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This hearing on the Department of 

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Energy Atomic Energy Defense Programs 

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and Department of Defense Nuclear 

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Weapons Programs of the Armed Services 

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Committee sub-committee on Strategic 

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Forces will come to order and I want to 

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thank our witnesses for appearing here 

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today and for their service to our 

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nation . I first want to welcome 

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Admiral Houston , our eighth director 

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of naval reactors to the sub-committee . 

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And we look forward to hearing from you 

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over the next eight years . Thank you , 

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Admiral . Congratulations . Today's 

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hearing consists of two panels to 

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review the budget request for defense 

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nuclear activities at the Department of 

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Energy and the Department of Defense 

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we're undertaking . Now our third era 

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of nuclear modernization . The first 

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two were conducted in 1960 1980 

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mainly in a situation of competition 

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with the Soviet Union . However , now 

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we face two heavily nuclear armed near 

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peer competitors , Russia and China . 

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More than ever , we are relying on 

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modernizing our triad to perform the 

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deterrence mission , the deterrence 

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mission , which is the bedrock of our 

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national security strategy . This year , 

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we were informed that there is a non 

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mccurdy breach of the sentinel ICBM 

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replacement program , General Bossier , 

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I will want to know how your command is 

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investigating this issue . 

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Administrator Ruby pit production costs 

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continue to climb at the Savannah River 

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plant and I look forward to your 

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telling us how you're tracking and 

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working on containing them . And Mister 

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White , you perhaps have the toughest 

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job of all managing the largest 

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liability of the federal government , 

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which in 2023 was estimated at 

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$531 billion . I 

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want to know what you are doing to work 

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your way through this backlog of clean 

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up and whether there are less costly 

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methods to dispose of some of the tank 

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waste at Hanford while still meeting 

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our commitments to the state and to the 

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environment . Because we have two 

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panels , I would appreciate if you 

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could make short 2 to 3 minute opening 

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statements , we'll have five minute 

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rounds of questions again . Welcome to 

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the committee . Thank you for your 

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service , Senator Fisher . Thank you , 

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Mr Chairman and thank you to all of our 

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witnesses for being here today . Our 

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nuclear deterrent underpins our entire 

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national security strategy and it must 

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remain safe , reliable , effective and 

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credible . We face two peer nuclear 

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adversaries for the first time in 

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history while our current nuclear 

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weapons and delivery systems meet the 

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threats of today . I am increasingly 

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concerned that our planned force 

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posture for the 20 thirties and beyond 

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will be insufficient . We need to start 

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laying the groundwork today to set the 

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conditions for success in the future . 

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I look forward to hearing from the 

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witnesses on both panels on the 

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progress being made with current 

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programs of record and what additional 

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resources or authorities are needed to 

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accelerate that progress . I would also 

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like to note that last year's report 

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from the bipartisan Strategic Posture 

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Commission included 81 recommendations 

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that I believe laid out an excellent 

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framework for this nation to revitalize 

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our entire nuclear enterprise . Senator 

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King and I work together on a bill , 

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the restoring American deterrence Act 

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that encapsulates many of these 

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recommendations . I look forward to 

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working with all of our panelists over 

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the coming months as we seek to 

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implement some of those changes . Thank 

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you again for joining us today and 

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thank you , Mr Chairman administrator 

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Ruby . Well , thank 

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you um Chairman King , ranking member 

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Fisher . It's a pleasure to be here um 

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to present the president's fiscal year 

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2025 budget request for the Department 

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of Energy's National Nuclear Security 

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Administration in today's complex and 

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dynamic security environment . N NSA is 

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delivering last year , we provided the 

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Department of Defense over 200 

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modernized weapons on schedule . Our 

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nuclear nonproliferation and 

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counterterrorism programs are advancing 

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technologies and partnerships that are 

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responsive to today's global 

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environment . We are preparing for the 

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future by revitalizing our 

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infrastructure and staying at the 

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cutting edge and select science and 

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technology . NN Sas Fy 2025 

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budget request of $25 billion reflects 

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this these priorities , the nuclear 

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weapons program of record has grown 

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from 5 to 7 systems to be delivered or 

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in active production within the next 

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decade . This request supports all 

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those systems with the exception of 

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Slick Em in just due to the timing of 

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the 2025 budget request and the fy 

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2024 NDA A . However , N NSA is 

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fully committed to fulfilling the Slick 

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um in requirement . These seven systems 

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represent modernized weapons for all 

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three legs of the trium and the new 

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capabilities responsive to today's 

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security environment . Additionally , 

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the request supports two phase one 

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studies to prepare to meet future 

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deterrent needs to deliver this 

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demanding schedule . N NSA is 

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prioritizing infrastructure investments 

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to get needed capabilities completed on 

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time while also pursuing a longer term 

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strategy of a responsive , flexible and 

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resilient enterprise . High priority 

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projects include the pit production 

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facilities at Los Alamos and Savannah 

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River and the uranium and lithium 

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processing facilities at Y 12 . Our 

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defense nuclear nonproliferation 

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activities are also responding to 

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today's global dynamic and anticipating 

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the future . In summary , N NSA is 

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hoist is holistically supporting 

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nuclear deterrence and strengthening 

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relationships with our allies and 

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partners . There's a lot of work ahead 

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and we appreciate your support . Thank 

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you . I look forward to your questions . 

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Chairman King , ranking member Fisher , 

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distinguished members of the 

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sub-committee . Thank you for the 

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opportunity to testify today . Your 

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support for the naval reactors enables 

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my team to design , operate and 

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maintain a globally deployed force of 

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submarines and aircraft carriers that 

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reliably and consistently carry out our 

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national security missions around the 

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world . Today , the US Navy's nuclear 

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power warships are operating alongside 

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our allies and partners in hostile 

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regions providing forward presence and 

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safeguarding stability in a world that 

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is increasingly tense . Our global 

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presence continues to be supported by 

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strong allies and relationships through 

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the Aus Agreement . The United States , 

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United Kingdom and Australia have 

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demonstrated a trilateral commitment to 

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a free and open Indo Pacific region . 

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While expanding the region of 

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effectiveness of all three nations 

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military forces , naval reactors has 

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delivered the advanced technology that 

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provides our fleet competitive edge in 

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the maritime environment through 

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investment in research and development . 

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In the past decades , our talented 

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people , our peerless technology and 

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our state of the art facilities give us 

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the ability to operate submarines and 

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carriers wherever and whenever we 

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choose , we must step up this 

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investment if we want to sustain and 

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exploit that advantage . My budget 

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request for fiscal year 25 is 2.12 

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billion and invest in each of the 

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following three carriers , three areas 

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and two priority projects . First , my 

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request supports our most important 

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resource . Our people , the talented 

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and dedicated people within the naval 

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nuclear propulsion enterprise are 

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essential to the management and 

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oversight of the important work we 

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perform for our nation . Second , the 

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budget reflects continued investment in 

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R and D of technology to support our 

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current and future fleet to 

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substantively lower costs , reduce 

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construction timelines and add fleet 

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capability . Finally , my request focus 

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on investment to modernize the critical 

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infrastructure throughout our 70 plus 

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year Department of Energy Laboratories 

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and address our legacy environmental 

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liabilities . I'm also seeking our 

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continued support for two national 

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priority projects . The first continued 

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development of the reactor plan for the 

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Columbia class ballistic missile 

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submarine directly supporting the 

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Navy's number one acquisition priority . 

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The second project is continued 

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construction of the naval spent fuel 

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handling facility in Idaho which 

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enables long term reliable processing 

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and packaging of spent fuel from the 

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navy's nuclear fleet . In closing your 

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strong and enduring support enables 

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naval reactors to provide the nation a 

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nuclear power fleet that is unrivaled . 

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I respectfully urge your endorsement of 

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our fiscal year 25 budget request . 

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Thank you . Thank you , Admiral Mr 

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White . You must have one of the 

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toughest jobs in the federal government . 

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Give us an update . Thank you , Senator , 

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um Chairman King , ranking member 

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Fisher . It's an honor to appear before 

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you . The em mission reflects the 

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United States commitment to cleaning up 

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the environmental legacy of national 

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defense programs that helped end World 

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War two and the Cold War . While our 

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mission is rooted in the past , we're 

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very much focused on the future clean 

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up progress at the Savannah riverside 

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in South Carolina , for example , is 

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leading to a greater role for N NSA . 

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There . Clean up accomplishments are 

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boosting the clean energy economy in 

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Tennessee and helping the Oak Ridge 

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National Laboratory and the Y 12 

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National Security Complex prepare for 

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expanding national security and 

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research missions as buildings like the 

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Biology complex have come down . 

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National security and science missions 

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have the space to be built up . The 

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budget requests positions em to deliver 

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on these and other priorities that 

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drive risk reduction progress , skyline 

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changes and help us ramp up tank waste 

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treatment , which is the largest part 

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of the environmental liability that you 

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mentioned earlier in Washington . 

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800,000 gallons of tank waste have been 

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treated at Hanford and will ultimately 

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be stabilized in glass . The waste 

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treatment plant melters have reached 

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operational temperature and have been 

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used to pour the first containers of 

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test class from both melters . The test 

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bed initiative is advancing as another 

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potential option to accelerate the 

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Hanford tank waste mission through 

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commercial grouting and disposal . In 

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parallel , we've reached a breakthrough 

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agreement with the state of Washington 

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and the EPA that charts a safe and 

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achievable path for the Hanford tank 

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waste mission . The fy 25 request is 

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consistent with this agreement which 

281
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will enable us to begin addressing 

282
00:10:28,200 --> 00:10:30,200
Hanford's high level tank waste and 

283
00:10:30,200 --> 00:10:32,367
achieve risk reduction while exploring 

284
00:10:32,367 --> 00:10:34,478
alternative treatment technologies to 

285
00:10:34,478 --> 00:10:36,422
accelerate our work on ems largest 

286
00:10:36,422 --> 00:10:38,478
environmental liability . By turning 

287
00:10:38,478 --> 00:10:40,256
this corner with our regulatory 

288
00:10:40,256 --> 00:10:42,478
partners . We hope to aggressively move 

289
00:10:42,478 --> 00:10:42,150
forward with our mission at Hanford . 

290
00:10:42,169 --> 00:10:44,113
Honoring our responsibility to the 

291
00:10:44,113 --> 00:10:46,225
environment and our commitment to the 

292
00:10:46,225 --> 00:10:48,169
communities and the tribal nations 

293
00:10:48,169 --> 00:10:50,225
around the site . Demolition efforts 

294
00:10:50,225 --> 00:10:52,447
across em are also moving forward after 

295
00:10:52,447 --> 00:10:54,447
bringing down four buildings at the 

296
00:10:54,447 --> 00:10:56,780
Nevada National security site last year , 

297
00:10:56,780 --> 00:10:56,650
we'll continue reducing our footprint 

298
00:10:56,659 --> 00:10:58,881
as we work to complete the legacy clean 

299
00:10:58,881 --> 00:11:00,992
up there within a decade . Demolition 

300
00:11:00,992 --> 00:11:03,048
work at West Valley in New York will 

301
00:11:03,048 --> 00:11:04,992
advance as well as clean up of the 

302
00:11:04,992 --> 00:11:06,881
highest risk excess facilities in 

303
00:11:06,881 --> 00:11:08,992
Tennessee . This request also enables 

304
00:11:08,992 --> 00:11:10,826
continued shipments to the waste 

305
00:11:10,826 --> 00:11:12,937
isolation pilot plant as we modernize 

306
00:11:12,937 --> 00:11:15,103
the facility to meet the needs of both 

307
00:11:15,103 --> 00:11:17,437
clean up and national security programs . 

