senator , I , you

01:43:26.080 --> 01:43:28.302
know , the , the conversation we've had

01:43:28.302 --> 01:43:30.680
is I , I absolutely am a proponent ,

01:43:30.939 --> 01:43:34.029
you know , oo of , of , of , of , of

01:43:34.040 --> 01:43:37.319
treaties . Um But everyone has to play

01:43:37.600 --> 01:43:39.970
and you have to follow the rules . Um

01:43:40.529 --> 01:43:43.350
So , um yes , what I'd love to see

01:43:43.359 --> 01:43:45.640
China step up and , and want to have a

01:43:45.649 --> 01:43:48.060
AAA negotiation with us , would I love

01:43:48.069 --> 01:43:50.236
to see Russia come back ? Absolutely .

01:43:50.350 --> 01:43:52.406
But I'm also a realist to understand

01:43:52.406 --> 01:43:54.572
that that may or may not happen . So ,

01:43:54.572 --> 01:43:56.628
as a combat commander , my job is to

01:43:56.628 --> 01:43:58.794
understand how do I , how do I build a

01:43:58.794 --> 01:43:58.589
force that I could present to the

01:43:58.600 --> 01:44:01.200
president if that doesn't happen ? Um

01:44:01.209 --> 01:44:04.020
But um to your point on , on what we're

01:44:04.029 --> 01:44:06.759
seeing in the rhetoric , um I think , I

01:44:06.770 --> 01:44:08.839
think what we're seeing is uh the

01:44:08.850 --> 01:44:11.279
president of the Russian Federation um

01:44:11.290 --> 01:44:13.401
sees that , that he can use that as a

01:44:13.401 --> 01:44:16.910
coercion tool um to threaten um in

01:44:16.919 --> 01:44:19.279
regards to uh what he has as far as a

01:44:19.290 --> 01:44:22.970
nuclear force . Um General Whiting

01:44:23.109 --> 01:44:25.419
Starlink and other commercial satellite

01:44:25.430 --> 01:44:28.990
ventures have been a compliment to our

01:44:29.000 --> 01:44:32.439
operations in space . Um But of course ,

01:44:32.450 --> 01:44:34.810
there have been some issues around um

01:44:35.180 --> 01:44:37.950
how those are being used and we have to

01:44:37.959 --> 01:44:39.959
ensure that we have the appropriate

01:44:39.959 --> 01:44:42.292
mechanisms in place to guarantee access .

01:44:42.540 --> 01:44:45.299
So how should we be thinking about that ?

01:44:45.310 --> 01:44:47.950
And what are you doing to mitigate the

01:44:47.959 --> 01:44:50.419
risk that we might have by relying on a

01:44:50.430 --> 01:44:52.560
commercial source for some of those

01:44:52.569 --> 01:44:54.736
services ? Senator . Thank you for the

01:44:54.736 --> 01:44:56.958
question . I would point to two aspects

01:44:56.958 --> 01:44:59.180
I think which help mitigate that risk .

