WEBVTT 00:00.009 --> 00:02.176 Meeting will come to order . Thank you 00:02.176 --> 00:04.398 all for being here . Thank you for your 00:04.398 --> 00:03.750 patience while we finished a vote 00:03.759 --> 00:07.130 series the last few minutes . Uh 00:07.139 --> 00:09.250 First of all , before we do anything 00:09.260 --> 00:11.427 else , I'm gonna ask unanimous consent 00:11.427 --> 00:13.649 that non subcomittee members be allowed 00:13.649 --> 00:15.649 to participate in today's hearing . 00:15.649 --> 00:17.816 After all , sub-committee members have 00:17.816 --> 00:19.927 had an opportunity to ask questions . 00:19.927 --> 00:21.760 Is there any objection if not so 00:21.760 --> 00:23.704 ordered ? So , sub-committee , non 00:23.704 --> 00:25.871 subcomittee members will be recognized 00:25.871 --> 00:27.704 at the appropriate time for five 00:27.704 --> 00:30.469 minutes . Welcome to our hearing and uh 00:30.479 --> 00:32.909 thank you witnesses for being here . We 00:32.919 --> 00:34.680 have Mr John Hill , the Deputy 00:34.689 --> 00:36.633 Assistant Secretary of Defense for 00:36.633 --> 00:38.578 Space and missile defense policy . 00:38.689 --> 00:40.522 Joining him , we have Lieutenant 00:40.522 --> 00:42.411 General Thomas James , the Deputy 00:42.411 --> 00:44.411 Commander of the US Space Command . 00:44.411 --> 00:46.578 Lieutenant General Heath Collins , the 00:46.578 --> 00:48.745 director of the missile defense agency 00:48.745 --> 00:50.800 and Lieutenant General Sean Gainey , 00:50.800 --> 00:52.745 the Commander of Us Army Space and 00:52.745 --> 00:54.411 Missile Defense Command . The 00:54.411 --> 00:56.522 subcomittee meets today to review the 00:56.522 --> 00:58.578 department's fiscal year 2025 budget 00:58.578 --> 01:00.133 request for missile defense 01:00.133 --> 01:02.022 capabilities . I have a number of 01:02.022 --> 01:04.189 concerns just right off the bat here . 01:04.189 --> 01:06.589 First , the overall level of funding is 01:06.599 --> 01:08.377 inadequate given today's threat 01:08.377 --> 01:11.720 environment . The fiscal year 25 budget 01:11.730 --> 01:14.319 requests $10.4 billion for the missile 01:14.330 --> 01:18.000 defense agency . That's more than $400 01:18.010 --> 01:20.800 million less than last year and almost 01:20.809 --> 01:22.698 a billion dollars below the level 01:22.698 --> 01:25.610 projected for fiscal year 25 in last 01:25.620 --> 01:28.930 year's five . I want to reiterate this 01:28.940 --> 01:30.970 point . The fiscal year 25 budget 01:30.980 --> 01:33.379 request for the missile defense agency 01:33.769 --> 01:36.800 is $960 million . Almost a billion 01:36.809 --> 01:39.339 dollars below the level planned for in 01:39.349 --> 01:42.889 last year's budget . Further , these 01:42.900 --> 01:45.339 draconian cuts are not limited to just 01:45.349 --> 01:47.849 fiscal year 25 . The out year spending 01:47.860 --> 01:49.860 projections included in this budget 01:49.860 --> 01:52.190 envision continued reductions in 01:52.199 --> 01:54.540 missile defense spending compared to 01:54.550 --> 01:56.328 the spending plan in the budget 01:56.328 --> 01:58.217 submitted last year . This budget 01:58.217 --> 02:00.809 forecasts cutting over $2.6 billion in 02:00.819 --> 02:03.610 missile defense funding between fiscal 02:03.620 --> 02:07.589 year 25 and fiscal year 28 . To achieve 02:07.599 --> 02:09.869 these cuts this budget would make would 02:09.880 --> 02:12.070 make several concerning decisions 02:12.080 --> 02:14.136 including terminating the production 02:14.136 --> 02:16.869 line for SM three block one B uh 02:16.940 --> 02:19.770 interceptor and eliminating competition 02:19.779 --> 02:23.009 by prematurely down selecting to single 02:23.020 --> 02:26.050 contractors on both the next generation 02:26.059 --> 02:29.089 interceptor and glide phase interceptor 02:29.100 --> 02:31.690 programs . I know we'll get into these 02:31.699 --> 02:33.810 issues in greater detail , but in the 02:33.810 --> 02:36.649 case of the guide excuse me , glide 02:36.660 --> 02:38.550 phase interceptor , I think it's 02:38.559 --> 02:40.392 important to note that this down 02:40.392 --> 02:42.281 selection is occurring five years 02:42.281 --> 02:45.550 earlier than planned . And before the 02:45.559 --> 02:48.789 preliminary design review is even held , 02:49.279 --> 02:51.335 I'm extremely concerned that we will 02:51.335 --> 02:53.223 simply not have enough sufficient 02:53.223 --> 02:55.300 technical data to make an informed 02:55.309 --> 02:57.420 choice between competing concepts for 02:57.420 --> 02:59.630 this program . The glide phase 02:59.639 --> 03:02.000 interceptor is the only capability in 03:02.009 --> 03:04.800 development specifically designed to 03:04.809 --> 03:07.279 com combat the growing hypersonic 03:07.289 --> 03:09.580 threats we face . It is vitally 03:09.589 --> 03:11.811 important to our national security that 03:11.811 --> 03:14.033 we get this program , right . We should 03:14.033 --> 03:16.479 be investing in a robust program that 03:16.490 --> 03:19.229 delivers an effective capability to our 03:19.240 --> 03:21.351 war fighters on a schedule that meets 03:21.351 --> 03:23.500 the threat . That is why Congress 03:23.509 --> 03:26.589 mandated in section 1666 of last year's 03:26.600 --> 03:28.860 defense authorization bill . But this 03:28.869 --> 03:31.710 budget would do the opposite overall , 03:31.720 --> 03:33.664 I'm concerned that these decisions 03:33.664 --> 03:36.740 simply accept too much risk and that 03:36.750 --> 03:38.917 missile defense appears to have become 03:38.917 --> 03:41.270 a bill payer bill payer for other 03:41.279 --> 03:43.649 capabilities in this budget . This is 03:43.660 --> 03:45.839 difficult to understand . Given the 03:45.850 --> 03:48.199 growth in missile threats , the 03:48.210 --> 03:50.199 extremely high demand for missile 03:50.210 --> 03:52.210 defense capabilities from combatant 03:52.210 --> 03:54.759 commanders and the visible evidence of 03:54.770 --> 03:56.881 the value these capabilities bring to 03:56.881 --> 03:59.000 the fight on full display as we speak 03:59.009 --> 04:02.720 in the Red Sea and in Israel and 04:02.729 --> 04:04.729 Ukraine . I look forward to hearing 04:04.729 --> 04:06.896 more from our witnesses about how this 04:06.896 --> 04:09.118 budget impacts their programs and their 04:09.118 --> 04:11.850 assessment of the risks contained in 04:11.860 --> 04:14.490 this budget . With that , I turn to the 04:14.500 --> 04:16.778 ranking member for his opening remarks . 04:17.079 --> 04:19.190 Thank you , Mr Chairman and uh I'll , 04:19.190 --> 04:21.660 I'll just begin by echoing many of your 04:21.670 --> 04:24.059 concerns . Uh This is obviously a time 04:24.260 --> 04:26.269 when missile defense is in use all 04:26.279 --> 04:28.168 around the globe including by the 04:28.168 --> 04:30.000 United States uh in great great 04:30.010 --> 04:31.788 quantity . Uh This is not a , a 04:31.989 --> 04:34.730 technology that seems to be fading away . 04:34.739 --> 04:37.649 And I think my biggest concern is that 04:37.790 --> 04:39.901 I just don't understand the rationale 04:39.901 --> 04:43.140 behind many of these cuts . Now , I've 04:43.149 --> 04:45.205 asked a lot of tough questions of uh 04:45.205 --> 04:47.260 leaders like yourself , Mr Hill , in 04:47.260 --> 04:49.205 particular about uh the purpose of 04:49.205 --> 04:51.371 hypersonics . It's in that same vein , 04:51.371 --> 04:53.500 we don't understand what exactly the 04:53.510 --> 04:55.519 operational concept is to use 04:55.529 --> 04:58.100 hypersonics that makes it hard to 04:58.109 --> 05:00.276 understand the money we're spending on 05:00.276 --> 05:02.442 it . Well , likewise , as the chairman 05:02.442 --> 05:04.665 said , uh if we don't understand why we 05:04.665 --> 05:06.776 understand the rationale behind these 05:06.776 --> 05:08.942 cuts , it becomes very hard to support 05:08.942 --> 05:11.165 them , especially in this environment . 05:11.470 --> 05:13.579 I want to uh welcome both Lieutenant 05:13.589 --> 05:15.645 General James and Lieutenant General 05:15.645 --> 05:17.256 Collins as this is the first 05:17.256 --> 05:19.422 opportunity to testify in front of the 05:19.422 --> 05:21.367 subcomittee uh in your new roles , 05:21.367 --> 05:23.089 Lieutenant General James Space 05:23.089 --> 05:25.145 Command's role is increasing in both 05:25.145 --> 05:27.311 importance and consequence . And given 05:27.311 --> 05:29.422 that space command was recently given 05:29.422 --> 05:31.422 responsibility for department level 05:31.422 --> 05:33.645 missile defense coordination's critical 05:33.645 --> 05:35.811 that you and we understand the complex 05:35.811 --> 05:38.033 strategic role missile defense plays in 05:38.033 --> 05:40.179 our national security . You are the 05:40.190 --> 05:42.529 first army space operator to reach the 05:42.540 --> 05:44.880 rank of Lieutenant general . So you 05:44.890 --> 05:47.649 must be doing something right ? Uh fa 05:47.660 --> 05:49.716 forties have been an exemplar in the 05:49.716 --> 05:51.827 department and this milestone is well 05:51.827 --> 05:53.604 overdue . So congratulations uh 05:53.670 --> 05:55.726 Lieutenant General Collins , uh your 05:55.726 --> 05:57.837 unique background across the spectrum 05:57.837 --> 06:00.059 of strategic programs including space , 06:00.059 --> 06:02.059 nuclear weapons and missile defense 06:02.059 --> 06:04.226 makes you well prepared to be director 06:04.226 --> 06:06.226 of the missile defense agency . I'm 06:06.226 --> 06:08.337 encouraged by our initial discussions 06:08.337 --> 06:08.059 that it is imperative that we 06:08.070 --> 06:09.681 understand the larger policy 06:09.681 --> 06:12.100 implications of what MD A is developing 06:12.329 --> 06:14.329 before we blindly build new systems 06:14.329 --> 06:16.385 that could inadvertently further the 06:16.385 --> 06:18.551 proliferation of missile technology or 06:18.551 --> 06:20.607 in the absolute worst case result in 06:20.607 --> 06:23.829 destabilization , misal calculation and 06:23.839 --> 06:26.829 escalation to nuclear war . As I shift 06:26.839 --> 06:28.839 to the topic of today's hearing , I 06:28.839 --> 06:30.839 want to remind the subcomittee that 06:30.839 --> 06:33.006 missile defense has a mixed legacy and 06:33.006 --> 06:35.117 continues to pose difficult questions 06:35.117 --> 06:37.339 about what its purpose is and should be 06:37.339 --> 06:39.561 under what conditions it actually makes 06:39.561 --> 06:41.728 us safer and how much and what kind of 06:41.728 --> 06:43.950 it we need . That's why these questions 06:43.950 --> 06:43.779 including what the chairman started 06:43.790 --> 06:46.459 with are so important as I laid out 06:46.470 --> 06:48.303 last year , there are five basic 06:48.303 --> 06:50.089 scenarios or levels at which we 06:50.100 --> 06:53.179 consider uh using or not using missile 06:53.190 --> 06:55.260 defense . Behind me is a graphic 06:55.269 --> 06:57.491 depicting these levels which I will use 06:57.491 --> 06:59.547 to frame uh the rest of my remarks , 06:59.799 --> 07:01.966 the highest level of missile defense . 07:01.966 --> 07:04.188 It has been long standing policy across 07:04.188 --> 07:06.410 nearly every administration that we are 07:06.410 --> 07:08.632 not and will not pursue missile defense 07:08.632 --> 07:10.799 to defeat a near peer nuclear attack . 07:10.799 --> 07:12.855 Despite attempts to change us policy 07:12.855 --> 07:14.688 during last year's nd a cycle to 07:14.688 --> 07:16.743 specifically do so , going down this 07:16.743 --> 07:19.021 road would be incredibly destabilizing , 07:19.021 --> 07:20.577 technically challenging and 07:20.577 --> 07:22.632 prohibitively expensive until we can 07:22.632 --> 07:24.632 safely rid the world of all nuclear 07:24.632 --> 07:26.743 weapons which I believe is ultimately 07:26.743 --> 07:28.910 necessary for the survival of humanity 07:28.910 --> 07:30.966 itself . We can neither unilaterally 07:30.966 --> 07:33.260 disarm nor unilaterally render useless . 07:33.269 --> 07:35.609 Our adversaries arsenals . If we were 07:35.619 --> 07:37.841 to try to render all of our adversaries 07:37.841 --> 07:39.897 missiles incapable through increased 07:39.897 --> 07:42.119 missile defenses , they would simply do 07:42.119 --> 07:44.286 what they have arguably already done , 07:44.286 --> 07:46.452 develop new , more complex missiles to 07:46.452 --> 07:48.341 defeat those systems . Mutually d 07:48.341 --> 07:50.508 absurd destruction sounds like a crazy 07:50.508 --> 07:52.675 concept when you first read about it , 07:52.675 --> 07:54.786 but it's fundamentally kept us safe . 07:55.320 --> 07:57.487 The fourth level of missile defense is 07:57.487 --> 07:59.820 the area where there is the most debate . 07:59.820 --> 07:59.339 This is where we can argue that our 07:59.350 --> 08:01.406 advancements in missile defense over 08:01.406 --> 08:03.572 the past two decades since pulling out 08:03.572 --> 08:05.517 of the A BM treaty have provided a 08:05.517 --> 08:07.350 greater security blanket against 08:07.350 --> 08:09.294 aspiring nuclear powers like North 08:09.294 --> 08:11.294 Korea and Iran . However , as North 08:11.294 --> 08:13.461 Korea , the D Pr K continues to expand 08:13.461 --> 08:15.461 their ballistic missile and nuclear 08:15.461 --> 08:17.183 arsenals , we must continually 08:17.183 --> 08:19.350 continually evaluate when we view them 08:19.350 --> 08:21.572 as more of a strategic level threat and 08:21.572 --> 08:23.683 therefore rely on a policy of nuclear 08:23.683 --> 08:25.850 deterrence instead of simply trying to 08:25.850 --> 08:27.406 outnumber their ICBM S with 08:27.406 --> 08:29.072 interceptors such as the next 08:29.072 --> 08:31.239 generation interceptor program intends 08:31.239 --> 08:33.128 to do if we decide to continue to 08:33.128 --> 08:34.906 outpace their ballistic missile 08:34.906 --> 08:36.961 expansion . The question is , how do 08:36.961 --> 08:39.190 Russia and China respond ? I've argued 08:39.200 --> 08:41.089 that they will certainly see that 08:41.089 --> 08:42.922 growth is directly affecting the 08:42.922 --> 08:45.144 credibility of their own nuclear forces 08:45.144 --> 08:46.867 which may have dire unintended 08:46.867 --> 08:48.978 consequences . I hope that in today's 08:48.978 --> 08:51.144 discussion , uh Mr Hill , you can help 08:51.144 --> 08:52.978 us understand how the department 08:52.978 --> 08:55.089 continues to weigh those questions in 08:55.089 --> 08:56.978 that balance . As the subcomittee 08:56.978 --> 08:59.033 evaluates this year's budget request 08:59.033 --> 08:58.650 and the continued missile defense 08:58.659 --> 09:00.992 policy and posture of the United States . 09:00.992 --> 09:03.103 We must understand these implications 09:03.103 --> 09:05.326 for ensuring the strategic stability of 09:05.326 --> 09:07.381 America and the world for decades to 09:07.381 --> 09:09.437 come . Now . Level three is a nuance 09:09.437 --> 09:11.048 that I think is important to 09:11.048 --> 09:13.270 distinguish from a rogue nation because 09:13.270 --> 09:13.010 the size of the system required to deal 09:13.020 --> 09:14.798 with . It is very different but 09:14.798 --> 09:16.909 continuing to have some capability to 09:16.909 --> 09:18.853 defend against a small even single 09:18.853 --> 09:21.020 accidental launch should be maintained 09:21.020 --> 09:23.242 at level two . The tactical level , the 09:23.242 --> 09:25.464 incredible support Ukraine has received 09:25.464 --> 09:27.687 from allies and partners in air missile 09:27.687 --> 09:29.853 defense has enabled them to fight back 09:29.853 --> 09:31.909 against near nonstop Russian missile 09:31.909 --> 09:31.450 attacks for the past three years 09:31.799 --> 09:33.909 through though , if this body cannot 09:33.919 --> 09:35.808 get its act together and pass the 09:35.808 --> 09:37.975 languishing supplemental . This is the 09:37.975 --> 09:40.086 area in which Ukraine will suffer the 09:40.086 --> 09:42.141 most and will have direct impacts on 09:42.141 --> 09:42.039 their ability to maintain their 09:42.049 --> 09:44.869 sovereign country and territory in the 09:44.880 --> 09:46.769 Red Sea . We are seeing what many 09:46.769 --> 09:48.269 thought was not possible , 09:48.269 --> 09:49.991 multinational co ordinated and 09:49.991 --> 09:51.769 effective missile defense . And 09:51.769 --> 09:53.602 obviously this is using a lot of 09:53.602 --> 09:55.324 missiles , which is one of the 09:55.324 --> 09:57.380 questions we have about reducing the 09:57.380 --> 09:59.602 budget while us navy ships have been at 09:59.602 --> 10:01.936 the center of defending deployed forces , 10:01.936 --> 10:01.140 allies , partners and commercial 10:01.150 --> 10:03.261 shipping vessels from a wide range of 10:03.261 --> 10:05.261 air breathing and ballistic missile 10:05.261 --> 10:07.483 threats . They have been working across 10:07.483 --> 10:09.372 a multi national task force . The 10:09.372 --> 10:11.428 French German and UK navies have all 10:11.428 --> 10:13.483 intercepted targets in the Red Sea . 10:13.483 --> 10:15.594 And while ideally , I believe we need 10:15.594 --> 10:15.400 to mo move towards non connect 10:15.409 --> 10:17.960 solutions that flip the cost curve of 10:17.969 --> 10:20.136 missile defense something the chairman 10:20.136 --> 10:22.358 and I have been pursuing aggressively , 10:22.358 --> 10:24.469 no one can deny the incredible impact 10:24.469 --> 10:26.469 today's missile defense systems are 10:26.469 --> 10:28.580 having in the Middle East . Finally , 10:28.580 --> 10:30.747 at the foundation , foundational level 10:30.747 --> 10:30.669 of missile defense simply detecting 10:30.679 --> 10:32.901 these threats . We still have much work 10:32.901 --> 10:34.957 to do . However , this past year has 10:34.957 --> 10:36.957 marked many successes in the domain 10:36.957 --> 10:38.780 awareness in February MD , A's 10:38.789 --> 10:41.011 hypersonic and ballistic tracking space 10:41.011 --> 10:43.011 sensor prototypes were launched and 10:43.011 --> 10:44.956 this budget supports their ongoing 10:44.956 --> 10:46.789 testing through 2027 . The Space 10:46.789 --> 10:48.956 development agency also launched their 10:48.956 --> 10:51.067 wide field of view sensors which will 10:51.067 --> 10:51.049 be a key component of the next 10:51.059 --> 10:52.948 generation of missile warning and 10:52.948 --> 10:55.003 missile track architecture replacing 10:55.003 --> 10:57.115 the legacy quote big juicy satellites 10:57.115 --> 10:59.690 currently on orbit . As we evaluate the 10:59.700 --> 11:01.719 fy 25 requests for missile defense 11:01.729 --> 11:03.840 programs , I will continue to ask the 11:03.840 --> 11:05.562 following questions . How will 11:05.562 --> 11:07.507 expanding us missile defense today 11:07.507 --> 11:09.618 impact strategic stability tomorrow ? 