WEBVTT

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I wouldn't mind sitting down and we can

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uh we can get started in the interest

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of time . OK .

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Subcomittee will come to order . Uh

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This will likely be my final hearing as

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chairman of the subcomittee . And

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before we get underway , I wanna thank ,

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well , he's not here . I was gonna add

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this whole nice thing prepared to thank

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uh Ro Connor for his partnership .

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We'll have to save all this happy stuff

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for when he actually gets here . But

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he's amazing and we've had a great

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partnership and uh being on this

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committee for eight years has been a

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highlight of my time uh in office . And

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I wanna thank all the members and Matt

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and I have sat next to each other for

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eight years now and had a lot of late

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night debates uh during uh nd a markup

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and I've , and often collaborations

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when it comes to a umf issues and I've

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sincerely enjoyed that . So , um today

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we're gonna uh we're gonna hear from

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the department on its budget request

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and plan for cyberspace operations for

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the coming fiscal year from 2013 to

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2023 . Congress tried to address force

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design and readiness through 24

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different pieces of legislation ,

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civilian and military workforce issues

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via 45 separate provisions of law and

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cyber security of the defense

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industrial base in 42 provisions of law .

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That's a lot of activity through this

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latest NDA A , we incorporated new

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requirements reports and mandates into

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each of those same categories . And yet

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here we are , there are still

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significant issues with our force

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design . Our civilian and military

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workforce issues remain as challenging

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as they have been in the past 10 years .

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And several cyber incidents targeting

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the defense industrial base have

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demonstrated that we as vulnerable now

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as we were a decade ago . And just as I

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said , when we were here a year ago for

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the same cyber posture , hearing

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insanity is doing the same thing over

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and over again and expecting different

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outcomes . I believe that almost

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everyone here today is familiar with

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the report published just two weeks ago

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by the foundation for the defense of

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democracies on the issue of a cyber

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force . A proposed new branch of the

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armed forces dedicated to the cyber

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domain . This new force would be

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responsible for organizing training and

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equipping for the cyber domain . No

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different from the Navy for combat at

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sea or the Air Force , the service

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responsible for air warfare . The

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report is very compelling and as I said ,

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in a event we did a couple weeks ago ,

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um I came in as a skeptic but I think

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they've raised some very important

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issues that need to be addressed . And

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it's a debate that's worth having

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because I think the status quo right

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now is unacceptable . But the arguments

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were not , um , the cogent arguments in

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the report are not the only thing that

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stood out included in the report were

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personal accounts provided anonymously

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by more than 75 active and recently

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separated service members representing

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every military branch and rank from E

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seven to 07 , as well as senior

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civilians , not a single individual

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that was approached , declined to

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respond . Nor did any one of them argue

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in favor of the current approach in

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which the operational force is sourced

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from four separate military services .

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I therefore ask unanimous uh general

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consent to enter this report into the

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record . So ordered , I will admit . Um

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again , I had concerns at the start of

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this debate , but over the last 18

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months , I've been presented with an

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astounding array of data and arguments

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in favor of a cyber force as well as a

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number of convincing arguments opposing

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such a force in my mind . The most

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logical way to address this question is

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a fully independent evaluation of the

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notional cyber force to be led by an

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entity other than the Department of

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Defense , other than the Department of

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Defense is critical . If anyone is

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opposed to a study of this question , I

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believe there's only one way to

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interpret that opposition , which is

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that if you're unwilling to ask the

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question . What you're really saying is

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that you're scared of the answer you

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might receive and the actions we will

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have to take to address the problem

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when it comes to national security .

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That way of thinking , acceptance of

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risk because of fear , I think is

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unacceptable . And while I may not be

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chair of the subcomittee during this

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year's ND A markup , I hope my

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colleagues will make the right decision

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and work collectively to ensure the

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Department of Defense is directed to

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conduct such a study . When the time

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comes with that as context . I'm very ,

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very eager to hear from both of our

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witnesses . Thank you for being here .

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Each appearing for their inaugural

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cyber posture hearing . There's a whole

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set of elaborate initiation events that

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we have to do afterwards . It's highly

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top secret . Uh But we're joined by

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Miss Ashley Manning , a career senior

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executive performing the duties of

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Assistant Secretary of Defense for

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Cyber Policy and General Tim Hawk , the

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commander of the United States Cyber

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Command . Thank you both for appearing

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today . At this point . I would turn it

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over to the ranking member . He is not

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yet here . He is on his way from an

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oversight hearing , but I ask that his

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opening remarks be entered into the

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record . I ask unanimous consent for

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that to happen and then something

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magically happens and it goes into the

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record . Um And with that , uh we go to

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Miss Manning . First . Correct . For

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five minutes , Chairman Gallagher ,

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ranking member , Ka and distinguished

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members of the committee . Thank you

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for inviting me to testify on the

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Department of Defense's cyber posture

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in the advancements . We continue to

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make operationalize the department's

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priorities in cyberspace . It's an

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honor to appear alongside General Hawk

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in my role , performing the duties of

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the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

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cyber policy . I am committed to

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providing overall supervision of the

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department's policy for Cyber ,

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advancing the department's strategic

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approach to cyberspace and ensuring our

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readiness to counter emerging cyber

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threats . Mr Chairman , I look forward

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to working with this committee through

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my newly established office to further

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these objectives . I come to this role

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as a career civilian with almost 20

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years of service in the Department of

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Defense . I've had the privilege of

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working across a wide range of regional

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and functional issues serving most

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recently as the acting Deputy Assistant

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Secretary of Defense for the Middle

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East and the Principal Director for

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Plans and Pre Posture . And in my

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previous positions , I have witnessed

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the cross cutting role cyber plays in

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the defense of our nation and our

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allies and partners . The president has

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nominated Doctor Michael Sulmeyer as

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the A SD for cyber policy . Should he

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be confirmed ? I look forward to

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serving as the principal Deputy

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Assistant Secretary of Defense for

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Cyber Policy . Our national defense

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strategy makes clear that the People's

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Republic of China remains an enduring

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cyber threat and the department's

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pacing challenge in cyberspace as the

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PR C continues to target us networks in

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prolonged campaigns of espionage and to

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preposition its cyber forces for future

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operations . Russia remains a

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persistent threat to the United States

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and our allies and partners as it

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continues to leverage cyberspace to

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target critical infrastructure networks

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and enable its malign influence

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operations . The ongoing unprovoked

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further invasion of Ukraine serves as a

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stark reminder of Russia's willingness

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to employ cyber capabilities to disrupt

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defensive military operations . And sow

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discord following hamas' attack against

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Israel on October 7th of last year ,

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Iran has exploited cyberspace to create

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additional disruptions and challenges

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in Israel . While many of these militia

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cyberspace activities have been

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relatively limited in their impact .

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The ability of both state and non state

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actors to act against Israel in the

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immediate aftermath of the attack by

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Hamas is a reminder of what to expect

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in future conflicts . Additionally ,

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the United States continues to face the

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still growing threat posed by for

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profit cyber criminals that target a

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wide array of vulnerable sectors ,

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conducting ransomware attacks that

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impact the daily lives of Americans

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across the country . In response to

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these evolving challenges . The

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department issued its fourth dod cyber

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strategy . Last May . Looking ahead ,

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we are committed to implementing our

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strategy and monitoring progress

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through the forthcoming Cyber Posture

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review in fy 26 . We understand the

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department cannot advance its defense

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priorities without a ready , capable

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and informed joint force to achieve

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this end , we will invest in our people

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in our capabilities and in our

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information needs to support and enable

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the full range of cyber activities in

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partnership with us cyber com . We are

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refining options for the secretary on

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how to improve the way in which forces

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are presented to the command to raise

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the readiness level of these forces and

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to streamline support mechanisms to

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other combatant commands . These

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options will enable us cyber com to

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fully exercise authorities in

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partnership with my office including

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through enhanced budget control . As

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part of the fy 26 budget cycle dod

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released its first ever department wide

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cyber operations programming guidance .

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This guidance will shape future

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cyberspace operations investments and

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will serve as a rubric for my office's

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certification of the budget's a

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adequacy for fy 26 with the authorities

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granted to us by Congress . The

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department will continue to build on

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the pathway laid out in the fy or I'm

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sorry . In the 2023 dod cyber strategy

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to provide a stronger cyber posture and

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protect the shared digital environment

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for those who intend to subvert our

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values and our interests by pursuing

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integrated deterrence which includes

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our cyber capabilities . The department

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will be ready to fight and win the

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nation's wars with an ability to

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rapidly respond across the spectrum of

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conflict . Thank you for your continued

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support in this fight and I look

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forward to answering your questions .

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Thank you . Generally , you recognize

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for five minutes , Chairman Gallagher ,

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ranking member , Ka and distinguished

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members of the committee . Thank you

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for the opportunity to testify before

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you . Today , I am honored to testify

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beside MS Manning . Joining me today is

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Chief Master Sergeant Kenneth Bruce ,

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the US Cyber Command and National

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Security Agency , senior enlisted

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leader . We are honored to represent

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the men and women of us . Cyber Command

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in an era defined by rapid

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technological advancement and

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increasing interconnectedness .

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Cyberspace is emerged as a vital domain

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for protecting our national security .

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The People's Republic of China is our

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greatest strategic competitor and poses

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unique challenges due to its advanced

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cyber capabilities . State sponsored

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cyber operations around the globe and a

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strategic focus on leveraging

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cyberspace for military economic and

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political purposes . Russia's cyber

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espionage campaigns , prioritize

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sensitive us government and military

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infrastructure and information and

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spread disinformation campaigns to

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influence public opinion and undermine

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our democratic processes . Iran North

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Korea , terrorist organizations and

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transnational criminal groups also

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challenge us interests in cyberspace

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and we are engaged in ongoing efforts

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to exploit vulnerabilities and are

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engaged in ongoing efforts to exploit

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vulnerabilities in us . Networks

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conduct influence operations and erode

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our national security interests with

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cyber operations becoming more

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sophisticated and frequent . It is

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vital to evolve our capabilities

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against new and novel threats . I am

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confident cyber command is well

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postured to meet the ever evolving

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challenges we face today , creating

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advantage for the department and the

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nation . Our mission is to direct

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synchronize and coordinate cyberspace

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planning and operations to defend and

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advance national interests in

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collaboration with domestic and

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international partners . We defend

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forward by countering cyber threats

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before they can reach us . Networks and

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critical infrastructure . These

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proactive defensive measures ranging

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from network hardening and threat

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hunting to information sharing bolster

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the resilience of our systems and foil

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potential cyber attacks before they can

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materialize . We are aligned with the

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national defense strategy and the deity

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cyber strategy to protect Department of

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Defense Information Systems support

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joint force commanders with cyberspace

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operations and defend the nation from

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significant cyber attacks . I am

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excited with what 2024 means for the

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maturation of us . Cyber command . This

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is a year of opportunity for us and I'd

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like to thank Congress for the service

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like enhanced budget control

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authorities granted by the 2022 NDA A

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and enacted with the fy 24

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appropriation . This authority creates

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tighter alignment between requirements

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and acquisition which will result in

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faster capability and fielding for our

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cyber mission force . Additionally ,

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this committee has been instrumental in

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focusing attention on readiness across

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the cyber emission force . The studies

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you have authorized are driving us to

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do work needed to ensure we have the

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force structure and force generation

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strategy necessary to field a force of

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the highest quality today . I hope we

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have an opportunity to unpack several

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of these initiatives today since Cyber

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Command's elevation in 2018 to a

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unified combatant command Cyber Command

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has worked to make most of its

12:10.235 --> 12:12.929
authorities , resources and support of

12:12.940 --> 12:15.162
these authorities . None is as vital to

12:15.162 --> 12:17.510
national security and the command as

12:17.520 --> 12:19.742
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence

12:19.742 --> 12:21.853
Surveillance Act , which is essential

12:21.853 --> 12:24.020
for identifying malicious cyber actors

12:24.020 --> 12:26.020
in protection of the nation and the

12:26.020 --> 12:28.187
Department of Defense . I am confident

12:28.187 --> 12:30.298
we are successful in our mission each

12:30.298 --> 12:32.464
and every day . Thanks to our people ,

12:32.464 --> 12:34.576
our innovation and our partnerships .

