WEBVTT

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Good afternoon . The sub-committee will

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come to order . I ask unanimous consent

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that the chair be authorized to declare

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a recess at any time without objection .

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So ordered today , we will hear from

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our witnesses on the defense

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Intelligence Enterprise's posture and

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capabilities in strategic competition

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and in synchronizing intelligence

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efforts to counter the People's

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Republic of China . The department's

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efforts are focused on China as the

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priority of the national defense

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strategy . But once again , as we hold

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this hearing , the Russia Ukraine

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conflict has been raging for more than

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two years . North Korea continues to

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test nuclear missiles on October 7th .

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Hamas conducted a surprise attack on

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Israel leading to a prolonged violent

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conflict that Iran has leveraged using

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its proxies to attack us forces in Iraq ,

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Syria while supporting the houthi

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attacks on international shipping . And

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threats from terrorist organizations

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are still persistent across the globe .

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The defense Intelligence enterprise has

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a challenging task to support the

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department's efforts in strategic

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competition , counter China and support

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the remaining geographic combatant

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commanders to counter increased threats

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in their areas of operations as well as

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their persistent counterterrorism

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efforts . This is by no means an easy

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task . I am interested in understanding

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each of your roles in synchronizing

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these efforts and ensuring your

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organizations have the ability uh have

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the capabilities needed are resourced

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appropriately and what capability gaps

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exist . I would like to welcome today's

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witnesses , all of whom are appearing

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before this subcomittee for the first

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time in their current capacities . The

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honorable MS Melany Harris , uh acting

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under Secretary of Defense for

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Intelligence Security General General

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Hawk , Director of National Security

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Agency , Chief of Central Security

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Service , and Commander of us , Cyber

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Command and Lieutenant General Cruz ,

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Director of Defense Intelligence Agency

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in the interest of time . I asked the

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witnesses to keep their opening remarks

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to five minutes or less so that we will

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have more time for closed discussion

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with that . Let me again , thank our

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witnesses for appearing before us today

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for before us today . I now recognize

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ranking member Panetta for any opening

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remarks . Thank you , Mr Chairman . I

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appreciate this opportunity to be in

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this seat , but also more importantly ,

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to be part of this very , very

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important hearing . So thank you for

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calling and thanks to all of the

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witnesses for your time today to appear

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in front of this subcomittee before we

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start though , I do wanna take just a

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quick chance to highlight that all of

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the witnesses are relatively new to

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your position . So welcome and

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congratulations . Uh as that really is

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a testament to your organizations that

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even as leaders transitions on to other

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roles . The people that make up our

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defense intelligence enterprise

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continue to do the great work to

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protect our country . So thank you .

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Now , last year , we had this same

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hearing and we opened up the hearing by

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saying the current global security

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environment is dynamic , is dynamic ,

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not only has that not changed , it's

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become , I think we can all admit even

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more dynamic . We got the horrific

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attack on Israel by Hamas on October

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7th , the ensuing conflict and

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humanitarian crisis , the Malign actors

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that seek to exploit and expand on that

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conflict all across the Middle East .

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We still have Russia as it continues .

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It's a legal and unjust war which has

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resulted in enormous damage to Ukraine ,

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the people of Russia and threatens the

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United States interest . We have Putin

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who remains defiant as he builds new

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partnerships to provide him the ability

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to continue that conflict . We have

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Iran , it's terrorist proxies and its

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nuclear program . Then there's North

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Korea and its nuclear weapons and we

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have violent extremist organizations

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who continue to carry out deadly

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attacks as we saw in Iran and Russia

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and continue to fill the void that's in

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the void , the voids that are present

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in the continent of Africa . And of

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course , we have the Chinese Communist

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Party that continues to present a

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considerable challenge , its

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willingness to act aggressively in

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contravention to international norms ,

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coupled with its extensive efforts to

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modernize and to consolidate its

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control over the People's Liberation

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Army . The all of those are cause for

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concern as coercive actions

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orchestrated by the CCP continue to

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undermine both regional and global

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stability based on my recent travel to

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the region with Chairman Bergman . It

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was good to see though that first that

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the first hand , the first hand the

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partnerships that the United States has

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and continue to grow and strengthen and

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share intelligence to counter CC P's

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malignant efforts . The defense

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intelligence enterprise is a key

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component of the whole of government

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approach to containing all of these

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types of threats . Given that the

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global environment remains dynamic .

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Now , more than ever , this committee

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remains committed to ensuring that your

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organizations have the resources and

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authorities required to carry out the

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duty that our country ask our country

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demands of you to effectively deal with

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those challenges and to recognize that

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we are in an era of great power

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competition . The defense Intelligence

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Enterprise must be postured and ready

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to deal with all of those threats . The

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defense intelligence enterprise must

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remain agile be collaborative across

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the enterprise . Quickly provide

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releasable and actionable intelligence

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throughout the department and

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collaborate with our allies and with

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our partners . That is why this hearing

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is important and why I look forward to

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hearing from all of our witnesses today .

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Thank you , Mr Chairman I , you back .

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Thank you . We will now hear from our

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witnesses then move into the question

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and answer session immediately

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following one round of questions . We

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will reconvene for the classified

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session which will take place in

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Rayburn room 2337 . I now

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recognize MS Harris Chairman

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Bergman , Representative Panetta and

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distinguished members of the

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subcomittee . It is a privilege to

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testify today on the current posture of

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the defense intelligence and security

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enterprise to confront the diverse

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array of global threats and challenges

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facing the United States of America and

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our allies and partners . The

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intelligence and security experts

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across the Department of Defense work

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tirelessly to address current and

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future threats to our nation on a daily

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basis on their behalf . Thank you to

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the members of the subcomittee for your

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ongoing support and collaboration . I'm

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joined here today by the Director of

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the National Security Agency General

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Timothy Hawk and director of the

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Defense Intelligence Agency ,

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Lieutenant General Jeffrey Cruz . They

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will be offering their intelligence

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informed perspectives on how we support

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our war fighters and characterize the

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challenges facing the United States ,

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our allies and partners today and in

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the future , we look forward to your

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questions on these challenges and how

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our enterprise is postured to meet them .

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In addition to my remarks today , I

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have submitted a classified statement

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for the record detailing our fy 25

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military intelligence program budget

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request , providing further insight

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into our plans . Our number one

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priority remains addressing our pacing

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challenge . The People's Republic of

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China . We seek a free and open Indo

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Pacific region that is peaceful and

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secure our our network of regional

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allies and partners is deep , wide ,

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strong and committed to a shared vision

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of peace , stability and deterrence .

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The fy 25 president's budget request

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for the military Intelligence program

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postures the defense intelligence and

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security enterprise to support all

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these efforts . And more . The

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department is also actively focused

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with our NATO allies in support of

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Ukraine's defense against Russia's

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invasion . We must remain vigilant in

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safeguarding against a resurgent

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Russian threat to NATO international

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security and the rules based order .

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The defense Intelligence and security

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enterprise is enabling the department's

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response to the ongoing conflict

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between Israel and Hamas as well as

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other crises in the Middle East

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involving the Houthis , Iranian

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affiliated militia groups and violent

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extremist organizations such as Isis

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and Al Qaeda . We will continue to

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cooper with allies and partners and

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leverage technology to build an

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enduring and sustainable

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counterterrorism posture to monitor and

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disrupt terrorist threats regarding

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both the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza .

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In order to continue the defense

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Intelligence and security enterprises

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support . It is vitally important that

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Congress approved the supplemental

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funding . We have requested that

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funding is urgently needed to support

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our allies and partners if we walk away ,

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that will signal that the United States

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is an unreliable partner and embolden

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would be aggressors across the globe .

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In our fy 25 budget request , we seek

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to advance crucial programs in the

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following ways providing the department

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with an information and decision

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advantage over key adversaries focused

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on the PR C operational defense

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Intelligence and security partnerships

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across the department , us government ,

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our allies and partners and the private

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sector , elevating security and

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counterintelligence to the maximum

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extent across the department and

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identifying recruiting , training and

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retaining a workforce capable of

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supporting our our mission requirements .

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Finally , before I close , I want to

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emphasize how critical it is for

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Congress to reauthorize section 702 of

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the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

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Act before it expires on April 19th .

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Additionally , recently proposed

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legislation has sought to limit dod s

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lawful and appropriate access to and

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use of commercially available

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information or CA I which is used to

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support the full spectrum of dod

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missions . CA I is lawfully obtained by

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dod and subject to stringent handling

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procedures to protect the privacy and

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similarities of us persons . It is

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important for the effectiveness of the

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defense intelligence and security

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enterprise that Dod and Congress have

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the opportunity to collaborate on

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legislation so as to preserve

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appropriate access to this data . In

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summary , the president's budget

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supports the department's programs and

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authorities needed to address these

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global challenges . Maintain our

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strategic advantages and provide

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decision makers and policymakers with

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information at the speed of relevance

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with that . I again , I again , thank

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the members of the subcomittee for your

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leadership and support and I look

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forward to answering your questions

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here and in our closed session , I'll

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now turn to General Hawk for his

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remarks . General haw you're recognized

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Chairman Bergman represented Panetta

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and distinguished members of the

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committee . I am honored to be with you

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today , representing the men and women

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of us , Cyber Command and the National

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security Agency defending the nation is

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the heart of our mission . The People's

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Republic of China poses a challenge .

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Unlike any our nation and allies have

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faced before competing fiercely in the

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information domain . The men and women

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of us , Cyber Command and NSA continue

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to use the full scope of our

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authorities and the full spectrum of

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our capabilities to contest the threats

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posed by the PR C imposing costs ,

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denying benefits and deterring the

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adversary . We will continue to

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strengthen partnerships across the US

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government with foreign partners and

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with private industry so that we may

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operate anywhere we are needed . We are

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ready and postured to contest pr C

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malicious activities at home and abroad .

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While cyber rates , threats have

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increased , we are ready to counter

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these threats with increased strength

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and capability . Us , Cyber command and

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NSA continue to use capabilities and

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partnerships to deny the PR C

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opportunities , frustrate their

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strategic efforts and systematically

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eradicate intrusions . Our cyber

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security mission is protecting the

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Department of Defense and the defense

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industrial base from adversary nation

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states and ransomware attacks . We are

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collaborating with us government

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partners and foreign partners to

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develop and execute intelligence driven

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campaigns to counter adversary

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activities . In addition , we continue

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to identify and share adversary tools

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and tradecraft , enabling public and

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private partners to further defend

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against these threats within us . Cyber

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Command and NSA , we are making

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investments in our workforce . Our

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talented agile and diverse people

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represent an important competitive

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advantage across all of our mission

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sets . That is why we are committed to

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reducing the time our new applicants

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spend in the hiring process and

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strengthening our expertise both in

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house and through hiring , especially

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those with language and technical

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skills . I remain focused on the

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reauthorization of title seven of the

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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ,

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which is of paramount importance FISA

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section 702 is absolutely critical to

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our Foreign Intelligence mission .