11:09.669 --> 11:11.725 We are already in an arm arms race . 11:11.725 --> 11:14.030 Will it make our world more safe and 11:14.039 --> 11:15.928 does each investment stabilize or 11:15.929 --> 11:18.479 destabilize our strategic national 11:18.489 --> 11:20.600 security ? These are the questions we 11:20.600 --> 11:22.878 must ask ourselves on this subcomittee . 11:22.878 --> 11:24.878 Not just with an eye to this year's 11:24.878 --> 11:27.100 budget and , and , and the NDA A but in 11:27.100 --> 11:29.169 determining how our decisions will 11:29.179 --> 11:31.179 impact the world , we leave for our 11:31.179 --> 11:33.346 Children . Thank you , Mr Chairman I , 11:33.346 --> 11:35.568 you back . Ok . Thank you . We will now 11:35.568 --> 11:37.568 move to opening statements from our 11:37.568 --> 11:39.512 witnesses . I would note that your 11:39.512 --> 11:41.623 prepared statements will be made part 11:41.623 --> 11:43.679 of the record , but you'll each have 11:43.679 --> 11:45.568 five minutes to make some opening 11:45.568 --> 11:47.623 remarks . Mr Hill . Let's begin with 11:47.623 --> 11:49.790 you . Thank you , Chairman Lamborn and 11:49.790 --> 11:51.290 ranking member Moulton and 11:51.290 --> 11:52.901 distinguished members of the 11:52.901 --> 11:55.123 sub-committee uh for the opportunity to 11:55.123 --> 11:57.235 testify today . Thank you as well for 11:57.235 --> 11:59.179 including my full statement in the 11:59.179 --> 12:01.068 record . Um In brief , my written 12:01.068 --> 12:03.179 statement surveys threat developments 12:03.179 --> 12:05.512 in a deteriorating security environment . 12:05.512 --> 12:07.940 It stresses the unmistakable centrality 12:07.950 --> 12:10.789 of missiles of all types including un 12:10.799 --> 12:13.549 crude aerial systems or UAs in modern 12:13.559 --> 12:15.659 warfare and it underscores the 12:15.669 --> 12:17.891 indispensability of missile defense and 12:17.891 --> 12:19.613 missile defeat capabilities to 12:19.613 --> 12:21.919 deterring aggression and to defending 12:21.929 --> 12:24.200 our homeland , our forces deployed 12:24.210 --> 12:26.210 around the world and our allies and 12:26.210 --> 12:28.154 partners . It highlights how those 12:28.154 --> 12:29.988 allies and partners have come to 12:29.988 --> 12:32.043 similar conclusions , are increasing 12:32.043 --> 12:34.154 their own investments and are working 12:34.154 --> 12:35.988 with us to meet these challenges 12:35.988 --> 12:38.309 together . The administration's defense 12:38.320 --> 12:41.090 budget request for fiscal year 2025 12:41.210 --> 12:44.229 includes $28.4 billion for missile 12:44.239 --> 12:46.729 defense and missile defeat programs . I 12:46.739 --> 12:48.795 want to acknowledge at the outset of 12:48.795 --> 12:50.961 this hearing , the strong support this 12:50.961 --> 12:53.017 sub-committee has consistently shown 12:53.017 --> 12:55.183 for missile defense and missile defeat 12:55.183 --> 12:57.390 efforts for many years . And I stand 12:57.400 --> 13:00.429 ready to work with you to pass defense 13:00.440 --> 13:02.496 authorization legislation for fiscal 13:02.496 --> 13:05.969 year 2025 the 64th consecutive year and 13:05.979 --> 13:08.239 with all of Congress to pass on time 13:08.250 --> 13:10.417 defense appropriations legislation for 13:10.417 --> 13:14.219 fiscal year 2025 . Today , I must also 13:14.229 --> 13:16.820 emphasize perhaps more than anything 13:16.830 --> 13:20.340 else , the critical urgency of passing 13:20.349 --> 13:22.293 the national security supplemental 13:22.293 --> 13:24.539 request which Congress has now had for 13:24.549 --> 13:27.270 nearly six months . That request 13:27.280 --> 13:29.650 includes desperately needed funding , 13:30.130 --> 13:32.669 funding to support Ukraine in defending 13:32.679 --> 13:34.979 its democratic sovereignty and its very 13:34.989 --> 13:37.239 existence against Russia's illegal and 13:37.250 --> 13:39.469 ruthless invasion and Russia's 13:39.479 --> 13:41.423 authoritarian aggression including 13:41.423 --> 13:44.140 relentless barrages of missiles and UAs 13:44.150 --> 13:47.260 attacks . Funding to support Israel in 13:47.270 --> 13:49.326 defending against itself against the 13:49.326 --> 13:51.409 continuing missile U A and rocket 13:51.419 --> 13:53.750 attacks by Hamas and other groups 13:53.760 --> 13:56.859 aligned with Iran funding to provide 13:56.869 --> 13:58.869 critical humanitarian assistance in 13:58.869 --> 14:00.760 Ukraine , Israel and Gaza where 14:00.770 --> 14:03.070 innocent civilians are dying every day . 14:03.530 --> 14:05.619 Funding to support our Indo Pacific 14:05.630 --> 14:07.852 partners in deterring aggression by the 14:07.852 --> 14:10.169 People's Republic of China . Funding to 14:10.179 --> 14:12.489 replenish our own military supplies of 14:12.500 --> 14:14.556 munitions and other material that we 14:14.556 --> 14:16.444 have had to draw down to meet the 14:16.444 --> 14:18.840 urgent needs of allies and partners and 14:18.849 --> 14:20.905 funding to invest in the capacity of 14:20.905 --> 14:22.738 the American industrial base and 14:22.738 --> 14:24.640 workforce that is producing these 14:24.650 --> 14:26.872 munitions and weapons systems including 14:26.872 --> 14:28.872 missile defense systems that are so 14:28.872 --> 14:31.094 vital to all of these American national 14:31.094 --> 14:34.020 security interests . Chairman Lamborn , 14:34.030 --> 14:35.530 ranking member Moulton and 14:35.530 --> 14:37.197 distinguished members of this 14:37.197 --> 14:39.500 subcomittee . There is simply no more 14:39.510 --> 14:42.270 time for delay . The time to act is now , 14:42.280 --> 14:44.830 I cannot overemphasize as General 14:44.840 --> 14:46.784 Cavoli said just the other day , I 14:46.784 --> 14:48.729 cannot overemphasize the critical 14:48.739 --> 14:51.010 importance of Congress coming together 14:51.020 --> 14:53.090 in common purpose and acting with 14:53.099 --> 14:55.210 urgency to pass the national security 14:55.210 --> 14:57.469 supplemental request . Thank you again 14:57.479 --> 14:59.646 for convening this crucially important 14:59.646 --> 15:01.868 and timely hearing . Thank you for your 15:01.868 --> 15:04.035 attention and thank you each and every 15:04.035 --> 15:06.035 one of you for what you do for your 15:06.035 --> 15:08.090 constituents and the nation . I look 15:08.090 --> 15:10.312 forward to your questions . Thank you , 15:10.312 --> 15:14.239 Lieutenant General Collins . Thank you , 15:14.250 --> 15:16.139 Chairman Lamborn , ranking member 15:16.139 --> 15:18.194 Moulton and distinguished members of 15:18.194 --> 15:20.306 the sub-committee . I appreciate your 15:20.306 --> 15:22.139 continued strong support for the 15:22.139 --> 15:23.972 missile defense mission and look 15:23.972 --> 15:26.194 forward to uh the questions today . I'd 15:26.194 --> 15:28.306 like to start out by thanking the men 15:28.306 --> 15:27.859 and women behind the development 15:27.869 --> 15:30.091 delivery and sustainment of the missile 15:30.091 --> 15:32.147 defense system . Uh that I represent 15:32.147 --> 15:33.925 today , our MD A family and the 15:33.925 --> 15:35.890 operators of the system , all key 15:35.900 --> 15:38.700 partners in this no fail mission . Uh 15:38.710 --> 15:40.766 As you mentioned , chairman , we are 15:40.766 --> 15:42.988 requesting $10.4 billion to develop and 15:42.988 --> 15:45.043 deploy homeland missile defenses and 15:45.043 --> 15:46.932 improve regional missile defenses 15:46.932 --> 15:48.766 against increasingly diverse and 15:48.766 --> 15:50.543 dangerous missile threats . Our 15:50.543 --> 15:52.377 prioritization of decisions will 15:52.377 --> 15:54.154 maximize missile defense system 15:54.154 --> 15:56.266 capability , capacity and readiness . 15:56.840 --> 15:58.896 We continue to work closely with our 15:58.896 --> 16:00.951 combatant commanders and services to 16:00.951 --> 16:03.062 help prepare them to fight uh for the 16:03.062 --> 16:05.173 fight of today and tomorrow to defend 16:05.173 --> 16:07.173 our homeland from ballistic missile 16:07.173 --> 16:07.169 attack . The ground based mid course 16:07.179 --> 16:09.989 defense or G MD system remains our 16:10.000 --> 16:12.111 nation's sole protection from limited 16:12.111 --> 16:14.278 attacks . With the primary focus being 16:14.278 --> 16:16.739 the advancing North Korean threat . The 16:16.750 --> 16:19.049 ongoing bro ground based interceptor or 16:19.059 --> 16:21.280 GB I service life extension program 16:21.429 --> 16:23.320 will continue to improve the GB I 16:23.330 --> 16:25.679 reliability and will help mitigate risk 16:25.690 --> 16:27.849 until the next gen interceptor next 16:27.859 --> 16:30.719 generation interceptor NG I is fielded 16:30.729 --> 16:34.020 by the end of 2028 . After 20 years , G 16:34.030 --> 16:36.252 MD stands ready as shown in December of 16:36.252 --> 16:39.450 2023 when we successfully executed a G 16:39.460 --> 16:43.000 MD intercept flight test using the 23 16:43.010 --> 16:45.179 stage selectable ground based 16:45.190 --> 16:47.412 interceptor in two stage mode . A first 16:48.039 --> 16:49.983 demonstrating increased engagement 16:49.983 --> 16:52.095 battle space . We plan to deploy this 16:52.095 --> 16:54.317 capability to the entire fleet . By the 16:54.317 --> 16:56.320 end of this year , the NG I program 16:56.330 --> 16:58.400 remains on track . Both prime 16:58.409 --> 17:00.576 contractors have successfully executed 17:00.576 --> 17:02.799 preliminary design reviews or PDRS and 17:02.809 --> 17:05.031 MD A is preparing in the near future to 17:05.031 --> 17:07.253 complete a best value determination and 17:07.253 --> 17:09.420 select a single company to continue NG 17:09.420 --> 17:11.476 I development testing production and 17:11.476 --> 17:15.410 fielding . Soon we plan to add the long 17:15.420 --> 17:17.800 range discrimination radar or LRDR to 17:17.810 --> 17:20.119 MD A's operational capability baseline 17:20.209 --> 17:23.199 by December of this year . LRDR 17:23.290 --> 17:25.457 delivered to the government last month 17:25.457 --> 17:27.512 will enhance tracking discrimination 17:27.512 --> 17:29.623 and hit assessment against long range 17:29.623 --> 17:31.679 missile threats . Additionally , the 17:31.679 --> 17:33.901 Space force and MD A are in the process 17:33.901 --> 17:35.957 of formally declaring LRDR ready for 17:35.957 --> 17:37.957 space object detection . Later this 17:37.957 --> 17:40.339 month for regional defense . MD A 17:40.349 --> 17:42.739 continues to design improvements to the 17:42.760 --> 17:45.069 AEGIS ba uh ballistic missile defense 17:45.079 --> 17:47.079 capability and procure the standard 17:47.079 --> 17:49.130 standard missile three block two A 17:49.140 --> 17:53.130 missiles in fy 2025 we will also test 17:53.140 --> 17:55.380 and deliver spy one radar upgrades and 17:55.390 --> 17:57.612 support the Navy in future space domain 17:57.612 --> 17:59.819 awareness demonstrations . We will 17:59.829 --> 18:02.051 continue us terminal high altitude area 18:02.051 --> 18:03.979 defense or Thaad interceptor 18:03.989 --> 18:05.878 procurement fielding and training 18:05.878 --> 18:08.045 support along with the reliability and 18:08.045 --> 18:09.767 cyber security improvements in 18:09.767 --> 18:11.767 collaboration with the US army . We 18:11.767 --> 18:13.878 have fielded the Thaad 4.0 capability 18:13.878 --> 18:15.989 to batteries in Korea and on Guam and 18:15.989 --> 18:18.100 are in the process of fielding 4.0 to 18:18.100 --> 18:20.267 the all remaining Thaad batteries . By 18:20.267 --> 18:23.270 the end of 2025 Thaad four thaad 4.0 18:23.459 --> 18:25.515 integrates patriot capabilities with 18:25.599 --> 18:27.821 Thaad to increase patriot defended area 18:27.821 --> 18:29.988 and engagement opportunities . We will 18:29.988 --> 18:32.099 also begin design work to improve the 18:32.099 --> 18:34.266 Thaad system to take on ever advancing 18:34.266 --> 18:36.155 regional threats . The department 18:36.155 --> 18:38.266 continues development of a 360 degree 18:38.266 --> 18:40.432 layered missile defense capability for 18:40.432 --> 18:42.800 Guam MD . A construction on the joint 18:42.810 --> 18:46.079 command center A NTPY six radar site 18:46.089 --> 18:48.145 and launch site will begin in fiscal 18:48.145 --> 18:51.569 year 2025 . And by the end of this year , 18:51.579 --> 18:53.579 we will execute a flight experiment 18:53.579 --> 18:56.339 with the SM three block two A against a 18:56.349 --> 18:58.460 medium range ballistic missile target 18:58.460 --> 19:01.060 controlled with the initial AEGIS Guam 19:01.069 --> 19:03.739 system using the first TPY six 19:03.750 --> 19:06.189 transportable array unit . Looking 19:06.199 --> 19:08.421 forward MD A continues to pursue end to 19:08.421 --> 19:10.588 end capabilities to defeat the serious 19:10.588 --> 19:12.255 challenge posed by hypersonic 19:12.255 --> 19:14.366 maneuvering threats . Today , our sea 19:14.366 --> 19:16.532 based terminal defenses protect assets 19:16.532 --> 19:18.560 at sea and forces ashore for from 19:18.569 --> 19:20.680 hypersonic threats . Working with the 19:20.680 --> 19:22.847 navy , we anticipate delivering follow 19:22.847 --> 19:24.902 on increment three capabilities . In 19:24.902 --> 19:27.500 fiscal year 2025 the glide phase 19:27.510 --> 19:29.454 interceptor program or GP I weapon 19:29.454 --> 19:31.399 system will enable layered defense 19:31.399 --> 19:33.621 against hypersonic glide threats by the 19:33.621 --> 19:36.500 end of Fy 24 in coordinating with our 19:36.510 --> 19:38.959 future uh international partner , Japan 19:38.969 --> 19:40.802 MD , A will select a single GP I 19:40.802 --> 19:42.525 interceptor design to complete 19:42.525 --> 19:44.413 development . We will continue to 19:44.413 --> 19:46.469 develop a mature GP I capability and 19:46.469 --> 19:48.636 support the planned cooper development 19:48.636 --> 19:50.691 of that glide phase interceptor with 19:50.691 --> 19:52.691 Japan on the detection and tracking 19:52.691 --> 19:54.802 part of the kill chain . As mentioned 19:54.802 --> 19:56.691 by uh ranking member Moulton . We 19:56.691 --> 19:58.802 launched the hypersonic and ballistic 19:58.802 --> 20:00.525 tracking space sensor or HPTSS 20:00.525 --> 20:02.525 prototype satellites in February to 20:02.525 --> 20:04.469 demonstrate fire control solutions 20:04.469 --> 20:04.430 generated against hypersonic 20:04.439 --> 20:06.369 maneuvering threats following 20:06.380 --> 20:09.140 successful demonstration of hphptss . 20:09.150 --> 20:11.800 The responsibility for fielding H BT SS 20:11.810 --> 20:13.977 like fire control capabilities will be 20:13.977 --> 20:15.810 transferred to space force . I'm 20:15.810 --> 20:17.866 honored by this opportunity and look 20:17.866 --> 20:20.088 forward to your questions . Thank you , 20:20.088 --> 20:22.939 Lieutenant General Gainey , Chairman 20:22.949 --> 20:25.005 Lamborn , ranking member Moulton and 20:25.005 --> 20:26.671 distinguished members of this 20:26.671 --> 20:28.839 subcomittee . I am honored to testify 20:28.849 --> 20:30.569 before you and represent this 20:30.579 --> 20:32.790 incredible one team organization of 20:32.800 --> 20:36.109 2300 soldiers and civilian spanning 13 20:36.119 --> 20:38.520 time zones in 19 locations worldwide . 20:38.910 --> 20:41.439 These professionals tirelessly provide 20:41.449 --> 20:43.969 space high altitude and missile defense 20:43.979 --> 20:46.201 forces and advanced capabilities to the 20:46.201 --> 20:48.270 army and joint war fighter . I am 20:48.280 --> 20:50.391 honored to represent them and I thank 20:50.391 --> 20:52.391 you for your unwavering support for 20:52.391 --> 20:54.724 this team and their families in January . 20:54.810 --> 20:57.040 I took command of the US Army Space and 20:57.050 --> 20:58.969 missile defense command and joint 20:58.979 --> 21:00.812 functional component command for 21:00.812 --> 21:02.923 integrated air missile defense , also 21:02.923 --> 21:04.979 known as J I MD , also acting as the 21:04.979 --> 21:07.146 senior commander for both Fort Greeley 21:07.146 --> 21:09.368 Alaska and US , army garrison quadri in 21:09.380 --> 21:12.589 a toll . Additionally , I also serve as 21:12.599 --> 21:15.209 the army's lead enterprise integrator 21:15.219 --> 21:17.689 for air and missile defense . And my 21:17.699 --> 21:19.643 organization , Jif I I MD provides 21:19.643 --> 21:21.560 operational level missile defense 21:21.569 --> 21:23.890 expertise and integrates trans regional 21:23.900 --> 21:25.956 missile defense functions across the 21:25.956 --> 21:28.067 joint and combined war fighting force 21:28.579 --> 21:30.839 as the army's air and missile defense 21:30.849 --> 21:33.339 enterprise integrator . Uh Today , I 21:33.349 --> 21:35.571 will , I will use this role to leverage 21:35.680 --> 21:37.680 and highlight the army air missile 21:37.689 --> 21:40.510 defense remains the army's most heavily 21:40.520 --> 21:42.729 deployed force with the highest demand 21:42.739 --> 21:44.729 signal amongst the combat commands 21:44.739 --> 21:46.890 every year . This high op tempo 21:46.900 --> 21:49.469 continues to provide a significant 21:49.479 --> 21:51.939 strain on our formations and families 21:51.949 --> 21:54.060 and we must continue to address their 21:54.060 --> 21:56.171 needs . As you know , the urgency for 21:56.171 --> 21:58.116 multi domain trans regional combat 21:58.116 --> 21:59.969 effects continues to increase 21:59.979 --> 22:02.780 exponentially . Our adverse air and 22:02.790 --> 22:04.846 missile defense related threats have 22:04.846 --> 22:07.750 rapidly expanded in recent years in 22:07.760 --> 22:10.410 quantity variety and sophistication , 22:10.869 --> 22:13.229 rapidly expanding their space R and D 22:13.239 --> 22:15.800 instigating cyber attacks and test 22:15.810 --> 22:18.359 complex missile systems . We see this 22:18.369 --> 22:20.410 today in Ukraine and looming on the 22:20.420 --> 22:22.619 horizon in the Pacific , it has never 22:22.630 --> 22:24.849 been more imperative that we and our 22:24.859 --> 22:28.089 allies and partners enhance our missile 22:28.099 --> 22:30.560 defense and space capabilities to 22:30.569 --> 22:32.458 impose costs on our adversaries , 22:32.458 --> 22:34.402 denying them the benefits of using 22:34.402 --> 22:36.125 these weapons and ensuring the 22:36.125 --> 22:38.369 safeguarding of our nation . As our 22:38.380 --> 22:40.547 adversaries increase their emphasis on 22:40.550 --> 22:43.239 space and missile capabilities . The US 22:43.250 --> 22:45.729 army grows in kind . In December , the 22:45.739 --> 22:49.099 secretary and chief staff of the army 22:49.439 --> 22:51.328 and the uh SARD Major of the army 22:51.328 --> 22:53.609 signed the army space Vision supporting 22:53.619 --> 22:55.719 multi domain operations . Specifying 22:55.729 --> 22:57.900 the army's role in integrating space 22:57.910 --> 23:00.021 capabilities into joint and coalition 23:00.021 --> 23:03.099 operations while also interdicting the 23:03.109 --> 23:05.890 space capabilities of adversaries . It 23:05.900 --> 23:07.844 is also increasingly apparent that 23:07.844 --> 23:09.930 integrating our space operations and 23:09.939 --> 23:11.910 missile defense operations is of 23:11.920 --> 23:13.920 critical importance to our national 23:13.920 --> 23:16.142 security . Our integration is essential 23:16.142 --> 23:18.309 to effectively contribute to strategic 23:18.309 --> 23:21.010 deterrent and respond in crisis . What 23:21.020 --> 23:23.430 worked for yesterday's military must 23:23.439 --> 23:25.660 evolve . Today , we must integrate 23:25.670 --> 23:27.829 space and missile defense at every at 23:27.839 --> 23:29.810 the very onset of our prototyping 23:29.839 --> 23:32.699 concept development and application and 23:32.709 --> 23:35.089 we do it all in this in concert with 23:35.099 --> 23:37.432 our army , joint and coalition partners , 23:37.432 --> 23:39.543 one voice together around the globe . 