01:44:59.180 --> 01:45:01.402
Number one is in all of my experience ,

01:45:01.402 --> 01:45:03.625
I have only known that every company we

01:45:03.625 --> 01:45:05.458
have contract with for satellite

01:45:05.458 --> 01:45:07.791
communications and other state services ,

01:45:07.791 --> 01:45:09.625
they have always fulfilled their

01:45:09.625 --> 01:45:11.736
contractual obligations to us . And I

01:45:11.736 --> 01:45:11.513
would expect that going forward . And

01:45:11.522 --> 01:45:13.522
so we wanna make sure we're writing

01:45:13.522 --> 01:45:15.744
those contracts uh smartly on , on what

01:45:15.744 --> 01:45:17.800
we need and ensure that , that we're

01:45:17.800 --> 01:45:17.583
getting that . And then secondly , uh

01:45:17.592 --> 01:45:19.759
Senator , I would point to the fact uh

01:45:19.759 --> 01:45:21.259
for example , in satellite

01:45:21.259 --> 01:45:23.148
communications , we want a hybrid

01:45:23.148 --> 01:45:25.036
architecture where there are some

01:45:25.036 --> 01:45:27.203
constellations . We need purpose built

01:45:27.203 --> 01:45:29.425
for the government exclusive use of the

01:45:29.425 --> 01:45:31.592
government . For example , in our work

01:45:31.592 --> 01:45:33.814
in support of General Cotton . Uh as we

01:45:33.814 --> 01:45:35.759
provide new command and control um

01:45:35.759 --> 01:45:37.925
protected communications to assure the

01:45:37.925 --> 01:45:39.981
president , the Secretary of Defense

01:45:39.981 --> 01:45:39.306
and General Cotton always can

01:45:39.315 --> 01:45:41.426
communicate to their forces . We want

01:45:41.426 --> 01:45:43.093
that to be a government owned

01:45:43.093 --> 01:45:45.259
constellation , but then there's other

01:45:45.259 --> 01:45:47.371
uh cons uh communication requirements

01:45:47.371 --> 01:45:49.593
that we absolutely can go to commercial

01:45:49.593 --> 01:45:51.593
for . So I think it's understanding

01:45:51.593 --> 01:45:53.648
what those highest priority , unique

01:45:53.648 --> 01:45:55.759
military requirements are and then uh

01:45:55.759 --> 01:45:55.346
satisfying those through our own

01:45:55.355 --> 01:45:57.855
systems and then using uh commercial to

01:45:57.866 --> 01:46:00.186
the max extent we can . Um That's how

01:46:00.195 --> 01:46:02.528
we can help mitigate risk . Good . Well ,

01:46:02.528 --> 01:46:04.862
thank you . I have some other questions ,

01:46:04.862 --> 01:46:06.806
but I'll save those for the closed

01:46:06.806 --> 01:46:08.751
session . Thank you very much . Uh

01:46:08.751 --> 01:46:11.028
Senator Bud , thank you chairman again .

01:46:11.028 --> 01:46:13.139
Thank you both for being here today .

01:46:13.139 --> 01:46:13.049
Now , General Whiting uh your

01:46:13.060 --> 01:46:15.470
predecessor , General Dickinson uh told

01:46:15.479 --> 01:46:17.701
this committee last March that Spacecom

01:46:17.701 --> 01:46:19.479
is creating concepts to further

01:46:19.479 --> 01:46:21.146
integrate space cyber special

01:46:21.146 --> 01:46:23.149
operations to generate asymmetrical

01:46:23.160 --> 01:46:26.490
advantages around the globe . Uh In a

01:46:26.500 --> 01:46:28.722
press release from your recent visit to

01:46:28.722 --> 01:46:31.080
us , army Space and missile defense

01:46:31.089 --> 01:46:33.200
command , it mentions that army space

01:46:33.200 --> 01:46:35.145
professionals are operating across

01:46:35.145 --> 01:46:37.200
multiple domains including cyber and

01:46:37.200 --> 01:46:38.922
space to support warfighters ,

01:46:38.922 --> 01:46:40.700
especially for deployed special

01:46:40.700 --> 01:46:42.700
operations forces . Can you briefly

01:46:42.700 --> 01:46:44.645
talk about the nexus between space

01:46:44.645 --> 01:46:47.120
cyber and soft ? Yes , Senator . Thank

01:46:47.129 --> 01:46:49.296
you for the question . Uh We do see it

01:46:49.296 --> 01:46:51.407
as , as a unique opportunity to bring

01:46:51.407 --> 01:46:53.462
together these three capabilities to

01:46:53.462 --> 01:46:55.740
help us all three achieve our missions .

01:46:55.740 --> 01:46:57.740
Uh For example , there's times that

01:46:57.740 --> 01:46:59.796
using space , we can create accesses

01:46:59.796 --> 01:47:01.907
for cyber forces who then can support

01:47:01.907 --> 01:47:03.907
special operation forces or special

01:47:03.907 --> 01:47:06.018
operation forces through their unique

01:47:06.018 --> 01:47:07.907
ability to gain access to certain

01:47:07.907 --> 01:47:10.018
geographic locations , can help us in

01:47:10.018 --> 01:47:12.240
our space mission by uh executing uh uh

01:47:12.240 --> 01:47:14.609
functions that support us . And so I

01:47:14.620 --> 01:47:16.842
have spoken to the commander of Special

01:47:16.842 --> 01:47:19.064
Operations Command about that uh as you

01:47:19.064 --> 01:47:21.120
noted have , have spoken to our army

01:47:21.120 --> 01:47:22.953
component about that and we also

01:47:22.953 --> 01:47:24.953
leverage the fact that our Navy and

01:47:24.953 --> 01:47:27.120
Marine Corps components are also cyber

01:47:27.120 --> 01:47:29.120
components . And so that gives us a

01:47:29.120 --> 01:47:31.342
unique pairing there as well . Uh Thank

01:47:31.342 --> 01:47:33.564
you for that . So it sounds like it's a

01:47:33.564 --> 01:47:33.560
two way street , right ? I mean , just

01:47:33.569 --> 01:47:36.000
as much as space enables soft in the

01:47:36.009 --> 01:47:38.065
entire joint force , the physical ac

01:47:38.065 --> 01:47:40.700
access that soft provides also enables

01:47:40.709 --> 01:47:42.709
critical space operations . Is that

01:47:42.709 --> 01:47:44.820
correct ? Senator ? That's absolutely

01:47:44.820 --> 01:47:46.931
correct . Given proposed cuts to army

01:47:46.931 --> 01:47:48.709
soft , uh there will be reduced

01:47:48.709 --> 01:47:50.765
capacity to fill combatant commander

01:47:50.765 --> 01:47:52.653
requirements . So I know that the

01:47:52.653 --> 01:47:54.820
demand for soft is up and we're likely

01:47:54.820 --> 01:47:57.042
to see increased that will be increased

01:47:57.042 --> 01:47:59.265
across geographical combatant command .