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There is no substitute for this

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authority . The timely actionable

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information it provides cannot be

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replicated by other means . As you

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consider reauthorization , I look

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forward to discussing how this tool

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enables mission success and the

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controls we implement to ensure the

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protection of the privacy and civil

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liberties of the American people . I

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would like to reiterate my appreciation

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for the opportunity to testify in front

13:27.904 --> 13:29.960
of you today and for the committee's

13:29.960 --> 13:32.016
continued support of our mission and

13:32.016 --> 13:33.960
our people . I look forward to our

13:33.960 --> 13:37.679
conversation . Lieutenant General

13:37.690 --> 13:40.809
Cruz . You are recognized chairman

13:40.820 --> 13:42.960
Bergman representative in today's

13:42.969 --> 13:44.469
ranking member , Panetta ,

13:44.469 --> 13:46.080
distinguished members of the

13:46.080 --> 13:47.913
subcomittee . Thank you for this

13:47.913 --> 13:49.858
opportunity to discuss the Defense

13:49.858 --> 13:51.969
Intelligence Agency assessment of the

13:51.969 --> 13:53.858
global security environment . The

13:53.858 --> 13:55.747
complexity trajectory and rate of

13:55.747 --> 13:57.858
change in the national security arena

13:57.858 --> 13:59.636
is perhaps the highest and most

13:59.636 --> 14:01.413
consequential we've seen in our

14:01.413 --> 14:04.169
lifetime , how we respond matters and

14:04.179 --> 14:06.190
our level of innovation , focus and

14:06.200 --> 14:08.780
integration must match our adversaries

14:08.789 --> 14:11.000
stride for stride . We must position

14:11.010 --> 14:13.250
ourselves and our capabilities to meet

14:13.260 --> 14:15.419
the threats we see now and on the

14:15.429 --> 14:17.530
horizon and not simply posture to

14:17.539 --> 14:21.320
repeat successes of the past dia and

14:21.330 --> 14:23.386
our global workforce . And more than

14:23.386 --> 14:25.497
100 and 40 nations around the globe ,

14:25.497 --> 14:27.386
partnered with our colleagues all

14:27.386 --> 14:29.441
across the nation and in the defense

14:29.441 --> 14:31.330
intelligence community are at the

14:31.330 --> 14:33.330
forefront of this task collecting ,

14:33.330 --> 14:35.497
analyzing and operational intelligence

14:35.497 --> 14:38.070
that underpins policy , diplomacy

14:38.179 --> 14:40.479
acquisition and when needed combat

14:40.489 --> 14:43.219
operations . It's an honor to join two

14:43.229 --> 14:45.229
of my colleagues in this endeavor ,

14:45.229 --> 14:47.118
honorable Harris and General Hawk

14:47.118 --> 14:49.062
before the committee . Today in my

14:49.062 --> 14:51.173
first two months as the 23rd director

14:51.173 --> 14:53.340
of the Defense Intelligence Agency , I

14:53.340 --> 14:55.340
have taken a three fold approach to

14:55.340 --> 14:57.340
setting our course . First , we are

14:57.340 --> 14:59.451
intensely integrated with and focused

14:59.451 --> 15:01.229
on meeting the needs of our war

15:01.229 --> 15:03.285
fighters and our allies and partners

15:03.285 --> 15:05.340
who are engaged in combat operations

15:05.340 --> 15:07.285
around the globe . Second , we are

15:07.285 --> 15:09.340
addressing new and emerging security

15:09.340 --> 15:11.173
and intelligence challenges that

15:11.173 --> 15:13.062
fundamentally alter our operating

15:13.062 --> 15:15.299
environment ranging from technology and

15:15.309 --> 15:17.570
artificial intelligence to cyber and

15:17.580 --> 15:20.349
biosecurity to a growing number of

15:20.359 --> 15:22.359
adversaries who are interacting and

15:22.359 --> 15:25.340
partnering in ways and towards ends .

15:25.349 --> 15:27.630
We have not seen before in these

15:27.640 --> 15:30.619
specific areas . I've started 390 day

15:30.630 --> 15:32.840
sprints addressing foundational

15:32.849 --> 15:35.140
military intelligence for cyber , the

15:35.150 --> 15:37.317
need for integrated force tracking and

15:37.317 --> 15:39.250
denied environments and technical

15:39.260 --> 15:41.371
intelligence collection . Finally , I

15:41.371 --> 15:43.538
have focused on partnerships . The one

15:43.538 --> 15:45.770
asset our adversaries simply cannot

15:45.780 --> 15:47.659
match . I've had more than 30

15:47.669 --> 15:49.725
international engagements to include

15:49.725 --> 15:51.836
hosting more than 70 foreign military

15:51.836 --> 15:53.836
representatives in my 1st 60 days ,

15:53.836 --> 15:55.836
simply stated the scale of national

15:55.836 --> 15:58.130
security challenges require a new scale

15:58.140 --> 15:59.862
in effective national security

15:59.862 --> 16:01.973
partnerships . My aim in this hearing

16:01.973 --> 16:04.140
is to crystallize these challenges and

16:04.140 --> 16:06.362
growing threats that we see and support

16:06.362 --> 16:08.473
this subcomittee in its critical work

16:08.473 --> 16:10.529
of defending the nation . One of the

16:10.529 --> 16:12.751
ways that Congress can provide its most

16:12.751 --> 16:14.807
effective support and defense of the

16:14.807 --> 16:17.029
nation is to reauthorize section 702 of

16:17.029 --> 16:19.140
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

16:19.140 --> 16:21.307
Act . Although dia collection does not

16:21.307 --> 16:22.918
operate under these specific

16:22.918 --> 16:25.029
authorities , our all source analysis

16:25.029 --> 16:27.251
mission , our ability to operationalize

16:27.251 --> 16:27.229
intelligence and our support to the

16:27.239 --> 16:29.461
Congress is dependent on those who do .

16:30.010 --> 16:32.232
Thank you for the opportunity to appear

16:32.232 --> 16:34.288
before the sub-committee today . I'm

16:34.288 --> 16:36.010
privileged to lead the defense

16:36.010 --> 16:38.121
intelligence agency and represent the

16:38.121 --> 16:40.454
talented and dedicated global workforce .

16:40.454 --> 16:42.343
We're grateful for your continued

16:42.343 --> 16:44.288
support and I look forward to your

16:44.288 --> 16:46.539
questions . Thank you . I recognize

16:46.549 --> 16:49.729
myself for five minutes . Uh First one

16:49.799 --> 16:51.855
question is for you , General Hawk .

16:51.929 --> 16:55.559
Can you explain how your dual hat as

16:55.570 --> 16:58.450
director of NSA and commander of cyber

16:58.460 --> 17:01.239
com has benefited the intelligence

17:01.250 --> 17:03.289
community as well as the cyber

17:03.299 --> 17:07.030
community ? Thank you very

17:07.040 --> 17:09.660
much uh for the question uh chairman .

17:09.880 --> 17:13.250
So from the what the determination as

17:13.260 --> 17:15.482
to how we've looked at the structure of

17:15.482 --> 17:17.649
both Cyber command and NSA . So having

17:17.649 --> 17:19.704
a single leader that is able to lead

17:19.704 --> 17:21.999
both organizations , uh what it , what

17:22.009 --> 17:23.842
it really benefits from both the

17:23.842 --> 17:25.953
intelligence community and , and from

17:25.953 --> 17:28.909
cyberspace is how we operate within the

17:28.918 --> 17:32.149
same operating domain within cyberspace .

17:32.159 --> 17:34.629
And with common partners , we're able

17:34.639 --> 17:36.861
to have agility , we're able to operate

17:36.861 --> 17:38.972
with speed and able to operate with a

17:38.972 --> 17:41.139
common intent . What that really helps

17:41.139 --> 17:43.250
an intelligence community perspective

17:43.250 --> 17:45.472
is that as we think about the campaigns

17:45.472 --> 17:47.195
that are gonna be conducted in

17:47.195 --> 17:49.250
cyberspace , we can start with a pro

17:49.250 --> 17:51.361
how are we going to protect those key

17:51.361 --> 17:53.472
intelligence sources and methods that

17:53.472 --> 17:55.639
allow the nation to have insights that

17:55.639 --> 17:57.806
allow our combatant commanders to have

17:57.806 --> 17:59.861
indications of warning while able to

17:59.861 --> 18:02.595
generate outcomes cyberspace that meet

18:02.605 --> 18:04.772
the demands of , of our war fighters .

18:04.885 --> 18:07.446
That'll that speed and agility uh was

18:07.456 --> 18:09.512
something that was looked at closely

18:09.512 --> 18:11.916
when in July 2022 both the DN I and the

18:11.926 --> 18:13.926
Secretary of Defense commissioned a

18:13.926 --> 18:16.037
joint study and they said they wanted

18:16.037 --> 18:18.093
to look at the dual hack construct .

18:18.093 --> 18:20.315
Their conclusion was that it was in the

18:20.315 --> 18:22.370
best interests of the nation . And ,

18:22.370 --> 18:24.482
and for many of those same reasons to

18:24.482 --> 18:26.759
be able to move with speed and agility ,

18:26.759 --> 18:28.370
the ability to have a common

18:28.370 --> 18:30.426
conversation , particularly with our

18:30.426 --> 18:32.537
foreign partners about how we partner

18:32.537 --> 18:34.704
together in cyberspace and then how we

18:34.704 --> 18:36.593
can move aggressively when we see

18:36.593 --> 18:38.259
threats to the nation and the

18:38.259 --> 18:40.229
Department of Defense . Uh So I've

18:40.239 --> 18:42.295
served in both organizations for the

18:42.295 --> 18:44.350
preponderance of my career and , and

18:44.350 --> 18:46.572
I'm very comfortable in terms of how we

18:46.572 --> 18:48.683
execute every single day for both our

18:48.683 --> 18:50.628
intelligence mission and our cyber

18:50.628 --> 18:52.850
mission . Thank you . The next question

18:52.850 --> 18:55.500
is for all of you for a response . Uh

18:55.510 --> 18:59.020
The DN I and CIA produced an open

18:59.030 --> 19:02.410
source intelligence strategy for 24 to

19:02.420 --> 19:05.260
26 last month . How do each of you

19:05.270 --> 19:07.380
envision implementing the strategy ,

19:07.390 --> 19:09.760
especially with the capability of A I

19:09.770 --> 19:13.239
and machine learning to one call down

19:13.250 --> 19:15.530
the trove of information into a

19:15.540 --> 19:18.579
manageable amount for further analysis .