23:39.543 --> 23:41.599 Our allies and partners are critical 23:41.599 --> 23:44.180 for layered and tiered operations to 23:44.189 --> 23:45.911 degrade , disrupt and defeat . 23:45.911 --> 23:49.229 Adversaries share burdens , integrate 23:49.239 --> 23:51.270 technology and protect our mutual 23:51.280 --> 23:53.800 homelands . But all these operational 23:53.810 --> 23:57.030 consideration pale uh in comparison to 23:57.040 --> 23:59.609 the will . Determination and the trust , 23:59.619 --> 24:02.060 the amazing men and women that operate 24:02.069 --> 24:04.125 and sustain these advanced systems . 24:04.125 --> 24:06.291 These soldiers and their families make 24:06.291 --> 24:08.959 life altering sacrifices to serve 24:08.969 --> 24:11.089 across the globe . Thank you for your 24:11.099 --> 24:13.310 efforts in supporting them with timely 24:13.319 --> 24:15.263 budget , caring for them and their 24:15.270 --> 24:17.420 families and building trust with the 24:17.430 --> 24:19.652 American people now and in the years to 24:19.652 --> 24:21.597 come , caring for our soldiers and 24:21.597 --> 24:23.708 their families is paramount to win in 24:23.708 --> 24:25.652 any environment around the globe . 24:26.619 --> 24:28.841 Thank you for your support , supporting 24:28.841 --> 24:31.063 such an incredible mission ready team . 24:31.063 --> 24:32.952 I look forward to addressing your 24:32.952 --> 24:34.952 questions . Thank you . Thank you , 24:34.952 --> 24:37.286 Lieutenant General James . Good morning , 24:37.286 --> 24:39.175 Chairman Lamborn , ranking member 24:39.175 --> 24:41.230 Moulton and distinguished members of 24:41.230 --> 24:43.397 the subcomittee . It is an honor to be 24:43.397 --> 24:45.286 here today , representing General 24:45.286 --> 24:47.563 Whiting and the nearly 18,000 soldiers , 24:47.563 --> 24:49.930 sailors , marines , airmen , guardians 24:49.939 --> 24:51.995 dod civilians and contractors of the 24:51.995 --> 24:54.079 United States Space Command . Our 24:54.089 --> 24:56.390 expertly trained and mission focused 24:56.400 --> 24:58.400 workforce remains our most valuable 24:58.400 --> 25:00.689 asset . As you've heard from our 25:00.699 --> 25:02.755 distinguished colleagues here on the 25:02.755 --> 25:04.755 panel , our strategic competitors , 25:04.859 --> 25:06.526 offensive missile systems are 25:06.526 --> 25:08.692 significantly increasing in capability 25:08.692 --> 25:10.692 and scale . They will challenge our 25:10.692 --> 25:12.581 ability to conduct operations and 25:12.581 --> 25:14.637 protect and defend us and our allies 25:14.637 --> 25:16.692 vital interest . Our competitors are 25:16.692 --> 25:19.000 rapidly evolving , diversifying and 25:19.010 --> 25:20.843 proliferating their victories of 25:20.843 --> 25:22.899 advanced missiles and technologies , 25:22.899 --> 25:24.954 hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise 25:24.954 --> 25:27.177 missiles pose diverse threats that will 25:27.177 --> 25:29.121 complicate our missile warning and 25:29.121 --> 25:31.121 missile defense missions . In April 25:31.121 --> 25:33.288 2023 the Unified Command plan assigned 25:33.288 --> 25:35.232 United States Space Command with a 25:35.232 --> 25:37.121 responsibility for trans regional 25:37.121 --> 25:38.732 missile defense planning and 25:38.732 --> 25:40.954 operational support . That decision was 25:40.954 --> 25:42.899 the culmination of a comprehensive 25:42.899 --> 25:45.121 study in alignment with numerous policy 25:45.121 --> 25:47.121 documents and with the 2022 missile 25:47.121 --> 25:49.343 defense review , this was a natural fit 25:49.343 --> 25:51.066 given our unified command plan 25:51.066 --> 25:52.920 responsibilities such as space 25:52.930 --> 25:55.109 operations and global sensor manager . 25:55.469 --> 25:57.191 As the missile defense mission 25:57.191 --> 25:59.619 continues to converge with the space 25:59.630 --> 26:02.260 missions . Part of the transition of 26:02.270 --> 26:04.492 trans regional missile defense planning 26:04.492 --> 26:06.714 and support missions included alignment 26:06.714 --> 26:08.603 of the joint functional component 26:08.603 --> 26:10.770 command for integrated missile defense 26:10.770 --> 26:12.881 under us . Space command commanded by 26:12.881 --> 26:12.489 my good friend , Lieutenant General 26:12.500 --> 26:16.140 Sean Gy JFCC I MD ensured the continued 26:16.150 --> 26:18.039 execution of the responsibilities 26:18.039 --> 26:19.928 during the transition without any 26:19.928 --> 26:22.229 mission degradation . We at United 26:22.239 --> 26:24.295 States Space Command have integrated 26:24.295 --> 26:26.406 JFCC I MD into our command structures 26:26.406 --> 26:28.628 and processes and our exploring ways to 26:28.628 --> 26:30.517 further optimize our execution of 26:30.517 --> 26:33.010 critical missions . As the global 26:33.020 --> 26:34.930 sensor manager us space com is 26:34.939 --> 26:37.170 responsible for planning , managing and 26:37.180 --> 26:39.347 overseeing the operations of all assad 26:39.347 --> 26:41.180 space Domain awareness , missile 26:41.180 --> 26:43.291 defense and missile warning sensors . 26:43.540 --> 26:45.707 Our terrestrial sensors are a critical 26:45.707 --> 26:47.762 enabler to the combatant command and 26:47.762 --> 26:50.096 national level military command centers . 26:50.096 --> 26:51.984 Most performing missile warning , 26:51.984 --> 26:54.151 missile defense and space domain Space 26:54.151 --> 26:56.484 Domain awareness mission simultaneously . 26:56.484 --> 26:58.484 Our space based sensors provide the 26:58.484 --> 27:00.540 first alert of a missile launch from 27:00.540 --> 27:02.651 anywhere on the planet . They provide 27:02.651 --> 27:04.596 this to our national leaders , the 27:04.596 --> 27:06.540 National military Command system , 27:06.540 --> 27:08.429 combating commands and select our 27:08.429 --> 27:10.596 international partners . Us , spacecom 27:10.596 --> 27:12.762 employs a joint combined and partnered 27:12.762 --> 27:14.596 approach to our operations which 27:14.596 --> 27:16.818 expands our access to sensors and their 27:16.818 --> 27:18.596 information . This includes our 27:18.596 --> 27:20.540 Combined Space Operations Center's 27:20.540 --> 27:22.540 commercial integration cell and our 27:22.540 --> 27:24.651 National Space Defense Center's joint 27:24.651 --> 27:26.873 commercial operations cell commensurate 27:26.873 --> 27:28.596 with the department's recently 27:28.596 --> 27:30.707 published commercial space strategy . 27:30.707 --> 27:32.484 The JCO also includes 14 allied 27:32.484 --> 27:34.151 partners that fully are fully 27:34.151 --> 27:35.984 integrated into our space domain 27:35.984 --> 27:39.900 operations . It is vital that 27:39.910 --> 27:42.077 we keep pace with the emerging threats 27:42.077 --> 27:44.132 and technologies while ensuring that 27:44.132 --> 27:45.966 our central architecture remains 27:45.966 --> 27:47.969 optimized and modernized . While we 27:47.979 --> 27:50.090 pursue integrating new capabilities , 27:50.090 --> 27:52.312 we must still aggressively leverage and 27:52.312 --> 27:54.535 integrate our legacy centers in support 27:54.535 --> 27:56.535 of our critical missile warning and 27:56.535 --> 27:58.590 missile defense functions today . As 27:58.590 --> 28:00.757 part of a comprehensive missile defeat 28:00.757 --> 28:02.590 strategy , continued funding for 28:02.590 --> 28:04.701 research and development for the next 28:04.701 --> 28:04.290 generation of space based and 28:04.300 --> 28:06.467 terrestrial sensor systems is critical 28:06.969 --> 28:09.239 uh to keep pace with the competitors 28:09.250 --> 28:10.861 and the po and the potential 28:10.861 --> 28:13.028 adversaries that we face today . These 28:13.028 --> 28:15.139 capabilities must be resilient and we 28:15.139 --> 28:17.361 must be able to defend and reconstitute 28:17.361 --> 28:19.528 them to achieve space and cross domain 28:19.528 --> 28:21.750 mission assurance for the joint force . 28:21.920 --> 28:24.010 In closing the 2022 missile defense 28:24.020 --> 28:26.310 review states , it is a strategic 28:26.319 --> 28:28.263 imperative of the United States to 28:28.263 --> 28:30.520 continue investments and innovation in 28:30.530 --> 28:32.363 the development of full spectrum 28:32.363 --> 28:34.586 missile defeat capabilities to maintain 28:34.586 --> 28:36.808 deterrence and offer protection . While 28:36.808 --> 28:38.474 hedging against uncertainty . 28:38.660 --> 28:40.660 Consistent with the missile defense 28:40.660 --> 28:42.716 review , the department must explore 28:42.716 --> 28:44.271 and enact the full range of 28:44.271 --> 28:46.104 capabilities to counter advanced 28:46.104 --> 28:48.327 adversary offensive missiles and hybrid 28:48.327 --> 28:50.549 threats across the spectrum of conflict 28:50.550 --> 28:52.717 us Space Command with fellow combatant 28:52.717 --> 28:54.883 Commands , services , allies and inter 28:54.883 --> 28:57.050 agency and commercial partners stands 28:57.060 --> 28:59.116 ready to perform our unified command 28:59.116 --> 29:01.227 plan responsibilities to maintain and 29:01.227 --> 29:03.520 expand our competitive advantage . Us 29:03.530 --> 29:05.363 space com appreciates Congress's 29:05.363 --> 29:07.449 continued support as we ensure the 29:07.459 --> 29:09.520 delivery of space based capabilities 29:09.530 --> 29:11.520 and achieve our foundational moral 29:11.530 --> 29:13.910 responsibility to protect the joint 29:13.920 --> 29:16.439 force , the nation and our allies 29:16.449 --> 29:18.560 through all levels of competition and 29:18.560 --> 29:20.727 conflict . I have submitted my written 29:20.727 --> 29:22.782 statement for the record . Thank you 29:22.782 --> 29:24.949 and I look forward to your questions . 29:24.949 --> 29:27.479 Thank you . We will now go to questions 29:27.489 --> 29:30.160 from the panel uh uh from , from the 29:30.170 --> 29:32.989 committee General Collins . As I talked 29:33.000 --> 29:35.000 about in my opening statement , I'm 29:35.000 --> 29:37.056 very concerned about the glide phase 29:37.056 --> 29:39.056 interceptor last year . The program 29:39.056 --> 29:41.222 planned to continue development and to 29:41.222 --> 29:43.599 maintain competition between two 29:43.609 --> 29:45.609 industry teams for at least another 29:45.609 --> 29:48.530 five years . A preliminary design 29:48.540 --> 29:51.920 review or let's say PDR was planned for 29:51.930 --> 29:55.410 2029 with a potential down select 29:55.420 --> 29:58.729 decision following PDR . Now the 29:58.739 --> 30:00.906 program is planning to select a single 30:00.906 --> 30:03.569 contractor this year without the 30:03.579 --> 30:05.690 development activity to prove out new 30:05.690 --> 30:08.000 technologies and with a lot less 30:08.010 --> 30:11.050 information first , uh a general 30:11.060 --> 30:13.770 question , competition in a program 30:13.780 --> 30:16.209 reduces risk , drives innovation and 30:16.219 --> 30:18.459 helps ensure the government is getting 30:18.489 --> 30:20.711 a good value . Wouldn't you say that in 30:20.711 --> 30:22.767 general ? That is a fair statement . 30:22.780 --> 30:24.719 Yeah , Mr chairman uh as a career 30:24.729 --> 30:27.180 acquisition officer uh competition 30:27.189 --> 30:28.967 within uh within an acquisition 30:28.967 --> 30:31.599 strategy is uh does buy down risk , uh 30:32.410 --> 30:34.466 keeps uh both teams sharp throughout 30:34.466 --> 30:36.577 the uh acquisition and , and tends to 30:36.577 --> 30:38.354 it's a best practice within the 30:38.354 --> 30:40.688 department . Yes , sir . Ok , thank you . 30:40.688 --> 30:42.743 So , how concerned are you then that 30:42.743 --> 30:44.688 making a down select decision this 30:44.688 --> 30:47.510 early in the program will increase risk , 30:49.199 --> 30:51.366 sir ? That is uh that is a job that we 30:51.366 --> 30:53.588 uh will be attacking greatly . Now , uh 30:53.588 --> 30:55.643 with uh the decision uh that will be 30:55.643 --> 30:57.588 coming later this fiscal year . Uh 30:57.588 --> 30:59.643 There are other mechanisms to manage 30:59.643 --> 31:01.643 competition uh and risk uh within a 31:01.643 --> 31:04.449 program uh lower than the prime level . 31:04.640 --> 31:06.862 Uh We certainly will be looking forward 31:06.862 --> 31:09.040 to uh uh keeping the program on pace . 31:09.050 --> 31:12.180 And uh based on section 1666 look for 31:12.189 --> 31:14.479 opportunities uh to bring hypersonic 31:14.489 --> 31:16.699 capability to the fight uh much sooner 31:17.030 --> 31:19.252 uh with the GP I program as established 31:19.252 --> 31:22.329 today , working with our uh our soon uh 31:22.339 --> 31:24.450 international partner Japan , we will 31:24.450 --> 31:26.561 continue to look for opportunities uh 31:26.561 --> 31:29.619 to buy down that risk uh judiciously 31:29.729 --> 31:31.951 potentially with competition at a lower 31:31.951 --> 31:33.896 level within , at the component or 31:33.896 --> 31:37.449 subsystem level . OK . So let's dive a 31:37.459 --> 31:39.292 little bit more into that . What 31:39.292 --> 31:41.181 concrete steps and you've already 31:41.181 --> 31:44.449 alluded to some can we take to mitigate 31:44.459 --> 31:47.079 this risk or to give ourselves options 31:47.089 --> 31:49.579 if technology development doesn't go as 31:49.589 --> 31:52.050 planned ? Yes , sir . Much of this is 31:52.060 --> 31:54.930 uh as part of um a a as part of the 31:54.939 --> 31:57.250 decision to , to come with uh down 31:57.260 --> 31:59.149 selecting , we're in the midst of 31:59.149 --> 32:01.371 upgrading our acquisition strategy . Uh 32:01.371 --> 32:04.469 and uh finalizing the decision criteria 32:04.479 --> 32:06.701 for making this decision , part of that 32:06.701 --> 32:08.868 will be finalizing uh and , and taking 32:08.868 --> 32:11.035 a look at how to establish the program 32:11.180 --> 32:14.239 uh and uh going forward uh depending on 32:14.250 --> 32:16.810 the selection and the risks associated 32:16.819 --> 32:19.079 with that particular prime . Uh We will 32:19.089 --> 32:21.145 then have to take a look at with the 32:21.145 --> 32:23.359 prime . Uh the steps that would be 32:23.369 --> 32:25.770 taken , each prime has a different set 32:25.780 --> 32:27.780 of risks based on their designs and 32:27.780 --> 32:29.724 that we would have to specifically 32:29.724 --> 32:31.724 identify based on the decision , uh 32:31.724 --> 32:34.290 which one would drive what decisions 32:34.300 --> 32:36.633 and actions we would take going forward . 