308
00:11:17,437 --> 00:11:19,437
While significant progress has been 

309
00:11:19,437 --> 00:11:18,609
made , we're always looking at 

310
00:11:18,619 --> 00:11:20,690
opportunities to improve the budget 

311
00:11:20,700 --> 00:11:22,311
request allows for continued 

312
00:11:22,311 --> 00:11:24,533
improvement to the rigor of program and 

313
00:11:24,533 --> 00:11:26,200
project management as well as 

314
00:11:26,200 --> 00:11:28,144
opportunities to progress clean up 

315
00:11:28,144 --> 00:11:30,089
safely and more efficiently . This 

316
00:11:30,089 --> 00:11:31,978
includes technology development , 

317
00:11:31,978 --> 00:11:33,700
targeted R and D investments , 

318
00:11:33,700 --> 00:11:35,867
evaluation of cost effective treatment 

319
00:11:35,867 --> 00:11:37,811
options and investment in building 

320
00:11:37,811 --> 00:11:39,867
future workforce pipelines . I thank 

321
00:11:39,867 --> 00:11:41,922
the sub-committee for its historical 

322
00:11:41,922 --> 00:11:41,330
support of our pro program and our 

323
00:11:41,340 --> 00:11:43,284
mission and I look forward to your 

324
00:11:43,284 --> 00:11:45,960
questions . Thank you . You'll notice 

325
00:11:46,299 --> 00:11:48,466
the vice chair and I are the only ones 

326
00:11:48,466 --> 00:11:50,410
here and I want to explain that uh 

327
00:11:50,410 --> 00:11:52,729
we're hoping that someone with an A I 

328
00:11:52,739 --> 00:11:54,517
capacity will figure out how to 

329
00:11:54,517 --> 00:11:57,619
schedule the Senate . Uh It's not 

330
00:11:57,630 --> 00:11:59,797
uncommon for us to have three hearings 

331
00:11:59,797 --> 00:12:01,963
scheduled at the same time and I think 

332
00:12:01,963 --> 00:12:04,074
that's happened this afternoon on top 

333
00:12:04,074 --> 00:12:06,297
of that as a vote on the Senate floor . 

334
00:12:06,297 --> 00:12:08,352
So , but be assured , uh we all know 

335
00:12:08,352 --> 00:12:10,186
these people and they are keenly 

336
00:12:10,186 --> 00:12:12,463
interested in what , what you're doing . 

337
00:12:12,463 --> 00:12:15,080
Um uh Administrator 

338
00:12:15,090 --> 00:12:18,919
Ruby uh is Savannah River a , a 

339
00:12:18,929 --> 00:12:21,909
practical project ? Is it , are we ever , 

340
00:12:22,010 --> 00:12:24,066
is it , is it going to be able to be 

341
00:12:24,066 --> 00:12:26,320
brought in at a reasonable time at , at 

342
00:12:26,330 --> 00:12:28,640
a reasonable cost that the numbers keep 

343
00:12:28,650 --> 00:12:30,928
going up and the date keeps moving out . 

344
00:12:30,928 --> 00:12:33,039
Give me an update on Savannah River . 

345
00:12:33,429 --> 00:12:35,540
Yeah , thank you , Senator King . I , 

346
00:12:35,540 --> 00:12:37,729
I'd be happy to um in short , I would 

347
00:12:37,739 --> 00:12:40,840
just say ab absolutely . Uh It's a 

348
00:12:40,849 --> 00:12:43,289
practical project and real progress is 

349
00:12:43,299 --> 00:12:47,090
being made . Uh uh We have um 

350
00:12:47,099 --> 00:12:49,570
we've done a lot of things uh to make 

351
00:12:49,580 --> 00:12:53,099
this project more realizable . Uh uh 

352
00:12:53,289 --> 00:12:56,849
uh But the costs have gone up . Uh We 

353
00:12:56,859 --> 00:12:59,081
have much , I have much more confidence 

354
00:12:59,081 --> 00:13:01,248
in the cost . I think we all have much 

355
00:13:01,248 --> 00:13:03,248
more confidence in the cost and the 

356
00:13:03,248 --> 00:13:05,081
time uh and the time estimate to 

357
00:13:05,081 --> 00:13:07,026
complete this . Our goal now is to 

358
00:13:07,026 --> 00:13:09,248
complete construction of Savannah River 

359
00:13:09,248 --> 00:13:13,190
uh by I I in tw in twe in 2032 . Uh And 

360
00:13:13,200 --> 00:13:15,256
then to start the process to do rate 

361
00:13:15,256 --> 00:13:17,422
production and have that complete in , 

362
00:13:17,422 --> 00:13:21,390
in 2030 35 or 2036 is is going 

363
00:13:21,400 --> 00:13:23,456
to be able to meet the , the , the , 

364
00:13:23,456 --> 00:13:25,678
the demand that we have for pits in the 

365
00:13:25,678 --> 00:13:27,859
meantime , they are so Los Alamos will 

366
00:13:27,869 --> 00:13:30,700
be producing 30 pits per year in , in 

367
00:13:30,710 --> 00:13:34,390
2028 for the W 87 dash roll war 

368
00:13:34,679 --> 00:13:36,735
been already produced this year . Is 

369
00:13:36,735 --> 00:13:38,979
that correct ? We have , uh , we , 

370
00:13:38,989 --> 00:13:42,010
we've made pits at Los Alamos . Uh We 

371
00:13:42,020 --> 00:13:44,131
have not , we're gonna make our first 

372
00:13:44,131 --> 00:13:46,640
fully wr certified war reserve , 

373
00:13:46,650 --> 00:13:48,872
certified diamond stamped as we call it 

374
00:13:48,872 --> 00:13:52,780
uh pit this year . Uh but we made uh 

375
00:13:52,789 --> 00:13:56,359
nine com complete pits last year plus 

376
00:13:56,369 --> 00:13:58,989
five developmental pits last year at 

377
00:13:59,000 --> 00:14:02,570
Los Alamos . So we're feeling uh a lot 

378
00:14:02,580 --> 00:14:04,747
more confidence in our ability to make 

379
00:14:04,747 --> 00:14:07,130
pits there repeatedly . We'll get our 

380
00:14:07,140 --> 00:14:09,307
certification . We'll be on our path . 

381
00:14:09,307 --> 00:14:11,820
Uh We have a uh a very , um you know , 

382
00:14:11,830 --> 00:14:14,330
detailed schedule path for 30 pits per 

383
00:14:14,340 --> 00:14:16,396
year at Los Alamos . Let me , let me 

384
00:14:16,396 --> 00:14:18,396
change the subject . Uh One of your 

385
00:14:18,396 --> 00:14:20,229
areas that you mentioned is , is 

386
00:14:20,229 --> 00:14:22,909
nonproliferation . One of my biggest 

387
00:14:22,919 --> 00:14:25,090
concerns is nuclear material falling 

388
00:14:25,099 --> 00:14:27,549
into the hands of terrorists in an open 

389
00:14:27,559 --> 00:14:30,070
setting . What can you tell us about 

390
00:14:31,090 --> 00:14:33,090
what steps are underway in order to 

391
00:14:33,090 --> 00:14:35,201
prevent that from happening ? We have 

392
00:14:35,201 --> 00:14:37,146
nuclear states , some of which are 

393
00:14:37,150 --> 00:14:39,640
rather unstable . Uh We have a nuclear 

394
00:14:39,650 --> 00:14:41,539
state that seems inclined to sell 

395
00:14:41,539 --> 00:14:44,770
things . Um That's the nightmare 

396
00:14:44,780 --> 00:14:46,502
because we've all talked about 

397
00:14:46,502 --> 00:14:48,558
deterrence , deterrence doesn't work 

398
00:14:48,558 --> 00:14:50,613
with a terrorist . They don't have a 

399
00:14:50,613 --> 00:14:52,724
capital city that is at risk and they 

400
00:14:52,724 --> 00:14:54,947
don't care about dying . So we're going 

401
00:14:54,947 --> 00:14:57,169
to have to rely on nonproliferation and 

402
00:14:57,169 --> 00:14:59,391
intelligence . But what can you tell us 

403
00:14:59,391 --> 00:15:01,869
in an open setting about dealing with 

404
00:15:01,880 --> 00:15:04,450
that issue . Well , we work with 

405
00:15:04,460 --> 00:15:06,460
everybody that we can to get rid of 

406
00:15:06,460 --> 00:15:08,609
weapon , usable material or materials 

407
00:15:08,619 --> 00:15:11,969
that we make bombs . Uh terrorists are 

408
00:15:11,979 --> 00:15:14,609
usually not in that group . Uh So what 

409
00:15:14,619 --> 00:15:18,320
we do is we work with our allies and 

410
00:15:18,330 --> 00:15:20,320
partners to make sure we have very 

411
00:15:20,330 --> 00:15:23,840
strong border uh protection and 

412
00:15:23,849 --> 00:15:26,239
crossing so any illicit movement of 

413
00:15:26,250 --> 00:15:28,690
materials . Uh and we , you know , we 

414
00:15:28,700 --> 00:15:31,469
have , fortunately or it depends on how 

415
00:15:31,479 --> 00:15:33,701
you think about it . But in this case , 

416
00:15:33,701 --> 00:15:36,140
fortunately , we have allies that live 

417
00:15:36,150 --> 00:15:38,140
in bad neighborhoods around these 

418
00:15:38,150 --> 00:15:40,859
places where terrorist cells exist and 

419
00:15:40,869 --> 00:15:43,440
we have a strong collaborations with 

420
00:15:43,450 --> 00:15:45,506
them to make sure we can detect , we 

421
00:15:45,506 --> 00:15:47,506
have technology that can detect the 

422
00:15:47,506 --> 00:15:50,070
movement of nuclear material . Uh 

423
00:15:50,789 --> 00:15:53,011
somewhat , we're in an open setting but 

424
00:15:53,011 --> 00:15:54,845
in so far as you can answer that 

425
00:15:54,845 --> 00:15:56,789
question , yeah , somewhat . Uh it 

426
00:15:56,789 --> 00:15:59,159
depends on the amount and it depends on 

427
00:15:59,169 --> 00:16:01,391
whether or not they shield it . There's 

428
00:16:01,391 --> 00:16:03,489
lots of , you know , lots of details 

429
00:16:03,500 --> 00:16:05,667
that matter , but we certainly work on 

430
00:16:05,667 --> 00:16:07,889
those technologies and we deploy them . 

431
00:16:07,889 --> 00:16:10,056
Uh you know , frequently when we think 

432
00:16:10,056 --> 00:16:12,278
they'll be effective and where we think 

433
00:16:12,278 --> 00:16:15,489
they'll be effective . I'm , I'm gonna 

434
00:16:15,500 --> 00:16:17,770
start with you admiral , but we'll come 

435
00:16:17,780 --> 00:16:20,049
back in a , in a second round . Um 

436
00:16:22,059 --> 00:16:24,226
I worry about the submarine industrial 

437
00:16:24,226 --> 00:16:26,669
base . We're , we're barely building a 

438
00:16:26,679 --> 00:16:29,210
submarine a year . And if you add Aus , 

439
00:16:29,429 --> 00:16:31,596
I just don't know who's going to build 

440
00:16:31,596 --> 00:16:33,818
those submarines . Is that a concern of 

441
00:16:33,818 --> 00:16:36,151
yours ? And what do we do to address it ? 

442
00:16:36,640 --> 00:16:39,500
Uh uh Chairman uh obviously uh 

443
00:16:39,510 --> 00:16:41,510
construction of submarines , career 

444
00:16:41,510 --> 00:16:43,621
submarine or it's near and dear to my 

445
00:16:43,621 --> 00:16:45,677
heart . Um With the Columbia and the 

446
00:16:45,677 --> 00:16:47,843
Virginia class , the one plus two , we 

447
00:16:47,843 --> 00:16:50,020
have invested heavily as a navy in the 

448
00:16:50,030 --> 00:16:52,520
submarine industrial base to build that 

449
00:16:52,530 --> 00:16:56,190
cadence and really helping those sub 

450
00:16:56,239 --> 00:16:59,820
tier uh suppliers that actually 

451
00:16:59,830 --> 00:17:03,049
feed our prime shipyards to build those 

452
00:17:03,059 --> 00:17:06,510
submarines is really key . And um we 

453
00:17:06,520 --> 00:17:09,160
are fully committed to that and your 

454
00:17:09,170 --> 00:17:11,392
investment on the navy is significant . 

455
00:17:11,392 --> 00:17:13,829
Do your current fiveyear plan indicate 

456
00:17:13,839 --> 00:17:15,950
that we're going to have the capacity 

457
00:17:15,950 --> 00:17:18,117
to build the submarines that we , that 

458
00:17:18,117 --> 00:17:21,670
we hope to um by for my uh naval 

459
00:17:21,680 --> 00:17:24,030
reactors . Hat on my doe side . 