19:18.589 --> 19:21.989
And two getting ahead and staying ahead

19:22.000 --> 19:25.489
of our adversaries . So please

19:26.540 --> 19:28.780
thank you for the question . I'll ,

19:28.790 --> 19:30.901
I'll take it from a little bit of the

19:30.901 --> 19:32.679
department's perspective before

19:32.679 --> 19:34.679
deferring to the directors on their

19:34.679 --> 19:36.790
specific uh enterprise efforts . From

19:36.790 --> 19:39.012
the department's perspective . The DN I

19:39.012 --> 19:41.123
strategy is , is one part of , of how

19:41.123 --> 19:42.846
we think about the open source

19:42.846 --> 19:45.123
ecosystem in the Department of Defense .

19:45.123 --> 19:47.234
We are very focused on making sure we

19:47.234 --> 19:49.234
make the maximum use of open source

19:49.234 --> 19:51.234
information to include commercially

19:51.234 --> 19:50.900
available and publicly available

19:50.910 --> 19:53.599
information . And for the portions of

19:53.609 --> 19:55.609
the department that sit in the IC ,

19:55.609 --> 19:57.831
we're focused on making sure that there

19:57.831 --> 20:00.053
is a framework in which they understand

20:00.053 --> 20:01.998
how to use that information to the

20:01.998 --> 20:05.689
maximum degree possible . From the NSA

20:05.699 --> 20:07.755
perspective , we do not have an open

20:07.755 --> 20:09.810
source intelligence mission , but we

20:09.810 --> 20:11.532
certainly do leverage publicly

20:11.532 --> 20:13.588
available and commercially available

20:13.588 --> 20:15.421
information . What we found most

20:15.421 --> 20:17.310
benefit from the overall strategy

20:17.310 --> 20:19.310
itself . It reaffirms how we handle

20:19.310 --> 20:21.366
information , how we use it and then

20:21.366 --> 20:23.032
how we protect it in a manner

20:23.032 --> 20:25.088
consistent with all of our oversight

20:25.088 --> 20:27.421
and all of our laws , all of our values .

20:27.421 --> 20:29.477
So we leverage that information . Uh

20:29.477 --> 20:31.532
It's a , it's a critical start point

20:31.532 --> 20:33.643
for us and being able to particularly

20:33.643 --> 20:35.810
fill in gaps when we think about cyber

20:35.810 --> 20:35.540
threats . It's an area that we have

20:35.550 --> 20:37.869
leveraged very deeply . Um And we'll

20:37.880 --> 20:40.102
continue to follow the guidelines we've

20:40.102 --> 20:43.420
been given by the department . Uh Thank

20:43.430 --> 20:45.489
you for the question . Uh for dia in

20:45.500 --> 20:47.890
particular , uh we are also designated

20:47.900 --> 20:49.567
as the Defense Intelligence ,

20:49.567 --> 20:51.511
Enterprise Manager for open source

20:51.511 --> 20:53.733
intelligence . So uh we do this mission

20:53.733 --> 20:55.622
uh each and every day and as that

20:55.622 --> 20:57.789
enterprise manager , we are also um uh

20:57.789 --> 20:59.956
deeply involved in how the rest of the

20:59.956 --> 21:02.122
enterprise is able to uh pull together

21:02.122 --> 21:04.289
uh the tactics techniques , procedures

21:04.289 --> 21:05.956
that are associated with this

21:05.956 --> 21:08.178
particular discipline . Uh The approach

21:08.178 --> 21:09.900
that DIA has taken since being

21:09.900 --> 21:12.011
designated as this is to take all the

21:12.011 --> 21:14.011
steps that are necessary to turn uh

21:14.011 --> 21:16.750
open source into the same kind of uh

21:16.760 --> 21:19.160
discipline that we see in signals

21:19.170 --> 21:20.790
intelligence , in geospatial

21:20.800 --> 21:22.689
intelligence , in measurement and

21:22.689 --> 21:24.522
signals intelligence . How do we

21:24.522 --> 21:26.578
normalize that ? Uh So uh across the

21:26.578 --> 21:28.467
board , uh D I has put together a

21:28.467 --> 21:30.640
program , it starts to deliver uh this

21:30.650 --> 21:32.859
year and it is designed to put a

21:32.869 --> 21:35.890
structure around uh everything from

21:35.900 --> 21:38.569
requirements management . How do we do

21:38.579 --> 21:40.680
collection ? What's the tradecraft

21:40.689 --> 21:42.939
associated with analysis ? Uh How do we

21:42.949 --> 21:44.893
do data management across multiple

21:44.893 --> 21:46.949
organizations ? What does a training

21:46.949 --> 21:49.060
program look like for whether it's us

21:49.060 --> 21:51.171
or whether it's the services that are

21:51.171 --> 21:53.060
doing open source ? And then more

21:53.060 --> 21:55.060
importantly , how do we do the data

21:55.060 --> 21:57.227
cataloging ? So if open source data is

21:57.227 --> 21:59.060
uh purchased or collected by one

21:59.060 --> 22:00.949
organization , we're not doing it

22:00.949 --> 22:03.060
across multiple organizations , uh we

22:03.060 --> 22:05.227
will deliver on the first iteration of

22:05.227 --> 22:07.393
that later this year and over a couple

22:07.393 --> 22:06.760
of years , uh we intend to

22:06.770 --> 22:08.992
institutionalize open source across the

22:08.992 --> 22:11.930
department . Thank you . Um Mr Panetta ,

22:11.939 --> 22:13.939
you are recognized . Thank you , Mr

22:13.939 --> 22:16.660
Chairman , uh General Hawk Russia and

22:16.670 --> 22:19.719
China are using sophisticated hybrid

22:20.069 --> 22:22.790
and irregular warfare tactics while

22:22.800 --> 22:24.770
harnessing cyber and technological

22:24.780 --> 22:27.260
advantages as we've seen over the past

22:27.270 --> 22:29.540
decade . Uh for sure , this has been

22:29.550 --> 22:31.883
abundantly clear though also in Ukraine ,

22:32.140 --> 22:34.369
where the forces have merged advanced

22:34.380 --> 22:36.380
technology with the regular warfare

22:36.380 --> 22:38.436
tactics to increase precision on the

22:38.436 --> 22:40.658
battlefield and control the information

22:40.658 --> 22:43.189
space to maintain our advantage . The

22:43.199 --> 22:45.959
United States most should be looking at

22:45.969 --> 22:48.400
new ways similar to how the Ukrainians

22:48.410 --> 22:50.949
did it to integrate our Special forces

22:50.959 --> 22:53.300
capabilities with advancements in cyber

22:53.310 --> 22:56.619
and information operations general .

22:57.050 --> 22:59.869
Can you explain how us cyber com is

22:59.880 --> 23:02.859
working with SOCOM to integrate cyber

23:02.869 --> 23:05.091
and soft capabilities And then second ,

23:05.091 --> 23:07.380
what's your assessment of Russia's

23:07.390 --> 23:09.890
utilization of both cyber and irregular

23:09.900 --> 23:11.178
warfare capabilities ?

23:16.209 --> 23:18.542
Uh Thank you very much for the question .

23:18.542 --> 23:20.880
So , so first , how do we think about

23:20.890 --> 23:22.779
our partnership with us ? Special

23:22.779 --> 23:25.229
operations Command ? Uh We look at that

23:25.239 --> 23:27.510
they are teammates uh in all of the

23:27.520 --> 23:29.853
missions that , that , that we consider .

23:29.859 --> 23:32.026
And so first , both of us do things in

23:32.026 --> 23:34.248
support of the other combatant commands

23:34.248 --> 23:36.359
and our responsibilities . We , we do

23:36.359 --> 23:38.470
those independently and we'll conduct

23:38.470 --> 23:40.470
operations that are linked to those

23:40.470 --> 23:42.470
combatant commands . But what we're

23:42.470 --> 23:44.470
increasingly finding that there are

23:44.470 --> 23:46.692
times where we're able to look at the ,

23:46.692 --> 23:48.748
they a something that the geographic

23:48.748 --> 23:50.859
combatant commander needs . And if we

23:50.859 --> 23:52.581
work together with our special

23:52.581 --> 23:54.692
operations , teammates with our space

23:54.692 --> 23:56.248
teammates , we can identify

23:56.248 --> 23:58.415
opportunities that allow us to produce

23:58.415 --> 24:00.637
an effect that would be larger than any

24:00.637 --> 24:02.859
of us operating independently . Can you

24:02.859 --> 24:04.748
give me an example ? So there are

24:04.748 --> 24:06.526
things that we're that we do in

24:06.526 --> 24:08.560
cyberspace um that would require uh

24:08.569 --> 24:10.819
someone to be in theater and to

24:10.829 --> 24:13.329
leverage what a special operator would

24:13.339 --> 24:15.939
be doing in country or in an

24:15.949 --> 24:18.619
environment that we don't reach as us

24:18.630 --> 24:20.963
cyber command . So that's a partnership .

24:20.963 --> 24:23.186
We leverage that and then we're able to

24:23.186 --> 24:25.074
extend our reach with our special

24:25.074 --> 24:27.241
operations partners . So that would be

24:27.241 --> 24:29.352
an example . Thank you . Uh The other

24:29.352 --> 24:31.463
area that , that in terms of Russia's

24:31.463 --> 24:33.519
evolution , your your second part of

24:33.519 --> 24:35.686
your question , I think what we saw at

24:35.686 --> 24:37.741
the outset of the conflict is Russia

24:37.741 --> 24:39.686
operated in cyberspace in the same

24:39.686 --> 24:41.797
manner that they did in all the other

24:41.797 --> 24:43.797
domains , not well planned , it was

24:43.797 --> 24:45.630
brute force . Uh but we also saw

24:45.630 --> 24:47.630
Ukraine take actions that we should

24:47.630 --> 24:49.741
learn from . They , they were uh very

24:49.741 --> 24:51.908
effective in moving their data outside

24:51.908 --> 24:53.963
of the country , using Western cloud

24:53.963 --> 24:56.130
providers , gave them resiliency . And

24:56.130 --> 24:58.530
then they also dr drew upon any number

24:58.540 --> 25:00.707
of nations including the United States

25:00.707 --> 25:03.040
for additional cyber defense activities .

