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Hearing . Welcome General Cavala , 

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General Van Ovo . Uh Senator , I will 

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uh differ from giving my opening 

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statement and submit it to the record . 

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I believe that uh the ranking member 

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will do so . Uh Also , so we can 

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expedite questioning uh with that uh 

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General Cavoli . Let me recognize you . 

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Thank you , Chairman , uh chairman Reed , 

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ranking member wicker distinguished 

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members of the committee . It's my 

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honor to testify before you today on 

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behalf of the brave men and women and 

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families of us European command . And 

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before we start , I'd like to publicly 

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publicly recognize our service members 

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shared sacrifice and praise their 

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devotion to the mission . And I'd like 

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to thank you for the support you give 

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them every day . Um They are 

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represented here today by my command 

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sergeant , Major Rob Abernathy who I'm 

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lucky to serve with . And I'm delighted 

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to testify next to my friend , Jackie 

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Van Vost . We're facing challenging 

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times in the European theater . Ladies 

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and gentlemen , Russia's brutal , 

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unprovoked war has ravaged Ukraine for 

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over two years . Their forces are 

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demolishing cities , destroying 

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innocent lives on a scale we have not 

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seen since the Second World War . 

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Moreover , Russia is turning to the 

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People's Republic of China , to Iran 

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and to North Korea to sustain its 

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campaign in Ukraine . Those countries 

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are forming interlocking strategic 

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partnerships in an attempt to challenge 

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the existing order from which we 

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benefit . This is profoundly inimical 

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to us national interests . And it's 

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important to note that Russia shows no 

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signs of stopping , nor does Russia 

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intend to stop with . Ukraine . Russia 

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presents to us a chronic threat . 

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US U COM has responded to this threat 

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by enhancing our deterrence posture 

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across Europe . We've strengthened our 

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eastern flank with rotational force 

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deployments . We've expanded 

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prepositioned stocks . We've modernized 

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our infrastructure to enable rapid 

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reception of forces and we have 

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demonstrated our ability to reinforce 

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in all domains through dozens of 

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multinational training exercises . So 

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we are ready to defend and this allows 

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us to deter and we have deterred Russia 

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from attacking our alliance . US . U is 

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also proud to lead the international 

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effort in support of Ukraine . We do 

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this as you know through the security 

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assistance group . Ukraine Sau which is 

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led by Lieutenant General Tony Agudo in 

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the past 26 months of war . The US and 

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our partners have delivered vast 

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amounts of critical munitions and 

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equipment to our Ukrainian colleagues , 

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Sau has been in the lead and they have 

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facilitated a full range of training to 

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promote unit readiness . We have 

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ensured that U that Ukraine knows how 

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to use their new equipment and just as 

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important how to maintain it 

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nevertheless , Russia persists in its 

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vicious campaign . Meanwhile , Ukraine 

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remains almost entirely dependent on 

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external support to stay in the fight . 

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The severity of this moment cannot be 

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overstated if we do not continue to 

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support Ukraine . Ukraine could lose . 

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So our efforts are great . But in all 

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of this Ucom is not alone . War in 

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Europe has also given our allies and 

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our partners clear purpose and unity . 

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They have seized this opportunity that 

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has been presented by this catastrophe . 

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And over the past year or two , there 

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have been profound changes in NATO . We 

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have new war plans for the first time . 

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In 35 years . We have new force and 

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readiness models . They make 700% more 

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European troops available to me as the 

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Supreme Allied Commander than just a 

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couple of years ago , we have 

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streamlined and focused new command 

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structures . We have new authorities 

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that give me as s a year the ability to 

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respond to crisis in a timely fashion . 

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And European governments are backing 

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these organizational changes with a 

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concrete uptick in investment in 2024 

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at least 20 nations are expected to 

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meet the 2% of GDP defense spending 

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compared to only three who met it in 

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2014 . Nevertheless , continued us , 

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leadership is essential . Our allies 

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are stepping up but they require our 

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leadership and our example . And by 

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upholding our commitment to Ukraine and 

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by demonstrating steadfast cohesion 

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with the NATO alliance , we provide a 

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clear deterrent to our adversaries . Of 

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course , should deterrence fail us ucom 

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along with our allies is ready to fight 

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and win . We thank you for Congress on 

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wavering support to us U COM . Service 

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members missions to their safety and to 

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their well-being . Chairman reed 

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ranking member wicker on behalf of the 

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entire European command . Thank you for 

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this opportunity today . I very much 

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look forward to your questions . Thank 

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you , General Cavoli General Van Os , 

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Please . Chairman Reed , ranking member 

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wicker distinguished members of the 

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committee . It's my honor to join you 

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today with my senior enlisted leader , 

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Chief Master Sergeant , Brian Krisel to 

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represent the men and women of the 

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United States Transportation Command . 

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As we defend the nation , take care of 

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our people and succeed through teamwork . 

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I'm extremely proud of our team of 

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logistics professionals who lead the 

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joint deployment and distribution 

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enterprise continually exceed 

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expectations and ensure hope , 

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deterrence and victory are assured as 

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we underwrite our nation's defense from 

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competition to crisis , the entire 

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enterprise proudly deliver for our 

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nations , our allies and partners . We 

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know our success around the globe would 

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not be possible without the steadfast 

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support of this committee and the whole 

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of Congress . The fiscal year 2025 

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budget request continues to make 

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strides in closing gaps in our mobility 

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areas as we prepare for global 

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operations in a contested environment . 

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A contested environment is the reality 

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of today , whether in the homeland or 

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abroad , we cannot presume freedom of 

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maneuver to execute our operations with 

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full access to our lines of 

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communication . Our organic fleets 

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coupled with the vital capacity 

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provided by our commercial 

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transportation partners must continue 

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to present credible capacity . Meaning 

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we must modernize our mobility 

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capabilities to include cyber 

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resiliency and digital modernization . 

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A connected aware and survivable 

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mobility fleet and network is needed to 

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maintain our advantage against a 

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capable and determined . A near peer 

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adversary . My top ratings concerns 

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remain sea lift and air fueling . Sea 

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lift is the backbone of our ability to 

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deliver a decisive joint force . 

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However , the age of the fleet is 

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dragging readiness to alarming levels . 

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17 of the 47 organic ready reserve for 

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ships are 50 years or older to address 

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readiness and decrease in capacity due 

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to the planned retirement of 27 ships 

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in the next eight years . We must add 

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younger ships to the fleet . Transcom 

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supports Navy strategy to acquire U 

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seli vessels from the commercial market 

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and further request to provide the 

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Secretary of Defense discretionary 

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authority to purchase foreign built U 

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ships under favorable market conditions 

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without restrictions . We acknowledge 

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Congress's intent to include domestic 

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new build sea lift ships to 

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recapitalize the ready Reserve force . 

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And we are working with the Navy and 

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Maritime Administration to create an 

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acquisition strategy for new 

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construction that will complement the 

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buy used program . I greatly appreciate 

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your support for timely predictable and 

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stabilized funding to meet our cli 

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requirements . Similarly , air 

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refueling is foundation to our nation's 

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power projection advantage . It is our 

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most stressed capability . We must 

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ensure continuous modernization and 

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recapitalization of the aging fleet to 

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meet the operational requirements of 

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the modern battle . Space Transcom 

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supports the air force's strategy for 

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the uninterrupted tanker 

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recapitalization and accelerated 

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feeling fielding of the next generation 

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air refueling system . Over the past 

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year , we've made great strides in 

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synchronize synchronizing global bulk 

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fuel management and delivery in 

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collaboration with our key partners in 

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the joint petroleum enterprise leading 

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to robust planning posture operations 

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and capability development to assure 

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end to end fuel distribution in a 

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contested environment . This includes 

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diversifying our distribution and 

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delivery posture by having an increased 

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forward presence with fuel afloat in in 

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contracted maritime tankers and 

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increasing capacity and access to the 

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US flagged maritime tanker fleet 

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through the tanker security program . 

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In addition , we fully support the 

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maritime security program , the Jones 

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Act and cargo preference laws that all 

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work to ensure that we have the 

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necessary us flag capability and us 

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merchant Mariners to move sensitive 

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defense materials during a national 

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emergency . Maritime stakeholders have 

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been experiencing challenges with 

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recruiting and retaining qualified 

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Mariners . And we support merit and 

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industry efforts to identify strategies 

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that address the mariner shortage and 

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ensure their readiness to effectively 

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sense adversary threats and activities 

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in our logistics networks . The nation 

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must utilize all available resources . 

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Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 

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Surveillance Act provides me insights 

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into adversary intent capabilities and 

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activities to contest our logistics 

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flows . The loss of this authority adds 

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risk to my mission . Additionally , 

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passing a national defense supplemental 

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is vital for the health of the 

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Transportation Working Capital Fund 

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which preserves essential readiness and 

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ensures response options for the 

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Secretary of Defense . I'm honored to 

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join General Koli today where we stand 

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firmly with Ukraine and its fight for 

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democracy , sovereignty and territorial 

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integrity that in turn delivers success 

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and stability for our allies and our 

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nation . I'd like to thank you once 

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again for your leadership and the 

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support you provide our workforce . I 

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look forward to your questions . Thank 

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you very much , General Van Ovo . Uh 

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Before we begin , let me remind 

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everyone that we must stop at 10 a.m. 

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for the joint session . So please limit 

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your questioning to five minutes and 

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the closed session will begin at noon 

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after the joint session in SVC 217 . 

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Thank you , General Kavali . Um 

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You indicated the severe consequences 

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of the failure to support Ukraine and 

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those consequences I presume are not 

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localized but global . Could you 

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elaborate a absolutely . Um 

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Mr Chairman . 

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So the uh if we , 

280
00:10:21,979 --> 00:10:24,340
if Ukraine fails in this fight , I 

281
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think problems radiate outwards 

282
00:10:26,830 --> 00:10:29,130
beginning with Europe . So there will 

283
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be the possibility the probability that 

284
00:10:32,599 --> 00:10:34,960
Russia will continue aggressive 

285
00:10:34,969 --> 00:10:36,747
behavior . They'll certainly be 

286
00:10:36,747 --> 00:10:39,000
emboldened , they're certainly building 

287
00:10:39,010 --> 00:10:41,121
a military that's going to be capable 

288
00:10:41,121 --> 00:10:43,010
of it . They're replenishing what 

289
00:10:43,010 --> 00:10:45,232
they've lost so far and they're working 

290
00:10:45,232 --> 00:10:47,177
very hard to build a larger army . 

291
00:10:47,177 --> 00:10:49,232
They've announced their plans for it 

292
00:10:49,232 --> 00:10:51,288
and they're on track to do that . Um 

293
00:10:51,288 --> 00:10:53,010
There are other nations in the 

294
00:10:53,010 --> 00:10:56,650
neighborhood um uh that Russia 

295
00:10:56,700 --> 00:10:59,780
publicly covets has publicly stated 

296
00:10:59,789 --> 00:11:02,090
that they're not really nations . Um 

297
00:11:02,099 --> 00:11:04,210
the same sort of rhetoric that led up 

298
00:11:04,210 --> 00:11:07,070
to the invasion of Ukraine beyond 

299
00:11:07,080 --> 00:11:09,479
Europe , which is critical to our 

300
00:11:09,489 --> 00:11:11,520
security beyond Europe . There are 

301
00:11:11,530 --> 00:11:13,697
other places , people are watching all 

302
00:11:13,697 --> 00:11:15,419
over the world . Mr Chairman , 

303
00:11:15,419 --> 00:11:17,586
obviously the People Republic of China 

304
00:11:17,586 --> 00:11:19,641
we know is watching very closely and 

305
00:11:19,641 --> 00:11:21,697
all other other nations are watching 

306
00:11:21,697 --> 00:11:23,808
very closely . First to gauge what is 

307
00:11:23,808 --> 00:11:25,808
the value of a partnership with the 

308
00:11:25,808 --> 00:11:27,974
United States . And second to see what 

309
00:11:27,974 --> 00:11:29,974
happens if it fails . Um and uh the 

310
00:11:29,974 --> 00:11:32,190
those who would be , our friends would 

311
00:11:32,200 --> 00:11:35,020
be made nervous by a loss in Ukraine 

312
00:11:35,229 --> 00:11:37,140
and those who um would be our 

313
00:11:37,150 --> 00:11:39,372
adversaries would be emboldened by it , 

314
00:11:39,372 --> 00:11:41,859
sir . Uh I had the opportunity to stop 

315
00:11:41,869 --> 00:11:44,190
in Graf Deve Ramstein and several other 

316
00:11:44,200 --> 00:11:48,080
places . And uh we are teaching uh the 

317
00:11:48,090 --> 00:11:50,570
Ukrainians , but we're also learning a 

318
00:11:50,580 --> 00:11:54,359
lot . Uh So this effort has allowed us 

319
00:11:54,369 --> 00:11:57,760
really to uh significantly increase our 

320
00:11:57,770 --> 00:12:00,320
insights into the the way Russia 

321
00:12:00,330 --> 00:12:02,559
particularly conduct uh conducts 

322
00:12:02,890 --> 00:12:05,229
operations and also others who are 

323
00:12:05,239 --> 00:12:08,010
aiding Russia's atmosphere . A a 

324
00:12:08,020 --> 00:12:10,280
absolutely Mr Chairman . First of all , 

325
00:12:10,289 --> 00:12:13,000
thank you and all members for your 

326
00:12:13,010 --> 00:12:15,066
visits to Grafenberg and elsewhere . 

327
00:12:15,066 --> 00:12:17,288
They , they , they help us a great deal 

328
00:12:17,288 --> 00:12:19,566
and , and we appreciate them . Um Yeah , 

329
00:12:19,566 --> 00:12:21,621
absolutely . We're learning from the 

330
00:12:21,621 --> 00:12:23,732
Ukrainians every day . Um uh We learn 

331
00:12:23,732 --> 00:12:25,899
in a variety of different ways . First 

332
00:12:25,899 --> 00:12:28,066
of all , just talking to them , we get 

333
00:12:28,066 --> 00:12:29,899
their experiences . This is very 

334
00:12:29,899 --> 00:12:29,799
valuable for our younger troops , 

335
00:12:29,809 --> 00:12:31,642
especially because it keeps them 

336
00:12:31,642 --> 00:12:33,753
galvanized , it keeps them focused on 

337
00:12:33,753 --> 00:12:35,642
the mission , they understand the 

338
00:12:35,642 --> 00:12:37,420
import of it . Uh But in a more 

339
00:12:37,420 --> 00:12:39,809
practical way , we um we practice 

340
00:12:39,820 --> 00:12:42,150
tactics and techniques with them and 

341
00:12:42,159 --> 00:12:44,048
refine them things that they have 

342
00:12:44,048 --> 00:12:46,103
developed under fire , we bring them 

343
00:12:46,103 --> 00:12:48,326
out and we work on those things . These 

344
00:12:48,326 --> 00:12:51,150
can be technical um um specific things 

345
00:12:51,159 --> 00:12:53,190
about um uh electromagnetic 

346
00:12:53,200 --> 00:12:55,200
interference and things like that . 

347
00:12:55,200 --> 00:12:56,922
They can be tactical um how to 

348
00:12:56,966 --> 00:12:59,356
negotiate um new forms of Russian 

349
00:12:59,366 --> 00:13:01,835
obstacles and defensive fortifications . 

350
00:13:01,926 --> 00:13:04,866
We have um both the incidental benefit 

351
00:13:04,875 --> 00:13:07,097
of working with them , but we also have 

352
00:13:07,097 --> 00:13:08,931
very specific focus , structured 

353
00:13:08,931 --> 00:13:11,153
programs to call out that information . 

354
00:13:11,315 --> 00:13:13,204
Um We also have a couple of other 

355
00:13:13,204 --> 00:13:15,148
programs , Mr Chairman that I'd be 

356
00:13:15,148 --> 00:13:17,037
delighted to talk about in closed 

357
00:13:17,037 --> 00:13:19,315
session that are also extremely useful . 

358
00:13:19,315 --> 00:13:21,093
But overall , yeah , we benefit 

359
00:13:21,093 --> 00:13:22,926
significantly from this . We are 

360
00:13:22,926 --> 00:13:25,192
watching them adapt to Russia's 

361
00:13:25,202 --> 00:13:27,981
adaptations . So it's uh you know , 

362
00:13:27,992 --> 00:13:30,541
warfare as it goes on is a series of 

363
00:13:30,552 --> 00:13:33,062
moves and counter moves . And Russia's 

364
00:13:33,072 --> 00:13:35,182
military has evolved significantly 

365
00:13:35,192 --> 00:13:37,025
during this conflict and this is 

366
00:13:37,025 --> 00:13:39,248
helping us to keep up with it as well . 

367
00:13:39,248 --> 00:13:43,010
Thank you , uh General Van Os , uh you 

368
00:13:43,020 --> 00:13:44,780
have already been delivering a 

369
00:13:44,789 --> 00:13:48,239
substantial amount of material to uh 

370
00:13:48,729 --> 00:13:50,719
our forces in Europe that which is 

371
00:13:50,729 --> 00:13:53,280
transshipped to the Ukrainians . So , 

372
00:13:53,599 --> 00:13:55,950
uh you've got a lot of money tied up in 

373
00:13:55,960 --> 00:13:58,071
the supplemental . Is that accurate ? 

374
00:13:59,169 --> 00:14:01,169
Uh Senator ? Thanks for asking that 

375
00:14:01,169 --> 00:14:03,669
question . Uh I indeed , about $550 

376
00:14:03,679 --> 00:14:05,401
million of the supplemental is 

377
00:14:05,401 --> 00:14:07,735
earmarked for us Transportation Command . 

378
00:14:07,735 --> 00:14:09,820
Uh Mainly in response to uh un 

379
00:14:09,830 --> 00:14:12,169
unreimbursed work for the Middle East 

380
00:14:12,179 --> 00:14:14,690
after the events of October 7th . Um 

381
00:14:14,700 --> 00:14:16,533
However , we look , we work very 

382
00:14:16,533 --> 00:14:18,589
closely with uconn and the office of 

383
00:14:18,589 --> 00:14:20,478
Secretary of Defense to deal with 

384
00:14:20,478 --> 00:14:22,533
transportation costs associated with 

385
00:14:22,533 --> 00:14:24,589
Ukraine . And so if the supplemental 

386
00:14:24,589 --> 00:14:27,239
doesn't pass , uh you have to find ways 

387
00:14:27,250 --> 00:14:29,750
to pay for that in internally , which 

388
00:14:29,760 --> 00:14:31,871
would be very disruptive , I assume . 

389
00:14:32,369 --> 00:14:34,591
So that's absolutely correct . Not just 

390
00:14:34,591 --> 00:14:36,425
Transcom , but all uh all of the 

391
00:14:36,425 --> 00:14:38,647
services and combatant commands have it 

392
00:14:38,647 --> 00:14:40,313
have , uh have costs that are 

393
00:14:40,313 --> 00:14:42,313
unreimbursed at this point . Uh The 

394
00:14:42,313 --> 00:14:44,536
issue with Transportation Command is it 

395
00:14:44,536 --> 00:14:44,359
comes out of our working capital fund 

396
00:14:44,369 --> 00:14:46,369
and , and a working capital fund is 

397
00:14:46,369 --> 00:14:48,313
there in case we have an emergency 

398
00:14:48,313 --> 00:14:50,369
where we have to go somewhere around 

399
00:14:50,369 --> 00:14:52,591
the globe and not having funds in there 

400
00:14:52,591 --> 00:14:52,390
would slow down any response and 

401
00:14:52,400 --> 00:14:54,456
certainly reduce the options for the 

402
00:14:54,456 --> 00:14:56,400
secretary . I'll yield that by six 

403
00:14:56,400 --> 00:14:59,409
seconds to the ranking member , Senator 

404
00:14:59,419 --> 00:15:01,641
worker . Thank you . And I'll take it . 

405
00:15:01,641 --> 00:15:04,780
Uh General Cavalli . Um You just said , 

406
00:15:04,789 --> 00:15:06,679
if we don't come forward with 

407
00:15:06,750 --> 00:15:08,750
assistance from the United States , 

408
00:15:08,750 --> 00:15:11,119
Ukraine could actually lose this war . 

409
00:15:11,200 --> 00:15:14,590
Uh That implies that Ukraine could also 

410
00:15:14,599 --> 00:15:17,780
actually win this war . Uh I would 

411
00:15:17,789 --> 00:15:20,739
remind you and , and you don't need to 

412
00:15:20,750 --> 00:15:22,549
be reminded . But , uh , anyone 

413
00:15:22,559 --> 00:15:25,109
listening that there were voices in the 

414
00:15:25,119 --> 00:15:26,841
United States well intentioned 

415
00:15:26,841 --> 00:15:29,969
Americans in the late thirties and , uh 

416
00:15:29,979 --> 00:15:33,119
early on in , uh , in watching the 

417
00:15:33,130 --> 00:15:36,030
European war , uh , that said there was 

418
00:15:36,039 --> 00:15:39,000
no way that the United Kingdom could 

419
00:15:39,010 --> 00:15:42,840
win the war against , um , against 

420
00:15:42,849 --> 00:15:45,630
Germany , against Hitler's Germany , um 

421
00:15:45,640 --> 00:15:48,159
respected , well intentioned Americans 

422
00:15:48,169 --> 00:15:50,280
like Charles Lindbergh , who is still 

423
00:15:50,280 --> 00:15:52,502
held in high regard said that there was 

424
00:15:52,502 --> 00:15:54,929
no way we should help because the war 

425
00:15:54,940 --> 00:15:58,760
was already lost . Can Ukraine win this 

426
00:15:58,770 --> 00:16:01,580
war ? Yes , Senator , absolutely . 

427
00:16:01,909 --> 00:16:05,789
And um is it also true that while we're 

428
00:16:05,799 --> 00:16:07,855
being asked and our allies are being 

429
00:16:07,855 --> 00:16:10,859
asked to help Ukraine Russia's seeking 

430
00:16:10,869 --> 00:16:13,091
help also from other countries on their 

431
00:16:13,091 --> 00:16:15,202
side . Is that correct ? Absolutely . 

432
00:16:15,202 --> 00:16:17,460
And those countries include countries 

433
00:16:17,469 --> 00:16:20,739
that um have a , a malign 

434
00:16:20,750 --> 00:16:23,549
intent toward the United States who are 

435
00:16:23,559 --> 00:16:26,729
those countries ? A absolutely . First 

436
00:16:26,739 --> 00:16:28,739
in line is the People's Republic of 

437
00:16:28,739 --> 00:16:30,517
China , the Democratic People's 

438
00:16:30,517 --> 00:16:33,849
Republic of Korea and Iran , sir . Now , 

439
00:16:33,859 --> 00:16:37,090
um we have the , the Japanese uh 

440
00:16:37,099 --> 00:16:40,940
prime Minister in this capital city 

441
00:16:40,950 --> 00:16:43,409
today and I'll be attending along with 

442
00:16:43,549 --> 00:16:46,260
most of my colleagues , his joint 

443
00:16:46,270 --> 00:16:49,570
address to the Congress . Uh what do 

444
00:16:49,580 --> 00:16:52,020
the , what does the Japanese leadership 

445
00:16:52,030 --> 00:16:53,809
have to say ? And what tangible 

446
00:16:53,830 --> 00:16:56,219
indication have they given as to the 

447
00:16:56,229 --> 00:16:58,929
importance of the Ukraine Russia 

448
00:16:58,940 --> 00:17:02,710
conflict ? Uh Senator , um , in my role 

449
00:17:02,719 --> 00:17:04,719
as the Supreme Allied Commander for 

450
00:17:04,719 --> 00:17:07,979
Europe , I recently traveled to Japan 

451
00:17:07,989 --> 00:17:10,530
about a , about a month ago , sir , and 

452
00:17:10,540 --> 00:17:12,707
met with uh their chief of defense and 

453
00:17:12,707 --> 00:17:15,069
a number of high , high , highly placed 

454
00:17:15,079 --> 00:17:18,569
officials there . Um It's a part of 

455
00:17:18,579 --> 00:17:20,949
nato's burgeoning relationship with key 

456
00:17:20,959 --> 00:17:23,729
Indo Pacific allies . Um , they are 

457
00:17:23,739 --> 00:17:26,270
focused on the Ukraine question . They 

458
00:17:26,280 --> 00:17:28,650
are watching it very closely . They 

459
00:17:28,660 --> 00:17:30,771
understand that the stakes are high . 

460
00:17:30,771 --> 00:17:32,827
Are they helping in a tangible way ? 

461
00:17:32,827 --> 00:17:35,199
They're helping in intangible ways and 

462
00:17:35,209 --> 00:17:37,542
um some tangible ways ? Yes , sir . And , 

463
00:17:37,542 --> 00:17:39,939
and what about , um South Korea ? What 

464
00:17:39,949 --> 00:17:42,920
about Australia , sir ? They are all 

465
00:17:42,930 --> 00:17:45,130
focused on this question and all of 

466
00:17:45,140 --> 00:17:47,307
them are rendering intangible help and 

467
00:17:47,307 --> 00:17:50,040
some tangible help and um um some of it 

468
00:17:50,060 --> 00:17:52,250
are rendering help in terms of dollars 

469
00:17:52,260 --> 00:17:54,482
and cents or they're not . Absolutely . 

470
00:17:54,482 --> 00:17:56,729
Yes . Um Well , um 

471
00:17:57,030 --> 00:17:59,020
Ukraine um 

472
00:18:00,640 --> 00:18:03,500
seems to have a lot of fight in them . 

473
00:18:03,510 --> 00:18:05,566
Is it true that they've retaken over 

474
00:18:05,566 --> 00:18:07,788
half the territory seized by Russia two 

475
00:18:07,788 --> 00:18:10,260
years ago ? Yes , sir . And uh how , 

476
00:18:10,270 --> 00:18:13,780
how is it that they have 

477
00:18:13,790 --> 00:18:16,459
been so successful in the Black Sea ? 

478
00:18:16,469 --> 00:18:18,670
How is it that Ukraine has been so 

479
00:18:18,680 --> 00:18:20,829
successful against one of the most 

480
00:18:20,839 --> 00:18:23,006
powerful countries in the world in the 

481
00:18:23,006 --> 00:18:25,689
Black Sea ? And how , so it , it starts 

482
00:18:25,699 --> 00:18:28,619
with their determination to have access 

483
00:18:28,630 --> 00:18:30,686
to the Black Sea . They , so they're 

484
00:18:30,686 --> 00:18:32,574
determined . Secondly , they have 

485
00:18:32,574 --> 00:18:34,408
extremely talented engineers and 

486
00:18:34,408 --> 00:18:36,574
extremely talented scientists who have 

487
00:18:36,574 --> 00:18:38,979
devoted this portion of their lives to 

488
00:18:39,000 --> 00:18:41,111
the defense of the auditors may not , 

489
00:18:41,111 --> 00:18:43,760
may not be aware to what extent they 

490
00:18:43,770 --> 00:18:45,881
have been successful . So what , what 

491
00:18:45,881 --> 00:18:48,214
has their success in the Black Sea been ? 

492
00:18:48,214 --> 00:18:50,437
They've sunk more than 20% of the Black 

493
00:18:50,437 --> 00:18:52,437
Sea fleet , but more to the point , 

494
00:18:52,437 --> 00:18:54,659
they've damaged critical infrastructure 

495
00:18:54,659 --> 00:18:56,826
associated with its sustenance and its 

496
00:18:56,826 --> 00:18:59,159
maintenance and the net effect has been . 

497
00:18:59,159 --> 00:19:01,949
We do not see Russian surface ships 

498
00:19:01,959 --> 00:19:04,510
west of Crimea ever anymore . 

499
00:19:05,680 --> 00:19:09,430
Um And 

500
00:19:09,439 --> 00:19:11,439
ok , well , let's talk about burden 

501
00:19:11,439 --> 00:19:14,939
sharing . Um Are we being asked to do 

502
00:19:14,949 --> 00:19:17,420
more than anybody else in terms of our 

503
00:19:17,430 --> 00:19:20,670
capacity ? No , sir . Um We , we are 

504
00:19:20,680 --> 00:19:23,459
doing a fair share if you measure by um 

505
00:19:23,469 --> 00:19:26,160
by percentage of GDP how much 

506
00:19:26,170 --> 00:19:28,281
assistance we're giving . We actually 

507
00:19:28,281 --> 00:19:30,337
rank well below 15 . I think we're , 

508
00:19:30,337 --> 00:19:34,000
we're down around 14 to 15 of our 

509
00:19:34,010 --> 00:19:36,680
economy as compared to all of the other 

510
00:19:36,689 --> 00:19:38,880
allies who see the importance there . 

511
00:19:39,349 --> 00:19:43,160
Uh uh What do our friends and 

512
00:19:43,170 --> 00:19:45,503
people we want to be more friendly with ? 

513
00:19:45,503 --> 00:19:49,310
What do they think about 

514
00:19:50,369 --> 00:19:53,869
the um likelihood of America keeping 

515
00:19:53,880 --> 00:19:57,000
its word long term , sir . They believe 

516
00:19:57,010 --> 00:19:59,177
in America , they believe in America's 

517
00:19:59,177 --> 00:20:01,343
leadership . They believe in America's 

518
00:20:01,343 --> 00:20:03,121
consistent dedication to global 

519
00:20:03,121 --> 00:20:05,010
security and to European security 

520
00:20:05,010 --> 00:20:07,010
because they understand it's in our 

521
00:20:07,010 --> 00:20:09,010
interest . However , when they hear 

522
00:20:09,010 --> 00:20:11,232
things or see things from our country , 

523
00:20:11,232 --> 00:20:13,399
they can get nervous sometimes . Thank 

524
00:20:13,399 --> 00:20:15,510
you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank 

525
00:20:15,510 --> 00:20:17,677
you , Senator Worker Senator Shaheen , 

526
00:20:17,677 --> 00:20:19,788
please . Um General Cavalli , General 

527
00:20:19,788 --> 00:20:21,732
Van Vost . Thank you both for your 

528
00:20:21,732 --> 00:20:24,066
service and for being here this morning . 