460
00:17:24,040 --> 00:17:26,849
Absolutely . And for the navy side 

461
00:17:26,859 --> 00:17:28,859
right now , we are progressing on a 

462
00:17:28,859 --> 00:17:30,170
plan to get to 

463
00:17:30,500 --> 00:17:33,550
2.0 by 

464
00:17:33,560 --> 00:17:36,589
28 and 2.33 by 

465
00:17:36,599 --> 00:17:39,760
32 which corresponds to the time that 

466
00:17:39,770 --> 00:17:41,979
we would be delivering the first um 

467
00:17:41,989 --> 00:17:45,520
submarine purchased by Australia , 

468
00:17:45,530 --> 00:17:47,510
that's going to take some serious 

469
00:17:47,520 --> 00:17:50,000
workforce . It's significant work . If 

470
00:17:50,010 --> 00:17:53,020
you look at what we have done in 2014 , 

471
00:17:53,229 --> 00:17:55,790
we're building a single Virginia and in 

472
00:17:55,800 --> 00:17:59,050
2024 we're building two Virginias that 

473
00:17:59,060 --> 00:18:02,680
are 25% bigger than the Virginias we're 

474
00:18:02,689 --> 00:18:05,530
building in 2014 . And we've added on 

475
00:18:05,540 --> 00:18:08,250
top of that , the Columbia class , 

476
00:18:08,459 --> 00:18:10,609
which is 2.5 times that original 

477
00:18:10,619 --> 00:18:12,949
Virginia . So we have increased by 

478
00:18:12,959 --> 00:18:15,569
fivefold , the tonnage we're building 

479
00:18:15,579 --> 00:18:18,229
on submarines in the middle of COVID in 

480
00:18:18,239 --> 00:18:21,829
the middle of supply chain issues and 

481
00:18:21,839 --> 00:18:23,950
we are progressing on that . And that 

482
00:18:23,950 --> 00:18:26,530
is why the navy is so invested in the 

483
00:18:26,540 --> 00:18:28,729
submarine industrial base to improve 

484
00:18:28,739 --> 00:18:31,410
that cadence on submarine construction , 

485
00:18:31,420 --> 00:18:33,420
which is absolutely critical to the 

486
00:18:33,420 --> 00:18:35,642
roles submarines play for our strategic 

487
00:18:35,642 --> 00:18:38,000
deterrence and also in the Western 

488
00:18:38,010 --> 00:18:40,520
Pacific . Thank you , Admiral Senator 

489
00:18:40,530 --> 00:18:43,630
Fisher . Thank you , Mr Chairman . As 

490
00:18:43,640 --> 00:18:45,529
members of this sub-committee are 

491
00:18:45,529 --> 00:18:48,550
acutely aware . N NSA has extensive 

492
00:18:48,560 --> 00:18:50,560
infrastructure needs . Some of your 

493
00:18:50,569 --> 00:18:52,680
facilities date back to the Manhattan 

494
00:18:52,680 --> 00:18:54,770
project and budget constraints and 

495
00:18:54,780 --> 00:18:56,869
uneven performance on past 

496
00:18:56,880 --> 00:18:59,265
recapitalization effort have increased 

497
00:18:59,275 --> 00:19:01,185
the level of risk to the nuclear 

498
00:19:01,194 --> 00:19:03,295
enterprise administrator . Can you 

499
00:19:03,305 --> 00:19:05,416
provide this committee with an update 

500
00:19:05,416 --> 00:19:08,635
on the ongoing capital asset projects , 

501
00:19:08,645 --> 00:19:11,354
particularly the new facilities planned 

502
00:19:11,375 --> 00:19:13,685
for the process processing of the 

503
00:19:13,694 --> 00:19:17,420
critical minerals ? Ok . Um 

504
00:19:17,430 --> 00:19:20,030
Thank you . Um So your pleasure . Uh 

505
00:19:20,160 --> 00:19:24,030
Yeah , we have , we do have 

506
00:19:24,040 --> 00:19:26,020
a lot of infrastructure projects 

507
00:19:26,030 --> 00:19:27,752
underway . Um Our , our um our 

508
00:19:27,752 --> 00:19:30,260
strategy 

509
00:19:32,310 --> 00:19:34,500
uh is to try is to start keeping them 

510
00:19:34,520 --> 00:19:37,699
done and then as opposed to start them 

511
00:19:37,709 --> 00:19:41,000
all at the same time . Uh And so we've 

512
00:19:41,010 --> 00:19:44,089
been uh we've been very um stringent 

513
00:19:44,099 --> 00:19:46,420
on our prioritization of these 

514
00:19:46,430 --> 00:19:48,430
facilities and we're doing this for 

515
00:19:48,430 --> 00:19:51,560
reasons why we need them . So we , we , 

516
00:19:51,569 --> 00:19:53,719
we , we need them to get our weapons 

517
00:19:53,729 --> 00:19:56,069
done . And , and the second thing is 

518
00:19:56,079 --> 00:19:58,190
it's cheaper if you can get them done 

519
00:19:58,190 --> 00:20:00,357
than if you just continue to drag them 

520
00:20:00,357 --> 00:20:02,357
out . We've seen cost increase as a 

521
00:20:02,357 --> 00:20:04,500
result of that just by keeping people 

522
00:20:04,510 --> 00:20:07,189
on roll , that might not be at their 

523
00:20:07,199 --> 00:20:09,780
full capacity . So we have a plan to 

524
00:20:09,790 --> 00:20:12,119
get uh projects finished now with 

525
00:20:12,130 --> 00:20:14,520
respect to critical uh minerals . Can I 

526
00:20:14,530 --> 00:20:16,760
ask you what the priority is on the 

527
00:20:16,770 --> 00:20:18,437
facilities ? Which one you're 

528
00:20:18,437 --> 00:20:20,760
prioritizing some do similar uh 

529
00:20:20,770 --> 00:20:22,900
minerals obviously , but most of them 

530
00:20:22,910 --> 00:20:25,021
are doing different ones , right ? So 

531
00:20:25,021 --> 00:20:27,132
the our , our highest priority is pet 

532
00:20:27,140 --> 00:20:29,920
production . Uh So the two facilities , 

533
00:20:29,930 --> 00:20:32,041
one at Los Alamos and one at Savannah 

534
00:20:32,041 --> 00:20:34,589
River . Uh the other facility that 

535
00:20:34,599 --> 00:20:36,760
we're , we're , we're pushing towards 

536
00:20:36,770 --> 00:20:38,826
completion is the uranium processing 

537
00:20:38,826 --> 00:20:41,280
facility at Y 12 . And the next most 

538
00:20:41,290 --> 00:20:44,050
crucial facility from a single point of 

539
00:20:44,060 --> 00:20:46,004
failure perspective is our lithium 

540
00:20:46,004 --> 00:20:48,449
processing facility at Y 12 . In 

541
00:20:48,459 --> 00:20:50,348
addition , we have high explosive 

542
00:20:50,348 --> 00:20:52,520
facilities underway which are also um 

543
00:20:52,530 --> 00:20:55,479
uh critical um to be able to produce 

544
00:20:55,489 --> 00:20:57,979
the weapons that we have . Um we have 

545
00:20:57,989 --> 00:21:01,790
lined up . Did you wanna give 

546
00:21:01,800 --> 00:21:03,967
us uh did you wanna finish your , your 

547
00:21:03,967 --> 00:21:06,022
first comment when I ? Well , I just 

548
00:21:06,022 --> 00:21:08,650
think that with RE II , I wanted to um 

549
00:21:08,660 --> 00:21:12,449
say more newer to our discussions , the 

550
00:21:12,459 --> 00:21:14,292
fact that we broke ground on the 

551
00:21:14,292 --> 00:21:17,010
lithium processing facility . Uh And uh 

552
00:21:17,020 --> 00:21:19,359
this facility is that at Y 12 that is 

553
00:21:19,369 --> 00:21:22,449
at Y 12 . Uh It re it replaces a , a 

554
00:21:22,459 --> 00:21:26,050
very old and , and facility that has 

555
00:21:26,060 --> 00:21:28,609
some serious both safety and structural 

556
00:21:28,619 --> 00:21:32,569
issues . Uh And so we um we'll 

557
00:21:32,579 --> 00:21:34,523
be talking about that in the years 

558
00:21:34,523 --> 00:21:37,069
ahead . Uh And I think it's also to the 

559
00:21:37,079 --> 00:21:40,680
point that Senator King made earlier to 

560
00:21:40,689 --> 00:21:42,959
get these pit production facilities 

561
00:21:42,969 --> 00:21:46,660
done is gonna require uh fast , is 

562
00:21:46,670 --> 00:21:48,781
gonna require higher investments over 

563
00:21:48,781 --> 00:21:50,781
shorter periods of time . So you're 

564
00:21:50,781 --> 00:21:53,003
gonna , you don't see that in the fy 25 

565
00:21:53,003 --> 00:21:55,400
request too much , but II I will , I 

566
00:21:55,410 --> 00:21:57,299
think it's coming and out your re 

567
00:21:57,299 --> 00:22:00,689
request . Thank you uh administrator 

568
00:22:00,699 --> 00:22:03,359
and Admiral between the Aus Agreement 

569
00:22:03,369 --> 00:22:05,591
and the possibility that we're going to 

570
00:22:05,591 --> 00:22:07,849
need to increase the number of planned 

571
00:22:07,859 --> 00:22:10,880
hulls for Columbia class Virginia class 

572
00:22:10,890 --> 00:22:14,640
or SNNSSNX submarines . 

573
00:22:14,650 --> 00:22:16,539
How are we managing the increased 

574
00:22:16,539 --> 00:22:19,250
demand for the highly enriched uranium 

575
00:22:19,260 --> 00:22:21,660
for the naval reactors ? Do we need to 

576
00:22:22,189 --> 00:22:25,140
put plans forward uh for any new 

577
00:22:25,150 --> 00:22:28,680
enrichment facilities ? The highly 

578
00:22:28,689 --> 00:22:30,911
enriched uranium supply is projected to 

579
00:22:30,920 --> 00:22:33,119
last to the 20 fifties . Even with 

580
00:22:33,130 --> 00:22:35,650
these increased demands , we are well 

581
00:22:35,660 --> 00:22:37,882
aware of that na actors is working very 

582
00:22:37,882 --> 00:22:41,020
closely with the N NSA and doe because 

583
00:22:41,030 --> 00:22:43,141
as you know , we're , we're currently 

584
00:22:43,141 --> 00:22:45,141
getting our highly enriched uranium 

585
00:22:45,141 --> 00:22:47,489
from older nuclear weapons that we're 

586
00:22:47,500 --> 00:22:49,611
reprocessing . So it's something that 

587
00:22:49,611 --> 00:22:51,900
has our attention . We have to develop 

588
00:22:51,910 --> 00:22:54,150
a plan to do that . Um And we're 

589
00:22:54,160 --> 00:22:55,993
watching that very closely , the 

590
00:22:55,993 --> 00:22:58,216
increased demands from AUS we've looked 

591
00:22:58,216 --> 00:23:00,609
at that . It's very , very small in the 

592
00:23:00,619 --> 00:23:03,939
overall scheme . The bigger thing is is 

593
00:23:03,949 --> 00:23:06,699
that we have to get the capability in 

594
00:23:06,709 --> 00:23:10,599
time to support about 2 to 3 metric ton 

595
00:23:10,609 --> 00:23:13,130
delivery to support our fleet needs in 

596
00:23:13,140 --> 00:23:15,251
the 20 fifties and we're working very 

597
00:23:15,251 --> 00:23:18,500
close . Thank you . Thank you , Mr 

598
00:23:18,510 --> 00:23:22,329
Chair Admiral . I visit the 

599
00:23:22,339 --> 00:23:24,561
Portman Table Shipyard fairly regularly 

600
00:23:24,561 --> 00:23:26,450
and always climb down in a , in a 

601
00:23:26,450 --> 00:23:28,770
submarine that's under overhaul . 

602
00:23:30,359 --> 00:23:32,192
By the way , I flunk the virtual 

603
00:23:32,192 --> 00:23:34,569
welding test every time I keep trying , 

604
00:23:34,579 --> 00:23:37,540
but it's very difficult anyway . Um 

605
00:23:39,569 --> 00:23:41,458
Are you doing any thought in your 

606
00:23:41,458 --> 00:23:45,069
design to accelerating the overhaul 

607
00:23:45,079 --> 00:23:47,729
process ? I'm , I'm concerned about 

608
00:23:47,739 --> 00:23:50,099
availability of these very expensive 

609
00:23:50,109 --> 00:23:53,069
assets and how much time they have to 

610
00:23:53,079 --> 00:23:56,739
spend in dry dock ? Uh Are there , 

611
00:23:56,760 --> 00:23:59,079
for example , uh Senator Fisher and I 

612
00:23:59,089 --> 00:24:01,369
were in North Dakota and we went down 

613
00:24:01,380 --> 00:24:03,324
into the missile field and the old 

614
00:24:03,324 --> 00:24:05,380
missiles , you've had to practically 

615
00:24:05,380 --> 00:24:07,491
take them all apart to get to some of 

616
00:24:07,491 --> 00:24:09,713
the pieces that needed maintenance . Is 

617
00:24:09,713 --> 00:24:11,880
this something that you think about in 

618
00:24:11,880 --> 00:24:13,991
the design of the submarines in order 

619
00:24:13,991 --> 00:24:15,991
to get them in and out of , of , of 

620
00:24:15,991 --> 00:24:17,939
overhaul on a more accelerated 

621
00:24:17,949 --> 00:24:21,939
timetable ? Yes , Senator , that was 

622
00:24:21,949 --> 00:24:24,116
my first time . I met you . You were a 

623
00:24:24,116 --> 00:24:26,227
governor and we commissioned the main 

624
00:24:26,227 --> 00:24:28,449
up in the Portsmouth shipyard . So it's 

625
00:24:28,449 --> 00:24:30,505
an incredible shipyard . It's one of 

626
00:24:30,505 --> 00:24:32,727
our leading submarine shipyards there . 