32:37.680 --> 32:40.910 Well , I , I still am concerned . I , I 32:40.920 --> 32:44.329 know that you'll do your best to play 32:44.339 --> 32:48.180 the um um hand of cards that you've 32:48.189 --> 32:50.670 been dealt , dealt , but I really am 32:50.680 --> 32:52.680 concerned about this . I just think 32:52.680 --> 32:54.791 we're taking on too much risk that we 32:54.791 --> 32:56.791 otherwise would be able to mitigate 32:57.020 --> 33:00.579 through continuing the competition uh 33:00.589 --> 33:03.989 more into the future . This leads to my 33:04.000 --> 33:06.222 next set of questions about the program 33:06.222 --> 33:08.333 schedule . Uh You would think that if 33:08.333 --> 33:10.780 the program had advanced sufficiently 33:11.109 --> 33:13.331 and technology is mature enough for the 33:13.331 --> 33:15.331 government to select a single prime 33:15.479 --> 33:17.599 contractor five years earlier than 33:17.609 --> 33:20.290 originally planned , that we would be 33:20.300 --> 33:22.078 in a position to accelerate the 33:22.078 --> 33:23.911 schedule , but it looks like the 33:23.920 --> 33:26.670 opposite is happening in last year's 33:26.680 --> 33:28.902 hearing your predecessor , Admiral Hill 33:28.902 --> 33:31.069 and I discussed the program's schedule 33:31.069 --> 33:34.469 and how delivering a capability in 2034 33:34.479 --> 33:36.930 was not adequate . He agreed and said , 33:36.939 --> 33:40.560 quote out of out in the mid thirties is 33:40.569 --> 33:42.869 almost irrelevant . We are not meeting 33:42.880 --> 33:46.020 the threat unquote , but this year's 33:46.030 --> 33:48.780 budget would add additional delay and 33:48.790 --> 33:50.790 now does not anticipate deploying a 33:50.790 --> 33:54.780 capability until 2035 . Do you share 33:54.790 --> 33:57.640 Admiral Hill's view that this makes it 33:57.650 --> 34:00.439 irrelevant to go more than 10 years 34:00.449 --> 34:03.520 into the future ? Sir ? I , I 34:03.530 --> 34:07.199 definitely agree with um waiting 11 34:07.209 --> 34:09.376 years to bring a hypersonic light face 34:09.376 --> 34:11.542 capability to the war fighter is uh is 34:11.760 --> 34:14.600 uh is too long and am looking into 34:14.610 --> 34:17.330 options within the GP I program and 34:17.340 --> 34:19.739 other options uh that could bring an 34:19.750 --> 34:22.159 interim capability sooner . Uh We do 34:22.169 --> 34:24.225 have a requirement to , to come back 34:24.225 --> 34:26.391 with those options to uh to you and we 34:26.391 --> 34:28.613 are working through that uh in a report 34:28.613 --> 34:30.800 uh will be provided uh by September 34:30.810 --> 34:32.699 that goes through those different 34:32.699 --> 34:34.699 options spaces both within the GP I 34:34.699 --> 34:36.810 program and , and , and , and broader 34:36.810 --> 34:38.477 across uh the missile defense 34:38.477 --> 34:40.919 enterprise to try to get any capability 34:40.929 --> 34:42.929 we can out of the weapon systems we 34:42.929 --> 34:45.159 have uh and also into the future with , 34:45.169 --> 34:49.000 with the GP I program . Um What can 34:49.010 --> 34:51.979 you tell us in this setting of for the 34:51.989 --> 34:55.540 record that um that you would do 34:55.550 --> 34:57.661 specifically , you already alluded to 34:57.661 --> 35:00.449 the intention to try to accelerate some 35:00.459 --> 35:04.010 things . But what are concrete steps 35:04.020 --> 35:06.189 that you're gonna be able to take or 35:06.199 --> 35:08.540 plan to take . Yes , sir . Uh right off 35:08.550 --> 35:10.550 the bat , one is , is we've engaged 35:10.550 --> 35:12.772 with both of our primes uh that we have 35:12.772 --> 35:14.661 on the GP I program today , uh to 35:14.661 --> 35:17.639 identify opportunities that they uh see 35:17.649 --> 35:19.871 within their industry , space and their 35:19.871 --> 35:22.959 broader enterprises uh to come up with 35:22.969 --> 35:25.080 acceleration options that we could be 35:25.080 --> 35:27.191 taking uh within the program , within 35:27.191 --> 35:29.520 the GP I program . Uh Otherwise I'm 35:29.530 --> 35:31.530 also looking across at other weapon 35:31.530 --> 35:34.129 systems that we have uh in place today 35:34.340 --> 35:37.449 uh to understand what if any residual 35:37.459 --> 35:40.570 capability they may have and or what 35:40.580 --> 35:43.169 potential uh developments , smaller 35:43.179 --> 35:45.401 developments could we take within those 35:45.401 --> 35:47.512 other weapon systems that could bring 35:47.512 --> 35:49.679 some type of resid residual capability 35:49.679 --> 35:52.012 or interim capability to the fight ? Ok . 35:52.012 --> 35:54.123 Thank you all in my questions there . 35:54.123 --> 35:56.068 But I'll just quickly summarize my 35:56.068 --> 35:59.030 concerns this budget as proposed cuts , 35:59.040 --> 36:01.260 the funding delays the schedule and 36:01.270 --> 36:03.580 adds risk to the acquisition approach . 36:04.020 --> 36:06.020 I understand that it'll save some 36:06.030 --> 36:08.500 dollars and is cheaper , but I'm just 36:08.510 --> 36:11.139 not sure it'll even lead to success in 36:11.149 --> 36:13.205 the long run , much less address the 36:13.205 --> 36:15.482 threats in the meantime . Uh With that , 36:15.482 --> 36:17.538 I turn to the ranking member for any 36:17.538 --> 36:19.649 questions he might have . Thank you , 36:19.649 --> 36:19.580 Mr Chairman . I certainly share some of 36:19.590 --> 36:22.649 these same concerns . Uh Lieutenant 36:22.659 --> 36:26.280 John Con Lockheed's F-35 and Northrop 36:26.300 --> 36:28.870 Grumman Sentinel are two examples of 36:28.879 --> 36:30.768 programs that currently have zero 36:30.768 --> 36:33.409 competition and are grossly over budget 36:33.659 --> 36:37.060 and grossly behind schedule . Now , you 36:37.070 --> 36:39.348 have extensive acquisitions experience . 36:39.348 --> 36:41.403 Can you cite an example of a program 36:41.403 --> 36:43.570 that benefited from down selecting and 36:43.570 --> 36:45.570 reducing competition early when has 36:45.570 --> 36:47.792 such a reduction in competition fielded 36:47.792 --> 36:49.681 a better technology faster and it 36:49.681 --> 36:53.600 reduced costs . Ranking member 36:53.610 --> 36:55.832 Moulton . Thank you for that question . 36:55.832 --> 36:59.830 Um Well , I think 36:59.840 --> 37:02.669 the silence speaks volumes . Uh Let's 37:02.679 --> 37:04.512 move on Mr Hill . The department 37:04.512 --> 37:06.346 indicated to this committee that 37:06.346 --> 37:08.512 cancellation of the SM three block one 37:08.512 --> 37:10.889 B was done in part to purchase more SM 37:10.899 --> 37:13.949 three block two A S . We will set aside 37:13.959 --> 37:16.181 that there are no additional two A s in 37:16.181 --> 37:18.237 this budget request and focus on the 37:18.237 --> 37:20.459 policy issues I've continued to raise . 37:20.459 --> 37:22.459 Is it accurate to say that SM three 37:22.459 --> 37:24.292 block one B is solely a regional 37:24.292 --> 37:25.626 missile defense asset . 37:27.919 --> 37:31.010 SM three block one B is for regional 37:31.020 --> 37:33.340 missile defense . It's medium range . 37:33.860 --> 37:35.804 Is it also accurate to say that SM 37:35.804 --> 37:37.860 three block two A has been proven to 37:37.860 --> 37:39.916 intercept an ICBM range threat , the 37:39.916 --> 37:42.027 type of threat designed to be handled 37:42.027 --> 37:44.193 by the ground based mid course defense 37:44.193 --> 37:47.510 system , I believe from a kinematic 37:47.520 --> 37:49.631 perspective has been shown to be able 37:49.639 --> 37:53.590 to intercept at that beginning edge , 37:53.820 --> 37:56.790 but it's the operational concepts for 37:56.800 --> 37:58.800 it or as a regional missile defense 37:58.800 --> 38:01.078 missile , it's mostly for medium range , 38:01.078 --> 38:03.300 right ? But I'm just asking about it to 38:03.300 --> 38:05.522 a building , I believe as a as a test , 38:05.522 --> 38:07.689 there was a test that was , was done . 38:07.689 --> 38:09.856 That's a very long way of saying yes . 38:09.856 --> 38:12.022 So my question is , was there a policy 38:12.022 --> 38:14.399 evaluation done on how our adversaries 38:14.409 --> 38:16.409 to include China , Russia and North 38:16.409 --> 38:18.242 Korea would respond to a further 38:18.242 --> 38:20.790 increase of SM three block two A s 38:20.800 --> 38:22.578 which have capability against a 38:22.578 --> 38:25.810 strategic missile in lieu of the one B 38:25.820 --> 38:29.330 variant , which does not . Yeah , that 38:29.340 --> 38:31.673 that was done before my time doing this . 38:31.673 --> 38:34.679 But I I think the um can the 38:36.060 --> 38:38.770 implications of the SM 32 A which 38:38.780 --> 38:40.947 you're talking about being deployed in 38:40.947 --> 38:43.058 fleets at different places around the 38:43.058 --> 38:45.679 world ? Uh is , is not something that 38:45.689 --> 38:49.629 should logically cause China or 38:49.639 --> 38:52.010 Russia to have any concerns from a 38:52.020 --> 38:54.298 strategic stability perspective . Well , 38:54.298 --> 38:56.520 if you could provide that report to the 38:56.520 --> 38:58.353 committee would be , it would be 38:58.353 --> 39:00.353 helpful . Uh But you said there was 39:00.353 --> 39:02.520 some analysis done . No uh the , the , 39:02.520 --> 39:04.576 the decision , the decision and that 39:04.576 --> 39:06.798 test was before I was doing the missile 39:06.798 --> 39:08.909 defense business . So I can look into 39:08.909 --> 39:11.187 the history of what was was done there . 39:11.187 --> 39:10.979 Well , look , the point is that what 39:10.989 --> 39:13.360 matters here for strategic stability is 39:13.370 --> 39:15.370 not just what we think is perfectly 39:15.370 --> 39:17.426 logical , but what our enemies think 39:17.426 --> 39:19.259 and we have to consider these uh 39:19.259 --> 39:21.129 concerns when we're making these 39:21.139 --> 39:24.870 budgetary decisions . I think um 39:25.070 --> 39:27.292 you know , SM three block two ways have 39:27.292 --> 39:29.292 an important role . But the con the 39:29.292 --> 39:31.403 quantities we're currently buying are 39:31.403 --> 39:33.570 about a third of what was intended for 39:33.570 --> 39:35.737 the one B . And if we suddenly reverse 39:35.737 --> 39:37.792 that in triple R two A by , we could 39:37.792 --> 39:39.903 very well embolden our adversaries to 39:39.903 --> 39:41.903 further proliferate and advance our 39:41.903 --> 39:41.719 technology in a way that not only makes 39:41.729 --> 39:43.896 our regional defense posture weaker at 39:43.979 --> 39:46.260 a time where regional missile defense 39:46.270 --> 39:49.439 is of prime importance but also impacts 39:49.449 --> 39:51.699 strate stability at their strategic 39:51.709 --> 39:53.909 level . I also get the sense that this 39:53.919 --> 39:56.270 decision was not thought through on an 39:56.280 --> 39:58.502 operational business . I mean , General 39:58.502 --> 40:00.558 Collins , from your perspective is a 40:00.558 --> 40:02.336 future navy fleet equipped with 40:02.336 --> 40:04.502 primarily SM six interceptors and some 40:04.502 --> 40:08.449 SM 3-2 a interceptors consistent 40:08.459 --> 40:10.570 with the direction you see the threat 40:10.570 --> 40:11.030 going , 40:14.459 --> 40:16.860 sir . Uh Thank you member Malton . Good 40:16.870 --> 40:19.037 question . I , what I would take is uh 40:19.037 --> 40:21.203 I would be concerned with the capacity 40:21.203 --> 40:23.370 uh of capabilities that are in a fleet 40:23.370 --> 40:25.314 uh and our ability to support with 40:25.314 --> 40:27.481 enough uh two ways moving forward . Uh 40:27.481 --> 40:29.592 given uh the capacity that we take uh 40:29.592 --> 40:31.870 from that production line today . Well , 40:31.870 --> 40:33.969 uh we obviously share those uh their 40:33.979 --> 40:36.469 show , share those concerns . Um John 40:36.540 --> 40:39.120 Holmes has MD A completed analysis of 40:39.129 --> 40:41.129 the impacts on this decision on its 40:41.129 --> 40:43.073 ability to support and sustain the 40:43.073 --> 40:45.185 current inventory of one B's meet the 40:45.185 --> 40:47.800 needs of allies and support the navy's 40:47.810 --> 40:49.939 requirements . Has that analysis been 40:49.949 --> 40:52.171 completed ? Sir ? We have not completed 40:52.171 --> 40:55.739 that analysis . We are uh we had been 40:55.750 --> 40:57.850 waiting for the 24 appropriation to 40:57.860 --> 41:00.129 understand uh the about the the amount 41:00.139 --> 41:02.250 of money we were gonna get within the 41:02.250 --> 41:04.472 SM 31 B line to support the negotiation 41:04.472 --> 41:06.919 for an additional lot uh of one BS uh 41:06.929 --> 41:09.520 that work is going on currently today . 41:09.709 --> 41:12.149 Uh to understand the impact to both the 41:12.159 --> 41:14.969 one B final lot , as well as the future 41:14.979 --> 41:18.129 of the two way line . Uh All of that to 41:18.139 --> 41:20.469 inform uh what type of sparing would we 41:20.479 --> 41:23.350 require uh within the one B line uh to 41:23.360 --> 41:26.020 support the life cycle of one BS . Well , 41:26.030 --> 41:28.030 I think to quickly summarize as the 41:28.030 --> 41:29.919 chairman did , uh we both share a 41:29.919 --> 41:32.030 concern about the lack of competition 41:32.030 --> 41:34.649 uh that seemed to be echoed by uh your 41:34.659 --> 41:37.739 silence . Uh We both uh share a concern 41:37.750 --> 41:40.239 about simply the magazine capacity that 41:40.250 --> 41:42.860 we have . If we're uh reducing the 41:42.870 --> 41:44.926 number of regional defense assets we 41:44.926 --> 41:47.439 have at a time when we're using them uh 41:47.449 --> 41:49.919 quite regularly . And I have additional 41:49.929 --> 41:52.096 concerns about what this all means for 41:52.096 --> 41:54.318 strategic stability that it just sounds 41:54.318 --> 41:56.540 like have not been ana analyzed or even 41:56.540 --> 41:58.790 considered carefully . Uh So we have a 41:58.800 --> 42:00.820 lot of questions and um and , and I 42:00.830 --> 42:02.886 think that's , that's important . Uh 42:02.886 --> 42:04.941 Just one final question , Lieutenant 42:04.941 --> 42:07.163 General columns . There have been a lot 42:07.163 --> 42:06.850 of discussions from the subcomittee and 42:06.860 --> 42:08.804 the about the potential need for a 42:08.804 --> 42:11.550 third Conus interceptor site has J rock 42:11.560 --> 42:13.782 validated any sort of requirement for a 42:13.782 --> 42:15.727 third site . No , sir . There's no 42:15.727 --> 42:18.030 requirement if they were to validate 42:18.040 --> 42:20.262 such a requirement is the location that 42:20.262 --> 42:22.318 was looked at almost 10 years ago at 42:22.318 --> 42:24.373 this point still , where you believe 42:24.373 --> 42:26.540 that third site site should be located 42:26.540 --> 42:28.707 as the last study explicitly indicated 42:28.707 --> 42:30.873 that MD A would need to re look at the 42:30.873 --> 42:32.984 analysis prior to moving forward with 42:32.984 --> 42:35.040 any sort of program . Once you had a 42:35.040 --> 42:37.373 requirement , sir , that's correct . We , 42:37.373 --> 42:38.984 we would take a look as if a 42:38.984 --> 42:41.096 requirement for an East coast site uh 42:41.096 --> 42:43.096 was identified as a requirement and 42:43.096 --> 42:45.280 validated . Uh as mentioned , when the 42:45.290 --> 42:47.512 final report came out , we would take a 42:47.512 --> 42:49.346 look at the current threat , the 42:49.346 --> 42:51.512 current performance of the system , uh 42:51.512 --> 42:51.379 the current state of affairs to assess 42:51.389 --> 42:53.556 and evaluate uh what that optimal site 42:53.556 --> 42:55.778 would be , right ? So just to summarize 42:55.778 --> 42:57.889 uh as of right now , you don't need a 42:57.889 --> 43:00.111 cert third site . If you were to need a 43:00.111 --> 42:59.790 third site , you wouldn't just go with 42:59.800 --> 43:01.800 what was selected uh 10 years ago . 43:01.800 --> 43:04.133 You'd do another analysis . And Mr Hill , 43:04.133 --> 43:06.356 I would just add , I hope that we would 43:06.356 --> 43:08.522 uh uh per my questions about strategic 43:08.522 --> 43:10.744 stability , look at the implications of 43:10.744 --> 43:12.856 a third site uh on the , the views of 43:12.856 --> 43:15.070 our adversaries that , that that's 43:15.080 --> 43:17.136 correct . The , the focus on a third 43:17.136 --> 43:19.302 site would be the things we're already 43:19.302 --> 43:21.524 investing in rather than a third site . 43:21.524 --> 43:23.580 Thank you , Mr Chairman Eldo . Thank 43:23.580 --> 43:25.413 you uh Representative Desjarlais 43:25.729 --> 43:27.870 General Collins . Uh Hypersonics have 43:27.879 --> 43:30.101 completely upended our prior conception 43:30.101 --> 43:32.268 of the global missile threat landscape 43:32.268 --> 43:34.510 with our ability to evade uh our legacy 43:34.520 --> 43:36.742 detection systems . And we are now in a 43:36.742 --> 43:38.853 position where we're playing catch up 43:38.853 --> 43:40.742 both in our ability to detect and 43:40.742 --> 43:42.853 defeat these novel capabilities . Can 43:42.853 --> 43:45.020 you update our committee on how you're 43:45.020 --> 43:47.020 addressing the issue of detection ? 43:47.020 --> 43:48.853 First with the capabilities like 43:48.853 --> 43:51.076 hypersonic and ballistic tracking space 43:51.076 --> 43:53.076 sensor satellites ? And how are you 43:53.076 --> 43:55.131 collaborating with SD A on these and 43:55.131 --> 43:57.298 other efforts pertaining to hypersonic 43:57.298 --> 43:58.964 missile defense ? Thank you , 43:58.964 --> 44:00.853 Congressman for the question . Uh 44:00.853 --> 44:03.076 Hypersonic missile defense is certainly 44:03.076 --> 44:05.242 a , a key focus of the missile defense 44:05.242 --> 44:07.353 agency in protecting our war fighters 44:07.353 --> 44:09.100 uh as we move forward . Uh The 44:09.110 --> 44:11.110 hypersonic ballistic tracking Space 44:11.110 --> 44:13.332 Center that I I mentioned in my opening 44:13.332 --> 44:15.499 statement and , and you just mentioned 44:15.499 --> 44:17.166 uh that is a prototype set of 44:17.166 --> 44:19.277 satellites to demonstrate our ability 44:19.277 --> 44:21.499 and the technology to from space detect 44:21.499 --> 44:23.610 track and close the fire control loop 44:23.610 --> 44:25.721 against a hypersonic threat to take a 44:25.721 --> 44:27.879 hypersonic threat and track it 44:27.979 --> 44:30.330 throughout its entire uh launch from uh 44:30.340 --> 44:32.284 from launch to , to intercept . Uh 44:32.290 --> 44:35.840 That's a key uh aspect of our future 44:35.850 --> 44:39.199 ability to main to detect uh and 44:39.209 --> 44:41.431 eventually intercept hypersonic weapons 44:41.431 --> 44:43.765 anywhere on the planet uh in the future . 44:43.790 --> 44:45.901 Uh to get there , we have worked very 44:45.901 --> 44:47.846 closely with the Space Development 44:47.846 --> 44:49.512 Agency . Uh They would be the 44:49.512 --> 44:51.679 operational transition agent for us to 44:51.679 --> 44:54.810 take uh H BT SS and include it within 44:54.820 --> 44:56.876 the future proliferated war fighting 44:56.876 --> 44:58.931 space architecture . Uh We have been 44:58.931 --> 45:00.931 working very closely with them . Uh 45:00.931 --> 45:03.153 Also the space war fighter war fighting 45:03.153 --> 45:05.264 uh Analysis center , the sw a part of 45:05.264 --> 45:07.431 the space force , we have been working 45:07.431 --> 45:09.598 with them to ensure that our long term 45:09.598 --> 45:11.764 fire control requirements are included 45:11.764 --> 45:13.876 within the force design of any future 45:13.876 --> 45:15.987 space architecture . And so , uh with 45:15.987 --> 45:18.098 those relationships with within space 45:18.098 --> 45:20.610 force , uh we are ready uh when we 45:20.620 --> 45:22.731 complete the demonstration later this 45:22.731 --> 45:25.489 year , uh to transition into uh the 45:25.500 --> 45:27.278 proliferated war fighting space 45:27.278 --> 45:29.444 architecture tracking layer to pick up 45:29.444 --> 45:31.667 on the hypersonic fire control tracking 45:31.667 --> 45:33.889 requirements for missile defense agency 45:34.080 --> 45:36.149 um on the glide phase interceptor . 45:36.159 --> 45:39.290 Where are we at ? Yes , sir . We have 45:39.300 --> 45:42.580 two primes uh awarded uh on uh other 45:42.590 --> 45:44.701 transaction authority agreements . Uh 45:44.701 --> 45:47.860 And both are proceeding uh post system 45:47.870 --> 45:50.860 requirements review uh and working to 45:50.870 --> 45:52.870 uh finalize designs as well as tech 45:52.870 --> 45:55.580 maturation uh for each of their designs . 