529
00:20:24,066 --> 00:20:26,449
Um Senators Reed and Wicker have been 

530
00:20:27,069 --> 00:20:30,339
um very broad and 

531
00:20:30,349 --> 00:20:33,219
expansive in covering Ukraine , which I , 

532
00:20:33,229 --> 00:20:35,285
I appreciate their comments and your 

533
00:20:35,285 --> 00:20:37,451
responses to that . So I want to focus 

534
00:20:37,451 --> 00:20:39,530
on the Western Balkans where we're 

535
00:20:39,540 --> 00:20:41,859
seeing tensions rise and I appreciate 

536
00:20:41,869 --> 00:20:44,430
your attention to that . General Cavoli 

537
00:20:45,069 --> 00:20:48,969
um a persistent problem is 

538
00:20:49,060 --> 00:20:51,459
ensuring that U four and K four 

539
00:20:51,469 --> 00:20:54,089
missions um are adequately prepared to 

540
00:20:54,099 --> 00:20:56,359
respond to those security concerns . I 

541
00:20:56,369 --> 00:20:59,569
think um so far we have been the 

542
00:20:59,579 --> 00:21:01,523
missions have been relying on each 

543
00:21:01,523 --> 00:21:03,690
other as reserve forces . I think this 

544
00:21:03,690 --> 00:21:06,229
dual hatting is concerning and uh 

545
00:21:06,239 --> 00:21:08,729
especially as we see tensions increase 

546
00:21:08,739 --> 00:21:12,089
in both Kosovo and um 

547
00:21:12,099 --> 00:21:15,109
Bosnia . So can you talk about how ucom 

548
00:21:15,119 --> 00:21:17,286
is engaging with our European partners 

549
00:21:17,286 --> 00:21:19,230
to emphasize the need to establish 

550
00:21:19,230 --> 00:21:22,489
separate reserve forces um for U four 

551
00:21:22,500 --> 00:21:25,180
and K four . Y yes , ma'am . Absolutely 

552
00:21:25,189 --> 00:21:27,189
because it's an extremely important 

553
00:21:27,189 --> 00:21:29,420
question . And as you know , um NATO is 

554
00:21:29,430 --> 00:21:31,780
not a one problem alliance , we're not 

555
00:21:31,790 --> 00:21:33,846
a one problem country . And , and so 

556
00:21:33,846 --> 00:21:36,012
it's important to recognize that there 

557
00:21:36,012 --> 00:21:38,179
are other things going on in Europe um 

558
00:21:38,179 --> 00:21:40,179
that are , that are not good for us 

559
00:21:40,179 --> 00:21:42,290
national interests . They're also not 

560
00:21:42,290 --> 00:21:44,512
unrelated to the conflict in Ukraine as 

561
00:21:44,512 --> 00:21:46,679
you well know , Senator . Um the first 

562
00:21:46,679 --> 00:21:50,040
thing uh US U COM did was get the U COM 

563
00:21:50,050 --> 00:21:52,130
commander to persuade the Supreme 

564
00:21:52,140 --> 00:21:54,500
Allied commander um to do something 

565
00:21:54,510 --> 00:21:56,621
about this inside of NATO with regard 

566
00:21:56,621 --> 00:21:58,788
to the Reserve forces and everything . 

567
00:21:58,788 --> 00:22:01,680
Um So we have done a complete plan 

568
00:22:01,689 --> 00:22:05,119
review for K four specifically and it 

569
00:22:05,130 --> 00:22:07,739
is revealed that we need um not just 

570
00:22:07,750 --> 00:22:10,359
more forces but we need heavier forces . 

571
00:22:10,430 --> 00:22:12,541
We're in the process of sourcing that 

572
00:22:12,541 --> 00:22:14,430
right now nations are being quite 

573
00:22:14,430 --> 00:22:16,374
generous , but we will put heavier 

574
00:22:16,374 --> 00:22:18,597
equipment on the ground as well as more 

575
00:22:18,597 --> 00:22:20,708
people . The second thing we're doing 

576
00:22:20,708 --> 00:22:22,979
is we're untying the um the 

577
00:22:22,989 --> 00:22:25,319
relationship between the Reserve Forces 

578
00:22:25,329 --> 00:22:28,189
for the Eu mission , Althea in Bosnia 

579
00:22:28,199 --> 00:22:30,579
and Herzegovina and the K four mission . 

580
00:22:30,692 --> 00:22:32,722
Because uh as you pointed out and I 

581
00:22:32,732 --> 00:22:35,852
agree , um that that was an economy 

582
00:22:35,862 --> 00:22:38,029
that we can no longer afford to , to , 

583
00:22:38,029 --> 00:22:40,084
to share the Strategic Reserve Force 

584
00:22:40,084 --> 00:22:42,362
there . Um I'd like to call , um call 

585
00:22:42,371 --> 00:22:44,261
out France for being especially 

586
00:22:44,271 --> 00:22:46,212
generous . Um As you know , the 

587
00:22:46,222 --> 00:22:48,771
commander of the Althea mission is a 

588
00:22:48,781 --> 00:22:51,182
French Lieutenant General Hubert core . 

589
00:22:51,442 --> 00:22:53,812
He's also my vice chief of staff at the 

590
00:22:53,822 --> 00:22:56,913
Supreme headquarters . Um And uh in 

591
00:22:56,923 --> 00:22:59,923
that dual hatted role , just like I can 

592
00:22:59,933 --> 00:23:02,264
dual hat , he benefits from his 

593
00:23:02,274 --> 00:23:04,385
relationship with France . France has 

594
00:23:04,385 --> 00:23:06,496
put the Charles de Gaulle offshore uh 

595
00:23:06,496 --> 00:23:08,404
in the Adriatic and has recently 

596
00:23:08,413 --> 00:23:10,904
deployed a battalion on a , an , an 

597
00:23:10,913 --> 00:23:14,443
operational deployment um for a medium 

598
00:23:14,453 --> 00:23:16,723
term . So they have upped their forces 

599
00:23:16,734 --> 00:23:19,067
especially important right now . As you , 

600
00:23:19,067 --> 00:23:21,067
you , you understand , because this 

601
00:23:21,067 --> 00:23:23,290
week in particular , the tensions are , 

602
00:23:23,290 --> 00:23:25,512
are , are significantly higher . So I'm 

603
00:23:25,512 --> 00:23:27,734
satisfied that we're in a good position 

604
00:23:27,734 --> 00:23:29,845
right now . Senator , but it's always 

605
00:23:29,845 --> 00:23:31,956
necessary to keep a very close eye on 

606
00:23:31,956 --> 00:23:34,776
it . We have run um at least two focus 

607
00:23:34,786 --> 00:23:37,296
collection missions to increase our 

608
00:23:37,306 --> 00:23:38,936
intelligence collection and 

609
00:23:38,946 --> 00:23:40,946
understanding of what's going on in 

610
00:23:40,946 --> 00:23:42,890
both of those countries . And I've 

611
00:23:42,890 --> 00:23:44,946
supported that from us U COM with uh 

612
00:23:44,946 --> 00:23:47,002
aerial ISR and other things we could 

613
00:23:47,002 --> 00:23:49,113
talk about in close session . Ma'am . 

614
00:23:49,113 --> 00:23:51,279
Great . I have several other questions 

615
00:23:51,279 --> 00:23:53,279
um specifically about the situation 

616
00:23:53,279 --> 00:23:55,446
there , but I'll save those for closed 

617
00:23:55,446 --> 00:23:57,446
sessions . So I can ask General Van 

618
00:23:57,446 --> 00:23:59,557
Vost a question about um the National 

619
00:23:59,557 --> 00:24:01,613
Guard Bureau's decision to level air 

620
00:24:01,613 --> 00:24:03,613
National Guard Units and the impact 

621
00:24:03,613 --> 00:24:05,668
that that's going to have across the 

622
00:24:05,668 --> 00:24:07,724
country . We're concerned about that 

623
00:24:07,724 --> 00:24:10,728
impact on the 157th Air refueling wing 

624
00:24:10,738 --> 00:24:12,849
in New Hampshire where we have the KC 

625
00:24:12,849 --> 00:24:16,060
40 Sixes . So , can you um ha have you 

626
00:24:16,069 --> 00:24:18,069
been briefed by the Guard Bureau on 

627
00:24:18,069 --> 00:24:20,069
what they're planning ? And are you 

628
00:24:20,069 --> 00:24:22,125
concerned about the impact that will 

629
00:24:22,125 --> 00:24:24,839
have on Transcom ? Uh Thanks Senator , 

630
00:24:24,849 --> 00:24:26,939
you know , uh as you know , uh two 

631
00:24:26,949 --> 00:24:29,060
thirds of our air refueling force are 

632
00:24:29,060 --> 00:24:31,282
in the Garden Reserve . They bring such 

633
00:24:31,282 --> 00:24:33,393
a great capability and absolute car . 

634
00:24:33,393 --> 00:24:35,393
We could not do our mission without 

635
00:24:35,393 --> 00:24:37,282
them . So this is an issue that's 

636
00:24:37,282 --> 00:24:39,338
emerging that I am tracking . I have 

637
00:24:39,338 --> 00:24:41,449
not been briefed by the International 

638
00:24:41,449 --> 00:24:43,616
Guard . However , we've looked at uh I 

639
00:24:43,616 --> 00:24:45,671
have no immediate concerns but as we 

640
00:24:45,671 --> 00:24:47,838
look into the out years as how this is 

641
00:24:47,838 --> 00:24:47,109
going to be leveled out and where the 

642
00:24:47,119 --> 00:24:49,341
capabilities are going , we're going to 

643
00:24:49,341 --> 00:24:51,508
track that very carefully , uh , for , 

644
00:24:51,508 --> 00:24:53,786
uh , for the guard . Well , again , um , 

645
00:24:53,786 --> 00:24:56,008
we're concerned that the 157th is going 

646
00:24:56,008 --> 00:24:59,609
to be affected and they , um , have , 

647
00:24:59,619 --> 00:25:02,770
um , major responsibility for , um , 

648
00:25:02,780 --> 00:25:05,550
refueling over , um , the North 

649
00:25:05,560 --> 00:25:08,630
Atlantic and , um , they have been 

650
00:25:08,640 --> 00:25:10,430
called in the past to help with 

651
00:25:10,439 --> 00:25:12,661
missions in Europe . So I hope you will 

652
00:25:12,661 --> 00:25:15,229
track that closely and that we can make 

653
00:25:15,239 --> 00:25:17,406
sure that doesn't affect their ability 

654
00:25:17,406 --> 00:25:19,461
to do their jobs . Yes , ma'am . The 

655
00:25:19,461 --> 00:25:21,572
157 has led the way for the guard for 

656
00:25:21,572 --> 00:25:23,461
integration of the KC 46 which is 

657
00:25:23,461 --> 00:25:25,628
absolutely the future of air fueling . 

658
00:25:25,628 --> 00:25:27,739
Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

659
00:25:27,739 --> 00:25:29,795
Thank you , Senator Senator Fisher , 

660
00:25:29,795 --> 00:25:31,850
please . Thank you , Mr Chairman and 

661
00:25:31,850 --> 00:25:34,072
thank you both for being here today and 

662
00:25:34,072 --> 00:25:36,128
thank you for your service , General 

663
00:25:36,128 --> 00:25:38,239
Van Os . The California Air Resources 

664
00:25:38,239 --> 00:25:40,017
Board has a proposal that would 

665
00:25:40,017 --> 00:25:42,239
significantly impact the ability of the 

666
00:25:42,239 --> 00:25:44,334
national rail network to support the 

667
00:25:44,344 --> 00:25:46,584
movement of Department of Defense 

668
00:25:46,594 --> 00:25:49,334
equipment and material deployment to 

669
00:25:49,344 --> 00:25:52,089
the West Coast . This proposal would 

670
00:25:52,099 --> 00:25:55,209
impose unrealistic emission standards 

671
00:25:55,219 --> 00:25:58,550
and require zero emission locomotives 

672
00:25:58,810 --> 00:26:01,199
which do not exist because that 

673
00:26:01,209 --> 00:26:05,030
technology is not even uh commercially 

674
00:26:05,040 --> 00:26:07,810
available at this point in time . And 

675
00:26:07,819 --> 00:26:10,400
this means that about 65% of the 

676
00:26:10,410 --> 00:26:12,079
nation's locomotives would be 

677
00:26:12,089 --> 00:26:15,310
prohibited from operating in California 

678
00:26:15,319 --> 00:26:18,250
starting in 2030 . What would the 

679
00:26:18,260 --> 00:26:21,189
operational impact be if railroads 

680
00:26:21,199 --> 00:26:23,880
could not service routes in California 

681
00:26:23,890 --> 00:26:26,680
or had to divert cargo to other areas 

682
00:26:26,689 --> 00:26:29,719
to meet the dod logistics requirements . 

683
00:26:31,900 --> 00:26:35,050
Senator , uh , we rely every day on 

684
00:26:35,060 --> 00:26:37,319
this nation's transportation network , 

685
00:26:37,329 --> 00:26:39,640
uh , whether it's seaports , it's rail 

686
00:26:39,650 --> 00:26:42,520
or its roads . So , and when I think 

687
00:26:42,530 --> 00:26:45,369
about uh the , the reduction in 

688
00:26:45,380 --> 00:26:47,436
capacity across California , I think 

689
00:26:47,436 --> 00:26:49,547
about , I have 15 nodes in California 

690
00:26:49,547 --> 00:26:51,790
that we use uh different and from two 

691
00:26:51,800 --> 00:26:54,510
different railroad lines and we have uh 

692
00:26:54,520 --> 00:26:57,849
five ports , one of which is our only 

693
00:26:57,859 --> 00:26:59,719
West Coast ammunition port for 

694
00:26:59,729 --> 00:27:01,729
containerized ammunition , which is 

695
00:27:01,729 --> 00:27:04,890
critical to our operational plans . And 

696
00:27:04,900 --> 00:27:07,122
of course , we have close relationships 

697
00:27:07,122 --> 00:27:09,178
with the railroad industry and so we 

698
00:27:09,178 --> 00:27:11,289
are working with them as , as this is 

699
00:27:11,289 --> 00:27:13,400
emerging and their understanding what 

700
00:27:13,400 --> 00:27:15,622
the implications are . Uh initially , I 

701
00:27:15,622 --> 00:27:17,733
believe that any increased costs will 

702
00:27:17,733 --> 00:27:19,956
be passed directly on to the customer , 

703
00:27:19,956 --> 00:27:22,178
but I am concerned about the technology 

704
00:27:22,178 --> 00:27:24,067
and their ability to recapitalize 

705
00:27:24,067 --> 00:27:26,233
between now , the readiness of now and 

706
00:27:26,233 --> 00:27:28,456
the readiness of future if they have to 

707
00:27:28,456 --> 00:27:30,567
transition . Have you expressed these 

708
00:27:30,567 --> 00:27:32,789
concerns to the administration ? I have 

709
00:27:32,789 --> 00:27:35,890
not . Do you plan to uh in my normal 

710
00:27:35,900 --> 00:27:38,067
course of action through the Secretary 

711
00:27:38,067 --> 00:27:40,289
of Defense ? If this is going to impact 

712
00:27:40,289 --> 00:27:42,400
national security ? I absolutely will 

713
00:27:42,400 --> 00:27:45,160
thank you . When um when we look at the 

714
00:27:45,170 --> 00:27:47,114
requirements that you have and the 

715
00:27:47,114 --> 00:27:50,170
plans that you have , if we are seeing 

716
00:27:50,180 --> 00:27:52,760
um conflict , take place in the Indo 

717
00:27:52,969 --> 00:27:55,640
Pacific . Uh how would , how would a 

718
00:27:55,650 --> 00:27:58,209
surge of forces be impacted 

719
00:28:00,199 --> 00:28:02,329
as when we think about options every 

720
00:28:02,339 --> 00:28:05,770
day ? Uh And we , we run several uh 

721
00:28:05,780 --> 00:28:07,780
several planning events and several 

722
00:28:07,780 --> 00:28:10,002
simulations that would occur around the 

723
00:28:10,002 --> 00:28:12,336
globe . These globally integrated plans . 

724
00:28:12,336 --> 00:28:14,447
Should we have to um search uh for an 

725
00:28:14,447 --> 00:28:16,630
event like the uh events after October 

726
00:28:16,640 --> 00:28:19,560
7th ? Uh And so we think about it and 

727
00:28:19,569 --> 00:28:21,625
we , we run these simulations and we 

728
00:28:21,625 --> 00:28:23,736
ensure that we have readiness for the 

729
00:28:23,736 --> 00:28:25,902
fleet . The most important thing is to 

730
00:28:25,902 --> 00:28:28,125
ensure not only do we have the capacity 

731
00:28:28,125 --> 00:28:30,347
but it's a credible capacity to operate 

732
00:28:30,347 --> 00:28:32,569
in the environment we expect to be in , 

733
00:28:32,569 --> 00:28:34,569
we expect it to be contested and an 

734
00:28:34,569 --> 00:28:36,625
example right there is the Red Sea . 

735
00:28:36,625 --> 00:28:38,847
Thank you , General Koi . I'm concerned 

736
00:28:38,847 --> 00:28:40,958
about the increasing cooper operation 

737
00:28:40,958 --> 00:28:43,180
between Russia , China , Iran and North 

738
00:28:43,180 --> 00:28:45,291
Korea , which we're seeing the impact 

739
00:28:45,291 --> 00:28:47,530
of in real time uh with Russia's war 

740
00:28:47,540 --> 00:28:50,800
against Ukraine . How is Ucom altering 

741
00:28:50,810 --> 00:28:53,180
its posture to address the strategic 

742
00:28:53,189 --> 00:28:55,479
dilemmas created by these partnerships ? 

743
00:28:57,130 --> 00:28:59,420
Thank you , Senator . Um The , the 

744
00:28:59,430 --> 00:29:01,208
first thing we've done is we've 

745
00:29:01,208 --> 00:29:03,959
responded to the Russian aggression by 

746
00:29:03,969 --> 00:29:06,739
bolstering our presence along with 

747
00:29:06,750 --> 00:29:09,780
nato's presence on the eastern flank . 

748
00:29:09,790 --> 00:29:11,901
We did that over the last two years . 

749
00:29:12,420 --> 00:29:14,969
NATO moved very quickly after the 

750
00:29:14,979 --> 00:29:17,201
invasion to establish new battle groups 

751
00:29:17,201 --> 00:29:19,550
and to increase the size of the 

752
00:29:19,560 --> 00:29:21,671
existing battle groups on the eastern 

753
00:29:21,671 --> 00:29:23,782
flank and to thicken the air policing 

754
00:29:23,782 --> 00:29:25,949
that is the air defense , um , efforts 

755
00:29:25,949 --> 00:29:27,949
that we were doing . US U COM was a 

756
00:29:27,949 --> 00:29:30,180
part of that . In fact , us U COM led 

757
00:29:30,189 --> 00:29:32,540
some of that with us unilateral , um , 

758
00:29:32,550 --> 00:29:34,829
deployments to that sort of seed corn 

759
00:29:34,839 --> 00:29:36,950
to get things going . We've continued 

760
00:29:36,950 --> 00:29:39,172
that and we've actually regularized the 

761
00:29:39,172 --> 00:29:41,283
procedures and those are gonna become 

762
00:29:41,283 --> 00:29:43,395
long term deployments that our allies 

763
00:29:43,395 --> 00:29:45,617
have out there . The second thing we've 

764
00:29:45,617 --> 00:29:48,469
been doing is , um , uh , tightening 

765
00:29:48,479 --> 00:29:50,701
our air and missile defense . I'm under 

766
00:29:50,701 --> 00:29:52,900
instruction from the um 32 heads of 

767
00:29:52,910 --> 00:29:55,132
state and government to tighten our air 

768
00:29:55,132 --> 00:29:57,299
and missile defense with regard to the 

769
00:29:57,299 --> 00:29:59,354
connections among the countries . We 

770
00:29:59,354 --> 00:30:01,410
work very closely with the , that is 

771
00:30:01,410 --> 00:30:03,466
these adversarial countries who have 

772
00:30:03,466 --> 00:30:05,577
formed this network . Um That's , you 

773
00:30:05,577 --> 00:30:07,910
know , profoundly against our interests . 

774
00:30:07,910 --> 00:30:09,966
We are working very closely with the 

775
00:30:09,966 --> 00:30:12,132
interagency across all the instruments 

776
00:30:12,132 --> 00:30:14,243
of national power to try to interrupt 

777
00:30:14,243 --> 00:30:16,734
that and to , and to , and to hinder 

778
00:30:16,744 --> 00:30:19,464
their ability to co-operate . We have 

779
00:30:19,474 --> 00:30:21,585
um based on my intelligence section , 

780
00:30:21,585 --> 00:30:23,585
my J two section , something called 

781
00:30:23,585 --> 00:30:25,752
task force champion , which focuses on 

782
00:30:25,752 --> 00:30:27,974
this question , those relationships and 

783
00:30:27,974 --> 00:30:30,196
feeds information to the interagency to 

784
00:30:30,196 --> 00:30:32,030
take action through a variety of 

785
00:30:32,030 --> 00:30:34,363
different means . Thank you . Thank you , 

786
00:30:34,363 --> 00:30:36,363
Mr Chairman . Thank you very much , 

787
00:30:36,363 --> 00:30:38,641
Senator Fisher , Senator Kane , please . 

788
00:30:38,641 --> 00:30:40,752
Thank you , Mr Chair and thank you to 

789
00:30:40,752 --> 00:30:42,918
our witnesses to General Van Vost . Um 

790
00:30:42,918 --> 00:30:45,141
In your written statement , you say the 

791
00:30:45,141 --> 00:30:47,030
dod s ability to project military 

792
00:30:47,030 --> 00:30:49,085
forces is inextricably linked to the 

793
00:30:49,085 --> 00:30:51,196
commercial industry , what we like to 

794
00:30:51,196 --> 00:30:53,307
call our fourth component um trends , 

795
00:30:53,307 --> 00:30:55,474
com's relationship with the commercial 

796
00:30:55,474 --> 00:30:57,530
sector is pretty unique . Talk about 

797
00:30:57,530 --> 00:30:59,752
the importance of our commercial sector 

798
00:30:59,752 --> 00:31:01,696
and challenges you have with uh in 

799
00:31:01,696 --> 00:31:03,696
working with commercial companies . 

800
00:31:03,696 --> 00:31:05,807
Thank you , Senator . Uh We cannot uh 

801
00:31:05,807 --> 00:31:08,030
do our job every day without our strong 

802
00:31:08,030 --> 00:31:10,197
commercial partnerships . In fact , uh 

803
00:31:10,197 --> 00:31:12,141
90% of our passengers flow through 

804
00:31:12,150 --> 00:31:14,317
commercial operations and day to day , 

805
00:31:14,317 --> 00:31:16,500
97% of our sustainment goes through 

806
00:31:16,510 --> 00:31:18,819
commercial sea lift . Uh So it , it is 

807
00:31:18,829 --> 00:31:21,040
absolutely significant . And while 

808
00:31:21,050 --> 00:31:23,050
that's the , the opportunity to use 

809
00:31:23,050 --> 00:31:24,772
them and use their networks is 

810
00:31:24,772 --> 00:31:26,494
significant and provides us an 

811
00:31:26,494 --> 00:31:28,217
asymmetric advantage . The top 

812
00:31:28,217 --> 00:31:30,383
vulnerability concern I have with them 

813
00:31:30,383 --> 00:31:32,494
is through cyber . Uh frankly , uh uh 

814
00:31:32,494 --> 00:31:34,272
we have heard even from the CIA 

815
00:31:34,272 --> 00:31:36,209
director uh that uh the PR C has 

816
00:31:36,219 --> 00:31:38,108
infiltrated some of the logistics 

817
00:31:38,108 --> 00:31:40,275
networks um of our , of our commercial 

818
00:31:40,275 --> 00:31:42,386
partners . So we've been working with 

819
00:31:42,386 --> 00:31:44,552
them on how to secure uh their , their 

820
00:31:44,552 --> 00:31:46,310
systems uh through the no cost 

821
00:31:46,412 --> 00:31:48,792
cybersecurity Collaboration Center and 

822
00:31:48,802 --> 00:31:50,802
the defense industrial Base uh work 

823
00:31:50,802 --> 00:31:52,858
that we've been doing and , and they 

824
00:31:52,858 --> 00:31:55,080
are paying attention at the CEO level . 

825
00:31:55,080 --> 00:31:56,969
That's great . Um In your written 

826
00:31:56,969 --> 00:31:58,913
statement , you also mentioned the 

827
00:31:58,913 --> 00:31:58,863
joint communications support element 

828
00:31:59,003 --> 00:32:01,192
which is part of the joint enabling 

829
00:32:01,203 --> 00:32:03,822
capabilities command in Norfolk . Why 

830
00:32:03,833 --> 00:32:06,000
do you mention them specifically ? And 

831
00:32:06,000 --> 00:32:07,833
how important is it that they be 

832
00:32:07,833 --> 00:32:09,333
recapitalized ? That joint 

833
00:32:09,333 --> 00:32:11,500
communication support element provides 

834
00:32:11,500 --> 00:32:13,500
deployable communications uh on air 

835
00:32:13,500 --> 00:32:16,135
land and sea in support of standing up 

836
00:32:16,145 --> 00:32:18,312
joint task forces . So if we go into a 

837
00:32:18,312 --> 00:32:20,534
crisis mode , they need to have the the 

838
00:32:20,534 --> 00:32:22,478
modernized equipment to be able to 

839
00:32:22,478 --> 00:32:24,645
support the joint task force commander 

840
00:32:24,645 --> 00:32:26,812
uh around the world . And we have done 

841
00:32:26,812 --> 00:32:28,978
that multiple times here , I would say 

842
00:32:28,978 --> 00:32:28,406
in , in the past couple of years . So 

843
00:32:28,416 --> 00:32:30,194
we need to make sure that their 

844
00:32:30,194 --> 00:32:32,416
equipment is modernized . Thank you for 

845
00:32:32,416 --> 00:32:34,527
that General Cavoli . Um talk to us a 

846
00:32:34,527 --> 00:32:36,749
little bit about how Sweden and Finland 

847
00:32:36,749 --> 00:32:38,916
are integrating into the existing NATO 

848
00:32:38,916 --> 00:32:40,805
military structure . Absolutely , 

849
00:32:40,805 --> 00:32:43,000
thanks uh Senator . So um first , I 

850
00:32:43,010 --> 00:32:44,899
think it's important to note that 

851
00:32:44,899 --> 00:32:47,250
Finland and Sweden have been 

852
00:32:47,260 --> 00:32:50,479
cooperating for years with NATO . Um 

853
00:32:50,489 --> 00:32:54,310
not just in training but in operations . 

854
00:32:54,589 --> 00:32:57,810
They've also been very close um closely 

855
00:32:57,819 --> 00:33:00,229
tied to the United States in bilateral 

856
00:33:00,239 --> 00:33:02,760
agreements . They're also closely tied 

857
00:33:02,770 --> 00:33:05,390
among the Nordic countries through 

858
00:33:05,400 --> 00:33:07,400
multilateral arrangements that they 

859
00:33:07,400 --> 00:33:09,456
have among themselves . All of those 

860
00:33:09,456 --> 00:33:12,319
things made it extremely easy to 

861
00:33:12,329 --> 00:33:15,689
integrate those two nations militarily 

862
00:33:15,810 --> 00:33:18,709
into the alliance , sir . Um The um 

863
00:33:18,719 --> 00:33:20,910
Supreme Allied Command Transformation 

864
00:33:21,000 --> 00:33:23,020
is formally responsible for the 

865
00:33:23,030 --> 00:33:25,589
integration effort and the integration 

866
00:33:25,599 --> 00:33:28,920
um uh documentation that was completed 

867
00:33:28,930 --> 00:33:31,760
in record time um for , for Finland and 

868
00:33:31,770 --> 00:33:33,937
will be for Sweden as well . They have 

869
00:33:33,937 --> 00:33:36,160
already been incorporated into the 

870
00:33:36,170 --> 00:33:38,281
regional plans that NATO has approved 

871
00:33:38,281 --> 00:33:40,503
in the past year . Um In fact , it took 

872
00:33:40,503 --> 00:33:42,726
less than five days for us to bring the 

873
00:33:42,726 --> 00:33:45,599
uh bring the um the inclusion of Sweden 

874
00:33:45,609 --> 00:33:47,720
for to the North Atlantic Council and 

875
00:33:47,720 --> 00:33:49,831
register that as a as an amendment to 

876
00:33:49,831 --> 00:33:51,998
the plans . So overall , it's all been 

877
00:33:51,998 --> 00:33:54,689
extremely easy um because we have such 

878
00:33:54,699 --> 00:33:56,755
a long history with them and because 

879
00:33:56,755 --> 00:33:58,921
they have invested in defense over the 

880
00:33:58,921 --> 00:34:02,430
years . Um So , uh you know , defense 

881
00:34:02,439 --> 00:34:04,661
investment has not been the strong suit 

882
00:34:04,661 --> 00:34:07,189
of uh of many nations in Europe over 

883
00:34:07,199 --> 00:34:09,669
the last 40 years , but it has been in 

884
00:34:09,679 --> 00:34:12,449
Finland in particular . And Sweden has 

885
00:34:12,459 --> 00:34:14,780
a radically stepped up uh defense 

886
00:34:14,790 --> 00:34:17,012
budget right now . So both of them have 

887
00:34:17,012 --> 00:34:19,610
maintained high capabilities and good 

888
00:34:19,620 --> 00:34:21,787
capacity and they're really welcome in 

889
00:34:21,787 --> 00:34:23,731
the alliance , sir . Well , I know 

890
00:34:23,731 --> 00:34:25,620
everyone on this , this committee 

891
00:34:25,620 --> 00:34:27,842
understands this , but for the public , 

892
00:34:27,842 --> 00:34:29,731
if you'd gone back five years and 

893
00:34:29,731 --> 00:34:31,620
polled in Sweden or Finland about 

894
00:34:31,620 --> 00:34:33,787
whether they wanted to join NATO , you 

895
00:34:33,787 --> 00:34:35,898
would have been lucky to get to 25% . 