25:03.040 --> 25:04.984
So they were very effective at the

25:04.984 --> 25:06.818
outset . What we have seen is an

25:06.818 --> 25:08.873
evolution of how Russia continues to

25:08.873 --> 25:10.929
use their cyber forces . And I think

25:10.929 --> 25:12.984
one of the areas that we wanna watch

25:12.984 --> 25:14.984
really closely is how they're using

25:14.984 --> 25:16.873
those forces from an intelligence

25:16.873 --> 25:18.929
aspect versus the cyber effect . And

25:18.929 --> 25:20.762
it's an area that we wanna watch

25:20.762 --> 25:22.984
closely and inform our European command

25:22.984 --> 25:25.207
teammates . Thank you uh General Cruz .

25:25.207 --> 25:27.680
Last year , we discussed the US cyber

25:27.689 --> 25:31.579
com NSA China Outcomes Group and the

25:31.589 --> 25:35.250
Dia China mission group . Um Can can

25:35.260 --> 25:37.510
you give us an update on those

25:37.520 --> 25:39.687
organizations and how they collaborate

25:39.687 --> 25:41.909
with each other ? And if you can answer

25:41.909 --> 25:44.131
as much as possible , now we can follow

25:44.131 --> 25:46.298
up in greater detail in the classified

25:46.298 --> 25:45.869
session . Obviously ,

25:51.140 --> 25:53.084
in this session , I'd certainly be

25:53.084 --> 25:55.251
happy uh to cover in particular um the

25:55.251 --> 25:57.307
China missions group within Dia uh a

25:57.307 --> 25:59.529
little bit of how we partner . And then

25:59.529 --> 26:01.751
I'll certainly let uh General Hawk talk

26:01.751 --> 26:03.862
to the China Outcomes Group . Uh So a

26:03.862 --> 26:06.084
little over a year ago , my predecessor

26:06.084 --> 26:07.918
uh after a series of studies put

26:07.918 --> 26:10.130
together uh the requirement if , if

26:10.140 --> 26:12.439
Chinas are facing threat , how do we

26:12.449 --> 26:14.782
integrate all the activities that we do ?

26:14.920 --> 26:16.976
Um whether it's collection , whether

26:16.976 --> 26:18.753
it's analysis , whether it is a

26:18.753 --> 26:21.160
protection of our own networks and how

26:21.170 --> 26:23.665
do we do that in a way that we can then

26:23.675 --> 26:25.905
build some campaigns to create the

26:25.915 --> 26:27.971
effects that we need both to advance

26:27.971 --> 26:30.082
our interest , advance our collection

26:30.082 --> 26:32.248
or to protect ourselves . So the China

26:32.248 --> 26:34.359
uh mission group that we put together

26:34.359 --> 26:36.526
uh pulls together for the first time .

26:36.526 --> 26:38.805
Uh all of our human collectors , all of

26:38.814 --> 26:41.785
our uh analyst , all of our um effects

26:41.795 --> 26:43.974
generators , if I could use that term

26:43.984 --> 26:46.040
in this environment , um in stitches

26:46.040 --> 26:48.479
together , uh what we might do with our

26:48.489 --> 26:50.180
service partners and with our

26:50.189 --> 26:52.189
interagency partners to include the

26:52.189 --> 26:54.359
China Outcome group . And um very much

26:54.369 --> 26:56.589
focused on ensuring that we are um

26:56.599 --> 26:59.880
taking identifying collection gaps and

26:59.890 --> 27:02.001
tasking either ourselves or others to

27:02.001 --> 27:04.168
fill those collection gaps in order to

27:04.168 --> 27:06.223
create the outfit uh the uh outcomes

27:06.223 --> 27:08.446
that we need . And one of our important

27:08.446 --> 27:10.223
partners is certainly the China

27:10.223 --> 27:12.279
Outcomes Group , General Hawk on the

27:12.279 --> 27:14.279
China Outcomes Group . So the China

27:14.279 --> 27:16.168
Outcomes Group is , is a combined

27:16.168 --> 27:18.390
effort between NSA and Cyber command to

27:18.390 --> 27:20.557
align our resources in support of Indo

27:20.557 --> 27:22.334
paycom . So we have a series of

27:22.334 --> 27:24.557
priorities that we've been given by the

27:24.557 --> 27:26.779
Indo Paycom commander . Uh and that has

27:26.779 --> 27:29.001
allowed us to really look at . How will

27:29.001 --> 27:28.859
we provide intelligence today ? How

27:28.869 --> 27:30.980
would we do that in a crisis ? How do

27:30.980 --> 27:32.925
we think about network defense and

27:32.925 --> 27:35.036
cyber security , both for Indo Paycom

27:35.036 --> 27:37.258
and for their partners ? And then if we

27:37.258 --> 27:39.480
get into a crisis , what are the things

27:39.480 --> 27:41.702
uh that us cyber command and NSA can do

27:41.702 --> 27:43.925
to assist in generating options for the

27:43.925 --> 27:46.147
Indo Paycom commander that continues to

27:46.147 --> 27:48.369
work uh very well and very closely with

27:48.369 --> 27:50.591
the Indo Paycom team . And I could give

27:50.591 --> 27:50.369
you more details in the closed session .

27:50.380 --> 27:52.324
Thanks to all of the witnesses . I

27:52.324 --> 27:54.658
yield back . Thank you , Doctor Jackson .

27:54.658 --> 27:56.713
You're recognized for five minutes .

27:56.713 --> 27:58.824
Thank you , Mr Chairman and thank you

27:58.824 --> 27:58.439
to our witnesses for being here today .

27:58.449 --> 28:00.393
I really appreciate your time . Uh

28:00.393 --> 28:02.449
accurate and actionable intelligence

28:02.449 --> 28:04.616
for our joint force is a key component

28:04.616 --> 28:06.671
of all of our operations . Uh A well

28:06.671 --> 28:08.838
informed intelligence picture from the

28:08.838 --> 28:11.060
defense Intelligence Enterprise will be

28:11.060 --> 28:10.719
key for decision makers and military

28:10.729 --> 28:12.896
leaders in understanding the potential

28:12.896 --> 28:14.840
battle space in the Indo Pacific .

28:14.840 --> 28:16.785
Should a conflict with China arise

28:16.785 --> 28:18.896
similar to other resources across the

28:18.896 --> 28:21.007
department that events . Intelligence

28:21.007 --> 28:23.118
Enterprise cannot neglect other a ors

28:23.118 --> 28:25.118
and miss an intelligence collection

28:25.118 --> 28:27.340
opportunity , the risks remain in those

28:27.340 --> 28:26.880
a ors and we missed , we , we have a

28:26.890 --> 28:29.530
duty to be properly postured . Um My

28:29.540 --> 28:31.596
first question is while we must face

28:31.596 --> 28:33.707
while we must focus on countering the

28:33.707 --> 28:35.596
Chinese Communist Party and their

28:35.596 --> 28:37.762
coercive actions . There are very real

28:37.762 --> 28:39.873
threats to our national security that

28:39.873 --> 28:41.984
exist at our own southern border . In

28:41.984 --> 28:41.699
recent years , we have seen a

28:41.709 --> 28:43.765
disturbing trend of known terrorists

28:43.765 --> 28:45.876
and Chinese military age males coming

28:45.876 --> 28:48.060
across our southern border as violent

28:48.069 --> 28:49.847
extremist organizations and our

28:49.847 --> 28:51.847
adversaries continue to become more

28:51.847 --> 28:54.013
bold and expand their reach . I'm very

28:54.013 --> 28:56.125
concerned about the uh the threats to

28:56.125 --> 28:58.291
our homeland and our intelligence will

28:58.291 --> 29:00.402
ultimately prove to be our , probably

29:00.402 --> 28:59.680
our greatest defense against these

28:59.689 --> 29:02.329
possible threats . Uh General Cruz I'll

29:02.339 --> 29:04.172
start with you . Do you have any

29:04.172 --> 29:06.339
concerns ? But I'll ask this of all of

29:06.339 --> 29:08.395
you . Do you have any concerns about

29:08.395 --> 29:10.006
the threats that may have or

29:10.006 --> 29:11.895
potentially could come across our

29:11.895 --> 29:14.006
southern border based , the increased

29:14.006 --> 29:13.420
number of known terrorists and Chinese

29:13.430 --> 29:15.652
military age males who have crossed our

29:15.652 --> 29:18.170
border ? And uh how has that increased

29:18.180 --> 29:20.291
your workload ? And are we adequately

29:20.291 --> 29:22.458
resourced to remain vigilant regarding

29:22.458 --> 29:24.402
these threats while simultaneously

29:24.402 --> 29:26.780
focusing necessary resources on Indo ?

29:28.640 --> 29:30.862
Uh So let me answer that two ways . One

29:30.862 --> 29:33.069
is um one of the advantages that Dia

29:33.079 --> 29:35.079
has , it is very complex mission is

29:35.079 --> 29:37.510
that in addition to Dia it itself at

29:37.520 --> 29:39.800
the headquarters , we also man uh the J

29:39.810 --> 29:41.977
twos at each of the Quebe and Commands

29:41.977 --> 29:44.032
and that gives us an ability to stay

29:44.032 --> 29:45.866
connected to each of the que and

29:45.866 --> 29:47.810
commands threats and that includes

29:47.810 --> 29:49.921
North com and south com uh as you are

29:49.921 --> 29:49.464
tracking today . So we're intimately

29:49.474 --> 29:51.252
involved either directly at the

29:51.252 --> 29:53.474
headquarters or the commands uh working

29:53.474 --> 29:55.474
the uh migration issues , the human

29:55.474 --> 29:57.363
issues or in the other case , you

29:57.363 --> 29:59.585
mentioned pr C um uh covered across the

29:59.585 --> 30:02.319
southern border . Uh We are always uh

30:02.329 --> 30:05.339
concerned about what may come across

30:05.349 --> 30:07.405
the southern border . Uh We have not

30:07.405 --> 30:10.290
seen uh to date the things that would

30:10.300 --> 30:12.819
cause us to notify you of uh increased

30:12.829 --> 30:14.662
concern . Uh But that's always a

30:14.662 --> 30:16.880
pathway and more to talk . Uh I'd be

30:16.890 --> 30:18.946
happy to talk more in detail when we

30:18.946 --> 30:21.223
get to the uh classified session . Yes ,

30:21.223 --> 30:23.390
sir . Thank you , Carson . As , as we

30:23.400 --> 30:25.511
look at the southern border , we just

30:25.511 --> 30:27.511
recently participated the dnil it a

30:27.511 --> 30:29.359
look at how could we uh as an

30:29.369 --> 30:31.729
intelligence community examine how we

30:31.739 --> 30:34.810
could better uh provide intelligence as

30:34.819 --> 30:36.930
it looks at fentaNYL and how it makes

30:36.930 --> 30:39.160
its way to the United States . Um As we

30:39.170 --> 30:40.948
look at that , I think from our

30:40.948 --> 30:42.781
perspective in , in the National

30:42.781 --> 30:44.837
Security Agency , we're proud of the

30:44.837 --> 30:44.250
work that we've done to be able to

30:44.260 --> 30:46.427
illuminate threats . The area that I'm

30:46.427 --> 30:48.649
probably most concerned about is we are

30:48.649 --> 30:50.871
illuminating most of those threats from

30:50.871 --> 30:53.479
section 702 that has allowed us to see

30:53.489 --> 30:55.322
what it looks like for precursor

30:55.322 --> 30:57.267
chemicals coming from companies in

30:57.267 --> 30:59.489
China , how they make their way to , to

30:59.489 --> 31:01.100
Mexico and then how criminal

31:01.100 --> 31:03.267
organizations can then move those . So

31:03.267 --> 31:05.378
I am concerned that we are gonna lose

31:05.378 --> 31:07.600
our opportunity for those insights . Uh

31:07.600 --> 31:09.656
Unless section 702 is reauthorized .