01:47:59.265 --> 01:48:01.376
So , do you anticipate any impacts on

01:48:01.376 --> 01:48:03.850
your commands operations ? Should those

01:48:03.859 --> 01:48:06.520
cuts to soft move forward over the next

01:48:06.529 --> 01:48:10.049
few years ? No , Senator Idell . So

01:48:10.060 --> 01:48:12.171
it's a two way street , but you don't

01:48:12.171 --> 01:48:14.338
see that it'll impact you if there are

01:48:14.338 --> 01:48:16.393
soft cuts . Uh Sir , I have not been

01:48:16.393 --> 01:48:18.609
briefed on any uh any of the the work

01:48:18.620 --> 01:48:20.287
we've been doing with special

01:48:20.287 --> 01:48:22.064
operations command uh that will

01:48:22.064 --> 01:48:25.200
specifically impact us um switching

01:48:25.209 --> 01:48:27.500
gears a bit . Um But general Whiting

01:48:27.509 --> 01:48:29.676
last year , I asked your predecessor ,

01:48:29.676 --> 01:48:31.787
how he would characterize the current

01:48:31.787 --> 01:48:33.342
resiliency of our satellite

01:48:33.342 --> 01:48:35.342
constellations , particularly given

01:48:35.342 --> 01:48:37.509
that constellations are often deployed

01:48:37.509 --> 01:48:37.319
with the minimum number of satellites

01:48:37.330 --> 01:48:40.609
available or necessary . How would you

01:48:40.620 --> 01:48:42.509
answer that same question today ,

01:48:42.509 --> 01:48:44.453
particularly given recent revealed

01:48:44.453 --> 01:48:46.620
advanced threats ? Senator , thank you

01:48:46.620 --> 01:48:48.787
for the question . I I would say today

01:48:48.787 --> 01:48:50.953
our constellations are optimized for a

01:48:50.953 --> 01:48:53.120
benign environment and as we see these

01:48:53.120 --> 01:48:55.176
threats now growing , we have to now

01:48:55.176 --> 01:48:56.731
protect and defend those uh

01:48:56.731 --> 01:48:58.731
constellations until we develop the

01:48:58.731 --> 01:49:00.620
next generation of resilient cons

01:49:00.620 --> 01:49:02.787
installations that work is on going to

01:49:02.787 --> 01:49:05.430
de develop uh DD um uh deploy those

01:49:05.439 --> 01:49:08.740
next generation of um of resilient

01:49:08.750 --> 01:49:11.129
capabilities . But we are , we're still

01:49:11.140 --> 01:49:13.196
gonna have to protect and defend our

01:49:13.196 --> 01:49:15.649
current ones uh for years to come . And

01:49:15.660 --> 01:49:17.827
so that's why we have to also focus on

01:49:17.827 --> 01:49:20.049
those protect and defend capabilities .

01:49:20.049 --> 01:49:22.271
Thank you , General Cotton . I think we

01:49:22.271 --> 01:49:24.271
can all agree that Sentinels delays

01:49:24.271 --> 01:49:26.327
greatly emphasize the need to ensure

01:49:26.327 --> 01:49:28.216
Minuteman's continued operational

01:49:28.216 --> 01:49:30.382
readiness as , as such . How important

01:49:30.382 --> 01:49:32.549
is it to conduct regular test launches

01:49:32.549 --> 01:49:34.604
of Minuteman to demonstrate that the

01:49:34.604 --> 01:49:36.938
United States nuclear deterrent is safe ,

01:49:36.938 --> 01:49:38.827
secure , reliable and effective .

01:49:39.009 --> 01:49:41.176
Senator . Thank you for the question .

01:49:41.176 --> 01:49:43.342
I think uh the the answer is I want to

01:49:43.342 --> 01:49:45.899
be able to have um uh uh an ability to

01:49:45.910 --> 01:49:48.040
surveil all three legs to include the

01:49:48.049 --> 01:49:50.290
Minuteman as well as my bomber forces

01:49:50.299 --> 01:49:52.750
and my SLBM force as well . Thank you .

01:49:53.120 --> 01:49:56.020
Uh General Whiting again , uh You've

01:49:56.029 --> 01:49:57.918
spoken publicly about the need to

01:49:57.918 --> 01:49:59.918
maximize partnerships with allies ,

01:49:59.918 --> 01:50:02.029
partners or interagency , teammates ,

01:50:02.029 --> 01:50:04.251
commercial industry and even academia .