896
00:34:35,898 --> 00:34:37,731
Yes . Um The Russian invasion of 

897
00:34:37,731 --> 00:34:39,731
Ukraine uh has caused the scales to 

898
00:34:39,731 --> 00:34:41,787
fall from folks' eyes about what the 

899
00:34:41,787 --> 00:34:44,760
likely threat scenario is and the uh 

900
00:34:44,770 --> 00:34:46,919
deep desire of Sweden and Finland to 

901
00:34:46,929 --> 00:34:49,520
join NATO . Demonstrates a reality we 

902
00:34:49,530 --> 00:34:51,141
have to be aware of and also 

903
00:34:51,141 --> 00:34:53,252
demonstrates the vitality of NATO and 

904
00:34:53,252 --> 00:34:55,197
other organizations of like-minded 

905
00:34:55,197 --> 00:34:57,363
democracies . Let me ask you one other 

906
00:34:57,363 --> 00:34:59,252
question . The Radford Arsenal in 

907
00:34:59,252 --> 00:35:01,308
Virginia produces munitions that are 

908
00:35:01,308 --> 00:35:03,530
critical to the battle in Ukraine . But 

909
00:35:03,530 --> 00:35:05,363
I think it's also important that 

910
00:35:05,363 --> 00:35:07,141
munitions be produced closer to 

911
00:35:07,141 --> 00:35:09,252
theaters of war . Talk about your dis 

912
00:35:09,252 --> 00:35:11,363
uh , discussions with our NATO allies 

913
00:35:11,363 --> 00:35:13,474
about munitions production ramping up 

914
00:35:13,474 --> 00:35:15,586
in Europe . This is something we talk 

915
00:35:15,586 --> 00:35:17,530
about a lot senator , as you might 

916
00:35:17,530 --> 00:35:20,860
imagine . Um , right now , Ukraine for 

917
00:35:20,870 --> 00:35:23,459
155 millimeter shells is mainly 

918
00:35:23,469 --> 00:35:25,770
dependent on us . Production . Uh 

919
00:35:25,780 --> 00:35:28,500
European production has just not gotten 

920
00:35:28,510 --> 00:35:31,149
up and running yet . It is increasing , 

921
00:35:31,189 --> 00:35:33,411
it's increasing and there are certainly 

922
00:35:33,411 --> 00:35:35,411
plans and investments to make it go 

923
00:35:35,411 --> 00:35:37,522
faster , but they're still ramping it 

924
00:35:37,522 --> 00:35:39,949
up . Some countries have converted 

925
00:35:39,959 --> 00:35:42,189
former factories very rapidly . 

926
00:35:42,399 --> 00:35:44,889
Slovakia . I would point to here is 

927
00:35:44,899 --> 00:35:47,540
producing a significant amount of 155 

928
00:35:47,550 --> 00:35:50,330
NATO standard um ammunition right now . 

929
00:35:50,340 --> 00:35:52,562
But really , there's a lot of work left 

930
00:35:52,562 --> 00:35:54,550
to be done . The EU and NATO are 

931
00:35:54,560 --> 00:35:56,989
cooperating closely on lifting 

932
00:35:57,000 --> 00:35:59,167
production and I believe they're going 

933
00:35:59,167 --> 00:36:01,167
to break down some barriers and get 

934
00:36:01,167 --> 00:36:03,389
that going . I do think it's gonna be a 

935
00:36:03,389 --> 00:36:05,500
few months before we see us levels of 

936
00:36:05,500 --> 00:36:07,790
production now . Um Related to that . 

937
00:36:07,800 --> 00:36:11,000
Senator is the , I'm sorry , sir , sir . 

938
00:36:13,780 --> 00:36:16,002
Thank you very much . Uh Senator Kane , 

939
00:36:16,002 --> 00:36:18,224
Senator Ernst , please . Thank you , Mr 

940
00:36:18,224 --> 00:36:20,530
Chair and uh thank you , General Van 

941
00:36:20,830 --> 00:36:22,886
Ost and thank you General Cavoli for 

942
00:36:22,886 --> 00:36:25,280
being here today . Um I want to thank 

943
00:36:25,290 --> 00:36:27,457
both of you for your continued service 

944
00:36:27,457 --> 00:36:31,020
and commitment to Ukraine . Um It has 

945
00:36:31,030 --> 00:36:33,086
been a very difficult time and , and 

946
00:36:33,086 --> 00:36:35,308
General Cavoli , I'll , I'll start with 

947
00:36:35,308 --> 00:36:37,850
you um because I did just return from a 

948
00:36:37,860 --> 00:36:41,189
trip uh to Poland um Ukraine where I 

949
00:36:41,199 --> 00:36:43,969
spent three days uh with a delegation 

950
00:36:44,080 --> 00:36:46,679
traveling across the country into many 

951
00:36:46,689 --> 00:36:48,870
different areas and then on to , into 

952
00:36:48,879 --> 00:36:51,419
Moldova , which is one of those other 

953
00:36:51,429 --> 00:36:53,850
areas that's uh pretty tenuous right 

954
00:36:53,860 --> 00:36:57,169
now . Um It's pretty clear that the 

955
00:36:57,179 --> 00:36:59,469
American political system has been very 

956
00:36:59,479 --> 00:37:02,699
ineffective in providing uh the needed 

957
00:37:02,709 --> 00:37:05,770
support to a fellow democracy there in 

958
00:37:05,780 --> 00:37:09,100
Ukraine . So as we await , the house's 

959
00:37:09,110 --> 00:37:11,580
uh finalized decision on a supplemental 

960
00:37:11,590 --> 00:37:15,050
package . Uh what more can you do in 

961
00:37:15,060 --> 00:37:18,060
your role uh to leverage assistance 

962
00:37:18,070 --> 00:37:21,050
from friends and allied nations in 

963
00:37:21,060 --> 00:37:23,540
Europe or other areas to provide 

964
00:37:23,550 --> 00:37:27,439
support for Ukraine . Um We worked that 

965
00:37:27,449 --> 00:37:29,449
very , very hard , Senator . As you 

966
00:37:29,449 --> 00:37:31,671
know , first of all , I would point out 

967
00:37:31,671 --> 00:37:35,050
that um the principal coordinating 

968
00:37:35,060 --> 00:37:38,800
mechanism for uh aggregating Ukrainian 

969
00:37:38,810 --> 00:37:41,639
demand and presenting it to allies and 

970
00:37:41,649 --> 00:37:44,729
partners and soliciting their help and 

971
00:37:44,739 --> 00:37:46,919
their contributions has been led by 

972
00:37:46,929 --> 00:37:48,709
Secretary Austin since the very 

973
00:37:48,719 --> 00:37:51,629
beginning with the uh uh the U DC G , 

974
00:37:51,639 --> 00:37:53,810
the , the Ukraine donors coordinations 

975
00:37:53,820 --> 00:37:55,830
group , uh sometimes known as the 

976
00:37:55,840 --> 00:37:57,840
Ramstein Group because it sometimes 

977
00:37:57,840 --> 00:38:00,800
meets there . Um 50 nations just over 

978
00:38:00,810 --> 00:38:04,370
50 nations come together about every 

979
00:38:04,379 --> 00:38:07,449
six weeks . And um and we , we 

980
00:38:07,459 --> 00:38:09,830
coordinate at a ministerial level that 

981
00:38:09,840 --> 00:38:12,989
is preceded by weeks of hard work 

982
00:38:13,000 --> 00:38:15,050
between our policy staffs and their 

983
00:38:15,060 --> 00:38:18,050
policy staffs and US U COM . With the 

984
00:38:18,070 --> 00:38:21,010
SAU works very hard to get the 

985
00:38:21,020 --> 00:38:24,250
specifics of the Ukrainian demand and 

986
00:38:24,260 --> 00:38:26,482
their needs and consult with them about 

987
00:38:26,482 --> 00:38:28,649
what they need to bring that forward . 

988
00:38:28,709 --> 00:38:31,189
However , it , it it's difficult . A 

989
00:38:31,199 --> 00:38:33,366
lot of this is dependent on production 

990
00:38:33,366 --> 00:38:35,143
levels at this point , how much 

991
00:38:35,143 --> 00:38:37,199
ammunition we can produce , how many 

992
00:38:37,199 --> 00:38:39,199
missiles we can produce . And so in 

993
00:38:39,199 --> 00:38:41,199
that regard , I spend a lot of time 

994
00:38:41,199 --> 00:38:43,366
working with the Secretary General and 

995
00:38:43,366 --> 00:38:45,643
the secretariat at NATO um to increase , 

996
00:38:45,643 --> 00:38:47,421
to work with national Armaments 

997
00:38:47,421 --> 00:38:49,421
directors to increase the amount of 

998
00:38:49,421 --> 00:38:51,755
production we can do . Well , thank you . 

999
00:38:51,755 --> 00:38:51,409
I appreciate that . And I'm I'm glad 

1000
00:38:51,419 --> 00:38:53,641
that we do have partners that are , are 

1001
00:38:53,641 --> 00:38:55,475
stepping up and assisting . They 

1002
00:38:55,475 --> 00:38:57,770
understand how significant this is and 

1003
00:38:57,780 --> 00:39:01,129
what could happen to all of us . Um If 

1004
00:39:01,139 --> 00:39:03,239
Ukraine falls oftentimes , Americans 

1005
00:39:03,250 --> 00:39:05,250
are very short sighted , you know , 

1006
00:39:05,250 --> 00:39:08,020
what is our immediate need today ? Um 

1007
00:39:08,030 --> 00:39:10,000
What is our immediate want ? But I 

1008
00:39:10,010 --> 00:39:11,732
think there are very long term 

1009
00:39:11,732 --> 00:39:14,300
repercussions to our country . Should 

1010
00:39:14,310 --> 00:39:17,520
Ukraine fall . And uh I think we need 

1011
00:39:17,530 --> 00:39:19,697
to keep our eyes open as we're looking 

1012
00:39:19,697 --> 00:39:21,850
to the future and what will happen if 

1013
00:39:21,860 --> 00:39:23,899
we continue to allow countries like 

1014
00:39:23,909 --> 00:39:27,020
Russia like China , like Iran , like 

1015
00:39:27,030 --> 00:39:29,689
North Korea to continue to spread 

1016
00:39:29,699 --> 00:39:32,260
around this globe and the pressures it 

1017
00:39:32,270 --> 00:39:35,379
puts on our own nation . Um So I thank 

1018
00:39:35,389 --> 00:39:37,909
you for being such a , a great leader 

1019
00:39:37,919 --> 00:39:41,300
in this fight . Um I know that in the 

1020
00:39:41,310 --> 00:39:43,254
lead up to the Russian invasion of 

1021
00:39:43,254 --> 00:39:45,500
Ukraine , the intelligence community 

1022
00:39:45,510 --> 00:39:48,860
did declassify um a number of reports 

1023
00:39:48,870 --> 00:39:51,080
which shed light on Russia's true 

1024
00:39:51,090 --> 00:39:53,719
intentions and it was a very proactive 

1025
00:39:53,729 --> 00:39:55,896
approach and I'm , I'm really thankful 

1026
00:39:55,896 --> 00:39:58,118
for that and it helped us counter a lot 

1027
00:39:58,118 --> 00:40:00,340
of that Russian disinformation that was 

1028
00:40:00,340 --> 00:40:02,451
being pushed out there . And we still 

1029
00:40:02,451 --> 00:40:05,135
see a lot of Russian propaganda . Um 

1030
00:40:05,145 --> 00:40:07,534
Can you speak to how uh various 

1031
00:40:07,544 --> 00:40:09,705
information sharing programs are 

1032
00:40:09,715 --> 00:40:12,225
assisting us in , in pushing back 

1033
00:40:12,235 --> 00:40:14,314
against some of the common security 

1034
00:40:14,324 --> 00:40:16,685
challenges that are faced by Europe and 

1035
00:40:16,695 --> 00:40:18,764
our friends . Ye yes , ma'am . 

1036
00:40:18,774 --> 00:40:21,544
Absolutely . Um First of all , in terms 

1037
00:40:21,554 --> 00:40:23,649
of collection , um you know , the 

1038
00:40:23,659 --> 00:40:26,060
variety of ways we collect , we , we 

1039
00:40:26,070 --> 00:40:29,419
have to um we rely on access and , and 

1040
00:40:29,429 --> 00:40:33,100
geographical access um to other 

1041
00:40:33,110 --> 00:40:35,332
countries in order to be able to , to , 

1042
00:40:35,332 --> 00:40:37,669
to collect information . Um nations 

1043
00:40:37,679 --> 00:40:39,901
have been very generous with us and not 

1044
00:40:39,901 --> 00:40:41,969
just allies but partners as well in 

1045
00:40:41,979 --> 00:40:44,989
allowing us to uh to , to operate with 

1046
00:40:45,000 --> 00:40:47,300
and from uh their countries that has 

1047
00:40:47,310 --> 00:40:49,620
been invaluable frequently that leads 

1048
00:40:49,629 --> 00:40:52,199
to very high level and detailed 

1049
00:40:52,209 --> 00:40:54,739
information sharing programs . We have 

1050
00:40:54,750 --> 00:40:57,745
allies who have access that we do not 

1051
00:40:57,935 --> 00:41:00,157
and we have accesses that they do not . 

1052
00:41:00,157 --> 00:41:01,879
And so it's very much mutually 

1053
00:41:01,879 --> 00:41:03,991
beneficial . The last thing I'd say , 

1054
00:41:03,991 --> 00:41:06,102
ma'am is that the uh interaction with 

1055
00:41:06,102 --> 00:41:08,324
Ukraine and their security services has 

1056
00:41:08,324 --> 00:41:09,935
provided us a vast amount of 

1057
00:41:09,935 --> 00:41:12,364
information as well . Well , and I will 

1058
00:41:12,375 --> 00:41:14,715
yield back my five seconds uh Mr Chair , 

1059
00:41:14,725 --> 00:41:17,058
but thank you both for being here today . 

1060
00:41:17,058 --> 00:41:19,284
Thank you , Senator Senator King , 

1061
00:41:19,294 --> 00:41:22,199
please . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Uh 

1062
00:41:22,209 --> 00:41:24,360
Before beginning my questions . I'd 

1063
00:41:24,370 --> 00:41:26,639
like to ask unanimous consent to uh 

1064
00:41:26,649 --> 00:41:29,510
submit to the committee a graph which 

1065
00:41:29,520 --> 00:41:31,840
represents the contribution by GDP of 

1066
00:41:31,850 --> 00:41:34,030
the various countries . Uh That's been 

1067
00:41:34,040 --> 00:41:36,350
updated by the Keel Institute without 

1068
00:41:36,560 --> 00:41:38,782
objection . Thank you . What this graph 

1069
00:41:38,782 --> 00:41:41,510
shows is that in fact , uh Senator 

1070
00:41:41,520 --> 00:41:43,742
Wicker made the point . We were 15th in 

1071
00:41:43,742 --> 00:41:45,464
the , in the world in terms of 

1072
00:41:45,464 --> 00:41:47,464
contribution as percentage of GDP . 

1073
00:41:47,464 --> 00:41:49,669
It's actually more like 29th now 

1074
00:41:49,679 --> 00:41:51,679
according to updated data from this 

1075
00:41:51,679 --> 00:41:55,560
past January . Uh and it's interesting 

1076
00:41:55,659 --> 00:41:57,326
to look at the countries that 

1077
00:41:57,326 --> 00:41:59,215
contributions . The number one is 

1078
00:41:59,215 --> 00:42:01,437
Estonia , then Poland , then Latvia . I 

1079
00:42:01,437 --> 00:42:03,548
don't think it's any coincidence that 

1080
00:42:03,548 --> 00:42:05,492
the two out of the first three are 

1081
00:42:05,492 --> 00:42:08,080
countries that border Russia and they 

1082
00:42:08,090 --> 00:42:11,340
understand what the risk is . I 

1083
00:42:11,429 --> 00:42:14,229
commonly hear on the street in Maine , 

1084
00:42:14,239 --> 00:42:16,500
why are we doing this ? Putin isn't 

1085
00:42:16,510 --> 00:42:19,100
really going to keep going ? And my 

1086
00:42:19,110 --> 00:42:21,729
response is ask the Finns General 

1087
00:42:21,750 --> 00:42:25,600
Cavoli , what's the level of anxiety 

1088
00:42:25,610 --> 00:42:28,100
in Eastern Europe about Putin's 

1089
00:42:28,110 --> 00:42:31,270
intentions beyond Ukraine ? Very high 

1090
00:42:31,280 --> 00:42:34,000
senator ? Very high . You are correct . 

1091
00:42:34,010 --> 00:42:36,189
I agree . It's reflected in the number 

1092
00:42:36,199 --> 00:42:38,600
of donations they've given . So Eastern 

1093
00:42:38,610 --> 00:42:40,721
European countries have emptied their 

1094
00:42:40,721 --> 00:42:44,520
pockets for Ukraine . Um many countries 

1095
00:42:44,530 --> 00:42:47,310
in Europe share that um and the 

1096
00:42:47,320 --> 00:42:50,260
contributions from nations in Europe 

1097
00:42:50,270 --> 00:42:52,709
are very significant . Some of them 

1098
00:42:52,719 --> 00:42:55,679
have given 100% of what they have in a 

1099
00:42:55,689 --> 00:42:57,989
given category . One nation is given 

1100
00:42:58,000 --> 00:43:00,810
100% of its mobile artillery . Another 

1101
00:43:00,820 --> 00:43:02,909
nation has given all of its jet 

1102
00:43:02,919 --> 00:43:05,929
fighters and all of its tanks , the 

1103
00:43:05,939 --> 00:43:09,189
nation has given 40% of its high end 

1104
00:43:09,199 --> 00:43:11,149
air defense systems . So these are 

1105
00:43:11,159 --> 00:43:13,381
significant contributions . So the idea 

1106
00:43:13,381 --> 00:43:15,326
that the United States is the only 

1107
00:43:15,326 --> 00:43:17,548
person carrying the burden here is just 

1108
00:43:17,548 --> 00:43:19,659
absolute nonsense . That is correct . 

1109
00:43:19,659 --> 00:43:21,826
And it's , you know , when Switzerland 

1110
00:43:21,826 --> 00:43:23,881
is giving more to the cause than the 

1111
00:43:23,881 --> 00:43:26,103
United States in terms of percentage of 

1112
00:43:26,103 --> 00:43:26,050
GDP , I think that's , that , that 

1113
00:43:26,060 --> 00:43:28,870
makes a statement , Cyprus uh countries 

1114
00:43:29,010 --> 00:43:31,310
uh just go going down the list . Uh 

1115
00:43:31,820 --> 00:43:35,350
Sweden , Croatia , Hungary , Finland , 

1116
00:43:35,360 --> 00:43:37,527
Romania . These are the countries that 

1117
00:43:37,527 --> 00:43:40,270
know Russia and that's why they're in 

1118
00:43:40,280 --> 00:43:42,449
so deeply in this , in this conflict . 

1119
00:43:42,459 --> 00:43:46,399
Is that correct ? Yes . And going down 

1120
00:43:46,409 --> 00:43:48,631
some of the other arguments that I hear 

1121
00:43:48,631 --> 00:43:51,770
uh Ukraine can't win . It really 

1122
00:43:51,780 --> 00:43:53,780
appears to me that this is a battle 

1123
00:43:53,780 --> 00:43:57,429
between industrial capacity and , and 

1124
00:43:57,439 --> 00:44:01,219
being able to supply weapons . Russia 

1125
00:44:01,229 --> 00:44:03,285
has vastly increased its capacity to 

1126
00:44:03,285 --> 00:44:06,419
generate , for example , artillery 

1127
00:44:06,429 --> 00:44:08,229
ammunition . Uh 

1128
00:44:10,419 --> 00:44:13,090
can the Ukrainians win if they have 

1129
00:44:13,100 --> 00:44:16,429
sufficient material to carry this fight ? 

1130
00:44:17,310 --> 00:44:20,449
Absolutely . Senator , they have the 

1131
00:44:20,459 --> 00:44:22,729
skill , but most importantly , they 

1132
00:44:22,739 --> 00:44:25,699
have the determination to accomplish 

1133
00:44:25,709 --> 00:44:28,510
their goals . They need external 

1134
00:44:28,520 --> 00:44:30,850
support until they're able to generate 

1135
00:44:30,860 --> 00:44:34,290
their own industrial production . I 

1136
00:44:34,300 --> 00:44:36,467
agree with you that in a long war like 

1137
00:44:36,467 --> 00:44:40,209
this , it's in large part , a matter of 

1138
00:44:40,219 --> 00:44:43,360
industrial production of output . Um 

1139
00:44:44,290 --> 00:44:46,512
Once that output is achieved , the side 

1140
00:44:46,512 --> 00:44:49,000
with the greater determination will win 

1141
00:44:49,159 --> 00:44:51,469
and that would be Ukraine and if we 

1142
00:44:51,479 --> 00:44:54,510
fail to , to pass the supplemental and 

1143
00:44:54,520 --> 00:44:56,242
essentially walk away from our 

1144
00:44:56,242 --> 00:44:58,850
commitment to Ukraine , that's exactly 

1145
00:44:58,860 --> 00:45:01,138
what Putin wants . Is that not correct ? 

1146
00:45:01,138 --> 00:45:03,138
Oh , ab absolutely , Senator . Um , 

1147
00:45:03,138 --> 00:45:06,709
because we are now in critical areas , 

1148
00:45:06,719 --> 00:45:09,989
munitions , especially their main 

1149
00:45:10,000 --> 00:45:13,229
provider without our help right now . 

1150
00:45:13,739 --> 00:45:16,860
Um , they will not be able to stay in 

1151
00:45:16,870 --> 00:45:20,360
the fight and the 

1152
00:45:20,370 --> 00:45:22,090
Russians are , have an active 

1153
00:45:22,100 --> 00:45:24,530
disinformation campaign to convince our 

1154
00:45:24,540 --> 00:45:28,020
political system to essentially support 

1155
00:45:28,229 --> 00:45:30,173
Putin's war . Isn't that correct ? 

1156
00:45:30,439 --> 00:45:32,217
Senator , the Russians maintain 

1157
00:45:32,217 --> 00:45:33,995
extremely active disinformation 

1158
00:45:33,995 --> 00:45:36,469
programs . Um They always have and they 

1159
00:45:36,479 --> 00:45:38,590
always do , but they are in overdrive 

1160
00:45:38,590 --> 00:45:40,923
right now and we know that definitively . 

1161
00:45:41,300 --> 00:45:43,356
Thank you very much , General . Your 

1162
00:45:43,356 --> 00:45:45,244
testimony is very important . Gen 

1163
00:45:45,244 --> 00:45:47,467
General Van Os . I , I'm afraid I don't 

1164
00:45:47,467 --> 00:45:49,578
have a lot of time , but uh one thing 

1165
00:45:49,578 --> 00:45:51,689
you , as , as you were testifying , I 

1166
00:45:51,689 --> 00:45:53,578
was writing , do we have adequate 

1167
00:45:53,578 --> 00:45:55,800
logistics for conflict in the Pacific ? 

1168
00:45:55,800 --> 00:45:58,022
And you said we're at alarming levels , 

1169
00:45:58,022 --> 00:46:00,244
perhaps for the record , you could give 

1170
00:46:00,244 --> 00:46:03,239
us more detail on the dangerous level 

1171
00:46:03,250 --> 00:46:05,472
if there is conflict in Pacific because 

1172
00:46:05,472 --> 00:46:07,694
it's all gonna be all about logistics . 

1173
00:46:07,694 --> 00:46:09,528
And I'm very concerned about the 

1174
00:46:09,528 --> 00:46:11,639
decline of the sea left capacity . So 

1175
00:46:11,639 --> 00:46:13,861
I'm out of time . But if you could give 

1176
00:46:13,861 --> 00:46:16,028
us that on the record , I appreciate . 

1177
00:46:16,028 --> 00:46:15,629
Yes , certainly , I take it for the 

1178
00:46:15,639 --> 00:46:17,639
record . Thank you . Thank you , Mr 

1179
00:46:17,639 --> 00:46:19,750
Chairman . Thank you , Senator King . 

1180
00:46:19,750 --> 00:46:21,972
Uh Senator Scott , please . Thank you , 

1181
00:46:21,972 --> 00:46:24,195
Chairman . Well , first of all , Thanks 

1182
00:46:24,195 --> 00:46:26,361
both of you for being here . Thank you 

1183
00:46:26,361 --> 00:46:28,583
for your service . It's a tough time in 

1184
00:46:28,583 --> 00:46:30,806
the world . Uh It's a scary time . So , 

1185
00:46:30,806 --> 00:46:32,972
um G Cavalli , can you just talk about 

1186
00:46:32,972 --> 00:46:35,780
our troop posture in , um , in Europe ? 

1187
00:46:35,790 --> 00:46:37,901
And , you know , when I first came up 

1188
00:46:37,909 --> 00:46:40,076
here , the , I was at , uh , the media 

1189
00:46:40,076 --> 00:46:42,260
security conference and Germany 

1190
00:46:42,270 --> 00:46:44,270
basically said they're not going to 

1191
00:46:44,270 --> 00:46:46,270
meet their 2% . They don't have any 

1192
00:46:46,270 --> 00:46:46,219
interest in meeting their 2% . They're 

1193
00:46:46,229 --> 00:46:48,229
not gonna ever meet their 2% . They 

1194
00:46:48,229 --> 00:46:50,451
didn't care about meeting their 2% . We 

1195
00:46:50,451 --> 00:46:52,340
still have a lot of our allies in 

1196
00:46:52,340 --> 00:46:54,396
Europe , they're not willing to meet 

1197
00:46:54,396 --> 00:46:56,618
their 2% . And uh so they're completely 

1198
00:46:56,618 --> 00:46:58,760
dependent on our , our troops . So do 

1199
00:46:58,770 --> 00:47:00,881
you think we have troops in the right 

1200
00:47:00,881 --> 00:47:03,048
places or do you , how do you , how do 

1201
00:47:03,048 --> 00:47:04,826
you deal with the fact that you 

1202
00:47:04,826 --> 00:47:06,881
supposed to have these allies that , 

1203
00:47:06,881 --> 00:47:08,937
that say they care about the , the , 

1204
00:47:08,937 --> 00:47:11,048
their own defense ? And they wouldn't 

1205
00:47:11,048 --> 00:47:13,326
actually in theory come to our defense , 

1206
00:47:13,326 --> 00:47:13,280
but they're not even willing to invest 

1207
00:47:13,500 --> 00:47:15,722
uh even the 2% that they're investing . 

1208
00:47:16,239 --> 00:47:18,461
Thanks , Senator . This is obviously an 

1209
00:47:18,461 --> 00:47:21,979
extremely important um question . Um So 

1210
00:47:21,989 --> 00:47:24,560
there is , there remains a gap between 

1211
00:47:24,570 --> 00:47:26,939
say and do in parts of the alliance . 

1212
00:47:27,209 --> 00:47:30,169
Um However , that gap has been closing 

1213
00:47:30,179 --> 00:47:32,620
o over the last couple of years in 2014 , 

1214
00:47:32,850 --> 00:47:35,020
there were three nations that met 2% . 

1215
00:47:35,409 --> 00:47:38,570
Um Last year , there were 11 nations 

1216
00:47:38,580 --> 00:47:42,389
that met 2% this year . There are 20 

1217
00:47:42,399 --> 00:47:45,300
as of today , uh who meet 2% . Norway 

1218
00:47:45,310 --> 00:47:47,310
just dropped a letter declaring its 

1219
00:47:47,310 --> 00:47:49,421
intention to close that gap by June . 

1220
00:47:49,421 --> 00:47:51,477
And I believe there will be three or 

1221
00:47:51,477 --> 00:47:53,532
four more before June of this year . 

1222
00:47:53,532 --> 00:47:55,477
Who meet 2% . That's not everybody 

1223
00:47:55,477 --> 00:47:57,699
though , that's not everybody , some of 

1224
00:47:57,699 --> 00:48:00,429
the biggest ones and , and , um , they 

1225
00:48:00,439 --> 00:48:02,709
should meet 2% and we encourage them 

1226
00:48:02,719 --> 00:48:04,775
every day to meet 2% . The Secretary 

1227
00:48:04,775 --> 00:48:06,775
General is extremely active in that 

1228
00:48:06,775 --> 00:48:08,830
regard . Um , and , um , and , and I 

1229
00:48:08,830 --> 00:48:11,189
believe they will , but they need to , 

1230
00:48:12,120 --> 00:48:14,342
when you , when you look at the map and 

1231
00:48:14,342 --> 00:48:16,379
you look at where , you know , the 

1232
00:48:16,389 --> 00:48:18,889
Soviet Union is located and then you 

1233
00:48:18,899 --> 00:48:21,066
look at where our troops are . Does it 

1234
00:48:21,066 --> 00:48:23,066
make sense where our troops are ? I 

1235
00:48:23,066 --> 00:48:22,330
mean , should they , should we have 

1236
00:48:22,340 --> 00:48:25,360
troops closer to maybe in uh Latvia and 

1237
00:48:25,370 --> 00:48:27,780
Lithuania or Estonia rather than so 

1238
00:48:27,790 --> 00:48:29,790
many troops that we , we have in uh 

1239
00:48:29,790 --> 00:48:32,510
Germany ? Sure . So we have troops in 

1240
00:48:32,520 --> 00:48:35,699
Estonia and Latvia and Lithuania and 

1241
00:48:35,709 --> 00:48:38,580
Romania and Bulgaria and Hungary and 

1242
00:48:38,590 --> 00:48:40,949
Slovakia and Poland , sir . So , uh , 

1243
00:48:40,959 --> 00:48:42,737
we , we do have troops in those 

1244
00:48:42,737 --> 00:48:44,903
specifically the troops that we , um , 

1245
00:48:44,903 --> 00:48:47,237
that we searched for after the invasion . 

1246
00:48:47,237 --> 00:48:49,292
They're all went to the front as did 

1247
00:48:49,292 --> 00:48:51,403
large parts of the organizations that 

1248
00:48:51,403 --> 00:48:53,709
are already located in Europe . Um , 

1249
00:48:53,719 --> 00:48:55,830
the ones that are already assigned to 

1250
00:48:55,830 --> 00:48:57,997
Europe , I believe are the ones you're 

1251
00:48:57,997 --> 00:48:59,997
asking me about though , um uh guys 

1252
00:48:59,997 --> 00:49:02,108
like the second Cavalry regiment , um 

1253
00:49:02,108 --> 00:49:04,330
um um 31st Fighter Wing and people like 

1254
00:49:04,330 --> 00:49:06,386
that , those organizations routinely 

1255
00:49:06,386 --> 00:49:08,608
get deployed from their home station to 

1256
00:49:08,608 --> 00:49:10,552
other places to include to central 

1257
00:49:10,552 --> 00:49:12,889
command . Um There are advantages where 

1258
00:49:12,899 --> 00:49:14,899
there are right now because they're 

1259
00:49:14,899 --> 00:49:17,121
sitting on excellent infrastructure for 

1260
00:49:17,121 --> 00:49:19,232
training , readiness and deployment . 