12:34.576 --> 12:36.742
My top three priorities that ensure we

12:36.742 --> 12:38.631
deliver outcomes against national

12:38.631 --> 12:40.798
priorities in Foreign Intelligence and

12:40.798 --> 12:42.909
cyber security . First , our strength

12:42.909 --> 12:44.853
lies in our people , skilled cyber

12:44.853 --> 12:46.520
warriors who are dedicated to

12:46.520 --> 12:48.464
protecting the nation from threats

12:48.464 --> 12:50.631
posed by our rivals and adversaries in

12:50.631 --> 12:52.576
cyberspace , we win because of our

12:52.576 --> 12:55.390
people . Second , Cyber Command remains

12:55.400 --> 12:57.511
committed to a relentless approach in

12:57.511 --> 12:59.733
innovation , to strengthen our military

12:59.733 --> 13:01.400
now and into the future . Our

13:01.400 --> 13:03.622
investment and technological innovation

13:03.622 --> 13:05.622
is key to maintaining our overmatch

13:05.622 --> 13:07.567
against our adversaries . Lastly ,

13:07.567 --> 13:09.789
Cyber Command maintains our competitive

13:09.789 --> 13:11.567
advantage through sustained and

13:11.567 --> 13:13.678
deliberate partnerships . In addition

13:13.678 --> 13:15.622
to the unique partnership with the

13:15.622 --> 13:17.456
national security agency , Cyber

13:17.456 --> 13:19.233
Command further embraces a team

13:19.233 --> 13:21.122
approach , working with my fellow

13:21.122 --> 13:23.178
combatant commanders and interagency

13:23.178 --> 13:25.344
partners while also collaborating with

13:25.344 --> 13:27.567
academic and inner and industry experts

13:27.567 --> 13:29.567
and cooperating with our allies and

13:29.567 --> 13:31.567
partners by establishing collective

13:31.567 --> 13:33.733
security . I am extremely proud of the

13:33.733 --> 13:35.844
effort Cyber Command has achieved and

13:35.844 --> 13:35.609
the direction we are headed . I look

13:35.619 --> 13:37.841
forward to your questions . Thank you ,

13:37.841 --> 13:40.400
General . Um You expressed , I believe

13:40.409 --> 13:42.729
that the section uh 15 , I'm

13:42.739 --> 13:44.961
recognizing myself for questions . OK .

13:44.961 --> 13:47.183
So it was not apparent . Uh the section

13:47.183 --> 13:49.489
1533 study was looking at all options

13:49.500 --> 13:51.389
to include the establishment of a

13:51.389 --> 13:54.549
separate , uh a service and hence a , a

13:54.580 --> 13:56.979
separate analysis what isn't necessary .

13:57.369 --> 13:59.429
But we required the department to do

13:59.440 --> 14:02.190
the study in the 2020 NDA A

14:02.200 --> 14:04.311
specifically to study the independent

14:04.311 --> 14:06.200
service idea as part of the Cyber

14:06.200 --> 14:08.549
Posture review . It seems to me that

14:08.559 --> 14:10.950
dod ignored that requirement and then

14:10.960 --> 14:14.219
pointed us to uh a section in the

14:14.229 --> 14:16.669
Posture review that included an

14:16.679 --> 14:18.901
assessment . Um But if you look at that

14:18.901 --> 14:21.809
section , no such assessment existed

14:22.030 --> 14:24.197
with this , this context , I , I guess

14:24.197 --> 14:26.539
we want to address that . Um But why

14:26.549 --> 14:28.660
should we believe that the department

14:28.660 --> 14:30.493
will follow on with an objective

14:30.493 --> 14:32.438
analysis as part of the 1533 study

14:32.438 --> 14:34.549
given that it was ignored previous to

14:34.549 --> 14:37.640
this Chairman Gallagher . I , I have no

14:37.650 --> 14:40.609
experience with the 2020 study . I can

14:40.619 --> 14:42.841
tell you what we're doing today . So we

14:42.841 --> 14:45.210
have taken that uh direction and , and

14:45.219 --> 14:47.840
we've really , uh that's an area for us .

14:47.849 --> 14:50.016
It's really about the readiness of our

14:50.016 --> 14:52.293
force and how do we generate our force .

14:52.293 --> 14:53.905
So we have looked at that in

14:53.905 --> 14:56.039
combination with other studies that

14:56.049 --> 14:58.105
you've asked us to do this year . So

14:58.105 --> 15:00.271
there are other studies to look at our

15:00.271 --> 15:00.099
headquarters , to look at our

15:00.109 --> 15:02.690
acquisition force , to look at how we

15:02.700 --> 15:05.619
uh examine our architecture and each of

15:05.630 --> 15:07.686
those we think make up a really good

15:07.686 --> 15:10.099
opportunity for us to evaluate what's

15:10.109 --> 15:12.276
the future of this force . So specific

15:12.276 --> 15:15.210
to your question on 1533 and the study

15:15.219 --> 15:17.450
that is underway , the the book ends

15:17.460 --> 15:20.020
that are required by the law are the

15:20.030 --> 15:22.919
way it was done last year . And a

15:22.929 --> 15:26.280
evaluation of a cyber service , we are

15:26.289 --> 15:28.289
going to look at both of those book

15:28.289 --> 15:30.122
ends and then look at options in

15:30.122 --> 15:32.345
between that would allow us to generate

15:32.345 --> 15:34.289
the force that we need . The other

15:34.289 --> 15:36.345
things that I think are , are that ,

15:36.345 --> 15:38.511
that I know we are doing . Uh today is

15:38.511 --> 15:40.567
the partnership we have uh with a SD

15:40.567 --> 15:42.678
Cyber who is the other portion of the

15:42.678 --> 15:44.789
study . So being done with a SD Cyber

15:44.789 --> 15:47.760
in uh Os D and Cyber command , we owe

15:47.770 --> 15:50.020
that to the secretary in June and we're

15:50.030 --> 15:51.919
required to brief him in June the

15:51.919 --> 15:53.974
results of that study . Um And , and

15:53.974 --> 15:56.141
we're moving at pace to ensure that we

15:56.141 --> 15:57.974
look at all the options that you

15:57.974 --> 15:59.863
directed . Now , I'm on record as

15:59.863 --> 16:01.919
favoring something like a zero based

16:01.919 --> 16:04.086
budgeting for congressional studies uh

16:04.086 --> 16:03.719
because they accumulate over time and

16:03.729 --> 16:05.840
periodically we need to sort of clear

16:05.840 --> 16:07.951
them out . But when they are a matter

16:07.951 --> 16:09.951
of us law , they should be complied

16:09.951 --> 16:12.118
with MS Manning . Do you know how many

16:12.118 --> 16:14.229
congressional requirements the dod is

16:14.229 --> 16:16.396
currently uh delinquent on ? Thank you

16:16.396 --> 16:18.562
for your question , Mr Chairman . This

16:18.562 --> 16:20.729
is actually one of the first questions

16:20.729 --> 16:22.951
I asked when I got into the seat and we

16:22.951 --> 16:24.840
are tracking 12 reports where our

16:24.840 --> 16:24.780
office is the office of Primary

16:24.789 --> 16:27.380
Responsibility to be able to conduct

16:27.390 --> 16:29.612
and conclude these reports . I received

16:29.612 --> 16:31.779
a status update on all these reports .

16:31.779 --> 16:33.668
There are a couple that have been

16:33.668 --> 16:35.779
delayed because they were independent

16:35.779 --> 16:37.723
studies that uh we're dependent on

16:37.723 --> 16:39.668
getting funding and because of the

16:39.668 --> 16:41.723
continuing resolutions , it's gotten

16:41.723 --> 16:41.242
delayed a little bit . But my

16:41.252 --> 16:43.308
commitment is to , to you is to make

16:43.308 --> 16:45.363
progress on all of these reports and

16:45.363 --> 16:47.474
ensure that we are delivering them as

16:47.474 --> 16:49.696
quickly as possible . I would note that

16:49.696 --> 16:51.696
there are a myriad of other reports

16:51.696 --> 16:51.583
related to Cyber that have been

16:51.593 --> 16:53.742
directed across the department and we

16:53.752 --> 16:56.122
are providing support as a coordinating

16:56.132 --> 16:58.945
uh entity on many of those , those

16:58.955 --> 17:01.177
reports . And in the interim , if there

17:01.177 --> 17:03.288
are specific issues where you want to

17:03.288 --> 17:05.344
understand a bit more about what the

17:05.344 --> 17:07.233
department is doing and how we're

17:07.233 --> 17:09.288
addressing issues myself and my team

17:09.288 --> 17:11.511
are always willing to come up and brief

17:11.511 --> 17:11.066
you on those . I appreciate that we're

17:11.076 --> 17:13.676
tracking 40 but that may be a broader

17:13.686 --> 17:16.576
aperture than just your office . Um But

17:16.586 --> 17:18.649
we very much would like to clear the

17:18.659 --> 17:20.881
backlog and , and work with both of you

17:20.881 --> 17:22.937
on , on clearing the backlog because

17:22.937 --> 17:25.159
again , wherever those reports appear ,

17:25.159 --> 17:24.948
it means that we , you know , we voted

17:24.958 --> 17:27.014
on it . We had a debate on it and it

17:27.014 --> 17:29.069
means there's questions we just need

17:29.069 --> 17:31.069
answers to . Uh And so I just would

17:31.069 --> 17:33.069
welcome your commitment to clearing

17:33.069 --> 17:35.180
that backlog . MS Manning your office

17:35.180 --> 17:34.369
will also be assuming the

17:34.379 --> 17:36.268
responsibility for certifying the

17:36.268 --> 17:38.157
cyberspace operations budget . Uh

17:38.157 --> 17:40.019
Within dod . Last year , we were

17:40.029 --> 17:42.229
informed that the fy 24 Cyber ops

17:42.239 --> 17:44.959
budget was 7.4 billion . But then this

17:44.969 --> 17:47.280
year the fy 25 ops budget , if I'm

17:47.290 --> 17:50.430
correct is 6.4 billion . What we're

17:50.439 --> 17:52.328
trying to understand is does this

17:52.328 --> 17:55.160
represent a net decrease or a confusion

17:55.170 --> 17:57.226
about categorizing investments ? Can

17:57.226 --> 17:59.392
you share your view of what appears to

17:59.392 --> 18:01.559
be a net reduction of nearly 1 billion

18:01.559 --> 18:03.503
or or more than 15% of the overall

18:03.503 --> 18:05.837
budget ? Thank you for your question on ,

18:05.837 --> 18:07.892
on our budget uh because it's really

18:07.892 --> 18:10.003
important that we get this right . So

18:10.003 --> 18:12.059
my understanding is that overall our

18:12.059 --> 18:14.170
cyber activities budget has increased

18:14.170 --> 18:16.114
by almost a billion dollars due to

18:16.114 --> 18:18.170
added investment in cyber security .

18:18.170 --> 18:20.170
The teams in both policy and in the

18:20.170 --> 18:22.392
office of the Chief Information Officer

18:22.392 --> 18:24.503
reviewed the various efforts that are

18:24.503 --> 18:26.337
included in the in the different

18:26.337 --> 18:28.170
budgets and decided that certain

18:28.170 --> 18:30.226
portions of the cyber ops budget are

18:30.226 --> 18:32.392
actually better categorized as part of

18:32.392 --> 18:34.614
the cyber security budget . So there is

18:34.614 --> 18:36.503
no reduction . It's more of a rec

18:36.503 --> 18:38.170
categorization of some of the

18:38.170 --> 18:40.337
activities that we are funding between

18:40.337 --> 18:40.030
the different budget categories . Thank

18:40.040 --> 18:42.151
you . My time is expired . Mr Khan is

18:42.151 --> 18:44.484
recognized for five minutes . Thank you ,

18:44.484 --> 18:46.540
Mr Chair . Apologies for being a few

18:46.540 --> 18:48.429
minutes late . We had a oversight

18:48.429 --> 18:50.262
hearing where I had to vote . Uh

18:50.262 --> 18:52.484
General Hawk . Great to see you again .