627
00:24:32,727 --> 00:24:34,949
It's a tremendous uh uh site and I will 

628
00:24:34,949 --> 00:24:37,171
tell you we from the nuclear propulsion 

629
00:24:37,171 --> 00:24:39,329
side are doing everything we can to 

630
00:24:39,380 --> 00:24:42,489
expedite those . Um We play a part in 

631
00:24:42,500 --> 00:24:45,270
the submarine overhaul , a large large 

632
00:24:45,280 --> 00:24:47,670
portion of it . Um We are working with 

633
00:24:47,680 --> 00:24:50,729
our inc to do a once in the life of the 

634
00:24:50,739 --> 00:24:52,890
ship upgrade on that . Um We have a 

635
00:24:52,900 --> 00:24:55,040
very robust design on that . We are 

636
00:24:55,050 --> 00:24:57,217
looking at maintenance activities such 

637
00:24:57,217 --> 00:24:59,439
as our media discharges to do a once in 

638
00:24:59,439 --> 00:25:01,619
life . And we are pushing technology . 

639
00:25:01,829 --> 00:25:03,885
We have invested heavily in additive 

640
00:25:03,885 --> 00:25:05,829
manufacturing because from a naval 

641
00:25:05,829 --> 00:25:07,979
reactor standpoint , I own both the 

642
00:25:07,989 --> 00:25:11,425
technical requirements and I also own 

643
00:25:11,574 --> 00:25:13,744
the financial levers to Paul . And I'm 

644
00:25:13,755 --> 00:25:15,944
actually leading the way for NAF C and 

645
00:25:15,954 --> 00:25:18,045
I have components now that are being 

646
00:25:18,055 --> 00:25:19,999
additively manufactured , that are 

647
00:25:19,999 --> 00:25:21,999
going into our primary plants , our 

648
00:25:21,999 --> 00:25:24,834
reactor plants to lead the way . So we 

649
00:25:24,844 --> 00:25:27,066
are trying to accelerate that because I 

650
00:25:27,066 --> 00:25:29,066
see the same thing . It's more than 

651
00:25:29,066 --> 00:25:31,011
just shipbuilding . It's that ship 

652
00:25:31,011 --> 00:25:33,229
repair and ship sustainment . Well , 

653
00:25:33,239 --> 00:25:35,128
I'm glad to hear about the uh the 

654
00:25:35,128 --> 00:25:37,260
attitude manufacturing . My belief is 

655
00:25:37,270 --> 00:25:39,359
that there should be a 3d printer on 

656
00:25:39,369 --> 00:25:41,839
every ship and in every hangar and that 

657
00:25:41,849 --> 00:25:44,189
we should be buying the IP when we buy 

658
00:25:44,959 --> 00:25:48,300
a platform so that we can maintain and 

659
00:25:48,310 --> 00:25:50,660
build parts in a much , much more 

660
00:25:50,670 --> 00:25:53,060
efficient way . I absolutely agree . 

661
00:25:53,069 --> 00:25:55,770
The carriers do have printers on them . 

662
00:25:55,780 --> 00:25:57,836
Some of our submarines have actually 

663
00:25:57,836 --> 00:25:59,613
deployed with printers and they 

664
00:25:59,613 --> 00:26:01,836
actually additively made , manufactured 

665
00:26:01,836 --> 00:26:03,947
some components already for that . We 

666
00:26:03,947 --> 00:26:06,599
need to expand that and it's more about 

667
00:26:06,609 --> 00:26:10,099
speed now than it is so much 

668
00:26:10,109 --> 00:26:13,540
about the process you use . And we find 

669
00:26:13,550 --> 00:26:16,170
with additive manufacturing that it 

670
00:26:16,180 --> 00:26:19,000
takes , it's faster than some of the 

671
00:26:19,010 --> 00:26:21,109
just pure casting , pouring molten 

672
00:26:21,119 --> 00:26:23,510
metal into sand and then removing all 

673
00:26:23,520 --> 00:26:26,689
that excess metal is all that work that 

674
00:26:26,699 --> 00:26:28,969
you have to do is taking away from 

675
00:26:28,979 --> 00:26:31,090
actual production time that you could 

676
00:26:31,090 --> 00:26:33,146
be using for other things . And so I 

677
00:26:33,146 --> 00:26:35,257
absolutely see it the same way as you 

678
00:26:35,257 --> 00:26:37,479
do and we just have to keep on lead the 

679
00:26:37,479 --> 00:26:39,590
way . I appreciate that . And I can't 

680
00:26:39,590 --> 00:26:41,701
resist mentioning that the University 

681
00:26:41,701 --> 00:26:43,868
of Maine has the largest 3d printer in 

682
00:26:43,868 --> 00:26:46,035
the world . And last year they printed 

683
00:26:46,035 --> 00:26:48,300
a house . So it's an amazing technology 

684
00:26:48,310 --> 00:26:50,660
that I think is going to change 

685
00:26:50,670 --> 00:26:52,837
everything , but it could also help us 

686
00:26:52,837 --> 00:26:55,130
with maintenance of our , of our naval 

687
00:26:55,140 --> 00:26:58,390
and in fact , uh air and armed forces 

688
00:26:58,400 --> 00:27:02,060
assets , Mr White , um I 

689
00:27:02,069 --> 00:27:04,180
mentioned in my opening , the cost of 

690
00:27:04,180 --> 00:27:06,920
the estimated cost of half a trillion 

691
00:27:06,930 --> 00:27:09,119
dollars . You mentioned in your 

692
00:27:09,130 --> 00:27:11,099
comments , looking at different 

693
00:27:11,109 --> 00:27:13,369
technologies and techniques . Is there 

694
00:27:13,380 --> 00:27:15,491
any hope of finding technologies that 

695
00:27:15,491 --> 00:27:17,658
will enable us , enable us to meet our 

696
00:27:17,658 --> 00:27:19,713
obligations at the same time , maybe 

697
00:27:19,713 --> 00:27:23,180
chip away at that 505 $100 billion . 

698
00:27:24,579 --> 00:27:26,746
Uh Senator . Thank you for that , that 

699
00:27:26,746 --> 00:27:28,968
question . II , I absolutely think so . 

700
00:27:28,968 --> 00:27:31,023
And I think some of them we're doing 

701
00:27:31,023 --> 00:27:33,190
currently and we're um working uh with 

702
00:27:33,190 --> 00:27:35,246
our state regulators and partners on 

703
00:27:35,246 --> 00:27:37,079
the agreement we just signed . I 

704
00:27:37,079 --> 00:27:39,079
mentioned earlier with the state of 

705
00:27:39,079 --> 00:27:41,079
Washington will allow us to explore 

706
00:27:41,079 --> 00:27:43,246
alternative treatment technologies for 

707
00:27:43,246 --> 00:27:43,050
the bulk of our tank waste there . The 

708
00:27:43,060 --> 00:27:45,160
low activity portion of that um this 

709
00:27:45,170 --> 00:27:47,003
committee supported our test bed 

710
00:27:47,003 --> 00:27:49,114
initiative in the past which looks at 

711
00:27:49,114 --> 00:27:51,114
commercial uh disposal and grouting 

712
00:27:51,114 --> 00:27:53,337
options . And I think just that ability 

713
00:27:53,337 --> 00:27:55,392
alone to , to , to deal with the low 

714
00:27:55,392 --> 00:27:55,189
activity piece of the tank waste in 

715
00:27:55,199 --> 00:27:57,199
that fashion would save hundreds of 

716
00:27:57,199 --> 00:27:59,380
billions of dollars beyond just simply 

717
00:27:59,390 --> 00:28:01,557
um uh vitrifying the waste . There are 

718
00:28:01,557 --> 00:28:03,723
other things we can do that . We're uh 

719
00:28:03,723 --> 00:28:05,890
this committee has supported our R and 

720
00:28:05,890 --> 00:28:07,946
D efforts . Uh looking long range at 

721
00:28:07,946 --> 00:28:09,946
our tank waste mission . One of the 

722
00:28:09,946 --> 00:28:09,400
things folks don't always think about 

723
00:28:09,410 --> 00:28:11,521
in terms of our tank is we have about 

724
00:28:11,521 --> 00:28:13,521
50 million gallons at Hanford . But 

725
00:28:13,521 --> 00:28:15,688
over time , because of the way we have 

726
00:28:15,688 --> 00:28:17,910
to retrieve the waste , we use water to 

727
00:28:17,910 --> 00:28:17,489
retrieve it . You end up having to 

728
00:28:17,500 --> 00:28:19,667
treat about 100 and 50 million gallons 

729
00:28:19,667 --> 00:28:21,667
of waste because you have to create 

730
00:28:21,667 --> 00:28:23,889
more waste as you retrieve what's there 

731
00:28:23,889 --> 00:28:26,111
to be able to treat it . Um Part of our 

732
00:28:26,111 --> 00:28:28,111
R and D effort that we just awarded 

733
00:28:28,111 --> 00:28:30,333
this past year , for example , is going 

734
00:28:30,333 --> 00:28:29,489
to our laboratories to look at 

735
00:28:29,500 --> 00:28:31,611
alternative retrieval technologies so 

736
00:28:31,611 --> 00:28:33,778
that we can reduce the amount of water 

737
00:28:33,778 --> 00:28:35,778
that we have to use in retrieval to 

738
00:28:35,778 --> 00:28:38,000
ultimately be able to reduce the amount 

739
00:28:38,000 --> 00:28:37,790
of tank waste that we have to treat . 

740
00:28:37,800 --> 00:28:40,022
So I think there are opportunities like 

741
00:28:40,022 --> 00:28:42,022
that across the enterprise . Um And 

742
00:28:42,022 --> 00:28:44,356
we're trying to take advantage of those . 

743
00:28:44,356 --> 00:28:46,578
Could you hazard an estimate as to when 

744
00:28:46,578 --> 00:28:48,689
Hanford will be done ? I , I can give 

745
00:28:48,689 --> 00:28:50,800
you an estimate , Senator , but I can 

746
00:28:50,800 --> 00:28:53,022
almost guarantee you that I would be uh 

747
00:28:53,022 --> 00:28:55,078
wrong . I think our best case uh for 

748
00:28:55,078 --> 00:28:57,022
getting done . I if we can uh work 

749
00:28:57,022 --> 00:28:59,189
through our , our technical challenges 

750
00:28:59,189 --> 00:28:58,369
and use alternative treatment 

751
00:28:58,380 --> 00:29:00,780
technologies could be as early as the 

752
00:29:00,790 --> 00:29:03,880
2060 ish time frame . Um I think if we 

753
00:29:03,890 --> 00:29:06,689
use 60 . Yes , sir . Wow . 

754
00:29:09,459 --> 00:29:11,729
And it could otherwise be much longer . 

755
00:29:14,060 --> 00:29:16,116
Keith Richards might be dead by then 

756
00:29:18,689 --> 00:29:21,880
Senator Rosen . On that note . Thank 

757
00:29:21,890 --> 00:29:25,109
you , Mr Chair . Thank you for holding 

758
00:29:25,119 --> 00:29:27,286
this hearing . It's really important . 

759
00:29:27,286 --> 00:29:29,563
Thank you all for the work that you do . 

760
00:29:29,563 --> 00:29:31,730
It's so important to us in Nevada . Um 

761
00:29:31,730 --> 00:29:33,730
As you know , and uh um because the 

762
00:29:33,730 --> 00:29:36,010
Nevada national security site , it has 

763
00:29:36,020 --> 00:29:38,339
been called the battlefield of the Cold 

764
00:29:38,349 --> 00:29:40,293
War and what was then known as the 

765
00:29:40,293 --> 00:29:42,182
Nevada test site . Those of us in 

766
00:29:42,182 --> 00:29:44,238
Nevada still call it the Nevada test 

767
00:29:44,238 --> 00:29:46,127
site . It was ground zero for the 

768
00:29:46,127 --> 00:29:48,293
majority of our nation's nuclear tests 

769
00:29:48,293 --> 00:29:51,609
were 100 atmospheric and 828 

770
00:29:51,619 --> 00:29:53,730
underground tests were conducted from 

771
00:29:53,730 --> 00:29:57,709
1951 to 1992 . We know these tests 

772
00:29:57,719 --> 00:30:00,052
contaminated our soil , our groundwater , 

773
00:30:00,052 --> 00:30:02,349
the facilities in the area and cleanup 

774
00:30:02,359 --> 00:30:05,949
is still ongoing . And so uh Mr White , 

775
00:30:05,959 --> 00:30:08,170
can you please provide us an update on 

776
00:30:08,180 --> 00:30:09,958
the cleanup projects within the 

777
00:30:09,958 --> 00:30:12,124
security site . And uh do you have the 

778
00:30:12,124 --> 00:30:14,458
adequate resources to complete the task ? 