1261
00:49:19,232 --> 00:49:21,455
So those are the forces that I can move 

1262
00:49:21,455 --> 00:49:23,830
to unpredictable points of trouble . Um 

1263
00:49:23,840 --> 00:49:26,179
And they're centrally located on really 

1264
00:49:26,189 --> 00:49:28,340
good deploy infrastructure . So it 

1265
00:49:28,350 --> 00:49:30,406
makes sense to me . Um However , the 

1266
00:49:30,406 --> 00:49:32,517
center of gravity of where our combat 

1267
00:49:32,517 --> 00:49:35,020
force in Europe is net net has moved 

1268
00:49:35,030 --> 00:49:37,500
significantly eastward . And that goes 

1269
00:49:37,510 --> 00:49:39,732
not just for us uconn , but that's true 

1270
00:49:39,732 --> 00:49:41,843
for the alliance as well . What about 

1271
00:49:41,843 --> 00:49:44,010
Poland ? Are you gonna get more troops 

1272
00:49:44,010 --> 00:49:46,066
in Poland ? Uh Sir , we got a ton of 

1273
00:49:46,066 --> 00:49:48,121
troops in Poland right now . There's 

1274
00:49:48,121 --> 00:49:50,232
someplace just shy of 10,000 which is 

1275
00:49:50,232 --> 00:49:52,177
up as you know , we have a defense 

1276
00:49:52,177 --> 00:49:52,070
cooper operation agreement with them . 

1277
00:49:52,280 --> 00:49:54,649
Um They'll build us infrastructure , 

1278
00:49:54,659 --> 00:49:56,770
they're in the process of building it 

1279
00:49:56,770 --> 00:49:58,826
right now . And as it comes online , 

1280
00:49:58,826 --> 00:50:00,937
we'll push forces in there um up to a 

1281
00:50:00,937 --> 00:50:03,350
brigade combat team . So the Air Force 

1282
00:50:03,360 --> 00:50:05,193
and Marines have done a good job 

1283
00:50:05,193 --> 00:50:07,416
planning and recapitalizing the reserve 

1284
00:50:07,416 --> 00:50:09,582
C 130 fleet yet . The Navy hasn't even 

1285
00:50:09,582 --> 00:50:11,582
started to recapitalize their C 130 

1286
00:50:11,582 --> 00:50:13,638
fleet . So , what do you think about 

1287
00:50:13,638 --> 00:50:15,749
that ? Do you think it's a mistake is 

1288
00:50:15,749 --> 00:50:17,693
that , are we , are we , we're not 

1289
00:50:17,693 --> 00:50:19,749
positioned properly with that . Uh , 

1290
00:50:19,749 --> 00:50:21,916
sir , I'm not really , uh , formi with 

1291
00:50:21,916 --> 00:50:24,082
the topic and , and , um , I , I think 

1292
00:50:24,082 --> 00:50:26,193
maybe the service could answer that a 

1293
00:50:26,193 --> 00:50:25,949
little bit better if you'd like , I 

1294
00:50:25,959 --> 00:50:28,070
could take it for the record or defer 

1295
00:50:28,070 --> 00:50:30,181
to them . Sir . I'll ask them . Thank 

1296
00:50:30,181 --> 00:50:30,110
you . Thanks both of you for your 

1297
00:50:30,120 --> 00:50:31,120
service . 

1298
00:50:35,739 --> 00:50:37,683
Thank you very much . Uh , Senator 

1299
00:50:37,683 --> 00:50:39,406
Scott , Senator Bal , please . 

1300
00:50:42,600 --> 00:50:46,189
Morning General , uh , generals . Uh , 

1301
00:50:46,199 --> 00:50:48,255
Thank you very much for your service 

1302
00:50:48,255 --> 00:50:50,899
and thanks for being here today . Um I , 

1303
00:50:50,909 --> 00:50:54,080
I know that you have talked a bit about 

1304
00:50:54,090 --> 00:50:57,560
the impact of the failure to pass the 

1305
00:50:57,570 --> 00:51:00,989
supplemental on the prospects for 

1306
00:51:01,000 --> 00:51:03,689
Ukraine and the likelihood of failure 

1307
00:51:04,110 --> 00:51:07,100
if the supplemental isn't passed . I 

1308
00:51:07,110 --> 00:51:09,332
wonder if you could look ahead a little 

1309
00:51:09,332 --> 00:51:12,719
bit beyond this supplemental and 

1310
00:51:12,729 --> 00:51:15,500
perhaps tell us in the longer range , 

1311
00:51:15,510 --> 00:51:18,419
whether you think additional aid is 

1312
00:51:18,429 --> 00:51:21,379
necessary and what form it would take ? 

1313
00:51:22,929 --> 00:51:26,060
Thank you , Senator . Um It will 

1314
00:51:26,070 --> 00:51:29,520
depend on production rates inside 

1315
00:51:29,530 --> 00:51:33,149
Ukraine and in um other allies . Uh 

1316
00:51:33,159 --> 00:51:36,699
So , uh as as this hearing is , has 

1317
00:51:36,709 --> 00:51:38,709
evolved , sir , I think it's become 

1318
00:51:38,709 --> 00:51:40,876
clear that that really , that level of 

1319
00:51:40,876 --> 00:51:43,510
industrial production is the key thing 

1320
00:51:43,520 --> 00:51:45,949
right now . Nations have given a lot 

1321
00:51:45,959 --> 00:51:48,699
from existing stocks , but as those go 

1322
00:51:48,709 --> 00:51:50,931
down , production becomes more and more 

1323
00:51:50,931 --> 00:51:52,959
important , not just in terms of um 

1324
00:51:52,969 --> 00:51:55,719
capital items like uh like large end 

1325
00:51:55,729 --> 00:51:57,729
items , like tanks and things , but 

1326
00:51:57,729 --> 00:52:00,239
also more importantly , consumables 

1327
00:52:00,250 --> 00:52:02,810
like ammunition and missiles . And 

1328
00:52:02,820 --> 00:52:05,010
things like that . So the rate of 

1329
00:52:05,020 --> 00:52:07,131
industrial production is gonna be the 

1330
00:52:07,131 --> 00:52:09,353
real answer to that question , how much 

1331
00:52:09,353 --> 00:52:11,520
more will be required . And when sir , 

1332
00:52:11,520 --> 00:52:15,239
my understanding is that the attack 

1333
00:52:15,250 --> 00:52:18,620
last night , uh , or maybe it was , I 

1334
00:52:18,629 --> 00:52:21,290
guess it was last night in Ukraine , uh , 

1335
00:52:21,439 --> 00:52:23,350
showed again the 

1336
00:52:25,570 --> 00:52:29,030
real dearth of air defense 

1337
00:52:29,360 --> 00:52:33,070
and the , and the impact of the ongoing 

1338
00:52:33,080 --> 00:52:36,219
rain of terror from the skies . Uh Is 

1339
00:52:36,229 --> 00:52:39,149
there not any uh 

1340
00:52:39,159 --> 00:52:42,790
possibility of right away providing 

1341
00:52:42,800 --> 00:52:45,570
more patriot missiles , more air 

1342
00:52:45,580 --> 00:52:49,469
defense since , as I traveled around 

1343
00:52:49,479 --> 00:52:52,770
Europe and in Poland , there were a lot 

1344
00:52:52,780 --> 00:52:55,110
of patriot missiles guarding sites and 

1345
00:52:55,209 --> 00:52:57,320
obviously they need to be there . But 

1346
00:52:57,320 --> 00:52:59,542
I'm just wondering whether , you know , 

1347
00:52:59,542 --> 00:53:02,659
34 or five of those patriot missiles uh 

1348
00:53:02,669 --> 00:53:04,947
facilities would make a big difference , 

1349
00:53:04,947 --> 00:53:08,879
sir , you know , three parts to the air 

1350
00:53:08,889 --> 00:53:11,080
defense question , radars , launchers 

1351
00:53:11,090 --> 00:53:13,146
and the missiles to shoot out of the 

1352
00:53:13,146 --> 00:53:15,429
launchers . Um We , we approach all of 

1353
00:53:15,439 --> 00:53:17,739
those um sometimes together and 

1354
00:53:17,750 --> 00:53:19,709
sometimes in part right now , the 

1355
00:53:19,719 --> 00:53:22,850
Ukrainians could use um their launchers 

1356
00:53:22,860 --> 00:53:24,971
aren't the most important thing . The 

1357
00:53:24,971 --> 00:53:27,082
missiles are the most important thing 

1358
00:53:27,082 --> 00:53:29,193
and we're soliciting those around the 

1359
00:53:29,193 --> 00:53:31,304
office of the Secretary of Defense is 

1360
00:53:31,304 --> 00:53:33,527
extremely actively looking for patriots 

1361
00:53:33,527 --> 00:53:35,527
right now . Um You're correct . The 

1362
00:53:35,527 --> 00:53:37,510
attack last night did was an 

1363
00:53:37,520 --> 00:53:39,850
illustration of why it's so important 

1364
00:53:39,860 --> 00:53:42,027
for us to keep funding right now . The 

1365
00:53:42,027 --> 00:53:44,399
main source of high end interceptors 

1366
00:53:44,409 --> 00:53:46,631
against ballistic missiles and high end 

1367
00:53:46,631 --> 00:53:48,853
cruise missiles it is the United States 

1368
00:53:48,853 --> 00:53:50,965
because we have the inventory and the 

1369
00:53:50,965 --> 00:53:52,687
production capability . Um And 

1370
00:53:52,687 --> 00:53:54,576
therefore that supplemental is so 

1371
00:53:54,576 --> 00:53:56,742
important without it . The attack last 

1372
00:53:56,742 --> 00:53:59,239
night , which included at least tu uh 

1373
00:53:59,250 --> 00:54:02,889
10 tu 95 heavy bombers launching 

1374
00:54:02,899 --> 00:54:06,399
everything they had simultaneously . Um 

1375
00:54:06,790 --> 00:54:09,012
an attack like that last night would go 

1376
00:54:09,012 --> 00:54:11,179
totally , almost totally undefended un 

1377
00:54:11,179 --> 00:54:13,346
until machine guns tried to shoot down 

1378
00:54:13,346 --> 00:54:15,568
the cruise missiles . So this is , this 

1379
00:54:15,568 --> 00:54:17,639
is vital , sir . Thank you . Um 

1380
00:54:18,080 --> 00:54:20,120
Separately , uh 

1381
00:54:22,310 --> 00:54:25,409
I'm uh chairman of a sub-committee of 

1382
00:54:25,419 --> 00:54:27,586
the Homeland Security Committee called 

1383
00:54:27,586 --> 00:54:29,197
the Permanent subcomittee on 

1384
00:54:29,197 --> 00:54:31,689
investigation , which is conducting an 

1385
00:54:31,699 --> 00:54:35,030
investigation of American 

1386
00:54:35,040 --> 00:54:37,239
chips , semiconductors , parts and 

1387
00:54:37,250 --> 00:54:39,949
components that are commonly found in 

1388
00:54:40,340 --> 00:54:44,090
Russian missiles , drones . And I'm 

1389
00:54:44,100 --> 00:54:46,729
sure you're familiar with this issue . 

1390
00:54:46,739 --> 00:54:50,120
Uh President Zelinski on my last trip , 

1391
00:54:50,129 --> 00:54:52,830
uh The chairman was with me , literally 

1392
00:54:52,840 --> 00:54:56,239
handed me a folder of photographs and 

1393
00:54:56,250 --> 00:54:59,169
charts showing the different components 

1394
00:54:59,179 --> 00:55:01,929
in Russian ballistics , uh drones and 

1395
00:55:01,939 --> 00:55:04,620
missiles . And we had a hearing 

1396
00:55:04,629 --> 00:55:06,573
yesterday in the Homeland Security 

1397
00:55:06,573 --> 00:55:09,610
Committee showing how porous our export 

1398
00:55:09,620 --> 00:55:12,439
controls are . And we've had a hearing 

1399
00:55:12,449 --> 00:55:15,489
and data has come to our attention 

1400
00:55:15,500 --> 00:55:19,229
showing how American companies four or 

1401
00:55:19,239 --> 00:55:21,959
five in particular are selling 

1402
00:55:23,750 --> 00:55:25,861
goods with these parts and components 

1403
00:55:25,861 --> 00:55:28,129
that then find their way into uh 

1404
00:55:28,139 --> 00:55:31,330
Russian munitions . Uh Is that your 

1405
00:55:31,340 --> 00:55:33,173
experience ? And do you have any 

1406
00:55:33,173 --> 00:55:35,173
suggestions for us as to what to be 

1407
00:55:35,173 --> 00:55:37,229
done about it ? Um So we worked that 

1408
00:55:37,229 --> 00:55:39,451
very hard in the interagency , sir . Um 

1409
00:55:39,451 --> 00:55:41,562
I don't have specific suggestions for 

1410
00:55:41,562 --> 00:55:43,618
how to do it better . But I can tell 

1411
00:55:43,618 --> 00:55:45,729
you that it is absolutely critical if 

1412
00:55:45,729 --> 00:55:47,729
the current war is a competition of 

1413
00:55:47,729 --> 00:55:49,989
production , our ability to handle the 

1414
00:55:50,000 --> 00:55:52,129
Russian threat in the future is going 

1415
00:55:52,139 --> 00:55:54,449
to depend on us being able to 

1416
00:55:54,699 --> 00:55:57,489
constitute forces faster than they can . 

1417
00:55:57,500 --> 00:55:59,556
Part of that is preventing them from 

1418
00:55:59,556 --> 00:56:01,722
constituting forces quickly and to the 

1419
00:56:01,722 --> 00:56:03,778
extent that they're using components 

1420
00:56:03,778 --> 00:56:05,944
that should be sanctioned and banned . 

1421
00:56:05,944 --> 00:56:08,222
It's regrettable and we need to fix it , 

1422
00:56:08,222 --> 00:56:10,333
sir . Thank you . I really appreciate 

1423
00:56:10,333 --> 00:56:12,729
your , your answers to my questions and 

1424
00:56:12,739 --> 00:56:15,659
to my colleagues and you're very 

1425
00:56:15,669 --> 00:56:17,891
excellent service to our nation . Thank 

1426
00:56:17,891 --> 00:56:20,780
you . Thank you very much , Senator 

1427
00:56:20,790 --> 00:56:22,679
Blumenthal . Senator Tuberville , 

1428
00:56:22,679 --> 00:56:24,901
please . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Good 

1429
00:56:24,901 --> 00:56:27,250
morning . Good morning . Both of you um 

1430
00:56:29,030 --> 00:56:31,530
general uh since the uh Crocus uh 

1431
00:56:31,540 --> 00:56:34,449
massacre , I guess I was in Moscow 

1432
00:56:34,459 --> 00:56:37,270
somewhere around there . Uh They picked , 

1433
00:56:37,280 --> 00:56:39,719
uh Russia's picked up their pace in 

1434
00:56:39,729 --> 00:56:41,285
Ukraine . Is that correct ? 

1435
00:56:43,709 --> 00:56:45,320
Um Yes , I'm not sure it's a 

1436
00:56:45,320 --> 00:56:47,487
consequence of that though , but yes , 

1437
00:56:47,487 --> 00:56:49,459
sir . Yeah , uh with uh secretary 

1438
00:56:49,489 --> 00:56:52,310
Lincoln coming out a couple of weeks 

1439
00:56:52,320 --> 00:56:55,110
ago basically saying that uh Ukraine 

1440
00:56:55,120 --> 00:56:57,679
will be in NATO . Uh I'm sure that 

1441
00:56:57,689 --> 00:57:00,699
didn't fly too well in , in Russia . So 

1442
00:57:01,209 --> 00:57:03,629
it's obvious to me just being in all 

1443
00:57:03,639 --> 00:57:06,820
these meetings uh and hearings , not 

1444
00:57:06,830 --> 00:57:08,941
just you other people , we're getting 

1445
00:57:08,941 --> 00:57:11,120
ready to go to war with Russia . Uh 

1446
00:57:12,429 --> 00:57:14,596
Have we got a game plan for that ? For 

1447
00:57:14,596 --> 00:57:16,818
how many people we're gonna need on the 

1448
00:57:16,818 --> 00:57:18,873
ground , young men and women from uh 

1449
00:57:18,873 --> 00:57:21,199
United States . When this war starts , 

1450
00:57:21,629 --> 00:57:23,889
sir , we have standing operational 

1451
00:57:23,899 --> 00:57:26,739
plans um around the globe for a variety 

1452
00:57:26,750 --> 00:57:30,149
of problems and I I am , I am , I mean , 

1453
00:57:30,159 --> 00:57:32,159
you think it's gonna take for us to 

1454
00:57:32,159 --> 00:57:34,492
beat Russia . Ukraine can't beat Russia . 

1455
00:57:34,492 --> 00:57:36,381
Can I take that in closed session 

1456
00:57:36,381 --> 00:57:38,715
please , sir ? Uh What about the budget ? 

1457
00:57:38,715 --> 00:57:40,937
60 60 billion is gonna be a drop in the 

1458
00:57:40,937 --> 00:57:43,159
bucket to the American taxpayer . We're 

1459
00:57:43,159 --> 00:57:45,103
35 trillion in debt . What is this 

1460
00:57:45,103 --> 00:57:47,270
going to cost us ? I know y'all surely 

1461
00:57:47,270 --> 00:57:49,437
put the numbers to that uh of , of our 

1462
00:57:49,437 --> 00:57:52,510
conflict versus uh Russia when this all 

1463
00:57:52,520 --> 00:57:56,050
starts . Have we done that , sir ? Um 

1464
00:57:56,060 --> 00:57:58,171
The , the number I would have to talk 

1465
00:57:58,171 --> 00:58:00,429
in closed session about also . Um , but 

1466
00:58:00,439 --> 00:58:02,530
I agree if we were to go to war with 

1467
00:58:02,540 --> 00:58:05,939
Russia in uh um , it would , the , the 

1468
00:58:05,949 --> 00:58:08,060
money we're spending in Ukraine would 

1469
00:58:08,060 --> 00:58:10,116
be a drop in the bucket . You know , 

1470
00:58:10,116 --> 00:58:12,060
where , where are we gonna get our 

1471
00:58:12,060 --> 00:58:14,060
energy from ? Uh when this starts ? 

1472
00:58:14,060 --> 00:58:16,282
Because they don't have any in Europe . 

1473
00:58:16,282 --> 00:58:18,489
Uh uh The Saudis , I don't know where 

1474
00:58:18,500 --> 00:58:20,722
they're going to help us out . Uh We're 

1475
00:58:20,722 --> 00:58:22,833
gonna have to buy it from Ukraine , I 

1476
00:58:22,833 --> 00:58:25,000
guess . Um , I mean Iran because we're 

1477
00:58:25,000 --> 00:58:27,000
not pumping the oil and gas that we 

1478
00:58:27,000 --> 00:58:26,310
need . We , we're gonna get our fuel 

1479
00:58:26,320 --> 00:58:28,879
for a war like this , sir . That's 

1480
00:58:28,889 --> 00:58:31,111
outside of my area of expertise but I'm 

1481
00:58:31,111 --> 00:58:33,278
sure I can get the U do we have enough 

1482
00:58:33,278 --> 00:58:35,333
right now ? Uh , you know , to get a 

1483
00:58:35,333 --> 00:58:37,500
war started uh on the ground there for 

1484
00:58:37,500 --> 00:58:39,778
our troops . Yeah . Yeah , we do , sir . 

1485
00:58:39,778 --> 00:58:41,945
Ok . Um Who is Turkey gonna fight with 

1486
00:58:41,945 --> 00:58:43,945
when this war starts between United 

1487
00:58:43,945 --> 00:58:47,110
States and Russia ? Turkey will fight 

1488
00:58:47,120 --> 00:58:49,287
with ? The alliance is my prediction . 

1489
00:58:49,287 --> 00:58:51,342
But all nations have their sovereign 

1490
00:58:51,342 --> 00:58:51,189
right to make that decision when the 

1491
00:58:51,199 --> 00:58:55,120
time comes . But it's the same . Do 

1492
00:58:55,129 --> 00:58:57,185
you think most , everybody else will 

1493
00:58:57,185 --> 00:59:01,129
stick with us in this fight ? I do . Um , 

1494
00:59:01,969 --> 00:59:04,260
everything that I read , uh , over the 

1495
00:59:04,270 --> 00:59:06,719
past few months is most of the 

1496
00:59:06,729 --> 00:59:10,580
militaries in the , uh , in NATO 

1497
00:59:10,590 --> 00:59:12,701
or boutique militaries . Do you agree 

1498
00:59:12,701 --> 00:59:14,812
with that ? I'm , I'm not sure what a 

1499
00:59:14,812 --> 00:59:17,080
boutique military is , shadow of what 

1500
00:59:17,090 --> 00:59:19,330
it used to be . Uh , haven't been 

1501
00:59:19,340 --> 00:59:22,070
preparing . Yeah . Sure . I , I would 

1502
00:59:22,080 --> 00:59:24,302
agree with that . For instance , the US 

1503
00:59:24,302 --> 00:59:26,780
army is now 450,000 when I joined it . 

1504
00:59:26,790 --> 00:59:30,209
It was 785 . So , um , 

1505
00:59:31,110 --> 00:59:35,050
with Ukraine , um , fighting 

1506
00:59:35,060 --> 00:59:37,282
right now as they are , uh , do we have 

1507
00:59:37,282 --> 00:59:39,116
any count of numbers of how many 

1508
00:59:39,116 --> 00:59:40,949
soldiers that they have actually 

1509
00:59:40,949 --> 00:59:43,171
fighting , uh , that they have in their 

1510
00:59:43,171 --> 00:59:44,949
military against Russia ? Yes , 

1511
00:59:44,949 --> 00:59:47,110
absolutely . Senator , do you have a 

1512
00:59:47,120 --> 00:59:49,120
number of that ? Yeah , it's , it's 

1513
00:59:49,120 --> 00:59:51,453
between 900,000 and a million right now . 

1514
00:59:51,860 --> 00:59:54,082
Yes , sir . How about Russia ? How many 

1515
00:59:54,082 --> 00:59:55,949
they have , uh , deployed within 

1516
00:59:55,959 --> 00:59:58,015
Ukraine ? Not , not on the borders . 

1517
00:59:58,015 --> 01:00:00,126
But how many do they have deployed in 

1518
01:00:00,126 --> 01:00:01,959
Ukraine inside the country ? 470 

1519
01:00:01,959 --> 01:00:04,300
outside the country more . And then 

1520
01:00:04,310 --> 01:00:06,477
they have the rest of their military . 

1521
01:00:06,477 --> 01:00:08,532
Yeah , my understanding is after the 

1522
01:00:08,532 --> 01:00:11,510
massacre , they have been growing at 

1523
01:00:11,520 --> 01:00:14,310
40,000 soldiers a month that are 

1524
01:00:14,320 --> 01:00:16,699
volunteering for the military . Is that 

1525
01:00:16,709 --> 01:00:18,931
pretty good intel or not ? I'm tracking 

1526
01:00:18,931 --> 01:00:21,098
30,000 . But yes , 30,000 . So growing 

1527
01:00:21,098 --> 01:00:23,780
more than it was more than it was 

1528
01:00:23,790 --> 01:00:26,929
before the massacre . The size of the 

1529
01:00:26,939 --> 01:00:29,179
Russian military is bigger today than 

1530
01:00:29,189 --> 01:00:31,356
it was when the war started . And it's 

1531
01:00:31,356 --> 01:00:33,356
bigger today than when the massacre 

1532
01:00:33,356 --> 01:00:35,522
started . Yes , in fact , I think what 

1533
01:00:35,522 --> 01:00:37,745
you're pointing to is they have um they 

1534
01:00:37,745 --> 01:00:39,689
have initiated their annual spring 

1535
01:00:39,689 --> 01:00:43,060
conscription senator . That is um that 

1536
01:00:43,070 --> 01:00:45,181
they do that every spring this year , 

1537
01:00:45,181 --> 01:00:46,903
they did 100 and 50,000 . They 

1538
01:00:46,903 --> 01:00:49,014
announced uh that they intend to take 

1539
01:00:49,014 --> 01:00:51,237
in under the draft . That's right about 

1540
01:00:51,237 --> 01:00:53,459
average for a spring conscription . The 

1541
01:00:53,459 --> 01:00:55,403
difference is this year , they are 

1542
01:00:55,403 --> 01:00:57,403
offering those conscripts after one 

1543
01:00:57,403 --> 01:00:59,626
month of service . The option to sign a 

1544
01:00:59,626 --> 01:01:02,080
contract to get paid um in exchange for 

1545
01:01:02,090 --> 01:01:04,090
being able to be sent to Ukraine to 

1546
01:01:04,090 --> 01:01:06,379
fight . Uh Do you feel a sense of 

1547
01:01:06,389 --> 01:01:08,979
urgency in our supply chain now , uh of 

1548
01:01:08,989 --> 01:01:11,370
building uh the munitions that we need 

1549
01:01:11,629 --> 01:01:13,685
because they have not been there ? I 

1550
01:01:13,685 --> 01:01:15,907
know in my state of Alabama there's not 

1551
01:01:15,907 --> 01:01:17,796
been a lot of sense of urgency of 

1552
01:01:17,796 --> 01:01:20,073
building javelins and things like that . 

1553
01:01:20,073 --> 01:01:22,296
Now , we're building them as fast as we 

1554
01:01:22,296 --> 01:01:22,290
can . But , uh , there's no sense of 

1555
01:01:22,300 --> 01:01:24,689
urgency , sir . I , I sense an 

1556
01:01:24,699 --> 01:01:26,866
increased urgency and demand . I can't 

1557
01:01:26,866 --> 01:01:28,977
speak to whether there's an increased 

1558
01:01:28,977 --> 01:01:31,143
urgency base itself to produce . Thank 

1559
01:01:31,143 --> 01:01:33,310
you . Thank you , sir . Thank you very 

1560
01:01:33,310 --> 01:01:35,310
much , Senator Tuberville . Senator 

1561
01:01:35,310 --> 01:01:37,088
Kelly , please . Thank you , Mr 

1562
01:01:37,088 --> 01:01:39,820
Chairman . Um , I agree with Senator 

1563
01:01:39,830 --> 01:01:42,020
Tub Tuberville's remarks about , uh , 

1564
01:01:42,030 --> 01:01:44,780
building the munitions that we need . I 

1565
01:01:44,790 --> 01:01:46,846
mean , it's critical that we restock 

1566
01:01:46,846 --> 01:01:50,800
our supplies of uh the munitions uh 

1567
01:01:50,810 --> 01:01:53,032
that we've uh shared with our Ukrainian 

1568
01:01:53,040 --> 01:01:56,459
allies and uh we've depleted uh 

1569
01:01:56,469 --> 01:02:00,209
stockpiles and the by passing 

1570
01:02:00,639 --> 01:02:02,861
the emergency supplemental , we have an 

1571
01:02:02,861 --> 01:02:05,679
opportunity uh to resupply uh our 

1572
01:02:05,689 --> 01:02:09,439
forces with new munitions . Uh some of 

1573
01:02:09,449 --> 01:02:11,393
which could be made in Alabama . I 

1574
01:02:11,393 --> 01:02:14,560
think what I , I don't agree with is um , 

1575
01:02:14,879 --> 01:02:17,830
the definitive language about we are 

1576
01:02:17,840 --> 01:02:20,118
getting ready to go to war with Russia . 

1577
01:02:20,118 --> 01:02:23,129
Uh I don't feel that is the case . Um , 

1578
01:02:23,199 --> 01:02:25,459
and using language about when this war 

1579
01:02:25,469 --> 01:02:29,330
starts . Um , my view is that 

1580
01:02:29,340 --> 01:02:31,562
we should do everything we possibly can 

1581
01:02:31,562 --> 01:02:34,560
to avoid uh going to war with a near 

1582
01:02:34,570 --> 01:02:36,959
peer adversary like Russia or China . 

1583
01:02:37,399 --> 01:02:40,770
Um It is uh not in our best interest to 

1584
01:02:40,780 --> 01:02:43,389
do that . So , General Cavoli , uh 

1585
01:02:43,399 --> 01:02:45,288
first of all , thank you for your 

1586
01:02:45,288 --> 01:02:47,455
service . I'm , I'm interested to hear 

1587
01:02:47,455 --> 01:02:49,510
uh just a little bit more about what 

1588
01:02:49,510 --> 01:02:53,100
you feel the best way uh in 

1589
01:02:53,110 --> 01:02:56,909
Europe right now , uh is for us to 

1590
01:02:56,919 --> 01:02:59,750
avoid a conflict with Russia . Thank 

1591
01:02:59,760 --> 01:03:02,093
you , Senator . And , and yes , I agree . 

1592
01:03:02,093 --> 01:03:05,330
Um , m my job is to deter um , 

1593
01:03:05,340 --> 01:03:08,699
both in my NATO role and in my US role . 

1594
01:03:08,709 --> 01:03:11,540
My primary job is to deter aggression 

1595
01:03:11,729 --> 01:03:14,169
and to avert a war . Not , not , not , 

1596
01:03:14,179 --> 01:03:16,235
not to fight one . Now , there's the 

1597
01:03:16,235 --> 01:03:18,568
paradox , of course , that historically , 

1598
01:03:18,568 --> 01:03:21,100
we , we , we deter by preparing , um , 

1599
01:03:21,129 --> 01:03:23,510
um , you know , c beacham parabellum . 