18:52.484 --> 18:54.596
I appreciated uh our conversation the

18:54.599 --> 18:56.766
other day and Miss Manning , thank you

18:56.766 --> 18:59.319
for your testimony . Uh General Hawk ,

18:59.329 --> 19:01.739
one of the things that we had discussed

19:01.750 --> 19:03.694
is the importance of getting young

19:03.694 --> 19:06.339
talent into uh our military service ,

19:06.349 --> 19:08.250
particularly young talent and

19:08.260 --> 19:11.030
technology and the military can also be

19:11.040 --> 19:13.689
a place where they develop uh initial

19:13.699 --> 19:16.430
skills and training . Uh Something that

19:16.439 --> 19:19.369
may be more accessible frankly for uh

19:19.380 --> 19:22.140
people than uh just starting at uh in

19:22.339 --> 19:24.395
uh Silicon Valley , which often does

19:24.395 --> 19:26.506
not have as unfortunately broad based

19:26.506 --> 19:29.400
hiring . Uh Can you talk about efforts

19:29.410 --> 19:32.599
at creating uh recruiting programs at

19:32.839 --> 19:35.170
uh community colleges or Historically

19:35.180 --> 19:37.760
Black uh uh colleges , Hispanic serving

19:37.770 --> 19:40.250
institutes and uh other public uh

19:40.260 --> 19:42.859
universities across the country that

19:42.869 --> 19:45.699
would allow us to recruit folks and per

19:45.709 --> 19:47.876
perhaps even recruit folks who may not

19:47.876 --> 19:50.010
have a four year degree . Uh I

19:50.400 --> 19:52.859
certainly rank mea th this is our

19:52.869 --> 19:54.758
important issue is how do we grow

19:54.758 --> 19:56.980
talent and , and for us , Cyber Command

19:56.980 --> 19:59.202
for the Department for the Nation . And

19:59.202 --> 20:01.091
so when we look across what Cyber

20:01.091 --> 20:03.258
Command and NSA are responsible for in

20:03.258 --> 20:05.202
Cyber Command , we've now grown an

20:05.202 --> 20:07.670
academic network to allow us to partner

20:07.680 --> 20:09.847
with universities across the country .

20:09.847 --> 20:11.902
So we , we have right now around 100

20:11.902 --> 20:13.902
and 20 universities in the National

20:13.902 --> 20:16.550
Security Agency , around 430 . Both

20:16.560 --> 20:18.560
those provide a really foundational

20:18.560 --> 20:20.969
opportunity for us to participate with

20:20.979 --> 20:23.146
uh our academic institute institutions

20:23.146 --> 20:25.334
on growing cyber curriculum and also

20:25.344 --> 20:27.744
working uh with a number of research

20:27.755 --> 20:29.922
institutions to be able to allow us to

20:29.922 --> 20:32.088
recruit that talent . So when we think

20:32.088 --> 20:33.588
about it internally to our

20:33.588 --> 20:35.755
organizations , that's how we maintain

20:35.755 --> 20:37.977
our partnership , growing relationships

20:37.977 --> 20:40.199
uh with Historically Black colleges and

20:40.199 --> 20:42.795
universities . And also uh looking at

20:42.805 --> 20:45.114
universities like University of Texas ,

20:45.125 --> 20:47.859
San Antonio , uh that has a large

20:47.869 --> 20:49.930
number of first generation Americans

20:49.939 --> 20:51.772
and Hispanic Latino population ,

20:51.772 --> 20:54.140
drawing talent from across the country

20:54.270 --> 20:56.381
to be able to ensure that we have the

20:56.381 --> 20:58.437
highest qualified workforce . And do

20:58.437 --> 21:00.770
you need more flexibility from Congress ?

21:00.770 --> 21:02.937
And because I've heard mixed things in

21:02.937 --> 21:05.048
terms of you want someone to come for

21:05.048 --> 21:07.214
three years , four years and then they

21:07.214 --> 21:09.437
wanna go on to the private sector . Are

21:09.437 --> 21:11.548
you able to do that ? Are you able to

21:11.548 --> 21:10.930
have flexibility if you wanna recruit

21:10.939 --> 21:12.883
someone who doesn't have a college

21:12.883 --> 21:15.106
degree and is talented or wants to do a

21:15.106 --> 21:16.772
few years or do you need more

21:16.772 --> 21:19.145
flexibility in in the hiring ? So last

21:19.155 --> 21:21.211
year , uh one of the studies that we

21:21.211 --> 21:24.625
executed uh was under section 1502 and

21:24.635 --> 21:26.857
it was about readiness and I'm required

21:26.857 --> 21:28.691
each year to provide a report on

21:28.691 --> 21:30.913
service readiness . In that report , we

21:30.913 --> 21:32.968
identified five provisions that were

21:32.968 --> 21:35.191
all around personnel and administrative

21:35.191 --> 21:37.413
policies . So what we're really looking

21:37.413 --> 21:39.191
for is we're seeing good things

21:39.191 --> 21:41.191
happening in each of the services .

21:41.191 --> 21:43.024
We'd like them all to adapt each

21:43.024 --> 21:44.913
other's best practice . So as you

21:44.913 --> 21:47.459
identified in this NDA A section 1535

21:47.469 --> 21:50.239
was to begin to drive those authorities

21:50.250 --> 21:52.250
across the department . And I think

21:52.250 --> 21:54.194
that would be an example of a step

21:54.194 --> 21:56.139
where we wanna continue to provide

21:56.139 --> 21:58.194
updates on which types of provisions

21:58.194 --> 22:00.250
would help and then we work together

22:00.250 --> 22:02.361
with the services to be able to enact

22:02.361 --> 22:04.583
those provisions . MS Manning , I don't

22:04.583 --> 22:06.417
know if you have any comments or

22:06.417 --> 22:08.583
thoughts on how we recruit more talent

22:08.583 --> 22:11.900
uh uh into our uh military . No , I

22:11.910 --> 22:14.132
would say , first of all , I , I really

22:14.132 --> 22:16.243
applaud the efforts that are underway

22:16.243 --> 22:18.299
to tackle this issue . It's , it's a

22:18.299 --> 22:18.270
real challenge across government in

22:18.280 --> 22:21.030
terms of how you recruit and retain top

22:21.040 --> 22:23.770
talent uh to support our , our ongoing

22:23.780 --> 22:25.891
efforts and , and really building out

22:25.891 --> 22:28.002
the workforce that's necessary for us

22:28.002 --> 22:29.613
to be able to accomplish our

22:29.613 --> 22:31.780
operational missions . So I think in ,

22:31.780 --> 22:33.947
in addition to what we're doing within

22:33.947 --> 22:33.359
the department , I think looking at

22:33.369 --> 22:35.369
sharing best practices across other

22:35.369 --> 22:37.313
departments and agencies will help

22:37.313 --> 22:39.313
generate new ideas in terms of what

22:39.313 --> 22:41.202
more we can do as a government to

22:41.202 --> 22:43.313
ensure that we are bringing people in

22:43.313 --> 22:45.647
to be able to serve our missions . Well ,

22:45.647 --> 22:47.813
thanks and you don't have to answer it

22:47.813 --> 22:49.925
now , but I , I , I've just been told

22:49.925 --> 22:51.813
that there's some restrictions on

22:51.813 --> 22:53.980
people being able to be hired only for

22:53.980 --> 22:56.202
a few years . That , that , that's hard

22:56.202 --> 22:58.313
to do because of civil service , uh ,

22:58.313 --> 22:58.270
protections . I don't know if that's

22:58.280 --> 23:00.530
the case or not . Uh , but I just , I

23:00.540 --> 23:02.762
didn't know if Congress needs to act in

23:02.762 --> 23:04.984
any way to simplify that . I , I , what

23:04.984 --> 23:07.207
I would expect that you're referring to

23:07.207 --> 23:09.429
is our ability to have people leave and

23:09.429 --> 23:11.596
come back . And those are areas that I

23:11.596 --> 23:13.540
think we've got to work internally

23:13.540 --> 23:15.707
within the department in terms of , of

23:15.707 --> 23:17.762
how we leverage the policies that we

23:17.762 --> 23:19.818
already have . But I think that's an

23:19.818 --> 23:19.449
area that we should be continue to

23:19.459 --> 23:21.459
explore that if somebody leaves and

23:21.459 --> 23:23.681
goes to industry , how do we bring that

23:23.681 --> 23:25.848
expertise back into our force ? Not as

23:25.848 --> 23:27.848
if they're a new hire , but they're

23:27.848 --> 23:29.570
returning expert back into the

23:29.570 --> 23:33.339
department . Thank you , MS

23:33.349 --> 23:35.627
Manning . I think you're totally right .

23:35.627 --> 23:37.127
When you say that China is

23:37.127 --> 23:39.293
prepositioning capabilities in advance

23:39.293 --> 23:41.910
of uh some deployment of them is one

23:41.920 --> 23:45.859
way China does that by having

23:45.869 --> 23:49.420
us based technology platforms that they

23:49.430 --> 23:51.939
own or control uh in order to

23:51.949 --> 23:54.109
preposition for their , their cyber

23:54.119 --> 23:56.939
capability . Thank you for your

23:56.949 --> 23:59.750
question . You know , as I said , Pr C

23:59.760 --> 24:01.982
is really our pacing challenge . And as

24:01.982 --> 24:03.927
you note , they're using malicious

24:03.927 --> 24:05.619
cyber activity to counter us

24:05.630 --> 24:07.739
conventional military power and to

24:07.750 --> 24:09.806
degrade the combat capability of the

24:09.806 --> 24:11.806
joint force . And we need to ensure

24:11.806 --> 24:13.861
that we are employing both defensive

24:13.861 --> 24:15.528
and offensive capabilities to

24:15.528 --> 24:17.528
strengthen our deterrence and , and

24:17.528 --> 24:19.639
gain our , our advantage . I defer to

24:19.639 --> 24:21.639
general haw for more of the details

24:21.639 --> 24:23.861
when it comes to how we are operating .

24:23.861 --> 24:22.969
Yeah , I'm really interested in the

24:22.979 --> 24:26.194
defensive part . Um vis a vis like what

24:26.204 --> 24:28.260
China might be doing with technology

24:28.260 --> 24:30.482
platforms in the United States . Do you

24:30.482 --> 24:32.648
have anything to add on that general ?

24:32.648 --> 24:34.704
So I think the area where we've seen

24:34.704 --> 24:36.815
specific action that has concerned us

24:36.815 --> 24:38.815
is hacking activity at our critical

24:38.815 --> 24:40.871
infrastructure and at Guam , I think

24:40.871 --> 24:42.982
those are specific examples in use of

24:42.982 --> 24:45.093
technology within the United States ,

24:45.093 --> 24:47.260
having Huawei presence and things like

24:47.260 --> 24:49.482
that is risk . So I that's what I wanna

24:49.482 --> 24:51.704
get into because I agree the hacking is

24:51.704 --> 24:51.484
sort of like if they're breaking into

24:51.494 --> 24:54.510
your house . But the Huawei example you

24:54.520 --> 24:56.687
give is more like inviting them in the

24:56.687 --> 24:58.798
front door . Have either of you heard

24:58.798 --> 25:02.680
of this company called tutor.com ? Ok .

25:02.689 --> 25:05.810
So this is a technology platform that

25:05.819 --> 25:08.140
is owned by Chinese nationals uh

25:08.150 --> 25:10.459
through the Primavera Holding Limited

25:10.469 --> 25:14.050
company . And it is principally used by

25:14.239 --> 25:16.500
Dido by the Department of Defense's

25:16.510 --> 25:19.280
Education System for military connected

25:19.290 --> 25:22.069
families . If you had a technology

25:22.079 --> 25:25.089
platform that was being used

25:25.099 --> 25:27.880
specifically by military families owned

25:27.890 --> 25:30.469
by Chinese nationals , would that raise

25:30.479 --> 25:32.459
any red flags based on what you're

25:32.469 --> 25:34.959
talking about regarding the need to be

25:34.969 --> 25:36.869
uh well , resilient to that

25:36.880 --> 25:38.713
prepositioning that Miss Manning

25:38.713 --> 25:41.750
discussed I think we wanna dive deeper

25:41.760 --> 25:43.538
and , and ensure that we're not

25:43.538 --> 25:45.760
bringing risk um in , in , by whomever

25:45.770 --> 25:47.937
we partner with and whatever company .