01:50:04.251 --> 01:50:06.473
So why are the , why is this partnering

01:50:06.473 --> 01:50:08.473
so crucial to our National security

01:50:08.473 --> 01:50:10.689
Space capabilities ? Senator , all the

01:50:10.700 --> 01:50:12.756
things we have to do in space . It ,

01:50:12.756 --> 01:50:14.867
it's so much that , that , you know ,

01:50:14.867 --> 01:50:17.033
no one department service command even

01:50:17.033 --> 01:50:19.144
country can do all the things we need

01:50:19.144 --> 01:50:20.867
to do . And it's an asymmetric

01:50:20.867 --> 01:50:22.922
advantage of ours to leverage all of

01:50:22.922 --> 01:50:25.033
these stakeholders uh to get unity of

01:50:25.033 --> 01:50:27.256
effort to achieve our goals . And so uh

01:50:27.256 --> 01:50:29.367
that's why we wanna partner as widely

01:50:29.367 --> 01:50:31.589
as we can with uh like minded countries

01:50:31.589 --> 01:50:33.756
and organizations because it maximizes

01:50:33.756 --> 01:50:35.811
our ability to execute our mission .

01:50:35.811 --> 01:50:37.867
Thank you very much . Thank you very

01:50:37.867 --> 01:50:39.978
much , Senator . But Senator Peters ,

01:50:39.978 --> 01:50:41.811
please . Thank you , Mr Chairman

01:50:41.811 --> 01:50:43.644
General Cotton . In your written

01:50:43.644 --> 01:50:45.422
testimony . You acknowledge the

01:50:45.422 --> 01:50:47.422
importance of the , the air force's

01:50:47.422 --> 01:50:49.970
refueling tanker fleet in accomplishing

01:50:49.979 --> 01:50:52.290
uh Strat com's global strike missions .

01:50:52.310 --> 01:50:54.032
Uh So we don't have to rely on

01:50:54.032 --> 01:50:56.450
intermediate uh basing uh installations .

01:50:56.660 --> 01:50:58.604
You also highlight the air force's

01:50:58.604 --> 01:51:01.129
upcoming Refueler tanker acquisitions

01:51:01.140 --> 01:51:03.189
uh being critical to enable

01:51:03.200 --> 01:51:05.689
simultaneous uh global operations ,

01:51:05.700 --> 01:51:07.810
including those involving multiple

01:51:07.819 --> 01:51:10.810
combatant commands . So my question for

01:51:10.819 --> 01:51:13.120
you sir is uh how , how does a robust

01:51:13.129 --> 01:51:15.830
refueling tanker fleet sustain strike

01:51:16.040 --> 01:51:18.350
missions if you could elaborate on that

01:51:18.359 --> 01:51:20.830
and , and also elaborate on how the air

01:51:20.839 --> 01:51:23.580
force's acquisition of the new KC 46

01:51:23.589 --> 01:51:26.750
tankers will expand your global reach

01:51:26.759 --> 01:51:29.069
and expand your current capabilities .