779
00:30:15,229 --> 00:30:17,396
Uh Thank you for that . Uh Senator and 

780
00:30:17,396 --> 00:30:19,562
I , I very much appreciate the support 

781
00:30:19,562 --> 00:30:21,673
from Congress over the last couple of 

782
00:30:21,673 --> 00:30:21,069
years in adding additional funds to our 

783
00:30:21,079 --> 00:30:23,079
clean up budget in Nevada . I think 

784
00:30:23,079 --> 00:30:25,190
that helped us in a couple of cases . 

785
00:30:25,190 --> 00:30:27,412
Um We , we've been able to install more 

786
00:30:27,412 --> 00:30:29,523
robust inspection uh capabilities for 

787
00:30:29,523 --> 00:30:31,746
our disposal activities there and we've 

788
00:30:31,746 --> 00:30:33,968
been able to optimize some of our D and 

789
00:30:33,968 --> 00:30:36,079
D efforts right now . We're very much 

790
00:30:36,079 --> 00:30:37,690
focused on what I think is a 

791
00:30:37,690 --> 00:30:39,746
historically interesting part of the 

792
00:30:39,746 --> 00:30:41,635
site where um some of the nuclear 

793
00:30:41,635 --> 00:30:43,579
rocket work was done . So the test 

794
00:30:43,579 --> 00:30:45,635
cells and the old uh facilities that 

795
00:30:45,635 --> 00:30:48,229
are being uh D and D with within our 

796
00:30:48,239 --> 00:30:50,239
our current approach , we should be 

797
00:30:50,239 --> 00:30:52,406
able to get that work done in the 2030 

798
00:30:52,406 --> 00:30:54,461
by the 2030 time frame . Wonderful . 

799
00:30:54,461 --> 00:30:56,406
Thank you and administrator Ruby . 

800
00:30:56,406 --> 00:30:58,461
Today . Uh The site conducts the sub 

801
00:30:58,461 --> 00:31:00,406
critical experiments to verify the 

802
00:31:00,406 --> 00:31:02,572
reliability , the effectiveness of our 

803
00:31:02,572 --> 00:31:04,795
nuclear stockpile so that we never ever 

804
00:31:04,795 --> 00:31:07,430
have to return to the days of above or 

805
00:31:07,439 --> 00:31:09,670
below ground testing , explosive 

806
00:31:09,680 --> 00:31:12,719
testing . And so last week , this first 

807
00:31:12,729 --> 00:31:14,673
sub critical experiment in roughly 

808
00:31:14,673 --> 00:31:16,507
three years was conducted in the 

809
00:31:16,507 --> 00:31:18,562
principal underground laboratory for 

810
00:31:18,562 --> 00:31:20,729
sub critical experimentation . It much 

811
00:31:20,729 --> 00:31:24,150
easier to say pulse facility . And so 

812
00:31:24,160 --> 00:31:26,430
can you discuss the importance of that 

813
00:31:26,439 --> 00:31:28,969
experiment why sub critical experiments 

814
00:31:28,979 --> 00:31:31,090
and other experiments taking place in 

815
00:31:31,090 --> 00:31:33,201
the Nevada National security site are 

816
00:31:33,201 --> 00:31:35,589
vital to our stockpile stewardship and 

817
00:31:35,599 --> 00:31:37,849
ensuring that we can continue to 

818
00:31:37,859 --> 00:31:40,069
certify the stockpile without again 

819
00:31:40,079 --> 00:31:43,089
ever returning to underground explosive 

820
00:31:43,099 --> 00:31:46,410
nuclear testing . Yeah , thank you . Um 

821
00:31:46,420 --> 00:31:48,476
Senator Rosen . It's good to see you 

822
00:31:48,476 --> 00:31:50,640
again . And we're very proud of the 

823
00:31:50,650 --> 00:31:53,219
fact that we um had a successful sub 

824
00:31:53,329 --> 00:31:55,662
critical experiment . Um just last week . 

825
00:31:55,662 --> 00:31:57,773
Uh These experiments are so important 

826
00:31:57,773 --> 00:32:01,680
because they allow us to 

827
00:32:01,689 --> 00:32:05,140
study actual plutonium without do 

828
00:32:05,199 --> 00:32:08,359
without uh without doing a , 

829
00:32:09,719 --> 00:32:11,719
without creating a chain reaction , 

830
00:32:11,719 --> 00:32:13,830
right ? So there , that's why we call 

831
00:32:13,830 --> 00:32:15,886
them sub critical . Uh And so we can 

832
00:32:15,886 --> 00:32:17,997
actually look at the real material uh 

833
00:32:17,997 --> 00:32:20,163
under conditions that are important to 

834
00:32:20,163 --> 00:32:22,330
us under very dynamic conditions . And 

835
00:32:22,330 --> 00:32:24,739
as a result of these tests , we can 

836
00:32:24,750 --> 00:32:28,530
make sure um the 

837
00:32:28,739 --> 00:32:31,180
aged material still behaving as we 

838
00:32:31,189 --> 00:32:33,369
would expect it to , we can look at 

839
00:32:33,380 --> 00:32:35,969
newly produced materials and see if it 

840
00:32:35,979 --> 00:32:38,849
behaves the same . Uh And we can learn 

841
00:32:38,859 --> 00:32:42,250
new things uh by our high fidelity 

842
00:32:42,260 --> 00:32:46,150
experimental um data collection . So uh 

843
00:32:46,160 --> 00:32:49,790
we anticipate this is the best way 

844
00:32:49,800 --> 00:32:52,949
um to maintain our stockpile without uh 

845
00:32:52,959 --> 00:32:55,290
returning to nuclear testing , 

846
00:32:55,400 --> 00:32:57,680
especially with the demands that we 

847
00:32:57,689 --> 00:33:00,589
have right now uh in our production uh 

848
00:33:00,599 --> 00:33:04,310
enterprise as well as uh um 

849
00:33:04,400 --> 00:33:07,280
perhaps new weapons that we need in the 

850
00:33:07,290 --> 00:33:10,250
future to meet these changing global 

851
00:33:10,260 --> 00:33:12,427
conditions . It's important that we do 

852
00:33:12,427 --> 00:33:15,150
these . And uh we talk about um all of 

853
00:33:15,160 --> 00:33:17,049
our missions and particularly our 

854
00:33:17,049 --> 00:33:18,993
counterterrorism mission . We have 

855
00:33:18,993 --> 00:33:21,049
another thing not besides having the 

856
00:33:21,049 --> 00:33:23,216
test site , we have the amazing remote 

857
00:33:23,216 --> 00:33:25,327
sensing laboratory . I love to go out 

858
00:33:25,327 --> 00:33:27,216
there . They're doing , um , just 

859
00:33:27,216 --> 00:33:29,049
wonderful things and of course , 

860
00:33:29,049 --> 00:33:31,049
they're both at Nevada's Nellis Air 

861
00:33:31,049 --> 00:33:33,049
Force Base and joint base Andrews . 

862
00:33:33,049 --> 00:33:35,104
They provide that emergency response 

863
00:33:35,104 --> 00:33:37,327
capability and crisis support teams and 

864
00:33:37,327 --> 00:33:39,280
they are ready to deploy anywhere 

865
00:33:39,300 --> 00:33:42,010
around the world and the personalities 

866
00:33:42,175 --> 00:33:44,397
cases . I said I've been out there many 

867
00:33:44,397 --> 00:33:46,564
times and uh and those of the national 

868
00:33:46,564 --> 00:33:48,619
security site , they're the nation's 

869
00:33:48,619 --> 00:33:52,175
experts in locating bombs , loose nukes 

870
00:33:52,185 --> 00:33:54,185
sources of radiation in addition to 

871
00:33:54,185 --> 00:33:56,129
determining origin and attribution 

872
00:33:56,129 --> 00:33:58,324
through nuclear forensics . And so 

873
00:33:58,724 --> 00:34:01,035
madam administrator given the critical 

874
00:34:01,045 --> 00:34:03,814
role that both our facilities play and 

875
00:34:04,310 --> 00:34:07,109
remote sensing lab in particular um in 

876
00:34:07,119 --> 00:34:09,429
our national defense architecture . Can 

877
00:34:09,439 --> 00:34:11,272
you speak a little bit about how 

878
00:34:11,272 --> 00:34:13,495
important our remote sensing lab is and 

879
00:34:13,495 --> 00:34:15,383
the safety and security that they 

880
00:34:15,383 --> 00:34:18,179
provide to the American people ? Yeah , 

881
00:34:18,189 --> 00:34:21,120
absolutely . It is fun to uh talk to 

882
00:34:21,129 --> 00:34:23,129
the people who work at these labs . 

883
00:34:23,129 --> 00:34:25,129
They do amazing things in amazingly 

884
00:34:25,129 --> 00:34:27,185
short time frames because everything 

885
00:34:27,185 --> 00:34:29,129
they do is usually associated with 

886
00:34:29,129 --> 00:34:31,240
emergency response . And I would just 

887
00:34:31,240 --> 00:34:33,840
like to say that it's been , it's not 

888
00:34:33,850 --> 00:34:36,040
only for the American people when a 

889
00:34:36,050 --> 00:34:38,199
source goes missing or something 

890
00:34:38,209 --> 00:34:41,095
unexpected happens in the US , it's 

891
00:34:41,105 --> 00:34:43,161
also for the international community 

892
00:34:43,161 --> 00:34:45,525
and they've been critical in our work . 

893
00:34:45,535 --> 00:34:47,424
They have everything they need to 

894
00:34:47,424 --> 00:34:49,479
continue their mission . I wanted to 

895
00:34:49,479 --> 00:34:51,646
ask you . I do think so . I think that 

896
00:34:51,646 --> 00:34:53,813
the , uh to be honest , so they've had 

897
00:34:53,813 --> 00:34:55,979
a big , uh they've had a boost because 

898
00:34:55,979 --> 00:34:58,406
of the supplemental funding for Ukraine . 

899
00:34:58,696 --> 00:35:00,974
They've done a lot of work for Ukraine . 

900
00:35:00,974 --> 00:35:03,196
I know . Uh So that , that's not in our 

901
00:35:03,196 --> 00:35:05,418
base budget . Of course , that's in our 

902
00:35:05,418 --> 00:35:07,307
uh supplemental budget . But as a 

903
00:35:07,307 --> 00:35:09,307
result of that , we've been able to 

904
00:35:09,307 --> 00:35:11,612
really exercise all the muscles um uh 

905
00:35:11,622 --> 00:35:14,211
uh with that , with that team . Well , 

906
00:35:14,221 --> 00:35:16,388
we have the remote sensing lab and the 

907
00:35:16,388 --> 00:35:18,642
test site . Amazing teams work out 

908
00:35:18,652 --> 00:35:20,902
there and I'm proud to uh go visit them 

909
00:35:20,912 --> 00:35:23,023
and see the good work they're doing . 

910
00:35:23,023 --> 00:35:24,968
Thank you , Senator Senator Fisher 

911
00:35:26,469 --> 00:35:28,691
administrator . I just have uh one more 

912
00:35:28,691 --> 00:35:30,913
comment and question . First of all , I 

913
00:35:30,913 --> 00:35:33,025
want to thank you for submitting your 

914
00:35:33,025 --> 00:35:35,090
unfunded um priorities list to the 

915
00:35:35,100 --> 00:35:37,211
committee earlier this year . I agree 

916
00:35:37,211 --> 00:35:39,969
with the programs that you listed and 

917
00:35:39,979 --> 00:35:42,146
uh I do believe that they warrant this 

918
00:35:42,146 --> 00:35:44,201
committee's attention and additional 

919
00:35:44,201 --> 00:35:46,649
funding . Would you speak to the three 

920
00:35:46,729 --> 00:35:49,320
programs that are listed ? Uh Slicker 

921
00:35:49,469 --> 00:35:52,580
in the Analytic Gas Laboratory mission 

922
00:35:52,590 --> 00:35:55,110
enabling construction project . And 

923
00:35:55,120 --> 00:35:57,231
then we've kind of talked in the past 

924
00:35:57,231 --> 00:35:59,231
about the need for the binder , the 

925
00:35:59,231 --> 00:36:01,287
production and qualification efforts 

926
00:36:01,287 --> 00:36:03,176
for that for the insensitive high 

927
00:36:03,176 --> 00:36:06,129
explosives . Uh Why do you need , why 

928
00:36:06,139 --> 00:36:08,306
do you need more resources for those ? 