31:09.656 --> 31:11.711
Thank you . That's helpful , ma'am .

31:11.750 --> 31:13.583
Thank you for the question . I'm

31:13.583 --> 31:15.806
confident that the defense intelligence

31:15.806 --> 31:17.861
enterprise is fully engaged on these

31:17.861 --> 31:19.917
issues . Many of them are a whole of

31:19.917 --> 31:22.139
government effort . They cross domestic

31:22.139 --> 31:24.194
and foreign intelligence . And so we

31:24.194 --> 31:26.361
have , I have full confidence that our

31:26.361 --> 31:28.306
agencies are fully engaged in that

31:28.306 --> 31:30.472
effort . From my seat . I'm constantly

31:30.472 --> 31:32.694
monitoring the resource trade offs that

31:32.694 --> 31:32.329
includes making sure we are making the

31:32.339 --> 31:34.450
right investments and we're , we're ,

31:34.450 --> 31:36.783
we're not taking unnecessary trade offs ,

31:36.783 --> 31:38.839
particularly in the counterterrorism

31:38.839 --> 31:40.728
space . One more question kind of

31:40.728 --> 31:42.895
related to that to the funding issue .

31:42.895 --> 31:41.892
But you know , funding for the Vince

31:41.902 --> 31:44.013
Intelligence Enterprise is split into

31:44.013 --> 31:46.013
two major components , the National

31:46.013 --> 31:48.124
Intelligence program and the military

31:48.124 --> 31:50.124
Intelligence program for Fy 24 . It

31:50.124 --> 31:52.180
looks like the National Intelligence

31:52.180 --> 31:54.291
program is funded at 72.4 billion and

31:54.291 --> 31:56.346
the military Intelligence program is

31:56.346 --> 31:58.291
funded at 29.3 billion for a grand

31:58.291 --> 32:01.042
total of 101.7 billion for Fy 24 . The

32:01.052 --> 32:02.996
request actually appears to show a

32:02.996 --> 32:05.163
slight decrease for a total funding of

32:05.163 --> 32:08.066
101.6 instead of 101.7 . When you

32:08.076 --> 32:10.076
factor in the record inflation that

32:10.076 --> 32:12.132
we've seen over the last few years ,

32:12.132 --> 32:14.243
this is really pretty severe cut . So

32:14.243 --> 32:16.465
my question is uh wait , I can get some

32:16.465 --> 32:18.465
more details on exactly uh what the

32:18.465 --> 32:18.416
issues are when the classified special

32:18.426 --> 32:20.836
session . Uh But I'd like to ask each

32:20.845 --> 32:23.067
of you real quickly . Are we adequately

32:23.067 --> 32:25.067
resourcing the defense Intelligence

32:25.067 --> 32:27.012
enterprise ? How are we justifying

32:27.012 --> 32:28.789
cutting funding for the defense

32:28.789 --> 32:30.956
intelligence enterprise at a time like

32:30.956 --> 32:33.012
this when we need to ensure that our

32:33.012 --> 32:35.859
intelligence is rock solid ? I'm happy

32:35.869 --> 32:38.091
to go into further detail in the closed

32:38.091 --> 32:40.258
session , but I'm confident that there

32:40.258 --> 32:42.480
has not been a decline in capability in

32:42.480 --> 32:44.647
the uh military intelligence program ,

32:44.647 --> 32:46.869
which is the portion I can speak to . I

32:46.869 --> 32:49.091
think that the decline that you note is

32:49.091 --> 32:51.130
due mostly to phased program

32:51.140 --> 32:53.196
acquisitions and other factors which

32:53.196 --> 32:55.084
I'm happy to dive into in further

32:55.084 --> 32:57.307
detail . But I'm confident that we have

32:57.307 --> 32:59.251
not made a reduction in capability

32:59.251 --> 33:01.418
particularly within the M I . Ok . I'm

33:01.418 --> 33:01.390
out of time . But if one of you wanna

33:01.400 --> 33:03.456
say something real quick , otherwise

33:03.456 --> 33:05.780
I'll yield back . I I'd prefer to talk

33:05.790 --> 33:07.901
about it in the closed session if you

33:07.901 --> 33:10.068
don't mind , Congressman . Yes , sir .

33:10.068 --> 33:12.234
Thank you . I'll go back . Thank you .

33:15.160 --> 33:17.327
Uh Representative mcclelland . You are

33:17.327 --> 33:19.739
recognized for five minutes . Thank you ,

33:19.750 --> 33:21.583
Mr Chairman and ranking member ,

33:21.583 --> 33:24.300
Panetta and to our witnesses for being

33:24.310 --> 33:27.050
here today . Um Secretary Harris , one

33:27.060 --> 33:29.599
of the key takeaways from uh the post

33:29.609 --> 33:32.010
911 era was the importance of our

33:32.020 --> 33:34.859
intelligence community working together

33:34.869 --> 33:36.839
and across agencies to tackle the

33:36.849 --> 33:40.359
threats that face the nation . Um How

33:40.369 --> 33:42.591
did the defense intelligence enterprise

33:42.591 --> 33:44.813
work to increase collaboration with the

33:44.813 --> 33:47.189
rest of the intelligence community in

33:47.199 --> 33:49.880
fiscal year 2024 . And what can we

33:49.890 --> 33:52.229
expect in fiscal year ? 2025 ?

33:53.880 --> 33:55.936
Thank you for the question . I think

33:55.936 --> 33:58.599
what I can I can offer is that I think

33:58.609 --> 34:00.831
we've only taken the lessons of the 911

34:00.831 --> 34:02.609
era and applied them to new and

34:02.609 --> 34:04.831
different challenges . So as I remarked

34:04.831 --> 34:06.720
before , I see the entire defense

34:06.720 --> 34:08.442
intelligence Enterprise really

34:08.442 --> 34:10.665
operationalize our partnerships , which

34:10.665 --> 34:12.609
means we're no longer just working

34:12.609 --> 34:14.831
independently with partners . But we're

34:14.831 --> 34:16.720
thinking about the ways different

34:16.720 --> 34:18.776
agencies can partner with our allies

34:18.776 --> 34:20.887
and partners and in service of common

34:20.887 --> 34:22.776
objectives . I think you've heard

34:22.776 --> 34:24.998
already today , some , some examples of

34:24.998 --> 34:27.109
joint work that is going on inside of

34:27.109 --> 34:29.331
the department to make sure that we are

34:29.331 --> 34:31.220
approaching things with a new and

34:31.220 --> 34:33.553
different informed view that takes into ,

34:33.553 --> 34:35.776
takes into account all of the different

34:35.776 --> 34:38.570
talents and um capabilities that exist

34:38.580 --> 34:40.747
inside the department and uses them to

34:40.747 --> 34:42.969
maximum effect . Thank you and for each

34:42.979 --> 34:45.530
of you , um what is the most pressing

34:45.540 --> 34:48.370
capability gap facing the defense

34:48.379 --> 34:50.212
intelligence enterprise and your

34:50.212 --> 34:52.435
specific agency ? What are you doing to

34:52.435 --> 34:54.601
mitigate these gaps ? And what support

34:54.601 --> 34:56.935
do you need from us to help you do ? So ,

35:00.570 --> 35:02.681
uh Congresswoman the I think from our

35:02.681 --> 35:04.514
perspective , the areas that the

35:04.514 --> 35:06.681
department has really asked us to look

35:06.681 --> 35:08.626
at is resiliency . How do we think

35:08.626 --> 35:10.570
about ensuring that we can deliver

35:10.570 --> 35:13.129
intelligence in competition and in

35:13.139 --> 35:15.350
crisis . And if deterrence fails in ,

35:15.360 --> 35:17.360
in conflict , and I think those are

35:17.360 --> 35:19.471
areas that we're gonna really examine

35:19.471 --> 35:21.582
closely and those are things that you

35:21.582 --> 35:23.749
will see coming through the department

35:23.749 --> 35:25.971
in terms of , of budget requests . As ,

35:25.971 --> 35:27.749
as we look at those areas , the

35:27.749 --> 35:29.804
secretary is asking us to focus on .

35:29.804 --> 35:32.540
Thank you . Uh I think uh what I would

35:32.550 --> 35:34.494
offer is that uh our most pressing

35:34.494 --> 35:36.800
capability gap um really not just for

35:36.810 --> 35:38.921
us , but for everyone . Uh when asked

35:38.921 --> 35:41.143
this question , I always actually go to

35:41.143 --> 35:43.310
a , a nontraditional route . And I say

35:43.310 --> 35:45.254
the thing that I am most concerned

35:45.254 --> 35:47.254
about is our ability to protect our

35:47.254 --> 35:49.477
networks , our people and our data . Uh

35:49.477 --> 35:48.770
So whether that's a counter

35:48.850 --> 35:50.961
intelligence piece , whether it is uh

35:50.961 --> 35:52.850
security of our highly classified

35:52.850 --> 35:54.850
networks , whether it's the defense

35:54.850 --> 35:56.961
industrial base , it is uh focused on

35:56.961 --> 35:58.961
those uh efforts that we need to do

35:58.961 --> 36:01.128
there . We are all working those . And

36:01.128 --> 36:03.128
I think what you will see in uh the

36:03.128 --> 36:04.906
budget um that has already been

36:04.906 --> 36:06.906
submitted are the kinds of programs

36:06.906 --> 36:09.017
that will help us in that regard . Uh

36:09.017 --> 36:11.239
Thank you and General Cruz , how is the

36:11.239 --> 36:13.461
defense intelligence enterprise looking

36:13.461 --> 36:15.683
to incorporate uh emerging technologies

36:15.683 --> 36:18.010
such as A I into its capabilities and

36:18.020 --> 36:20.600
to ensure that these new capabilities

36:20.610 --> 36:22.610
will provide the most relevant ,

36:23.020 --> 36:24.853
relevant information for our war

36:24.853 --> 36:27.760
fighters ? Uh Thank you for the

36:27.770 --> 36:29.826
question . Um We have established an

36:29.826 --> 36:31.881
emerging and disruptive technologies

36:31.881 --> 36:34.048
organization that is focused uh really

36:34.048 --> 36:36.500
in three areas . Uh One is on quantum

36:36.739 --> 36:39.080
and that is doing some uh really good

36:39.090 --> 36:41.449
work on um how others are using quantum

36:41.459 --> 36:43.580
computing quantum coms and quantum

36:43.590 --> 36:45.889
sensing . Uh We have an organization

36:45.899 --> 36:48.010
that is focused on biotechnology and

36:48.020 --> 36:50.479
biosecurity . Uh And then another uh

36:50.489 --> 36:52.820
group that is working specifically on A

36:52.830 --> 36:54.997
I and counter A I and we can certainly

36:54.997 --> 36:56.941
talk through what uh some of those

36:56.941 --> 36:59.052
lines of efforts uh might look like .

