1 00:00:00,009 --> 00:00:02,009 Good afternoon . So we have a guest 2 00:00:02,009 --> 00:00:04,199 today today , Doctor John Plumb , 3 00:00:04,210 --> 00:00:06,154 Assistant Secretary of Defense for 4 00:00:06,154 --> 00:00:08,239 Space Policy is here to announce the 5 00:00:08,250 --> 00:00:10,417 release of the department's commercial 6 00:00:10,417 --> 00:00:12,750 space integration policy . Doctor 7 00:00:12,760 --> 00:00:14,871 Plumb's space policy portfolio covers 8 00:00:14,880 --> 00:00:16,709 the strategic capabilities of 9 00:00:16,719 --> 00:00:18,989 integrated deterrent space missile 10 00:00:19,000 --> 00:00:20,770 defense , nuclear weapons and 11 00:00:20,780 --> 00:00:23,058 countering weapons of mass destruction . 12 00:00:23,058 --> 00:00:25,169 Doctor Plum has some opening comments 13 00:00:25,169 --> 00:00:27,391 and then we'll take a few questions and 14 00:00:27,391 --> 00:00:29,502 following Doctor Plum's portion . I'm 15 00:00:29,502 --> 00:00:31,724 happy to answer a few news of days , uh 16 00:00:31,724 --> 00:00:31,510 news of day questions . So with that , 17 00:00:31,520 --> 00:00:33,742 I'll turn over to Doctor Plum . Great . 18 00:00:33,742 --> 00:00:35,631 Uh Well , thanks Sabrina and good 19 00:00:35,631 --> 00:00:37,631 afternoon everyone . Uh Today , I'm 20 00:00:37,631 --> 00:00:39,687 proud to announce the release of the 21 00:00:39,687 --> 00:00:41,631 department's first ever commercial 22 00:00:41,631 --> 00:00:44,069 space integration strategy . This marks 23 00:00:44,080 --> 00:00:46,247 a new effort to harness the remarkable 24 00:00:46,247 --> 00:00:48,191 innovation of the commercial space 25 00:00:48,191 --> 00:00:50,819 sector to enhance our resilience and 26 00:00:50,830 --> 00:00:52,941 strengthen integrated deterrence as a 27 00:00:52,941 --> 00:00:55,729 department , space is essential to the 28 00:00:55,740 --> 00:00:58,409 joint force . Our military relies on 29 00:00:58,419 --> 00:01:00,930 space every single day to protect our 30 00:01:00,939 --> 00:01:03,106 men and women in uniform and to ensure 31 00:01:03,106 --> 00:01:05,328 the space services they rely on will be 32 00:01:05,328 --> 00:01:07,495 available when needed . The department 33 00:01:07,495 --> 00:01:09,550 has a responsibility to leverage all 34 00:01:09,550 --> 00:01:11,439 tools available . And those tools 35 00:01:11,439 --> 00:01:13,328 include commercial solutions from 36 00:01:13,328 --> 00:01:15,328 launch to space domain awareness to 37 00:01:15,328 --> 00:01:17,439 satellite communications and more the 38 00:01:17,439 --> 00:01:19,272 commercial sectors of ability to 39 00:01:19,272 --> 00:01:21,272 innovate to scale production and to 40 00:01:21,272 --> 00:01:23,589 rapidly refresh their technology is 41 00:01:23,599 --> 00:01:25,432 opening the door to all kinds of 42 00:01:25,432 --> 00:01:27,655 possibilities . Now , when I talk about 43 00:01:27,655 --> 00:01:29,821 the commercial sector , it's important 44 00:01:29,821 --> 00:01:31,988 to note that this is distinct from the 45 00:01:31,988 --> 00:01:34,099 defense industrial base or the dib as 46 00:01:34,099 --> 00:01:36,220 we call it , the dib is predominantly 47 00:01:36,230 --> 00:01:38,341 focused on us government contracts to 48 00:01:38,341 --> 00:01:41,169 build specific government systems . But 49 00:01:41,180 --> 00:01:43,402 the commercial sector develops products 50 00:01:43,402 --> 00:01:45,513 that serve a viable commercial market 51 00:01:45,513 --> 00:01:47,402 outside of government . And their 52 00:01:47,402 --> 00:01:49,458 incentives are to innovate for their 53 00:01:49,458 --> 00:01:51,458 entire customer base , not just the 54 00:01:51,458 --> 00:01:54,709 Department of Defense . The 2022 55 00:01:54,720 --> 00:01:56,831 national defense strategy directed us 56 00:01:56,831 --> 00:01:58,776 to increase collaboration with the 57 00:01:58,776 --> 00:02:00,720 commercial sector and leverage its 58 00:02:00,720 --> 00:02:02,387 technological advancement and 59 00:02:02,387 --> 00:02:04,220 entrepreneurial spirit . Our new 60 00:02:04,220 --> 00:02:06,331 commercial space integration strategy 61 00:02:06,331 --> 00:02:08,960 follows through on that directive , the 62 00:02:08,970 --> 00:02:10,803 degree to which commercial space 63 00:02:10,803 --> 00:02:12,914 capabilities and services can benefit 64 00:02:12,914 --> 00:02:15,137 us national security will ultimately be 65 00:02:15,137 --> 00:02:17,359 measured by how well the department can 66 00:02:17,359 --> 00:02:19,581 actually integrate commercial solutions 67 00:02:19,581 --> 00:02:21,692 into the way we operate , not just in 68 00:02:21,692 --> 00:02:23,914 peace time , but also in conflict . And 69 00:02:23,914 --> 00:02:25,859 to do this as Secretary Austin has 70 00:02:25,859 --> 00:02:28,137 written in the forward of the strategy , 71 00:02:28,137 --> 00:02:30,081 the dod will need to eliminate the 72 00:02:30,081 --> 00:02:32,026 structural procedural and cultural 73 00:02:32,026 --> 00:02:34,248 barriers to overcoming legacy practices 74 00:02:34,248 --> 00:02:36,248 and preconceived notions of how the 75 00:02:36,248 --> 00:02:38,414 commercial sector can support national 76 00:02:38,414 --> 00:02:42,339 security . Now , rolling this out , 77 00:02:42,429 --> 00:02:44,596 uh It's been a lot of work to get here 78 00:02:44,639 --> 00:02:46,472 over the last year . My team has 79 00:02:46,472 --> 00:02:48,028 engaged directly with space 80 00:02:48,028 --> 00:02:49,972 stakeholders across the department 81 00:02:49,972 --> 00:02:51,806 across the inter agency and with 82 00:02:51,806 --> 00:02:54,083 commercial space entities of all sizes . 83 00:02:54,083 --> 00:02:56,195 We've hosted round tables , table top 84 00:02:56,195 --> 00:02:58,417 exercises and informational sessions to 85 00:02:58,417 --> 00:03:00,583 better understand how commercial space 86 00:03:00,583 --> 00:03:02,750 solutions could support the department 87 00:03:02,750 --> 00:03:04,417 while taking into account the 88 00:03:04,417 --> 00:03:04,369 commercial sector's interest as well 89 00:03:05,009 --> 00:03:07,231 and informed by that body of work . Our 90 00:03:07,231 --> 00:03:09,342 strategy outlines four priorities for 91 00:03:09,342 --> 00:03:12,080 the department to pursue . First , we 92 00:03:12,089 --> 00:03:13,756 will work to ensure access to 93 00:03:13,756 --> 00:03:15,533 commercial solutions across the 94 00:03:15,533 --> 00:03:17,756 spectrum of conflict . We will leverage 95 00:03:17,756 --> 00:03:19,867 contracts and other agreements to set 96 00:03:19,867 --> 00:03:21,811 clear expectations with commercial 97 00:03:21,811 --> 00:03:23,867 providers and ensure the joint force 98 00:03:23,867 --> 00:03:26,089 has access to the capabilities it needs 99 00:03:26,089 --> 00:03:27,978 when it needs them to execute its 100 00:03:27,978 --> 00:03:29,922 mission . Second , we will work to 101 00:03:29,922 --> 00:03:32,033 achieve integration prior to crisis . 102 00:03:32,330 --> 00:03:34,441 We want to integrate commercial space 103 00:03:34,441 --> 00:03:36,608 solutions in our day to day operations 104 00:03:36,608 --> 00:03:38,774 during peace time . So we can be ready 105 00:03:38,774 --> 00:03:40,497 and able to rely on those same 106 00:03:40,497 --> 00:03:42,552 commercial solutions during conflict 107 00:03:42,552 --> 00:03:44,774 critically . And this is a finding from 108 00:03:44,774 --> 00:03:46,552 our uh sessions with commercial 109 00:03:46,552 --> 00:03:48,608 providers . We need to work to bring 110 00:03:48,608 --> 00:03:50,719 more commercial partners into our war 111 00:03:50,719 --> 00:03:52,830 games and into our training exercises 112 00:03:52,830 --> 00:03:54,663 so that commercial partners also 113 00:03:54,663 --> 00:03:54,229 understand what will be required of 114 00:03:54,240 --> 00:03:58,160 them . Third , we 115 00:03:58,169 --> 00:04:00,169 will work to establish the security 116 00:04:00,169 --> 00:04:02,058 conditions necessary to integrate 117 00:04:02,058 --> 00:04:04,058 commercial space solutions and help 118 00:04:04,058 --> 00:04:06,336 commercial providers reduce risk . Now , 119 00:04:06,336 --> 00:04:08,558 the department will always maintain the 120 00:04:08,558 --> 00:04:10,780 option to use military force to protect 121 00:04:10,780 --> 00:04:12,947 and defend commercial assets . But our 122 00:04:12,947 --> 00:04:14,960 main lines of effort will follow 33 123 00:04:14,970 --> 00:04:17,081 lines , one create norms that enhance 124 00:04:17,081 --> 00:04:19,440 safety for all two , generate and share 125 00:04:19,450 --> 00:04:21,394 actionable threat information with 126 00:04:21,394 --> 00:04:23,920 commercial partners and three explore 127 00:04:23,929 --> 00:04:26,151 different forms of financial protection 128 00:04:26,160 --> 00:04:29,359 if required underpinning all of this is 129 00:04:29,369 --> 00:04:31,536 the department's firm commitment to be 130 00:04:31,536 --> 00:04:33,536 a leader and a responsible actor in 131 00:04:33,536 --> 00:04:35,679 space . And finally , we will support 132 00:04:35,690 --> 00:04:37,912 the development of new commercial space 133 00:04:37,912 --> 00:04:40,134 capabilities that have the potential to 134 00:04:40,134 --> 00:04:41,801 support the joint force . The 135 00:04:41,801 --> 00:04:41,679 department has a number of tools at our 136 00:04:41,690 --> 00:04:43,801 disposal to help commercial companies 137 00:04:43,801 --> 00:04:45,968 scale where our interests align and we 138 00:04:45,968 --> 00:04:48,510 need to seize them . Now , before I 139 00:04:48,519 --> 00:04:50,519 take questions , I'll just note the 140 00:04:50,519 --> 00:04:52,630 commercial space integration strategy 141 00:04:52,630 --> 00:04:54,408 is entirely unclassified . It's 142 00:04:54,408 --> 00:04:56,463 available to the public . It will be 143 00:04:56,463 --> 00:04:58,575 posted today on defense.gov . I think 144 00:04:58,575 --> 00:05:00,797 uh shortly after this , the strategy is 145 00:05:00,797 --> 00:05:02,575 deliberately unclassified to be 146 00:05:02,575 --> 00:05:04,630 transparent about what we are trying 147 00:05:04,630 --> 00:05:06,869 and need to achieve . And it will also 148 00:05:06,880 --> 00:05:09,047 help hold ourselves accountable to the 149 00:05:09,047 --> 00:05:11,324 strategy we've signed ourselves up for . 150 00:05:11,324 --> 00:05:13,269 So we're excited to embark on this 151 00:05:13,269 --> 00:05:15,102 important new effort to leverage 152 00:05:15,102 --> 00:05:17,047 American ingenuity and enhance the 153 00:05:17,047 --> 00:05:16,559 resilience of our national security 154 00:05:16,570 --> 00:05:18,681 space , architecture and strength and 155 00:05:18,681 --> 00:05:20,737 deterrence . I'm confident we'll pay 156 00:05:20,737 --> 00:05:22,903 dividends for the department for years 157 00:05:22,903 --> 00:05:24,792 to come . Uh Thank you and I look 158 00:05:24,792 --> 00:05:26,792 forward to your questions . Great . 