1600
01:03:23,669 --> 01:03:25,770
And , um , and we are certainly 

1601
01:03:25,780 --> 01:03:28,810
prepared militarily to fight whoever we 

1602
01:03:28,820 --> 01:03:32,770
need to um how to do it first of 

1603
01:03:32,780 --> 01:03:34,724
all by training . But secondly , I 

1604
01:03:34,724 --> 01:03:37,050
think inside the alliance , the most 

1605
01:03:37,060 --> 01:03:39,760
important way to deter is by doing it 

1606
01:03:39,770 --> 01:03:43,409
together . And so um the comments from 

1607
01:03:43,419 --> 01:03:46,550
members uh uh of the committee about 

1608
01:03:46,560 --> 01:03:50,350
the lamentable um uh the lamentable 

1609
01:03:50,360 --> 01:03:53,810
fact that some very wealthy nations 

1610
01:03:53,820 --> 01:03:55,598
inside the alliance are not yet 

1611
01:03:55,598 --> 01:03:57,820
spending what they should be is , is an 

1612
01:03:57,820 --> 01:03:59,931
important fact . And we have to close 

1613
01:03:59,931 --> 01:04:02,098
that because we have to have a capable 

1614
01:04:02,098 --> 01:04:04,320
alliance that will fight together . The 

1615
01:04:04,320 --> 01:04:06,209
alliance fighting together is far 

1616
01:04:06,209 --> 01:04:08,098
greater than the sum of its parts 

1617
01:04:08,098 --> 01:04:10,689
because of the political unity and the 

1618
01:04:10,699 --> 01:04:13,810
representation of such a mass of 

1619
01:04:14,149 --> 01:04:17,689
humanity . Um and its will . So it's 

1620
01:04:17,699 --> 01:04:19,810
the most important thing is for us to 

1621
01:04:19,810 --> 01:04:21,949
deter as part of an alliance and that 

1622
01:04:21,959 --> 01:04:24,070
alliance has to be fit in order to do 

1623
01:04:24,070 --> 01:04:26,229
that I have been charged by the North 

1624
01:04:26,239 --> 01:04:28,729
Atlantic Treaty Organization to make 

1625
01:04:28,739 --> 01:04:31,340
the operational force of the alliance 

1626
01:04:31,350 --> 01:04:33,572
fit , fit for the purpose of collective 

1627
01:04:33,572 --> 01:04:35,649
defense of large scale defense of 

1628
01:04:35,659 --> 01:04:38,169
Europe . We are well along on that , um 

1629
01:04:38,179 --> 01:04:40,800
uh we have produced the plans necessary , 

1630
01:04:40,810 --> 01:04:42,866
the requirements necessary and we're 

1631
01:04:42,866 --> 01:04:44,699
going through the process to get 

1632
01:04:44,699 --> 01:04:46,921
nations to fulfill those requirements . 

1633
01:04:46,921 --> 01:04:49,149
I believe that that process is one of 

1634
01:04:49,159 --> 01:04:51,610
the things that has stimulated at least 

1635
01:04:51,620 --> 01:04:54,409
10 additional countries to meet 2% this 

1636
01:04:54,419 --> 01:04:56,669
year compared to last year because they 

1637
01:04:56,679 --> 01:04:59,012
have a list . Now they have a blueprint . 

1638
01:04:59,012 --> 01:05:01,179
This is how to get ready . This is the 

1639
01:05:01,179 --> 01:05:03,290
things we need to do to get ready and 

1640
01:05:03,290 --> 01:05:05,290
they can bring tangible things back 

1641
01:05:05,290 --> 01:05:07,346
home to the political leadership and 

1642
01:05:07,346 --> 01:05:09,512
say these are the things we need to go 

1643
01:05:09,512 --> 01:05:11,846
by . So that's what we're doing to , to , 

1644
01:05:11,846 --> 01:05:14,068
to get ready . And that's , I think the 

1645
01:05:14,068 --> 01:05:13,550
best way to do this , sir . And what , 

1646
01:05:13,560 --> 01:05:15,659
what is the best thing , uh the most 

1647
01:05:15,669 --> 01:05:17,780
appropriate thing that we can do here 

1648
01:05:17,780 --> 01:05:19,840
as members of Congress right now to 

1649
01:05:19,850 --> 01:05:22,540
deter , to continue to possibly deter 

1650
01:05:22,550 --> 01:05:24,883
Russian aggression into another country . 

1651
01:05:25,270 --> 01:05:27,159
I , I think the first thing is to 

1652
01:05:27,159 --> 01:05:29,048
continue the discussion about the 

1653
01:05:29,048 --> 01:05:32,050
Malign intent of Russia , sir . I think 

1654
01:05:32,060 --> 01:05:33,893
it's important for the , the the 

1655
01:05:33,893 --> 01:05:36,320
members of the US Congress to recognize 

1656
01:05:36,330 --> 01:05:38,552
the malign intent of Russia and to talk 

1657
01:05:38,552 --> 01:05:40,552
about the malign intent of Russia . 

1658
01:05:40,552 --> 01:05:42,719
That's , that's the principal thing to 

1659
01:05:42,719 --> 01:05:44,830
do after that , the various different 

1660
01:05:44,830 --> 01:05:46,941
programs that we have and authorizing 

1661
01:05:46,941 --> 01:05:48,719
us to do certain things will be 

1662
01:05:48,719 --> 01:05:50,719
necessary . But I think the primary 

1663
01:05:50,719 --> 01:05:52,830
thing is to help us all recognize and 

1664
01:05:52,830 --> 01:05:55,344
keep our eye on the real threat and how 

1665
01:05:55,354 --> 01:05:57,054
significant is the emergency 

1666
01:05:57,064 --> 01:05:59,304
supplemental in , uh , in the list of 

1667
01:05:59,314 --> 01:06:02,014
things that we could do . Um , to deter 

1668
01:06:02,024 --> 01:06:05,639
Russia , it's , it's vital . I think if , 

1669
01:06:05,649 --> 01:06:09,550
um , if Ukraine fails , um and 

1670
01:06:09,560 --> 01:06:13,209
Russia succeeds , um it will be a 

1671
01:06:13,320 --> 01:06:15,969
big setback for deterrence . Russia 

1672
01:06:15,979 --> 01:06:17,757
will be emboldened . They'll be 

1673
01:06:17,757 --> 01:06:19,760
geographically in a better position 

1674
01:06:19,770 --> 01:06:22,560
from a military perspective . Um So 

1675
01:06:22,570 --> 01:06:24,514
there are many things that will be 

1676
01:06:24,514 --> 01:06:26,629
damaged in our ability to deter . One 

1677
01:06:26,639 --> 01:06:28,806
of the things that would be damaged in 

1678
01:06:28,806 --> 01:06:31,310
our ability to deter is um it's likely 

1679
01:06:31,320 --> 01:06:33,487
that the number of nations who want to 

1680
01:06:33,487 --> 01:06:35,542
side with us could shrink . And so I 

1681
01:06:35,542 --> 01:06:37,598
think it's absolutely imperative for 

1682
01:06:37,598 --> 01:06:39,542
all of those reasons . Thank you , 

1683
01:06:39,542 --> 01:06:41,870
General and uh Mr Chairman , I have a 

1684
01:06:41,879 --> 01:06:44,800
question to submit for uh General Van 

1685
01:06:44,989 --> 01:06:48,459
Avis um on uh maritime security . Thank 

1686
01:06:48,469 --> 01:06:50,525
you . Thank you , Senator Kelly . Uh 

1687
01:06:50,525 --> 01:06:53,110
Senator Budd , please . Thank you , 

1688
01:06:53,120 --> 01:06:55,270
Chairman and thank you both again for 

1689
01:06:55,280 --> 01:06:59,020
being here . Um General Van Vost , the 

1690
01:06:59,030 --> 01:07:00,919
collapse of the Francis Scott key 

1691
01:07:00,919 --> 01:07:04,110
bridge , uh horrible . Um But it 

1692
01:07:04,120 --> 01:07:06,120
highlights the larger issue I think 

1693
01:07:06,120 --> 01:07:08,287
that we need to address and that's how 

1694
01:07:08,287 --> 01:07:09,842
a single piece of destroyed 

1695
01:07:09,842 --> 01:07:11,953
infrastructure can shut down multiple 

1696
01:07:11,953 --> 01:07:15,050
modes of transportation . If I'm not 

1697
01:07:15,060 --> 01:07:16,838
mistaken , a number of critical 

1698
01:07:16,838 --> 01:07:18,949
military supply ships , they're stuck 

1699
01:07:18,949 --> 01:07:21,171
in Baltimore Harbor in addition to road 

1700
01:07:21,171 --> 01:07:24,080
traffic that's been diverted . So how 

1701
01:07:24,090 --> 01:07:27,080
resilient are our ports of embarkation ? 

1702
01:07:27,090 --> 01:07:28,923
And for instance , like in North 

1703
01:07:28,923 --> 01:07:30,979
Carolina , military Ocean terminal , 

1704
01:07:30,979 --> 01:07:33,610
sunny point uh in the event of a 

1705
01:07:33,620 --> 01:07:36,429
conflict . Uh And if our adversaries 

1706
01:07:36,439 --> 01:07:38,800
should decide to conduct cyber attacks 

1707
01:07:38,810 --> 01:07:41,929
or sa sabotage infrastructure . And 

1708
01:07:41,939 --> 01:07:44,050
then if you would follow that up with 

1709
01:07:44,050 --> 01:07:46,217
how we can be helpful here um securing 

1710
01:07:46,217 --> 01:07:48,840
these critical nodes . Yeah , thanks 

1711
01:07:48,850 --> 01:07:51,072
for that question . As I mentioned , uh 

1712
01:07:51,072 --> 01:07:53,072
we cannot do what we do without the 

1713
01:07:53,072 --> 01:07:55,679
substantial private infrastructure here 

1714
01:07:55,689 --> 01:07:57,745
in the United States , roads , rails 

1715
01:07:57,745 --> 01:07:59,578
and seaports with respect to the 

1716
01:07:59,578 --> 01:08:01,850
Francis Scott Key Bridge . Uh a tragic 

1717
01:08:01,860 --> 01:08:04,580
event . Uh And , but we think about how 

1718
01:08:04,590 --> 01:08:06,850
do we recover very quickly . Uh And the 

1719
01:08:06,860 --> 01:08:09,027
fact that we had a few ships that were 

1720
01:08:09,027 --> 01:08:11,520
essentially blocked in . Um but that's 

1721
01:08:11,530 --> 01:08:14,139
why we have so many ports . Uh We can 

1722
01:08:14,149 --> 01:08:16,482
afford to lose a port and some capacity , 

1723
01:08:16,482 --> 01:08:18,593
we can't afford to lose them all . So 

1724
01:08:18,593 --> 01:08:20,427
we do many efforts to ensure the 

1725
01:08:20,427 --> 01:08:22,316
resiliency of the ports . We work 

1726
01:08:22,316 --> 01:08:24,538
directly with the port managers and all 

1727
01:08:24,538 --> 01:08:26,205
of our strategic ports on our 

1728
01:08:26,205 --> 01:08:28,205
alternative plans . Should there be 

1729
01:08:28,205 --> 01:08:30,427
problems there as well as in a state of 

1730
01:08:30,427 --> 01:08:32,371
emergency ? How would we use their 

1731
01:08:32,371 --> 01:08:34,482
resources ? But it , it also comes to 

1732
01:08:34,482 --> 01:08:34,419
the fact that that those some of the 

1733
01:08:34,430 --> 01:08:36,500
ships that were behind uh behind the 

1734
01:08:36,509 --> 01:08:38,787
lines that couldn't get out , actually , 

1735
01:08:38,787 --> 01:08:40,787
we wouldn't use them anyway because 

1736
01:08:40,787 --> 01:08:43,009
they're in such a state of disrepair uh 

1737
01:08:43,009 --> 01:08:45,176
that we wouldn't uh wouldn't call upon 

1738
01:08:45,176 --> 01:08:47,287
those ships . It goes back to how old 

1739
01:08:47,287 --> 01:08:49,231
these ships are and how we need to 

1740
01:08:49,231 --> 01:08:51,176
continue with the recapitalization 

1741
01:08:51,176 --> 01:08:50,279
program , which is one of the number 

1742
01:08:50,290 --> 01:08:52,457
one things we can do here is to ensure 

1743
01:08:52,457 --> 01:08:54,568
the readiness of the force , not just 

1744
01:08:54,568 --> 01:08:56,740
the capacity but credible capacity to 

1745
01:08:56,750 --> 01:08:58,917
fight in the uncontested environment . 

1746
01:08:58,917 --> 01:09:01,250
Thank you . Um slightly different topic . 

1747
01:09:01,250 --> 01:09:03,194
Um In your opening statement , you 

1748
01:09:03,194 --> 01:09:05,361
argued for the need for a supplemental 

1749
01:09:05,361 --> 01:09:07,361
uh correct uh general analysis . Um 

1750
01:09:07,361 --> 01:09:09,583
Here's what I'm trying to reconcile for 

1751
01:09:09,583 --> 01:09:11,750
the third year in a row . I I see that 

1752
01:09:11,750 --> 01:09:13,750
you didn't submit a single unfunded 

1753
01:09:13,750 --> 01:09:15,809
requirement . Um Why was even though 

1754
01:09:15,818 --> 01:09:19,409
that's required by um 10 US C 222 . A ? 

1755
01:09:19,628 --> 01:09:22,688
Why are you asking for supplemental and 

1756
01:09:22,699 --> 01:09:24,477
then yet didn't submit unfunded 

1757
01:09:24,477 --> 01:09:26,532
requests ? Certainly supplemental is 

1758
01:09:26,532 --> 01:09:28,699
critical for the Department of Defense 

1759
01:09:28,699 --> 01:09:30,699
and for us Transportation Command , 

1760
01:09:30,699 --> 01:09:32,866
it's critical because we have not been 

1761
01:09:32,866 --> 01:09:35,032
reimbursed for funding associated with 

1762
01:09:35,032 --> 01:09:37,199
the events after October 7th uh in the 

1763
01:09:37,199 --> 01:09:39,310
Middle East . And that is eating away 

1764
01:09:39,310 --> 01:09:41,477
at our reserves and those reserves are 

1765
01:09:41,477 --> 01:09:43,477
there . Our working capital fund is 

1766
01:09:43,477 --> 01:09:43,128
there to be able to respond at a 

1767
01:09:43,139 --> 01:09:45,519
moment's notice , notice to meet our 

1768
01:09:45,528 --> 01:09:47,729
nation's most critical priorities . Uh 

1769
01:09:47,738 --> 01:09:49,738
So that is , that's associated with 

1770
01:09:49,738 --> 01:09:51,849
authorization to spend transportation 

1771
01:09:51,849 --> 01:09:54,071
funding uh in that area with respect to 

1772
01:09:54,071 --> 01:09:56,294
the unfunded list . We worked very hard 

1773
01:09:56,294 --> 01:09:58,182
with the Department of Defense to 

1774
01:09:58,182 --> 01:10:00,294
balance the resources to meet today's 

1775
01:10:00,294 --> 01:10:02,405
regiments requirements and to be able 

1776
01:10:02,405 --> 01:10:04,682
to transition into the future . Uh And , 

1777
01:10:04,682 --> 01:10:06,849
and this budget directly addresses our 

1778
01:10:06,849 --> 01:10:08,794
recapitalization requirements . It 

1779
01:10:08,794 --> 01:10:10,571
begins to address our contested 

1780
01:10:10,571 --> 01:10:10,464
logistics and uh requirements to 

1781
01:10:10,475 --> 01:10:12,665
include posture forward and 

1782
01:10:12,674 --> 01:10:14,595
cybersecurity needs . Thank you , 

1783
01:10:14,604 --> 01:10:16,685
General uh General Cavalli . Uh Last 

1784
01:10:16,694 --> 01:10:19,044
week , Deputy Secretary of State Kurt 

1785
01:10:19,055 --> 01:10:20,999
Campbell , he said that Russia had 

1786
01:10:20,999 --> 01:10:22,999
almost completely reconstituted its 

1787
01:10:22,999 --> 01:10:24,888
military . Do you agree with that 

1788
01:10:24,888 --> 01:10:27,055
assessment ? And what can you tell the 

1789
01:10:27,055 --> 01:10:29,111
committee about the current state of 

1790
01:10:29,111 --> 01:10:31,166
Russia's conventional and industrial 

1791
01:10:31,166 --> 01:10:33,222
capacity ? Um If you'd speak broadly 

1792
01:10:33,222 --> 01:10:35,959
here and as many details and also uh in 

1793
01:10:35,970 --> 01:10:38,081
the closed session , if you could add 

1794
01:10:38,081 --> 01:10:40,303
to that . Yeah , absolutely . Senator , 

1795
01:10:40,303 --> 01:10:42,414
I will , I will add to it in the , in 

1796
01:10:42,414 --> 01:10:44,581
the closed session , first of all . Um 

1797
01:10:44,581 --> 01:10:46,748
but generally speaking , um Russia has 

1798
01:10:46,748 --> 01:10:48,470
been working extremely hard on 

1799
01:10:48,470 --> 01:10:50,979
reconstituting its forces . Um And , 

1800
01:10:50,990 --> 01:10:53,046
and they're being quite successful , 

1801
01:10:53,046 --> 01:10:55,810
especially in , in the uh ground forces . 

1802
01:10:55,990 --> 01:10:58,930
So the attrition that they've suffered 

1803
01:10:58,939 --> 01:11:01,106
so far has been very significant , but 

1804
01:11:01,106 --> 01:11:03,272
it's been localized . It's been mainly 

1805
01:11:03,272 --> 01:11:05,217
in the ground forces . They lost a 

1806
01:11:05,217 --> 01:11:07,495
couple 1000 tanks in the ground forces . 

1807
01:11:07,495 --> 01:11:09,717
They lost as many as 75,000 killed from 

1808
01:11:09,717 --> 01:11:11,495
the ground forces , but they've 

1809
01:11:11,495 --> 01:11:13,606
replenished those . They , they've uh 

1810
01:11:13,606 --> 01:11:15,939
they've got um tank production going on , 

1811
01:11:15,939 --> 01:11:18,161
they've got tank refurbishment going on 

1812
01:11:18,161 --> 01:11:20,217
and they've got tank repair going on 

1813
01:11:20,217 --> 01:11:22,439
and they have managed , they still have 

1814
01:11:22,439 --> 01:11:24,272
as many tanks functioning inside 

1815
01:11:24,272 --> 01:11:26,161
Ukraine as they introduced at the 

1816
01:11:26,161 --> 01:11:28,383
beginning of the war . So , if you look 

1817
01:11:28,383 --> 01:11:30,606
general at their capacity . February of 

1818
01:11:30,606 --> 01:11:32,717
2022 as a percentage 0 to 100 . Where 

1819
01:11:32,717 --> 01:11:34,939
would you say they are today ? If there 

1820
01:11:34,939 --> 01:11:37,770
were 100 in February 2022 and it's been 

1821
01:11:37,779 --> 01:11:39,335
diminished and then they've 

1822
01:11:39,335 --> 01:11:41,112
reconstituted according to Kurt 

1823
01:11:41,112 --> 01:11:43,335
Campbell . Where are they now ? Numbers 

1824
01:11:43,335 --> 01:11:45,770
of soldiers have just in total capacity . 

1825
01:11:46,069 --> 01:11:48,236
Well , that's a really hard thing to , 

1826
01:11:48,236 --> 01:11:50,589
to , to , to do . I , um , because are 

1827
01:11:50,600 --> 01:11:52,711
they back to where they started ? Are 

1828
01:11:52,711 --> 01:11:54,544
they more , are they less they , 

1829
01:11:54,544 --> 01:11:54,359
they're a little bit behind where they 

1830
01:11:54,370 --> 01:11:56,481
started , but not by too much , sir . 

1831
01:11:56,481 --> 01:11:58,703
Um , but , but it's really hard to give 

1832
01:11:58,703 --> 01:12:00,592
a numerical , um , uh , answer to 

1833
01:12:00,592 --> 01:12:02,759
something like that . I could go , you 

1834
01:12:02,759 --> 01:12:04,926
know , function by function or I could 

1835
01:12:04,926 --> 01:12:07,037
go , um , um , armored service by arm 

1836
01:12:07,037 --> 01:12:09,259
of the service and give you a good rich 

1837
01:12:09,259 --> 01:12:11,370
answer that gave you a good feeling . 

1838
01:12:11,370 --> 01:12:13,426
But the overall message I would give 

1839
01:12:13,426 --> 01:12:15,592
you is they've grown back to what they 

1840
01:12:15,592 --> 01:12:17,834
were before . They've got some gaps 

1841
01:12:17,845 --> 01:12:19,956
that have been produced by this war , 

1842
01:12:19,956 --> 01:12:21,901
but their overall capacity is very 

1843
01:12:21,901 --> 01:12:24,123
significant . Still a a and they intend 

1844
01:12:24,123 --> 01:12:26,289
to make it go higher . Senator . Thank 

1845
01:12:26,289 --> 01:12:28,512
you both chairman . Thank you , Senator 

1846
01:12:28,512 --> 01:12:29,512
Senator Peters 

1847
01:12:35,459 --> 01:12:38,220
Mic issue there . So , come over here . 

1848
01:12:40,160 --> 01:12:42,216
Well , I welcome both of you . Thank 

1849
01:12:42,216 --> 01:12:44,438
you , uh for uh , for your service , uh 

1850
01:12:44,438 --> 01:12:46,382
General Cavoli , uh , the uh , the 

1851
01:12:46,382 --> 01:12:48,382
state Partnership program has uh an 

1852
01:12:48,382 --> 01:12:50,438
incredible history of building trust 

1853
01:12:50,438 --> 01:12:52,660
and capability with uh important allies 

1854
01:12:52,660 --> 01:12:54,660
over the past 30 years . And I know 

1855
01:12:54,660 --> 01:12:56,827
you're well well aware of that two key 

1856
01:12:56,827 --> 01:12:58,938
Arctic allies , uh Finland and Sweden 

1857
01:12:58,938 --> 01:13:00,660
uh will soon join uh the state 

1858
01:13:00,660 --> 01:13:02,771
partnership program to be paired with 

1859
01:13:02,771 --> 01:13:04,716
uh National Guard units . Uh These 

1860
01:13:04,716 --> 01:13:06,938
state partners uh will certainly play a 

1861
01:13:06,938 --> 01:13:08,882
critical role in integrating these 

1862
01:13:08,882 --> 01:13:10,993
countries uh uh into NATO . Uh And in 

1863
01:13:10,993 --> 01:13:13,216
particular , I would argue that pairing 

1864
01:13:13,216 --> 01:13:15,216
Sweden with uh an experienced uconn 

1865
01:13:15,216 --> 01:13:17,382
partner , like the State of Michigan , 

1866
01:13:17,382 --> 01:13:19,438
uh National Guard would facilitate a 

1867
01:13:19,438 --> 01:13:21,859
seamless transition into NATO . But my 

1868
01:13:21,870 --> 01:13:24,037
question for you , sir is uh with this 

1869
01:13:24,037 --> 01:13:26,148
in mind , uh how is uconn planning to 

1870
01:13:26,148 --> 01:13:28,259
take advantage of uh the expansion of 

1871
01:13:28,259 --> 01:13:30,370
the state partnership program uh into 

1872
01:13:30,370 --> 01:13:32,426
both uh Sweden and Finland ? And are 

1873
01:13:32,426 --> 01:13:34,537
there certain capabilities that would 

1874
01:13:34,537 --> 01:13:36,648
be particularly helpful to you as you 

1875
01:13:36,648 --> 01:13:39,899
think about uh uh this expansion ? Uh 

1876
01:13:39,910 --> 01:13:42,910
Th thank you , Senator uh for the great , 

1877
01:13:43,350 --> 01:13:45,572
the great opportunity to talk about the 

1878
01:13:45,572 --> 01:13:47,739
State Partnership program . You'd have 

1879
01:13:47,739 --> 01:13:49,961
to look pretty , pretty far and wide to 

1880
01:13:49,961 --> 01:13:51,961
find somebody who's a bigger fan of 

1881
01:13:51,961 --> 01:13:54,183
state partnership than I am . In fact , 

1882
01:13:54,183 --> 01:13:56,350
uh Rob Abernathy , my command sergeant 

1883
01:13:56,350 --> 01:13:58,239
major here routinely visits those 

1884
01:13:58,239 --> 01:14:00,128
troops and , and goes back to the 

1885
01:14:00,128 --> 01:14:01,850
States to talk to their senior 

1886
01:14:01,850 --> 01:14:04,089
leadership about a about this program . 

1887
01:14:04,299 --> 01:14:06,299
It's vital , it is expanding as you 

1888
01:14:06,299 --> 01:14:08,399
point out , but not just among our 

1889
01:14:08,410 --> 01:14:10,243
allies . As you know , the state 

1890
01:14:10,243 --> 01:14:12,830
Partnership program has been vital to 

1891
01:14:12,839 --> 01:14:15,689
our ability to bring car partners into 

1892
01:14:15,700 --> 01:14:19,470
the alliance um and to take countries 

1893
01:14:19,479 --> 01:14:21,590
that didn't consider themselves to be 

1894
01:14:21,590 --> 01:14:23,646
partners and make them partners . Um 

1895
01:14:23,646 --> 01:14:25,535
This has been especially valuable 

1896
01:14:25,535 --> 01:14:29,020
lately . Um Austria um has become a 

1897
01:14:29,029 --> 01:14:31,629
state partner um this year , but a 

1898
01:14:31,640 --> 01:14:33,979
nation that's had a uh post world war 

1899
01:14:33,990 --> 01:14:36,890
two tradition of neutrality . So it's a 

1900
01:14:36,899 --> 01:14:38,843
big step forward in terms of their 

1901
01:14:38,843 --> 01:14:41,066
understanding of their responsibilities 

1902
01:14:41,066 --> 01:14:43,288
for collective defense . You can't just 

1903
01:14:43,288 --> 01:14:45,343
sit in the middle of a bunch of safe 

1904
01:14:45,343 --> 01:14:44,819
countries , you to be part of that . 

1905
01:14:44,899 --> 01:14:46,899
Switzerland . Also . In fact , this 

1906
01:14:46,899 --> 01:14:49,629
morning , I received uh an email from 

1907
01:14:49,640 --> 01:14:51,799
ambassador Miller telling me that um 

1908
01:14:52,009 --> 01:14:54,540
that Switzerland had sent its letter to 

1909
01:14:54,549 --> 01:14:56,709
me asking me to endorse their state 

1910
01:14:56,720 --> 01:14:59,120
partnership request . And I've talked 

1911
01:14:59,129 --> 01:15:01,296
to Dan Hogenson about that and , and I 

1912
01:15:01,296 --> 01:15:03,351
think we're going to go forward with 

1913
01:15:03,351 --> 01:15:05,185
that specifically with regard to 

1914
01:15:05,185 --> 01:15:07,518
Finland and Sweden . Um uh Michigan and , 

1915
01:15:07,518 --> 01:15:09,685
and the various other states have very 

1916
01:15:09,685 --> 01:15:11,700
broad based capability and we would 

1917
01:15:11,709 --> 01:15:13,653
just like them to continue to pull 

1918
01:15:13,653 --> 01:15:15,876
Sweden and Finland toward uh toward the 

1919
01:15:15,876 --> 01:15:18,042
alliance . As you know , both of those 

1920
01:15:18,042 --> 01:15:20,098
militaries are quite capable and you 

1921
01:15:20,098 --> 01:15:22,320
know , they don't need coaching on this 

1922
01:15:22,320 --> 01:15:22,109
or that they just need continued 

1923
01:15:22,120 --> 01:15:24,220
partnership . Senator , thank you . 

1924
01:15:24,229 --> 01:15:26,700
Thank you , General uh general uh Van 

1925
01:15:26,830 --> 01:15:28,950
Vost . Uh as you know , uh contested 

1926
01:15:28,959 --> 01:15:30,903
logistics and sustainment during a 

1927
01:15:30,903 --> 01:15:33,126
potential conflict is uh it's clearly a 

1928
01:15:33,126 --> 01:15:35,229
significant uh challenge uh for our 

1929
01:15:35,240 --> 01:15:37,689
forces in the Indo Pacific . And 

1930
01:15:37,700 --> 01:15:39,922
despite our forward position units , uh 

1931
01:15:39,922 --> 01:15:41,811
prepositioned stocks and regional 

1932
01:15:41,811 --> 01:15:44,033
allies and partners . Uh our ability to 

1933
01:15:44,033 --> 01:15:46,209
refuel rearm and repair under fire uh 

1934
01:15:46,299 --> 01:15:49,310
will be severely tested in any conflict 

1935
01:15:49,609 --> 01:15:51,649
in preparation . I believe that we 

1936
01:15:51,660 --> 01:15:53,382
would argue we need to do more 

1937
01:15:53,382 --> 01:15:56,600
exercises like uh Tsin saber with large 

1938
01:15:56,609 --> 01:15:59,240
scale sustainment rehearsals and major 

1939
01:15:59,250 --> 01:16:01,859
fuel offloads to test our contested 

1940
01:16:01,870 --> 01:16:03,814
logistics . So my question for you 

1941
01:16:03,819 --> 01:16:05,875
general is , what role does Transcom 

1942
01:16:05,875 --> 01:16:08,299
play in rehearsing a contested uh 

1943
01:16:08,310 --> 01:16:10,959
logistics as part of uh large exercises ? 

1944
01:16:11,250 --> 01:16:13,540
And is it your uh intent to make sure 

1945
01:16:13,549 --> 01:16:15,890
that uh logistics plays a central role 

1946
01:16:15,899 --> 01:16:17,700
in all future major exercises 

1947
01:16:17,709 --> 01:16:19,931
particularly in the Indo Pacific area . 

1948
01:16:20,470 --> 01:16:22,637
And thanks for that question , Senator 

1949
01:16:22,637 --> 01:16:24,692
across the entire joint deployment , 

1950
01:16:24,692 --> 01:16:26,748
distribution enterprise . We've seen 

1951
01:16:26,748 --> 01:16:28,859
how everyone has mobilized to support 

1952
01:16:28,859 --> 01:16:30,970
our partners like Ukraine with , with 

1953
01:16:30,970 --> 01:16:34,290
the fuel , ammunition equipment , uh su 

1954
01:16:34,299 --> 01:16:36,919
supplies . Uh And so when I think about 

1955
01:16:36,930 --> 01:16:39,041
the lessons we have learned uh in the 

1956
01:16:39,041 --> 01:16:40,930
Middle East and in Europe , we're 

1957
01:16:40,930 --> 01:16:42,986
absolutely translating them out into 

1958
01:16:42,986 --> 01:16:44,819
the Indo Pacific with respect to 

1959
01:16:44,819 --> 01:16:44,759
posture , you see multiple Posture 

1960
01:16:44,770 --> 01:16:46,959
initiatives in the Indo Pacific uh 

1961
01:16:46,970 --> 01:16:48,979
forward , stationing of equipment , 

1962
01:16:48,990 --> 01:16:51,660
more resilient uh uh bases that we're 

1963
01:16:51,669 --> 01:16:55,290
using and seaports as well as more fuel 

1964
01:16:55,299 --> 01:16:57,640
forward and then ability to distribute 

1965
01:16:57,649 --> 01:16:59,816
that fuel forward . So again , this is 

1966
01:16:59,816 --> 01:17:01,816
not merely about uh moving supplies 

1967
01:17:01,816 --> 01:17:03,760
forward like we have done with the 

1968
01:17:03,760 --> 01:17:05,593
unfettered access . We work very 

1969
01:17:05,593 --> 01:17:07,816
closely with our allies and partners to 

1970
01:17:07,816 --> 01:17:09,982
ensure that we have multiple resilient 

1971
01:17:09,982 --> 01:17:12,419
ways to come at the problem to ensure 

1972
01:17:12,430 --> 01:17:14,640
uh that our geographic combatant 

1973
01:17:14,649 --> 01:17:16,600
commands will be successful in any 

1974
01:17:16,609 --> 01:17:18,859
future fight . Thank you , General . 