45:55.590 --> 45:58.100 Uh There's a num uh uh a good amount of 45:58.110 --> 46:00.221 tech maturation of the design and the 46:00.221 --> 46:01.943 integration of the system that 46:01.943 --> 46:03.999 everything worked on . Ok . Uh Is an 46:03.999 --> 46:05.999 acceleration research on hypersonic 46:05.999 --> 46:08.110 defense options necessary . And is it 46:08.110 --> 46:11.560 technologically feasible sir ? It , we 46:11.570 --> 46:14.020 believe hypersonic defense is feasible . 46:14.030 --> 46:17.479 Um The uh we , we have today a terminal 46:17.489 --> 46:20.840 case uh uh ability capability to to 46:20.850 --> 46:23.419 intercept hypersonic threats uh within 46:23.429 --> 46:25.800 the SM six C based terminal capability 46:25.909 --> 46:28.076 uh within the AEGIS weapon system . So 46:28.076 --> 46:31.040 we are already uh fielded uh capability 46:31.050 --> 46:32.828 to intercept hypersonics in the 46:32.828 --> 46:34.494 terminal phase uh glide phase 46:34.494 --> 46:37.060 interceptor . We've identified uh the 46:37.070 --> 46:39.292 uh the technology areas that need to be 46:39.292 --> 46:41.514 matured within that program to do glide 46:41.514 --> 46:43.737 phase intercept farther away from the , 46:43.737 --> 46:45.792 from the intended target . Uh And we 46:45.792 --> 46:48.014 are in the midst of burning down all of 46:48.014 --> 46:50.126 those technologies to be able to feel 46:50.126 --> 46:49.889 this capability . So yes , we , we 46:49.899 --> 46:52.989 believe that technology exists uh with 46:53.000 --> 46:55.111 some maturation to come . But we , we 46:55.111 --> 46:56.944 do believe hypersonic glad phase 46:56.944 --> 46:59.459 intercept capabilities is feasible . Mr 46:59.469 --> 47:01.636 Hill . What is the department's policy 47:01.636 --> 47:03.525 on how the US will address nearer 47:03.525 --> 47:07.500 hypersonic threats to the homeland ? Uh 47:07.510 --> 47:09.510 As General Collins just described , 47:09.510 --> 47:11.621 we're investing in capabilities uh as 47:11.621 --> 47:14.340 Congress directed , we um uh created uh 47:14.350 --> 47:16.500 we designated the uh Secretary of the 47:16.510 --> 47:19.290 Air Force for uh leading the cruise 47:19.300 --> 47:21.979 missile defense of the homeland um 47:21.989 --> 47:24.010 project and of course glide phase 47:24.020 --> 47:26.187 interceptors , many of them are cruise 47:26.187 --> 47:29.100 missiles . Uh So we will , we will 47:29.110 --> 47:31.277 defend them against that . Recognizing 47:31.277 --> 47:33.443 that in many cases , this is something 47:33.443 --> 47:35.989 that an adversary is using and 47:36.000 --> 47:39.280 developing not in the context of a 47:39.290 --> 47:41.969 nuclear strike , but in the context of 47:41.979 --> 47:44.035 potentially defeating our ability to 47:44.035 --> 47:46.250 respond . We want to demonstrate that 47:46.260 --> 47:48.820 now we have the ability to follow up on 47:48.830 --> 47:50.830 the commitments we've made and that 47:50.830 --> 47:52.497 means we will defend critical 47:52.497 --> 47:54.608 infrastructure in the United States . 47:54.608 --> 47:57.649 Thank you . Thank you , Representative 47:57.659 --> 48:00.020 Norcross . Thank you , Chairman Ranking 48:00.030 --> 48:02.250 matter for today's hearing and 48:02.260 --> 48:05.260 certainly the witnesses . Uh We've had 48:05.270 --> 48:07.381 another number of discussions on this 48:07.381 --> 48:10.350 committee that talked about the ability 48:10.360 --> 48:13.530 to produce the weapons , we need the 48:13.540 --> 48:16.030 interceptors and quite frankly the 48:16.040 --> 48:19.600 entire uh industrial base , Mr Hill . 48:19.610 --> 48:21.832 Today , you talked about the investment 48:21.832 --> 48:25.790 in that industrial base . So just for 48:25.800 --> 48:28.909 the sake of an argument , let's assume 48:28.919 --> 48:31.030 we have the technical expertise to 48:31.040 --> 48:33.370 design and build and we might be able 48:33.379 --> 48:35.939 to build a prototype when you look 48:35.949 --> 48:38.510 across the US missile industrial base 48:39.149 --> 48:41.669 and the workforce . Uh Are you 48:41.679 --> 48:45.489 comfortable with where we are in 48:45.500 --> 48:47.570 terms of being able to produce the 48:47.580 --> 48:49.524 numbers that we're talking about ? 48:52.310 --> 48:55.250 I think uh Mike , I am concerned that 48:55.260 --> 48:58.590 we have taken a bit of a holiday and 48:58.600 --> 49:00.822 that we're playing some catch up here . 49:00.822 --> 49:03.010 I am concerned that we have an 49:03.020 --> 49:06.879 adversary in Russia that is on a 49:06.889 --> 49:09.850 war footing in Ukraine and we and our 49:09.860 --> 49:12.870 allies in Europe all need to look more 49:12.879 --> 49:14.712 carefully at the investments and 49:14.712 --> 49:17.979 improve our abilities to replenish when 49:17.989 --> 49:21.699 we draw down munitions and other key 49:21.709 --> 49:23.830 systems . So you talked about the 49:23.840 --> 49:25.850 investment in the industrial base . 49:25.860 --> 49:28.129 What specifically would you point to 49:28.139 --> 49:31.389 that in this budget that is actually 49:31.399 --> 49:33.177 going to mitigate some of those 49:33.177 --> 49:35.379 concerns ? Yeah , I think it's there 49:35.389 --> 49:38.110 are um focused particularly on 49:38.120 --> 49:40.379 munitions area and , and expanding 49:40.389 --> 49:44.340 capacity . Uh And , and some of that is 49:44.350 --> 49:46.406 a function of when you're , when you 49:46.406 --> 49:48.572 are buying in larger quantities . When 49:48.572 --> 49:50.739 you're buying with using the authority 49:50.739 --> 49:52.961 that the committee has given us to have 49:52.961 --> 49:54.961 multi year procurement . Now you're 49:54.961 --> 49:57.183 creating an environment in which you're 49:57.183 --> 49:56.510 not just relying on the government's 49:56.520 --> 49:58.687 money , but companies are also willing 49:58.687 --> 50:00.909 to put their money into expanding their 50:00.909 --> 50:03.131 capacity . Those are . So , what are we 50:03.131 --> 50:05.298 doing to address that ? Exactly . What 50:05.298 --> 50:07.520 signals are we sending ? Industry ? And 50:07.520 --> 50:09.939 I'm very familiar with the much of the 50:09.949 --> 50:11.893 ammunition , what we're doing over 50:11.893 --> 50:14.005 there . I'm more concerned , at least 50:14.005 --> 50:15.727 at this hearing at our missile 50:15.727 --> 50:17.838 industrial base . Uh , when you start 50:17.838 --> 50:19.560 talking about investing in our 50:19.560 --> 50:21.671 workforce , what does that mean ? You 50:21.671 --> 50:23.505 can send a signal ? But unless a 50:23.505 --> 50:25.505 contract follows it , it's a hollow 50:25.505 --> 50:29.219 signal , right ? It's the the 50:29.229 --> 50:31.562 contract following . It is gonna be the , 50:31.562 --> 50:33.285 the question of the rec source 50:33.285 --> 50:35.899 allocations in finite budgets . Uh This 50:35.909 --> 50:37.965 is , this is the question that we've 50:37.965 --> 50:40.459 been at discussing earlier today about 50:40.760 --> 50:44.080 uh how many are we acquiring ? Uh Well , 50:44.580 --> 50:46.524 I'm not trying to pin you . Well , 50:46.524 --> 50:48.469 actually I am pin you down because 50:48.469 --> 50:50.469 we're doing this to address exactly 50:50.469 --> 50:52.524 what we're talking about and , and I 50:52.524 --> 50:54.691 get , we make the decision and all the 50:54.691 --> 50:56.913 complexities in dealing with that . And 50:56.913 --> 50:58.969 then we say we need it yesterday and 50:58.969 --> 51:01.191 that , that's historically what we do . 51:01.191 --> 51:03.302 And if we look at some of the numbers 51:03.302 --> 51:03.300 that we're requesting and particularly 51:03.550 --> 51:05.717 uh Mr Moulton and what he was saying , 51:05.830 --> 51:07.830 even if you change your mind , they 51:07.830 --> 51:10.129 cannot ramp up in time . So when we 51:10.139 --> 51:13.159 start looking towards investing in that 51:13.169 --> 51:15.280 industrial base , we have to send the 51:15.280 --> 51:17.469 signals that are true to industry and 51:17.479 --> 51:19.368 we have to build it ahead of time 51:19.368 --> 51:21.810 because the longest lead item is not a 51:21.820 --> 51:24.770 piece of material . It's a human and 51:24.780 --> 51:27.489 that is why I continue to bring this up 51:27.620 --> 51:30.250 uh meeting after meeting . But uh with 51:30.260 --> 51:32.489 that , uh I will yield back to the 51:32.500 --> 51:34.444 chairman . Thank you . Thank you , 51:34.444 --> 51:36.722 Representative uh Representative Bacon . 51:37.010 --> 51:38.899 Thank you Mr Chairman . Thank you 51:38.899 --> 51:40.954 gentlemen for being here . Could you 51:40.954 --> 51:42.843 help me understand why the budget 51:42.843 --> 51:44.954 overall budget numbers have gone down 51:44.954 --> 51:47.010 significantly for missile defense in 51:47.010 --> 51:49.177 the upcoming budget versus what we did 51:49.177 --> 51:51.288 last year ? That's what it appears to 51:51.288 --> 51:53.399 me . Is it because of the budget caps 51:53.399 --> 51:55.566 or maybe there's other priorities ? So 51:55.566 --> 51:57.788 I just trying to , trying to understand 51:57.788 --> 51:59.677 that . Sure , I'll , I'll start . 51:59.677 --> 52:01.843 Definitely , the Fiscal Responsibility 52:01.843 --> 52:04.010 Act did set a ceiling . We had to work 52:04.010 --> 52:06.121 within that ceiling . You had uh must 52:06.121 --> 52:08.177 pay bills , payroll increases health 52:08.177 --> 52:10.288 care programs , child support . A lot 52:10.288 --> 52:12.177 of those things that go on in the 52:12.177 --> 52:14.232 defense department . And uh then you 52:14.232 --> 52:16.454 find you're having to make some choices 52:16.454 --> 52:18.566 in your end game , my readiness today 52:18.566 --> 52:20.399 for the things I'm working on my 52:20.399 --> 52:22.969 investment for the future . Um Not easy 52:22.979 --> 52:25.229 choices , the general environment . I 52:25.280 --> 52:27.224 think it's something for the armed 52:27.224 --> 52:29.447 Services committee to maybe review . It 52:29.447 --> 52:31.558 seems like missile defense is an area 52:31.558 --> 52:31.179 that we do not want to be cutting . I 52:31.189 --> 52:33.300 mean , I know the budget's going up a 52:33.300 --> 52:35.411 little bit , but I was just surprised 52:35.411 --> 52:37.522 to see the amount of the cut going on 52:37.522 --> 52:39.856 for missile defense . A second question . 52:39.856 --> 52:39.050 I'm not sure who's appropriate for us 52:39.060 --> 52:41.219 to ask this to . It's concerning when 52:41.229 --> 52:43.340 you see the bases , particularly like 52:43.340 --> 52:46.229 Iraq being repeatedly hit out of , from 52:46.239 --> 52:48.461 Iran . What could we be doing better to 52:48.461 --> 52:50.729 protect our forward bases uh from this 52:50.739 --> 52:53.959 or what are we not doing ? I know this 52:53.969 --> 52:56.191 could be a theater commander's question 52:56.191 --> 52:58.080 too , but , uh , you have a great 52:58.080 --> 53:00.247 insight , congressman . Uh Thank you , 53:00.247 --> 53:02.469 I'll , I'll take that question . And uh 53:02.469 --> 53:04.525 in my current role in previous roles 53:04.525 --> 53:06.636 specifically is the army is providing 53:06.636 --> 53:09.360 the preponderance of uh missile defense 53:09.370 --> 53:12.000 and counter us defense uh for those 53:12.010 --> 53:15.989 bases for uh again , uh continuing to 53:16.209 --> 53:19.709 add funding for the Ford War fighter to 53:19.719 --> 53:21.663 employ capabilities . Uh You heard 53:21.663 --> 53:23.889 General Ka advocate for the additional 53:23.899 --> 53:25.677 funding that he's requested for 53:25.677 --> 53:27.843 additional counter us capability uh to 53:27.843 --> 53:29.843 proliferate across all of our bases 53:29.843 --> 53:32.066 forward . We do have capability there . 53:32.066 --> 53:34.320 Now , that is uh proven successful . We 53:34.330 --> 53:37.120 are putting in uh technology and 53:37.129 --> 53:40.270 directed energy uh And uh also other 53:40.280 --> 53:42.447 type of kinetic systems and continuing 53:42.447 --> 53:44.613 funding of those systems will allow us 53:44.613 --> 53:47.350 to put in volume additional capability 53:47.360 --> 53:50.800 on those bases . Thank you . It's 53:50.810 --> 53:53.479 alarming to see the amount of targeting 53:53.489 --> 53:55.719 Iran's doing at our bases in Iraq and 53:55.790 --> 53:57.623 it seems like we should be doing 53:57.623 --> 53:59.679 everything we can to protect against 53:59.679 --> 54:01.846 that . Now , in the last nd A , we put 54:01.846 --> 54:03.901 some missile defense measures in for 54:03.901 --> 54:06.123 Kurdistan . Uh how will that look , you 54:06.123 --> 54:08.123 think ? Or how , how will that be a 54:08.123 --> 54:10.068 hard challenge for you all to , to 54:10.068 --> 54:13.919 accomplish ? Uh 54:14.290 --> 54:16.401 There was a provision that helped the 54:16.401 --> 54:18.512 Kurds get missile defense in the last 54:18.512 --> 54:20.568 nd A . Yeah , I'm sorry , I actually 54:20.568 --> 54:22.939 heard Kyrgyzstan but the Kurdistan 54:23.229 --> 54:25.340 Kurdistan . No , that's just , that's 54:25.340 --> 54:27.062 just my , my , my hearing . Um 54:27.270 --> 54:29.381 Absolutely . Support , support to the 54:29.381 --> 54:31.548 Kurds have been part of this balancing 54:31.548 --> 54:34.550 that um relationship , their relations 54:34.560 --> 54:36.782 in the region is also uh part of that , 54:36.782 --> 54:39.040 that question , one of the other to add 54:39.050 --> 54:41.328 to some general gay's comments as well . 54:41.328 --> 54:44.340 We have also uh in the Red Sea context , 54:44.350 --> 54:46.810 obviously struck back at some of those 54:46.820 --> 54:49.290 sites where some of these uh Iran 54:49.300 --> 54:51.300 aligned mission groups , uh militia 54:51.300 --> 54:53.860 groups operate the Houthis , uh most 54:53.870 --> 54:57.209 notably . And uh that is an 54:57.219 --> 55:00.070 essential complement to the , the force 55:00.080 --> 55:01.858 protection that missile defense 55:01.858 --> 55:04.260 provides . Thank you 11 last question 55:04.270 --> 55:06.500 for General Gy , if I may , we've been 55:06.510 --> 55:08.510 reading some reports of fatigue and 55:08.510 --> 55:10.621 burnout because of the high ops tempo 55:10.621 --> 55:12.732 uh for your service , men and women . 55:12.732 --> 55:14.954 Uh What can we do to help mitigate that 55:16.110 --> 55:18.429 the army has taken a holistic look and , 55:18.439 --> 55:20.550 and as you heard me earlier highlight 55:20.550 --> 55:23.320 the significant strain uh on the force . 55:23.330 --> 55:25.860 But what I will tell you is , I'm 55:25.870 --> 55:28.020 amazed at how those soldiers continue 55:28.030 --> 55:30.540 to respond uh and continue to maintain 55:30.550 --> 55:32.520 a positive attitude and high re 55:32.560 --> 55:35.219 enlistment rate . Uh moving forward . 55:35.229 --> 55:39.100 Uh As the army looks to get after , 55:39.110 --> 55:41.221 how do we improve the quality of life 55:41.221 --> 55:43.860 and improve the uh optempo goes to our 55:43.870 --> 55:46.550 modernization efforts in continuing 55:46.560 --> 55:48.100 supportive funding for our 55:48.110 --> 55:51.120 modernization efforts . Because patriot 55:51.129 --> 55:53.449 system is the most deployed system 55:53.459 --> 55:56.120 because it is our workhorse system . As 55:56.129 --> 55:58.239 we modernize with integrated battle 55:58.250 --> 56:01.550 command system . As the core uh point 56:01.560 --> 56:03.727 inside of that modernization , we will 56:03.727 --> 56:05.560 then integrate several different 56:05.560 --> 56:07.616 factors and capability that provides 56:07.616 --> 56:09.449 the range of capabilities across 56:09.449 --> 56:11.560 several threats . So you'll no longer 56:11.560 --> 56:13.727 have to deploy just a patriot batter . 56:13.727 --> 56:15.782 You can now deploy several different 56:15.782 --> 56:17.782 components and the army's growth of 56:17.782 --> 56:19.893 that capability . Uh In the last hour 56:19.893 --> 56:21.671 struck will also add additional 56:21.671 --> 56:23.727 capacity so that will help uh moving 56:23.727 --> 56:25.893 forward . Well , we appreciate the men 56:25.893 --> 56:28.116 and women who serve in your command and 56:28.116 --> 56:27.820 in that matter for all of your house 56:27.830 --> 56:30.389 commands and uh missile defense is such 56:30.399 --> 56:32.860 an important mission and it's in high 56:32.870 --> 56:34.648 demand everywhere . So uh we're 56:34.648 --> 56:36.648 grateful to you and your and your , 56:36.648 --> 56:39.429 your people . Perfect timing . Uh We 56:39.439 --> 56:41.661 will now go to Representative Vasquez . 56:43.449 --> 56:45.616 Thank you , Chairman . Uh Thank you to 56:45.616 --> 56:47.671 the ranking member . Uh Thank you to 56:47.671 --> 56:49.893 our witnesses for being here today this 56:49.893 --> 56:49.750 morning . I have the privilege of 56:49.760 --> 56:51.593 representing New Mexico's second 56:51.593 --> 56:53.649 district home to White Sands Missile 56:53.649 --> 56:55.371 Range . It's the birthplace of 56:55.371 --> 56:57.593 America's Space and missile program and 56:57.593 --> 56:59.538 through white , uh the White Sands 56:59.538 --> 56:59.189 continues to be the Department of 56:59.199 --> 57:01.366 Defense's Premier research and testing 57:01.366 --> 57:03.088 facility for our nation's most 57:03.088 --> 57:05.255 important weapons programs . They also 57:05.255 --> 57:07.421 continue to face struggles maintaining 57:07.421 --> 57:09.699 modern technology and facilities . Now , 57:09.699 --> 57:11.810 during my visit to white sands , this 57:11.810 --> 57:13.977 January base leadership shared with me 57:13.977 --> 57:16.143 that their long range radars which are 57:16.143 --> 57:18.255 supposed to provide critical tracking 57:18.255 --> 57:20.366 capabilities for weapons testing have 57:20.366 --> 57:22.255 been in service and have not been 57:22.255 --> 57:24.310 upgraded since the 19 sixties posing 57:24.310 --> 57:24.290 significant challenges to keeping them 57:24.300 --> 57:26.300 operational and in line with modern 57:26.300 --> 57:28.189 missile technology . Beyond these 57:28.189 --> 57:29.856 maintenance challenges , I've 57:29.856 --> 57:32.022 understood that these radar challenges 57:32.022 --> 57:33.967 and the failures during tests have 57:33.967 --> 57:36.133 become increasingly frequent occurring 57:36.133 --> 57:38.189 as often as five times per month and 57:38.189 --> 57:40.411 with tracking inaccuracies that are off 57:40.411 --> 57:42.633 by hundreds to thousands of yards , not 57:42.633 --> 57:44.800 being able to accurately track weapons 57:44.800 --> 57:46.689 during testing , not only poses a 57:46.689 --> 57:48.578 safety risk to the folks that are 57:48.578 --> 57:50.689 working there but also to surrounding 57:50.689 --> 57:52.911 communities but threatens our readiness 57:52.911 --> 57:54.911 and national security . And I think 57:54.911 --> 57:57.078 that's completely unacceptable . Uh We 57:57.078 --> 57:56.770 should do everything in our power to 57:56.780 --> 57:58.836 ensure white sands has the necessary 57:58.836 --> 58:00.780 equipment to safely and accurately 58:00.780 --> 58:02.669 track weapons tests so that we're 58:02.669 --> 58:04.669 providing our war fighters with the 58:04.669 --> 58:06.836 best tools and information possible to 58:06.836 --> 58:08.502 accomplish their mission . Uh 58:08.502 --> 58:10.280 Lieutenant General Ganey uh are 58:10.280 --> 58:12.336 diminished testing cap uh conditions 58:12.336 --> 58:14.558 like these acceptable to you and how do 58:14.558 --> 58:16.502 deficient testing standards pose a 58:16.502 --> 58:18.280 threat to our national security 58:18.280 --> 58:20.224 congressman ? Thank you for the uh 58:20.224 --> 58:22.391 question . Uh White Sand missile range 58:22.391 --> 58:24.558 remains an integral part as you know , 58:24.558 --> 58:26.613 to our testing in the the army's air 58:26.613 --> 58:28.558 and missile defense program as the 58:28.558 --> 58:30.780 senior mission commander uh for quadrio 58:30.780 --> 58:34.479 toll , I also have uh strategic 58:34.649 --> 58:36.729 testing at those sites where I also 58:36.739 --> 58:39.330 maintain an infrastructure uh and 58:39.340 --> 58:41.507 sensors to be able to get after that . 