159 00:05:26,792 --> 00:05:29,014 We'll start in the room here . Yes , go 160 00:05:29,014 --> 00:05:30,959 ahead . Hi . Um Ashley Rookie with 161 00:05:30,959 --> 00:05:33,126 breaking defense . I wanted to ask you 162 00:05:33,126 --> 00:05:35,014 about the promise gaps analysis , 163 00:05:35,014 --> 00:05:37,126 dealing with commercial insurance for 164 00:05:37,126 --> 00:05:39,292 uh dod space contractors . When do you 165 00:05:39,292 --> 00:05:41,292 think that will be wrapped up ? And 166 00:05:41,292 --> 00:05:43,292 then sort of the strategy published 167 00:05:43,292 --> 00:05:45,514 about when to compensate firms or would 168 00:05:45,514 --> 00:05:47,626 that be a case by case basis ? So the 169 00:05:47,626 --> 00:05:49,792 strategy uh looks at so first of all , 170 00:05:49,792 --> 00:05:49,170 thanks to the question , the strategy 171 00:05:49,179 --> 00:05:51,109 is uh kind of lays out the four 172 00:05:51,119 --> 00:05:53,549 different types of uh financial 173 00:05:53,820 --> 00:05:55,989 protection uh that can be made 174 00:05:56,000 --> 00:05:58,167 available to commercial partners . And 175 00:05:58,167 --> 00:06:00,278 so one is just commercial insurance . 176 00:06:00,278 --> 00:06:02,500 So there's a market that the government 177 00:06:02,500 --> 00:06:04,500 had to deal with . Uh There is also 178 00:06:04,500 --> 00:06:06,722 this concept of uh war risk insurance , 179 00:06:06,722 --> 00:06:08,611 which is sometimes available on a 180 00:06:08,611 --> 00:06:10,722 commercial market . Uh And then there 181 00:06:10,722 --> 00:06:12,556 is us government backed war risk 182 00:06:12,556 --> 00:06:12,029 insurance , which is us government 183 00:06:12,040 --> 00:06:14,151 backed insurance . Uh That particular 184 00:06:14,151 --> 00:06:16,151 piece I think is what you're asking 185 00:06:16,151 --> 00:06:18,799 about . Uh We do not have a uh final 186 00:06:18,809 --> 00:06:21,920 answer on that . Uh The secretary is uh 187 00:06:21,929 --> 00:06:24,950 directed uh that the department look at , 188 00:06:24,959 --> 00:06:27,126 are there gaps that need to be covered 189 00:06:27,126 --> 00:06:29,899 by this now ? And the , the parallel is 190 00:06:30,149 --> 00:06:32,149 uh for air logistics , we have this 191 00:06:32,149 --> 00:06:34,316 craft agreement which in very specific 192 00:06:34,316 --> 00:06:36,260 cases , the department can turn on 193 00:06:36,260 --> 00:06:38,482 additional uh insurance for providers , 194 00:06:38,482 --> 00:06:40,649 same uh for the maritime , for convoys 195 00:06:40,649 --> 00:06:42,871 and for the types of logistics . And so 196 00:06:42,871 --> 00:06:44,982 the question is , is there a gap that 197 00:06:44,982 --> 00:06:47,205 needs to be filled for specific mission 198 00:06:47,205 --> 00:06:49,316 sets ? And I think the most important 199 00:06:49,316 --> 00:06:51,427 thing to take away is in any case and 200 00:06:51,427 --> 00:06:53,538 whatever uh thing we end up with , if 201 00:06:53,538 --> 00:06:55,760 we do end up in that space , it is only 202 00:06:55,760 --> 00:06:57,982 when the government turns that on . And 203 00:06:57,982 --> 00:06:56,880 so what we're gonna look at as our 204 00:06:56,890 --> 00:07:00,100 primary means of uh ensuring uh that 205 00:07:00,109 --> 00:07:01,887 kind of de risks is through the 206 00:07:01,887 --> 00:07:03,831 contract with the company itself . 207 00:07:04,410 --> 00:07:06,410 Follow up , you mentioned different 208 00:07:06,410 --> 00:07:08,521 stakeholders . Did you work with ODNI 209 00:07:08,521 --> 00:07:10,410 on this or should we be expecting 210 00:07:10,410 --> 00:07:12,521 different strategies to come out from 211 00:07:12,521 --> 00:07:14,632 the intelligence community ? So there 212 00:07:14,632 --> 00:07:16,799 are many components of the I that have 213 00:07:16,799 --> 00:07:18,854 kind of dual hat that also work with 214 00:07:18,854 --> 00:07:20,910 the department and uh the IC . So uh 215 00:07:20,910 --> 00:07:23,790 certainly NGA and uh NRO part of this 216 00:07:23,799 --> 00:07:26,250 and OD and I is aware of it . Uh if you 217 00:07:26,260 --> 00:07:29,130 know NRO has its own uh commercial 218 00:07:29,140 --> 00:07:31,769 strategy for buying uh electro optical . 219 00:07:31,890 --> 00:07:34,829 So they all nest sort of under this OS 220 00:07:34,839 --> 00:07:37,290 D piece , they're all uh work together . 221 00:07:37,299 --> 00:07:39,466 They're not at odds with each other in 222 00:07:39,466 --> 00:07:41,466 any way . Let's go to Mike and then 223 00:07:41,466 --> 00:07:43,577 Sandra Mike Stone from Reuters . Hi , 224 00:07:43,577 --> 00:07:45,829 Mike has commercially provided space 225 00:07:45,839 --> 00:07:48,950 capabilities become more critical for 226 00:07:48,959 --> 00:07:52,329 civil services on earth . How does the 227 00:07:52,339 --> 00:07:54,089 department under International 228 00:07:54,100 --> 00:07:56,320 Humanitarian Law view , the principle 229 00:07:56,329 --> 00:07:59,160 of distinction between military and 230 00:07:59,170 --> 00:08:01,769 civilian assets in space . 231 00:08:03,420 --> 00:08:05,253 How does the department view the 232 00:08:05,253 --> 00:08:07,790 distinction ? I'm not sure I have a 233 00:08:09,399 --> 00:08:12,420 answer on that specific piece because 234 00:08:12,429 --> 00:08:15,260 of course , many uh systems can be used 235 00:08:15,269 --> 00:08:17,380 for military or for commercial . They 236 00:08:17,380 --> 00:08:19,380 are today and continue to do . So I 237 00:08:19,380 --> 00:08:21,602 will say on the , you know , what we've 238 00:08:21,602 --> 00:08:23,769 seen in the Ukraine conflict is Russia 239 00:08:23,769 --> 00:08:25,658 threatening commercial provider , 240 00:08:25,658 --> 00:08:27,769 satellites frankly , even hacking via 241 00:08:27,769 --> 00:08:29,436 SAT . Uh , because while it's 242 00:08:29,436 --> 00:08:31,602 commercial providers also being used , 243 00:08:31,602 --> 00:08:31,399 uh , or the Russians think they're 244 00:08:31,410 --> 00:08:33,521 being used for , for Ukrainian , uh , 245 00:08:33,521 --> 00:08:35,854 battlefield . So the question is really , 246 00:08:35,854 --> 00:08:38,280 at what point of , uh , content on a 247 00:08:38,289 --> 00:08:40,609 satellite will you view that as an act 248 00:08:40,619 --> 00:08:42,563 of war if someone shoots it down ? 249 00:08:44,599 --> 00:08:48,219 Or I'm not ? Uh , I'm not , I can't get 250 00:08:48,229 --> 00:08:50,750 into hypothetical red lines , but I 251 00:08:50,760 --> 00:08:52,927 understand your question . It's a good 252 00:08:52,927 --> 00:08:54,982 question . I , I think I'd have to , 253 00:08:54,982 --> 00:08:57,204 I'd have to ponder that one for a bit , 254 00:08:57,204 --> 00:08:56,590 Mike . That's not one that I've , I've 255 00:08:56,599 --> 00:08:59,349 considered before . Sandra . Thank you , 256 00:09:00,590 --> 00:09:03,169 Mr Secretary Sandra Irwin Space News . 257 00:09:03,200 --> 00:09:05,570 Um , on your point about what the 258 00:09:05,580 --> 00:09:08,650 secretary wrote in the , um , report 259 00:09:08,659 --> 00:09:11,840 about the , uh , cultural impediments 260 00:09:11,849 --> 00:09:14,729 and institutional problems or issues . 261 00:09:14,799 --> 00:09:17,789 Um , how do you change that ? I mean , 262 00:09:17,799 --> 00:09:19,799 the , the report really doesn't get 263 00:09:19,799 --> 00:09:22,250 into like that problem . So , what are 264 00:09:22,260 --> 00:09:24,371 your thoughts on how you would change 265 00:09:24,371 --> 00:09:27,530 that ? So , I don't want to , uh , 266 00:09:27,950 --> 00:09:30,117 undersell how hard that could possibly 267 00:09:30,117 --> 00:09:32,339 be . But I do think right now it's very 268 00:09:32,339 --> 00:09:34,394 clear across the department that the 269 00:09:34,394 --> 00:09:36,506 commercial sector has uh , ability to 270 00:09:36,506 --> 00:09:38,728 move at a faster speed than we can move 271 00:09:38,728 --> 00:09:40,728 in many ways . Uh , and is bringing 272 00:09:40,728 --> 00:09:42,894 innovation in ways that uh maybe don't 273 00:09:42,894 --> 00:09:45,006 match our normal pace . Uh We need to 274 00:09:45,006 --> 00:09:47,061 hold ourselves accountable frankly . 275 00:09:47,061 --> 00:09:46,809 One way to do that is to come back to 276 00:09:46,820 --> 00:09:48,764 the secretary perhaps on an annual 277 00:09:48,764 --> 00:09:50,987 basis , et cetera to say , hey , here's 278 00:09:50,987 --> 00:09:52,987 what we're doing . Here's how we're 279 00:09:52,987 --> 00:09:52,700 making progress . Here's where there's 280 00:09:52,710 --> 00:09:55,450 um stumbling blocks and hurdles . So we 281 00:09:55,460 --> 00:09:57,460 have to have an internal process to 282 00:09:57,460 --> 00:09:59,830 make sure that uh we do keep doing this . 283 00:09:59,840 --> 00:10:02,062 That's one thing I intend to do through 284 00:10:02,062 --> 00:10:03,750 uh kind of the A SD for space 285 00:10:03,780 --> 00:10:05,891 architecture . We've set up the space 286 00:10:05,891 --> 00:10:08,002 war fighting activities group just to 287 00:10:08,002 --> 00:10:10,113 make sure that uh we are staying true 288 00:10:10,113 --> 00:10:12,113 to the strategy . Is that something 289 00:10:12,113 --> 00:10:15,270 that you discussed with ? Oh , with the 290 00:10:15,280 --> 00:10:17,558 companies or with the department ? Yes , 291 00:10:17,558 --> 00:10:19,724 with the companies . I think the value 292 00:10:19,724 --> 00:10:21,613 of this being unclassified as the 293 00:10:21,613 --> 00:10:23,836 companies will also be able to use this 294 00:10:23,836 --> 00:10:23,179 and say , look , this is a thing you've 295 00:10:23,190 --> 00:10:25,539 signed up for . So how can I benefit 296 00:10:25,549 --> 00:10:27,327 national security ? Can we work 297 00:10:27,327 --> 00:10:29,438 together ? I think it's very powerful 298 00:10:29,438 --> 00:10:31,216 on both sides , not just on the 299 00:10:31,216 --> 00:10:33,382 department side when we're in the room 300 00:10:33,382 --> 00:10:35,605 here . Hi , I'm K Easley with defense . 301 00:10:35,605 --> 00:10:37,827 Thanks for your time , sir . I was just 302 00:10:37,827 --> 00:10:37,369 hoping maybe you could clarify the 303 00:10:37,380 --> 00:10:39,491 differences between this strategy and 304 00:10:39,491 --> 00:10:41,658 the one currently under development by 305 00:10:41,658 --> 00:10:43,713 the Space Force as well as maybe how 306 00:10:43,713 --> 00:10:45,769 these two will support one another . 