01:51:30.890 --> 01:51:32.834
Senator Peters . Thank you for the

01:51:32.834 --> 01:51:34.890
question . You know , something that

01:51:34.890 --> 01:51:36.668
makes us incredibly unique as a

01:51:36.668 --> 01:51:39.549
fighting force is um you know , we have

01:51:39.560 --> 01:51:42.910
the ability to fly the entire

01:51:42.919 --> 01:51:46.629
globe . Um even at its onset , the

01:51:46.640 --> 01:51:49.089
tanker and the bomber were both

01:51:49.100 --> 01:51:53.080
complimentary acquisitions . Um It

01:51:53.089 --> 01:51:55.779
gives us incredible reach . That being

01:51:55.790 --> 01:51:58.680
said , that's why it is such a unique

01:51:58.930 --> 01:52:01.339
um relationship between the tanker

01:52:01.350 --> 01:52:04.149
force and our bomber force and my , my

01:52:04.160 --> 01:52:06.919
air leg and absolutely critical to my

01:52:06.930 --> 01:52:09.759
mission set in with regards to ensuring

01:52:09.770 --> 01:52:12.109
that we have sustainable and enough

01:52:12.120 --> 01:52:14.359
tankers uh to be able to make , make um

01:52:14.370 --> 01:52:17.379
make that AAA requirement that can be

01:52:17.390 --> 01:52:21.149
enduring Um So I pay attention

01:52:21.160 --> 01:52:23.104
to what the availability is of the

01:52:23.104 --> 01:52:25.129
tanker force . Um We have a great

01:52:25.140 --> 01:52:27.689
relationship with the US Transcom and

01:52:27.700 --> 01:52:29.811
General Jackie Van Ovo , who's a dear

01:52:29.811 --> 01:52:32.200
friend as well to ensure that there's

01:52:32.209 --> 01:52:33.876
no disconnect in the , in the

01:52:33.876 --> 01:52:36.470
requirements . Um , but , uh , you're

01:52:36.479 --> 01:52:38.589
right , that can be stretched , um ,

01:52:38.600 --> 01:52:40.790
with the , with the requirements that

01:52:40.799 --> 01:52:44.729
the tanker force has on non weapons

01:52:44.750 --> 01:52:47.479
system , movement emissions , um ,

01:52:47.490 --> 01:52:49.601
missions that don't include bombers ,

01:52:49.601 --> 01:52:51.560
but includes , um , you know ,

01:52:51.569 --> 01:52:53.970
providing forces forward , et cetera ,

01:52:53.979 --> 01:52:56.090
et cetera . So we always have to make

01:52:56.090 --> 01:52:58.312
sure that we pay attention and see that

01:52:58.312 --> 01:53:00.646
those acquisitions , not only the , the ,

01:53:00.646 --> 01:53:02.312
the nuclear triad , but those

01:53:02.312 --> 01:53:05.000
acquisition programs are on time and

01:53:05.009 --> 01:53:08.200
are , and are healthy as well . And ,

01:53:08.209 --> 01:53:10.265
and I suspect the , uh , this , uh ,

01:53:10.265 --> 01:53:12.487
the new KC 46 will probably be around a

01:53:12.487 --> 01:53:14.598
long time . That mission is not gonna

01:53:14.598 --> 01:53:16.820
go anywhere uh uh soon . And , uh , I ,

01:53:16.820 --> 01:53:19.042
I've told folks this could be a 50 year

01:53:19.042 --> 01:53:21.209
mission for this aircraft . And then I

01:53:21.209 --> 01:53:23.320
was reminded the B 50 twos are likely

01:53:23.320 --> 01:53:23.250
to be well , in excess of 50 years . Is

01:53:23.259 --> 01:53:25.580
that a accurate statement in regards to

01:53:25.589 --> 01:53:28.600
the KC 46 ? Well , I , I don't know how

01:53:28.609 --> 01:53:30.776
long the , uh , the , the , the tanker

01:53:30.776 --> 01:53:32.942
community plans on having , having the

01:53:32.942 --> 01:53:36.459
KC 46 . But , uh , but uh , if we use

01:53:36.470 --> 01:53:39.290
uh uh legacy as a , as a measure , the ,

01:53:39.299 --> 01:53:41.466
the KC 135 has been around a long time

01:53:41.466 --> 01:53:44.009
as well . It is absolutely . Absolutely .

01:53:44.069 --> 01:53:46.347
General cotton . Um as you likely know ,

01:53:46.347 --> 01:53:49.279
northern strike uh in , in Michigan is

01:53:49.290 --> 01:53:51.830
the dod s largest annual joint Reserve

01:53:51.839 --> 01:53:54.509
component readiness exercise . Uh uh

01:53:54.520 --> 01:53:56.687
that takes place in the country . Over

01:53:56.687 --> 01:53:59.430
7000 service members from over 25

01:53:59.439 --> 01:54:01.272
states and several international

01:54:01.272 --> 01:54:03.799
partners converge at the uh National

01:54:03.810 --> 01:54:06.143
All Domain War F uh War Fighting Center ,

01:54:06.143 --> 01:54:08.569
which is also known as uh wick for

01:54:08.580 --> 01:54:10.580
critical training focused on future

01:54:10.580 --> 01:54:12.750
multi domain conflict . Uh It's one of

01:54:12.759 --> 01:54:15.060
my top priorities to ensure that

01:54:15.069 --> 01:54:17.200
Northern strike continues to receive

01:54:17.209 --> 01:54:20.830
robust uh funding to support realistic

01:54:20.839 --> 01:54:23.330
uh joint force training with our global

01:54:23.339 --> 01:54:26.319
allies and partners . And part of this

01:54:26.330 --> 01:54:28.799
uh realistic preparation for a future

01:54:28.810 --> 01:54:30.950
conflict requires training for our

01:54:30.959 --> 01:54:33.015
armed forces to fight and win in the

01:54:33.015 --> 01:54:36.649
electromagnetic spectrum . Uh What role

01:54:36.660 --> 01:54:39.220
do you see uh state of the art training

01:54:39.229 --> 01:54:41.540
centers like Natwick will play in

01:54:41.549 --> 01:54:43.970
preparing for this uh very unique

01:54:44.080 --> 01:54:46.399
electromagnetic uh challenge that will

01:54:46.410 --> 01:54:48.399
likely get only more significant .