25:47.937 --> 25:50.103
Yeah . No , I , I would just encourage

25:50.103 --> 25:52.326
you because this one sort of , I mean ,

25:52.326 --> 25:51.920
I know how much you care about

25:51.930 --> 25:53.874
resilience , particularly with our

25:53.874 --> 25:56.097
service members and their families . We

25:56.097 --> 25:58.469
all know that their targets uh often

25:58.479 --> 26:00.535
times . And so if we're inviting the

26:00.535 --> 26:02.757
Chinese in the front door here , I just

26:02.757 --> 26:04.868
would advise you to look at that . Uh

26:04.868 --> 26:04.569
And I would draw your attention to the

26:04.579 --> 26:06.801
fact that Manny Diaz , the Commissioner

26:06.801 --> 26:08.857
of Education in the State of Florida

26:08.857 --> 26:11.562
has advised superintendents of schools

26:11.572 --> 26:13.883
and charter schools to discontinue the

26:13.892 --> 26:17.282
use of this technology . And even after

26:17.302 --> 26:19.302
the State of Florida , Secretary of

26:19.302 --> 26:21.524
Education made that pronouncement based

26:21.524 --> 26:23.413
on these ties , the Department of

26:23.413 --> 26:25.524
Defense Education System continued to

26:25.524 --> 26:28.152
offer that platform to students of

26:28.162 --> 26:30.083
military connected families um in

26:30.093 --> 26:32.260
Florida and elsewhere . Shifting gears

26:32.260 --> 26:34.260
just briefly to this concept of the

26:34.260 --> 26:36.371
cyber force . Uh I wanna draw a finer

26:36.371 --> 26:38.371
point on what Mr K was saying about

26:38.371 --> 26:41.306
recruitment . I've noticed anecdotally

26:41.316 --> 26:43.595
at our academy nights that we have in

26:43.605 --> 26:45.605
our district , that we get a lot of

26:45.605 --> 26:47.661
students that are real interested in

26:47.661 --> 26:49.605
going to the academies and they're

26:49.605 --> 26:51.549
fired up about Space force . And I

26:51.549 --> 26:53.661
never really understood how a focused

26:53.661 --> 26:55.605
mission set like that could really

26:55.605 --> 26:57.716
ignite a great deal of interest . And

26:57.716 --> 26:59.938
do you think that we could get the same

26:59.938 --> 27:02.105
type of positive effect with the cyber

27:02.105 --> 27:04.776
force to uh recruit specific people for

27:04.786 --> 27:08.719
a specific domain general . So ,

27:08.729 --> 27:10.840
so I think from our standpoint , what

27:10.840 --> 27:12.729
what we have done is we've really

27:12.729 --> 27:15.007
focused on what are the services doing ?

27:15.007 --> 27:16.729
How are they doing in terms of

27:16.729 --> 27:19.007
recruiting ? Uh one of the first doing ?

27:19.007 --> 27:21.118
Great . So where , where they , where

27:21.118 --> 27:23.229
they have done congressman is , is in

27:23.229 --> 27:25.340
specific areas particularly , um as I

27:25.340 --> 27:27.562
look , the area we've focused on is has

27:27.562 --> 27:29.785
been the Navy and , and as we've looked

27:29.785 --> 27:31.951
at where the navy's readiness has been

27:31.951 --> 27:34.062
this past year , the navy got 100% of

27:34.062 --> 27:36.007
their cyber warfare technicians in

27:36.007 --> 27:38.173
terms of their recruiting numbers . Um

27:38.173 --> 27:40.340
that shows me the services can do it .

27:40.340 --> 27:43.000
Um And that a a focused effort and

27:43.010 --> 27:45.066
continue and sustain that they'll be

27:45.066 --> 27:47.177
able to meet some of those . I'm open

27:47.177 --> 27:49.177
minded . I think Chairman Gallagher

27:49.177 --> 27:51.510
made some good points . And Mr Chairman ,

27:51.510 --> 27:53.677
before my time concludes , I wanted to

27:53.677 --> 27:53.479
thank you for your outstanding service

27:53.489 --> 27:55.660
as chairman of our subcomittee , your

27:55.670 --> 27:57.837
great work on the House Armed Services

27:57.837 --> 27:59.726
Committee . And in the house more

27:59.726 --> 28:02.003
broadly , it has certainly been to the ,

28:02.003 --> 28:04.226
the country's benefit . It's been to my

28:04.226 --> 28:06.448
personal benefit to sit next to you for

28:06.448 --> 28:08.614
seven years , eight years and to learn

28:08.614 --> 28:07.890
a great deal from you along the way .

28:07.900 --> 28:09.733
And I know many of our community

28:09.733 --> 28:11.456
members feel the same that the

28:11.456 --> 28:13.511
thoughtfulness you've brought to the

28:13.511 --> 28:15.733
position is certainly uh been a great ,

28:15.733 --> 28:15.180
been a great benefit to all of us so

28:15.189 --> 28:17.300
greatly appreciate it . You're back ,

28:17.550 --> 28:19.550
Mr Chairman if I could speak out of

28:19.550 --> 28:21.606
order because I didn't know this was

28:21.606 --> 28:23.717
your last meeting and I don't know if

28:23.717 --> 28:27.489
there's an objection . Uh But I , I

28:27.500 --> 28:29.819
just wanna say from the democratic side

28:29.829 --> 28:31.699
that it's really been a pleasure

28:31.709 --> 28:33.931
working with you and you have displayed

28:33.931 --> 28:36.400
a patriotism and bipartisanship on this

28:36.410 --> 28:38.577
committee . Uh that I think has been a

28:38.577 --> 28:41.500
model uh for what leadership looks like ,

28:41.510 --> 28:43.489
even when we've disagreed , I have

28:43.500 --> 28:45.389
never questioned that you put the

28:45.389 --> 28:47.444
country's interests first . And uh I

28:47.444 --> 28:49.611
know that this isn't gonna be the last

28:49.611 --> 28:51.611
of your public service . And uh you

28:51.611 --> 28:53.778
certainly have someone who's a admirer

28:53.778 --> 28:55.889
on this side and I think very many of

28:55.889 --> 28:57.556
my colleagues feel the same .

29:01.239 --> 29:04.359
Appreciate it . Uh Mr Ryan . All right .

29:04.369 --> 29:06.480
Well , I guess I'm not allowed to say

29:06.480 --> 29:08.591
nice things . So thank , thank you Mr

29:08.591 --> 29:10.702
Chair . I'll leave it at that on many

29:10.702 --> 29:12.647
levels . Um And thank you both for

29:12.647 --> 29:14.758
being here . Uh I wanna build on some

29:14.758 --> 29:14.560
of the different directions that my

29:14.569 --> 29:16.819
colleagues were taking , particularly

29:16.829 --> 29:20.819
honing in on as , as we continue

29:20.829 --> 29:23.420
to , to , to everyone's credit across

29:23.430 --> 29:25.430
the board , develop more mature and

29:25.430 --> 29:27.263
robust and sort of broader cyber

29:27.263 --> 29:29.670
capability . I wanna push and get your

29:29.680 --> 29:31.902
thoughts general on kind of that . What

29:31.902 --> 29:33.958
is that ? Right ? Intersection point

29:33.958 --> 29:37.339
between cyber com services co coms I

29:37.349 --> 29:39.516
know that's a very broad question . So

29:39.516 --> 29:41.738
maybe to hone it a little bit , can you

29:41.738 --> 29:44.689
let , let's talk about , um le let's

29:44.699 --> 29:46.760
look actually at the U com A or for

29:46.770 --> 29:49.140
example , just as in theory , how is

29:49.150 --> 29:51.261
that playing out right now ? Where do

29:51.261 --> 29:53.483
you see the future going in terms of as

29:53.483 --> 29:56.130
we build more capability ? How , what's

29:56.140 --> 29:58.362
the right hand off point to co coms and

29:58.362 --> 30:00.640
services ? So if that makes sense , it ,

30:00.640 --> 30:02.807
it does . And , and what I would first

30:02.807 --> 30:04.807
start with is where are we today in

30:04.807 --> 30:06.807
terms of now the authorities that ,

30:06.807 --> 30:08.973
that you've given us in the department

30:08.973 --> 30:11.196
is given to you as Cyber command uh for

30:11.196 --> 30:13.196
the original stand up of us , Cyber

30:13.196 --> 30:15.307
command , our goal has been to become

30:15.307 --> 30:17.084
SOCOM like to have service like

30:17.084 --> 30:19.029
authorities two weeks ago when the

30:19.029 --> 30:20.973
appropriation passed , that is the

30:20.973 --> 30:23.084
first time that we've now had service

30:23.084 --> 30:25.084
like authorities to do budget to do

30:25.084 --> 30:26.973
acquisition , to set the training

30:26.973 --> 30:29.084
standards for the department . So now

30:29.084 --> 30:31.251
what we really want to be graded on is

30:31.251 --> 30:33.251
what is our ability to generate new

30:33.251 --> 30:35.473
capability . So as , as things emerge .

30:35.473 --> 30:37.696
So today , our partnership with Ucom is

30:37.696 --> 30:39.584
really strong and , and I was the

30:39.584 --> 30:41.696
component to U COM as the Air Force ,

30:41.696 --> 30:43.862
Cyber commander and the 16th Air Force

30:43.862 --> 30:46.029
commander at the outset of , of Russia

30:46.029 --> 30:48.084
Ukraine . And so that partnership is

30:48.084 --> 30:50.307
really about them driving priorities in

30:50.307 --> 30:52.469
that theater and then how we leverage

30:52.479 --> 30:54.535
each of our components to be able to

30:54.535 --> 30:56.479
respond to that , to be able to do

30:56.479 --> 30:58.757
defensive activities at their priority ,

30:58.757 --> 31:00.979
but also to be able to generate options

31:00.979 --> 31:02.979
that give a number of things to the

31:02.979 --> 31:05.201
secretary and to the U COM commander uh

31:05.201 --> 31:07.368
that allow us to consider how we would

31:07.368 --> 31:09.146
impose costs based off of their

31:09.146 --> 31:11.368
guidance and direction . I think it has

31:11.368 --> 31:13.535
worked well . I think the area that we

31:13.535 --> 31:13.520
need to be able to accelerate is

31:13.530 --> 31:16.079
capability development and how we use

31:16.089 --> 31:18.410
our budget control and our authorities

31:18.420 --> 31:21.109
to generate an acquisition . We should

31:21.119 --> 31:23.230
be able to develop things faster than

31:23.230 --> 31:25.286
anybody else in the department . The

31:25.286 --> 31:27.397
only thing we're developing is code .

31:27.397 --> 31:29.452
How do we do that faster ? How do we

31:29.452 --> 31:28.819
get it in the hands of our cyber

31:28.829 --> 31:31.051
emission force faster and , and you see

31:31.051 --> 31:33.170
that primarily happening or the large

31:33.180 --> 31:35.819
preponderance of it happening at , at

31:35.829 --> 31:37.996
me essentially rather than out there .

31:37.996 --> 31:40.218
Where , where do you , where do you see

31:40.218 --> 31:42.273
that ? We see increasingly that that

31:42.273 --> 31:44.329
would be a balance , we'll drive the

31:44.329 --> 31:46.440
requirement , we'll drive the overall

31:46.440 --> 31:48.662
acquisition oversight and the dollars ,

31:48.662 --> 31:50.551
but we will also partner with the

31:50.551 --> 31:52.718
services , it'll just look different .

31:52.718 --> 31:54.662
Whereas before they , the services

31:54.662 --> 31:56.829
would be able to do that . We're doing

31:56.829 --> 31:58.940
that in support of their own forces .