307 00:10:45,769 --> 00:10:47,824 Sure and frankly , I just had a long 308 00:10:47,824 --> 00:10:50,047 talk with General Saltzman about this . 309 00:10:50,047 --> 00:10:49,250 So I'll just say we're , we're very 310 00:10:49,260 --> 00:10:51,780 much aligned . Uh This is department 311 00:10:51,789 --> 00:10:53,845 wide strategy , a little bit more of 312 00:10:53,845 --> 00:10:55,956 policy focus and overall , I think uh 313 00:10:55,956 --> 00:10:57,956 you know , I hope his strategy will 314 00:10:57,956 --> 00:11:00,178 follow in the near future . And I think 315 00:11:00,178 --> 00:11:00,169 it is uh a little bit more focused on 316 00:11:00,289 --> 00:11:02,479 service specific acquisition specific 317 00:11:02,489 --> 00:11:04,711 and , and , and , and frankly how he is 318 00:11:04,711 --> 00:11:06,640 a service chief wants to see his 319 00:11:06,650 --> 00:11:09,690 military service , uh uh take this on 320 00:11:09,700 --> 00:11:11,922 and address it . Great . And uh we will 321 00:11:11,922 --> 00:11:14,200 go to the phone , Tony Capac Bloomberg . 322 00:11:16,700 --> 00:11:18,756 Hi , sir . Thanks for doing this one 323 00:11:18,756 --> 00:11:20,978 quick uh two quick questions . How much 324 00:11:20,978 --> 00:11:22,811 money in the space force ? Space 325 00:11:22,811 --> 00:11:24,978 systems command budget is there for in 326 00:11:24,978 --> 00:11:27,010 the , in the 25 plan for potential 327 00:11:27,020 --> 00:11:29,187 commercial services envisioned in your 328 00:11:29,187 --> 00:11:31,960 strategy ? And two , what commercial 329 00:11:31,969 --> 00:11:33,913 companies can you point to at this 330 00:11:33,913 --> 00:11:36,840 point as capable of performing this s a 331 00:11:36,849 --> 00:11:38,940 mission , this space services , 332 00:11:38,950 --> 00:11:41,340 assembly logistics manufacturing 333 00:11:41,349 --> 00:11:43,750 mission . Uh Thanks Tony . So two 334 00:11:43,760 --> 00:11:45,927 things . One , I don't know the answer 335 00:11:45,927 --> 00:11:48,149 to your question about how much money . 336 00:11:48,149 --> 00:11:50,371 Uh So I'm just gonna have to , you have 337 00:11:50,371 --> 00:11:50,130 to ask the space uh systems command or 338 00:11:50,140 --> 00:11:52,362 Space Force on that . And I do wanna be 339 00:11:52,362 --> 00:11:54,473 clear , the point of this strategy is 340 00:11:54,473 --> 00:11:56,196 not to have someone just do an 341 00:11:56,196 --> 00:11:58,196 accounting for how much money we're 342 00:11:58,196 --> 00:12:00,362 spending on a thing because that's a , 343 00:12:00,362 --> 00:12:02,362 that's the wrong metric . The right 344 00:12:02,362 --> 00:12:02,190 metric is . How much national security 345 00:12:02,200 --> 00:12:04,422 benefit are we getting or how much more 346 00:12:04,422 --> 00:12:06,422 cost efficient might it be to solve 347 00:12:06,422 --> 00:12:08,533 certain problems using the commercial 348 00:12:08,533 --> 00:12:10,367 market ? Uh But then your second 349 00:12:10,367 --> 00:12:12,478 question . Uh So in the strategy , we 350 00:12:12,478 --> 00:12:12,419 have these 13 different missionaries 351 00:12:12,429 --> 00:12:14,719 laid out and we distinguish between 352 00:12:14,729 --> 00:12:16,840 those missionaries that are primarily 353 00:12:16,840 --> 00:12:18,896 government , which means mostly it's 354 00:12:18,896 --> 00:12:21,118 government function and some commercial 355 00:12:21,118 --> 00:12:23,285 uh sector uh solutions might help it . 356 00:12:23,285 --> 00:12:25,451 There's hybrid where it's more of a 50 357 00:12:25,451 --> 00:12:27,760 to 50 uh some government , some 358 00:12:27,770 --> 00:12:29,937 commercial and it could be pretty much 359 00:12:29,937 --> 00:12:32,090 even Stevens and then uh primary , 360 00:12:32,099 --> 00:12:34,210 primary commercial . And out of those 361 00:12:34,210 --> 00:12:36,043 13 , the only one that's clearly 362 00:12:36,043 --> 00:12:38,266 primarily commercial right now is uh uh 363 00:12:38,266 --> 00:12:40,432 Space Force designation here . But Sam 364 00:12:40,432 --> 00:12:42,543 L which is uh Space access , mobility 365 00:12:42,543 --> 00:12:44,432 and logistics and space access is 366 00:12:44,432 --> 00:12:48,059 launched , Tony , so SpaceX Firefly 367 00:12:48,270 --> 00:12:51,460 um Rocket Lab . Uh all these different 368 00:12:51,469 --> 00:12:53,469 companies that are doing commercial 369 00:12:53,469 --> 00:12:55,525 launch , that's where the commercial 370 00:12:55,525 --> 00:12:57,691 sector clearly uh can provide services 371 00:12:57,691 --> 00:12:59,747 on mobility and logistics . I'm only 372 00:12:59,747 --> 00:13:01,913 aware of one kind of fully functioning 373 00:13:01,913 --> 00:13:04,136 company that's space logistics that can 374 00:13:04,136 --> 00:13:06,750 do kind of in on orbit uh servicing 375 00:13:06,760 --> 00:13:09,200 right now . There are more coming . Uh 376 00:13:09,210 --> 00:13:11,510 And then the is a piece is not even a 377 00:13:11,520 --> 00:13:13,687 missionary for us yet . It is emerging 378 00:13:13,687 --> 00:13:15,798 and is clearly emerging mainly in the 379 00:13:15,798 --> 00:13:17,798 commercial market which is on orbit 380 00:13:17,798 --> 00:13:19,969 assembly generally . So great . Thank 381 00:13:19,979 --> 00:13:21,979 you . And our last question is from 382 00:13:21,979 --> 00:13:25,190 Shelly Mesh uh inside defense . Hi , 383 00:13:25,200 --> 00:13:27,256 thank you for taking the time . Um I 384 00:13:27,256 --> 00:13:30,760 wanted to ask about um what commercial 385 00:13:30,770 --> 00:13:32,940 space operators can do with this 386 00:13:32,950 --> 00:13:35,109 information . Um What guidance do you 387 00:13:35,119 --> 00:13:37,679 have for them to getting involved ? 388 00:13:37,690 --> 00:13:41,080 What's the front door and how is this 389 00:13:41,090 --> 00:13:43,280 going to help the department find new 390 00:13:43,289 --> 00:13:46,869 commercial partners ? Ok , thanks 391 00:13:46,880 --> 00:13:49,158 Shelley . I guess I'd say first of all , 392 00:13:49,158 --> 00:13:51,809 I uh as the policy uh is the space 393 00:13:51,820 --> 00:13:53,931 policy chief . As some of you like to 394 00:13:53,931 --> 00:13:56,098 call me , I don't have any acquisition 395 00:13:56,098 --> 00:13:55,770 authority . Uh That acquisition 396 00:13:55,780 --> 00:13:57,780 authority is in uh you know , space 397 00:13:57,780 --> 00:13:59,891 Systems Command is one of the primary 398 00:13:59,891 --> 00:14:02,113 acquisition uh places of Frank Calve of 399 00:14:02,113 --> 00:14:04,058 the Department of the Air Force as 400 00:14:04,058 --> 00:14:06,280 Space Acquisition executive title on uh 401 00:14:06,280 --> 00:14:06,210 clearly Space Systems Command as a 402 00:14:06,219 --> 00:14:08,275 space commercial office , which is a 403 00:14:08,275 --> 00:14:10,330 front door . I'm not saying it's the 404 00:14:10,330 --> 00:14:12,330 only front door . I think what this 405 00:14:12,330 --> 00:14:14,219 strategy hopes to do is say yes , 406 00:14:14,219 --> 00:14:16,441 continue working on bringing commercial 407 00:14:16,441 --> 00:14:18,608 entities in . This is actually a thing 408 00:14:18,608 --> 00:14:20,663 we want you to do , not just a thing 409 00:14:20,663 --> 00:14:20,590 you should be experimenting with . And 410 00:14:20,599 --> 00:14:23,330 so I think over time this should 411 00:14:23,340 --> 00:14:26,419 provide uh better integration , better 412 00:14:26,429 --> 00:14:28,485 ways forward . And hopefully , as we 413 00:14:28,485 --> 00:14:30,750 identify those uh mechanisms of those 414 00:14:30,760 --> 00:14:32,927 capabilities that can benefit national 415 00:14:32,927 --> 00:14:34,982 security . Uh uh an additional lever 416 00:14:34,982 --> 00:14:36,982 arm for the department to say yes , 417 00:14:36,982 --> 00:14:39,093 let's help that through . Let's scale 418 00:14:39,093 --> 00:14:38,979 that let's figure out how we can 419 00:14:38,989 --> 00:14:40,940 incorporate that uh not just into 420 00:14:40,950 --> 00:14:43,061 peacetime but also into to crisis and 421 00:14:43,061 --> 00:14:45,228 conflict . Thank you . Thanks , Doctor 422 00:14:45,228 --> 00:14:47,394 Plum . I really appreciate your time . 423 00:14:47,394 --> 00:14:47,330 Thanks Sabrina and thank you everybody . 424 00:14:47,340 --> 00:14:48,729 I really appreciate it . 425 00:14:51,880 --> 00:14:55,479 Great . Hi , everyone . Um 426 00:14:57,000 --> 00:14:58,944 Hopefully you don't have any space 427 00:14:58,944 --> 00:15:01,320 questions for me . Um I just have one 428 00:15:01,330 --> 00:15:03,552 thing at the top and then happy to jump 429 00:15:03,552 --> 00:15:05,774 in and start taking questions . Uh This 430 00:15:05,774 --> 00:15:07,608 morning , Assistant Secretary of 431 00:15:07,608 --> 00:15:09,719 Defense Eli Ratner hosted Singapore , 432 00:15:09,719 --> 00:15:11,830 Deputy Secretary for Policy Frederick 433 00:15:11,830 --> 00:15:13,997 Chu here at the Pentagon for the ninth 434 00:15:13,997 --> 00:15:16,219 US . Singapore midterm defense review . 435 00:15:16,219 --> 00:15:18,441 This is an annual dialogue that surveys 436 00:15:18,441 --> 00:15:20,497 defense priorities and collaboration 437 00:15:20,497 --> 00:15:22,608 between the US and Singapore . One of 438 00:15:22,608 --> 00:15:24,774 our long standing partners in the Indo 439 00:15:24,774 --> 00:15:26,497 Pacific region . The officials 440 00:15:26,497 --> 00:15:28,663 discussed a range of topics to include 441 00:15:28,663 --> 00:15:30,719 maritime domain awareness , emerging 442 00:15:30,719 --> 00:15:32,330 technologies , Force Posture 443 00:15:32,330 --> 00:15:34,608 initiatives and training opportunities . 444 00:15:34,608 --> 00:15:36,441 A readout of the meeting will be 445 00:15:36,441 --> 00:15:38,663 published later today online . And with 446 00:15:38,663 --> 00:15:40,941 that , I'm happy to jump into question . 447 00:15:40,941 --> 00:15:42,941 So Tara , I have a couple on Israel 448 00:15:42,941 --> 00:15:44,750 Gaza . Um first is the Pentagon 449 00:15:44,760 --> 00:15:47,690 concerned that Israel's strike against 450 00:15:47,700 --> 00:15:51,070 the Iranian consulate um is going to 451 00:15:51,080 --> 00:15:53,247 increase the risk to us troops in both 452 00:15:53,247 --> 00:15:55,358 Iraq and Syria . There has been a , a 453 00:15:55,358 --> 00:15:57,302 quiet period , I guess um where it 454 00:15:57,302 --> 00:15:59,136 looks like Iran had directed the 455 00:15:59,136 --> 00:16:01,136 proxies not to strike , but is that 456 00:16:01,136 --> 00:16:02,913 over an hour or is the Pentagon 457 00:16:02,913 --> 00:16:05,024 concerned about that ? Well , I can't 458 00:16:05,024 --> 00:16:06,858 speak to um actions that haven't 459 00:16:06,858 --> 00:16:08,913 happened or anything , uh you know , 460 00:16:08,913 --> 00:16:10,747 hypothetical actions , but uh we 461 00:16:10,747 --> 00:16:13,700 certainly um continue to monitor the 462 00:16:13,710 --> 00:16:15,932 situation . Of course , we are aware of 463 00:16:15,932 --> 00:16:18,266 the strike that was conducted yesterday . 