01:54:49.410 --> 01:54:51.577
Thank you for the question , Senator .

01:54:51.577 --> 01:54:53.790
I think what's gonna be key is um

01:54:53.799 --> 01:54:56.069
ensuring that the participants of those

01:54:56.080 --> 01:54:58.729
exercises are , are given the true

01:54:58.740 --> 01:55:00.907
challenges that they could potentially

01:55:00.907 --> 01:55:02.740
face and then they can drive the

01:55:02.740 --> 01:55:04.740
techniques , tactics and procedures

01:55:04.790 --> 01:55:07.149
because some of it is as simple as that

01:55:07.439 --> 01:55:10.430
um to be able to uh counter that threat .

01:55:10.560 --> 01:55:13.250
Um I think um I think having live

01:55:13.259 --> 01:55:15.540
virtual and constructive um

01:55:15.549 --> 01:55:18.180
opportunities on training venues are

01:55:18.189 --> 01:55:20.411
gonna be incredibly important as well .

01:55:20.509 --> 01:55:22.870
Um Understanding that probably having a

01:55:22.879 --> 01:55:25.919
live uh training venue might not be

01:55:25.930 --> 01:55:28.479
feasible . Um But having a virtual one

01:55:28.490 --> 01:55:32.049
is so , um you know , continued support

01:55:32.060 --> 01:55:34.529
and having , you know , push for that

01:55:34.540 --> 01:55:36.318
type of training venue would be

01:55:36.318 --> 01:55:38.262
incredibly important . Thank you ,

01:55:38.262 --> 01:55:40.262
General . Thank you , Mr Chairman .

01:55:40.262 --> 01:55:42.151
Thank you Senator Peters . Before

01:55:42.151 --> 01:55:44.040
recognizing Senator Mull , let me

01:55:44.040 --> 01:55:46.262
remind everyone that we will uh convene

01:55:46.262 --> 01:55:48.589
immediately after this uh open session

01:55:48.750 --> 01:55:52.750
in a closed session in SVC 217 and

01:55:52.759 --> 01:55:55.220
I will at this time , pass the gavel to

01:55:55.229 --> 01:55:57.540
Senator Shaheen who provide , who

01:55:57.549 --> 01:56:00.970
preside rather uh here and there .

01:56:01.129 --> 01:56:03.700
Senator Mullen , please . Thank you Mr

01:56:03.709 --> 01:56:05.850
Chairman and uh thank you both for

01:56:05.859 --> 01:56:08.689
being here today . Um First off , I

01:56:08.700 --> 01:56:11.109
wanna , I wanna thank Senator Cotton uh

01:56:11.120 --> 01:56:13.009
for emphasizing the importance of

01:56:13.009 --> 01:56:15.009
modernization of the B 52 fleet and

01:56:15.009 --> 01:56:17.176
keeping it in the air especially since

01:56:17.176 --> 01:56:19.064
um all that work is being done in

01:56:19.064 --> 01:56:21.176
Oklahoma at right at Tinker Air Force

01:56:21.176 --> 01:56:23.064
Base . Uh Tinker will also be the

01:56:23.064 --> 01:56:25.064
maintenance center for the new B 20

01:56:25.064 --> 01:56:27.176
ones and they are rapidly building up

01:56:27.176 --> 01:56:29.287
the capacities and capabilities today

01:56:29.287 --> 01:56:31.231
to , to take on that new mission .

01:56:31.231 --> 01:56:33.176
We're very , very proud of that uh

01:56:33.176 --> 01:56:35.453
General Cotton . Uh A question for you ,

01:56:35.453 --> 01:56:37.509
Oklahoma is very proud to invest the

01:56:37.509 --> 01:56:39.731
investments we've made to support the B

01:56:39.731 --> 01:56:41.509
uh bomber modernization and the

01:56:41.509 --> 01:56:43.676
maintenance at Tinker Air Force Base .

01:56:43.676 --> 01:56:45.676
Can you speak of the benefit ? This

01:56:45.676 --> 01:56:47.731
brings to the , uh to the leg of the

01:56:47.731 --> 01:56:51.049
triad . A absolutely senator . Um It's

01:56:51.060 --> 01:56:53.509
absolutely foundational T Tinker , uh

01:56:53.520 --> 01:56:55.520
and the teammates that are there at

01:56:55.520 --> 01:56:57.853
Tinker Air Force Base that support , um ,

01:56:57.853 --> 01:56:59.909
that mission leg on behalf of uh men

01:56:59.909 --> 01:57:01.964
and women of Air Force Global Strike

01:57:01.964 --> 01:57:04.131
Command that provides that , um , that

01:57:04.131 --> 01:57:06.020
leg to me , um , is ab absolutely

01:57:06.020 --> 01:57:08.187
critical . Uh the fact that the , that

01:57:08.187 --> 01:57:10.409
we're um expanding and building a , you

01:57:10.409 --> 01:57:12.576
know , a , a bomber campus if you will

01:57:12.576 --> 01:57:15.839
um in , in preparation of B 21 um is

01:57:15.850 --> 01:57:18.470
gonna be um extremely important , but

01:57:18.479 --> 01:57:20.701
even more so , um the production of the

01:57:20.701 --> 01:57:24.569
B 52 J um as we , as we go through the

01:57:24.580 --> 01:57:26.580
uh uh commercial engine replacement

01:57:26.580 --> 01:57:29.509
program uh for that jet . Thank you .