31:58.940 --> 31:58.469
They presented which was very

31:58.479 --> 32:00.535
disconnected from operations . We're

32:00.535 --> 32:02.535
not gonna be able to drive that and

32:02.535 --> 32:04.535
we've got good service partnerships

32:04.535 --> 32:06.535
with their program offices and with

32:06.535 --> 32:08.757
their acquisition force . So we need to

32:08.757 --> 32:10.923
be able to move faster and we would be

32:10.923 --> 32:10.869
able to be able to recast those

32:10.880 --> 32:13.047
relationships that are more responsive

32:13.410 --> 32:15.719
and last follow up on this thread . Um

32:16.380 --> 32:18.436
So am I hearing you right ? That the

32:18.436 --> 32:20.269
general direction though is more

32:20.269 --> 32:22.269
capability at the cyber com command

32:22.269 --> 32:24.589
level to push more , you know ,

32:24.859 --> 32:26.970
technical capabilities out there . Do

32:26.970 --> 32:30.219
you have the , do you have enough sort

32:30.229 --> 32:33.689
of people and , and capability at your

32:33.699 --> 32:35.921
level to do that ? Like do , do you see

32:35.921 --> 32:37.921
the direction , do we have the pace

32:37.921 --> 32:37.380
that we need ? Do you have the

32:37.390 --> 32:39.501
resources you need to speed that up ?

32:39.501 --> 32:41.557
So from , from our perspective , the

32:41.557 --> 32:43.779
department has , has asked us to be the

32:43.779 --> 32:45.668
integrator of the joint cyber war

32:45.668 --> 32:47.723
fighting architecture . That's the ,

32:47.723 --> 32:46.979
those are the platforms and

32:46.989 --> 32:49.156
capabilities that cyber command fights

32:49.156 --> 32:51.719
from . So for that , now we've got to

32:51.729 --> 32:53.451
be able to drive that with our

32:53.451 --> 32:55.618
authorities , our team it that we have

32:55.618 --> 32:57.729
from an acquisition perspective , I'm

32:57.729 --> 32:59.951
very confident in they're small . We've

32:59.951 --> 33:02.173
now been given more resources , we have

33:02.173 --> 33:04.340
to hire quickly and we have to use the

33:04.340 --> 33:06.507
authorities that Congress has given us

33:06.507 --> 33:08.451
to be able to hire data scientists

33:08.451 --> 33:10.396
under what we previously knew as a

33:10.396 --> 33:12.340
section 1708 authority , we've now

33:12.340 --> 33:14.507
started to hire , we've got the policy

33:14.507 --> 33:14.219
in place . So we've got to use all

33:14.229 --> 33:16.285
those tools to really accelerate our

33:16.285 --> 33:18.285
acquisition team to be able to meet

33:18.285 --> 33:20.173
those objectives , I only have 40

33:20.173 --> 33:22.285
seconds . But at the , as you look 10

33:22.285 --> 33:24.451
years ahead or 20 even in terms of the

33:24.451 --> 33:26.839
quality of the American , essentially ,

33:26.849 --> 33:28.960
you're getting to show up . What more

33:28.960 --> 33:30.738
do we need to do at the sort of

33:30.738 --> 33:32.849
community college level , high school

33:32.849 --> 33:34.905
level ? I know that's a big question

33:34.905 --> 33:34.560
with 30 seconds . But so I think we

33:34.569 --> 33:36.791
have an opportunity , we have expertise

33:36.791 --> 33:38.847
and we've got partnerships across uh

33:38.847 --> 33:41.180
the , the really this the cadre of

33:41.189 --> 33:43.189
higher institutions that are really

33:43.189 --> 33:44.911
focused on cyber , we can help

33:44.911 --> 33:47.022
influence that curriculum . How do we

33:47.022 --> 33:49.245
accelerate the curriculum in a way that

33:49.245 --> 33:51.245
allows them to be able to adopt and

33:51.245 --> 33:53.022
then to be able to make it more

33:53.022 --> 33:55.189
available , particularly as technology

33:55.189 --> 33:57.356
changes ? Because I think what we find

33:57.356 --> 33:59.467
when we receive somebody today , they

33:59.467 --> 33:58.944
have a good foundation , but they're

33:58.954 --> 34:01.300
not necessarily current of date . Thank

34:01.310 --> 34:03.254
you . And you go back , Mr Chair ,

34:03.254 --> 34:05.939
Doctor mccormick . Thank you , Mr Chair

34:05.949 --> 34:08.171
and uh at the risk of being gaveled out

34:08.171 --> 34:10.530
for being out of order uh in this uh

34:13.379 --> 34:15.590
and this era of politics where people

34:15.600 --> 34:17.870
are vilified for a green and vilified

34:17.879 --> 34:21.239
for dissenting . Uh Mr Chair . You've

34:21.250 --> 34:23.439
been an honor to , to uh to serve with

34:23.449 --> 34:27.070
you . Uh my fellow marine . Uh Let me

34:27.080 --> 34:29.191
just summarize by saying you could be

34:29.191 --> 34:31.870
my wing man anytime uh that I'm I'm the

34:31.879 --> 34:34.830
top gun class . So I can say that um

34:36.500 --> 34:39.040
considering uh we're at war basically

34:39.050 --> 34:41.272
cyber war right now and our , our , our

34:41.510 --> 34:43.788
adversaries are attacking us regularly ,

34:43.899 --> 34:45.949
uh , almost momentarily around the

34:45.959 --> 34:48.239
clock 24 hours a day and how A I will

34:48.250 --> 34:50.028
affect that into the future and

34:50.028 --> 34:52.250
accelerate that process . Uh , a lot of

34:52.250 --> 34:54.361
times the perception at least is that

34:54.361 --> 34:56.417
we're always on the defense . Uh , I

34:56.417 --> 34:58.250
was hoping generally , you could

34:58.250 --> 35:00.472
actually address that over the last two

35:00.472 --> 35:00.050
years , the new concepts such as

35:00.060 --> 35:02.310
persistent engagement , hunt Ford and

35:02.320 --> 35:04.699
defend Ford have started to dominate

35:04.709 --> 35:06.931
the conversation . And I was hoping you

35:06.931 --> 35:08.765
could elaborate on how the wider

35:08.765 --> 35:10.876
concepts are distinct from each other

35:10.876 --> 35:13.042
as we go forward . Congressman . Thank

35:13.042 --> 35:15.376
you for the for the question . So first ,

35:15.376 --> 35:17.487
as we think about campaigning against

35:17.487 --> 35:19.598
any one of those adversaries that are

35:19.598 --> 35:21.542
targeting either our nation or the

35:21.542 --> 35:23.765
department , really think of it through

35:23.765 --> 35:23.399
three lens . First , how do we generate

35:23.409 --> 35:25.760
insights ? How do we understand what's

35:25.770 --> 35:27.881
underway ? How do we communicate that

35:27.881 --> 35:30.103
to the broadest audience possible ? How

35:30.103 --> 35:32.159
do we enable defense that's enabling

35:32.159 --> 35:34.492
industry , it's enabling the department ,

35:34.492 --> 35:36.548
it's enabling our foreign partners .

35:36.548 --> 35:36.395
And then what are our options to impose

35:36.405 --> 35:39.264
costs ? Some of those are how we use

35:39.274 --> 35:41.635
our defensive force and then others are

35:41.645 --> 35:43.812
how we partner across the inter agency

35:43.812 --> 35:45.812
and then how we generate options uh

35:45.812 --> 35:48.089
that allow us to contest in cyberspace .

35:48.089 --> 35:50.145
So I think from our perspective , we

35:50.145 --> 35:52.256
wanna be able to bring a full menu of

35:52.256 --> 35:54.929
not only defensive activities but those

35:54.939 --> 35:57.889
things that we can do uh from uh both

35:57.899 --> 35:59.566
the inter agency and from the

35:59.566 --> 36:01.677
department to impose costs . Is there

36:01.677 --> 36:03.677
anything that we can do to keep you

36:03.677 --> 36:05.732
from being inhibited from doing what

36:05.732 --> 36:07.955
you need to do to be optimized to going

36:07.955 --> 36:10.066
forward , using A I and other weapons

36:10.066 --> 36:11.899
that we have to , to be not just

36:11.899 --> 36:14.066
posturing defensively , but also being

36:14.066 --> 36:16.288
proactive . So I think what you've done

36:16.288 --> 36:18.510
is you have empowered us in a number of

36:18.510 --> 36:20.566
different ways . Uh in terms of , of

36:20.566 --> 36:22.399
how we have brought together our

36:22.399 --> 36:24.455
acquisition force and how we brought

36:24.455 --> 36:26.566
together our authorities . Uh we will

36:26.566 --> 36:28.732
identify areas throughout this year as

36:28.732 --> 36:30.899
we begin to use those authorities that

36:30.899 --> 36:33.121
I suspect you'll start to see in budget

36:33.121 --> 36:35.343
request for fy 26 . We're gonna learn a

36:35.343 --> 36:37.455
lot with the establishment of our A I

36:37.455 --> 36:39.677
task force . We pre we completed an A I

36:39.677 --> 36:41.732
road map last year and that lays out

36:41.732 --> 36:43.955
for us , the technologies that we wanna

36:43.955 --> 36:46.121
begin to experiment with and pilot and

36:46.121 --> 36:48.288
introduce to our force . Those will be

36:48.288 --> 36:47.949
areas that I would expect you're gonna

36:47.959 --> 36:49.903
see from us in the future . That's

36:49.903 --> 36:52.015
great . Uh With that said , now , now

36:52.015 --> 36:53.792
that we looked at this is about

36:53.792 --> 36:56.219
interesting uh enough by our chair . Uh

36:56.229 --> 36:58.649
As far as the integrated cyber command

36:58.659 --> 37:00.659
versus the individual departments ,

37:00.659 --> 37:02.826
I've had plenty of people here testify

37:02.826 --> 37:04.881
saying , well , we like , can I keep

37:04.881 --> 37:06.937
this in columns because each service

37:06.937 --> 37:09.159
has its own specific requirements . But

37:09.159 --> 37:11.159
as A I continues to be a problem of

37:11.159 --> 37:11.139
integration , whether it be on weapon

37:11.149 --> 37:13.179
systems , information collecting uh

37:13.189 --> 37:15.389
dissemination of information , the way

37:15.399 --> 37:17.566
it needs to be integrated throughout a

37:17.566 --> 37:19.732
blue , a purple force if you will . Uh

37:19.732 --> 37:21.399
my concern is that we'll have

37:21.399 --> 37:23.621
difficulties integrating even different

37:23.621 --> 37:25.566
weapon systems . Let alone the the

37:25.566 --> 37:27.677
comprehensive Battlefield . Like when

37:27.677 --> 37:29.843
you talk about purple assets , whether

37:29.843 --> 37:31.677
it be electronic jamming or , or

37:31.677 --> 37:31.459
information gathering , I'm just

37:31.469 --> 37:33.649
wondering , is there a compromise in

37:33.659 --> 37:35.826
there that we could , we could come to

37:35.826 --> 37:37.715
in information sharing , which is

37:37.715 --> 37:39.881
already the biggest problem we have in

37:39.881 --> 37:39.139
the military anyways , it's kind of our

37:39.149 --> 37:41.149
Achilles heel whether it be through

37:41.149 --> 37:42.871
coms or just getting the right

37:42.871 --> 37:45.038
information to the right people in the

37:45.038 --> 37:47.260
right way . That's my biggest concern .