464 00:16:18,266 --> 00:16:20,377 Um But I don't have anything more for 465 00:16:20,377 --> 00:16:22,488 you . We're going to continue to make 466 00:16:22,488 --> 00:16:24,599 sure that our forces are protected in 467 00:16:24,599 --> 00:16:26,710 the region . So that means monitoring 468 00:16:26,710 --> 00:16:26,250 what's going on around them . But 469 00:16:26,260 --> 00:16:28,482 beyond that , I just don't have more to 470 00:16:28,482 --> 00:16:30,427 share . Ok . And then on the World 471 00:16:30,427 --> 00:16:32,369 Central Kitchen strike has Israel 472 00:16:32,380 --> 00:16:35,130 reached out to you to assure you that 473 00:16:35,140 --> 00:16:37,084 the weapons used to kill the World 474 00:16:37,084 --> 00:16:39,140 Central Kitchen aid workers were not 475 00:16:39,140 --> 00:16:41,770 provided by the US . So on that first , 476 00:16:41,780 --> 00:16:45,609 um I think just it should be uh very 477 00:16:45,619 --> 00:16:47,789 clear that um you know , our hearts go 478 00:16:47,799 --> 00:16:49,966 out to those who lost their lives . Um 479 00:16:49,966 --> 00:16:51,969 in that strike , these are um 480 00:16:51,979 --> 00:16:53,812 humanitarian aid workers who are 481 00:16:53,812 --> 00:16:56,309 providing life saving aid um to 482 00:16:56,320 --> 00:16:59,599 Palestinians in Gaza . And um , you 483 00:16:59,609 --> 00:17:01,331 know , the Israelis have taken 484 00:17:01,331 --> 00:17:03,442 responsibility for that strike . They 485 00:17:03,442 --> 00:17:05,498 are conducting an investigation . Um 486 00:17:05,498 --> 00:17:05,489 There have been conversations at 487 00:17:05,500 --> 00:17:07,556 different levels from the department 488 00:17:07,556 --> 00:17:09,722 with Israeli counterparts . Um I don't 489 00:17:09,722 --> 00:17:11,611 have more to share for you on the 490 00:17:11,611 --> 00:17:13,667 weapons that were used . Um , but we 491 00:17:13,667 --> 00:17:15,444 are certainly engaging with the 492 00:17:15,444 --> 00:17:17,333 Israelis . Um , as you know , the 493 00:17:17,333 --> 00:17:19,167 secretary regularly engages with 494 00:17:19,167 --> 00:17:21,222 Minister Gallant . Um I don't have a 495 00:17:21,222 --> 00:17:23,222 call to preview just yet , but um , 496 00:17:23,222 --> 00:17:22,969 when they do speak , I'm sure this will 497 00:17:22,979 --> 00:17:24,646 be something that comes up in 498 00:17:24,646 --> 00:17:26,701 conversation . Um , but we certainly 499 00:17:26,701 --> 00:17:28,812 welcome that the Israelis have opened 500 00:17:28,812 --> 00:17:30,979 up an immediate investigation into the 501 00:17:30,979 --> 00:17:33,201 incident . Does it change circumstances 502 00:17:33,201 --> 00:17:33,199 particularly for the US providing 503 00:17:33,209 --> 00:17:35,042 weapons if it turns out that the 504 00:17:35,042 --> 00:17:37,098 weapons that were used to kill these 505 00:17:37,098 --> 00:17:39,209 aid workers were actually us provided 506 00:17:39,209 --> 00:17:41,431 weapons though ? Well , again , I'm not 507 00:17:41,431 --> 00:17:43,653 going to get ahead of the investigation 508 00:17:43,653 --> 00:17:45,765 that the Israelis are conducting . Um 509 00:17:45,765 --> 00:17:47,876 We've been very clear from the , from 510 00:17:47,876 --> 00:17:49,987 the beginning since the war started , 511 00:17:49,987 --> 00:17:51,765 uh since the Israelis conducted 512 00:17:51,765 --> 00:17:53,876 operations within Gaza that they need 513 00:17:53,876 --> 00:17:55,987 to do everything possible to preserve 514 00:17:55,987 --> 00:17:58,250 um innocent lives . Palestinian lives , 515 00:17:58,260 --> 00:18:00,371 the lives of humanitarian aid workers 516 00:18:00,371 --> 00:18:02,371 going in every single day providing 517 00:18:02,371 --> 00:18:04,482 this type of care and , and service . 518 00:18:04,482 --> 00:18:06,316 Um and they need to uphold those 519 00:18:06,316 --> 00:18:08,482 humanitarian laws and that's something 520 00:18:08,482 --> 00:18:08,140 that , you know , you've seen in every 521 00:18:08,150 --> 00:18:10,317 single readout that we put out as well 522 00:18:10,317 --> 00:18:12,539 with the Secretary and Minister Galan . 523 00:18:12,539 --> 00:18:12,060 So we're gonna keep having 524 00:18:12,209 --> 00:18:14,042 conversations . We're gonna keep 525 00:18:14,042 --> 00:18:16,098 reiterating that just last . Um Does 526 00:18:16,098 --> 00:18:18,099 this further complicate getting the 527 00:18:18,109 --> 00:18:20,310 pure constructed , does it show just 528 00:18:20,319 --> 00:18:22,541 how potentially dangerous and deadly it 529 00:18:22,541 --> 00:18:24,541 could be for anyone that's going to 530 00:18:24,541 --> 00:18:26,763 distribute aid that comes into that ? P 531 00:18:26,763 --> 00:18:28,930 Well , it's certainly something that , 532 00:18:28,930 --> 00:18:30,875 um uh you know , we , we take into 533 00:18:30,875 --> 00:18:33,041 consideration when we're talking about 534 00:18:33,041 --> 00:18:35,208 our forces that are going in to set up 535 00:18:35,208 --> 00:18:37,097 the pier . Now , we have received 536 00:18:37,097 --> 00:18:39,430 assurances . The chairman spoke to this . 537 00:18:39,430 --> 00:18:41,597 Um You've seen other people across the 538 00:18:41,597 --> 00:18:43,652 administration also speak to this as 539 00:18:43,652 --> 00:18:45,763 well that the Israelis have committed 540 00:18:45,763 --> 00:18:47,930 to providing some type of security for 541 00:18:47,930 --> 00:18:50,152 our forces along with other , we expect 542 00:18:50,152 --> 00:18:52,208 other nations to also play a role in 543 00:18:52,208 --> 00:18:54,375 that . Um I don't have more to provide 544 00:18:54,375 --> 00:18:56,430 at this time , but there's no higher 545 00:18:56,430 --> 00:18:58,930 priority than the protection of our 546 00:18:58,939 --> 00:19:01,106 forces . Um That is something that the 547 00:19:01,106 --> 00:19:03,217 Secretary and the president take very 548 00:19:03,217 --> 00:19:05,439 seriously and they will be protected um 549 00:19:05,439 --> 00:19:07,661 When they begin to start the setting up 550 00:19:07,661 --> 00:19:10,160 the J Lots , Carla , thanks . Her last 551 00:19:10,170 --> 00:19:12,170 question was one of mine , but I'll 552 00:19:12,170 --> 00:19:14,392 follow up on that . Can you give us any 553 00:19:14,392 --> 00:19:16,726 sort of update on the pure construction ? 554 00:19:16,726 --> 00:19:18,892 Do we have any more finite ideas about 555 00:19:18,892 --> 00:19:20,614 when this will start ? Uh No , 556 00:19:20,614 --> 00:19:22,670 unfortunately , I know , I know that 557 00:19:22,670 --> 00:19:24,892 you want an exact date . Um Look , we , 558 00:19:24,892 --> 00:19:27,003 we announced this , we said within 60 559 00:19:27,003 --> 00:19:29,170 days from when we announced . So we're 560 00:19:29,170 --> 00:19:31,170 looking , you know , mid uh sorry , 561 00:19:31,170 --> 00:19:33,392 late April early May , I believe that's 562 00:19:33,392 --> 00:19:35,559 somewhere in the 60 days . I'm again , 563 00:19:35,559 --> 00:19:37,781 I'm not looking at a calendar here . Um 564 00:19:37,781 --> 00:19:39,670 We're still on track to meet that 565 00:19:39,670 --> 00:19:41,726 deadline we believe or that timeline 566 00:19:41,726 --> 00:19:43,670 that we set . Um And the ships are 567 00:19:43,670 --> 00:19:45,837 continuing underway . But when we have 568 00:19:45,837 --> 00:19:48,003 more details of when that construction 569 00:19:48,003 --> 00:19:50,114 starts , we'd certainly be , we'll be 570 00:19:50,114 --> 00:19:52,281 providing an update . Thanks Sabrina . 571 00:19:52,281 --> 00:19:54,448 And then just two clarifications . The 572 00:19:54,448 --> 00:19:56,781 US did not conduct a strike in Damascus . 573 00:19:56,781 --> 00:19:58,726 The US did not conduct a strike in 574 00:19:58,726 --> 00:20:00,726 Damascus . I would refer you to the 575 00:20:00,726 --> 00:20:02,948 Israelis to speak to their strike . And 576 00:20:02,948 --> 00:20:05,170 then can you confirm that no attack has 577 00:20:05,170 --> 00:20:07,170 occurred on us ground forces in the 578 00:20:07,170 --> 00:20:09,059 Middle East over the last month . 579 00:20:09,059 --> 00:20:11,226 That's correct . I if you're referring 580 00:20:11,226 --> 00:20:13,448 to an engagement that happened at al to 581 00:20:13,448 --> 00:20:16,099 garrison , um Yesterday , a drone was 582 00:20:16,109 --> 00:20:18,260 shot down by the base . Um But we do 583 00:20:18,270 --> 00:20:20,492 not believe the base or us or coalition 584 00:20:20,492 --> 00:20:22,969 forces were the intended target . Um , 585 00:20:23,140 --> 00:20:24,862 the drone was traveling in the 586 00:20:24,862 --> 00:20:27,029 proximity of the base and the base did 587 00:20:27,029 --> 00:20:28,918 engage that drone , but we do not 588 00:20:28,918 --> 00:20:30,807 assess right now that that was an 589 00:20:30,807 --> 00:20:33,380 attack on us forces , Joe , do you know 590 00:20:33,510 --> 00:20:35,677 the origin of that drone where it came 591 00:20:35,677 --> 00:20:39,260 from or have you ? I mean , we 592 00:20:39,270 --> 00:20:41,750 have , uh , believe is probably 593 00:20:41,760 --> 00:20:43,982 launched by an I RGC backed group , but 594 00:20:43,982 --> 00:20:45,982 I don't have an attribution for the 595 00:20:45,982 --> 00:20:48,149 drone in Iraq or Syria or , you know . 596 00:20:48,300 --> 00:20:52,020 Um , all right . And then I have , have 597 00:20:52,030 --> 00:20:53,641 there been any force posture 598 00:20:53,641 --> 00:20:55,729 adjustments in the aftermath of the 599 00:20:55,739 --> 00:20:57,906 Israeli strike in Damascus yesterday ? 600 00:20:57,989 --> 00:21:00,540 I wouldn't get into any force posture 601 00:21:01,339 --> 00:21:03,339 projections or changes just for the 602 00:21:03,339 --> 00:21:05,619 security of our own forces . Again , 603 00:21:05,630 --> 00:21:07,569 we're all , we will always take 604 00:21:08,640 --> 00:21:11,540 whatever we need to do to protect our 605 00:21:11,550 --> 00:21:13,772 forces , but I just don't have anything 606 00:21:13,772 --> 00:21:15,994 to announce . Can you say if anybody in 607 00:21:15,994 --> 00:21:18,000 dod was contacted by the Israelis 608 00:21:18,010 --> 00:21:20,180 before , during or after the strike ? 