1975
01:17:18,870 --> 01:17:20,990
Thank you , Mr Chair . Thank you , 

1976
01:17:21,000 --> 01:17:23,111
Senator Peters in a moment , please . 

1977
01:17:23,111 --> 01:17:25,222
Thank you Mr Chairman and to the both 

1978
01:17:25,222 --> 01:17:27,167
of you all . Thank you so much for 

1979
01:17:27,167 --> 01:17:29,389
taking the time to come visit with us . 

1980
01:17:29,389 --> 01:17:31,759
Uh I uh I know it's , it's important to 

1981
01:17:31,770 --> 01:17:33,937
us and I know we give you an important 

1982
01:17:33,937 --> 01:17:36,159
mission to carry out every day . And um 

1983
01:17:36,160 --> 01:17:38,271
I don't take it lightly that you take 

1984
01:17:38,271 --> 01:17:40,216
the time to come up here and , and 

1985
01:17:40,216 --> 01:17:42,950
visit with us . Uh um General Van Ost . 

1986
01:17:43,439 --> 01:17:46,509
Is that how you say it ? Ost ? OK . I , 

1987
01:17:46,520 --> 01:17:48,859
I'm I'm sorry from , we don't pronounce 

1988
01:17:48,870 --> 01:17:51,029
that that often from Oklahoma . Uh I 

1989
01:17:51,189 --> 01:17:53,300
understand you're familiar with Altus 

1990
01:17:53,300 --> 01:17:55,078
Air Force Base and uh we really 

1991
01:17:55,078 --> 01:17:57,245
appreciate that they speak very highly 

1992
01:17:57,245 --> 01:17:59,467
of you . Um You know , as someone who's 

1993
01:17:59,467 --> 01:18:01,522
commanded various aspects of maining 

1994
01:18:01,522 --> 01:18:03,680
training , um equipping and , and 

1995
01:18:03,689 --> 01:18:06,129
mission of air mobility . Uh I just 

1996
01:18:06,140 --> 01:18:08,362
wanna know , are , are you getting what 

1997
01:18:08,362 --> 01:18:10,418
you need from the Air Force to carry 

1998
01:18:10,418 --> 01:18:12,584
out that mission still ? Thank you . I 

1999
01:18:12,584 --> 01:18:14,751
uh first of all , all this is a really 

2000
01:18:14,751 --> 01:18:16,751
important base for us . It's uh the 

2001
01:18:16,751 --> 01:18:19,084
home of mobility of all of our training . 

2002
01:18:19,084 --> 01:18:19,060
Uh And of course , you have our assets 

2003
01:18:19,069 --> 01:18:21,560
there to include our new KC 46 which is 

2004
01:18:21,569 --> 01:18:23,513
really critical when I think about 

2005
01:18:23,513 --> 01:18:25,513
transitioning and the future of air 

2006
01:18:25,513 --> 01:18:27,736
refueling uh in that type of airplane . 

2007
01:18:27,736 --> 01:18:29,847
Uh So I support uh the Air Force . We 

2008
01:18:29,847 --> 01:18:31,902
are , we , we are on a journey uh to 

2009
01:18:31,902 --> 01:18:34,069
try to ensure that our assets are able 

2010
01:18:34,069 --> 01:18:36,291
to communicate . They have battle space 

2011
01:18:36,291 --> 01:18:38,513
awareness and they're survivable in the 

2012
01:18:38,513 --> 01:18:40,736
environment where we are expected to go 

2013
01:18:40,736 --> 01:18:42,847
into . Uh And so as we , as we embark 

2014
01:18:42,847 --> 01:18:45,069
upon that journey , uh we are providing 

2015
01:18:45,069 --> 01:18:47,125
the requirements to the air force to 

2016
01:18:47,125 --> 01:18:49,347
ensure that we can continue to maintain 

2017
01:18:49,347 --> 01:18:51,458
credible capacity . Is there anything 

2018
01:18:51,458 --> 01:18:53,625
we need to be doing on our behalf from 

2019
01:18:53,625 --> 01:18:55,791
Congress to help with that ? Certainly 

2020
01:18:55,791 --> 01:18:57,958
supporting the air force's budget with 

2021
01:18:57,958 --> 01:18:59,736
respect to uh modernization and 

2022
01:18:59,736 --> 01:19:01,736
recapitalization is just not of air 

2023
01:19:01,736 --> 01:19:03,958
feeling but also of the airlift fleet . 

2024
01:19:03,958 --> 01:19:05,791
Uh We have 275 strategic airlift 

2025
01:19:05,791 --> 01:19:07,791
aircraft and we will consume all of 

2026
01:19:07,791 --> 01:19:09,736
that . Should we have to go into a 

2027
01:19:09,736 --> 01:19:11,791
large scale uh combat operation ? So 

2028
01:19:11,791 --> 01:19:13,958
the work done there to modernize those 

2029
01:19:13,958 --> 01:19:16,180
and frankly , to think about the future 

2030
01:19:16,180 --> 01:19:15,750
and where we're going with that . So 

2031
01:19:15,759 --> 01:19:17,926
we're supporting the air force as they 

2032
01:19:17,926 --> 01:19:19,815
look into the future of strategic 

2033
01:19:19,815 --> 01:19:21,981
airlift . So specifically dialing down 

2034
01:19:21,981 --> 01:19:23,926
on that when we're looking towards 

2035
01:19:23,926 --> 01:19:26,092
possible conflicts and God forbid that 

2036
01:19:26,092 --> 01:19:28,315
actually happens . But you know , we're 

2037
01:19:28,315 --> 01:19:30,203
doing what we can to prevent it , 

2038
01:19:30,203 --> 01:19:32,259
however , we need to be strengthened 

2039
01:19:32,259 --> 01:19:34,481
and preparing for it . Um What , what's 

2040
01:19:34,481 --> 01:19:36,648
the , what's the biggest hold back ? I 

2041
01:19:36,648 --> 01:19:39,479
is it or is it a , is it the dod 

2042
01:19:39,490 --> 01:19:42,419
defense contractors , um , is it , uh , 

2043
01:19:42,430 --> 01:19:45,040
requirements if its regulations is the 

2044
01:19:45,049 --> 01:19:47,105
slow flow of money , what is it that 

2045
01:19:47,105 --> 01:19:49,438
you're , that ? It's the biggest hiccup . 

2046
01:19:49,438 --> 01:19:51,382
I think the biggest thing we think 

2047
01:19:51,382 --> 01:19:53,493
about is the aging fleets , uh , that 

2048
01:19:53,493 --> 01:19:55,605
we have and we have to modernize them 

2049
01:19:55,605 --> 01:19:55,580
to ensure sure that they can survive uh 

2050
01:19:55,589 --> 01:19:57,700
out into the future . So , you know , 

2051
01:19:57,700 --> 01:19:59,811
just looking at the capacity ensuring 

2052
01:19:59,811 --> 01:20:02,220
that it remains credible and that is , 

2053
01:20:02,229 --> 01:20:04,919
it is uh it is uh an ability to fund it 

2054
01:20:04,930 --> 01:20:07,589
and have a stable funding that we know 

2055
01:20:07,600 --> 01:20:09,767
that we're , we can count on to lay in 

2056
01:20:09,767 --> 01:20:11,933
those contracts to gain the capability 

2057
01:20:11,933 --> 01:20:14,100
moving forward . If something comes up 

2058
01:20:14,100 --> 01:20:16,211
that we can um be assistance , please 

2059
01:20:16,211 --> 01:20:18,433
holler at us and let us know how we can 

2060
01:20:18,433 --> 01:20:21,660
help . Um Sir , looking uh looking 

2061
01:20:21,669 --> 01:20:23,502
towards , you know , some of our 

2062
01:20:23,502 --> 01:20:25,502
biggest adversaries , especially in 

2063
01:20:25,502 --> 01:20:27,391
geopolitics , you know , China is 

2064
01:20:27,391 --> 01:20:29,613
obviously playing a big role in that um 

2065
01:20:29,613 --> 01:20:31,225
and ever strengthening their 

2066
01:20:31,225 --> 01:20:33,169
relationships with Russia . And uh 

2067
01:20:33,169 --> 01:20:36,029
obviously Iran , uh how we see that 

2068
01:20:36,040 --> 01:20:39,819
play out in Ukraine . Uh Thank you very 

2069
01:20:39,830 --> 01:20:43,379
much , Senator . Um Yeah , so we see 

2070
01:20:43,390 --> 01:20:45,700
direct military support from some of 

2071
01:20:45,709 --> 01:20:49,680
those countries um that goes to Russia 

2072
01:20:49,689 --> 01:20:52,580
and then the Russians employ that 

2073
01:20:53,069 --> 01:20:56,310
material in combat . A great example is 

2074
01:20:56,319 --> 01:21:00,080
the uh Shahid 136 drone . Um 

2075
01:21:00,089 --> 01:21:02,189
It's a one way attack drone . It was 

2076
01:21:02,200 --> 01:21:05,069
created by Iran , it was developed by 

2077
01:21:05,080 --> 01:21:07,520
Iran . It was produced by Iran . It was 

2078
01:21:07,529 --> 01:21:10,040
given to Russia . It was used with 

2079
01:21:10,049 --> 01:21:13,560
great effect . And Iran helped Russia 

2080
01:21:13,569 --> 01:21:15,819
build a factory for them in Russia . 

2081
01:21:16,029 --> 01:21:18,140
And Russia now produces them and they 

2082
01:21:18,140 --> 01:21:20,370
call them the Garon 10 . And those are 

2083
01:21:20,379 --> 01:21:22,720
used . They were used uh early this 

2084
01:21:22,729 --> 01:21:24,673
morning , uh to strike you train . 

2085
01:21:24,673 --> 01:21:26,896
That's just one example . So I could go 

2086
01:21:26,896 --> 01:21:28,951
into dozens of examples like this in 

2087
01:21:28,951 --> 01:21:31,118
closed session with you . Some of what 

2088
01:21:31,118 --> 01:21:33,229
we know about this is classified . Um 

2089
01:21:33,229 --> 01:21:35,451
But some of it's very visible right out 

2090
01:21:35,451 --> 01:21:37,451
there , just like the 136 . Are you 

2091
01:21:37,451 --> 01:21:39,562
able to talk about the cost of what , 

2092
01:21:39,562 --> 01:21:41,729
what in this session and what it costs 

2093
01:21:41,729 --> 01:21:43,840
them to produce one of those drones ? 

2094
01:21:44,419 --> 01:21:46,680
Um So I could probably talk about it in 

2095
01:21:46,689 --> 01:21:48,689
this session , but I don't have the 

2096
01:21:48,689 --> 01:21:50,911
money to figure right off the top of my 

2097
01:21:50,911 --> 01:21:53,022
head . I can take that for the record 

2098
01:21:53,022 --> 01:21:55,078
gladly . Um But generally speaking , 

2099
01:21:55,078 --> 01:21:57,300
the cost of the drones is far less than 

2100
01:21:57,300 --> 01:21:59,356
the cost of defending them , which , 

2101
01:21:59,356 --> 01:22:01,467
which might be your deeper question . 

2102
01:22:01,467 --> 01:22:01,310
It is the , the the fence that we're 

2103
01:22:01,319 --> 01:22:04,879
using in om Plus looking at what we're , 

2104
01:22:05,549 --> 01:22:08,390
what we're um producing in the United 

2105
01:22:08,399 --> 01:22:10,740
States and the cost of what it cost us . 

2106
01:22:10,890 --> 01:22:13,057
Uh because obviously what they have is 

2107
01:22:13,057 --> 01:22:16,330
being , you know , fairly effective 

2108
01:22:17,000 --> 01:22:20,689
and the cost ratio it to me , I see 

2109
01:22:20,700 --> 01:22:23,479
that Russia's they're adapting 

2110
01:22:24,029 --> 01:22:26,830
and uh and I , I don't , I mean , we've 

2111
01:22:26,839 --> 01:22:28,990
got sanctions on Russia , I don't see 

2112
01:22:29,000 --> 01:22:31,222
that they're being effective . I'd love 

2113
01:22:31,222 --> 01:22:33,444
to hear your comment on that . It seems 

2114
01:22:33,444 --> 01:22:33,299
like their economy is growing , it said 

2115
01:22:33,310 --> 01:22:35,600
that their economy is gonna maybe grow 

2116
01:22:35,609 --> 01:22:38,169
by 2.4% which is a full percentage 

2117
01:22:38,180 --> 01:22:40,979
higher than it was last year . Um It , 

2118
01:22:40,990 --> 01:22:42,768
it seems like they've , they've 

2119
01:22:42,768 --> 01:22:44,934
actually adapted to their techniques . 

2120
01:22:44,934 --> 01:22:47,109
Uh And as you're saying , they're 

2121
01:22:47,120 --> 01:22:50,270
almost back to full capacity . So the 

2122
01:22:50,279 --> 01:22:53,229
sanctions we're having that we put on 

2123
01:22:53,240 --> 01:22:55,351
uh or not , we're having , but we put 

2124
01:22:55,351 --> 01:22:57,518
on Russia are they are they seem to be 

2125
01:22:57,518 --> 01:22:59,740
effective . Um So obviously this is 

2126
01:22:59,750 --> 01:23:02,083
outside my field of expertise , Senator , 

2127
01:23:02,083 --> 01:23:04,139
the , the , the sanctions , how they 

2128
01:23:04,139 --> 01:23:06,250
work and , and how effective they are 

2129
01:23:06,250 --> 01:23:08,194
in some things as noted previously 

2130
01:23:08,194 --> 01:23:10,472
during the discussion today . Um uh It , 

2131
01:23:10,472 --> 01:23:13,459
there have been instances where clearly 

2132
01:23:13,609 --> 01:23:16,490
um sanctioned components have still 

2133
01:23:16,500 --> 01:23:19,020
gotten into rush of weapons systems 

2134
01:23:19,029 --> 01:23:21,359
with regard to the overall cost ratios 

2135
01:23:21,370 --> 01:23:23,259
between , you know , the sorts of 

2136
01:23:23,259 --> 01:23:25,203
drones we produce and the sorts of 

2137
01:23:25,203 --> 01:23:27,370
drones that we see else there . It's a 

2138
01:23:27,370 --> 01:23:29,314
complicated question . I'm not the 

2139
01:23:29,314 --> 01:23:28,919
expert on it , but I can certainly talk 

2140
01:23:28,930 --> 01:23:31,152
to you about it . Yes , sir . Thank you 

2141
01:23:31,152 --> 01:23:33,097
so much . Thank you , Senator M uh 

2142
01:23:33,109 --> 01:23:35,600
Senator Ren , please . Well , thank you , 

2143
01:23:35,609 --> 01:23:37,776
Chairman Reed for holding this hearing 

2144
01:23:37,776 --> 01:23:39,887
and of course , I'd like to thank and 

2145
01:23:39,887 --> 01:23:42,053
welcome General Cavoli and General Van 

2146
01:23:42,053 --> 01:23:43,979
Ost . Uh Of course , for your 

2147
01:23:43,990 --> 01:23:45,823
commitment , your passion , your 

2148
01:23:45,823 --> 01:23:47,879
service to our country and for being 

2149
01:23:47,879 --> 01:23:50,770
here to uh testify uh this morning . So 

2150
01:23:50,779 --> 01:23:54,470
General Cavoli um we are working to 

2151
01:23:54,479 --> 01:23:56,590
provide Ukraine with critical air and 

2152
01:23:56,590 --> 01:23:58,810
missile defense capabilities . And my 

2153
01:23:58,819 --> 01:24:02,209
concern is that defense alone is not 

2154
01:24:02,220 --> 01:24:04,220
going to solve this conflict or win 

2155
01:24:04,220 --> 01:24:06,850
this conflict . So can you speak to how 

2156
01:24:06,859 --> 01:24:08,879
the integration of additional long 

2157
01:24:08,890 --> 01:24:11,209
range systems would impact the 

2158
01:24:11,220 --> 01:24:14,069
operational effectiveness of Ukraine 

2159
01:24:14,080 --> 01:24:17,049
forces and what strategic advances um 

2160
01:24:17,240 --> 01:24:19,407
could be that these capabilities might 

2161
01:24:19,407 --> 01:24:23,180
provide them . Sure , Senator , um the 

2162
01:24:23,189 --> 01:24:26,359
additional long range capabilities for 

2163
01:24:26,370 --> 01:24:28,580
Ukraine would clearly allow them to 

2164
01:24:28,589 --> 01:24:32,229
reach farther back and to hit um and 

2165
01:24:32,240 --> 01:24:35,709
destroy systems that are shooting at 

2166
01:24:35,720 --> 01:24:38,629
them . Um Of course , you know , you 

2167
01:24:38,640 --> 01:24:40,640
know , the , the Russians carefully 

2168
01:24:40,640 --> 01:24:42,751
measure the ranges of the things they 

2169
01:24:42,751 --> 01:24:44,973
believe are available to the Ukrainians 

2170
01:24:44,973 --> 01:24:46,973
and then move their important stuff 

2171
01:24:46,973 --> 01:24:49,140
outside of that range . The ability to 

2172
01:24:49,140 --> 01:24:51,220
move in and out of the farther range 

2173
01:24:51,229 --> 01:24:53,319
would be an important addition to to 

2174
01:24:53,330 --> 01:24:55,497
Ukraine's capabilities . When we think 

2175
01:24:55,497 --> 01:24:58,399
about long range fires , though , you 

2176
01:24:58,410 --> 01:25:00,077
know , there are really three 

2177
01:25:00,077 --> 01:25:02,299
components to effectiveness . The first 

2178
01:25:02,299 --> 01:25:05,330
is the range itself . Uh the second is 

2179
01:25:05,339 --> 01:25:07,750
the precision with which it can strike . 

2180
01:25:08,149 --> 01:25:10,419
And the third is the survivability of 

2181
01:25:10,430 --> 01:25:12,652
the mu munition so that , you know , it 

2182
01:25:12,652 --> 01:25:15,060
gets , gets to the target . And so as 

2183
01:25:15,069 --> 01:25:17,620
uh as Ukraine goes around trying to 

2184
01:25:17,629 --> 01:25:19,851
work on its longer range capabilities , 

2185
01:25:19,851 --> 01:25:21,629
they have a lot of drones , for 

2186
01:25:21,629 --> 01:25:23,685
instance , that they're using longer 

2187
01:25:23,685 --> 01:25:25,740
range , um they try to balance those 

2188
01:25:25,740 --> 01:25:25,700
things and get the sweet spot for the 

2189
01:25:25,709 --> 01:25:27,876
given target that they're looking at . 

2190
01:25:27,876 --> 01:25:29,598
Thank you . I just think is as 

2191
01:25:29,598 --> 01:25:31,598
important as defense it is . Um And 

2192
01:25:31,598 --> 01:25:33,542
speaking of offense , uh general , 

2193
01:25:33,542 --> 01:25:35,487
we're gonna talk a little bit more 

2194
01:25:35,487 --> 01:25:37,431
about uh general Cavoli if we have 

2195
01:25:37,431 --> 01:25:39,653
multiple generals here . Excuse me . Um 

2196
01:25:39,653 --> 01:25:41,820
uh How are you working with cybercom ? 

2197
01:25:41,820 --> 01:25:43,931
Because cybersecurity is so important 

2198
01:25:43,931 --> 01:25:46,042
to provide that cybersecurity support 

2199
01:25:46,042 --> 01:25:47,931
to our NATO allies , particularly 

2200
01:25:47,931 --> 01:25:49,765
there's some nations with lesser 

2201
01:25:49,765 --> 01:25:51,598
capabilities , we have , they're 

2202
01:25:51,598 --> 01:25:53,765
vulnerable from the cyber attacks from 

2203
01:25:53,765 --> 01:25:55,876
Russia , China and Iran . And can you 

2204
01:25:55,876 --> 01:25:57,765
share to us the real value to the 

2205
01:25:57,765 --> 01:26:00,500
United States of the multilateral cyber 

2206
01:26:00,509 --> 01:26:02,859
exercises with our European allies such 

2207
01:26:02,870 --> 01:26:05,370
as locked shields ? Absolutely , 

2208
01:26:05,379 --> 01:26:08,660
Senator . Um you know , it , it raises 

2209
01:26:09,339 --> 01:26:11,669
a , a AAA an ancillary question , by 

2210
01:26:11,680 --> 01:26:15,459
the way . So Tim Hawk at Cybercom 

2211
01:26:15,470 --> 01:26:17,740
runs a lot of that . I , I feel that 

2212
01:26:17,750 --> 01:26:20,028
all the Russia questions it seems like , 

2213
01:26:20,028 --> 01:26:22,250
but there are so many people working on 

2214
01:26:22,250 --> 01:26:24,472
this problem , Jackie . Uh I , I mean , 

2215
01:26:24,472 --> 01:26:26,639
I I wouldn't be giving anything to the 

2216
01:26:26,639 --> 01:26:28,750
Ukrainians if it weren't for Jackie's 

2217
01:26:28,750 --> 01:26:30,972
splendid ability to deliver . Tim's the 

2218
01:26:30,972 --> 01:26:33,250
same with uh with , with Cyber . Um He , 

2219
01:26:33,250 --> 01:26:35,330
he sponsors and co sponsors with us 

2220
01:26:35,339 --> 01:26:37,850
these multilateral exercises that allow 

2221
01:26:37,859 --> 01:26:40,200
us primarily to illuminate 

2222
01:26:40,209 --> 01:26:43,120
vulnerabilities in networks in our 

2223
01:26:43,129 --> 01:26:45,129
allies and our partners and for the 

2224
01:26:45,129 --> 01:26:47,450
alliance's own proper , you know , the , 

2225
01:26:47,459 --> 01:26:49,910
all the networks we own as an alliance 

2226
01:26:49,919 --> 01:26:52,141
proper . They're very , very valuable , 

2227
01:26:52,209 --> 01:26:54,629
but then we follow up with cyber 

2228
01:26:54,640 --> 01:26:56,939
protection teams that go forward and do 

2229
01:26:56,950 --> 01:26:58,839
what , um , Tim calls , hunt Ford 

2230
01:26:58,839 --> 01:27:01,189
operations and we help them defend 

2231
01:27:01,200 --> 01:27:03,560
their networks . Uh , um Ford , it's 

2232
01:27:03,569 --> 01:27:06,620
been tremendously successful , not just 

2233
01:27:06,629 --> 01:27:09,270
with allies , but with partners as well 

2234
01:27:09,350 --> 01:27:11,569
and with commercial enterprises as you 

2235
01:27:11,580 --> 01:27:13,524
know , a lot of our transportation 

2236
01:27:13,524 --> 01:27:16,060
works on unclassified systems and they 

2237
01:27:16,069 --> 01:27:18,013
can be vulnerable . So it's a very 

2238
01:27:18,013 --> 01:27:20,180
valuable thing , ma'am offensive stuff 

2239
01:27:20,180 --> 01:27:22,236
we could talk about in cla in closed 

2240
01:27:22,236 --> 01:27:24,458
session if you desire . Thank you . And 

2241
01:27:24,458 --> 01:27:26,625
I fully support the idea that Jackie's 

2242
01:27:26,625 --> 01:27:28,625
can deliver . So General Jackie Man 

2243
01:27:28,625 --> 01:27:30,625
Novos , welcome . I want to ask you 

2244
01:27:30,625 --> 01:27:32,680
about logistics operations uh in the 

2245
01:27:32,685 --> 01:27:34,754
Pacific . Uh because from the Berlin 

2246
01:27:34,765 --> 01:27:38,254
Air uh Berlin airlift in 1948 to the 

2247
01:27:38,265 --> 01:27:40,705
chaotic evacuation of Afghanistan by 

2248
01:27:40,714 --> 01:27:42,955
air history really has shown us the 

2249
01:27:42,964 --> 01:27:45,186
extensive resources that we really need 

2250
01:27:45,186 --> 01:27:47,115
to undertake a complex airlift 

2251
01:27:47,125 --> 01:27:49,375
operation even in a relatively 

2252
01:27:49,384 --> 01:27:51,794
permissive environment . So how is 

2253
01:27:51,805 --> 01:27:54,027
Transcom ? Are you actively testing the 

2254
01:27:54,027 --> 01:27:56,544
forces to conduct a long scale or large 

2255
01:27:56,555 --> 01:27:58,754
scale prolonged logistical operation ? 

2256
01:27:58,970 --> 01:28:01,192
Uh Should there be a blockade of Taiwan 

2257
01:28:01,192 --> 01:28:03,248
in the future ? Especially given the 

2258
01:28:03,248 --> 01:28:05,470
threats we know regional threats in the 

2259
01:28:05,470 --> 01:28:07,581
Indo Pacific ? Well , thanks . That's 

2260
01:28:07,581 --> 01:28:09,303
one of the key things we do in 

2261
01:28:09,303 --> 01:28:11,414
exercises around the globe as well as 

2262
01:28:11,414 --> 01:28:13,303
in the Indo Pacific uh scenario . 

2263
01:28:13,303 --> 01:28:15,359
Agnostic our ability to deliver at a 

2264
01:28:15,359 --> 01:28:17,526
time and place of our nations choosing 

2265
01:28:17,526 --> 01:28:19,526
is a , is a strategic advantage . I 

2266
01:28:19,526 --> 01:28:21,692
think about the differences between uh 

2267
01:28:21,692 --> 01:28:21,680
the Middle East and Europe . And Indo 

2268
01:28:21,689 --> 01:28:23,689
Pacific is we're going to rely more 

2269
01:28:23,689 --> 01:28:27,149
upon uh the , the airlift because of 

2270
01:28:27,160 --> 01:28:29,271
the , you know , the dearth of ground 

2271
01:28:29,271 --> 01:28:31,604
lines of communication . Uh And so as I , 

2272
01:28:31,604 --> 01:28:33,604
we do analysis on the intra theater 

2273
01:28:33,604 --> 01:28:35,382
movement necessary to get those 

2274
01:28:35,382 --> 01:28:37,910
supplies that last tactical 1000 miles , 

2275
01:28:37,919 --> 01:28:40,649
we are exercising sea lift capacity , 

2276
01:28:40,660 --> 01:28:43,870
which is uh uh shallow draft sea lift , 

2277
01:28:43,879 --> 01:28:46,549
uh running uh essentially a network uh 

2278
01:28:46,560 --> 01:28:48,727
below the network of airplanes because 

2279
01:28:48,850 --> 01:28:51,290
it will fully consume our airlift fleet 

2280
01:28:51,299 --> 01:28:53,700
if we fly everything . So that's an 

2281
01:28:53,709 --> 01:28:56,042
important part of what we're exercising . 

2282
01:28:56,042 --> 01:28:58,153
And I think like Tasman Saber , where 

2283
01:28:58,153 --> 01:28:58,089
we're moving around with ships and , 

2284
01:28:58,100 --> 01:29:00,322
and moving , preposition around is very 

2285
01:29:00,322 --> 01:29:01,989
important . Uh prepositioning 

2286
01:29:01,989 --> 01:29:04,100
capability to include fuel forward is 

2287
01:29:04,100 --> 01:29:06,267
important as well as ensuring re re uh 

2288
01:29:06,267 --> 01:29:09,479
resilient ports and airports for , for 

2289
01:29:09,490 --> 01:29:11,939
defense and , and uh and our ability to 

2290
01:29:11,950 --> 01:29:14,870
survive essentially to aggregate , to 

2291
01:29:14,879 --> 01:29:17,069
fight and disaggregate to survive and 

2292
01:29:17,080 --> 01:29:19,029
regenerate . Thank you very much . 

2293
01:29:19,040 --> 01:29:21,151
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you , 

2294
01:29:21,151 --> 01:29:23,484
Senator Rosen , Senator Cotton , please . 

2295
01:29:23,484 --> 01:29:25,429
General Cave , General Van Novos . 

2296
01:29:25,429 --> 01:29:24,890
Thank you both for your appearance . 

2297
01:29:24,899 --> 01:29:27,010
General Cavoli . Uh You've been asked 

2298
01:29:27,010 --> 01:29:28,677
on occasion to include by the 

2299
01:29:28,677 --> 01:29:30,732
chairman's very first question about 

2300
01:29:30,732 --> 01:29:32,788
the lessons that other nations might 

2301
01:29:32,788 --> 01:29:34,788
learn uh from Ukraine like China in 

2302
01:29:34,788 --> 01:29:37,010
particular , if American will falters , 

2303
01:29:37,010 --> 01:29:39,010
I I agree with that . Um Because we 

2304
01:29:39,010 --> 01:29:41,288
underpin global stability and security . 

2305
01:29:41,288 --> 01:29:43,288
If American will falters anywhere , 

2306
01:29:43,288 --> 01:29:45,455
then Aversa s a will take lessons from 

2307
01:29:45,455 --> 01:29:47,566
it . The one thing you haven't gotten 

2308
01:29:47,566 --> 01:29:49,677
asked about is what's happening right 

2309
01:29:49,677 --> 01:29:51,843
now in the Red Sea , an outlaw gang of 

2310
01:29:51,843 --> 01:29:54,259
brigands and rebels is shooting at us 

2311
01:29:54,270 --> 01:29:56,890
navy vessels on a routine basis dozens 

2312
01:29:56,899 --> 01:29:59,066
of times now . Now , fortunately , our 

2313
01:29:59,066 --> 01:30:01,177
air defenses have intercepted those . 