58:41.679 --> 58:45.239 And I uh believe continuing funding and 58:45.250 --> 58:46.861 improvements of all of those 58:46.861 --> 58:48.972 capabilities are critical to continue 58:48.972 --> 58:50.750 to ensure that we have the best 58:50.750 --> 58:52.694 capability as we test our critical 58:52.694 --> 58:54.806 systems moving forward . Thank you so 58:54.806 --> 58:57.083 much . And in New Mexico , as you know , 58:57.083 --> 58:59.083 Lieutenant General , we have a long 58:59.083 --> 59:01.250 legacy of not uh dismissal , testing , 59:01.250 --> 59:03.361 but a lot of research and development 59:03.361 --> 59:03.270 that has contributed uh to the strength 59:03.280 --> 59:05.502 of this nation's national security . We 59:05.502 --> 59:07.979 also have a toxic legacy uh of impacts 59:07.989 --> 59:10.100 to local surrounding communities from 59:10.100 --> 59:12.156 testing activities , which is one of 59:12.156 --> 59:14.156 the reasons I'm fighting and others 59:14.156 --> 59:16.156 here in Congress are fighting uh to 59:16.156 --> 59:18.378 reauthorize Rica . And so we just wanna 59:18.378 --> 59:17.560 make sure that those technologies are 59:17.570 --> 59:19.792 updated and that we don't make the same 59:19.792 --> 59:21.903 mistakes of the past . Uh at the same 59:21.903 --> 59:24.237 time protecting national security . Now , 59:24.237 --> 59:26.459 Mr Hill , given the importance of white 59:26.459 --> 59:28.681 sands testing capabilities . Uh what is 59:28.681 --> 59:30.848 stopping the department currently from 59:30.848 --> 59:30.820 updating these critical testing systems ? 59:32.750 --> 59:35.790 Uh Congressman Vasquez , I'm , I'm not 59:35.800 --> 59:38.133 familiar with the specific decisions on , 59:38.133 --> 59:42.030 on those , but um we can certainly take 59:42.040 --> 59:44.370 the question . Uh and in the general 59:44.379 --> 59:46.435 sense , obviously , the pre previous 59:46.435 --> 59:48.679 discussions about the overall top line 59:48.689 --> 59:50.699 and making tradeoffs within finite 59:50.709 --> 59:52.709 resources . I'm sure is part of the 59:52.929 --> 59:54.651 part of the calculation that's 59:54.651 --> 59:56.651 happening . Thank you , Mr Hill . I 59:56.651 --> 59:58.762 appreciate uh you paying attention to 59:58.762 --> 01:00:01.096 this issue in in future budget requests . 01:00:01.096 --> 01:00:03.040 Now beyond the missile testing and 01:00:03.040 --> 01:00:05.207 evaluation done at white sands , we're 01:00:05.207 --> 01:00:04.979 also home to the largest manufacturer 01:00:04.989 --> 01:00:07.211 of space grade solar cells that are key 01:00:07.211 --> 01:00:09.211 component to providing power to our 01:00:09.211 --> 01:00:11.260 satellites producers in my district 01:00:11.270 --> 01:00:13.326 power , a significant portion of our 01:00:13.326 --> 01:00:15.437 nation's national security satellites 01:00:15.437 --> 01:00:17.548 directly contributing to the strength 01:00:17.548 --> 01:00:19.770 of our missile warning fleet in space . 01:00:19.770 --> 01:00:21.826 Uh Mr Hill for components like solar 01:00:21.826 --> 01:00:24.048 cells that are critical for our missile 01:00:24.048 --> 01:00:26.103 defense and warning infrastructure . 01:00:26.103 --> 01:00:28.270 What does it mean to the department to 01:00:28.270 --> 01:00:30.492 have a reliable domestic supply chain ? 01:00:30.492 --> 01:00:32.381 And how can Congress help support 01:00:32.381 --> 01:00:34.381 robust production capabilities like 01:00:34.381 --> 01:00:36.270 those in my state ? I think these 01:00:36.270 --> 01:00:38.381 reliable domestic production chains , 01:00:38.381 --> 01:00:40.326 we , we see how important they are 01:00:40.326 --> 01:00:42.437 across a number of fields . Uh One of 01:00:42.437 --> 01:00:44.492 the things that we've done this , we 01:00:44.492 --> 01:00:44.360 most recently issued our commercial 01:00:44.370 --> 01:00:45.981 space integration strategy , 01:00:45.981 --> 01:00:47.929 recognizing how much innovation is 01:00:47.939 --> 01:00:50.149 being driven by the commercial side of 01:00:50.159 --> 01:00:53.550 space and and the understanding that we 01:00:53.560 --> 01:00:55.782 in the defense department need to shift 01:00:55.782 --> 01:00:57.616 from trying to contort them into 01:00:57.616 --> 01:00:59.504 meeting our requirements to being 01:00:59.504 --> 01:01:01.616 flexible about our requirements so we 01:01:01.616 --> 01:01:03.782 can leverage what they're doing . That 01:01:03.782 --> 01:01:05.893 would be an example of le creating an 01:01:05.893 --> 01:01:07.949 environment in which more innovation 01:01:07.949 --> 01:01:10.250 happens inside domestic production uh 01:01:10.260 --> 01:01:13.260 capacity . I appreciate that Mr Hill 01:01:13.270 --> 01:01:15.492 and we certainly are at the forefront , 01:01:15.492 --> 01:01:17.159 I think of that uh commercial 01:01:17.159 --> 01:01:18.937 commercialization , both in the 01:01:18.937 --> 01:01:20.992 research and development phase , but 01:01:20.992 --> 01:01:22.714 also now in light assembly and 01:01:22.714 --> 01:01:24.659 manufacturing when it comes to all 01:01:24.659 --> 01:01:23.989 these different components that are 01:01:24.000 --> 01:01:26.239 going into these modern uh systems . 01:01:26.250 --> 01:01:28.028 And I appreciate your continued 01:01:28.028 --> 01:01:30.194 attention and investment to New Mexico 01:01:30.194 --> 01:01:32.361 Second District . Thank you so much uh 01:01:32.361 --> 01:01:34.139 Chairman Ayo Beck . Thank you , 01:01:34.139 --> 01:01:36.139 Representative Strong . Thank you , 01:01:36.139 --> 01:01:38.083 Chairman Lamborn and uh ranking Mi 01:01:38.083 --> 01:01:40.194 Moulin . And , uh , thank each of you 01:01:40.194 --> 01:01:42.194 for being here today . Uh General . 01:01:42.194 --> 01:01:44.194 It's great having each of you in my 01:01:44.194 --> 01:01:46.306 office last week . It was interesting 01:01:46.306 --> 01:01:45.929 to learn that not only is Huntsville , 01:01:45.939 --> 01:01:47.969 the Rocket City , but it's also 01:01:47.979 --> 01:01:50.790 apparently the city of love since , uh , 01:01:50.800 --> 01:01:52.967 uh , this is where you met your wife , 01:01:52.967 --> 01:01:54.967 General , uh , James . And , uh , I 01:01:54.967 --> 01:01:57.189 also found out that General G's parents 01:01:57.189 --> 01:01:59.750 met at Redstone Arsenal . So , uh , it 01:01:59.760 --> 01:02:01.871 was interesting to hear that Redstone 01:02:01.871 --> 01:02:03.816 Arsenal is truly making a name for 01:02:03.816 --> 01:02:05.927 itself . Uh , I've said it before and 01:02:05.927 --> 01:02:07.871 I'll say it again . We've got some 01:02:07.871 --> 01:02:09.982 great things coming out of Huntsville 01:02:09.982 --> 01:02:12.149 General Collins just a few weeks ago . 01:02:12.149 --> 01:02:14.427 General GEO with North com reconfirmed , 01:02:14.580 --> 01:02:17.449 um , to , uh , this committee that the 01:02:17.459 --> 01:02:19.860 next generation interceptor is critical 01:02:19.899 --> 01:02:22.590 for defending the homeland . Last 01:02:22.600 --> 01:02:25.229 spring , your predecessor testified to 01:02:25.239 --> 01:02:27.072 the benefits of keeping multiple 01:02:27.072 --> 01:02:30.139 contractors on the NG I program through 01:02:30.149 --> 01:02:33.659 critical design review . Uh , but since , 01:02:33.669 --> 01:02:35.669 uh , late last year , we've learned 01:02:35.669 --> 01:02:37.836 that this is , uh , no longer the plan 01:02:38.050 --> 01:02:40.429 uh , this really concerns me and many 01:02:40.439 --> 01:02:43.459 others . Looking back to 2019 , when 01:02:43.469 --> 01:02:47.270 the uh redesign , uh kill vehicle RKV 01:02:47.280 --> 01:02:49.850 program was canceled , we had all our 01:02:49.860 --> 01:02:52.449 eggs in one basket . There wasn't a 01:02:52.459 --> 01:02:55.550 backup plan and because we didn't have 01:02:55.560 --> 01:02:57.616 a backup plan , we had to extend the 01:02:57.616 --> 01:02:59.780 life of our interceptors and start an 01:02:59.790 --> 01:03:02.110 entirely new program . This cost 01:03:02.120 --> 01:03:04.231 taxpayers a lot of money . It cost us 01:03:04.231 --> 01:03:06.959 capability and it cost us time when 01:03:06.969 --> 01:03:09.510 there's a ticking clock over in the 01:03:09.520 --> 01:03:11.949 Indo Pacific and throughout the world , 01:03:12.659 --> 01:03:15.360 what changed ? Why is MD A now making 01:03:15.370 --> 01:03:17.800 an earlier than planned down select 01:03:17.810 --> 01:03:20.600 decision before critical design review 01:03:20.610 --> 01:03:24.560 next year . Congressman , 01:03:24.570 --> 01:03:26.848 thanks for , for that question on NG I . 01:03:26.848 --> 01:03:29.014 Uh it is absolutely our foundation for 01:03:29.014 --> 01:03:31.126 homeland defense uh into the future . 01:03:31.126 --> 01:03:35.000 And uh we have uh continued to focus uh 01:03:35.199 --> 01:03:37.255 the agency very much on NG I and its 01:03:37.255 --> 01:03:39.850 incorporation uh in uh no later than 01:03:39.860 --> 01:03:43.159 2028 . 2 things of note , I , 11 we've 01:03:43.169 --> 01:03:46.810 talked about is uh certainly the fiscal 01:03:46.820 --> 01:03:48.987 uh realities uh and the decisions that 01:03:48.987 --> 01:03:51.729 needed to be made uh with a across the , 01:03:51.739 --> 01:03:54.909 the missile defense portfolio uh has 01:03:54.919 --> 01:03:58.020 been far reaching . Uh But second , 01:03:58.030 --> 01:04:00.939 we've also been keeping the NG I 01:04:00.949 --> 01:04:02.949 program on track . Both primes have 01:04:02.949 --> 01:04:05.171 completed a preliminary design review . 01:04:05.389 --> 01:04:07.340 Uh Both have completed full 01:04:07.350 --> 01:04:09.939 qualification of all their parts for uh 01:04:09.949 --> 01:04:12.939 the radiation environment and many of 01:04:12.949 --> 01:04:15.179 the sub components uh have been taken 01:04:15.189 --> 01:04:17.600 to the critical design review stage uh 01:04:17.610 --> 01:04:21.250 of design . Uh all that 01:04:21.260 --> 01:04:23.879 brought together we , the agency 01:04:23.889 --> 01:04:27.360 believe uh we have a full in depth 01:04:27.370 --> 01:04:29.800 understanding of the designs uh from 01:04:29.810 --> 01:04:32.840 the two primes . Uh We fully understand 01:04:33.060 --> 01:04:36.459 and uh the uh transition to production 01:04:36.469 --> 01:04:38.413 plans and the risks that are still 01:04:38.413 --> 01:04:40.358 involved with both primes . And we 01:04:40.358 --> 01:04:42.413 believe that the level of risk is uh 01:04:42.413 --> 01:04:45.469 well below uh the department standard 01:04:45.479 --> 01:04:47.646 of making a decision such as this . So 01:04:47.646 --> 01:04:49.812 we believe we have the technical depth 01:04:49.812 --> 01:04:51.923 uh and knowledge and understanding of 01:04:51.923 --> 01:04:53.979 risk as we move forward , uh to make 01:04:53.979 --> 01:04:56.201 that decision . Thank you . I know that 01:04:56.201 --> 01:04:58.368 some very smart people have done great 01:04:58.368 --> 01:05:00.479 work to keep our current interceptors 01:05:00.479 --> 01:05:02.701 in the game longer , but we cannot keep 01:05:02.701 --> 01:05:04.646 life extending the fleet . Is that 01:05:04.646 --> 01:05:06.757 right ? That is correct , sir . Thank 01:05:06.757 --> 01:05:08.923 you . I know that the uh confidence in 01:05:08.923 --> 01:05:11.146 NG I is succeeding is high . I credit a 01:05:11.146 --> 01:05:13.257 big part of that to the incredible uh 01:05:13.257 --> 01:05:15.257 work being done at Redstone Arsenal 01:05:15.257 --> 01:05:17.370 with both uh uh industry teams in 01:05:17.379 --> 01:05:19.101 Huntsville , Alabama . But the 01:05:19.101 --> 01:05:21.212 consequences of something going wrong 01:05:21.212 --> 01:05:23.959 with NG I are much higher now than it 01:05:23.969 --> 01:05:26.760 was back in 2019 . Would that be a 01:05:26.770 --> 01:05:30.270 correct statement ? Yes , sir . There 01:05:30.280 --> 01:05:32.739 is still additional risk ahead of us on 01:05:32.750 --> 01:05:34.750 the program and we will continue to 01:05:34.750 --> 01:05:37.083 stay very focused on where that risk is , 01:05:37.219 --> 01:05:39.386 uh sorry . Uh We will continue to stay 01:05:39.386 --> 01:05:41.739 focused on where that risk is and uh 01:05:41.750 --> 01:05:44.159 focused on mitigating that risk as best 01:05:44.169 --> 01:05:46.169 as possible . I totally , I totally 01:05:46.169 --> 01:05:49.409 agree . Um They're much , much higher 01:05:49.419 --> 01:05:52.610 uh this time because just um uh as you 01:05:52.620 --> 01:05:54.969 said , uh we can't fall back on doing 01:05:54.979 --> 01:05:57.129 another life extension of the current 01:05:57.139 --> 01:05:59.439 system . We've already used uh our get 01:05:59.449 --> 01:06:01.850 out of jail free card with the uh uh 01:06:01.860 --> 01:06:04.149 RKV . I worry that the Biden 01:06:04.159 --> 01:06:05.937 administration is uh wanting to 01:06:05.937 --> 01:06:08.030 dismantle the significant industrial 01:06:08.040 --> 01:06:11.709 cap uh capacity that has um been built 01:06:11.719 --> 01:06:14.290 up over decades . And MD A's budget and 01:06:14.300 --> 01:06:16.909 plans are taking a detrimental hit due 01:06:16.919 --> 01:06:19.320 to some short uh sighted decisions . 01:06:19.330 --> 01:06:21.850 Here , is there a report or study that 01:06:21.860 --> 01:06:24.270 MD A has conducted that supports down 01:06:24.280 --> 01:06:26.770 selecting before critical design review 01:06:26.780 --> 01:06:29.550 over uh sticking with the original 01:06:29.560 --> 01:06:32.379 acquisition strategy ? No sir . We do 01:06:32.389 --> 01:06:34.445 not have any report or assessment on 01:06:34.445 --> 01:06:38.139 that . Thank you . Uh So we're so were 01:06:38.149 --> 01:06:41.030 budget constraints the primary uh or 01:06:41.040 --> 01:06:42.873 initial reason for the change in 01:06:42.873 --> 01:06:45.590 strategy or is it because the team , uh 01:06:45.600 --> 01:06:47.711 the teams have progressed better than 01:06:47.711 --> 01:06:49.989 expected ? I'd say sir , it's a 01:06:50.000 --> 01:06:52.000 combination of both uh both teams , 01:06:52.000 --> 01:06:54.333 both teams have pro pro progressed very , 01:06:54.333 --> 01:06:56.709 very well . Uh But there was a catalyst 01:06:56.780 --> 01:06:58.947 that was driven by the fiscal decision 01:06:58.947 --> 01:07:01.169 as well . I thank each of you for being 01:07:01.169 --> 01:07:03.169 here , Mr Chairman . I yield back . 01:07:03.169 --> 01:07:05.391 Thank you , Representative Carba Hall . 01:07:05.391 --> 01:07:07.530 Thank you , Mr Chairman . Um hearing 01:07:07.540 --> 01:07:09.262 all the nexus that you have to 01:07:09.262 --> 01:07:11.484 representative strong's uh district and 01:07:11.484 --> 01:07:13.484 not paradise , which is my district 01:07:13.570 --> 01:07:15.348 makes me start questioning your 01:07:15.348 --> 01:07:18.280 judgment . I must say . Um We know our 01:07:18.290 --> 01:07:20.179 adversaries possess hypersonic 01:07:20.189 --> 01:07:22.439 capabilities , defending against and 01:07:22.449 --> 01:07:24.800 defeating this threat is proving to be 01:07:24.810 --> 01:07:26.977 challenging both technically and physi 01:07:26.977 --> 01:07:29.669 and physically . General Collins . How 01:07:29.679 --> 01:07:31.401 are our advanced manufacturing 01:07:31.401 --> 01:07:33.110 technologies such as additive 01:07:33.120 --> 01:07:36.709 manufacturing being utilized to 01:07:36.719 --> 01:07:39.719 reduce costs and acquisition timelines 01:07:39.810 --> 01:07:42.159 for future hypersonic defense programs ? 01:07:43.090 --> 01:07:45.368 Thank you , Congress for that question . 01:07:45.368 --> 01:07:47.469 Uh And , and fully agree with your , 01:07:47.479 --> 01:07:50.909 your uh your notes on the difficulty in 01:07:50.919 --> 01:07:54.229 developing an industry base to uh to 01:07:54.239 --> 01:07:56.461 accelerate our hypersonic offensive and 01:07:56.461 --> 01:07:58.628 defensive weapons as we move forward . 01:07:58.628 --> 01:08:00.850 Uh And uh in my previous job within the 01:08:00.850 --> 01:08:02.961 air force buying hypersonic weapons , 01:08:02.961 --> 01:08:04.628 we had the same challenges is 01:08:04.628 --> 01:08:06.850 developing the industry base to produce 01:08:06.850 --> 01:08:08.906 the critical technologies we require 01:08:08.906 --> 01:08:10.850 for hypersonic weapons . Uh At the 01:08:10.850 --> 01:08:12.850 missile defense agency , we're very 01:08:12.850 --> 01:08:14.795 focused on bringing any of the new 01:08:14.795 --> 01:08:16.961 advanced manufacturing uh capabilities 01:08:16.961 --> 01:08:19.183 and technologies to bear uh to help one 01:08:19.183 --> 01:08:21.072 reduced uh reduce cost uh of , of 01:08:21.072 --> 01:08:23.017 building hypersonic weapons in the 01:08:23.017 --> 01:08:25.128 future as well , helping to scale and 01:08:25.128 --> 01:08:27.406 increase pace of , of capacity of , of , 01:08:27.406 --> 01:08:29.572 of , of lines going forward . Uh We're 01:08:29.572 --> 01:08:31.350 very much looking into advanced 01:08:31.350 --> 01:08:33.517 manufacturing additive manufacturing . 