929
00:36:09,270 --> 00:36:11,381
Yeah . A as I mentioned in my opening 

930
00:36:11,381 --> 00:36:14,510
comments , uh slicker in is the is a 

931
00:36:14,520 --> 00:36:17,320
very unique case in this regard that uh 

932
00:36:17,330 --> 00:36:20,360
you know , it wasn't in our program of 

933
00:36:20,370 --> 00:36:23,409
record until the fy 

934
00:36:23,419 --> 00:36:27,169
2024 NDA A was passed . Uh 

935
00:36:27,179 --> 00:36:29,780
And by , at that time , we had already 

936
00:36:29,790 --> 00:36:32,879
submitted our fy 25 budget request . So 

937
00:36:32,889 --> 00:36:35,830
the slick him in uh budget request when 

938
00:36:35,840 --> 00:36:38,399
the unfunded requirements is for $70 

939
00:36:38,409 --> 00:36:40,576
million that's an amount that we think 

940
00:36:40,576 --> 00:36:43,750
is reasonable to do what we anticipate 

941
00:36:43,760 --> 00:36:45,871
needing to do in that program . We're 

942
00:36:45,871 --> 00:36:48,093
still working very closely with the dod 

943
00:36:48,093 --> 00:36:50,204
and the Navy to define the details of 

944
00:36:50,204 --> 00:36:52,649
that program . Uh But we are gonna need 

945
00:36:52,659 --> 00:36:56,199
some budget to do it . Um The uh 

946
00:36:56,209 --> 00:36:59,010
the I'm gonna do the binder . Uh Let me 

947
00:36:59,020 --> 00:37:02,540
address this uh binder issue . Uh We uh 

948
00:37:02,550 --> 00:37:06,540
we have uh we uh emerging issue 

949
00:37:06,550 --> 00:37:09,860
has uh come up as a result of changing 

950
00:37:09,870 --> 00:37:12,409
environmental regulations concerning uh 

951
00:37:12,419 --> 00:37:16,110
forever chemicals uh that we have a 

952
00:37:16,120 --> 00:37:18,489
binder material on our explosives that 

953
00:37:18,500 --> 00:37:21,719
falls into this category of materials 

954
00:37:21,729 --> 00:37:24,719
that are now being regulated uh very uh 

955
00:37:24,729 --> 00:37:27,870
very closely by the EPA . And so we 

956
00:37:27,879 --> 00:37:29,935
need a new binder material and we're 

957
00:37:29,935 --> 00:37:32,046
gonna work on a new binder material . 

958
00:37:32,046 --> 00:37:34,157
Uh And , but meanwhile , we also have 

959
00:37:34,157 --> 00:37:36,212
to figure out how to get through the 

960
00:37:36,212 --> 00:37:38,379
program of record that we have with uh 

961
00:37:38,379 --> 00:37:40,379
a limited supply of this particular 

962
00:37:40,379 --> 00:37:42,268
material and , or finding another 

963
00:37:42,268 --> 00:37:45,340
supplier . Uh So , uh so that's an 

964
00:37:45,350 --> 00:37:48,550
issue that emerged after the budget was 

965
00:37:48,560 --> 00:37:51,370
formulated . Uh and that's why it's in 

966
00:37:51,379 --> 00:37:54,080
and the uh analytical lab is uh again , 

967
00:37:54,090 --> 00:37:56,850
just to make sure that we can , uh we 

968
00:37:56,860 --> 00:38:00,389
have all the facilities we need uh to 

969
00:38:00,399 --> 00:38:03,330
make sure that we can um we can 

970
00:38:03,340 --> 00:38:07,300
analyze um the WW what we 

971
00:38:07,310 --> 00:38:09,729
need to do to make to , to produce the 

972
00:38:09,739 --> 00:38:11,959
pets that we need to produce . Thank 

973
00:38:11,969 --> 00:38:14,209
you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Ok . 

974
00:38:14,219 --> 00:38:16,275
Thank you all very much . We'll have 

975
00:38:16,275 --> 00:38:18,386
our second panel come forward . Thank 

976
00:38:18,386 --> 00:38:17,879
you . 

977
00:38:29,120 --> 00:38:32,550
L he's from Vermont . Yeah , actually 

978
00:38:32,560 --> 00:38:34,838
his family's in . Is that right ? Yeah . 

979
00:38:34,838 --> 00:38:37,889
Ok . Ok . 

980
00:38:39,320 --> 00:38:40,487
There's still time . 

981
00:38:49,389 --> 00:38:51,389
So when Senator Kelly comes , he'll 

982
00:38:51,389 --> 00:38:53,939
probably ask Johnny Wolf admiral 

983
00:38:54,120 --> 00:38:56,250
handles nuclear programs about the 

984
00:38:56,260 --> 00:38:58,560
slicker man issue . Yes , I know 

985
00:39:03,959 --> 00:39:06,015
Doctor Adams . Are you leading off ? 

986
00:39:10,120 --> 00:39:13,360
Um some , some short opening remarks , 

987
00:39:14,239 --> 00:39:16,295
sir . Are , are you requesting short 

988
00:39:16,300 --> 00:39:19,280
opening remarks ? Ok . Thank you . Yes . 

989
00:39:19,290 --> 00:39:21,401
So , Chairman King , ranking member , 

990
00:39:21,401 --> 00:39:23,512
Fisher and members of the committee . 

991
00:39:23,512 --> 00:39:26,030
It is an honor to be here before you to 

992
00:39:26,040 --> 00:39:28,350
discuss the president's fiscal year 

993
00:39:28,360 --> 00:39:30,629
2025 budget request for the weapons 

994
00:39:30,639 --> 00:39:34,010
activities portion of doe and N SAS 

995
00:39:34,459 --> 00:39:38,149
um activities . Thanks to support from 

996
00:39:38,159 --> 00:39:40,520
this sub-committee and the full 

997
00:39:40,530 --> 00:39:43,189
committee and Congress in general and 

998
00:39:43,199 --> 00:39:44,921
the efforts of our outstanding 

999
00:39:44,921 --> 00:39:46,977
dedicated workers across the nuclear 

1000
00:39:46,977 --> 00:39:49,389
security enterprise . We are steadily 

1001
00:39:49,399 --> 00:39:51,969
improving our infrastructure and our 

1002
00:39:51,979 --> 00:39:54,629
capabilities while we are also taking 

1003
00:39:54,639 --> 00:39:57,719
on new challenges as they arise from a 

1004
00:39:57,850 --> 00:40:00,389
worsening global security situation , 

1005
00:40:01,649 --> 00:40:04,639
the fy 25 weapons activity's budget 

1006
00:40:04,649 --> 00:40:08,610
request of about $19.8 billion will 

1007
00:40:08,620 --> 00:40:11,689
support our continued commitment to 

1008
00:40:11,699 --> 00:40:15,699
design manufacture , certify transport , 

1009
00:40:15,780 --> 00:40:18,870
maintain and assess the safe , secure 

1010
00:40:18,879 --> 00:40:21,530
and reliable warheads that are needed 

1011
00:40:21,540 --> 00:40:23,484
to keep our deterrent credible and 

1012
00:40:23,484 --> 00:40:25,949
effective . Toward that end , we have 

1013
00:40:25,959 --> 00:40:29,239
added programs for the B 6113 gravity 

1014
00:40:29,250 --> 00:40:31,600
bomb and the nuclear sea launch cruise 

1015
00:40:31,610 --> 00:40:33,760
missile to the other five warhead 

1016
00:40:33,770 --> 00:40:35,992
programs that have been and continue to 

1017
00:40:35,992 --> 00:40:38,560
be in our program of record , we have 

1018
00:40:38,570 --> 00:40:40,626
accepted the challenge of delivering 

1019
00:40:40,626 --> 00:40:42,681
the two new warheads within the same 

1020
00:40:42,681 --> 00:40:45,080
time frame spanned by the other five 

1021
00:40:46,860 --> 00:40:49,270
in fiscal year 2023 . As administrator 

1022
00:40:49,280 --> 00:40:51,502
Ruby mentioned , we delivered more than 

1023
00:40:51,502 --> 00:40:53,800
200 modernized warheads to the military 

1024
00:40:53,959 --> 00:40:56,909
with all deliveries on schedule . The F 

1025
00:40:56,919 --> 00:40:59,100
I 25 budget request supports our 

1026
00:40:59,110 --> 00:41:02,090
commitment to continuing on time 

1027
00:41:02,100 --> 00:41:04,489
deliveries into the future . It 

1028
00:41:04,500 --> 00:41:07,219
reflects time phasing of many efforts 

1029
00:41:07,620 --> 00:41:09,989
including construction projects to 

1030
00:41:10,000 --> 00:41:12,310
ensure that capabilities are ready by 

1031
00:41:12,320 --> 00:41:14,376
the time they are needed for warhead 

1032
00:41:14,376 --> 00:41:17,969
delivery . In closing , I would like to 

1033
00:41:17,979 --> 00:41:20,035
thank again this sub-committee , the 

1034
00:41:20,035 --> 00:41:22,090
full committee in Congress for the 

1035
00:41:22,100 --> 00:41:24,459
support that has enabled N NSA to 

1036
00:41:24,469 --> 00:41:27,290
deliver on its important national 

1037
00:41:27,300 --> 00:41:29,610
security missions to date . And I look 

1038
00:41:29,620 --> 00:41:31,842
forward to your questions . Thank you , 

1039
00:41:31,842 --> 00:41:35,729
sir . A wolf . Chairman King , 

1040
00:41:35,739 --> 00:41:37,850
ranking member Fisher . Thank you for 

1041
00:41:37,850 --> 00:41:40,072
the opportunity to testify on behalf of 

1042
00:41:40,072 --> 00:41:42,072
the Department of the Navy's budget 

1043
00:41:42,072 --> 00:41:43,906
priorities for nuclear forces as 

1044
00:41:43,906 --> 00:41:46,183
Director of Strategic Systems programs . 

1045
00:41:46,183 --> 00:41:48,295
My mission is to provide credible and 

1046
00:41:48,295 --> 00:41:50,406
affordable strategic solutions to our 

1047
00:41:50,406 --> 00:41:52,709
warfighter for nearly seven decades . 

1048
00:41:52,729 --> 00:41:55,129
And with Congress's steadfast support , 

1049
00:41:55,250 --> 00:41:57,417
the navy submarine force has served as 

1050
00:41:57,417 --> 00:41:59,709
the foundation for the US Strategic 

1051
00:41:59,719 --> 00:42:02,629
Posture operating on continuous patrol 

1052
00:42:02,639 --> 00:42:04,689
and providing assured second strike 

1053
00:42:04,699 --> 00:42:07,149
capability . Since I testified before 

1054
00:42:07,159 --> 00:42:09,381
this panel last year , we have built on 

1055
00:42:09,381 --> 00:42:11,603
this remarkable history of deterrence , 

1056
00:42:11,603 --> 00:42:13,959
marking such milestones as the final 

1057
00:42:13,969 --> 00:42:16,149
demonstration and shakedown operation 

1058
00:42:16,530 --> 00:42:18,810
for our high class ballistic missile 

1059
00:42:18,820 --> 00:42:21,070
submarines . Establishment of a new 

1060
00:42:21,080 --> 00:42:23,360
nuclear office for the sea launched 

1061
00:42:23,370 --> 00:42:25,409
cruise missile slick them . In . 

1062
00:42:25,919 --> 00:42:28,141
Additionally , in coordinating with our 

1063
00:42:28,141 --> 00:42:30,197
N NSA partners , we are initiating a 

1064
00:42:30,197 --> 00:42:32,086
nuclear weapon project to adapt a 

1065
00:42:32,086 --> 00:42:34,419
nuclear warhead for this new capability . 

1066
00:42:34,439 --> 00:42:36,383
This work has not been without its 

1067
00:42:36,383 --> 00:42:38,600
challenges . Long periods of nuclear 

1068
00:42:38,610 --> 00:42:41,169
sustainment have atrophied the domestic 

1069
00:42:41,179 --> 00:42:43,760
industrial base and its critical skills . 