2314
01:30:01,177 --> 01:30:03,343
That's the only thing that stopped our 

2315
01:30:03,343 --> 01:30:05,455
sailors from being killed . Yet , all 

2316
01:30:05,455 --> 01:30:07,399
we're doing is shooting down those 

2317
01:30:07,399 --> 01:30:09,621
drones and missiles in the air or maybe 

2318
01:30:09,621 --> 01:30:11,732
when they're on the launch pad , what 

2319
01:30:11,732 --> 01:30:11,620
lessons do countries like China or for 

2320
01:30:11,629 --> 01:30:13,851
that matter , Russia learn when we just 

2321
01:30:13,851 --> 01:30:16,018
let our sailors sit in the Red Sea and 

2322
01:30:16,018 --> 01:30:18,439
become sitting ducks for an outlaw band 

2323
01:30:18,450 --> 01:30:21,520
of rebels . Uh Thanks Senator . Um 

2324
01:30:22,160 --> 01:30:25,330
So to be clear that that's not my area 

2325
01:30:25,339 --> 01:30:27,172
of response , but you comment as 

2326
01:30:27,299 --> 01:30:29,466
Chairman Reed that people outside your 

2327
01:30:29,466 --> 01:30:31,688
area take lessons from what's happening 

2328
01:30:31,688 --> 01:30:33,799
there . So what lessons are people in 

2329
01:30:33,799 --> 01:30:33,589
your area take from the fact that again , 

2330
01:30:33,600 --> 01:30:35,878
we're doing nothing . Sure . The , the , 

2331
01:30:35,878 --> 01:30:37,933
the lessons that uh European nations 

2332
01:30:37,933 --> 01:30:40,450
are taking from this . Vladimir Putin 

2333
01:30:40,459 --> 01:30:43,200
is taking from it . Um Well , I , I 

2334
01:30:43,209 --> 01:30:45,431
don't know what Vladimir Putin's taking 

2335
01:30:45,431 --> 01:30:47,542
from it , sir because he's got his uh 

2336
01:30:47,542 --> 01:30:49,598
he's got his hands pretty full right 

2337
01:30:49,598 --> 01:30:51,765
now inside Ukraine where he's learning 

2338
01:30:51,765 --> 01:30:53,876
some of the same lessons , right ? If 

2339
01:30:53,876 --> 01:30:55,987
uh the lesson is that President Biden 

2340
01:30:55,987 --> 01:30:58,042
can be deterred from taking decisive 

2341
01:30:58,042 --> 01:31:00,265
action to protect our interests for two 

2342
01:31:00,265 --> 01:31:02,153
years . He pussyfooted around and 

2343
01:31:02,153 --> 01:31:04,265
didn't provide Ukraine what it needed 

2344
01:31:04,265 --> 01:31:06,350
to stop the invasion earlier and to 

2345
01:31:06,359 --> 01:31:08,303
roll it back and now we're at this 

2346
01:31:08,310 --> 01:31:11,430
unsatisfactory , uh , moment in time . 

2347
01:31:11,439 --> 01:31:13,383
Ok . Uh , let me come to that . So 

2348
01:31:13,383 --> 01:31:15,606
Ukraine's a pretty big country compared 

2349
01:31:15,606 --> 01:31:17,828
to some countries . It's small compared 

2350
01:31:17,828 --> 01:31:20,161
to Russia . Some people say like , well , 

2351
01:31:20,161 --> 01:31:19,859
Russia is always gonna win . Russia 

2352
01:31:19,870 --> 01:31:21,870
always wins because Russia is a big 

2353
01:31:21,870 --> 01:31:23,870
country . Is it the case in history 

2354
01:31:23,870 --> 01:31:25,870
that smaller nations always lose to 

2355
01:31:25,870 --> 01:31:27,981
bigger nations ? Uh No , it's not the 

2356
01:31:27,981 --> 01:31:29,981
case . Um Especially if the smaller 

2357
01:31:29,981 --> 01:31:31,959
nation can make sure that they 

2358
01:31:31,970 --> 01:31:33,914
accomplish their objectives in the 

2359
01:31:33,914 --> 01:31:36,990
fight quickly . Um I think over time , 

2360
01:31:37,000 --> 01:31:40,160
as we see , um in history , as we see , 

2361
01:31:40,459 --> 01:31:43,990
um , conflicts get protracted , 

2362
01:31:44,100 --> 01:31:46,433
typically that favors the larger nation . 

2363
01:31:46,433 --> 01:31:48,378
I agree . That's why it was such a 

2364
01:31:48,378 --> 01:31:50,600
terrible mistake for President Biden to 

2365
01:31:50,600 --> 01:31:52,489
foot around for two years and not 

2366
01:31:52,489 --> 01:31:54,600
provide Ukraine the weapons it needed 

2367
01:31:54,600 --> 01:31:54,509
when it could have had a decisive 

2368
01:31:54,520 --> 01:31:56,687
advantage . But it's not even the case 

2369
01:31:56,687 --> 01:31:58,742
in Russia's history , right . Russia 

2370
01:31:58,742 --> 01:32:00,909
lost the Russo Japan war . Russia lost 

2371
01:32:00,909 --> 01:32:02,964
the war in Afghanistan , I guess you 

2372
01:32:02,964 --> 01:32:04,964
could say Russia won the winter war 

2373
01:32:04,964 --> 01:32:07,660
against Finland in 1939 and 1940 but it 

2374
01:32:07,669 --> 01:32:09,836
got very little for an extraordinarily 

2375
01:32:09,836 --> 01:32:12,002
high cost . So it is not the case that 

2376
01:32:12,002 --> 01:32:14,113
just because you're a bigger nation , 

2377
01:32:14,113 --> 01:32:16,113
you're fated to win a war against a 

2378
01:32:16,113 --> 01:32:15,910
smaller nation . But as you say , 

2379
01:32:15,919 --> 01:32:18,086
you've got , the smaller nation has to 

2380
01:32:18,086 --> 01:32:20,197
be more nimble and aggressive , maybe 

2381
01:32:20,197 --> 01:32:22,419
take risks that it otherwise wouldn't . 

2382
01:32:22,419 --> 01:32:24,752
Um , one thing that Ukraine needs to do , 

2383
01:32:24,752 --> 01:32:26,919
therefore , in my opinion , is conduct 

2384
01:32:26,919 --> 01:32:29,141
more strikes against the facilities and 

2385
01:32:29,141 --> 01:32:31,363
the sites and the resources that Russia 

2386
01:32:31,363 --> 01:32:33,586
is using to wage this unprovoked war of 

2387
01:32:33,586 --> 01:32:35,419
aggression . So , for instance , 

2388
01:32:35,419 --> 01:32:37,419
General Kelly , what's the military 

2389
01:32:37,419 --> 01:32:39,641
value of striking refineries on Russian 

2390
01:32:39,641 --> 01:32:41,808
territory ? For Ukraine ? The military 

2391
01:32:41,808 --> 01:32:45,620
value of that is producing a deficit in 

2392
01:32:45,629 --> 01:32:48,370
fuel available for the fielded force 

2393
01:32:48,379 --> 01:32:51,029
that is for the combat force someplace 

2394
01:32:51,040 --> 01:32:53,151
downstream of the strike , right ? So 

2395
01:32:53,151 --> 01:32:55,262
there's a , there's a time lag in its 

2396
01:32:55,262 --> 01:32:57,484
effect . Senator , as you , as you well 

2397
01:32:57,484 --> 01:32:59,429
know , the military value of ST of 

2398
01:32:59,429 --> 01:33:01,429
striking drone factories on Russian 

2399
01:33:01,429 --> 01:33:03,762
soil . Yeah , the , the , the same , it , 

2400
01:33:03,762 --> 01:33:05,540
it , it has an effect , it is a 

2401
01:33:05,540 --> 01:33:07,762
downstream effect but , but of course , 

2402
01:33:07,762 --> 01:33:09,818
it has an effect , military value of 

2403
01:33:09,818 --> 01:33:11,929
striking the Kerch Strait bridge . Um 

2404
01:33:11,929 --> 01:33:13,929
that would have a downstream effect 

2405
01:33:13,929 --> 01:33:17,100
that took effect sooner . Ok . The 

2406
01:33:17,109 --> 01:33:19,680
administration has urged Ukraine not to 

2407
01:33:19,689 --> 01:33:21,800
launch these kind of strikes though , 

2408
01:33:21,800 --> 01:33:24,078
in your professional military judgment , 

2409
01:33:24,078 --> 01:33:26,189
would u Ukraine be more likely to win 

2410
01:33:26,189 --> 01:33:28,356
or at least get a satisfactory outcome 

2411
01:33:28,356 --> 01:33:30,411
of this war if it was striking those 

2412
01:33:30,411 --> 01:33:32,467
sites and other sites that right now 

2413
01:33:32,467 --> 01:33:34,633
are safe haven for Russia's military . 

2414
01:33:34,633 --> 01:33:36,745
So I think , I think Ukraine would um 

2415
01:33:36,745 --> 01:33:40,209
be very well advised to 

2416
01:33:40,220 --> 01:33:43,370
strike the operational level targets 

2417
01:33:43,540 --> 01:33:46,029
that are supporting the fielded force . 

2418
01:33:46,229 --> 01:33:48,396
They have some urgent challenges right 

2419
01:33:48,396 --> 01:33:50,618
now . On the front line , as , as we've 

2420
01:33:50,618 --> 01:33:52,729
spoken about , the fighting is active 

2421
01:33:52,729 --> 01:33:54,896
along the forward line of troops . And 

2422
01:33:54,896 --> 01:33:57,560
so those things that view most directly 

2423
01:33:57,569 --> 01:33:59,458
that have the shortest downstream 

2424
01:33:59,458 --> 01:34:01,569
effect right now , I think should be 

2425
01:34:01,580 --> 01:34:04,390
struck kind of feeding the wolf closest 

2426
01:34:04,399 --> 01:34:06,621
to the sled , I think is what they need 

2427
01:34:06,621 --> 01:34:08,677
to do right now . Is , is it , is it 

2428
01:34:08,677 --> 01:34:10,788
your military judgment that we should 

2429
01:34:10,788 --> 01:34:12,732
provide Ukraine with more and more 

2430
01:34:12,732 --> 01:34:14,843
variants of the attacks missiles than 

2431
01:34:14,843 --> 01:34:17,299
we have already ? It is . Ok . Um One 

2432
01:34:17,310 --> 01:34:19,477
final question on this small and , and 

2433
01:34:19,477 --> 01:34:21,477
large point , um It's been reported 

2434
01:34:21,477 --> 01:34:23,477
that that Russia has about a 3 to 1 

2435
01:34:23,477 --> 01:34:25,699
advantage in artillery production right 

2436
01:34:25,699 --> 01:34:27,588
now over Ukraine . Um I , is that 

2437
01:34:27,588 --> 01:34:29,810
accurate ? Uh No sir , they have a 3 to 

2438
01:34:29,810 --> 01:34:33,740
1 production advantage over the 

2439
01:34:33,750 --> 01:34:35,917
North Atlantic treaty or Ukraine , the 

2440
01:34:35,917 --> 01:34:38,083
good guys , let's put it that way . Uh 

2441
01:34:38,083 --> 01:34:40,306
ok . So , uh but isn't it also the case 

2442
01:34:40,306 --> 01:34:43,160
that Ukraine is destroying four Russian 

2443
01:34:43,169 --> 01:34:45,279
Houser for everyone that Russia 

2444
01:34:45,290 --> 01:34:48,160
destroys something about like that , 

2445
01:34:49,580 --> 01:34:51,747
pretty big mismatch if you , if Russia 

2446
01:34:51,747 --> 01:34:54,609
can , can make three times as many big 

2447
01:34:54,620 --> 01:34:56,279
rounds that we all can make 

2448
01:34:56,290 --> 01:34:58,346
collectively that Ukraine is able to 

2449
01:34:58,346 --> 01:35:00,479
kill four times as many guns as , as 

2450
01:35:00,490 --> 01:35:02,823
Russia has what explains that the , the , 

2451
01:35:02,823 --> 01:35:05,620
the what explains their ability to , to 

2452
01:35:05,629 --> 01:35:07,796
kill more because the Russians are not 

2453
01:35:07,796 --> 01:35:10,018
as precise in their targeting . So it's 

2454
01:35:10,018 --> 01:35:12,185
not just a matter of having a lot more 

2455
01:35:12,185 --> 01:35:11,939
stuff although it's nice to have more 

2456
01:35:11,950 --> 01:35:14,172
stuff and we should certainly have more 

2457
01:35:14,172 --> 01:35:16,283
stuff and be able to make it faster . 

2458
01:35:16,283 --> 01:35:15,970
It's also that you got to be able to 

2459
01:35:15,979 --> 01:35:18,090
use it or to put it in simple terms , 

2460
01:35:18,090 --> 01:35:20,201
you got to be able to hit the targets 

2461
01:35:20,201 --> 01:35:22,423
that you shoot at in a timely fashion . 

2462
01:35:22,423 --> 01:35:24,590
Of course , Ukraine is doing that much 

2463
01:35:24,590 --> 01:35:24,529
more effectively than Russia is doing 

2464
01:35:24,540 --> 01:35:27,600
that typically , but not you not 

2465
01:35:27,609 --> 01:35:29,276
uniformly . So why the 3 to 1 

2466
01:35:29,276 --> 01:35:31,442
production advantage is unsatisfactory 

2467
01:35:31,442 --> 01:35:33,498
and needs to be reversed . It's also 

2468
01:35:33,498 --> 01:35:36,140
not uh the a sign that Russian victory 

2469
01:35:36,149 --> 01:35:38,479
is inevitable . There is no such thing 

2470
01:35:38,490 --> 01:35:40,620
as you know , of inevitable victory , 

2471
01:35:40,629 --> 01:35:43,359
sir . Um I if , if your question is , 

2472
01:35:43,370 --> 01:35:45,592
can Ukraine win this war ? They can win 

2473
01:35:45,592 --> 01:35:47,703
this war , can they win it without um 

2474
01:35:47,703 --> 01:35:50,629
without achieving Russian levels of 

2475
01:35:50,640 --> 01:35:53,709
production ? Sure they can . Um But 

2476
01:35:53,720 --> 01:35:55,776
right now they're in a very critical 

2477
01:35:55,776 --> 01:35:57,887
moment . Well , what would be best is 

2478
01:35:57,887 --> 01:35:57,779
if we achieve Russian levels of 

2479
01:35:57,790 --> 01:36:00,649
production and we maintain the 4 to 1 

2480
01:36:00,660 --> 01:36:02,827
advantage on , on targeting . So let's 

2481
01:36:02,827 --> 01:36:06,209
try to , let's try to get there . Thank 

2482
01:36:06,220 --> 01:36:08,498
you , Senator Cotton , Senator Schmidt , 

2483
01:36:08,498 --> 01:36:10,498
please . Thank you , Mr Chairman um 

2484
01:36:10,498 --> 01:36:12,553
General Cavoli . Thank you for being 

2485
01:36:12,553 --> 01:36:14,776
here . Um , a couple of questions about 

2486
01:36:14,776 --> 01:36:14,240
NATO and then I do want to ask about 

2487
01:36:14,250 --> 01:36:18,049
the guys up here . Um There , there's a 

2488
01:36:18,060 --> 01:36:20,227
lot of discussions today about lessons 

2489
01:36:20,227 --> 01:36:22,338
learned from the Ukraine war . One of 

2490
01:36:22,338 --> 01:36:24,560
the lessons I suppose that we could all 

2491
01:36:24,560 --> 01:36:27,549
learn is that , um , our European 

2492
01:36:27,560 --> 01:36:29,227
allies in NATO have come very 

2493
01:36:29,229 --> 01:36:32,100
accustomed to us subsidizing their 

2494
01:36:32,410 --> 01:36:34,299
social welfare programs in Europe 

2495
01:36:34,299 --> 01:36:36,354
because they refuse to meet their 2% 

2496
01:36:36,354 --> 01:36:38,577
obligations . There's only 11 countries 

2497
01:36:38,577 --> 01:36:41,200
that do it . Um , and I think , you 

2498
01:36:41,209 --> 01:36:43,487
know , we represent American taxpayers , 

2499
01:36:44,439 --> 01:36:46,383
United States sent , that's who we 

2500
01:36:46,383 --> 01:36:48,550
represent . Um , and I wanna ask about 

2501
01:36:48,550 --> 01:36:51,740
that . So what in 

2502
01:36:53,299 --> 01:36:56,240
so 2% the t why is 2% the target ? 

2503
01:36:57,189 --> 01:36:58,450
Why not ? 3% 

2504
01:37:01,140 --> 01:37:03,790
sir ? Because that's what was agreed to 

2505
01:37:03,799 --> 01:37:07,729
at Wales some years ago . Um I , is it 

2506
01:37:07,740 --> 01:37:10,240
an appropriate target ? Is it an 

2507
01:37:10,250 --> 01:37:12,229
arbitrary target ? I leave those 

2508
01:37:12,240 --> 01:37:14,462
questions to somebody else . What I can 

2509
01:37:14,462 --> 01:37:16,580
tell you is that I know what the 

2510
01:37:16,589 --> 01:37:18,819
alliance needs to do to modernize and 

2511
01:37:18,830 --> 01:37:21,479
to get fit for its collective defense , 

2512
01:37:21,490 --> 01:37:23,680
its new purpose , its reestablished 

2513
01:37:23,689 --> 01:37:26,229
purpose in the wake of the invasion of 

2514
01:37:26,240 --> 01:37:30,109
Ukraine . And um it is at least 2% . 

2515
01:37:30,240 --> 01:37:32,549
That's why the alliance at the last 

2516
01:37:32,560 --> 01:37:35,660
summit adopted the phrase floor , not a 

2517
01:37:35,669 --> 01:37:38,470
ceiling . I think over time we'll see 

2518
01:37:38,479 --> 01:37:40,979
our allies realize that it is , it 2% 

2519
01:37:40,990 --> 01:37:43,720
is inadequate uh for the cost , at 

2520
01:37:43,729 --> 01:37:45,896
least in the near and midterm . Yeah , 

2521
01:37:45,896 --> 01:37:48,007
I'm glad that I'm glad that they make 

2522
01:37:48,007 --> 01:37:50,062
these pronouncements . Um but uh our 

2523
01:37:50,062 --> 01:37:52,118
allies and in NATO allies , but they 

2524
01:37:52,118 --> 01:37:54,451
don't seem to ever meet the obligations . 

2525
01:37:54,451 --> 01:37:56,779
And so I guess at what point , um you 

2526
01:37:56,790 --> 01:37:58,957
know , when you only have 11 countries 

2527
01:37:58,957 --> 01:38:00,957
doing it . And by the way , many of 

2528
01:38:00,957 --> 01:38:03,234
them fudge these numbers . They're not , 

2529
01:38:03,234 --> 01:38:05,457
they're not dollars related to military 

2530
01:38:05,457 --> 01:38:07,700
readiness . Um And so here we are now , 

2531
01:38:08,419 --> 01:38:10,586
the taxpayers are again being asked to 

2532
01:38:10,586 --> 01:38:12,752
spend another 60 billion on top of the 

2533
01:38:12,752 --> 01:38:14,752
112 billion , we've been told there 

2534
01:38:14,752 --> 01:38:16,975
could be another 100 billion requests , 

2535
01:38:16,975 --> 01:38:19,086
although that's not reflected in this 

2536
01:38:19,086 --> 01:38:21,086
budget . Um So we don't really know 

2537
01:38:21,086 --> 01:38:24,100
this is a ongoing war and a blank check . 

2538
01:38:25,000 --> 01:38:27,830
And I believe my job is to try to find 

2539
01:38:27,839 --> 01:38:30,779
out what does victory look like and 

2540
01:38:30,790 --> 01:38:33,012
what is the cost gonna be ? Because I , 

2541
01:38:33,012 --> 01:38:34,957
I feel like we're in this mode now 

2542
01:38:34,957 --> 01:38:38,310
where um this dominates discussion , 

2543
01:38:38,319 --> 01:38:40,486
but there aren't really a whole lot of 

2544
01:38:40,486 --> 01:38:43,189
details . Um So again , I question 

2545
01:38:43,200 --> 01:38:46,149
whether 2% is even enough for our 

2546
01:38:46,160 --> 01:38:49,160
European allies . Um I don't think that 

2547
01:38:49,169 --> 01:38:51,336
it is . I think I hear you saying that 

2548
01:38:51,336 --> 01:38:53,169
but we also only have 11 of them 

2549
01:38:53,169 --> 01:38:55,391
meeting those obligations . And again , 

2550
01:38:55,391 --> 01:38:57,669
I think those numbers are being fudged . 

2551
01:38:57,669 --> 01:38:59,836
I also uh have come to learn that . Is 

2552
01:38:59,836 --> 01:39:01,891
it your understanding that Hawaii is 

2553
01:39:01,891 --> 01:39:04,002
actually not included in article five 

2554
01:39:04,002 --> 01:39:07,109
obligations under NATO ? Um 

2555
01:39:07,319 --> 01:39:11,100
Sure . So um the number right now is 

2556
01:39:11,109 --> 01:39:14,100
20 are meeting , um twe 20 allies are 

2557
01:39:14,109 --> 01:39:16,859
meeting 2% as of June . They , they 

2558
01:39:16,870 --> 01:39:18,926
will be projected . Norway just sent 

2559
01:39:18,926 --> 01:39:20,814
the Secretary General a letter on 

2560
01:39:20,814 --> 01:39:22,981
Monday saying that and , and there are 

2561
01:39:22,981 --> 01:39:25,203
a couple more coming up . But the point 

2562
01:39:25,203 --> 01:39:27,037
senator your point that the rich 

2563
01:39:27,037 --> 01:39:29,092
countries of Western Europe that are 

2564
01:39:29,092 --> 01:39:31,634
not at 2% are in the wrong place . I 

2565
01:39:31,645 --> 01:39:33,201
agree with . Absolutely and 

2566
01:39:33,201 --> 01:39:35,312
fundamentally , but I would point out 

2567
01:39:35,312 --> 01:39:37,256
that the trajectory is moving very 

2568
01:39:37,256 --> 01:39:39,367
rapidly um in the right direction and 

2569
01:39:39,367 --> 01:39:41,805
it's doing that because our allies have 

2570
01:39:41,814 --> 01:39:43,925
learned the lesson of the invasion of 

2571
01:39:43,925 --> 01:39:46,154
Ukraine as well . Um We still do need 

2572
01:39:46,165 --> 01:39:48,834
to close the say do gap , however , um 

2573
01:39:48,845 --> 01:39:50,955
Yy , yeah , so um 

2574
01:39:52,339 --> 01:39:55,779
with regard to um Hawaii , if Hawaii is 

2575
01:39:55,790 --> 01:39:59,200
attacked by China , article six 

2576
01:39:59,209 --> 01:40:01,042
defines of the Washington treaty 

2577
01:40:01,042 --> 01:40:04,399
defines what the territory covered in 

2578
01:40:04,410 --> 01:40:07,339
the treaty is . Um south of the tropic 

2579
01:40:07,350 --> 01:40:09,239
of cancer is not included . So uh 

2580
01:40:09,239 --> 01:40:11,859
French Polynesia is not in there . The 

2581
01:40:11,870 --> 01:40:14,160
U K's Pitcairn Islands are not in there 

2582
01:40:14,549 --> 01:40:16,660
in Hawaii and Guam are not in there . 

2583
01:40:16,660 --> 01:40:20,140
However , article four gives any nation 

2584
01:40:20,149 --> 01:40:22,899
that has been attacked the right to 

2585
01:40:22,910 --> 01:40:25,319
call consultations with other nations 

2586
01:40:25,370 --> 01:40:27,481
and to say I want you to do something 

2587
01:40:27,481 --> 01:40:29,481
about this . And article five gives 

2588
01:40:29,481 --> 01:40:31,537
them all the same sovereign right to 

2589
01:40:31,537 --> 01:40:33,259
decide on that . It's just not 

2590
01:40:33,259 --> 01:40:35,314
automatic . But article six , if you 

2591
01:40:35,314 --> 01:40:37,481
want , one would be our , our European 

2592
01:40:37,481 --> 01:40:39,592
allies would have no objection to why 

2593
01:40:39,592 --> 01:40:41,759
you're being included . Correct ? II , 

2594
01:40:41,759 --> 01:40:43,926
I would expect not . Article six can , 

2595
01:40:43,926 --> 01:40:45,981
what about Guam ? Article six can be 

2596
01:40:45,981 --> 01:40:48,037
amended . The United States is never 

2597
01:40:48,037 --> 01:40:50,037
asked to amend it . Um I I'm deeply 

2598
01:40:50,037 --> 01:40:53,600
troubled by um uh Macron's comments , I 

2599
01:40:53,609 --> 01:40:57,109
guess about a year ago that um that 

2600
01:40:57,120 --> 01:40:59,287
Europe doesn't need to be dragged into 

2601
01:40:59,287 --> 01:41:01,287
a war in the Pacific and follow the 

2602
01:41:01,287 --> 01:41:03,176
United States . Something to that 

2603
01:41:03,176 --> 01:41:05,790
effect . Um In America's strategic 

2604
01:41:05,799 --> 01:41:08,459
interest , China is by far and away our 

2605
01:41:08,470 --> 01:41:11,600
biggest threat . Um Do you 

2606
01:41:11,609 --> 01:41:15,419
believe that our NATO allies , if 

2607
01:41:15,430 --> 01:41:19,009
Taiwan is attacked , would join us 

2608
01:41:19,520 --> 01:41:23,270
in that ? Cause I , I believe that many 

2609
01:41:23,279 --> 01:41:25,500
of them would , I do not believe that 

2610
01:41:25,509 --> 01:41:28,220
NATO as an alliance has that purpose 

2611
01:41:28,229 --> 01:41:30,660
right now . It could adopt that purpose , 

2612
01:41:30,689 --> 01:41:32,856
but that's not part of the , is anyone 

2613
01:41:32,856 --> 01:41:35,022
in this administration talking to them 

2614
01:41:35,022 --> 01:41:37,133
about that ? Oh , this administration 

2615
01:41:37,133 --> 01:41:39,022
talks a great deal too about that 

2616
01:41:39,022 --> 01:41:40,979
specific issue to our allies about 

2617
01:41:40,990 --> 01:41:43,212
being active in the Pacific . Are , are 

2618
01:41:43,212 --> 01:41:45,212
you asking is , well , I guess I'll 

2619
01:41:45,212 --> 01:41:47,434
just close with this because I'm out of 

2620
01:41:47,434 --> 01:41:50,339
time . I'm very concerned that um our 

2621
01:41:50,350 --> 01:41:53,689
NATO allies um don't meet their 

2622
01:41:53,700 --> 01:41:56,549
obligations , depend on the generosity 

2623
01:41:56,589 --> 01:41:58,950
of the American taxpayer to a degree . 

2624
01:41:59,109 --> 01:42:02,180
Um that uh of 

2625
01:42:04,080 --> 01:42:06,191
I it's very concerning to me and when 

2626
01:42:06,191 --> 01:42:08,779
you hear comments from the leader of 

2627
01:42:08,790 --> 01:42:11,080
France that they don't want to follow 

2628
01:42:11,089 --> 01:42:13,145
the United States into potentially a 

2629
01:42:13,145 --> 01:42:15,189
war in the Pacific , uh potentially 

2630
01:42:15,200 --> 01:42:18,089
with our chief adversary China . Uh 

2631
01:42:18,180 --> 01:42:20,291
that , that raises a lot of concern . 

2632
01:42:20,291 --> 01:42:22,490
So , um anyway , I appreciate your 

2633
01:42:22,500 --> 01:42:24,970
service and what you do . Um But again , 

2634
01:42:24,979 --> 01:42:27,201
I , I just don't feel like our European 

2635
01:42:27,201 --> 01:42:29,257
allies have stepped up . Thank you . 

2636
01:42:29,257 --> 01:42:31,090
Thank you , Senator Schmidt . Uh 

2637
01:42:31,090 --> 01:42:32,757
Senator King . Requested . Uh 

2638
01:42:32,757 --> 01:42:34,923
additional time , 111 brief question , 

2639
01:42:34,923 --> 01:42:38,290
we talked a lot about air defense um is 

2640
01:42:38,299 --> 01:42:40,410
are are there and perhaps this has to 

2641
01:42:40,410 --> 01:42:42,466
go to the closed session . Are there 

2642
01:42:42,466 --> 01:42:44,132
directed energy , air defense 

2643
01:42:44,132 --> 01:42:46,240
facilities in Ukraine ? Because the 

2644
01:42:46,250 --> 01:42:48,417
bullet on a bullet is a very expensive 

2645
01:42:48,417 --> 01:42:52,060
way to defend . Directed energy is a 

2646
01:42:52,069 --> 01:42:54,830
lot cheaper . And I know there are 

2647
01:42:54,839 --> 01:42:57,109
systems now that are in development or 

2648
01:42:57,120 --> 01:42:59,410
actually in testing , is that an option 

2649
01:42:59,419 --> 01:43:01,586
that we should be pursuing in terms of 

2650
01:43:01,586 --> 01:43:03,863
our support for air defense in Ukraine ? 

2651
01:43:03,863 --> 01:43:05,975
It is an option that , that , that we 

2652
01:43:05,975 --> 01:43:09,250
could pursue . Senator and your points 

2653
01:43:09,259 --> 01:43:11,810
about the cost ratios and the reload 

2654
01:43:11,819 --> 01:43:14,410
ratio , uh speed of directed energy is 

2655
01:43:14,419 --> 01:43:16,752
very , you know , very important . It's , 

2656
01:43:16,752 --> 01:43:18,975
it's obviously a big part of the future 

2657
01:43:18,975 --> 01:43:20,975
of missile defense specifically and 

2658
01:43:20,975 --> 01:43:23,030
counter drone defense specifically , 

2659
01:43:23,030 --> 01:43:25,086
there are some systems um that we're 

2660
01:43:25,086 --> 01:43:27,470
working with out there . Um There are a 

2661
01:43:27,479 --> 01:43:29,479
lot of power problems as you know , 

2662
01:43:29,479 --> 01:43:31,535
associated with . Still , we haven't 

2663
01:43:31,535 --> 01:43:33,839
fully realized its potential um with 

2664
01:43:33,850 --> 01:43:36,017
regard to Ukraine , it , it'd be great 

2665
01:43:36,017 --> 01:43:38,017
to speak to you just a moment about 

2666
01:43:38,017 --> 01:43:40,072
that in , in , in a closed session . 