01:08:33.517 --> 01:08:35.628 As you mentioned , we have a group uh 01:08:35.628 --> 01:08:37.795 within our S and T division uh that is 01:08:37.795 --> 01:08:39.795 closely looking at and investing in 01:08:39.795 --> 01:08:41.406 small business uh maturation 01:08:41.406 --> 01:08:43.910 capabilities of additive manufacturing 01:08:43.919 --> 01:08:45.919 in particular capabilities that are 01:08:45.919 --> 01:08:48.030 required within a hypersonic weapon . 01:08:48.030 --> 01:08:50.252 Uh One in particular is carbon , carbon 01:08:50.419 --> 01:08:53.200 uh uh additive manufacturing , which is 01:08:53.209 --> 01:08:55.350 key to the front edge thermal 01:08:55.359 --> 01:08:57.415 protection systems of our hypersonic 01:08:57.415 --> 01:08:59.581 weapons . A key technology and a lim a 01:08:59.581 --> 01:09:01.692 limiting factor within our ability to 01:09:01.692 --> 01:09:03.692 scale uh the industry base . And so 01:09:03.692 --> 01:09:05.915 we're very much investing across uh the 01:09:05.915 --> 01:09:08.137 traditional and nontraditional basis to 01:09:08.137 --> 01:09:10.303 en to ensure we have the manufacturing 01:09:10.303 --> 01:09:10.109 capability for hypersonic weapons . 01:09:10.720 --> 01:09:12.831 Thank you , General Collins . Earlier 01:09:12.831 --> 01:09:14.998 this year , the missile defense agency 01:09:14.998 --> 01:09:16.930 MD A launched two hypersonic and 01:09:16.939 --> 01:09:19.220 ballistic tracking space satellites . H 01:09:19.229 --> 01:09:22.939 BT SS MD A received additional funds in 01:09:22.950 --> 01:09:25.319 fiscal year 24 defense appropriations 01:09:25.330 --> 01:09:27.819 bill to do calibration testing and 01:09:27.830 --> 01:09:30.040 training on threat , representative 01:09:30.049 --> 01:09:32.259 hypersonic targets . Can you please 01:09:32.270 --> 01:09:34.850 describe the status of the satellites 01:09:35.089 --> 01:09:37.145 and how MD A is going to execute the 01:09:37.145 --> 01:09:39.830 additional 25 million for calibrate 01:09:39.839 --> 01:09:42.509 calibration provided in fiscal year uh 01:09:42.520 --> 01:09:45.029 24 omnibus . Yes , Congressman . 01:09:45.040 --> 01:09:46.929 Absolutely . Uh It was a major uh 01:09:46.929 --> 01:09:49.290 activity uh on , on Valentine's Day uh 01:09:49.299 --> 01:09:51.410 of this year when we launched the two 01:09:51.410 --> 01:09:53.632 weeks anniversary . By the way , it's , 01:09:53.632 --> 01:09:55.355 it's a great day . Uh So those 01:09:55.355 --> 01:09:57.188 satellites are still progressing 01:09:57.188 --> 01:09:59.466 through launch and early orbit testing . 01:09:59.466 --> 01:10:01.410 Uh We , we have a very slow method 01:10:01.410 --> 01:10:03.521 methodical uh process whereby we turn 01:10:03.521 --> 01:10:05.466 on the satellites , we turn on the 01:10:05.466 --> 01:10:07.577 payload . Uh over the last month , we 01:10:07.577 --> 01:10:09.688 have had first light what we call the 01:10:09.688 --> 01:10:09.640 first time we've turned on the payloads 01:10:09.649 --> 01:10:11.705 uh and actually looked with them and 01:10:11.705 --> 01:10:13.760 started taking a look at the data to 01:10:13.760 --> 01:10:15.927 calibrate that calibration continues . 01:10:15.927 --> 01:10:18.038 We've started to do uh a number of uh 01:10:18.038 --> 01:10:20.290 cooper uh activities where there may be 01:10:20.299 --> 01:10:22.410 a launch or a test that somebody else 01:10:22.410 --> 01:10:24.577 is uh is uh executing . And we've been 01:10:24.577 --> 01:10:27.279 using those as capabilities uh as , as 01:10:27.290 --> 01:10:29.512 opportunities to calibrate that payload 01:10:29.540 --> 01:10:31.490 later this summer . Uh We will be 01:10:31.500 --> 01:10:34.810 executing our first H DH TB hypersonic 01:10:34.819 --> 01:10:37.250 test bed one launch in June that is a 01:10:37.259 --> 01:10:40.009 launch specifically designed uh for our 01:10:40.020 --> 01:10:42.129 H BT SS satellites to look at a 01:10:42.140 --> 01:10:44.330 hypersonic threat and track it through 01:10:44.540 --> 01:10:46.651 uh through its uh time of flight . Uh 01:10:46.651 --> 01:10:49.319 Those uh there'll be another H TB two 01:10:49.330 --> 01:10:51.779 test later in the summer . Those are 01:10:51.790 --> 01:10:54.012 the two main wickets that we're looking 01:10:54.012 --> 01:10:56.259 at to calibrate and certify the uh the 01:10:56.270 --> 01:10:57.937 fire control solution and the 01:10:57.937 --> 01:11:00.103 technology that we have uh back to the 01:11:00.103 --> 01:11:01.826 earlier conversation . Another 01:11:01.826 --> 01:11:03.992 opportunity we're getting is the Space 01:11:03.992 --> 01:11:06.103 Development Agency for widefield view 01:11:06.103 --> 01:11:05.970 satellites were launched on the same 01:11:05.979 --> 01:11:08.201 booster , they're in plane with our two 01:11:08.201 --> 01:11:10.146 satellites . And so we're actually 01:11:10.146 --> 01:11:12.146 going to be able to utilize uh some 01:11:12.146 --> 01:11:14.035 testing of the wide field of view 01:11:14.035 --> 01:11:16.201 capability in concert with uh our H BT 01:11:16.201 --> 01:11:18.035 SS technology as well . Uh a key 01:11:18.035 --> 01:11:19.979 capability as we look forward to a 01:11:19.979 --> 01:11:21.812 future missile warning , missile 01:11:21.812 --> 01:11:23.701 defense and missile defense space 01:11:23.701 --> 01:11:25.868 architecture . Thank you , sir . Thank 01:11:25.868 --> 01:11:27.979 you , General James . The value uh ad 01:11:27.979 --> 01:11:30.560 of H BT SS is that it will provide fire 01:11:30.569 --> 01:11:32.490 control quality data to track and 01:11:32.500 --> 01:11:35.149 intercept hypersonic threats . Can you 01:11:35.160 --> 01:11:37.382 speak to the importance of fire control 01:11:37.382 --> 01:11:39.549 quality data . The importance of using 01:11:39.549 --> 01:11:41.370 threat represent representative 01:11:41.379 --> 01:11:43.620 hypersonic targets to calibrate and 01:11:43.629 --> 01:11:46.490 train against and how space command 01:11:46.689 --> 01:11:48.689 plans to do that across future year 01:11:48.689 --> 01:11:50.899 defense programs . Yes , Congress , I 01:11:50.910 --> 01:11:52.799 sure can . Thank . Thanks for the 01:11:52.799 --> 01:11:55.021 question . I I came a long way . I have 01:11:55.021 --> 01:11:57.132 a few things to say so . Thanks for a 01:11:57.132 --> 01:12:00.459 question . Um Absolutely important and 01:12:00.470 --> 01:12:02.470 incredible as spacecom continues to 01:12:02.470 --> 01:12:05.640 flesh out its um trans regional missile 01:12:05.649 --> 01:12:07.705 defense mission . And we continue to 01:12:07.705 --> 01:12:09.871 press on that and we see those natural 01:12:09.871 --> 01:12:11.982 links between what you've heard . The 01:12:11.982 --> 01:12:13.982 other colleagues say here about the 01:12:13.982 --> 01:12:15.816 convergence of the space and the 01:12:15.816 --> 01:12:17.982 missile defense mission . How we , how 01:12:17.982 --> 01:12:20.390 we use our space assets and develop 01:12:20.399 --> 01:12:22.677 those to get at the technology changes . 01:12:22.677 --> 01:12:24.510 We see to your point , the hyper 01:12:24.510 --> 01:12:26.970 velocity for the cruise missile threats 01:12:26.979 --> 01:12:29.090 that we see . We're gonna have to use 01:12:29.090 --> 01:12:31.257 space based systems . We're gonna have 01:12:31.257 --> 01:12:33.430 to be able to provide that level of uh 01:12:33.439 --> 01:12:36.450 targeting uh quality information . And 01:12:36.459 --> 01:12:38.681 so that's exactly the things that we're 01:12:38.681 --> 01:12:40.903 working on as we continue to develop uh 01:12:40.903 --> 01:12:43.129 the net centric uh um command and 01:12:43.140 --> 01:12:45.839 control systems and the information 01:12:45.850 --> 01:12:47.700 systems like C two B MC . As we 01:12:47.709 --> 01:12:49.899 continue to uh press for that , you'll 01:12:49.910 --> 01:12:52.100 see that in our list is an important 01:12:52.109 --> 01:12:54.053 factor that we need to continue to 01:12:54.053 --> 01:12:56.259 press on to increase our ability to 01:12:56.270 --> 01:12:59.439 command and control . Um And pass that 01:12:59.450 --> 01:13:03.120 information from uh closest sensor 01:13:03.129 --> 01:13:05.185 sensor to best shooter to be able to 01:13:05.185 --> 01:13:07.351 make those connections . And there's a 01:13:07.351 --> 01:13:09.518 lot of work that's happening more than 01:13:09.518 --> 01:13:11.629 just in us spacecom . And we're tying 01:13:11.629 --> 01:13:13.685 into all of that with ND A with M DC 01:13:13.685 --> 01:13:15.796 Army's convergence . Nimble , tighten 01:13:15.796 --> 01:13:17.907 lots of different exercises . JM . Do 01:13:17.907 --> 01:13:20.018 uh nimble fire . We use , we exercise 01:13:20.018 --> 01:13:22.129 all of those to continue to build our 01:13:22.129 --> 01:13:24.379 expertise in that absolutely critical 01:13:24.390 --> 01:13:26.390 because terrestrial sensors are not 01:13:26.390 --> 01:13:29.950 gonna allow us to track and uh target 01:13:30.080 --> 01:13:32.247 the threats that we see coming the way 01:13:32.247 --> 01:13:34.358 we have in the past that will have to 01:13:34.358 --> 01:13:36.524 be space based and all the things that 01:13:36.524 --> 01:13:38.691 General Collins just talked about from 01:13:38.691 --> 01:13:41.020 SD A . Uh and the work with uh H BT SS 01:13:41.029 --> 01:13:42.918 from uh the Space Force and other 01:13:42.918 --> 01:13:45.580 capabilities absolutely important and 01:13:45.589 --> 01:13:47.756 integrating commercial and integrating 01:13:47.756 --> 01:13:50.680 the allies . That is an area that us 01:13:50.689 --> 01:13:52.745 space com has done tons of work with 01:13:52.745 --> 01:13:54.856 over the years and it falls naturally 01:13:54.856 --> 01:13:57.078 in to how we're gonna move forward with 01:13:57.078 --> 01:13:59.189 missile defense . Thank you and thank 01:13:59.189 --> 01:14:01.356 you Mr Chair for the additional time . 01:14:01.356 --> 01:14:03.022 Well , it was really more for 01:14:03.022 --> 01:14:05.189 Lieutenant General James . Thank you , 01:14:05.419 --> 01:14:07.586 Representative Wilson . Thank you very 01:14:07.586 --> 01:14:09.752 much , Mr Chairman . And indeed , uh I 01:14:09.752 --> 01:14:12.209 hope uh Mr Secretary General as you see 01:14:12.419 --> 01:14:14.399 uh that uh incredibly , this is 01:14:14.410 --> 01:14:16.521 bipartisan with the leadership of our 01:14:16.521 --> 01:14:18.577 chairman and ranking member and even 01:14:18.577 --> 01:14:20.688 including uh Congressman Carba Hall . 01:14:20.759 --> 01:14:23.569 And so , um but uh truly , we want you 01:14:23.580 --> 01:14:26.029 to succeed and uh I I have a personal 01:14:26.040 --> 01:14:28.450 interest . I served 31 years in the 01:14:28.459 --> 01:14:31.649 Army Guard and Reserves and uh I really 01:14:31.660 --> 01:14:33.660 appreciate military service and I'm 01:14:33.660 --> 01:14:35.720 grateful my oldest son served uh in 01:14:35.729 --> 01:14:37.930 Iraq field artillery . My second son 01:14:37.939 --> 01:14:40.879 was a doctor uh out of uh track , he 01:14:40.890 --> 01:14:43.520 was in the navy . Um But I still claim 01:14:43.529 --> 01:14:47.180 him uh serving in Baghdad . My um third 01:14:47.189 --> 01:14:49.720 son , uh signal in Sinai . Uh and my 01:14:49.729 --> 01:14:52.240 youngest a year uh Afghanistan as an 01:14:52.250 --> 01:14:55.040 engineer . So uh I uh all credit to my 01:14:55.049 --> 01:14:57.759 wife Roxanne for um actually training 01:14:57.770 --> 01:14:59.937 these guys , but the bottom line is we 01:14:59.937 --> 01:15:02.310 want you to succeed . And uh e equally 01:15:02.319 --> 01:15:04.430 um it's more important than ever . Uh 01:15:04.430 --> 01:15:06.652 Mr Secretary General , uh we , we're in 01:15:06.652 --> 01:15:08.875 a conflict , we did not choose . Uh and 01:15:08.875 --> 01:15:11.790 it uh to me it's a uh conflict , a war 01:15:11.819 --> 01:15:14.399 uh between dictators uh with the rule 01:15:14.410 --> 01:15:16.529 of gun who are invading democracies 01:15:16.540 --> 01:15:19.060 with rule of law . Uh Sadly , it began 01:15:19.069 --> 01:15:21.919 February 24th , 2022 . Uh when war 01:15:21.930 --> 01:15:25.470 criminal Putin uh just uh murderously 01:15:25.479 --> 01:15:28.990 invaded uh uh Ukraine uh just uh 01:15:29.000 --> 01:15:31.100 seeking out civilians to murder 01:15:31.109 --> 01:15:33.669 civilians . I , I've been there to b to 01:15:33.680 --> 01:15:36.379 see um the inhumanity of what's been 01:15:36.390 --> 01:15:39.990 done . I uh actually was in um 01:15:40.270 --> 01:15:42.830 in Kev uh in August last year , 01:15:42.839 --> 01:15:45.069 possibly for the first hypersonic 01:15:45.080 --> 01:15:47.830 missile attack . Uh And the tactic of 01:15:47.839 --> 01:15:50.709 war criminal Putin um is , is so uh 01:15:50.720 --> 01:15:53.229 inhuman and that is to attack a 01:15:53.240 --> 01:15:55.129 civilian target like an apartment 01:15:55.129 --> 01:15:57.390 complex . And then uh that's not the 01:15:57.399 --> 01:16:00.390 real attack 20 years , 20 minutes later , 01:16:00.640 --> 01:16:02.751 when the first responders are there , 01:16:02.751 --> 01:16:04.918 the fire service , the EMS personnel , 01:16:04.918 --> 01:16:06.973 uh law enforcement , that's when the 01:16:06.973 --> 01:16:09.240 real attack occurs . And uh it , it's 01:16:09.250 --> 01:16:12.100 just shocking to think of the tactics 01:16:12.109 --> 01:16:14.549 that Putin has to try to intimidate the 01:16:14.560 --> 01:16:16.990 people of Ukraine just as they did the 01:16:17.000 --> 01:16:19.709 people of Aleppo in Syria and then to 01:16:19.806 --> 01:16:22.105 come back and try to intimidate uh 01:16:22.116 --> 01:16:24.306 first responders . Then of course , it 01:16:24.315 --> 01:16:26.846 continued on October the seventh uh 01:16:27.076 --> 01:16:29.916 when the puppets of Iran of the regime 01:16:29.925 --> 01:16:32.925 in Tehran uh invaded again , 1200 01:16:32.956 --> 01:16:35.505 innocent civilians , uh mercilessly 01:16:35.516 --> 01:16:39.246 murdered uh uh intentionally uh without 01:16:39.255 --> 01:16:43.016 any uh sense of uh propriety or uh 01:16:43.025 --> 01:16:46.565 concept and uh indeed uh not in uniform , 01:16:46.576 --> 01:16:48.354 just everything that could be a 01:16:48.354 --> 01:16:50.187 violation of laws of war they uh 01:16:50.187 --> 01:16:52.582 conducted . And then , of course , uh 01:16:52.591 --> 01:16:54.872 sadly , we've had over 100 and 50 01:16:54.881 --> 01:16:57.961 attacks uh that uh have occurred uh uh 01:16:57.972 --> 01:17:00.952 in the Red Sea uh as uh correctly 01:17:00.961 --> 01:17:04.541 identified uh by uh Car Moulton uh in 01:17:04.551 --> 01:17:07.102 Iraq . Uh over and over again . Uh we 01:17:07.111 --> 01:17:09.582 see these attacks over 100 and 50 then 01:17:09.611 --> 01:17:12.872 culminating on January the 28th with 01:17:12.881 --> 01:17:16.432 three young uh members of the Army 01:17:16.441 --> 01:17:18.879 Reserves from Georgia uh who were 01:17:18.890 --> 01:17:21.919 killed uh by a uh a Hezbollah uh 01:17:22.080 --> 01:17:26.069 again , another puppet of uh Iran 01:17:26.080 --> 01:17:28.419 killing three of our personnel and 01:17:28.430 --> 01:17:31.089 wounding 40 others . And so , uh it's 01:17:31.100 --> 01:17:33.229 just uh in incredible to me the 01:17:33.240 --> 01:17:35.459 challenges that we have and , and we 01:17:35.470 --> 01:17:37.979 want the best and uh wanting the best 01:17:37.990 --> 01:17:40.569 uh general gy in particular , I am uh 01:17:40.580 --> 01:17:43.720 concerned with the level of deployment 01:17:43.890 --> 01:17:47.189 of such an important branch , the air 01:17:47.200 --> 01:17:49.311 defense , air defense artillery . And 01:17:49.311 --> 01:17:51.422 actually I want to commend uh it's no 01:17:51.422 --> 01:17:53.533 surprise uh General Congress person , 01:17:53.533 --> 01:17:55.970 Don Bacon uh was ahead of the curve . 01:17:55.979 --> 01:17:58.459 Uh And that is the uh deployment level 01:17:58.470 --> 01:18:00.779 that's being conducted . And uh we , I 01:18:00.790 --> 01:18:02.734 know with the leadership , we have 01:18:02.734 --> 01:18:04.846 bipartisan , uh we would like to back 01:18:04.846 --> 01:18:06.846 you up in any way to try to address 01:18:06.850 --> 01:18:09.859 that . Uh with all of this in mind , uh 01:18:09.870 --> 01:18:11.981 General Ganey in particular , how are 01:18:11.981 --> 01:18:14.859 we addressing uh the technological 01:18:14.870 --> 01:18:17.200 development of the Chinese Communist 01:18:17.209 --> 01:18:19.640 Party war criminal Putin uh the regime 01:18:19.649 --> 01:18:23.000 in Tehran , the Pyongyang . How are we 01:18:23.009 --> 01:18:26.750 addressing this congressman ? Uh 01:18:26.759 --> 01:18:29.250 Thank you uh for the question and 01:18:29.259 --> 01:18:32.049 appreciate your thoughts . Uh As I , 01:18:32.060 --> 01:18:34.410 I'll speak first on the uh army 01:18:34.419 --> 01:18:37.229 perspective , the army is undergoing 01:18:37.240 --> 01:18:40.810 its most modernized effort in several , 01:18:40.819 --> 01:18:43.359 several years . Uh We , we are moving 01:18:43.370 --> 01:18:46.459 from a patriot centric force and I 01:18:46.470 --> 01:18:48.581 highlighted earlier how we are asking 01:18:48.581 --> 01:18:50.803 patriot to essentially do everything in 01:18:50.803 --> 01:18:52.526 the fight , get after tactical 01:18:52.529 --> 01:18:54.696 ballistic missiles , cruise missiles . 