1070
00:42:44,060 --> 00:42:46,389
Significant investments are required to 

1071
00:42:46,399 --> 00:42:49,139
build back capacity to handle multiple , 

1072
00:42:49,149 --> 00:42:50,860
multiple concurrent nuclear 

1073
00:42:50,870 --> 00:42:53,439
modernization programs . Furthermore , 

1074
00:42:53,520 --> 00:42:55,629
we are seeing exceptional inflation 

1075
00:42:55,699 --> 00:42:57,879
based cost growth due to the aging 

1076
00:42:57,889 --> 00:43:00,489
industrial base associated supply 

1077
00:43:00,500 --> 00:43:03,020
change challenges and material 

1078
00:43:03,030 --> 00:43:06,090
obsolescence . Nevertheless , we must 

1079
00:43:06,100 --> 00:43:08,211
continue to sustain today's deterrent 

1080
00:43:08,219 --> 00:43:10,163
while modernizing for the future . 

1081
00:43:10,239 --> 00:43:12,629
First and foremost , we must maintain 

1082
00:43:12,639 --> 00:43:15,050
the current D five le missile inventory 

1083
00:43:15,120 --> 00:43:17,231
and provide the necessary operational 

1084
00:43:17,239 --> 00:43:19,360
support to sustain Ohio class 

1085
00:43:19,370 --> 00:43:21,370
submarines through the end of their 

1086
00:43:21,370 --> 00:43:24,830
life in the early 20 forties . Secondly , 

1087
00:43:24,979 --> 00:43:28,010
along with Pe Os SBN , we must continue 

1088
00:43:28,020 --> 00:43:30,449
to ensure a seamless transition between 

1089
00:43:30,459 --> 00:43:32,479
Ohio class and Columbia class 

1090
00:43:32,489 --> 00:43:35,840
submarines for my command SSP this 

1091
00:43:35,850 --> 00:43:37,961
requires a seamless transition of the 

1092
00:43:37,961 --> 00:43:40,072
current trident two D five le weapons 

1093
00:43:40,072 --> 00:43:42,300
system onto the new Columbia class 

1094
00:43:42,310 --> 00:43:44,909
ballistic missile submarine . Finally , 

1095
00:43:45,030 --> 00:43:46,974
one of the greatest advantages the 

1096
00:43:46,974 --> 00:43:49,141
United States has is its alliances and 

1097
00:43:49,141 --> 00:43:51,729
partnerships for decades . Us policy 

1098
00:43:51,739 --> 00:43:54,070
has recognized the contribution of an 

1099
00:43:54,080 --> 00:43:56,191
independent British nuclear deterrent 

1100
00:43:56,191 --> 00:43:58,959
adds to NA NATO . And indeed global 

1101
00:43:58,969 --> 00:44:02,090
stability SSP will continue to support 

1102
00:44:02,100 --> 00:44:04,060
and sustain this most important 

1103
00:44:04,070 --> 00:44:06,229
relationship . Execution of these 

1104
00:44:06,239 --> 00:44:08,510
priorities is only possible through 

1105
00:44:08,520 --> 00:44:10,469
investment in our people , our 

1106
00:44:10,479 --> 00:44:13,189
infrastructure and our industrial base , 

1107
00:44:13,459 --> 00:44:15,770
nuclear modernization will take time . 

1108
00:44:15,879 --> 00:44:18,040
And I echo the Strategic Posture 

1109
00:44:18,050 --> 00:44:20,280
Commission's findings that urgent and 

1110
00:44:20,290 --> 00:44:22,679
comprehensive resourcing and whole of 

1111
00:44:22,689 --> 00:44:24,719
enterprise effort is absolutely 

1112
00:44:24,729 --> 00:44:26,729
essential . It is only through your 

1113
00:44:26,729 --> 00:44:28,951
continued support that the department's 

1114
00:44:28,951 --> 00:44:31,173
highest modernization priorities can be 

1115
00:44:31,173 --> 00:44:33,173
achieved and the Navy can deliver a 

1116
00:44:33,173 --> 00:44:35,360
reliable seabased strategic deterrent 

1117
00:44:35,370 --> 00:44:37,239
capability . Thank you for the 

1118
00:44:37,250 --> 00:44:39,800
opportunity to testify today on behalf 

1119
00:44:39,810 --> 00:44:42,040
of the dedicated Americans that make 

1120
00:44:42,050 --> 00:44:44,489
strategic deterrent their life's work . 

1121
00:44:44,500 --> 00:44:46,444
I look forward to your questions . 

1122
00:44:46,444 --> 00:44:48,439
Thank you , Admiral General , good 

1123
00:44:48,449 --> 00:44:50,449
afternoon , Chairman King , ranking 

1124
00:44:50,449 --> 00:44:52,671
member Fisher and distinguished members 

1125
00:44:52,671 --> 00:44:54,616
of this committee . I'm honored to 

1126
00:44:54,616 --> 00:44:56,560
represent the men and women of Air 

1127
00:44:56,560 --> 00:44:58,782
Force Global Strike Command and provide 

1128
00:44:58,782 --> 00:45:00,727
you an update on our mission , our 

1129
00:45:00,727 --> 00:45:02,782
airmen and our ongoing modernization 

1130
00:45:02,782 --> 00:45:04,449
efforts and the challenges in 

1131
00:45:04,449 --> 00:45:06,616
sustaining our legacy weapon systems . 

1132
00:45:06,616 --> 00:45:08,560
I'd like to thank Congress for its 

1133
00:45:08,560 --> 00:45:10,727
support , not only to national defense 

1134
00:45:10,727 --> 00:45:12,838
but the Air Force's long range strike 

1135
00:45:12,838 --> 00:45:14,838
in nuclear deterrence missions . My 

1136
00:45:14,838 --> 00:45:16,949
full statement has been submitted for 

1137
00:45:16,949 --> 00:45:19,005
the record Air Force . Global Strike 

1138
00:45:19,005 --> 00:45:20,949
Command was established in 2009 to 

1139
00:45:20,949 --> 00:45:23,171
ensure focused leadership and oversight 

1140
00:45:23,171 --> 00:45:25,350
of the Air Force's nuclear mission . I 

1141
00:45:25,360 --> 00:45:27,304
am grateful to the members of this 

1142
00:45:27,304 --> 00:45:29,527
committee for your steadfast support as 

1143
00:45:29,527 --> 00:45:31,582
we continue to move forward with the 

1144
00:45:31,582 --> 00:45:33,693
modernization of our weapon systems . 

1145
00:45:33,693 --> 00:45:35,916
The timely modernization of our nuclear 

1146
00:45:35,916 --> 00:45:37,693
triad of which global strike is 

1147
00:45:37,693 --> 00:45:39,860
responsible for two thirds remains the 

1148
00:45:39,860 --> 00:45:42,739
command's paramount focus with our 

1149
00:45:42,750 --> 00:45:44,972
current modernization efforts including 

1150
00:45:44,972 --> 00:45:47,320
our land based ICBM S bomber force , 

1151
00:45:47,330 --> 00:45:49,610
helicopter force , nuclear command and 

1152
00:45:49,620 --> 00:45:52,040
control platforms , weapons generation 

1153
00:45:52,050 --> 00:45:55,310
facilities and nuclear weapons . This 

1154
00:45:55,320 --> 00:45:57,153
committee is keenly aware of the 

1155
00:45:57,153 --> 00:45:59,350
threats facing our nation today and in 

1156
00:45:59,360 --> 00:46:01,770
the foreseeable future , we currently 

1157
00:46:01,780 --> 00:46:03,780
face the challenge of deterring two 

1158
00:46:03,780 --> 00:46:05,891
major nuclear armed competitors . The 

1159
00:46:05,891 --> 00:46:07,836
People's Republic of China and the 

1160
00:46:07,836 --> 00:46:09,969
Russian Federation , both armed with 

1161
00:46:09,979 --> 00:46:12,312
modern and diverse nuclear capabilities . 

1162
00:46:12,979 --> 00:46:14,923
Additionally , we are aware of the 

1163
00:46:14,923 --> 00:46:17,090
escalating nuclear threat presented by 

1164
00:46:17,090 --> 00:46:19,090
the Democratic People's Republic of 

1165
00:46:19,090 --> 00:46:21,257
Korea and the possibility of a nuclear 

1166
00:46:21,257 --> 00:46:24,159
armed Iran , not only is the command 

1167
00:46:24,169 --> 00:46:26,002
leading the charge in sustaining 

1168
00:46:26,002 --> 00:46:28,002
current forces and deploying future 

1169
00:46:28,002 --> 00:46:29,947
long range strike weapon systems . 

1170
00:46:29,947 --> 00:46:32,113
Global strike command is acutely aware 

1171
00:46:32,113 --> 00:46:34,280
that the nuclear deterrence mission is 

1172
00:46:34,280 --> 00:46:36,280
the bedrock of our national defense 

1173
00:46:36,280 --> 00:46:38,113
strategy and foundational to our 

1174
00:46:38,113 --> 00:46:40,770
nation's defense and essential to that 

1175
00:46:40,780 --> 00:46:43,139
of our allies and partners . The air 

1176
00:46:43,149 --> 00:46:44,982
force nuclear enterprise is at a 

1177
00:46:44,982 --> 00:46:46,982
critical juncture . Our operational 

1178
00:46:46,982 --> 00:46:50,050
margin is razor thin . Our resources 

1179
00:46:50,060 --> 00:46:52,739
are stretched to their limits . Today , 

1180
00:46:52,750 --> 00:46:54,917
I request your continued support as we 

1181
00:46:54,917 --> 00:46:56,861
confront these pressing challenges 

1182
00:46:56,861 --> 00:46:59,083
while upholding our nation's security . 

1183
00:46:59,399 --> 00:47:01,343
Thank you . I look forward to your 

1184
00:47:01,343 --> 00:47:03,232
questions . Thank you very much , 

1185
00:47:03,232 --> 00:47:07,199
General Admiral Wolf . We 

1186
00:47:07,209 --> 00:47:09,879
who work in this area so frequently , 

1187
00:47:09,889 --> 00:47:12,889
sometimes things just go by and we take 

1188
00:47:12,899 --> 00:47:15,250
them for granted . You said something 

1189
00:47:15,260 --> 00:47:16,982
very important in your opening 

1190
00:47:16,982 --> 00:47:19,149
statement about a secure second strike 

1191
00:47:19,149 --> 00:47:21,439
capability . Why is that so important 

1192
00:47:21,449 --> 00:47:24,540
to deterrence ? Yes , sir . I mean , 

1193
00:47:24,550 --> 00:47:26,717
obviously , if you think about it from 

1194
00:47:26,717 --> 00:47:28,661
the adversary's perspective , um , 

1195
00:47:28,661 --> 00:47:30,883
anything that they may think they could 

1196
00:47:30,883 --> 00:47:33,389
do as an initial strike , the SSBN 

1197
00:47:33,399 --> 00:47:35,621
force is always out there on alert , on 

1198
00:47:35,621 --> 00:47:38,060
patrol unknown where they're at , but 

1199
00:47:38,070 --> 00:47:40,324
certainly if ever called upon , they 

1200
00:47:40,334 --> 00:47:43,084
are survivable and could ensure that a 

1201
00:47:43,094 --> 00:47:44,983
second strike from our , from our 

1202
00:47:44,983 --> 00:47:47,150
nation could be , could be performed . 

1203
00:47:47,150 --> 00:47:49,614
So that is absolutely critical as you 

1204
00:47:49,625 --> 00:47:51,792
look at deterrence and what it means . 

1205
00:47:51,792 --> 00:47:55,000
So the idea is that the adversary can't 

1206
00:47:55,010 --> 00:47:56,843
think that they can knock us out 

1207
00:47:56,843 --> 00:47:58,899
entirely with one strike . If you've 

1208
00:47:58,899 --> 00:48:01,419
got the survivable at sea capability , 

1209
00:48:01,830 --> 00:48:04,199
that must give them pause . That's , 

1210
00:48:04,479 --> 00:48:06,701
that's absolutely correct . Thank you , 

1211
00:48:08,389 --> 00:48:10,959
Doctor Adams . Uh many of the 

1212
00:48:10,969 --> 00:48:12,969
production lines and I think you've 

1213
00:48:12,969 --> 00:48:15,080
touched on this in your testimony for 

1214
00:48:15,080 --> 00:48:17,136
the components have been dormant for 

1215
00:48:17,136 --> 00:48:19,580
many years . Do we have the , the 

1216
00:48:19,590 --> 00:48:22,100
physical assets and the people to be 

1217
00:48:22,110 --> 00:48:24,332
able to bring those lines back in order 

1218
00:48:24,332 --> 00:48:26,554
to meet the demand that we're seeing in 

1219
00:48:26,554 --> 00:48:29,219
our , in our uh modernization . Yes , 

1220
00:48:29,229 --> 00:48:31,062
sir , we do . Thank you for that 

1221
00:48:31,062 --> 00:48:34,850
question . Um Yes , thank you . 