37:47.260 --> 37:49.427
If we don't have a cyber command , how

37:49.427 --> 37:51.593
do we do that in an efficient way ? So

37:51.593 --> 37:51.129
what I would , the way that I think the

37:51.139 --> 37:53.083
department looks at it , the , the

37:53.083 --> 37:54.972
deputy secretary has , has really

37:54.972 --> 37:57.280
empowered the CD A O to set our data

37:57.290 --> 37:59.719
standards and to do that across the

37:59.729 --> 38:01.896
department . And so when I look at our

38:01.896 --> 38:04.580
teammates that we have in the dod Cio

38:04.949 --> 38:07.899
in CD A O , how do we enable their

38:07.909 --> 38:10.020
ability to go faster in some of those

38:10.020 --> 38:12.187
data standards ? And I think we have a

38:12.187 --> 38:14.409
role to play in that and I think we can

38:14.409 --> 38:16.576
help and assist not only in how we set

38:16.576 --> 38:16.340
some of those standards . But how we

38:16.350 --> 38:18.406
think about defense of each of these

38:18.406 --> 38:20.517
activities from a cyber perspective ,

38:20.517 --> 38:22.239
from the outset as we begin to

38:22.239 --> 38:23.794
introduce some of those new

38:23.794 --> 38:25.850
technologies . OK , I I just for the

38:25.850 --> 38:27.850
record , I I , you can see a lot of

38:27.850 --> 38:29.961
congressmen are , are concerned about

38:29.961 --> 38:32.128
this integration process . China has a

38:32.128 --> 38:31.909
huge advantage in this one area that

38:31.919 --> 38:34.030
they have one command structure , one

38:34.030 --> 38:36.030
government , they all agree on each

38:36.030 --> 38:35.699
other because it's kind of a

38:35.709 --> 38:37.876
monopolistic government and it's gonna

38:37.876 --> 38:40.098
be a lot easier for them to integrate A

38:40.098 --> 38:42.320
I throughout their weapon systems . The

38:42.320 --> 38:44.487
way they do to the technologies , it's

38:44.487 --> 38:46.653
a lot less um distractions . There are

38:46.653 --> 38:46.229
a lot more fal and I think if we get

38:46.239 --> 38:48.295
outpaced in the A I arena , we're in

38:48.295 --> 38:50.406
big , big trouble . So I hope we do a

38:50.406 --> 38:52.572
good job on that . Thank you with that

38:52.572 --> 38:55.860
AI Mr M . Thank you , Miss , thank you

38:55.870 --> 38:57.870
Mr Chairman . And uh thank you very

38:57.870 --> 38:59.926
much for being here . Um A couple of

38:59.926 --> 39:02.092
weeks ago , the Foundation for Defense

39:02.092 --> 39:04.314
of Democracy Think Tank issued a report

39:04.314 --> 39:06.481
calling for a separate cyber force and

39:06.481 --> 39:08.648
I suspect you've read this . Uh I know

39:08.648 --> 39:10.370
this is not a new topic . It's

39:10.370 --> 39:12.592
something that I've discussed myself uh

39:12.592 --> 39:15.050
over the years . Um And I was curious ,

39:15.060 --> 39:17.282
I mean , basically the main argument of

39:17.282 --> 39:19.004
the report is that because the

39:19.004 --> 39:21.171
individual services each run their own

39:21.171 --> 39:20.560
recruitment , training and promotion

39:20.570 --> 39:22.626
systems for their cyber operations ,

39:22.626 --> 39:24.459
those who get sent to us , Cyber

39:24.459 --> 39:26.681
command have inconsistent knowledge and

39:26.681 --> 39:28.737
qualifying experience . So general ,

39:28.737 --> 39:30.848
how have these inconsistencies across

39:30.848 --> 39:33.070
the services impacted the effectiveness

39:33.070 --> 39:35.181
of us Cyber command and executing its

39:35.181 --> 39:38.300
mission ? Uh So Congressman first , if ,

39:38.310 --> 39:40.310
if I address the study , one of the

39:40.310 --> 39:42.719
areas that I do think that as we go

39:42.729 --> 39:45.000
through this year , the 1533 study and

39:45.010 --> 39:46.760
we evaluate all of the options

39:46.770 --> 39:48.826
available for fourth generation , we

39:48.826 --> 39:51.048
certainly are gonna look really closely

39:51.048 --> 39:53.270
at what are the implications of a cyber

39:53.270 --> 39:55.437
service . We will evaluate that one of

39:55.437 --> 39:57.659
the other responsibilities that that is

39:57.659 --> 39:59.826
in both our Unified Command plan . And

39:59.826 --> 40:01.937
in the law is that I'm responsible to

40:01.937 --> 40:04.159
evaluate the overall health of the duty

40:04.159 --> 40:06.419
cyber workforce . So I'm responsible to

40:06.429 --> 40:08.596
do that in plain English , both to the

40:08.596 --> 40:10.429
Secretary of Defense and back to

40:10.429 --> 40:12.151
Congress . So I think from our

40:12.151 --> 40:14.151
perspective , uh those reports have

40:14.151 --> 40:16.590
allowed us to identify where are areas

40:16.600 --> 40:18.959
that the services could improve . And ,

40:18.969 --> 40:21.191
and in doing so , it is also allowed us

40:21.191 --> 40:22.969
to build a partnership with the

40:22.969 --> 40:25.136
services on how do we work together to

40:25.136 --> 40:27.358
improve the readiness ? Because I think

40:27.358 --> 40:29.525
what areas we had seen in the past was

40:29.525 --> 40:31.691
not necessarily uh from the recruiting

40:31.691 --> 40:33.636
perspective , but more so from the

40:33.636 --> 40:35.858
assignment and retention . And Congress

40:35.858 --> 40:38.080
has given us a number of authorities to

40:38.080 --> 40:40.136
the department that , that allow for

40:40.136 --> 40:42.136
retention incentives . What we were

40:42.136 --> 40:44.439
seeing was it uh the services implement

40:44.449 --> 40:46.616
those differently . And so what we are

40:46.616 --> 40:48.838
encouraging and what we did in our 1502

40:48.838 --> 40:51.040
report last year was to ask for some

40:51.050 --> 40:53.239
specific authorities that , that

40:53.250 --> 40:55.379
encouraged our ability to for

40:55.389 --> 40:57.278
assignment policies and personnel

40:57.278 --> 40:59.820
policies to ensure that those trained

40:59.830 --> 41:02.070
individuals stay in our force . And we

41:02.080 --> 41:04.302
have seen the services respond to those

41:04.302 --> 41:06.469
requests . So we wanna be able to lock

41:06.469 --> 41:08.580
those in and then continue to work on

41:08.580 --> 41:10.802
other areas that will improve readiness

41:10.802 --> 41:10.739
within the force . Do you feel that

41:10.750 --> 41:12.472
you're doing enough to use the

41:12.472 --> 41:14.694
authorities that the Congress has given

41:14.694 --> 41:16.917
you ? So , I , I think now that we have

41:16.917 --> 41:19.028
budget control authority uh that we ,

41:19.028 --> 41:21.194
that we received last month , that now

41:21.194 --> 41:23.306
gives us a new series of options that

41:23.306 --> 41:25.417
will allow us to drive our priorities

41:25.417 --> 41:27.250
in training in readiness . We're

41:27.250 --> 41:29.361
responsible for the advanced training

41:29.361 --> 41:31.528
of the Department Cyber Force . How we

41:31.528 --> 41:33.528
use those dollars in many ways will

41:33.528 --> 41:35.306
determine our readiness and our

41:35.306 --> 41:37.361
proficiency . I'd like to ask just a

41:37.361 --> 41:39.528
couple of questions about deterrence .

41:39.528 --> 41:41.694
Uh deterrence is obviously important ,

41:41.694 --> 41:43.750
writ large . But of course , when we

41:43.750 --> 41:46.719
look at a China uh attack on Taiwan ,

41:46.729 --> 41:48.951
we want to deter that from happening in

41:48.951 --> 41:51.062
the first place . Deterrence is tough

41:51.062 --> 41:53.285
in , in , in the cyber world because we

41:53.285 --> 41:55.451
worry about giving up our capabilities

41:55.451 --> 41:57.562
when we , we use them . How are you ,

41:57.562 --> 41:59.340
how is your thinking about this

41:59.340 --> 42:02.239
evolving and how do you think ? Um I'd

42:02.250 --> 42:04.250
love to hear uh general a couple of

42:04.250 --> 42:06.361
comments and then MS Manning , how do

42:06.361 --> 42:08.528
you think about this in the integrated

42:08.528 --> 42:10.583
deterrence environment ? But general

42:10.583 --> 42:12.806
price we could stop start with you just

42:12.806 --> 42:14.972
how at , with , with cyber force , how

42:14.972 --> 42:17.028
do you think about deterrence ? So ,

42:17.028 --> 42:19.250
from a cyber command perspective , what

42:19.250 --> 42:19.189
we really think about an integrated

42:19.199 --> 42:21.949
deterrence or who can we bring ? That's

42:21.959 --> 42:24.181
a partner that will allow us to be able

42:24.181 --> 42:26.181
to have the outcome we're trying to

42:26.181 --> 42:27.792
achieve . And for us , those

42:27.792 --> 42:29.792
partnerships look different than in

42:29.792 --> 42:31.792
some of the other domains . When we

42:31.792 --> 42:33.959
think about how the role that industry

42:33.959 --> 42:35.959
plays in terms of both creating the

42:35.959 --> 42:37.959
domain and also being the ones with

42:37.959 --> 42:37.959
their own sensors that are global in

42:37.969 --> 42:39.747
nature . How do we partner with

42:39.747 --> 42:41.858
industry ? How do we partner with our

42:41.858 --> 42:44.080
foreign allies and partners that either

42:44.080 --> 42:45.969
bring capability or have the same

42:45.969 --> 42:47.969
common threat ? We partner with our

42:47.969 --> 42:49.969
fellow combatant commanders as they

42:49.969 --> 42:52.136
think about cyber security defense and

42:52.136 --> 42:53.969
how do we integrate capabilities

42:53.969 --> 42:56.080
together to be able to have options ?

42:56.080 --> 42:58.136
So I think for us , we have a unique

42:58.136 --> 43:00.136
set of partners and we've got to be

43:00.136 --> 42:59.860
able to use our authorities and how we

42:59.870 --> 43:01.981
defend forward and do it every single

43:01.981 --> 43:04.203
day . MS Manning , how are you thinking

43:04.203 --> 43:06.259
about working with your counterparts

43:06.259 --> 43:08.481
and other agencies to , to fulfill this

43:08.481 --> 43:10.537
goal of integrated deterrence ? No ,

43:10.537 --> 43:10.250
thank you for your question ,

43:10.260 --> 43:12.649
Congressman . We really do see cyber

43:12.659 --> 43:14.881
deterrence , as you mentioned , as part

43:14.881 --> 43:16.937
of overall integrated deterrence and

43:16.937 --> 43:19.048
thinking about integrating across the

43:19.048 --> 43:21.103
department across domains across the

43:21.103 --> 43:23.159
interagency and also with allies and

43:23.159 --> 43:25.048
partners and those private public

43:25.048 --> 43:26.770
partnerships that General Hawk

43:26.770 --> 43:28.937
mentioned . And it's important that we

43:28.937 --> 43:30.881
work together with our interagency

43:30.881 --> 43:32.715
partners , with our partners and

43:32.715 --> 43:34.659
industry , with our our allies and

43:34.659 --> 43:36.881
partners to really look at ways that we

43:36.881 --> 43:38.881
can deny adversaries the benefit of

43:38.881 --> 43:40.770
cyber attack by one being able to

43:40.770 --> 43:42.770
provide indications and warnings of

43:42.770 --> 43:44.715
threats to benefit our interagency

43:44.715 --> 43:46.659
partners and then also by imposing

43:46.659 --> 43:48.603
consequences on our adversaries by

43:48.603 --> 43:50.937
disrupting their operations . Thank you ,

43:50.937 --> 43:53.103
Mr Chairman . Uh I think I should note

43:53.103 --> 43:54.770
the section 1533 study that I

43:54.770 --> 43:56.770
referenced earlier was I believe Mr

43:56.770 --> 43:58.826
Moulton's amendment . So he deserves

43:58.826 --> 44:00.548
credit for provoking and , and

44:00.548 --> 44:02.715
stimulating the debate that led to the

44:02.715 --> 44:04.826
report he referenced . And so I thank

44:04.826 --> 44:04.459
him for that . Uh Mr Fallon is

44:04.469 --> 44:07.570
recognized . Thank you Mr Chairman and

44:07.580 --> 44:09.469
thank you for your service to the

44:09.469 --> 44:11.691
country . I'm sorry to see you go . But

44:11.691 --> 44:13.840
as uh to quote the immortal words of

44:13.850 --> 44:16.560
Doctor Seuss don't cry because it's

44:16.570 --> 44:19.610
over smile because it happened . So um

44:21.459 --> 44:25.419
last November , the North

44:25.429 --> 44:27.373
Texas municipal water district got

44:27.373 --> 44:30.270
hacked and it was a domestic , uh

44:31.489 --> 44:33.340
it was a domestic attack , but

44:33.350 --> 44:35.461
nonetheless , and they didn't shut it

44:35.461 --> 44:37.628
down , but they showed that they could

44:37.628 --> 44:39.889
have and it reminded me of J BS and

44:40.129 --> 44:42.110
Colonial pipeline and general , I

44:42.120 --> 44:44.287
wanted to ask you what have we learned

44:44.287 --> 44:46.342
because that's the greatest f we all

44:46.342 --> 44:48.342
have is that these critical areas ,

44:48.342 --> 44:50.760
water , electricity , energy , fuel ,

44:50.909 --> 44:52.853
um what have we learned from those

44:52.853 --> 44:55.729
attacks that we can employ um within

44:55.739 --> 44:58.520
the defense department ? So I , I'll

44:58.530 --> 45:00.752
give you a couple of different things .