36:59.052 --> 37:00.886
Uh We also have a um a sort of a

37:00.886 --> 37:02.997
technology and long range assessments

37:02.997 --> 37:05.219
organization that is looking out in the

37:05.219 --> 37:06.941
5 to 20 year point to see what

37:06.941 --> 37:08.774
technologies are in research and

37:08.774 --> 37:10.552
development stages that may not

37:10.552 --> 37:12.608
necessarily be military technologies

37:12.608 --> 37:14.608
yet , but could be if applied . And

37:14.608 --> 37:13.959
then we track those through to

37:13.969 --> 37:16.800
acquisition and , and for some of the

37:16.810 --> 37:19.520
work that you are doing um in the A I

37:19.530 --> 37:23.409
space . Uh What steps are you taking um

37:23.419 --> 37:26.149
to ensure that you can identify uh

37:26.159 --> 37:30.159
misinformation that , that our , our

37:30.169 --> 37:33.629
um adversaries may be using through A I

37:34.050 --> 37:37.969
uh in the context of the question .

37:37.979 --> 37:40.312
And I know I'm about to run out of time .

37:40.312 --> 37:42.257
So you may have to submit it uh an

37:42.257 --> 37:44.312
answer later . Um Five years ago , I

37:44.312 --> 37:46.330
was at a conference where an expert

37:46.340 --> 37:49.540
said that the ability of A I to detect

37:49.550 --> 37:52.479
misinformation was gonna be outpaced by

37:52.489 --> 37:54.100
the ability of A I to create

37:54.100 --> 37:56.267
misinformation . And I've been worried

37:56.267 --> 37:59.159
about that for five years . So um if

37:59.169 --> 38:01.280
you could provide some information on

38:01.280 --> 38:03.336
what you all are doing to try to get

38:03.336 --> 38:06.100
ahead of that . Uh I would be happy um

38:06.110 --> 38:08.221
Either to take that for the record or

38:08.221 --> 38:10.332
answer that in a classified session ,

38:10.332 --> 38:10.060
there is some important work , your

38:10.070 --> 38:12.070
concerns are very valid and it's an

38:12.070 --> 38:14.237
issue . We've got to stay a step ahead

38:14.237 --> 38:16.181
of . Thank you . Now you're back .

38:16.280 --> 38:18.113
Thank you . Uh Mr Mills , you're

38:18.113 --> 38:21.679
recognized for five minutes . Thank you ,

38:21.689 --> 38:23.411
Mr Chairman . Thank you to our

38:23.411 --> 38:25.411
distinguished guests for being here

38:25.411 --> 38:28.250
today . We've got into a very bad habit

38:28.260 --> 38:30.371
of continuing our 19 eighties fashion

38:30.371 --> 38:32.371
of understanding warfare to only be

38:32.371 --> 38:34.482
kinetic , which has been a really big

38:34.482 --> 38:36.649
missed opportunity for us knowing that

38:36.649 --> 38:38.871
the evolution of warfare has truly gone

38:38.871 --> 38:41.038
to an economic resource , cyber supply

38:41.038 --> 38:43.204
chain and even a non kinetic influence

38:43.204 --> 38:45.427
operation campaign . You know , I argue

38:45.427 --> 38:47.538
to many that we've been in a cold war

38:47.538 --> 38:49.649
for about 20 plus years with China as

38:49.649 --> 38:49.600
they've continued to advance their

38:49.610 --> 38:52.010
influences and also to segregate

38:52.020 --> 38:54.689
America's confidence in our currencies

38:54.699 --> 38:56.810
or in developing nations . So they're

38:56.810 --> 38:58.810
moving away from utilizing American

38:58.810 --> 39:01.032
goods as well as for using our currency

39:01.032 --> 39:03.500
as its primary source in knowing this .

39:03.800 --> 39:05.790
What is it that and , and , and my

39:05.800 --> 39:07.744
belief personally , with the China

39:07.744 --> 39:09.356
Russia , Iran , North Korean

39:09.356 --> 39:11.467
geopolitical alignment , could we not

39:11.467 --> 39:13.610
utilize the quantum race ? Especially

39:13.620 --> 39:15.564
looking at things like A I quantum

39:15.564 --> 39:17.564
entanglement ? Self healing , drone

39:17.564 --> 39:19.731
capabilities and others to be utilized

39:19.731 --> 39:21.620
in a very similar fashion to what

39:21.620 --> 39:23.620
President Reagan utilized the space

39:23.620 --> 39:25.620
race for , against the Soviet Union

39:25.620 --> 39:25.489
with a way to try and go ahead and

39:25.500 --> 39:27.729
economically cripple them . Knowing the

39:27.739 --> 39:29.870
Pr CS economics are not where they

39:29.879 --> 39:32.101
claim it's at and seeing that they have

39:32.101 --> 39:34.046
more workforce strikes in the past

39:34.046 --> 39:36.046
years than they have in ever in its

39:36.046 --> 39:39.620
history . So uh

39:39.629 --> 39:41.685
Congressman I'll , I'll touch on the

39:41.685 --> 39:43.851
the quantum discussion as a as a start

39:43.851 --> 39:46.018
point . Um And then we can go wherever

39:46.018 --> 39:48.129
you would like to go . So as we think

39:48.129 --> 39:50.240
about quantum , we're really thinking

39:50.240 --> 39:52.407
about it in two ways . First , we have

39:52.407 --> 39:54.518
a research organization that has been

39:54.518 --> 39:56.685
involved in quantum research since its

39:56.685 --> 39:58.685
inception . And it really sponsored

39:58.685 --> 39:58.320
some of those original studies that

39:58.330 --> 40:01.070
enabled uh the original qubit to be to

40:01.080 --> 40:03.459
be ee employed . So we continue to

40:03.469 --> 40:05.580
partner with academia , with industry

40:05.580 --> 40:07.191
to look at what are the most

40:07.191 --> 40:09.358
appropriate applications when we think

40:09.358 --> 40:11.525
about quantum . The other is how do we

40:11.525 --> 40:13.358
prepare the nation for a quantum

40:13.358 --> 40:15.247
computer to ensure that we've got

40:15.247 --> 40:17.358
quantum resistant encryption ? So NSA

40:17.358 --> 40:19.191
has published our first round of

40:19.191 --> 40:21.191
quantum resi resistant encryption .

40:21.191 --> 40:23.358
That's an area that we wanna work with

40:23.358 --> 40:22.653
the rest of the department to ensure

40:22.663 --> 40:25.262
that we deploy so that we're prepared

40:25.272 --> 40:27.232
when the event that a quantum uh

40:27.242 --> 40:29.464
computer is developed and employed . So

40:29.464 --> 40:31.353
I think that's an area that we're

40:31.353 --> 40:33.298
certainly invested in and , and we

40:33.298 --> 40:35.353
wanna continue to advance and do you

40:35.353 --> 40:35.115
think that the quantum entanglement

40:35.125 --> 40:37.525
capability is advancing at a pace that

40:37.535 --> 40:40.686
will uh see us beat China in that race ?

40:40.696 --> 40:43.006
Uh I think this is one that is really

40:43.016 --> 40:45.238
difficult science . And so I think it's

40:45.238 --> 40:47.349
one we wanna make sure as a nation we

40:47.349 --> 40:49.516
from our perspective , well , with the

40:49.516 --> 40:51.627
resources that we have will employ uh

40:51.627 --> 40:53.460
employ to continue to drive that

40:53.460 --> 40:55.627
research forward . I appreciate that .

40:55.627 --> 40:57.849
Yeah , my my hope is that we can get to

40:57.849 --> 41:00.016
a point where quantum entanglement can

41:00.016 --> 41:02.072
be utilized in a multi drone fashion

41:02.072 --> 41:04.294
that would be enabled to be deployed to

41:04.294 --> 41:03.530
kind of leave our enemies blind , deaf

41:03.540 --> 41:05.707
and dumb on the battlefield to give us

41:05.707 --> 41:07.596
that advantage for the warfighter

41:07.596 --> 41:09.707
abroad . Uh Miss Harris , I wanted to

41:09.707 --> 41:11.818
ask you your thoughts on , you know ,

41:11.818 --> 41:13.373
how can we leverage our JSO

41:13.373 --> 41:15.262
capabilities , relationships with

41:15.262 --> 41:17.096
allies in the regions to counter

41:17.096 --> 41:19.373
China's efforts with regards to Africa ,

41:22.110 --> 41:23.999
I'm having to talk . I think in a

41:23.999 --> 41:25.832
little bit more detail in closed

41:25.832 --> 41:28.054
session . But I think what we have seen

41:28.054 --> 41:30.277
is that those partnerships are not just

41:30.277 --> 41:32.499
belonging to one organization . I think

41:32.499 --> 41:34.666
where we have worked best is where our

41:34.666 --> 41:36.443
our partnerships inside dod are

41:36.443 --> 41:38.510
combined with those of our diplomats

41:38.540 --> 41:40.530
and those of USA ID and other us

41:40.540 --> 41:42.762
government entities that are working in

41:42.762 --> 41:44.596
the region to really deep in the

41:44.596 --> 41:46.484
conversation . Understand the the

41:46.484 --> 41:48.596
different dynamics at play and figure

41:48.596 --> 41:50.979
out how best to work together . And I

41:50.989 --> 41:53.211
guess the kind of a follow on to that ,

41:53.211 --> 41:55.378
which I'm just curious is , you know ,

41:55.378 --> 41:54.860
how can we shorten the decision making

41:54.870 --> 41:56.703
process between the intelligence

41:56.703 --> 41:58.759
community and respective agencies or

41:58.759 --> 42:00.919
teams on the ground ? So I think that

42:00.929 --> 42:03.151
that is work that is , is ongoing every

42:03.151 --> 42:05.449
day . Um I think we've come a long way

42:05.459 --> 42:07.610
in shortening that cycle . I think we

42:07.620 --> 42:09.919
have um a focus right now on making

42:09.929 --> 42:12.262
sure we are sharing information quickly .