609 00:21:20,189 --> 00:21:21,967 Were you guys not , we were not 610 00:21:21,967 --> 00:21:24,140 notified about the , I'm sorry , the 611 00:21:24,150 --> 00:21:26,209 strike in Damascus , we were not 612 00:21:26,219 --> 00:21:28,469 notified by the Israelis about their 613 00:21:28,510 --> 00:21:30,677 strike or the intended target of their 614 00:21:30,677 --> 00:21:33,589 strike in Damascus . Yes . Hi . Well , 615 00:21:33,599 --> 00:21:35,739 shouldn't the Israelis have notified 616 00:21:35,750 --> 00:21:37,583 you given this does have a clear 617 00:21:37,583 --> 00:21:39,670 implication for the safety of us 618 00:21:39,680 --> 00:21:41,680 personnel in the region . All I can 619 00:21:41,680 --> 00:21:43,791 tell you is that we were not notified 620 00:21:43,791 --> 00:21:45,847 about the strike prior to the strike 621 00:21:45,847 --> 00:21:47,902 happening remarkably unconcerned . I 622 00:21:47,902 --> 00:21:47,719 mean , this has an implication though , 623 00:21:48,189 --> 00:21:50,300 that's your characterization . That's 624 00:21:50,300 --> 00:21:52,300 not mine . One question on the pier 625 00:21:52,300 --> 00:21:54,411 there . I asked once before , whether 626 00:21:54,411 --> 00:21:56,578 assurances have been received from the 627 00:21:56,578 --> 00:21:58,633 Israelis ? I mean , you talked about 628 00:21:58,633 --> 00:22:00,911 assurances for the safety of us forces . 629 00:22:00,911 --> 00:22:02,967 But what about the safety of the aid 630 00:22:02,967 --> 00:22:05,189 workers unloading supplies from the P I 631 00:22:05,189 --> 00:22:07,530 asked General Ryder whether that the US 632 00:22:07,540 --> 00:22:09,484 had asked for assurances that they 633 00:22:09,484 --> 00:22:11,707 wouldn't be fired upon and he said they 634 00:22:11,707 --> 00:22:13,596 hadn't . But now with this latest 635 00:22:13,596 --> 00:22:13,430 attack and we now have , you know , 636 00:22:13,439 --> 00:22:15,709 Haret and Israel is reporting the drone 637 00:22:15,719 --> 00:22:18,140 methodically shot each one of these 638 00:22:18,150 --> 00:22:20,372 cars making sure everyone was dead with 639 00:22:20,372 --> 00:22:22,810 full visibility on a convoy , aid 640 00:22:22,819 --> 00:22:24,597 convoy cleared with the Israeli 641 00:22:24,597 --> 00:22:26,763 military . They made sure everyone was 642 00:22:26,763 --> 00:22:29,939 dead in . It . Isn't it time now to ask 643 00:22:29,949 --> 00:22:32,959 for assurances that , that humanitarian 644 00:22:32,969 --> 00:22:34,969 workers removing supplies from this 645 00:22:34,969 --> 00:22:36,969 pair will not be fired upon even if 646 00:22:36,969 --> 00:22:39,080 there's no clear visibility . I think 647 00:22:39,080 --> 00:22:41,510 we've been very clear and at the top , 648 00:22:41,520 --> 00:22:43,742 when I was addressing Tara's question , 649 00:22:43,742 --> 00:22:45,853 we were very clear that we don't want 650 00:22:45,853 --> 00:22:47,631 to see humanitarian aid workers 651 00:22:47,631 --> 00:22:49,853 targeted . These are heroes going in to 652 00:22:49,853 --> 00:22:52,131 Gaza , putting their lives on the line , 653 00:22:52,131 --> 00:22:54,353 getting life saving aid . Uh whether it 654 00:22:54,353 --> 00:22:56,906 be medical or human or food aid into 655 00:22:56,975 --> 00:22:59,556 Gaza to Palestinians , we certainly 656 00:22:59,566 --> 00:23:01,576 don't want to see any humanitarian 657 00:23:02,145 --> 00:23:04,845 organization or worker targeted . Um , 658 00:23:04,895 --> 00:23:06,839 in terms of assurances , all I can 659 00:23:06,839 --> 00:23:08,839 speak to right now are our forces ? 660 00:23:08,839 --> 00:23:12,472 What happened when the aid convoys come 661 00:23:12,482 --> 00:23:15,151 off the pier and go into Gaza again . 662 00:23:15,161 --> 00:23:17,272 We don't want to see any humanitarian 663 00:23:17,272 --> 00:23:19,383 aid worker or the distribution of aid 664 00:23:19,383 --> 00:23:21,272 targeted . Um We are working with 665 00:23:21,272 --> 00:23:23,439 partners in the region NGO S to figure 666 00:23:23,439 --> 00:23:25,621 out how that aid is distributed . Um 667 00:23:27,271 --> 00:23:30,052 Who will want to do this . Now , we are 668 00:23:30,092 --> 00:23:32,780 still an organization like the World 669 00:23:32,790 --> 00:23:35,359 Central Kitchen is um one of many 670 00:23:35,369 --> 00:23:37,680 organizations providing life saving aid 671 00:23:37,750 --> 00:23:40,170 to Palestinians and , and , and people 672 00:23:40,180 --> 00:23:42,540 all around the world . Um We hope that 673 00:23:42,550 --> 00:23:44,606 they will continue to do that and to 674 00:23:44,606 --> 00:23:46,772 continue their efforts within , within 675 00:23:46,772 --> 00:23:49,280 um Gaza . Um But again , the logistics 676 00:23:49,290 --> 00:23:51,123 of how the humanitarian aid gets 677 00:23:51,123 --> 00:23:53,234 dispersed and distributed within Gaza 678 00:23:53,234 --> 00:23:55,401 is still something that's being worked 679 00:23:55,401 --> 00:23:59,020 out now . So um I mean , 680 00:23:59,030 --> 00:24:02,219 this incident is significant but it's , 681 00:24:02,380 --> 00:24:04,436 it's not isolated according to the a 682 00:24:04,436 --> 00:24:07,079 war security database which receives 683 00:24:07,089 --> 00:24:09,880 support from the USA ID in less than 684 00:24:09,890 --> 00:24:12,180 six months , 200 aid workers have been 685 00:24:12,189 --> 00:24:14,411 killed by Israel in Gaza , which is the 686 00:24:14,411 --> 00:24:17,819 highest toll uh registered since 1997 . 687 00:24:17,910 --> 00:24:19,589 This is more than what's been 688 00:24:19,910 --> 00:24:23,010 documented in Syria , in Afghanistan 689 00:24:23,349 --> 00:24:26,290 and in Sudan . Are you calling on 690 00:24:26,300 --> 00:24:28,300 Israel to investigate all the other 691 00:24:28,300 --> 00:24:30,411 incidents ? And do you think this was 692 00:24:30,411 --> 00:24:33,770 an an unintended consequence of uh the 693 00:24:33,780 --> 00:24:37,699 war or is Israel actually uh this 694 00:24:37,709 --> 00:24:40,810 has some disregard to civilian life ? 695 00:24:40,819 --> 00:24:43,699 Uh Aid workers as manifested by the 696 00:24:43,709 --> 00:24:45,900 high numbers of aid workers killed and 697 00:24:45,910 --> 00:24:47,910 the high toll of civilians killed . 698 00:24:47,910 --> 00:24:50,021 Well , and not to sound like a broken 699 00:24:50,021 --> 00:24:52,089 record here , but we have been very 700 00:24:52,099 --> 00:24:53,932 consistent and repetitive in our 701 00:24:53,932 --> 00:24:57,040 conversations with the Israelis . Um 702 00:24:57,439 --> 00:25:00,270 They need to preserve innocent lives , 703 00:25:00,280 --> 00:25:02,613 they need to when conducting operations , 704 00:25:02,613 --> 00:25:05,459 protect innocent lives um within Gaza . 705 00:25:06,099 --> 00:25:08,109 Um And of course , that includes 706 00:25:08,119 --> 00:25:10,040 humanitarian aid workers . Um , I 707 00:25:10,050 --> 00:25:11,939 believe Israel has launched other 708 00:25:11,939 --> 00:25:14,050 investigations into other incidents . 709 00:25:14,050 --> 00:25:16,217 So I , you know , refer you to them to 710 00:25:16,217 --> 00:25:18,050 speak to more of those . Um , we 711 00:25:18,050 --> 00:25:20,106 certainly welcome the fact that they 712 00:25:20,106 --> 00:25:22,217 did this very quickly . They launched 713 00:25:22,217 --> 00:25:24,272 an investigation very quickly taking 714 00:25:24,272 --> 00:25:26,494 responsibility . Um , so we want to see 715 00:25:26,494 --> 00:25:28,494 what comes out of that and we would 716 00:25:28,494 --> 00:25:30,439 hope that they share those results 717 00:25:30,439 --> 00:25:32,661 publicly . So we too can also learn and 718 00:25:32,661 --> 00:25:34,883 understand what exactly happened here . 719 00:25:34,883 --> 00:25:36,939 So as you said , you've been raising 720 00:25:36,939 --> 00:25:39,680 this issue with defense official , 721 00:25:39,689 --> 00:25:41,745 including the secretary , with their 722 00:25:41,745 --> 00:25:44,640 Israeli counterparts . Do you think the 723 00:25:44,650 --> 00:25:46,928 Israelis have been listening ? It does , 724 00:25:48,380 --> 00:25:50,869 do the , do the numbers provide you 725 00:25:50,880 --> 00:25:52,713 with a sense of the Israelis are 726 00:25:52,713 --> 00:25:54,602 actually listening to what you're 727 00:25:54,602 --> 00:25:56,824 saying to them ? We do believe that the 728 00:25:56,824 --> 00:25:58,880 Israelis have listened to us when it 729 00:25:58,880 --> 00:25:58,420 comes to some of their operations . I 730 00:25:58,430 --> 00:26:00,597 mean , we saw at the very beginning of 731 00:26:00,597 --> 00:26:04,369 the war , you know , more pared 732 00:26:04,380 --> 00:26:07,369 back targeted operations , um , they 733 00:26:07,380 --> 00:26:10,160 have been able to , uh , heed our 734 00:26:10,180 --> 00:26:12,469 advice , um , especially early on when 735 00:26:12,479 --> 00:26:14,590 we , um , you know , we're talking to 736 00:26:14,590 --> 00:26:16,646 them about urban warfare and what it 737 00:26:16,646 --> 00:26:18,923 would mean to go in , into highly , um , 738 00:26:18,923 --> 00:26:21,530 uh , dense populations . So we do 739 00:26:21,540 --> 00:26:23,429 believe that they are heeding our 740 00:26:23,429 --> 00:26:25,609 advice . Um , again , we're going to 741 00:26:25,619 --> 00:26:27,420 continue to in , in all of our 742 00:26:27,430 --> 00:26:29,152 conversations at all levels of 743 00:26:29,152 --> 00:26:31,374 government , we're going to continue to 744 00:26:31,374 --> 00:26:33,430 urge them , um , to protect innocent 745 00:26:33,430 --> 00:26:35,486 Palestinians to protect humanitarian 746 00:26:35,486 --> 00:26:37,541 aid workers . Um , and that's coming 747 00:26:37,541 --> 00:26:39,763 from the highest levels of government . 748 00:26:39,763 --> 00:26:41,930 So we're going to continue that in our 749 00:26:41,930 --> 00:26:41,479 conversation . May I just ask one more 750 00:26:41,489 --> 00:26:43,711 question on the strike in Damascus ? So 751 00:26:43,711 --> 00:26:46,930 apparently it targeted a diplomatic uh 752 00:26:46,939 --> 00:26:50,209 building uh which according to 753 00:26:50,219 --> 00:26:52,386 international law should have immunity 754 00:26:52,630 --> 00:26:55,329 is the US concerned that its main ally 755 00:26:55,339 --> 00:26:57,450 in the region is targeting diplomatic 756 00:26:57,450 --> 00:26:59,859 building . Um So I don't actually know 757 00:26:59,869 --> 00:27:01,869 what type of facility that was . Um 758 00:27:01,869 --> 00:27:04,390 again , this was not a US strike . Um 759 00:27:04,400 --> 00:27:08,000 So I don't have a lot of details on 760 00:27:08,010 --> 00:27:10,569 um what type of building that was . But 761 00:27:10,579 --> 00:27:12,430 no , we don't support attacks on 762 00:27:12,439 --> 00:27:15,619 diplomatic facilities . Laura . Yes , 763 00:27:15,640 --> 00:27:17,529 thank you . I'm just wondering if 764 00:27:17,529 --> 00:27:20,650 anyone in dod is looking into whether 765 00:27:20,660 --> 00:27:23,729 Israel deliberately targeting aid 766 00:27:23,739 --> 00:27:26,709 convoy is um violates international 767 00:27:26,719 --> 00:27:28,608 humanitarian war and whether that 768 00:27:28,608 --> 00:27:30,663 should have consequences in terms of 769 00:27:30,663 --> 00:27:32,997 continuing to send aid to Israel ? Well , 770 00:27:32,997 --> 00:27:34,886 that's something that the Israeli 771 00:27:34,886 --> 00:27:34,619 government is looking into . They're 772 00:27:34,630 --> 00:27:36,630 launching their own investigation . 