01:57:29.520 --> 01:57:31.742
Um In addition to the nuclear deterrent

01:57:31.742 --> 01:57:33.964
stratcom is also tasked with electronic

01:57:33.964 --> 01:57:36.629
warfare . Uh What is the next uh

01:57:36.640 --> 01:57:38.899
technological frontier for protecting

01:57:38.910 --> 01:57:40.979
our electronic communications and

01:57:40.990 --> 01:57:44.750
weapon systems ? Well , sir , obviously

01:57:44.759 --> 01:57:46.815
it's , it's protection systems and ,

01:57:46.815 --> 01:57:49.037
and my colleague to the left also uh um

01:57:49.037 --> 01:57:51.459
plays an important role in that . Um

01:57:51.470 --> 01:57:53.526
But more so , one of the things that

01:57:53.526 --> 01:57:55.748
we're , that we're finding and we , and

01:57:55.748 --> 01:57:58.081
it was noted through both Northern edge ,

01:57:58.081 --> 01:58:00.248
21 and Northern Edge 23 exercises that

01:58:00.248 --> 01:58:02.470
it's really have an adequate training .

01:58:02.580 --> 01:58:04.802
Uh So the men and women that are put in

01:58:04.802 --> 01:58:06.969
those in those situations , understand

01:58:06.969 --> 01:58:09.191
that there are techniques , tactics and

01:58:09.191 --> 01:58:11.580
procedures um that , that can avoid .

01:58:11.680 --> 01:58:14.919
Um um having , you know , being um

01:58:14.930 --> 01:58:17.444
susceptible to , to the interference

01:58:17.455 --> 01:58:19.455
that you might see in that spectrum

01:58:19.455 --> 01:58:21.677
domain . Um I had mentioned earlier but

01:58:21.677 --> 01:58:23.455
the , the realities of um us uh

01:58:23.455 --> 01:58:26.444
recognizing that that domain is , is ,

01:58:26.455 --> 01:58:28.566
is gonna be contestant with the peers

01:58:28.566 --> 01:58:30.177
that we have , the near peer

01:58:30.177 --> 01:58:32.584
adversaries that we have now . Um And ,

01:58:32.595 --> 01:58:34.785
and being able to identify and find

01:58:34.794 --> 01:58:38.450
ways to , to ensure that we can fight

01:58:38.459 --> 01:58:40.709
in that domain at our choosing is going

01:58:40.720 --> 01:58:42.887
to be incredibly important . Whiting .

01:58:42.887 --> 01:58:45.220
Do you wanna speak about that too ? Yes ,

01:58:45.220 --> 01:58:46.831
thank you , Senator . Um The

01:58:46.831 --> 01:58:49.053
electromagnetic uh spectrum is vital to

01:58:49.053 --> 01:58:50.720
us . It's the only way to get

01:58:50.720 --> 01:58:52.609
information back from space . And

01:58:52.609 --> 01:58:54.720
that's our satellite communications ,

01:58:54.720 --> 01:58:54.520
our missile warning , our uh

01:58:54.529 --> 01:58:56.729
positioning , navigation and timing .