42:12.262 --> 42:14.810
We are , we are proactively making sure

42:14.820 --> 42:16.931
that information is releasable to our

42:16.931 --> 42:18.820
partners . That conversations can

42:18.820 --> 42:20.320
happen at the lowest level

42:20.320 --> 42:22.487
classification that they need to . All

42:22.487 --> 42:24.709
of that speeds the the pace of decision

42:24.709 --> 42:26.431
making and the ease of getting

42:26.431 --> 42:28.598
information out to our operators . And

42:28.598 --> 42:28.495
I know that you all and again , I also

42:28.504 --> 42:30.675
can speak to sitting in classified

42:30.685 --> 42:33.195
briefings and , and other areas where

42:33.205 --> 42:35.215
we have seen FISA play a very vital

42:35.225 --> 42:37.395
role with regards to preventing

42:37.574 --> 42:39.630
terrorist attacks by Malign actors .

42:39.630 --> 42:41.852
But I would also argue that the FBI who

42:41.852 --> 42:43.907
has violated that utilizing backdoor

42:43.907 --> 42:45.796
searches and others 287,000 times

42:45.899 --> 42:48.129
without the appropriate reforms , these

42:48.139 --> 42:49.917
types of warrantless surface uh

42:49.917 --> 42:52.083
searches would be in direct violations

42:52.083 --> 42:54.306
of the fourth Amendment . Would you not

42:54.306 --> 42:56.590
agree ? I can speak to what the current

42:56.600 --> 42:58.433
bill offers , which I think is a

42:58.433 --> 43:00.600
meaningful set of reforms that gets us

43:00.600 --> 43:02.933
some of the concerns that have had that ,

43:02.933 --> 43:05.044
that you raise . I think that we have

43:05.044 --> 43:07.044
made a number of , of uh reforms in

43:07.044 --> 43:09.044
response to concerns . But the bill

43:09.044 --> 43:11.044
right now is the most comprehensive

43:11.044 --> 43:13.100
reforms that we have would have will

43:13.100 --> 43:15.211
ever be made to section 70 , well , I

43:15.211 --> 43:17.322
agree that there are some reforms the

43:17.322 --> 43:19.156
FBI is reporting , they have 98%

43:19.156 --> 43:18.399
compliance . But if you look at the

43:18.409 --> 43:21.060
over 200,000 violation , they had

43:21.070 --> 43:23.014
that's still over 4000 a year that

43:23.014 --> 43:24.792
they're violating these illegal

43:24.792 --> 43:26.959
warrantless searches that are a direct

43:26.959 --> 43:29.070
violation of our fourth amendment and

43:29.070 --> 43:28.879
as constitutionalists and those who

43:28.889 --> 43:30.833
swear an oath , that is our job to

43:30.833 --> 43:32.889
protect our constitution against all

43:32.889 --> 43:34.945
enemies , foreign and domestic . And

43:34.945 --> 43:34.760
that means the violations there by

43:34.770 --> 43:36.714
government as well . But without a

43:36.714 --> 43:39.550
yield back , Mr Keating , you are

43:39.560 --> 43:41.893
recognized for five minutes . Thank you ,

43:41.893 --> 43:43.893
Mr Chairman . Uh two days ago , the

43:43.893 --> 43:46.120
Wall Street Journal uh published a

43:46.129 --> 43:48.018
report about the private sales of

43:48.018 --> 43:51.169
Starlink uh assets and the shipping

43:51.179 --> 43:53.389
them uh shipping of them to , to

43:53.399 --> 43:56.459
Russians uh uh battlefield sources . Uh

43:56.469 --> 43:58.247
battle battle Sea , I'm sorry ,

43:58.247 --> 44:00.979
battlefield sources in Ukraine . Uh Can

44:00.989 --> 44:03.156
you talk , comment about the threat of

44:03.156 --> 44:05.156
these private sales , either public

44:05.156 --> 44:07.378
sales or through the black market and ,

44:07.378 --> 44:09.545
and , and you know what the effect can

44:09.545 --> 44:11.656
be uh on the battlefield in Ukraine ,

44:11.659 --> 44:14.189
but also uh what it can be in the hands

44:14.199 --> 44:15.479
of non state actors .

44:18.909 --> 44:21.131
I'm happy to discuss that question . In

44:21.131 --> 44:23.131
more detail in a closed session . I

44:23.131 --> 44:25.840
think we have um a number of efforts

44:25.850 --> 44:28.409
ongoing to address some of these issues .

44:28.419 --> 44:30.530
But I would need to take that for the

44:30.530 --> 44:32.641
record as not all of them fall within

44:32.641 --> 44:34.739
my remit within the department . Um

44:34.750 --> 44:36.861
Just looking at the uh you know , the

44:36.861 --> 44:39.379
forming access of Russia , China , Iran

44:39.389 --> 44:41.445
and North Korea together . And could

44:41.445 --> 44:43.556
you comment on there uh to the extent

44:43.556 --> 44:45.556
you can publicly on the information

44:45.556 --> 44:47.556
sharing that might have resulted in

44:47.556 --> 44:49.778
that closer relationship uh and what we

44:49.778 --> 44:51.945
could do uh ourselves to do it and try

44:51.945 --> 44:54.000
and make sure that we're not falling

44:54.000 --> 44:56.169
into uh siloing things that we have in

44:56.179 --> 44:58.290
the past and that we have on , on our

44:58.290 --> 45:00.401
part , greater uh information sharing

45:00.401 --> 45:02.600
across the board , given the expansion

45:02.610 --> 45:04.554
of the cooper operation with those

45:04.554 --> 45:08.270
without access . So III I can take some

45:08.280 --> 45:10.502
of this congressman because I , I think

45:10.502 --> 45:12.613
one of the things that we have worked

45:12.613 --> 45:14.724
really hard on since the beginning of

45:14.724 --> 45:16.613
Russia , Ukraine is how do we use

45:16.613 --> 45:18.613
intelligence to be able to have the

45:18.613 --> 45:20.669
greatest impact possible ? And , and

45:20.669 --> 45:23.709
how uh all the elements of the C SAS

45:23.719 --> 45:25.775
within the department and within the

45:25.775 --> 45:27.669
community were able to generate

45:27.679 --> 45:29.846
intelligence and either be used by the

45:29.846 --> 45:32.012
administration to identify what Russia

45:32.012 --> 45:33.957
was doing , but also to inform our

45:33.957 --> 45:35.957
combatant commands . And I think we

45:35.957 --> 45:38.068
have really worked on the trade craft

45:38.068 --> 45:40.290
of how do you use intelligence not just

45:40.290 --> 45:42.512
for military targeting but to create an

45:42.512 --> 45:44.679
outcome that gives some advantage . So

45:44.679 --> 45:46.790
in this case , how do we expose those

45:46.790 --> 45:48.846
activities in a way that someone can

45:48.846 --> 45:50.957
take an action based on them ? And we

45:50.957 --> 45:53.123
could talk a little bit more detail in

45:53.123 --> 45:55.179
the , in the closed session ? Do you

45:55.179 --> 45:57.457
think that ? Oh , go ahead , I'm sorry .

45:57.457 --> 45:59.290
Uh Do you think that any of this

45:59.290 --> 46:01.512
information sharing is a threat that uh

46:01.512 --> 46:03.512
particularly given the Iran and the

46:03.512 --> 46:05.679
Middle East uh of sharing this uh with

46:05.899 --> 46:08.739
their proxy , uh militia forces ,

46:08.750 --> 46:10.472
Malign forces that they have .

46:14.280 --> 46:16.620
So I , I think from our perspective ,

46:16.629 --> 46:19.379
uh from , from my perspective , uh as

46:19.389 --> 46:21.556
they collaborate , it , it , it , it ,

46:21.556 --> 46:23.939
it brings uh the potential for transfer

46:23.949 --> 46:25.800
of , of different technology or

46:25.810 --> 46:28.239
intelligence . Um We want to be able to

46:28.250 --> 46:31.830
limit that wherever we can . Uh I

46:31.840 --> 46:34.159
would um offer , it's a , it's a great

46:34.169 --> 46:36.391
question as you kind of think through ,

46:36.391 --> 46:38.391
what is it that the four nations in

46:38.391 --> 46:40.502
particular that you talked about ? Um

46:40.502 --> 46:42.725
Russia , China , North Korea and Iran ?

46:42.725 --> 46:44.780
Um What are they doing now that they

46:44.780 --> 46:44.360
weren't doing before ? And what are

46:44.370 --> 46:46.314
they increasing ? And I think what

46:46.314 --> 46:48.537
we've seen is the relationships that uh

46:48.537 --> 46:50.703
Russia has had to build in order to uh

46:50.703 --> 46:52.592
bring ammunition stocks and other

46:52.592 --> 46:54.426
weapons to them . Uh Some of the

46:54.426 --> 46:56.370
historic friction that has existed

46:56.370 --> 46:58.537
between those countries uh is going by

46:58.537 --> 47:00.759
the wayside . And what we don't know is

47:00.759 --> 47:02.870
what is North Korea , what is China ?

47:02.870 --> 47:04.926
What is Iran getting in return , the

47:04.926 --> 47:06.981
information flow that we expect they

47:06.981 --> 47:08.981
are getting in return is more about

47:08.981 --> 47:11.148
technology , more about capabilities .