773 00:27:36,630 --> 00:27:38,630 We're not , we're not doing our own 774 00:27:38,630 --> 00:27:40,741 independent investigation . Um That's 775 00:27:40,741 --> 00:27:42,574 something that we uh again , are 776 00:27:42,574 --> 00:27:44,574 waiting to see what the results are 777 00:27:44,574 --> 00:27:46,408 from the investigation . They've 778 00:27:46,408 --> 00:27:48,074 already started , I believe a 779 00:27:48,074 --> 00:27:50,250 preliminary one . And so we'll just 780 00:27:50,260 --> 00:27:52,427 wait to see what those results yield . 781 00:27:52,427 --> 00:27:54,482 So why do we have any assurances ? I 782 00:27:54,482 --> 00:27:56,538 mean , why do we , why do we trust ? 783 00:27:56,538 --> 00:27:58,204 And is the Israeli government 784 00:27:58,204 --> 00:28:00,316 investigating themselves on this ? Is 785 00:28:00,316 --> 00:28:02,316 that how we treat other allies ? We 786 00:28:02,316 --> 00:28:04,204 investigate ourselves and we hold 787 00:28:04,204 --> 00:28:04,170 ourselves to very , very high standards 788 00:28:04,180 --> 00:28:06,489 as well ? We would expect we would 789 00:28:06,500 --> 00:28:08,722 expect the Israeli government to do the 790 00:28:08,722 --> 00:28:10,944 same if that are violating humanitarian 791 00:28:10,944 --> 00:28:13,724 law . Is that , do we trust them or do 792 00:28:13,734 --> 00:28:15,901 we have an independent assessment ? We 793 00:28:15,901 --> 00:28:18,155 expect that uh well , I'm not going to 794 00:28:18,165 --> 00:28:19,665 speak and get ahead of the 795 00:28:19,665 --> 00:28:22,185 investigation . If there are findings 796 00:28:22,194 --> 00:28:25,155 in the investigation that lead to um 797 00:28:26,099 --> 00:28:28,210 behavior changes , how operations are 798 00:28:28,210 --> 00:28:30,266 conducted on the ground in Gaza , we 799 00:28:30,266 --> 00:28:32,930 would certainly want and would want to 800 00:28:32,939 --> 00:28:34,995 have assurances that Israel would do 801 00:28:34,995 --> 00:28:37,339 that would uphold um any findings from 802 00:28:37,349 --> 00:28:39,869 the investigation and would , um you 803 00:28:39,880 --> 00:28:41,880 know , implement them . But again , 804 00:28:41,880 --> 00:28:43,991 it's under investigation and I'm just 805 00:28:43,991 --> 00:28:45,824 not going to get ahead of that . 806 00:28:45,824 --> 00:28:47,880 Natasha . You've said a couple times 807 00:28:47,880 --> 00:28:51,209 now that this was an Israeli strike on 808 00:28:51,219 --> 00:28:53,108 this building in Damascus and the 809 00:28:53,108 --> 00:28:55,330 Israelis have not actually confirmed or 810 00:28:55,330 --> 00:28:57,330 denied whether it was them . So I'm 811 00:28:57,330 --> 00:28:59,552 just double checking here . So it's the 812 00:28:59,552 --> 00:29:01,719 Pentagon's assessment that this was an 813 00:29:01,719 --> 00:29:03,830 Israeli strike . Have you all been in 814 00:29:03,830 --> 00:29:06,052 touch with the Israelis about this ? We 815 00:29:06,052 --> 00:29:08,052 were not notified before the strike 816 00:29:08,052 --> 00:29:10,108 occurred . We have been engaged with 817 00:29:10,108 --> 00:29:12,275 them at different levels . But again , 818 00:29:12,275 --> 00:29:14,441 this was not a US military strike . So 819 00:29:14,441 --> 00:29:16,775 I don't have a lot of the details on it , 820 00:29:16,775 --> 00:29:16,219 but you have been engaging with them 821 00:29:16,229 --> 00:29:18,396 after the fact to discuss specifically 822 00:29:18,589 --> 00:29:20,422 their attack on this building in 823 00:29:20,422 --> 00:29:22,645 Damascus , we have engaged with them on 824 00:29:22,645 --> 00:29:24,533 various different levels . Not to 825 00:29:24,533 --> 00:29:26,949 mention some of the um uh questions 826 00:29:26,959 --> 00:29:29,819 about the humanitarian aid workers that 827 00:29:29,829 --> 00:29:32,107 were also killed in the strike in Gaza . 828 00:29:33,630 --> 00:29:35,739 Thank you . Um Does the US plan on 829 00:29:35,750 --> 00:29:37,917 increasing airdrops into Gaza now that 830 00:29:37,917 --> 00:29:40,189 World Central Kitchen and at least one 831 00:29:40,199 --> 00:29:42,477 other agency have suspended operations . 832 00:29:42,660 --> 00:29:44,993 Uh We have a steady cadence of airdrops , 833 00:29:44,993 --> 00:29:47,104 humanitarian airdrops that um Central 834 00:29:47,104 --> 00:29:49,829 Command does almost daily or every 835 00:29:49,839 --> 00:29:51,950 other day . It sort of depends on the 836 00:29:51,950 --> 00:29:54,117 weather conditions and also conditions 837 00:29:54,117 --> 00:29:56,010 on the ground . Um um You know , 838 00:29:56,020 --> 00:29:58,353 they're , they're pretty consistent tom . 839 00:29:58,353 --> 00:30:00,298 So I think I'd let Central Command 840 00:30:00,298 --> 00:30:00,099 speak to that if they're going to 841 00:30:00,109 --> 00:30:01,942 increase , but right now they're 842 00:30:01,942 --> 00:30:03,942 happening almost on a daily basis . 843 00:30:03,942 --> 00:30:05,998 Thank you . And going back to um the 844 00:30:05,998 --> 00:30:08,053 drone outside of our town . Does the 845 00:30:08,053 --> 00:30:10,109 Pentagon still assess that ? I think 846 00:30:10,109 --> 00:30:12,331 the date was February the fourth uh was 847 00:30:12,331 --> 00:30:14,331 the sort of the last attack on , is 848 00:30:14,331 --> 00:30:16,276 that , is that , is that still the 849 00:30:16,560 --> 00:30:18,616 determination that that was the last 850 00:30:18,616 --> 00:30:20,838 attack on US troops yesterday ? Doesn't 851 00:30:20,838 --> 00:30:23,060 count that was the last attack on on US 852 00:30:23,060 --> 00:30:25,227 forces was February 4th that we assess 853 00:30:25,227 --> 00:30:27,449 as an attack again , as I said , um , I 854 00:30:27,469 --> 00:30:29,636 believe it was that , that had asked , 855 00:30:29,636 --> 00:30:31,910 um , uh , the , the drone was shot down 856 00:30:31,920 --> 00:30:34,142 in the vicinity of all Tom G garrison , 857 00:30:34,142 --> 00:30:35,920 but we don't assess that it was 858 00:30:35,920 --> 00:30:37,976 targeting that base . What kind of a 859 00:30:37,976 --> 00:30:39,920 drone was it ? I don't have any of 860 00:30:39,920 --> 00:30:42,500 those details just to be clear from 861 00:30:42,510 --> 00:30:44,732 something you said earlier . I think it 862 00:30:44,732 --> 00:30:46,788 was in response to Tara's question . 863 00:30:46,788 --> 00:30:48,899 You , are you the Pentagon are unable 864 00:30:48,899 --> 00:30:51,589 at this time to rule out that us 865 00:30:51,750 --> 00:30:53,694 munitions were used in yesterday's 866 00:30:53,694 --> 00:30:55,583 strike in Gaza . I don't have any 867 00:30:55,583 --> 00:30:57,939 details on the strike . We as you know , 868 00:30:57,949 --> 00:30:59,719 the Israelis are launching an 869 00:30:59,729 --> 00:31:01,785 investigation , we are in touch with 870 00:31:01,785 --> 00:31:03,562 them , but I have no details on 871 00:31:03,562 --> 00:31:06,489 anything that was used in terms of what 872 00:31:06,500 --> 00:31:09,719 hit that convoy . What I can tell you 873 00:31:09,770 --> 00:31:11,714 and what I will continue . What we 874 00:31:11,714 --> 00:31:13,770 continue to say in our conversations 875 00:31:13,770 --> 00:31:15,770 with the Israelis is that we always 876 00:31:15,770 --> 00:31:17,992 expect them to uphold humanitarian laws 877 00:31:17,992 --> 00:31:21,209 when it comes to the use of uh us made 878 00:31:21,430 --> 00:31:24,500 uh systems capabilities munitions . Um 879 00:31:24,510 --> 00:31:26,510 They are launching an investigation 880 00:31:26,510 --> 00:31:28,566 into what happened . They have taken 881 00:31:28,566 --> 00:31:30,677 responsibility for what happened . Um 882 00:31:30,677 --> 00:31:32,677 So I'm gonna let that investigation 883 00:31:32,677 --> 00:31:34,899 continue and not get ahead of that . Um 884 00:31:34,899 --> 00:31:37,121 I'm gonna go to the phones and happy to 885 00:31:37,121 --> 00:31:36,719 come back in the room . Uh Dan La Moth 886 00:31:36,729 --> 00:31:40,199 Washington Post Sabrina . Uh to the 887 00:31:40,209 --> 00:31:42,560 question of uh I guess targeting uh the 888 00:31:42,569 --> 00:31:44,791 United States has offered several times 889 00:31:44,791 --> 00:31:48,280 uh to assist uh Israel with targeting 890 00:31:48,319 --> 00:31:50,541 uh basically improving their accuracy . 891 00:31:50,839 --> 00:31:52,895 Uh This looks different , this looks 892 00:31:52,895 --> 00:31:55,599 like less like uh inaccuracy as much as 893 00:31:56,219 --> 00:31:58,108 uh a direct choice to strike this 894 00:31:58,108 --> 00:32:00,900 convoy . Uh This world central kitchen 895 00:32:00,910 --> 00:32:04,339 convoy . Um What is , I guess the uh 896 00:32:04,349 --> 00:32:06,959 secretary's comfort at this point that 897 00:32:07,329 --> 00:32:09,459 uh the Israelis are taking uh nece 898 00:32:09,469 --> 00:32:11,790 necessary precautions to avoid 899 00:32:11,800 --> 00:32:13,800 collateral damage to avoid civilian 900 00:32:13,800 --> 00:32:16,000 casualties . Uh And if it is as it 901 00:32:16,010 --> 00:32:18,719 sounds so far , an open source uh that 902 00:32:18,729 --> 00:32:20,840 they may have struck a convoy knowing 903 00:32:20,840 --> 00:32:22,951 there is humanitarian workers in it , 904 00:32:22,951 --> 00:32:25,118 even if there was only one militant or 905 00:32:25,118 --> 00:32:27,520 something like that nearby . Thanks Dan 906 00:32:27,530 --> 00:32:30,979 for the questions . Um So what we have 907 00:32:30,989 --> 00:32:33,000 uh worked with Israel on and , and 908 00:32:33,010 --> 00:32:35,869 helped them with is um I think what 909 00:32:35,880 --> 00:32:37,824 you're referring to is some of the 910 00:32:37,824 --> 00:32:40,047 operational planning . When it comes to 911 00:32:40,047 --> 00:32:42,269 Rafa , there was a meeting at the White 912 00:32:42,269 --> 00:32:44,930 House , um a virtual meeting hosted by 913 00:32:44,939 --> 00:32:47,160 the White House yesterday . Um when it 914 00:32:47,170 --> 00:32:49,160 came , when it comes to um the 915 00:32:49,170 --> 00:32:53,060 operations in , in Rafa . Um But what 916 00:32:53,069 --> 00:32:56,060 we are working with the Israelis on is 917 00:32:56,069 --> 00:32:58,291 how they're going to conduct operations 918 00:32:58,291 --> 00:33:01,400 when there's a dense humanitarian um 919 00:33:01,410 --> 00:33:04,229 population there . Um We're not 920 00:33:04,239 --> 00:33:07,510 necessarily uh providing targeting to 921 00:33:07,520 --> 00:33:09,687 the Israelis . What we have been doing 922 00:33:09,687 --> 00:33:11,798 is is um providing assistance when it 923 00:33:11,798 --> 00:33:13,964 comes to hostage rescue and recovery . 