45:00.752 --> 45:03.060
Congressman , one is , this is an area

45:03.070 --> 45:05.237
that we've clearly identified that the

45:05.239 --> 45:07.649
PR C is targeting . So this wasn't in

45:07.659 --> 45:09.826
this case , but we know that's an area

45:09.826 --> 45:11.992
they're targeting . So from a National

45:11.992 --> 45:13.937
Readiness perspective , we have to

45:13.937 --> 45:16.103
consider that the other thing we think

45:16.103 --> 45:18.103
about is what does it look like for

45:18.103 --> 45:20.326
defense critical infrastructure , those

45:20.326 --> 45:19.919
things that are the nexus between our

45:19.929 --> 45:22.151
private infrastructure and those things

45:22.151 --> 45:24.350
the department would rely upon if we

45:24.360 --> 45:26.027
were mobilizing . So that's a

45:26.027 --> 45:28.138
partnership with North Com and it's a

45:28.138 --> 45:30.304
partnership with Homeland Security . I

45:30.304 --> 45:32.416
think those are areas that within the

45:32.416 --> 45:34.638
department . Uh We've now focused , how

45:34.638 --> 45:36.969
do we think about that nexus ? And what

45:36.979 --> 45:39.146
will it mean for the department from a

45:39.146 --> 45:41.312
cyber security standpoint ? So I think

45:41.312 --> 45:43.535
we have now been applying some of those

45:43.535 --> 45:43.510
lessons . We're gonna have to continue

45:43.520 --> 45:45.576
to scale as we think about it within

45:45.576 --> 45:47.909
the department . And then , um you know ,

45:47.909 --> 45:49.964
with uh you , you mentioned that the

45:49.964 --> 45:53.020
CCP and like vault typhoon comes to

45:53.030 --> 45:56.790
mind . Um There's no doubt that they're

45:56.800 --> 46:00.459
actively probing . Uh Of course , can

46:00.469 --> 46:02.469
you talk about the work that you're

46:02.469 --> 46:04.525
doing with industry partners because

46:04.525 --> 46:06.469
you know , the ch the chain meet ,

46:06.469 --> 46:08.691
weakest link . If we've got some of our

46:08.691 --> 46:10.913
partners were buttoned up and secure as

46:10.913 --> 46:12.969
a uniform service or even a along as

46:12.969 --> 46:15.330
the dod . But uh , a private company

46:15.340 --> 46:17.229
that's working with us isn't , it

46:17.229 --> 46:19.451
doesn't get us anywhere . So , um , can

46:19.451 --> 46:21.699
you talk to us about um what we're

46:21.709 --> 46:23.709
doing to enhance , particularly the

46:23.709 --> 46:25.876
cyber security of our partners ? Yes .

46:25.876 --> 46:28.179
Congressman . Uh both Congress and the

46:28.189 --> 46:30.411
department have given cyber command and

46:30.411 --> 46:32.459
NSA authorities to work with our

46:32.469 --> 46:34.669
defense industrial base . And , and

46:34.679 --> 46:36.846
that information sharing component has

46:36.846 --> 46:38.957
now allowed us to establish over 1000

46:38.957 --> 46:40.840
partnerships and that allows to

46:40.850 --> 46:43.017
exchange information . It allows us to

46:43.017 --> 46:45.128
do it in real time at an unclassified

46:45.128 --> 46:47.419
level so that we can make industry

46:47.429 --> 46:49.919
aware of those threats . Um As we think

46:49.929 --> 46:51.985
about those partnerships , now , dod

46:51.985 --> 46:53.800
CIO is also funded additional

46:53.810 --> 46:55.899
activities that allow us to provide

46:55.909 --> 46:58.242
services to the defense industrial base ,

46:58.242 --> 47:01.080
protective DNS so that they have a

47:01.090 --> 47:03.280
service that is uh uh that would make

47:03.290 --> 47:05.399
it more difficult for a redirection

47:05.409 --> 47:07.242
attack or a spear fishing attack

47:07.242 --> 47:10.000
informed by N SAS knowledge . Uh The

47:10.010 --> 47:11.899
other things we've been doing are

47:11.899 --> 47:14.066
scanning of uh various elements of the

47:14.066 --> 47:16.121
defense industrial base . We provide

47:16.121 --> 47:17.899
them a scan , we tell them what

47:17.899 --> 47:20.010
vulnerabilities we see and allow them

47:20.010 --> 47:21.843
to correct those vulnerabilities

47:21.843 --> 47:23.899
themselves . We're gonna continue to

47:23.899 --> 47:23.840
look at what other services we could

47:23.850 --> 47:26.072
provide , but we're also looking at how

47:26.072 --> 47:28.489
can we extend those partnerships to a

47:28.500 --> 47:30.611
broader number that would ensure that

47:30.611 --> 47:32.556
we're , we're covering the highest

47:32.556 --> 47:34.389
priority things that support the

47:34.389 --> 47:36.611
department . Thank you . And then , you

47:36.611 --> 47:36.449
know , when people come into our

47:36.459 --> 47:39.350
offices , they're all dying in , uh ,

47:39.360 --> 47:41.138
for labor , doesn't matter what

47:41.138 --> 47:43.304
industry it is . Well , I asked them ,

47:43.304 --> 47:45.471
do you have , um , you know , you have

47:45.471 --> 47:47.693
job openings and they're all crying for

47:47.693 --> 47:49.916
labor , so , particularly skilled labor

47:49.916 --> 47:51.916
even more . So . So I wanted to ask

47:51.916 --> 47:53.971
maybe Miss Manning as well . Um What

47:53.971 --> 47:56.249
can we do if anything do we need to do ?

47:56.249 --> 47:58.304
Um I remember being a junior officer

47:58.304 --> 48:00.304
and the , the doctors got paid more

48:00.304 --> 48:00.120
because , you know , it's just the

48:00.129 --> 48:02.296
market , right ? You wanna , you wanna

48:02.296 --> 48:04.240
have those medical doctors stay on

48:04.240 --> 48:07.010
after maybe they uh owe some time after

48:07.020 --> 48:09.187
getting going through medical school .

48:09.189 --> 48:11.189
But in particularly in this field ,

48:11.219 --> 48:13.441
it's just the high demand and it , they

48:13.441 --> 48:15.679
make quite a bit of money . Uh Do we ,

48:15.689 --> 48:18.320
is there incentive pay for folks uh in

48:18.330 --> 48:20.530
this service ? And if does it need to

48:20.540 --> 48:22.596
do we need to ratchet it up ? I just

48:22.596 --> 48:24.651
wanted to kick that to both of you .

48:25.820 --> 48:28.042
You know , I think at this point , it's

48:28.042 --> 48:29.764
important that we consider all

48:29.764 --> 48:31.876
different ideas of how we can recruit

48:31.876 --> 48:33.653
and retain top talent . I think

48:33.653 --> 48:35.876
incentives are one tool that we have in

48:35.876 --> 48:37.820
our tool kit . I think also though

48:37.820 --> 48:39.931
there's a sense of mission that comes

48:39.931 --> 48:39.699
with doing the work in the department .

48:39.820 --> 48:42.159
And so thinking about how we can make

48:42.169 --> 48:44.169
people feel really connected to the

48:44.169 --> 48:46.391
mission itself is another thing that we

48:46.391 --> 48:48.447
can think about . But I think really

48:48.447 --> 48:50.280
understanding what is it that is

48:50.280 --> 48:52.613
motivating people to come to these jobs ,

48:52.613 --> 48:54.447
what is allowing them to sustain

48:54.447 --> 48:56.669
careers in government long term ? And I

48:56.669 --> 48:58.780
think pay incentives are , are one of

48:58.780 --> 48:58.395
the tools we have at our disposal . I

48:58.405 --> 49:00.516
just don't want the canyon to be this

49:00.516 --> 49:02.627
big . You know , if it's 300 grand on

49:02.627 --> 49:02.495
the private market and it's 100 grand

49:02.504 --> 49:04.782
here , that's just too big of a canyon ,

49:04.782 --> 49:06.837
even if you're really rewarded if we

49:06.837 --> 49:09.115
can close it . That's kind of my point .

49:09.115 --> 49:08.594
Thank you , Mr Chairman , I , you back

49:09.034 --> 49:12.570
Mr Latrell . Thank you , Mr

49:12.580 --> 49:15.719
Chairman uh General in December 2022 .

49:15.750 --> 49:17.639
Se officially elevated Cybercom

49:17.649 --> 49:19.850
Offensive Arm , the Cyber National

49:19.860 --> 49:22.260
Mission Force to a sub Unified Command .

49:22.270 --> 49:24.270
The logic was that it would provide

49:24.270 --> 49:26.270
greater enabling resources for this

49:26.270 --> 49:28.214
critical mission set with how much

49:28.214 --> 49:30.270
adversary activity we have witnessed

49:30.270 --> 49:32.437
against dod networks . It would appear

49:32.437 --> 49:34.548
that your defensive arm , armed joint

49:34.548 --> 49:36.437
forces headquarters could similar

49:36.437 --> 49:38.714
benefit . Could you share your opinion ?

49:38.714 --> 49:40.937
Uh Thank you , Congressman . So when we

49:40.937 --> 49:42.881
stood up , uh when we elevated the

49:42.881 --> 49:44.937
Cyber National Mission Force , uh it

49:44.937 --> 49:47.159
was at a point . So we now that's about

49:47.159 --> 49:49.270
a third of our force and , and with a

49:49.270 --> 49:51.492
very distinct headquarters and assigned

49:51.492 --> 49:53.548
forces um that has now , I think was

49:53.548 --> 49:55.770
absolutely the right thing for us to do

49:55.770 --> 49:55.560
that . We , we're allowing it to create

49:55.570 --> 49:57.792
an identity , we're allowing it to grow

49:57.792 --> 49:59.737
its own uh the staff to expand its

49:59.737 --> 50:01.403
planning and then , and other

50:01.403 --> 50:03.570
capability development . I think we're

50:03.570 --> 50:05.681
seeing benefit from that . This is an

50:05.681 --> 50:07.792
area that we are gonna look at in the

50:07.792 --> 50:09.848
1533 study , which is as we start to

50:09.848 --> 50:11.959
think about or , or actually the 1537

50:11.959 --> 50:13.792
study that you've asked us to do

50:13.792 --> 50:15.848
looking at our headquarters . What's

50:15.848 --> 50:17.848
the right way to position the joint

50:17.848 --> 50:19.959
force headquarters ? Doen in terms of

50:19.959 --> 50:22.126
the right resources and authorities to

50:22.126 --> 50:24.237
make sure that it has the capacity to

50:24.237 --> 50:26.126
really set the globe . That's the

50:26.126 --> 50:28.348
mission we've given them when we have a

50:28.348 --> 50:30.626
crisis , we want them to set the globe .