47:11.148 --> 47:13.540
Uh It is um less focused on sharing

47:13.550 --> 47:15.709
information about the US . But that

47:15.719 --> 47:17.870
said uh they have shared common

47:17.879 --> 47:20.280
interest in uh their views of what is

47:20.290 --> 47:22.512
the role in the US in the future versus

47:22.512 --> 47:25.189
their roles in the future . And I would

47:25.199 --> 47:28.669
um uh be remiss if I did not go back to

47:28.679 --> 47:32.340
your question on Iran and proxies , we

47:32.350 --> 47:34.520
do see information sharing with Iran

47:34.530 --> 47:36.474
and their proxies , but it is more

47:36.474 --> 47:38.586
related about creating effects on the

47:38.586 --> 47:40.808
battle space that Iran would like to do

47:40.808 --> 47:43.739
but hide its hand . I think with the uh

47:43.750 --> 47:46.060
the race that's going on between uh the

47:46.070 --> 47:48.237
development of artificial intelligence

47:48.237 --> 47:50.469
and then uh our ability to deal with

47:50.479 --> 47:52.701
that arti artificial intelligence , how

47:52.701 --> 47:56.110
to react to that on our own . Uh You'll

47:56.120 --> 47:58.231
have to do with this and classify , I

47:58.231 --> 48:00.342
understand , but also uh on a general

48:00.342 --> 48:03.379
sense , uh our , our enemies , uh Some

48:03.389 --> 48:05.556
of the countries I just mentioned , uh

48:05.556 --> 48:08.729
are they in a situation where uh you ,

48:08.739 --> 48:10.879
you see them developing that kind of

48:10.889 --> 48:13.530
capability too to counter that as well ,

48:13.540 --> 48:16.129
to keep up with it uh on , on the uh

48:16.139 --> 48:17.472
responding side of it .

48:20.679 --> 48:22.679
Uh I think what I would offer is uh

48:22.679 --> 48:24.623
there's at least two of those four

48:24.623 --> 48:26.679
countries that are deeply focused in

48:26.679 --> 48:28.512
that area and uh in a classified

48:28.512 --> 48:28.459
session , we can talk through more

48:28.469 --> 48:30.899
detail . Ok . Thank you very much . I

48:30.909 --> 48:34.290
yield back , Miss Jacobs . You're

48:34.300 --> 48:36.633
recognized for five minutes . Thank you ,

48:36.633 --> 48:38.689
Mr Chairman and thank you so much to

48:38.689 --> 48:40.800
our witnesses . Um I know we talked a

48:40.800 --> 48:42.856
little bit about uh Africa and , and

48:42.856 --> 48:42.340
what we're doing there . I wanted to

48:42.350 --> 48:44.580
ask a little more specifically how

48:44.590 --> 48:46.534
we're sort of learning lessons and

48:46.534 --> 48:48.757
thinking strategically about maybe some

48:48.757 --> 48:50.812
of the things that we are missing in

48:50.812 --> 48:53.350
Africa and making sure , um you know ,

48:53.360 --> 48:56.129
that , that we are looking not only at

48:56.139 --> 48:58.429
sort of targeting but also the dy the

48:58.500 --> 49:01.310
dynamics and , and populations , you

49:01.320 --> 49:03.959
know , for instance , um despite all of

49:03.969 --> 49:06.080
the investments and access we've made

49:06.080 --> 49:08.530
in West Africa , we , the inter agency

49:08.540 --> 49:10.651
was caught surprised by the coup in .

49:10.889 --> 49:13.370
Um despite the huge amount of military

49:13.379 --> 49:15.490
assets that we have in that country .

49:15.530 --> 49:17.641
Um So I guess , uh Lieutenant General

49:17.641 --> 49:20.389
Cruz , can you share how and why as

49:20.399 --> 49:22.850
much as you can in , in open uh hearing ,

49:22.860 --> 49:25.027
we couldn't , we didn't anticipate the

49:25.027 --> 49:27.750
coup in , what lessons we've learned

49:27.760 --> 49:30.110
from that and how dia is working to

49:30.120 --> 49:32.209
ensure we're gathering intelligence

49:32.219 --> 49:34.879
that is more focused on local political

49:34.889 --> 49:37.111
and conflict dynamics , particularly in

49:37.111 --> 49:39.560
places where we do have big uh foreign

49:39.570 --> 49:43.540
military relationships . Uh Thank you

49:43.550 --> 49:46.120
for the question and uh I would offer a

49:46.129 --> 49:48.351
little bit of framing , uh and then the

49:48.351 --> 49:50.573
answer . So for me , uh , the framing ,

49:50.573 --> 49:52.629
uh , that really has resulted in , I

49:52.629 --> 49:54.685
think eight military coups in Africa

49:54.685 --> 49:57.939
since 2020 are tied to a combination of

49:57.949 --> 50:00.560
many things . It is humanitarian issues .

50:00.570 --> 50:02.514
It's food insecurity , it's , it's

50:02.514 --> 50:04.737
migration is terrorism . It's a variety

50:04.737 --> 50:06.792
of things that no amount of military

50:06.792 --> 50:10.090
presence can , um , you know , overturn .

50:10.389 --> 50:12.167
And so when there is a military

50:12.167 --> 50:14.278
presence there , what that does allow

50:14.278 --> 50:16.389
us to do is , um , one of the other ,

50:16.389 --> 50:18.611
uh , organizations that we run , we run

50:18.611 --> 50:20.445
the Defense intel or the Defense

50:20.445 --> 50:22.222
Attache service and the defense

50:22.222 --> 50:24.222
clandestine service . And that does

50:24.222 --> 50:26.222
allow us to have a footprint , uh ,

50:26.222 --> 50:28.389
with embassies , uh , in , uh , all of

50:28.389 --> 50:30.278
the nations around the globe that

50:30.278 --> 50:32.389
allows us to have , um , the kinds of

50:32.389 --> 50:34.500
interagency conversations to see what

50:34.500 --> 50:34.370
it is that we can detect and what we

50:34.379 --> 50:36.739
can do about it . Um , and I think in a

50:36.750 --> 50:38.972
classified setting we can talk a little

50:38.972 --> 50:41.083
bit more about what we saw leading up

50:41.083 --> 50:43.250
to and , uh , perhaps what we're doing

50:43.250 --> 50:45.361
about it . Ok , great . Are there any

50:45.361 --> 50:47.361
broad lessons learned on how you're

50:47.361 --> 50:49.528
doing things differently based on sort

50:49.528 --> 50:51.750
of what happened in the Sahel with the

50:51.760 --> 50:53.871
eight coups over the past few years ?

50:54.679 --> 50:57.120
Um , I , I actually think it's too

50:57.129 --> 50:59.600
early to understand how those , uh ,

50:59.610 --> 51:01.770
are playing out in a couple of areas

51:01.780 --> 51:03.780
and there's a lot of activity still

51:03.780 --> 51:05.836
ongoing . I think the biggest lesson

51:05.836 --> 51:07.947
for us almost goes back to one of the

51:07.947 --> 51:10.058
previous questions which is to ensure

51:10.058 --> 51:12.113
while we're focused on China , where

51:12.113 --> 51:14.224
we're focused on some of the high end

51:14.224 --> 51:14.100
uh adversaries , one of the critical

51:14.110 --> 51:16.166
responsibilities of the intelligence

51:16.166 --> 51:18.277
community is to be that guardrail and

51:18.277 --> 51:20.443
to keep a pulse in some of those other

51:20.443 --> 51:22.388
areas . And so for us , it's about

51:22.388 --> 51:24.388
maintaining uh attache presence and

51:24.388 --> 51:26.554
other presence uh in collection within

51:26.554 --> 51:28.777
the areas you you've talked about . Got

51:28.777 --> 51:30.943
it . Thank you . And I know uh some of

51:30.943 --> 51:30.510
my colleagues have asked about A , I

51:30.520 --> 51:32.687
already , I wanted to ask particularly

51:32.687 --> 51:35.860
about um A I and sort of the ethical

51:35.870 --> 51:38.340
principles . I know um Dod has adopted

51:38.350 --> 51:40.350
ethical principles . I think that's

51:40.350 --> 51:42.517
great . I think there's still a lot of

51:42.517 --> 51:44.572
questions about how those principles

51:44.572 --> 51:46.739
translate into actionable guidelines .

51:46.739 --> 51:48.739
Um And one of the things we've been

51:48.739 --> 51:50.628
hearing a lot of concern about is

51:50.628 --> 51:52.909
around um art of A I drones ,

51:52.919 --> 51:54.669
particularly ones using facial

51:54.679 --> 51:57.540
recognition um used during military

51:57.550 --> 52:00.870
operations . So I guess a question is

52:00.879 --> 52:03.046
how accurate is the facial recognition

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technology used by the A I drones ? And

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what measures have been taken to ensure

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that it doesn't produce false positives

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for whoever wants to answer ?

52:14.060 --> 52:16.171
I think we're gonna have to take that

52:16.171 --> 52:18.393
question for the record . Um What I can

52:18.393 --> 52:20.338
tell you is that the department is

52:20.338 --> 52:22.449
committed to ensuring the ethical use

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of A I , I think you've seen that the

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department has put that priority at

52:26.560 --> 52:28.782
first , and foremost , by elevating the

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position of our chief uh data and A I

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officer to a direct report to the

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secretary . There is a focus in the

52:34.782 --> 52:36.560
department to make sure we both

52:36.560 --> 52:38.671
understand the challenges those tools

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will , will face , we will face on the

52:40.838 --> 52:42.671
battlefield but also how best to

52:42.671 --> 52:45.004
integrate them into military operations .

52:45.004 --> 52:47.227
But I'm happy to take back the question

52:47.227 --> 52:46.810
for more details . Yes , I would

52:46.820 --> 52:48.931
appreciate that . And um you may have

52:48.931 --> 52:51.830
to take this back to then , but uh has

52:51.840 --> 52:54.449
there anything put in place to ensure

52:54.459 --> 52:56.459
that A I drones do not accidentally

52:56.469 --> 52:58.302
target innocent civilians during

52:58.302 --> 53:01.780
military operations ? Again , I'll take

53:01.790 --> 53:03.734
the specific question back for the

53:03.734 --> 53:05.790
record . But I think as you've heard

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many seniors from the department say

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just this week on the hill , civilian

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protection is at the forefront of all

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of our operations . Perfect . Thank you ,

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Mr Chairman . I go back . Thank you .

53:15.179 --> 53:17.149
Uh uh Well , we , they have called

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votes and uh the open portion of the

53:20.939 --> 53:23.659
hearing is now adjourned . We will

53:23.669 --> 53:27.610
reconvene in Rayburn 2337 for the

53:27.620 --> 53:30.830
classified session at the conclusion of

53:30.840 --> 53:32.951
votes which right , right now , we're

53:32.951 --> 53:35.118
looking at walking off the floor about

53:35.118 --> 53:38.050
uh 445 or 1645 . I'm not gonna give it

53:38.060 --> 53:40.171
in Zulu time , so we'll just leave it

53:40.171 --> 53:42.699
at those two to figure it out . But uh

53:42.709 --> 53:46.330
we will all walk back from the floor

53:46.340 --> 53:49.840
to 2337 as soon as possible after that

53:49.850 --> 53:51.683
and we'll reconvene there in the

53:51.683 --> 53:53.739
classified section . This portion is

53:53.739 --> 53:53.070
adjourned .