924 00:33:14,079 --> 00:33:16,750 Um in terms of assurances when it comes 925 00:33:16,760 --> 00:33:20,089 to protecting innocent Palestinian 926 00:33:20,099 --> 00:33:22,750 lives the lives of aid workers going in 927 00:33:22,910 --> 00:33:25,680 to Gaza . It's something that every 928 00:33:25,689 --> 00:33:28,390 single call , conversation from the 929 00:33:28,400 --> 00:33:30,567 secretary's level on down through this 930 00:33:30,567 --> 00:33:32,979 building . Um We are focused on , it 931 00:33:32,989 --> 00:33:35,270 comes up in every single meeting . Um 932 00:33:35,280 --> 00:33:37,391 And we are going to continue to press 933 00:33:37,391 --> 00:33:39,002 the Israelis to uphold those 934 00:33:39,002 --> 00:33:41,113 humanitarian laws to ensure that they 935 00:33:41,113 --> 00:33:42,891 are doing everything possible , 936 00:33:42,891 --> 00:33:45,113 everything possible to protect innocent 937 00:33:45,113 --> 00:33:47,979 lives in Gaza . Um I will take another 938 00:33:47,989 --> 00:33:49,822 one from the phone , uh Idris uh 939 00:33:49,822 --> 00:33:53,550 Reuters , Sabrina . Um So I think in 940 00:33:53,560 --> 00:33:55,616 every readout that you put out and I 941 00:33:55,616 --> 00:33:58,050 think even after the secretary met Mr 942 00:33:58,060 --> 00:34:00,171 Gland , you talk about the importance 943 00:34:00,171 --> 00:34:02,116 of civilian casualties and how the 944 00:34:02,116 --> 00:34:03,893 secretary brings it up with his 945 00:34:03,893 --> 00:34:05,949 counterpart . Is he a bit frustrated 946 00:34:06,030 --> 00:34:08,199 and maybe even embarrassed that even 947 00:34:08,209 --> 00:34:11,909 after his pleas , the Israelis continue 948 00:34:12,270 --> 00:34:14,330 these sort of actions that risk and 949 00:34:14,340 --> 00:34:16,562 kill civilians and are actually somehow 950 00:34:16,562 --> 00:34:18,451 actually increasing the number of 951 00:34:18,451 --> 00:34:20,507 civilians they've killed in the past 952 00:34:20,507 --> 00:34:22,229 couple of weeks even after the 953 00:34:22,229 --> 00:34:24,284 secretary met him . So the secretary 954 00:34:24,284 --> 00:34:26,284 frustrated and does he believe it's 955 00:34:26,284 --> 00:34:28,284 worth um pushing the Israelis since 956 00:34:28,284 --> 00:34:30,007 they don't seem to be actually 957 00:34:30,007 --> 00:34:32,118 decreasing , they actually seem to be 958 00:34:32,118 --> 00:34:31,639 increasing civilian casualties over 959 00:34:31,649 --> 00:34:34,530 time ? Thanks for the question . Um The 960 00:34:34,540 --> 00:34:37,169 secretary has voiced his concerns uh 961 00:34:37,179 --> 00:34:39,489 publicly and privately with Minister 962 00:34:39,500 --> 00:34:43,030 Gallant um over his concerns 963 00:34:43,270 --> 00:34:47,090 um on how innocent civilians within 964 00:34:47,100 --> 00:34:49,699 Gaza are being protected as the ID F 965 00:34:49,709 --> 00:34:52,449 continues their operations . Um I'm not 966 00:34:52,459 --> 00:34:54,181 going to go further into their 967 00:34:54,181 --> 00:34:55,969 conversations , but uh these 968 00:34:55,979 --> 00:34:58,090 conversations have been very direct . 969 00:34:58,250 --> 00:35:01,449 Um , they've been quite candid and um , 970 00:35:01,459 --> 00:35:03,719 you know , they continue to engage on 971 00:35:03,729 --> 00:35:06,120 an almost weekly basis , um , as you 972 00:35:06,129 --> 00:35:08,129 well know , Idris . And so I'm just 973 00:35:08,129 --> 00:35:10,185 gonna leave it at that . Yeah . Um , 974 00:35:10,185 --> 00:35:12,407 thank you yesterday , the NSC announced 975 00:35:12,407 --> 00:35:14,629 that uh there would be an upcoming talk 976 00:35:14,629 --> 00:35:17,389 between Secretary Austin and the PR C 977 00:35:17,520 --> 00:35:19,853 curious if you can add any more details , 978 00:35:19,853 --> 00:35:22,040 schedule purpose of call . And then is 979 00:35:22,050 --> 00:35:24,272 the secretary planning to travel to the 980 00:35:24,272 --> 00:35:26,328 PR C anytime soon ? I don't have any 981 00:35:26,328 --> 00:35:28,550 travel announcements to make today . Um 982 00:35:28,550 --> 00:35:30,883 I don't have any calls to preview today . 983 00:35:30,883 --> 00:35:32,661 I know uh you were probably not 984 00:35:32,661 --> 00:35:34,994 expecting that . Um But I will say that , 985 00:35:34,994 --> 00:35:36,828 you know , we value mill to mill 986 00:35:36,828 --> 00:35:38,994 communications at the highest levels . 987 00:35:38,994 --> 00:35:40,939 It's something that we continue to 988 00:35:40,939 --> 00:35:43,106 engage the PR C on . Um A call has not 989 00:35:43,106 --> 00:35:45,328 been set up yet . That's not to say one 990 00:35:45,328 --> 00:35:47,550 won't come in the future . I just don't 991 00:35:47,550 --> 00:35:49,494 have an exact date for you . Yes . 992 00:35:49,494 --> 00:35:51,272 Thank you on the attacks on the 993 00:35:51,272 --> 00:35:53,106 consulate . Iranian consulate in 994 00:35:53,106 --> 00:35:54,939 Damascus yesterday , the Iranian 995 00:35:54,939 --> 00:35:57,106 Foreign Minister , he pushed the pause 996 00:35:57,106 --> 00:35:59,479 on a and he said that we send a very 997 00:35:59,489 --> 00:36:01,322 important message to the US as a 998 00:36:01,330 --> 00:36:03,669 supporter of the Israeli government and 999 00:36:03,679 --> 00:36:06,780 the US uh must be held accountable for 1000 00:36:06,790 --> 00:36:08,401 that . Have you received any 1001 00:36:08,401 --> 00:36:10,401 notification or message through the 1002 00:36:10,401 --> 00:36:12,929 Swiss embassy in Iran from the Iranian 1003 00:36:12,939 --> 00:36:15,106 government first ? And the second does 1004 00:36:15,106 --> 00:36:17,350 that kind of this message concerns you 1005 00:36:17,360 --> 00:36:20,110 that this will may fuel up the conflict 1006 00:36:20,120 --> 00:36:22,120 in Gaza and this will encourage the 1007 00:36:22,120 --> 00:36:24,310 Iranian proxy groups to resume the 1008 00:36:24,320 --> 00:36:26,659 attacks on the US forces in the region . 1009 00:36:27,159 --> 00:36:29,103 Well , we've made it very clear in 1010 00:36:29,103 --> 00:36:31,215 private channels to Iran that we were 1011 00:36:31,215 --> 00:36:33,215 not responsible for the strike that 1012 00:36:33,215 --> 00:36:36,139 happened in Damascus . Um I will 1013 00:36:36,149 --> 00:36:38,316 reiterate the US had no involvement in 1014 00:36:38,320 --> 00:36:40,300 that strike . Um And we had no 1015 00:36:40,310 --> 00:36:42,421 knowledge about it ahead of time . So 1016 00:36:42,421 --> 00:36:45,889 I'll just leave it at that . Ok . You 1017 00:36:45,899 --> 00:36:47,955 are not involved in the attack , but 1018 00:36:48,620 --> 00:36:50,709 are you expecting more attacks on us 1019 00:36:50,719 --> 00:36:52,719 forces in the Middle East after the 1020 00:36:52,719 --> 00:36:54,941 Israel ? I don't have a crystal ball to 1021 00:36:54,941 --> 00:36:57,280 predict attacks on us forces . So don't 1022 00:36:57,290 --> 00:36:59,179 you believe that such kind of air 1023 00:36:59,179 --> 00:37:02,239 strikes will escalate the region ? Well , 1024 00:37:02,250 --> 00:37:03,972 we certainly don't want to see 1025 00:37:03,972 --> 00:37:06,540 escalation in the region again . What 1026 00:37:06,550 --> 00:37:08,717 we have done in the region is position 1027 00:37:08,717 --> 00:37:11,739 us forces to send a message of 1028 00:37:11,750 --> 00:37:14,090 deterrence . We continue to engage 1029 00:37:14,100 --> 00:37:16,267 through diplomatic channels . Um So we 1030 00:37:16,267 --> 00:37:19,360 don't see tensions rise in or continue 1031 00:37:19,370 --> 00:37:21,426 to rise in the region . We certainly 1032 00:37:21,426 --> 00:37:23,537 don't seek escalation . Um And I know 1033 00:37:23,537 --> 00:37:25,592 we've had conversations about this , 1034 00:37:25,592 --> 00:37:27,648 but , you know , our forces in Syria 1035 00:37:27,648 --> 00:37:29,780 and Iraq are there for the primary 1036 00:37:29,790 --> 00:37:31,957 mission to ensure the defeat of ISIS , 1037 00:37:31,957 --> 00:37:33,840 that is their goal . Um That is 1038 00:37:33,850 --> 00:37:36,017 something that we share with the Iraqi 1039 00:37:36,017 --> 00:37:38,017 government . Um That is something a 1040 00:37:38,017 --> 00:37:40,330 mission that we share with the SDF and 1041 00:37:40,340 --> 00:37:42,451 so we want to be able to continue our 1042 00:37:42,451 --> 00:37:44,562 mission . Um And of course , we don't 1043 00:37:44,562 --> 00:37:47,120 want to see any escalation or , or 1044 00:37:47,129 --> 00:37:49,949 tensions rise . Courtney , a couple of 1045 00:37:49,959 --> 00:37:52,181 quick ones on the World Central Kitchen 1046 00:37:52,181 --> 00:37:53,737 who in the Pentagon had the 1047 00:37:53,737 --> 00:37:55,848 conversations with the Israelis about 1048 00:37:55,848 --> 00:37:57,959 that the strike that killed the , the 1049 00:37:57,959 --> 00:38:00,015 aid workers . I'm not gonna get into 1050 00:38:00,015 --> 00:38:02,070 specifics but at different levels of 1051 00:38:02,070 --> 00:38:03,737 the department , there was an 1052 00:38:03,737 --> 00:38:05,903 engagement with the Israeli government 1053 00:38:05,903 --> 00:38:08,015 phone calls today or today . I mean , 1054 00:38:08,015 --> 00:38:10,070 are we talking at Secretary Austin's 1055 00:38:10,070 --> 00:38:12,126 level or I have no calls to read out 1056 00:38:12,126 --> 00:38:14,860 from the secretary today ? So , so no , 1057 00:38:15,159 --> 00:38:18,449 so it wasn't . Um And then on the um on 1058 00:38:18,459 --> 00:38:21,939 the strike in Syria , um do , do you 1059 00:38:21,949 --> 00:38:24,060 expect that the US will have any kind 1060 00:38:24,060 --> 00:38:26,227 of independent confirmation of who was 1061 00:38:26,227 --> 00:38:28,060 actually killed there or are you 1062 00:38:28,060 --> 00:38:30,227 relying on the reports from the Syrian 1063 00:38:30,227 --> 00:38:32,282 and Iranian government ? Our initial 1064 00:38:32,282 --> 00:38:34,449 assessment right now is that it was um 1065 00:38:34,449 --> 00:38:36,659 a few top I RGC leaders , we haven't 1066 00:38:36,669 --> 00:38:38,639 been able to independently confirm 1067 00:38:38,649 --> 00:38:40,871 identities . Um But that is our initial 1068 00:38:40,871 --> 00:38:43,909 assessment right now . Yeah , and then 1069 00:38:43,919 --> 00:38:46,030 I know the answer to this , but I got 1070 00:38:46,030 --> 00:38:48,252 to ask it . So you just said that the , 1071 00:38:48,252 --> 00:38:47,780 we made it very clear in private 1072 00:38:47,790 --> 00:38:49,979 channels to Iran that the US was not 1073 00:38:49,989 --> 00:38:52,639 involved . Who , what are those 1074 00:38:52,649 --> 00:38:54,760 channels and who's , who's the one on 1075 00:38:54,760 --> 00:38:56,871 the US side of those channels ? Yes , 1076 00:38:56,871 --> 00:38:58,982 thank you . Courtney for the question 1077 00:38:58,982 --> 00:39:01,038 as you can . Uh as you predicted , I 1078 00:39:01,038 --> 00:39:03,038 will not get into more specifics on 1079 00:39:03,038 --> 00:39:02,679 that , but I appreciate the question . 