01:18:54.696 --> 01:18:56.696 And in some cases with our partners 01:18:56.696 --> 01:18:58.529 even going after drones with the 01:18:58.529 --> 01:19:00.529 patriot system , the US through our 01:19:00.529 --> 01:19:02.585 modernization program , US , army is 01:19:02.585 --> 01:19:04.839 now looking at integrated battle 01:19:04.850 --> 01:19:07.310 command system is the cornerstone of 01:19:07.319 --> 01:19:09.680 that system we have that system in test 01:19:09.689 --> 01:19:12.160 right now with our unit out at Fort 01:19:12.169 --> 01:19:14.939 Bliss . What that unit that integrate 01:19:14.950 --> 01:19:17.339 that C two system , does it , it 01:19:17.350 --> 01:19:19.461 integrates several components and not 01:19:19.461 --> 01:19:22.240 just a system , it takes a lower tier 01:19:22.250 --> 01:19:25.080 air missile defense uh sensor uh as the 01:19:25.089 --> 01:19:27.569 cornerstone of that uh capability . And 01:19:27.580 --> 01:19:29.802 then it adds in other sensors , whether 01:19:29.802 --> 01:19:31.858 ground based sensors are airborne uh 01:19:31.858 --> 01:19:34.600 platforms and also add in uh shooters 01:19:34.609 --> 01:19:36.720 into that common C two . So now given 01:19:36.720 --> 01:19:39.580 the operator to leverage several 01:19:39.689 --> 01:19:42.939 different sensors to provide several 01:19:42.950 --> 01:19:45.006 different factors against a range of 01:19:45.006 --> 01:19:47.310 threats . And also that lower tier uh 01:19:47.319 --> 01:19:49.541 air and missile defense sensor provides 01:19:49.541 --> 01:19:51.597 significant more capability than the 01:19:51.597 --> 01:19:53.763 current uh system does , which , which 01:19:53.763 --> 01:19:56.009 would allow it to now optimize uh most 01:19:56.020 --> 01:19:58.187 of those interceptors that are part of 01:19:58.187 --> 01:20:00.353 that uh C two system . And if you look 01:20:00.353 --> 01:20:02.076 at this challenge from a joint 01:20:02.076 --> 01:20:04.569 perspective of my GIC I MD hat , that's 01:20:04.580 --> 01:20:06.802 where we look at . How do you bring all 01:20:06.802 --> 01:20:08.913 of these systems together in a larger 01:20:08.913 --> 01:20:11.399 uh C two construct ? And that's 01:20:11.410 --> 01:20:13.243 something as we work towards the 01:20:13.243 --> 01:20:15.188 defense of Guam . One of the areas 01:20:15.188 --> 01:20:17.410 we're looking at is how do you take the 01:20:17.410 --> 01:20:19.299 army uh integrated battle command 01:20:19.299 --> 01:20:21.410 system integrated with some of the uh 01:20:21.410 --> 01:20:23.632 systems that the missile defense agency 01:20:23.632 --> 01:20:25.854 uh is putting together on Guam . And so 01:20:25.854 --> 01:20:28.077 therefore , we're looking at we'll have 01:20:28.077 --> 01:20:30.299 an enduring solution that moves forward 01:20:30.299 --> 01:20:32.410 that essentially integrates all those 01:20:32.410 --> 01:20:34.243 several systems leverages the uh 01:20:34.243 --> 01:20:36.132 sensors and the shooters together 01:20:36.132 --> 01:20:38.419 that's the uh medium uh lower to medium 01:20:38.430 --> 01:20:40.263 range . Now , if you look at the 01:20:40.263 --> 01:20:43.109 counter us in the uh protection to the 01:20:43.120 --> 01:20:45.459 maneuver capability , the army has also 01:20:45.470 --> 01:20:47.581 significantly invested in that area . 01:20:47.649 --> 01:20:50.629 Uh Also where we've added uh several uh 01:20:50.640 --> 01:20:52.959 maneuver , a short range air defense 01:20:52.970 --> 01:20:55.379 systems integrated into our division 01:20:55.390 --> 01:20:57.168 and BC TS to be able to provide 01:20:57.168 --> 01:20:59.223 capability against cruise missiles . 01:20:59.223 --> 01:21:01.580 Looking at technology like uh directed 01:21:01.589 --> 01:21:03.645 energy , 50 kilowatt directed energy 01:21:03.645 --> 01:21:06.600 that we have uh deployed out there 01:21:06.609 --> 01:21:08.720 right now , testing that capability . 01:21:09.149 --> 01:21:11.910 And also we fill high powered microwave 01:21:12.049 --> 01:21:14.319 into our formations to be able to get 01:21:14.330 --> 01:21:16.330 at the threat . So if you look at a 01:21:16.330 --> 01:21:18.386 capability , a system that's able to 01:21:18.386 --> 01:21:21.009 integrate all of these sensors , all of 01:21:21.020 --> 01:21:23.839 these factors and then be able to put 01:21:23.850 --> 01:21:26.310 the proper fires on target , the 01:21:26.319 --> 01:21:29.830 appropriate uh uh interceptor or effect 01:21:29.839 --> 01:21:32.006 on the appropriate target . That's how 01:21:32.006 --> 01:21:34.228 we're moving forward in modernization . 01:21:34.228 --> 01:21:36.395 That's how it's gonna allow us to move 01:21:36.395 --> 01:21:35.930 forward . Thank you very much . Thank 01:21:35.939 --> 01:21:37.772 you , Representative Garamendi . 01:21:41.790 --> 01:21:42.410 Thank you 01:21:45.589 --> 01:21:48.430 if there is ever a committee that is 01:21:48.439 --> 01:21:52.339 faced with a problem . It's this one , 01:21:53.629 --> 01:21:55.851 I'm on a lot of military committees and 01:21:55.851 --> 01:21:58.018 I've never had a committee that had so 01:21:58.018 --> 01:22:01.790 many acronyms to try to understand what 01:22:01.799 --> 01:22:03.743 each and every one of these things 01:22:03.743 --> 01:22:07.540 actually is . Uh It's a challenge . Uh 01:22:07.549 --> 01:22:09.549 But I'm gonna try to take this in a 01:22:09.549 --> 01:22:11.729 different direction uh following on 01:22:11.740 --> 01:22:13.518 some of the work that , uh , my 01:22:13.518 --> 01:22:15.850 colleague Mr Moulton , uh put forward 01:22:15.859 --> 01:22:19.609 earlier in his remarks , we will 01:22:19.620 --> 01:22:23.490 forever be playing defense 01:22:25.839 --> 01:22:27.950 trying to catch up with the offense . 01:22:28.689 --> 01:22:31.109 We can use the NFL , we can use uh , 01:22:31.120 --> 01:22:33.660 the experience of um , what we're 01:22:33.669 --> 01:22:36.310 hearing here today . Much of this 01:22:36.319 --> 01:22:39.259 discussion today is about defense 01:22:40.959 --> 01:22:43.899 and we know that in that 01:22:43.910 --> 01:22:45.879 defensive environment , 01:22:48.229 --> 01:22:52.229 there is great risk . What's happened 01:22:52.240 --> 01:22:55.990 over the course of the last 20 01:22:56.660 --> 01:23:00.629 three years is a very significant 01:23:00.640 --> 01:23:03.180 shift in this entire 01:23:04.209 --> 01:23:06.359 um arena . 01:23:07.799 --> 01:23:09.540 Prior to 20 01:23:10.709 --> 01:23:14.609 2002 , there was an A BM 01:23:14.620 --> 01:23:17.870 treaty , an anti ballistic missile 01:23:17.879 --> 01:23:21.080 treaty . It would do well for all of us 01:23:21.089 --> 01:23:24.120 to understand the details that of the 01:23:24.129 --> 01:23:26.073 actual language of the treaty . We 01:23:26.073 --> 01:23:28.779 usually think it only applies uh to uh 01:23:29.109 --> 01:23:31.220 intercontinental ballistic missiles . 01:23:31.220 --> 01:23:33.387 It , it didn't , it went beyond that . 01:23:34.819 --> 01:23:37.740 The United States withdrew from that to 01:23:37.750 --> 01:23:40.419 this day . Russia 01:23:41.200 --> 01:23:44.819 uses the withdrawal of the , of 01:23:44.830 --> 01:23:48.799 America from the A BM treaty to justify 01:23:48.810 --> 01:23:52.020 their continued build up of 01:23:52.029 --> 01:23:53.973 intercontinental ballistic missile 01:23:53.973 --> 01:23:57.839 systems and the weapons that go 01:23:57.850 --> 01:24:01.370 with it . Interestingly , 01:24:02.359 --> 01:24:05.580 in recent days , the last few years , 01:24:06.229 --> 01:24:08.859 China is using that very same 01:24:08.870 --> 01:24:11.279 withdrawal , American withdrawal from 01:24:11.290 --> 01:24:15.069 the A BM treaty system to 01:24:15.080 --> 01:24:18.790 justify its build 01:24:18.799 --> 01:24:20.680 up of intercontinental ballistic 01:24:20.689 --> 01:24:23.180 missiles including silos which this 01:24:23.189 --> 01:24:24.660 committee has discussed . 01:24:28.839 --> 01:24:32.270 It is fair to argue that that 01:24:32.279 --> 01:24:35.509 withdrawal from that treaty has led to 01:24:35.520 --> 01:24:39.270 the current nuclear arms race . 01:24:40.899 --> 01:24:43.169 And much of the discussion today has to 01:24:43.180 --> 01:24:45.799 do with how we are going to defend 01:24:47.740 --> 01:24:51.459 using the G MD system . 01:24:53.560 --> 01:24:56.209 And my concern here is that we are in a 01:24:56.220 --> 01:25:00.200 never ending cycle of 01:25:00.589 --> 01:25:03.689 offense followed by defense 01:25:05.200 --> 01:25:08.049 that presumes to be successful against 01:25:08.060 --> 01:25:11.669 the then known offense . And yet one 01:25:11.680 --> 01:25:15.390 more round my point here is 01:25:15.399 --> 01:25:18.479 that as much time as we are spending on 01:25:19.509 --> 01:25:21.609 in this committee defense , 01:25:23.379 --> 01:25:25.970 we ought to be looking at how to break 01:25:25.979 --> 01:25:29.720 this cycle of an arms race . 01:25:30.879 --> 01:25:33.046 Now , you can add the nuclear piece to 01:25:33.046 --> 01:25:35.640 it , which you must do and it becomes 01:25:35.649 --> 01:25:38.970 even more significant . It's never 01:25:38.979 --> 01:25:41.990 ending . And I know the members of this 01:25:42.000 --> 01:25:44.111 committee and certainly the gentlemen 01:25:44.111 --> 01:25:47.870 before us , um understand in detail 01:25:49.819 --> 01:25:53.819 what this race is all about the 01:25:53.830 --> 01:25:56.620 risks that are in it . And my question 01:25:56.629 --> 01:26:00.540 to you , Mr Hill is , is there , is 01:26:00.549 --> 01:26:03.350 it useful for us 01:26:03.640 --> 01:26:06.810 policymakers and for you and your team 01:26:07.180 --> 01:26:09.830 to spend as much time thinking about 01:26:09.839 --> 01:26:13.589 how to stop this 01:26:13.600 --> 01:26:17.020 cycle or at least slow down the cycle 01:26:17.709 --> 01:26:19.720 of offense , defense , defense , 01:26:19.729 --> 01:26:22.220 offense and back and forth , all of 01:26:22.229 --> 01:26:26.129 which creates greater risk . Mr Hill , 01:26:26.140 --> 01:26:28.307 I'd love to hear your thoughts on it . 01:26:28.310 --> 01:26:31.879 Sure , Congressman Garamendi , um very , 01:26:31.890 --> 01:26:35.479 very key pieces in the entire 01:26:35.490 --> 01:26:37.899 puzzle what you're getting after here . 01:26:38.060 --> 01:26:40.529 Um Clearly , there was a time there was 01:26:40.540 --> 01:26:42.799 an era when we had someone we could 01:26:42.810 --> 01:26:44.754 work with on the other side of the 01:26:44.754 --> 01:26:46.754 negotiating table during the Soviet 01:26:46.754 --> 01:26:49.729 Union , there were different that era 01:26:49.740 --> 01:26:52.600 in the Cold War , we did negotiate 01:26:52.609 --> 01:26:55.379 agreements with them successfully . Um , 01:26:55.919 --> 01:26:58.479 we're in it and that's a key piece to 01:26:58.490 --> 01:27:01.140 any kind of arms control situation . Do 01:27:01.149 --> 01:27:03.205 you have someone you can work with ? 01:27:03.205 --> 01:27:05.205 Now ? You have three and you have a 01:27:05.205 --> 01:27:07.316 very different Russia in some ways in 01:27:07.316 --> 01:27:09.700 terms of , can you cred can you deal 01:27:09.709 --> 01:27:11.709 with them as a credible negotiating 01:27:11.709 --> 01:27:14.290 partner right now ? So it's not to , it , 01:27:14.299 --> 01:27:16.660 it's to say you always need to be 01:27:16.669 --> 01:27:18.759 thinking about that as one of the 01:27:18.770 --> 01:27:21.399 pieces of what you have to work with to 01:27:21.450 --> 01:27:23.870 try and maintain strategic stability , 01:27:23.879 --> 01:27:27.430 defense offense as well as can you come 01:27:27.439 --> 01:27:29.830 up to a confidence level with somebody 01:27:29.839 --> 01:27:32.006 on the other side of the table ? China 01:27:32.006 --> 01:27:34.117 is a third player in this now , which 01:27:34.117 --> 01:27:36.339 adds to the complications , but I think 01:27:36.339 --> 01:27:39.240 the tool never goes away . It's how do 01:27:39.250 --> 01:27:41.528 you use it in the environment you have , 01:27:41.680 --> 01:27:43.680 I'm , I'm out of time and I'm gonna 01:27:43.680 --> 01:27:46.859 take five more seconds every one of the 01:27:46.870 --> 01:27:50.069 arms control mechanisms that went into 01:27:50.080 --> 01:27:52.790 effect during the Cold War occurred 01:27:52.879 --> 01:27:56.459 almost immediately after the most 01:27:56.470 --> 01:28:00.220 difficult of moments in that Cold 01:28:00.229 --> 01:28:02.629 war . I let it go at that . That's a 01:28:02.640 --> 01:28:04.970 historical issue . But uh thank you , 01:28:04.979 --> 01:28:07.640 I'm out of time and uh for me , I'm 01:28:07.649 --> 01:28:09.816 gonna spend as much time talking about 01:28:10.060 --> 01:28:12.620 this as I do about offense and defense 01:28:13.870 --> 01:28:15.981 representative Stefanik , thank you , 01:28:15.981 --> 01:28:18.092 Chairman Lamborn first . I would like 01:28:18.092 --> 01:28:20.203 to correct the record earlier in this 01:28:20.203 --> 01:28:22.259 hearing the ranking member said that 01:28:22.259 --> 01:28:24.314 the Department of Defense chose Fort 01:28:24.314 --> 01:28:24.040 Drum as the preferred missile defense 01:28:24.049 --> 01:28:26.049 site for the third homeland missile 01:28:26.049 --> 01:28:28.271 defense site nearly 10 years ago . That 01:28:28.271 --> 01:28:30.493 is incorrect . Uh Despite the fact that 01:28:30.493 --> 01:28:32.382 you said that's correct , General 01:28:32.382 --> 01:28:34.493 Collins , you are aware that the date 01:28:34.493 --> 01:28:34.069 that that was designated was 2019 . 01:28:34.080 --> 01:28:37.259 Correct . Yes , ma'am . So the 10 years 01:28:37.270 --> 01:28:41.250 ago is incorrect . Great . Um 01:28:41.259 --> 01:28:43.970 You also are aware that just last year 01:28:43.979 --> 01:28:46.035 General Millie and Vice Admiral Hill 01:28:46.035 --> 01:28:48.090 testified in front of this committee 01:28:48.090 --> 01:28:50.201 that the construction of a third site 01:28:50.201 --> 01:28:52.146 at Fort Drum will be strategically 01:28:52.146 --> 01:28:55.259 worthwhile . Correct . You're aware of 01:28:55.270 --> 01:28:58.620 that testimony . Yes . And you're also 01:28:58.629 --> 01:29:02.529 aware that in multiple NDAAS , uh 01:29:02.540 --> 01:29:05.049 the language designating Fort Drum as 01:29:05.060 --> 01:29:07.116 the preferred third site for an East 01:29:07.116 --> 01:29:09.282 Coast missile defense site uh has been 01:29:09.282 --> 01:29:11.282 included in multiple NDAAS . You're 01:29:11.282 --> 01:29:13.393 aware of that and just let the record 01:29:13.393 --> 01:29:15.393 reflect the ranking member voted in 01:29:15.393 --> 01:29:17.504 support of that language not once but 01:29:17.504 --> 01:29:19.504 multiple times as well as voted for 01:29:19.504 --> 01:29:21.616 appropriations as did the majority of 01:29:21.616 --> 01:29:23.727 the members of this committee . Now , 01:29:23.727 --> 01:29:25.949 in the Fy 14 Appropriations Act and the 01:29:25.949 --> 01:29:28.060 NDA A , we work to secure $10 million 01:29:28.060 --> 01:29:30.116 in planning and design funds for the 01:29:30.116 --> 01:29:31.893 missile defense agency to begin 01:29:31.893 --> 01:29:33.893 construction activities for a third 01:29:33.893 --> 01:29:36.004 homeland missile defense site at Fort 01:29:36.004 --> 01:29:38.004 Drum . My question to you , General 01:29:38.004 --> 01:29:40.060 Collins is as the director of MD A . 01:29:40.060 --> 01:29:42.250 Can you confirm to me that this $10 01:29:42.259 --> 01:29:45.160 million is being used as , as 01:29:45.660 --> 01:29:47.950 dictated by Congress , as explicitly 01:29:47.959 --> 01:29:50.169 stated by Congress at Fort Drum to 01:29:50.180 --> 01:29:52.124 begin the planning and design of a 01:29:52.124 --> 01:29:54.180 third missile defense site , ma'am . 01:29:54.180 --> 01:29:56.402 The $10 million has been authorized and 01:29:56.402 --> 01:29:58.291 appropriated for that purpose and 01:29:58.291 --> 01:30:00.402 that's the purpose we're executing it 01:30:00.402 --> 01:30:02.513 for . And what are you using that for 01:30:02.513 --> 01:30:02.470 that ? That's to do the initial 01:30:02.479 --> 01:30:05.350 planning and development of uh a design 01:30:05.359 --> 01:30:07.979 for a continental interceptor site uh 01:30:08.000 --> 01:30:10.629 to take it to the 10% design level at 01:30:10.640 --> 01:30:12.970 Fort Drum . Uh We are pursuing an 01:30:12.979 --> 01:30:15.339 agnostic design that would support , 01:30:15.350 --> 01:30:17.239 that's not what the language said 01:30:20.419 --> 01:30:22.759 by providing an by doing it as an 01:30:22.770 --> 01:30:25.419 agnostic site . We would not slow down 01:30:25.430 --> 01:30:27.486 the capability to do it . That's not 01:30:27.486 --> 01:30:29.541 what the language that was passed by 01:30:29.541 --> 01:30:31.763 Congress said . And you understand that 01:30:31.763 --> 01:30:34.620 in the NDA A for multiple years , it 01:30:34.629 --> 01:30:36.629 had designated Fort Dr , there were 01:30:36.629 --> 01:30:38.573 three sites under consideration in 01:30:38.573 --> 01:30:40.629 three different states . There was a 01:30:40.629 --> 01:30:42.962 process , an environmental impact study . 01:30:42.962 --> 01:30:44.796 This has been uh a very thorough 01:30:44.796 --> 01:30:47.620 process . And so you're saying to me 01:30:47.629 --> 01:30:49.518 today that the $10 million is not 01:30:49.518 --> 01:30:51.296 designated at Fort Drum for the 01:30:51.296 --> 01:30:53.129 planning and design . It is , it 01:30:53.129 --> 01:30:55.240 supports uh a continental interceptor 01:30:55.240 --> 01:30:57.609 site at any location that's determined 01:30:57.620 --> 01:31:00.379 to be optimal in the future . In line 01:31:00.390 --> 01:31:03.080 with the 2019 memo that the department 01:31:03.089 --> 01:31:05.810 signed out designating Fort Drum for 01:31:05.870 --> 01:31:08.220 Drum . And it also designated that when 01:31:08.229 --> 01:31:10.451 a requirement was set for a continental 01:31:10.451 --> 01:31:12.396 site that there would have to be a 01:31:12.396 --> 01:31:14.173 readdress and a reassessment of 01:31:14.173 --> 01:31:16.229 location based on performance . Even 01:31:16.229 --> 01:31:18.396 though you said in my office , when we 01:31:18.396 --> 01:31:20.618 met General Collins in my office , that 01:31:20.618 --> 01:31:20.490 you understood that the $10 million 01:31:20.500 --> 01:31:22.667 would go to the design and planning at 01:31:22.667 --> 01:31:24.950 Fort Drum as specified by the NDA A . 01:31:27.700 --> 01:31:29.922 When a decision , if a decision is made 01:31:29.922 --> 01:31:32.790 to pursue a Fort Drum site , the $10 01:31:32.799 --> 01:31:35.021 million will be 100% in line with being 01:31:35.021 --> 01:31:37.129 able to accomplish that . But you do 01:31:37.140 --> 01:31:39.149 understand that multiple NDAAS Fort 01:31:39.160 --> 01:31:41.327 Drum has been designated as well as by 01:31:41.327 --> 01:31:45.040 dod . I'm aware ma'am of the report 01:31:45.049 --> 01:31:47.216 that the department signed out and the 01:31:47.216 --> 01:31:51.089 previous NDA A . Ok , great . Um With 01:31:51.100 --> 01:31:53.709 that , I will yield back . All right . 01:31:53.720 --> 01:31:56.270 Thank you . That concludes the public 01:31:56.279 --> 01:31:59.549 portion of this hearing . We have votes 01:31:59.560 --> 01:32:02.379 that will be called roughly 1145 or 01:32:02.390 --> 01:32:04.759 shortly thereafter . So we will be in 01:32:04.770 --> 01:32:06.659 recess . We will go into a closed 01:32:06.659 --> 01:32:10.560 hearing up in room 2371 until 01:32:10.569 --> 01:32:12.569 such time as votes are called . And 01:32:12.569 --> 01:32:14.736 then we will adjourn the sub-committee 01:32:14.736 --> 01:32:16.958 at that point . So we will be in recess 01:32:16.958 --> 01:32:17.589 and meet upstairs .