01:58:56.910 --> 01:58:58.910
And so we absolutely have to ensure

01:58:58.910 --> 01:59:01.520
that we can operate there uh free of uh

01:59:01.529 --> 01:59:03.362
hindrance or at least be able to

01:59:03.362 --> 01:59:05.473
operate through any hindrance that we

01:59:05.473 --> 01:59:07.696
see . And uh we definitely want to look

01:59:07.696 --> 01:59:09.696
to technologies that can help us uh

01:59:09.696 --> 01:59:11.696
reduce that uh susceptibility to uh

01:59:11.696 --> 01:59:13.862
jamming , for example , uh I , I think

01:59:13.862 --> 01:59:15.918
things like laser communications can

01:59:15.918 --> 01:59:18.029
help with that and uh I'd like to see

01:59:18.029 --> 01:59:19.918
those investments continue moving

01:59:19.918 --> 01:59:22.085
forward . Uh Currently , we have a , a

01:59:22.085 --> 01:59:21.589
company of stage who's working on a

01:59:21.600 --> 01:59:23.839
quantum and physics based um

01:59:23.850 --> 01:59:26.459
communication techniques is that , is

01:59:26.470 --> 01:59:29.459
that a help , a big role for you guys ,

01:59:31.100 --> 01:59:33.322
Senator ? I think it could be . I think

01:59:33.322 --> 01:59:35.378
that's one of those new technologies

01:59:35.378 --> 01:59:37.322
that , that would give us a way uh

01:59:37.322 --> 01:59:39.156
perhaps to uh defeat traditional

01:59:39.156 --> 01:59:41.378
jamming techniques . And so I certainly

01:59:41.378 --> 01:59:43.544
would encourage uh the uh research lab

01:59:43.544 --> 01:59:45.433
and uh the science and technology

01:59:45.433 --> 01:59:47.433
community uh to continue to work on

01:59:47.433 --> 01:59:49.656
that . And , and for companies to bring

01:59:49.656 --> 01:59:51.656
mature capabilities forward in that

01:59:51.656 --> 01:59:53.544
area is , is our defense industry

01:59:53.544 --> 01:59:55.930
capable to , to make those changes when

01:59:55.939 --> 01:59:58.520
we're working on a system , uh that

01:59:58.529 --> 02:00:00.585
they say is three years , four years

02:00:00.585 --> 02:00:02.807
out in some cases , most of the time is

02:00:02.807 --> 02:00:05.029
seven , are they able to pivot when new

02:00:05.029 --> 02:00:07.399
technology comes on ? Uh Because

02:00:07.410 --> 02:00:10.720
obviously this is a , a growing space

02:00:10.729 --> 02:00:12.896
and a growing concern . So there's new

02:00:13.479 --> 02:00:16.859
finds , a new technology that's coming

02:00:16.870 --> 02:00:19.720
on constantly . Are we able to pivot ?

02:00:19.729 --> 02:00:21.896
Uh I have that I hold that for both of

02:00:21.896 --> 02:00:24.062
y'all , I I in in defense to say yes ,

02:00:24.062 --> 02:00:26.229
we want to start moving this direction

02:00:26.660 --> 02:00:28.382
for us as we're looking at our

02:00:28.382 --> 02:00:30.549
modernization programs acro across the

02:00:30.549 --> 02:00:32.771
portfolio . Um What we're seeing that's

02:00:32.771 --> 02:00:34.771
different and the way we want to do

02:00:34.771 --> 02:00:36.438
business , Senator is through

02:00:36.438 --> 02:00:38.604
modularity . Um So having , having the

02:00:38.604 --> 02:00:40.771
opportunity for modularity um is gonna

02:00:40.771 --> 02:00:42.882
be critical for us and crucial for us

02:00:42.882 --> 02:00:44.938
because then we can outpace and stay

02:00:44.938 --> 02:00:47.104
ahead of the adversary . And Senator ,

02:00:47.104 --> 02:00:49.104
I would just add that . Uh we wanna

02:00:49.104 --> 02:00:51.327
work with the , the companies that have

02:00:51.327 --> 02:00:53.438
existed for a long time and help them

02:00:53.438 --> 02:00:55.660
uh to see the requirements and make the

02:00:55.660 --> 02:00:55.589
pivot but also we want to make sure we

02:00:55.600 --> 02:00:57.711
have a relationship with new start up

02:00:57.711 --> 02:00:59.878
companies uh that , that may not be uh

02:00:59.878 --> 02:01:02.044
burdened by the way , things that have

02:01:02.044 --> 02:01:04.044
happened in the past and can now uh

02:01:04.044 --> 02:01:06.156
move right to the future and we wanna

02:01:06.156 --> 02:01:06.080
make sure they have an opportunity to

02:01:06.089 --> 02:01:08.311
compete for our requirements and we can

02:01:08.311 --> 02:01:10.422
help move them through that valley of

02:01:10.422 --> 02:01:12.367
death . They call it to , to bring

02:01:12.367 --> 02:01:14.589
successful programs forward . Thank you

02:01:14.589 --> 02:01:13.779
guys . We'll see you here in just a

02:01:13.790 --> 02:01:17.089
minute and skiff . I'll go back . Um

02:01:17.100 --> 02:01:19.322
Thank you , Senator King . Did you have

02:01:19.322 --> 02:01:21.489
a second round that you wanted to do ?

02:01:21.489 --> 02:01:23.433
Ok . We're going to adjourn for 15

02:01:23.433 --> 02:01:25.600
minutes . Um so that senators can vote

02:01:25.600 --> 02:01:28.020
and um go into closed session in the

02:01:28.029 --> 02:01:30.879
SVC . So at this point , we will close

02:01:30.890 --> 02:01:34.100
the open session hearing .