1080 00:39:03,340 --> 00:39:06,540 Well , and then yeah , go ahead . Two 1081 00:39:06,550 --> 00:39:08,661 quick questions . Thank you . I don't 1082 00:39:08,661 --> 00:39:10,828 know if you can answer about the space 1083 00:39:10,828 --> 00:39:13,149 or not . My question was about space up 1084 00:39:13,290 --> 00:39:16,629 here . Thank you . Uh Is there a 1085 00:39:16,639 --> 00:39:19,919 competition in the space like we have 1086 00:39:19,929 --> 00:39:23,379 on the arms on the earth ? Uh As far as 1087 00:39:23,389 --> 00:39:25,639 space is concerned ? And second , where 1088 00:39:25,649 --> 00:39:27,689 do we stand as far as Us ? India , 1089 00:39:27,699 --> 00:39:29,810 space relations are concerned because 1090 00:39:29,810 --> 00:39:32,032 so much has been going on in the past . 1091 00:39:32,060 --> 00:39:34,171 Yeah , I don't have much more for you 1092 00:39:34,171 --> 00:39:36,171 on that . Um , you know , we have a 1093 00:39:36,171 --> 00:39:38,060 good relationship with the Indian 1094 00:39:38,060 --> 00:39:40,060 government . Um , we don't seek any 1095 00:39:40,060 --> 00:39:42,780 conflict when it comes to , um , you 1096 00:39:42,790 --> 00:39:44,810 know , expanding operations or 1097 00:39:44,820 --> 00:39:47,409 capabilities in space , but competition , 1098 00:39:47,659 --> 00:39:50,429 um , is something that , you know , all 1099 00:39:50,439 --> 00:39:52,439 nations are looking to expand their 1100 00:39:52,439 --> 00:39:54,661 capabilities into space . But we're , I 1101 00:39:54,661 --> 00:39:56,883 just don't have more for you on that as 1102 00:39:56,883 --> 00:39:58,772 far as cyber security attacks are 1103 00:39:58,772 --> 00:40:00,772 concerned so much in the town these 1104 00:40:00,772 --> 00:40:03,679 days , which nations are those who are 1105 00:40:03,689 --> 00:40:06,030 attacking the cyber sticks in the US 1106 00:40:06,040 --> 00:40:09,879 and affecting the common normal 1107 00:40:09,889 --> 00:40:11,820 lives and also the National US , 1108 00:40:11,830 --> 00:40:14,370 national security . Look , I don't have 1109 00:40:14,379 --> 00:40:16,840 any specifics to go into from here . Um 1110 00:40:16,850 --> 00:40:20,199 We're certainly , you know , mindful 1111 00:40:20,209 --> 00:40:23,620 of bad actors who want to attack our 1112 00:40:23,629 --> 00:40:25,840 cybersecurity infrastructure . Uh We 1113 00:40:25,850 --> 00:40:27,840 take , you know , precautionary 1114 00:40:27,850 --> 00:40:29,739 measures , we work with the inter 1115 00:40:29,739 --> 00:40:32,399 agency to ensure that our systems are 1116 00:40:32,409 --> 00:40:35,739 um robust and secure . But beyond that , 1117 00:40:35,750 --> 00:40:39,719 I just don't have more lo um yeah , 1118 00:40:39,750 --> 00:40:41,972 uh you mentioned that the United States 1119 00:40:41,972 --> 00:40:44,083 reached out to the Iranians . Can you 1120 00:40:44,083 --> 00:40:46,306 explain why ? I mean , I understand the 1121 00:40:46,306 --> 00:40:48,528 circumstances but what is the rationale 1122 00:40:48,528 --> 00:40:50,639 in doing so to make clear that the US 1123 00:40:50,639 --> 00:40:52,694 had nothing to do with those strikes 1124 00:40:52,694 --> 00:40:54,917 based on comments that they've made , I 1125 00:40:54,917 --> 00:40:57,028 mean , what , what was , what was the 1126 00:40:57,028 --> 00:40:59,361 prompting for something like this again ? 1127 00:40:59,361 --> 00:41:01,528 I think that uh tensions being high in 1128 00:41:01,528 --> 00:41:03,583 the region . Uh We wanted to make it 1129 00:41:03,583 --> 00:41:05,583 very clear in , in private channels 1130 00:41:05,583 --> 00:41:05,570 that the US had no involvement in the 1131 00:41:05,580 --> 00:41:08,209 strike in Damascus . Um And we did that 1132 00:41:09,239 --> 00:41:11,295 and then a separate question back to 1133 00:41:11,295 --> 00:41:13,461 Natasha's Point . Um I don't think the 1134 00:41:13,461 --> 00:41:15,461 Israelis have actually acknowledged 1135 00:41:15,461 --> 00:41:17,628 that this was their airstrike . So are 1136 00:41:17,628 --> 00:41:16,689 you saying that this was the United 1137 00:41:16,699 --> 00:41:18,810 States assessment ? When you say that 1138 00:41:18,810 --> 00:41:21,419 there were several um I RGC top leaders 1139 00:41:21,429 --> 00:41:23,373 that were there , that this was an 1140 00:41:23,373 --> 00:41:25,096 Israeli airstrike ? That's our 1141 00:41:25,096 --> 00:41:26,818 assessment and that's also our 1142 00:41:26,818 --> 00:41:29,040 assessment that there were a handful of 1143 00:41:29,040 --> 00:41:31,340 I RGC top leaders there can't confirm 1144 00:41:31,350 --> 00:41:33,239 those identities , but that's our 1145 00:41:33,239 --> 00:41:35,406 initial assessment right now . Great . 1146 00:41:35,406 --> 00:41:37,406 Um I will take uh two more from the 1147 00:41:37,406 --> 00:41:39,628 phone and then happy to wrap up uh Jeff 1148 00:41:39,628 --> 00:41:41,572 Fogel task and purpose . Thank you 1149 00:41:41,572 --> 00:41:43,739 during the most recent uh airdrop over 1150 00:41:43,739 --> 00:41:45,919 Gaza 60 bundles went into the ocean . 1151 00:41:46,090 --> 00:41:48,090 That seems a little bit higher than 1152 00:41:48,090 --> 00:41:50,312 recently . Do you have any data on what 1153 00:41:50,312 --> 00:41:52,368 may have caused that ? Yeah , Jeff , 1154 00:41:52,368 --> 00:41:54,479 thanks for the question . Um For more 1155 00:41:54,479 --> 00:41:56,312 specifics , I would refer you to 1156 00:41:56,312 --> 00:41:58,479 Centcom to answer that . Um What I can 1157 00:41:58,479 --> 00:42:00,701 say is that when we do these airdrops , 1158 00:42:00,701 --> 00:42:02,979 while we always try to mitigate for um , 1159 00:42:02,979 --> 00:42:05,139 you know , civilian harm and where 1160 00:42:05,149 --> 00:42:06,982 these could land , um whether is 1161 00:42:06,982 --> 00:42:09,189 something that we cannot control . Um 1162 00:42:09,199 --> 00:42:10,866 And I believe these bundles , 1163 00:42:10,866 --> 00:42:12,921 unfortunately , when they did deploy 1164 00:42:12,921 --> 00:42:14,977 were just drifted into the water and 1165 00:42:14,977 --> 00:42:17,199 landed into the water . Um But for more 1166 00:42:17,199 --> 00:42:19,088 specifics , I would direct you to 1167 00:42:19,088 --> 00:42:21,421 Centcom for that . Um And last question , 1168 00:42:21,421 --> 00:42:23,709 Heather us and I hi , thanks so much 1169 00:42:23,719 --> 00:42:25,941 two questions . Um The first is that it 1170 00:42:25,941 --> 00:42:27,997 seems that the houthi attacks in the 1171 00:42:27,997 --> 00:42:30,219 Red Sea has slowed a bit um in the past 1172 00:42:30,219 --> 00:42:32,386 couple of weeks and I was wondering if 1173 00:42:32,386 --> 00:42:34,219 there is any um , speculation or 1174 00:42:34,219 --> 00:42:36,163 reasoning for why those might have 1175 00:42:36,163 --> 00:42:38,386 slowed down . And then second , um just 1176 00:42:38,386 --> 00:42:40,608 to go back to the Israeli strike on the 1177 00:42:40,608 --> 00:42:40,590 aid workers . I know you talked about 1178 00:42:40,600 --> 00:42:42,767 how they were investigating themselves 1179 00:42:42,767 --> 00:42:44,989 and that the United States investigates 1180 00:42:44,989 --> 00:42:44,840 themselves . But does the United States 1181 00:42:44,850 --> 00:42:46,628 have the same confidence in the 1182 00:42:46,628 --> 00:42:48,679 Israelis ability to investigate , 1183 00:42:48,689 --> 00:42:50,856 investigate themselves , as they would 1184 00:42:50,856 --> 00:42:52,411 say , for the United States 1185 00:42:52,411 --> 00:42:54,467 investigating themselves , we expect 1186 00:42:54,467 --> 00:42:56,189 the Israeli government to hold 1187 00:42:56,189 --> 00:42:56,159 themselves to the same standards that 1188 00:42:56,169 --> 00:42:58,336 we do when we do an investigation . Uh 1189 00:42:58,336 --> 00:43:00,169 We want this investigation to be 1190 00:43:00,169 --> 00:43:02,500 independent to be fair to gather the 1191 00:43:02,510 --> 00:43:04,909 facts and to make sure that um 1192 00:43:06,189 --> 00:43:08,590 something like this never happens again . 1193 00:43:08,780 --> 00:43:11,050 So yes , we do have confidence that the 1194 00:43:11,060 --> 00:43:13,679 Israelis can do this um and learn from 1195 00:43:13,689 --> 00:43:15,659 their mistakes and understand and 1196 00:43:15,669 --> 00:43:18,969 better plan um for future operations , 1197 00:43:18,979 --> 00:43:21,312 whether it be in Gaza or , or elsewhere . 1198 00:43:21,312 --> 00:43:23,929 Um in terms of your first questions on 1199 00:43:23,939 --> 00:43:27,610 um Houthi attacks in the Red Sea . Um 1200 00:43:28,919 --> 00:43:31,899 I mean , we look , we have continued to 1201 00:43:31,909 --> 00:43:35,800 engage um when we see um , the Houthis 1202 00:43:35,810 --> 00:43:38,679 preparing to launch uh whether it be , 1203 00:43:39,070 --> 00:43:41,229 you know , unmanned surface vehicles 1204 00:43:41,239 --> 00:43:44,209 uass at our ships or commercial vessels . 1205 00:43:44,219 --> 00:43:46,550 Um I can't speak to the pace . I would 1206 00:43:46,560 --> 00:43:49,139 direct you to them to speak to why if 1207 00:43:49,149 --> 00:43:51,409 they have slowed down . Um , we 1208 00:43:51,419 --> 00:43:53,308 certainly continue to engage , we 1209 00:43:53,308 --> 00:43:54,975 certainly will continue to do 1210 00:43:54,975 --> 00:43:57,197 everything we can to protect commercial 1211 00:43:57,197 --> 00:43:59,252 shipping through the Red Sea and the 1212 00:43:59,252 --> 00:44:01,030 Gulf of Aden and of course , do 1213 00:44:01,030 --> 00:44:03,252 everything that we need to , to protect 1214 00:44:03,252 --> 00:44:05,475 our forces as well . All right , thanks 1215 00:44:05,475 --> 00:44:04,790 everyone .