2667
01:43:40,072 --> 01:43:42,183
Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

2668
01:43:42,183 --> 01:43:44,294
Thank you , Senator King . Uh Senator 

2669
01:43:44,294 --> 01:43:46,239
Smith one more . I have a judicial 

2670
01:43:46,239 --> 01:43:45,959
question . Yeah , thank you . Thank you , 

2671
01:43:45,970 --> 01:43:48,169
Mr Chairman . Um I did not get to the 

2672
01:43:48,220 --> 01:43:50,200
Gaza here . So um I apologize . Uh 

2673
01:43:50,220 --> 01:43:52,669
General uh Van Os , I did want to ask 

2674
01:43:52,680 --> 01:43:54,791
you Um I know there's been discussion 

2675
01:43:54,791 --> 01:43:58,250
about this uh effort to Gaza here 

2676
01:43:58,259 --> 01:44:01,370
um for humanitarian aid . Um 

2677
01:44:02,890 --> 01:44:04,779
I have concerns and I don't think 

2678
01:44:04,779 --> 01:44:07,049
they're alone . Um I don't think I'm 

2679
01:44:07,060 --> 01:44:09,282
alone in concerns about what that means 

2680
01:44:09,282 --> 01:44:11,890
for our American troops or personnel 

2681
01:44:11,899 --> 01:44:14,250
that would be engaged in this activity . 

2682
01:44:14,310 --> 01:44:16,532
What is your understanding of what this 

2683
01:44:16,532 --> 01:44:18,643
looks like ? Uh What could be done if 

2684
01:44:18,643 --> 01:44:20,866
this is happening ? What can be done to 

2685
01:44:20,866 --> 01:44:22,588
ensure that American lives are 

2686
01:44:22,588 --> 01:44:25,060
protected ? Yeah , thanks . Uh I think 

2687
01:44:25,069 --> 01:44:27,180
about uh what we do at Transportation 

2688
01:44:27,180 --> 01:44:29,500
Command . We provide transportation for 

2689
01:44:29,509 --> 01:44:31,620
these capabilities around the globe . 

2690
01:44:31,620 --> 01:44:33,620
We have to exercise them . We do it 

2691
01:44:33,620 --> 01:44:35,787
almost every year . Uh as we bring all 

2692
01:44:35,787 --> 01:44:37,842
of the elements together to do joint 

2693
01:44:37,842 --> 01:44:39,676
logistics over the shore or even 

2694
01:44:39,676 --> 01:44:41,787
airdrop through humanitarian aid . Uh 

2695
01:44:41,787 --> 01:44:44,479
We put um uh processes and we exercise 

2696
01:44:44,490 --> 01:44:46,379
these things . So we have a great 

2697
01:44:46,379 --> 01:44:48,601
understanding of what it takes to build 

2698
01:44:48,601 --> 01:44:51,040
a pier and a discharge facility and to 

2699
01:44:51,049 --> 01:44:53,327
offload and to move humanitarian goods . 

2700
01:44:53,327 --> 01:44:55,419
We've done this uh actively for the 

2701
01:44:55,430 --> 01:44:58,810
Haiti earthquake in 2010 . So when we 

2702
01:44:58,819 --> 01:45:00,930
think about the new , you know , what 

2703
01:45:00,930 --> 01:45:03,152
is the strategic environment associated 

2704
01:45:03,152 --> 01:45:04,930
uh with doing this in Gaza ? Uh 

2705
01:45:04,930 --> 01:45:07,299
Obviously , II I forward that to the 

2706
01:45:07,310 --> 01:45:09,199
geographic combatant commander to 

2707
01:45:09,199 --> 01:45:11,310
Centcom . So we're working diligently 

2708
01:45:11,310 --> 01:45:13,310
with them on the planning and I can 

2709
01:45:13,310 --> 01:45:15,421
tell you that force protection is our 

2710
01:45:15,421 --> 01:45:17,643
number one concern . And if I could add 

2711
01:45:17,643 --> 01:45:19,779
to that senator , so O obviously with 

2712
01:45:19,790 --> 01:45:23,779
the transfer of uh Israel from the Ucom 

2713
01:45:23,790 --> 01:45:25,901
area of responsibility to the Centcom 

2714
01:45:25,901 --> 01:45:28,779
area of responsibility . Um We , we get 

2715
01:45:28,790 --> 01:45:31,020
a , a combined effort there now . So 

2716
01:45:31,029 --> 01:45:34,700
the protection um is combined between 

2717
01:45:34,709 --> 01:45:38,240
us U COM and Centcom depending on which 

2718
01:45:38,250 --> 01:45:40,139
exact part of the operation we're 

2719
01:45:40,139 --> 01:45:41,972
talking about Eric and I uh Eric 

2720
01:45:41,972 --> 01:45:44,194
Carrell and I have been in very intense 

2721
01:45:44,194 --> 01:45:45,917
conversation about this . More 

2722
01:45:45,917 --> 01:45:48,194
importantly in our maritime components . 

2723
01:45:48,194 --> 01:45:50,306
We've been very , very close planning 

2724
01:45:50,306 --> 01:45:52,779
on this . Um It's not without danger 

2725
01:45:52,790 --> 01:45:54,957
but , but um but we know how to handle 

2726
01:45:54,957 --> 01:45:57,012
it , sir . Well , and I , I guess it 

2727
01:45:57,012 --> 01:45:59,234
just to , to , to color in a little bit 

2728
01:45:59,234 --> 01:46:01,234
of detail to the extent . Um I know 

2729
01:46:01,234 --> 01:46:00,930
it's just been , the gaz up here has 

2730
01:46:00,939 --> 01:46:03,106
been sort of talked about , but what's 

2731
01:46:03,106 --> 01:46:04,606
your , who's , what's your 

2732
01:46:04,606 --> 01:46:06,661
understanding of who's receiving the 

2733
01:46:06,661 --> 01:46:08,717
aid ? I guess we've vaguely heard of 

2734
01:46:08,717 --> 01:46:11,120
NGO S . Um But again , this is in a 

2735
01:46:11,129 --> 01:46:13,520
very um dangerous part of the world 

2736
01:46:13,529 --> 01:46:15,585
right now with a lot of people who , 

2737
01:46:15,585 --> 01:46:18,120
who don't like um the United States of 

2738
01:46:18,129 --> 01:46:19,962
America . So I guess what's your 

2739
01:46:19,962 --> 01:46:22,129
understanding of , of more the details 

2740
01:46:22,129 --> 01:46:24,351
as it stands today , sir ? So , so that 

2741
01:46:24,351 --> 01:46:26,520
part is Inside General Corolla's A or 

2742
01:46:26,529 --> 01:46:29,229
Inside Centcom . And uh II , I know 

2743
01:46:29,240 --> 01:46:31,351
that this is a fast moving story as , 

2744
01:46:31,351 --> 01:46:33,462
as as we go forward and I hesitate to 

2745
01:46:33,462 --> 01:46:35,684
give you an answer , I can refer to him 

2746
01:46:35,684 --> 01:46:37,684
for you . We'll follow up on that . 

2747
01:46:37,684 --> 01:46:39,684
Thank you . Thank you . Thank you , 

2748
01:46:39,684 --> 01:46:41,518
Senator Schmidt . Uh , I've been 

2749
01:46:41,518 --> 01:46:43,573
informed that Senator Sullivan is on 

2750
01:46:43,573 --> 01:46:45,790
his way , but I have an additional 

2751
01:46:45,799 --> 01:46:48,021
question . There's been discussion back 

2752
01:46:48,021 --> 01:46:50,080
and forth in a very , I think , uh , 

2753
01:46:50,790 --> 01:46:54,669
useful one about , uh , what happens if , 

2754
01:46:54,680 --> 01:46:57,430
uh , the UK Ukrainian government 

2755
01:46:57,680 --> 01:47:01,379
fails and , and my sense and I 

2756
01:47:01,390 --> 01:47:03,470
just , uh , ask for your opinion . 

2757
01:47:03,479 --> 01:47:06,029
General Cavoli is that if we fail in 

2758
01:47:06,189 --> 01:47:08,910
Ukraine , Russia is more likely to 

2759
01:47:08,919 --> 01:47:10,790
conduct operations against other 

2760
01:47:10,799 --> 01:47:13,979
countries . Uh So if we really want to 

2761
01:47:14,270 --> 01:47:16,950
diminish a potential conflict between 

2762
01:47:16,959 --> 01:47:18,959
NATO , the United States and Russia 

2763
01:47:19,169 --> 01:47:22,410
succeeding Ukraine is a fundamental uh 

2764
01:47:23,450 --> 01:47:26,959
obligation or uh sir , 

2765
01:47:26,970 --> 01:47:30,660
II , I agree . I think um the biggest 

2766
01:47:30,669 --> 01:47:32,502
single change we can make in our 

2767
01:47:32,502 --> 01:47:35,200
deterrent posture for the better is for 

2768
01:47:35,209 --> 01:47:39,000
Ukraine to win . And uh 

2769
01:47:39,009 --> 01:47:42,459
there's been comments about uh the 

2770
01:47:42,470 --> 01:47:46,470
contribution of our allies , but uh the 

2771
01:47:46,770 --> 01:47:49,560
reality is that in many other ways 

2772
01:47:49,569 --> 01:47:51,625
which are absolutely critical to the 

2773
01:47:51,625 --> 01:47:55,029
success of the Ukraine , um Our allies 

2774
01:47:55,040 --> 01:47:57,151
are far out pacing us in humanitarian 

2775
01:47:57,151 --> 01:47:59,484
assistance and absorption of immigrants , 

2776
01:47:59,500 --> 01:48:02,240
very costly programs . But without 

2777
01:48:02,250 --> 01:48:04,830
those programs , uh essentially Ukraine 

2778
01:48:04,839 --> 01:48:07,061
would not be able to concentrate on the 

2779
01:48:07,061 --> 01:48:09,228
battle . Is that accurate ? Yeah , a a 

2780
01:48:09,228 --> 01:48:12,250
absolutely chairman . Um the uh amount 

2781
01:48:12,259 --> 01:48:14,540
of humanitarian assistance , the amount 

2782
01:48:14,549 --> 01:48:16,493
of support for the electrical grid 

2783
01:48:16,493 --> 01:48:18,740
which is under constant attack and on 

2784
01:48:18,750 --> 01:48:22,229
and on . Uh the not inconsequential 

2785
01:48:22,240 --> 01:48:24,990
act of taking on board at least 4 

2786
01:48:25,000 --> 01:48:28,109
million refugees for two years without , 

2787
01:48:28,120 --> 01:48:31,189
without a bump . Um The , these are the , 

2788
01:48:31,200 --> 01:48:33,256
these are important contributions to 

2789
01:48:33,256 --> 01:48:35,144
some of them are , are , are less 

2790
01:48:35,144 --> 01:48:36,978
tangible , sir . Um But they are 

2791
01:48:36,978 --> 01:48:39,569
contributions um inside the military 

2792
01:48:39,580 --> 01:48:41,802
sphere . I , I really have to point out 

2793
01:48:41,802 --> 01:48:43,913
there , there are some things that we 

2794
01:48:43,913 --> 01:48:47,109
provide a lot of and in the aggregate , 

2795
01:48:47,120 --> 01:48:49,479
we are certainly providing an awful lot . 

2796
01:48:49,729 --> 01:48:51,840
Um But there are some things that are 

2797
01:48:51,840 --> 01:48:55,330
100% provided by people other than the 

2798
01:48:55,339 --> 01:48:58,049
United States , uh petroleum products 

2799
01:48:58,060 --> 01:49:00,899
for the use the fuel for the force 100% 

2800
01:49:00,910 --> 01:49:04,830
from allies . Um All of it tanks , more 

2801
01:49:04,839 --> 01:49:07,020
than 90% of the tanks that we've given 

2802
01:49:07,029 --> 01:49:09,085
to the Ukrainians came from allies , 

2803
01:49:09,085 --> 01:49:11,140
not from us , fighter jets , 100% of 

2804
01:49:11,140 --> 01:49:13,779
them have not come from us . Um um and 

2805
01:49:13,790 --> 01:49:15,846
I and I could go on and on . So , so 

2806
01:49:15,846 --> 01:49:17,623
it's really important for us to 

2807
01:49:17,623 --> 01:49:19,846
recognize the value of our contribution 

2808
01:49:19,865 --> 01:49:22,032
and to justify , it's important for me 

2809
01:49:22,032 --> 01:49:23,976
to be able to justify to , to , to 

2810
01:49:23,976 --> 01:49:26,143
members and constituents , the , the , 

2811
01:49:26,143 --> 01:49:28,254
the , the , the value proposition for 

2812
01:49:28,254 --> 01:49:30,476
America in these contributions , but we 

2813
01:49:30,476 --> 01:49:32,587
shouldn't lose sight of the fact that 

2814
01:49:32,587 --> 01:49:34,698
our allies are contributing as well . 

2815
01:49:34,698 --> 01:49:37,535
In fact , um just my impression it 

2816
01:49:37,544 --> 01:49:40,990
might be yours is that uh the European 

2817
01:49:41,000 --> 01:49:43,520
allies and NATO and other countries in 

2818
01:49:43,529 --> 01:49:45,359
Europe have far exceeded any 

2819
01:49:45,370 --> 01:49:47,399
expectations we had when this fight 

2820
01:49:47,410 --> 01:49:51,120
began . I , I'm impressed , I think in 

2821
01:49:51,129 --> 01:49:53,330
the terms of , and it's for their own 

2822
01:49:53,339 --> 01:49:55,700
self interest and self protection , but 

2823
01:49:55,709 --> 01:49:57,910
it is , uh , I , I agree with that , 

2824
01:49:57,919 --> 01:49:59,808
not just in terms of what they're 

2825
01:49:59,808 --> 01:50:01,697
giving to Ukraine and the support 

2826
01:50:01,697 --> 01:50:03,641
they're giving to Ukraine , but in 

2827
01:50:03,641 --> 01:50:05,863
terms of what they expect of themselves 

2828
01:50:05,863 --> 01:50:08,197
to contribute to the alliance . Um , um , 

2829
01:50:08,197 --> 01:50:10,530
so both of those tracks , it's , uh , I , 

2830
01:50:10,530 --> 01:50:12,863
I would never have guessed this in , uh , 

2831
01:50:12,863 --> 01:50:15,089
2021 chairman . Uh , I was in the same 

2832
01:50:15,100 --> 01:50:18,770
sense of uh disbelief as you were , sir . 

2833
01:50:18,779 --> 01:50:21,549
Uh Let me recognize Senator Sullivan . 

2834
01:50:21,560 --> 01:50:23,504
Uh We're trying to keep it to five 

2835
01:50:23,504 --> 01:50:25,616
minutes . We have to adjourn chance . 

2836
01:50:25,616 --> 01:50:27,671
Thank you , Mr Chairman uh General . 

2837
01:50:27,671 --> 01:50:29,782
It's good to see both of you . Thanks 

2838
01:50:29,782 --> 01:50:32,229
for your great work . Um General Cavoli , 

2839
01:50:32,240 --> 01:50:34,560
I wanna dig into a little bit more 

2840
01:50:34,569 --> 01:50:38,069
about a couple of issues . One is the 

2841
01:50:38,080 --> 01:50:41,700
extent to which the authoritarian 

2842
01:50:41,709 --> 01:50:44,540
regimes in the world who are all on the 

2843
01:50:44,549 --> 01:50:48,500
March . Um China , 

2844
01:50:48,509 --> 01:50:52,450
Russia , Iran , North 

2845
01:50:52,459 --> 01:50:56,350
Korea are cooperating . I'm sure 

2846
01:50:56,359 --> 01:50:58,759
you're seeing this . But um can you 

2847
01:50:58,770 --> 01:51:00,826
spell that out a little bit more ? I 

2848
01:51:00,826 --> 01:51:03,430
mean , one of the things that I talk 

2849
01:51:03,439 --> 01:51:05,328
about with this national security 

2850
01:51:05,328 --> 01:51:07,495
supplement , I don't even like calling 

2851
01:51:07,495 --> 01:51:09,439
it the Ukraine supplemental or the 

2852
01:51:09,439 --> 01:51:11,606
Ukraine aid bill because it's actually 

2853
01:51:11,606 --> 01:51:14,209
not accurate , the more accurate way to 

2854
01:51:14,220 --> 01:51:17,370
pick that bill is , we have 

2855
01:51:17,379 --> 01:51:19,490
authoritarians all working together , 

2856
01:51:19,740 --> 01:51:22,240
clearly aimed at us . They hate us 

2857
01:51:23,189 --> 01:51:27,189
and um we need to be strategic in 

2858
01:51:27,200 --> 01:51:30,350
our response and we also need to 

2859
01:51:30,359 --> 01:51:32,526
recognize that our own industrial base 

2860
01:51:32,526 --> 01:51:35,310
is atrophied dramatically . It has . 

2861
01:51:36,209 --> 01:51:38,669
And so I like to call this national 

2862
01:51:38,680 --> 01:51:41,109
Security Bill , the revitalizing 

2863
01:51:41,120 --> 01:51:44,750
America's Industrial Base Act because 

2864
01:51:44,759 --> 01:51:48,250
60% of it , 60% of it goes directly 

2865
01:51:48,259 --> 01:51:51,930
into our ability , America's ability to 

2866
01:51:51,939 --> 01:51:55,310
produce weapons for us . Everything 

2867
01:51:55,319 --> 01:51:57,430
from nuclear subs which Xi Jinping is 

2868
01:51:57,430 --> 01:52:00,520
scared to death of to 155 millimeter 

2869
01:52:00,529 --> 01:52:02,640
howitzer around . So , can you talk a 

2870
01:52:02,640 --> 01:52:04,430
little bit more about how these 

2871
01:52:04,439 --> 01:52:06,729
Dictatorships who don't like us now ? 

2872
01:52:06,740 --> 01:52:09,479
We don't like them uh are all working 

2873
01:52:09,490 --> 01:52:11,601
together and what that means in terms 

2874
01:52:11,601 --> 01:52:14,939
of strategy . A a absolutely senator . 

2875
01:52:14,950 --> 01:52:18,120
Um First of all , I think the way 

2876
01:52:18,129 --> 01:52:20,589
you've characterized this is spot on . 

2877
01:52:20,890 --> 01:52:23,240
Um these are not our friends that the , 

2878
01:52:23,250 --> 01:52:25,720
these are countries , these are regimes 

2879
01:52:25,729 --> 01:52:28,490
that wish us ill and are taking active 

2880
01:52:28,500 --> 01:52:31,720
measures to deliver us ill . Um So 

2881
01:52:31,729 --> 01:52:33,507
there's practical cooperation's 

2882
01:52:33,507 --> 01:52:35,660
practical cooper operation on an 

2883
01:52:35,669 --> 01:52:37,959
economic level that that is China 

2884
01:52:37,970 --> 01:52:41,060
becomes Russia's salvation economically , 

2885
01:52:41,069 --> 01:52:43,359
right ? By absorbing its uh its gas 

2886
01:52:43,370 --> 01:52:45,720
output . Um Other countries do the same 

2887
01:52:46,000 --> 01:52:48,278
and oil uh other countries do the same . 

2888
01:52:48,549 --> 01:52:50,890
There's direct military support , right ? 

2889
01:52:50,899 --> 01:52:53,649
D pr K loads up trainloads of artillery 

2890
01:52:53,660 --> 01:52:55,438
shells and sends them and those 

2891
01:52:55,438 --> 01:52:57,438
artillery shells are exploding over 

2892
01:52:57,438 --> 01:52:59,649
Ukrainian heads every day . Um A a and 

2893
01:52:59,660 --> 01:53:02,819
on the earlier , we discussed the uh 

2894
01:53:02,830 --> 01:53:05,339
the uh creation of a 

2895
01:53:05,970 --> 01:53:09,350
Iranian based drone factory to 

2896
01:53:09,359 --> 01:53:12,509
reproduce the Shahid 136 inside Russia . 

2897
01:53:12,600 --> 01:53:14,767
Those were , those were exploding over 

2898
01:53:14,767 --> 01:53:17,290
Ukraine th th this morning early . Um 

2899
01:53:17,299 --> 01:53:19,355
So , so it's , it's very practical , 

2900
01:53:19,355 --> 01:53:21,939
more distressing though , is the fact 

2901
01:53:21,950 --> 01:53:25,069
that these countries seem to be forming 

2902
01:53:25,080 --> 01:53:29,049
an intensifying bond uh that they 

2903
01:53:29,060 --> 01:53:31,870
intend to use geopolitically to weaken 

2904
01:53:31,879 --> 01:53:34,310
our position in the world , which will 

2905
01:53:34,319 --> 01:53:37,220
inevitably hurt our own interests and 

2906
01:53:37,229 --> 01:53:40,629
our own citizens . Um Let me ask a 

2907
01:53:40,640 --> 01:53:43,640
related question , you know , you read 

2908
01:53:43,649 --> 01:53:46,379
about it and the some commentators , 

2909
01:53:46,390 --> 01:53:48,740
actually , some of my colleagues have 

2910
01:53:48,750 --> 01:53:50,806
kind of come up with this new theory 

2911
01:53:50,806 --> 01:53:53,689
about deterrence being divisible . Uh 

2912
01:53:53,700 --> 01:53:56,270
Let me unpack that a little bit more . 

2913
01:53:56,279 --> 01:53:59,930
Um So again , with these authoritarians 

2914
01:53:59,939 --> 01:54:01,939
working together , you could have a 

2915
01:54:01,939 --> 01:54:04,089
situation where Putin rolls over 

2916
01:54:05,299 --> 01:54:08,450
Ukraine eventually . But if we don't 

2917
01:54:08,459 --> 01:54:11,479
provide any more military aid , by the 

2918
01:54:11,490 --> 01:54:13,601
way , do you think that'll happen ? I 

2919
01:54:13,601 --> 01:54:15,712
mean , if , if , if at the end of the 

2920
01:54:15,712 --> 01:54:17,823
day , the US is pretty much right now 

2921
01:54:17,823 --> 01:54:19,990
like , hey , sorry , we're gonna build 

2922
01:54:19,990 --> 01:54:19,250
out our industrial base , which we need 

2923
01:54:19,259 --> 01:54:21,148
to do , but we're not , we're not 

2924
01:54:21,148 --> 01:54:23,500
sending anything else to you . Good 

2925
01:54:23,509 --> 01:54:27,509
luck . What do you think happens if we 

2926
01:54:27,520 --> 01:54:29,687
don't continue to support ? You ? Just 

2927
01:54:29,687 --> 01:54:31,798
say we stop a couple of my colleagues 

2928
01:54:31,798 --> 01:54:34,076
just want to stop everything right now . 

2929
01:54:34,076 --> 01:54:36,353
Nothing . What , what'll happen ? Sure . 

2930
01:54:36,353 --> 01:54:38,520
That's easy that they run out of 155 , 

2931
01:54:38,520 --> 01:54:40,076
they run out of air defense 

2932
01:54:40,076 --> 01:54:42,298
interceptors and , you know , as I said 

2933
01:54:42,298 --> 01:54:44,464
yesterday in the house , the side that 

2934
01:54:44,464 --> 01:54:46,631
can't shoot back loses . Ok . So , but 

2935
01:54:46,631 --> 01:54:48,798
there's this notion , it's out there . 

2936
01:54:48,798 --> 01:54:50,964
I don't think it really works with the 

2937
01:54:50,964 --> 01:54:53,131
facts on the ground . I don't think it 

2938
01:54:53,131 --> 01:54:55,242
works with history if you read it . I 

2939
01:54:55,242 --> 01:54:57,353
don't think it works at all , but the 

2940
01:54:57,353 --> 01:54:59,464
deterrence is divisible . You can let 

2941
01:54:59,464 --> 01:55:01,464
Putin roll over Ukraine , but we're 

2942
01:55:01,464 --> 01:55:03,687
gonna , we're gonna send that signal to 

2943
01:55:03,687 --> 01:55:05,631
Xi Jinping and the Taiwan Strait . 

2944
01:55:05,631 --> 01:55:04,810
We're gonna be really strong with 

2945
01:55:04,819 --> 01:55:07,520
Taiwan . You think deterrence is 

2946
01:55:07,529 --> 01:55:09,585
divisible like that ? Now , look , I 

2947
01:55:09,585 --> 01:55:11,751
don't think it no offense to President 

2948
01:55:11,751 --> 01:55:13,585
Biden , but I , I think it's not 

2949
01:55:13,585 --> 01:55:15,529
divisible at all . His Afghanistan 

2950
01:55:15,529 --> 01:55:17,640
withdrawal signaled to the world that 

2951
01:55:17,640 --> 01:55:19,807
hey game on . Um let the authoritarian 

2952
01:55:19,807 --> 01:55:21,973
regimes roll . What do you think about 

2953
01:55:21,973 --> 01:55:24,370
this idea that somehow deterrence is 

2954
01:55:24,379 --> 01:55:26,850
divisible ? You can be weak in Ukraine 

2955
01:55:26,859 --> 01:55:29,081
but still strong in the Taiwan Strait , 

2956
01:55:29,081 --> 01:55:30,637
particularly when all these 

2957
01:55:30,637 --> 01:55:32,748
authoritarians are working together . 

2958
01:55:32,748 --> 01:55:35,270
Senator , I think that every action or 

2959
01:55:35,279 --> 01:55:38,080
every inaction we take sends a message 

2960
01:55:38,259 --> 01:55:40,359
and I think that people all over the 

2961
01:55:40,370 --> 01:55:42,592
world listen for that message and those 

2962
01:55:42,592 --> 01:55:44,481
messages are always global . They 

2963
01:55:44,481 --> 01:55:46,481
cannot be sent to one audience at a 

2964
01:55:46,481 --> 01:55:48,990
time . So I agree . My final question , 

2965
01:55:49,000 --> 01:55:51,740
General , you are undisputed Russian 

2966
01:55:51,750 --> 01:55:54,689
expert . Uh One thing that always kind 

2967
01:55:54,700 --> 01:55:57,029
of and I've pressed the DN I on this . 

2968
01:55:57,040 --> 01:55:59,262
II , I don't understand why we don't do 

2969
01:55:59,262 --> 01:56:01,479
this , these authoritarian regimes . 

2970
01:56:01,490 --> 01:56:03,657
One of things that they're starting to 

2971
01:56:03,657 --> 01:56:07,169
do is messing with our most precious 

2972
01:56:08,089 --> 01:56:11,770
institution and that's elections . We 

2973
01:56:11,779 --> 01:56:14,069
are a Republic a democracy . We elect 

2974
01:56:14,080 --> 01:56:16,149
our leaders . These dictators would 

2975
01:56:16,160 --> 01:56:18,669
never stand for fair elections because 

2976
01:56:18,680 --> 01:56:21,200
they probably wouldn't win . Uh 

2977
01:56:21,290 --> 01:56:23,399
Certainly Xi Jinping Putin , one of 

2978
01:56:23,410 --> 01:56:25,410
their biggest vulnerabilities , the 

2979
01:56:25,410 --> 01:56:27,521
ayatollahs in Iran as they fear their 

2980
01:56:27,521 --> 01:56:30,350
own people . But they come after us on 

2981
01:56:30,359 --> 01:56:33,129
elections with , you know , cyber and 

2982
01:56:33,569 --> 01:56:35,791
things like that . Don't you think that 

2983
01:56:35,791 --> 01:56:38,209
if Putin says coming after our 

2984
01:56:38,220 --> 01:56:39,998
elections trying to disrupt our 

2985
01:56:39,998 --> 01:56:41,887
elections when he won't stand for 

2986
01:56:41,887 --> 01:56:43,998
election , we should do everything we 

2987
01:56:43,998 --> 01:56:46,109
can to counter by getting out all the 

2988
01:56:46,109 --> 01:56:48,109
information we have on this guy . I 

2989
01:56:48,109 --> 01:56:50,220
mean , he's one of the richest people 

2990
01:56:50,220 --> 01:56:52,442
in the world . Literally , he stole $80 

2991
01:56:52,442 --> 01:56:54,664
billion from the Russians . We probably 

2992
01:56:54,664 --> 01:56:56,831
have the Swiss bank account numbers to 

2993
01:56:56,831 --> 01:56:56,689
where he stashed all the money , these 

2994
01:56:56,700 --> 01:56:59,470
poor Russians , you know , are starving 

2995
01:56:59,479 --> 01:57:02,049
and drinking vodka for breakfast and 

2996
01:57:02,060 --> 01:57:04,171
Putin steals from them . Shouldn't we 

2997
01:57:04,171 --> 01:57:06,490
get that out to the world the way 

2998
01:57:06,500 --> 01:57:08,770
Navalny did and say , all right , you 

2999
01:57:08,779 --> 01:57:10,890
wanna mess with our elections ? We're 

3000
01:57:10,890 --> 01:57:12,779
gonna let the people same with Xi 

3001
01:57:12,779 --> 01:57:14,946
Jinping . These guys are all corrupt , 

3002
01:57:14,946 --> 01:57:16,835
shouldn't we do that when they're 

3003
01:57:16,835 --> 01:57:19,057
messing with the most precious thing we 

3004
01:57:19,057 --> 01:57:21,112
have in America , our elections . Uh 

3005
01:57:21,112 --> 01:57:23,446
Senator , if , if you don't mind , I'll , 

3006
01:57:23,446 --> 01:57:25,335
I'll , I'll leave uh that sort of 

3007
01:57:25,335 --> 01:57:28,129
strategy to um civilian policymakers , 

3008
01:57:28,140 --> 01:57:30,084
but I would like to agree with you 

3009
01:57:30,084 --> 01:57:32,589
strongly that Putin fears open 

3010
01:57:32,600 --> 01:57:34,656
elections . He fears them in his own 

3011
01:57:34,656 --> 01:57:37,080
country and he fears them elsewhere . 

3012
01:57:37,279 --> 01:57:39,919
He fears them and he therefore seeks to 

3013
01:57:39,930 --> 01:57:42,399
undermine them . And I also agree with 

3014
01:57:42,410 --> 01:57:45,160
your opinion that the um that , that 

3015
01:57:45,220 --> 01:57:48,680
our elections , our ability to choose 

3016
01:57:48,689 --> 01:57:51,979
who governs us , our government by the 

3017
01:57:51,990 --> 01:57:54,560
consent of the governed is the most 

3018
01:57:54,569 --> 01:57:56,847
precious thing we have in this country . 

3019
01:57:56,847 --> 01:57:58,958
Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

3020
01:57:58,958 --> 01:58:01,180
Thank you , Senator Sullivan . Uh Thank 

3021
01:58:01,180 --> 01:58:03,236
you General Cavalla General Van Vost 

3022
01:58:03,236 --> 01:58:05,236
for your excellent testimony . This 

3023
01:58:05,236 --> 01:58:08,839
will conclude the open session . Uh We 

3024
01:58:08,850 --> 01:58:12,740
will reconvene at uh 12 noon in S 

3025
01:58:12,750 --> 01:58:16,200
EC2 17 for the closed session . And 

3026
01:58:16,209 --> 01:58:17,279
thank you very much .