50:30.626 --> 50:29.879
So I think it's an area that we're

50:29.889 --> 50:32.280
certainly gonna evaluate . Um and it

50:32.290 --> 50:34.401
does look different as a headquarters

50:34.401 --> 50:36.568
also in terms of assigned forces , but

50:36.568 --> 50:38.734
it's something that we will definitely

50:38.734 --> 50:40.846
be looking at . Thank you , Miss be I

50:40.846 --> 50:43.012
apologize Mr for walking into Mi Mi Mr

50:43.012 --> 50:46.850
Fin's questions to expand or to

50:46.860 --> 50:50.510
create an expansiveness of talent . We

50:50.520 --> 50:52.780
wanted to reach out to academics , of

50:52.790 --> 50:55.399
academics , a academia and institutes

50:55.409 --> 50:58.060
of higher performance , correct ? Um

50:58.500 --> 51:01.699
Are we doing that from your , in your

51:01.709 --> 51:03.889
opinion ? I have , I have universities

51:03.899 --> 51:06.066
in my district and then of course , as

51:06.066 --> 51:08.232
I travel , the state and the country ,

51:08.232 --> 51:10.343
I we I have these discussions when it

51:10.343 --> 51:10.030
comes to cyber risk , cyber threat ,

51:10.040 --> 51:12.207
cyberspace , artificial intelligence ,

51:12.207 --> 51:14.729
machine learning and how it seems like

51:14.739 --> 51:17.610
we're missing the , the the rising wave

51:17.620 --> 51:19.979
because the our our brilliant minds are

51:19.989 --> 51:22.760
traveling elsewhere . Are we creating

51:22.770 --> 51:25.300
effective narrative from your position

51:25.310 --> 51:27.421
in order to share that with the youth

51:27.421 --> 51:29.643
and say , hey , I say youth , but our ,

51:29.643 --> 51:31.919
our next generation of computational

51:32.590 --> 51:35.689
mathematicians , I think there are two

51:35.699 --> 51:38.530
aspects to this . I think one is making

51:38.750 --> 51:41.719
uh folks see a career in government as

51:41.729 --> 51:43.785
something that they want to pursue .

51:43.785 --> 51:45.870
And they see building the skills in

51:45.879 --> 51:48.310
cyber and in other fields as something

51:48.320 --> 51:50.469
where they can have a unique role in

51:50.479 --> 51:52.649
terms of defending our national

51:52.659 --> 51:54.881
security interests by having jobs . You

51:54.881 --> 51:56.770
can really only do when you're in

51:56.770 --> 51:58.992
government . How do we make working for

51:58.992 --> 52:01.215
the government ? Sound cool . I I think

52:01.215 --> 52:00.810
that's a really important point and I

52:00.820 --> 52:03.030
think also beyond just making it sound

52:03.040 --> 52:05.207
cool how you have the lack of a better

52:05.207 --> 52:07.429
term . I'm sorry , I should say no . II

52:07.429 --> 52:09.429
I think , you know , it needs to be

52:09.429 --> 52:11.540
relatable and we also though need the

52:11.540 --> 52:13.318
mechanisms to bring people into

52:13.318 --> 52:15.373
government . So looking at different

52:15.373 --> 52:17.596
tools like the cyber accepted service ,

52:17.596 --> 52:19.762
looking at the presidential management

52:19.762 --> 52:21.651
tool , uh fellowship , looking at

52:21.651 --> 52:23.151
different scholarships and

52:23.151 --> 52:23.074
opportunities . I think all of this

52:23.084 --> 52:25.195
should be on the table so that we can

52:25.195 --> 52:27.362
give folks the opportunity not only to

52:27.362 --> 52:29.584
want to serve in government , but to be

52:29.584 --> 52:31.751
able to have the mechanisms to come in

52:31.751 --> 52:33.917
and be able to be a part of our team ?

52:33.917 --> 52:36.350
Are we looking at having them serve in

52:36.360 --> 52:38.527
the , in the , in the various branches

52:38.527 --> 52:40.749
of armed services or just government in

52:40.749 --> 52:43.409
general ? Because as we know , we're ,

52:43.419 --> 52:45.419
we're having trouble recruiting the

52:45.419 --> 52:48.379
bodies for , for those platforms . Is

52:48.389 --> 52:51.510
it , is it both in between or is it

52:51.520 --> 52:53.520
just something we're trying to cast

52:53.520 --> 52:55.576
that wide net and fill all the , all

52:55.576 --> 52:57.687
the silos ? I would defer to my , the

52:57.687 --> 52:59.742
team who's responsible for personnel

52:59.742 --> 53:01.853
and readiness in terms of the overall

53:01.853 --> 53:03.964
policy . That's a great shift . But I

53:03.964 --> 53:05.909
think there are opportunities both

53:05.909 --> 53:07.853
within uh the command , within the

53:07.853 --> 53:10.020
services for , for individuals to come

53:10.020 --> 53:12.187
in and to serve . You got something on

53:12.187 --> 53:14.353
that one . So what , what I would give

53:14.353 --> 53:14.320
you is what do , what do we see that

53:14.330 --> 53:16.441
that are things that are , are pretty

53:16.441 --> 53:19.060
exciting that are really looking at

53:19.070 --> 53:21.237
high schools and middle schools . Uh I

53:21.237 --> 53:23.126
just attended the finals of Cyber

53:23.126 --> 53:25.689
Patriot 5000 schools across the country

53:25.760 --> 53:27.927
where they're doing cyber competitions

53:27.927 --> 53:30.149
in middle school and in high school and

53:30.149 --> 53:32.093
then ROTC programs . Those are the

53:32.093 --> 53:34.204
types of things that we wanna be able

53:34.204 --> 53:36.316
to do is early . We would like to see

53:36.316 --> 53:38.538
being done as early as possible so that

53:38.538 --> 53:40.649
we're really trying to capture people

53:40.649 --> 53:40.159
and , and what it looks like to be that

53:40.169 --> 53:42.679
that can be both cool and really

53:42.689 --> 53:44.850
impactful things for our nation . I

53:44.969 --> 53:47.136
think they have a willingness to put a

53:47.136 --> 53:49.136
uniform on . I , I think what we've

53:49.136 --> 53:51.302
seen is they've done a really nice job

53:51.302 --> 53:53.302
of , of bringing people towards the

53:53.302 --> 53:55.469
technology and then it's our job to be

53:55.469 --> 53:57.525
able to , to have opportunities with

53:57.525 --> 53:59.525
the Razzi programs that are in high

53:59.525 --> 54:01.747
school and also to be able to reach out

54:01.747 --> 54:03.969
and , and be able to explain what would

54:03.969 --> 54:06.080
you do if you came and worked with us

54:06.080 --> 54:08.413
either as a civilian or in the military ?

54:08.413 --> 54:10.747
That's our story that we've got to tell .

54:10.747 --> 54:10.250
Yes , sir . Thank you , Mr Chairman .

54:11.250 --> 54:13.560
Thank you . Uh Does any other member

54:13.570 --> 54:17.540
have a follow up question ? Ok . Uh The

54:17.550 --> 54:19.717
FDD , we're going to have a classified

54:19.717 --> 54:21.772
session after this , but I think the

54:21.772 --> 54:23.994
FDD report that you've heard referenced

54:23.994 --> 54:26.161
numerous times here . Uh Again , I , I

54:26.161 --> 54:25.639
think , I mean , I'm biased because I

54:25.649 --> 54:27.816
work with a lot of these people in the

54:27.816 --> 54:29.927
cyberspace Solarium Commission . I'll

54:29.927 --> 54:32.038
admit that , but I think what is most

54:32.038 --> 54:34.205
compelling in it is the testimony from

54:34.205 --> 54:36.371
active duty ranging from company grade

54:36.371 --> 54:38.371
to general grade officers . And I'd

54:38.371 --> 54:40.482
like to read one statement from uh uh

54:40.482 --> 54:42.482
Marine Corps captain and all wisdom

54:42.482 --> 54:44.649
emanates from Marine Corps captains as

54:44.649 --> 54:46.871
Mr Moulton . And I know quite well , uh

54:46.871 --> 54:48.871
uh leading in the cyberspace domain

54:48.871 --> 54:50.760
demands technical competency that

54:50.760 --> 54:50.350
cannot be taught in a 12 month

54:50.360 --> 54:52.360
schoolhouse alone . One of my worst

54:52.360 --> 54:54.249
professional experiences involved

54:54.249 --> 54:55.916
working underneath a woefully

54:55.916 --> 54:58.027
unprepared commander with a degree in

54:58.027 --> 55:00.138
culinary arts under no circumstance ,

55:00.138 --> 55:02.304
would a cyber officer be asked to lead

55:02.304 --> 55:04.360
a squadron of aircraft ? And yet the

55:04.360 --> 55:04.270
opposite is often true . That's just

55:04.280 --> 55:06.502
one of many quotes in the report that I

55:06.502 --> 55:08.502
think are , are worth reading . And

55:08.502 --> 55:10.669
again , I'm not biasing the outcome of

55:10.669 --> 55:12.780
the study you guys are gonna do or an

55:12.780 --> 55:14.724
independent study . But I , I just

55:14.724 --> 55:16.780
think it's fair to say at this point

55:16.780 --> 55:18.947
that the status quo is not getting the

55:18.947 --> 55:21.113
job done . So we're asking you to take

55:21.113 --> 55:23.336
a hard look at this problem and work in

55:23.336 --> 55:25.447
partnership with us to come up with a

55:25.447 --> 55:27.613
better model as was referenced by some

55:27.613 --> 55:27.239
of my colleagues . We've given so many

55:27.250 --> 55:29.659
authorities to dod in the eight years .

55:29.669 --> 55:31.725
I've been on this committee and it's

55:31.725 --> 55:33.725
all been well intentioned . It just

55:33.725 --> 55:35.558
seems like it's not adding up or

55:35.558 --> 55:37.725
producing the outcome we want . And so

55:37.725 --> 55:39.780
I know you're both relatively new to

55:39.780 --> 55:41.891
your respective jobs . Uh and they're

55:41.891 --> 55:43.780
critically important jobs and our

55:43.780 --> 55:45.836
commitment is to work with you uh to

55:45.836 --> 55:47.891
get this right because the safety of

55:47.891 --> 55:50.169
our country and our , our citizens are ,

55:50.169 --> 55:52.113
are quite literally hanging in the

55:52.113 --> 55:51.830
balance . And so we appreciate your

55:51.840 --> 55:54.007
time today . We look forward to the um

55:54.007 --> 55:55.951
classified session . And finally ,

55:55.951 --> 55:58.118
since he was not here when I said nice

55:58.118 --> 55:57.459
things about him , I just want to

55:57.469 --> 55:59.840
reiterate how uh much of a pleasure to

55:59.850 --> 56:02.017
spend a work with the ranking member ,

56:02.017 --> 56:04.128
Rohana , not just on this committee ,

56:04.128 --> 56:06.017
but on many issues , uh one of my

56:06.017 --> 56:08.239
fondest memories is the op ed we did on

56:08.239 --> 56:10.350
congressional reform together when we

56:10.350 --> 56:12.461
were uh impetuous uh freshman members

56:12.461 --> 56:16.459
of congress uh Children . My biggest

56:16.469 --> 56:18.580
failure of my time here , term limits

56:18.580 --> 56:20.636
didn't happen . We went to the White

56:20.636 --> 56:22.802
House together to talk about that . Uh

56:22.802 --> 56:24.969
But ro you've always been incredibly ,

56:24.969 --> 56:27.247
obviously smart and independent minded ,

56:27.247 --> 56:27.030
but you have a bias for action that I ,

56:27.040 --> 56:28.984
that I admire that I think is rare

56:28.984 --> 56:31.610
among uh uh people in public service .

56:31.620 --> 56:33.787
And uh I also appreciate your sense of

56:33.787 --> 56:36.009
humor and that you take the mission but

56:36.009 --> 56:38.231
not yourself too seriously . So , thank

56:38.231 --> 56:40.342
you for your productive partnership .

56:40.342 --> 56:40.320
Appreciate that with that . The open

56:40.330 --> 56:42.497
hearing is adjourned and we'll move to

56:42.497 --> 56:42.260
a classified session .