1222
00:48:35,100 --> 00:48:37,659
Um I'll repeat my answer . Uh Thank you 

1223
00:48:37,669 --> 00:48:39,780
for the question , Senator King . The 

1224
00:48:39,780 --> 00:48:42,610
short answer is yes , sir . We do . We 

1225
00:48:42,620 --> 00:48:45,620
don't have a lot of margin . We have to 

1226
00:48:45,629 --> 00:48:48,530
time phase things carefully so that we 

1227
00:48:48,590 --> 00:48:52,389
um deploy the needed capabilities in 

1228
00:48:52,399 --> 00:48:54,566
time for when they're needed for given 

1229
00:48:54,570 --> 00:48:57,040
warheads . As I think , you know , uh 

1230
00:48:57,110 --> 00:48:59,489
as we progress through our program of 

1231
00:48:59,500 --> 00:49:01,879
record , successive warheads will 

1232
00:49:01,889 --> 00:49:04,199
require more and more of the components 

1233
00:49:04,209 --> 00:49:07,239
to be newly manufactured um as opposed 

1234
00:49:07,250 --> 00:49:10,949
to reused and that , that's an 

1235
00:49:10,959 --> 00:49:13,290
integral part of what goes into our 

1236
00:49:13,300 --> 00:49:15,411
planning and our budget requests that 

1237
00:49:15,411 --> 00:49:17,649
support that planning . But the answer 

1238
00:49:17,659 --> 00:49:20,399
is yes , we can do it . Is there a , is 

1239
00:49:20,409 --> 00:49:24,060
there AAA an end date to a nuclear 

1240
00:49:24,070 --> 00:49:26,237
warhead ? In other words , I've , I've 

1241
00:49:26,237 --> 00:49:28,340
seen in , in , in New Mexico , those 

1242
00:49:28,419 --> 00:49:30,679
rows and rows and rows , is there some 

1243
00:49:30,689 --> 00:49:33,639
point where they're deemed useless ? 

1244
00:49:33,649 --> 00:49:36,469
And we have to reprocess uh what , 

1245
00:49:36,479 --> 00:49:38,646
what's , what's the estimated lifespan 

1246
00:49:38,646 --> 00:49:41,469
of a nuclear warhead ? The answer is 

1247
00:49:41,479 --> 00:49:43,535
different for different warheads and 

1248
00:49:43,535 --> 00:49:45,868
it's different for different components . 

1249
00:49:45,868 --> 00:49:49,659
Um We are a conservative bunch 

1250
00:49:49,669 --> 00:49:51,629
by our , by our nature and by the 

1251
00:49:51,639 --> 00:49:53,695
importance of our mission , we don't 

1252
00:49:53,695 --> 00:49:55,750
certify things to be out in the , in 

1253
00:49:55,750 --> 00:49:58,030
the stockpile unless we are highly 

1254
00:49:58,040 --> 00:50:01,419
confident that that um they can still 

1255
00:50:01,429 --> 00:50:03,919
meet all the military requirements . If 

1256
00:50:03,929 --> 00:50:06,096
there's an exception to that . We duly 

1257
00:50:06,096 --> 00:50:09,179
note it and work with the services and 

1258
00:50:09,189 --> 00:50:11,580
um , dod to accommodate those 

1259
00:50:11,590 --> 00:50:14,810
exceptions , but we do retire our 

1260
00:50:14,820 --> 00:50:16,931
warheads and we dismantle them and we 

1261
00:50:16,939 --> 00:50:18,939
do recycle that material and that's 

1262
00:50:18,939 --> 00:50:20,828
when that material can go to , to 

1263
00:50:20,828 --> 00:50:23,189
Admiral Houston for naval reactors . It , 

1264
00:50:23,199 --> 00:50:25,669
it goes various places . We recycle the 

1265
00:50:25,679 --> 00:50:28,010
material that goes into our newly 

1266
00:50:28,020 --> 00:50:30,139
manufactured warheads . For example , 

1267
00:50:30,149 --> 00:50:32,038
the plutonium we will use for pit 

1268
00:50:32,038 --> 00:50:34,520
production will be recycled . The , the 

1269
00:50:34,530 --> 00:50:36,752
highly enriched uranium that we use for 

1270
00:50:36,752 --> 00:50:39,250
our warheads is recycled . And of 

1271
00:50:39,260 --> 00:50:42,010
course , yes , it's um older 

1272
00:50:42,020 --> 00:50:44,070
secondaries that are the source of 

1273
00:50:44,080 --> 00:50:46,750
material for naval reactors and also 

1274
00:50:46,760 --> 00:50:50,479
for some other uh defense related and 

1275
00:50:50,489 --> 00:50:52,469
in NSA related uses . Thank you , 

1276
00:50:53,199 --> 00:50:56,929
General busier . You're engaged 

1277
00:50:56,939 --> 00:51:00,550
in the overseeing and in many ways , 

1278
00:51:00,560 --> 00:51:02,800
managing the sentinel rebuilding . 

1279
00:51:04,340 --> 00:51:06,320
Are you satisfied that we have the 

1280
00:51:06,330 --> 00:51:08,760
organizational structure to manage that 

1281
00:51:08,770 --> 00:51:10,881
process ? Because as you know , we're 

1282
00:51:10,881 --> 00:51:12,992
facing a non mccurdy breach , I think 

1283
00:51:12,992 --> 00:51:15,048
it's important to note that that the 

1284
00:51:15,048 --> 00:51:17,159
problem is not the missiles , but the 

1285
00:51:17,159 --> 00:51:19,469
civil works , do we have the , do we 

1286
00:51:19,479 --> 00:51:22,229
have the , the structure and the people 

1287
00:51:22,239 --> 00:51:24,295
in charge that are necessary to make 

1288
00:51:24,295 --> 00:51:26,295
sure we can get beyond that and get 

1289
00:51:26,295 --> 00:51:28,949
that project moving forward ? Senator 

1290
00:51:28,959 --> 00:51:31,070
King ? That's a , that's an excellent 

1291
00:51:31,070 --> 00:51:33,070
question as it relates to how we're 

1292
00:51:33,070 --> 00:51:35,469
rebuilding the management team that 

1293
00:51:35,479 --> 00:51:37,590
oversees the Sentinel weapon system , 

1294
00:51:38,000 --> 00:51:39,889
your mic on . I'm having a little 

1295
00:51:39,889 --> 00:51:42,111
trouble . Could you get a little closer 

1296
00:51:42,111 --> 00:51:44,333
to your mic , please ? So as you know , 

1297
00:51:44,333 --> 00:51:47,739
in nd 823 we were directed at Global 

1298
00:51:47,750 --> 00:51:49,649
Strike Command to stand up a site 

1299
00:51:49,659 --> 00:51:51,770
activation task force relating to the 

1300
00:51:51,770 --> 00:51:53,937
transition from Minim Man three to the 

1301
00:51:53,937 --> 00:51:56,159
Sentinel weapon system that directorate 

1302
00:51:56,159 --> 00:51:58,381
stood up last August and General Connor 

1303
00:51:58,381 --> 00:52:00,437
is the general officer that I put in 

1304
00:52:00,437 --> 00:52:02,879
charge of that . And as you know , the 

1305
00:52:02,889 --> 00:52:05,949
24 ND A requires the department to look 

1306
00:52:05,959 --> 00:52:08,149
at those uh various different 

1307
00:52:08,489 --> 00:52:10,545
authorities within the Department of 

1308
00:52:10,545 --> 00:52:12,545
Defense that should be delegated to 

1309
00:52:12,545 --> 00:52:14,639
that task force to oversee the 

1310
00:52:14,649 --> 00:52:16,705
transition from men and man three to 

1311
00:52:16,705 --> 00:52:18,560
the Sentinel program . Um 

1312
00:52:21,270 --> 00:52:23,492
We , we do , we have the structure that 

1313
00:52:23,492 --> 00:52:25,714
we need . We , we haven't returned back 

1314
00:52:25,714 --> 00:52:27,548
to , to Congress with , with our 

1315
00:52:27,548 --> 00:52:28,937
recommendations on those 

1316
00:52:28,937 --> 00:52:31,550
responsibilities , primarily because of 

1317
00:52:31,560 --> 00:52:33,850
the pause with the nun mccurdy process 

1318
00:52:33,860 --> 00:52:35,971
going through right now . So we still 

1319
00:52:35,971 --> 00:52:38,510
owe that answer from the 24 ND A back 

1320
00:52:38,520 --> 00:52:40,520
to Congress . We'll look forward to 

1321
00:52:40,520 --> 00:52:42,687
having that because this is one of the 

1322
00:52:42,687 --> 00:52:44,742
most important and frankly expensive 

1323
00:52:44,742 --> 00:52:46,853
projects that we have underway and we 

1324
00:52:46,853 --> 00:52:49,020
really , I'll sleep better at night if 

1325
00:52:49,020 --> 00:52:50,853
I know somebody's in charge , my 

1326
00:52:50,853 --> 00:52:52,909
philosophy of management is you want 

1327
00:52:52,909 --> 00:52:55,479
one throat to choke . Uh I think we 

1328
00:52:55,489 --> 00:52:57,600
need to be sure that there's somebody 

1329
00:52:57,600 --> 00:52:59,822
who's ultimately responsible for this . 

1330
00:52:59,822 --> 00:53:01,767
Yes , Senator , and I think you're 

1331
00:53:01,767 --> 00:53:03,933
looking at him . Thank you . Thank you 

1332
00:53:03,933 --> 00:53:06,320
for volunteering Senator Fisher . 

1333
00:53:07,919 --> 00:53:10,030
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you , 

1334
00:53:10,030 --> 00:53:11,975
gentlemen for being here today and 

1335
00:53:11,975 --> 00:53:14,197
thank you for your service . Uh Admiral 

1336
00:53:14,197 --> 00:53:16,252
Wolf , one of the recommendations of 

1337
00:53:16,252 --> 00:53:18,197
the Strategic Posture Commission's 

1338
00:53:18,197 --> 00:53:20,629
report was to quote , accelerate 

1339
00:53:20,639 --> 00:53:23,870
development and deployment of D five le 

1340
00:53:23,879 --> 00:53:26,110
two end quote . How is your 

1341
00:53:26,120 --> 00:53:28,330
organization evaluating different 

1342
00:53:28,340 --> 00:53:30,639
avenues to ensure that this critical 

1343
00:53:30,649 --> 00:53:33,239
update is available as soon as possible ? 

1344
00:53:33,590 --> 00:53:35,368
Yes , ma'am . Thank you for the 

1345
00:53:35,368 --> 00:53:37,368
question . Um So what , where we're 

1346
00:53:37,368 --> 00:53:39,423
currently at right now ? We are , we 

1347
00:53:39,423 --> 00:53:41,646
are within a year of getting to what we 

1348
00:53:41,646 --> 00:53:43,590
call milestone B , which is really 

1349
00:53:43,590 --> 00:53:45,757
where we will settle in on what , what 

1350
00:53:45,757 --> 00:53:47,701
the trade studies have told us the 

1351
00:53:47,701 --> 00:53:49,923
right architecture is gonna be and then 

1352
00:53:49,923 --> 00:53:51,757
where we start to get the entire 

1353
00:53:51,757 --> 00:53:53,979
program in alignment uh to move forward 

1354
00:53:53,979 --> 00:53:56,034
to understand what the schedule will 

1355
00:53:56,034 --> 00:53:58,146
really be to first meet where we know 

1356
00:53:58,146 --> 00:54:00,257
we need to get , which is in the late 

1357
00:54:00,257 --> 00:54:02,257
thirties when we run out of current 

1358
00:54:02,257 --> 00:54:04,479
assets . But then once we anchor that , 

1359
00:54:04,479 --> 00:54:06,534
that will give us the opportunity to 

1360
00:54:06,534 --> 00:54:08,701
look to see if there are any , are any 

1361
00:54:08,701 --> 00:54:10,868
opportunities to accelerate . Um We're 

1362
00:54:10,868 --> 00:54:12,979
certainly aware of what the Strategic 

1363
00:54:12,979 --> 00:54:14,757
uh Strategic Posture Commission 

1364
00:54:14,757 --> 00:54:17,090
recommended . And as we go through this , 

1365
00:54:17,090 --> 00:54:19,201
that will be taken into account as we 

1366
00:54:19,201 --> 00:54:21,201
start to lock in that program , you 

1367
00:54:21,201 --> 00:54:22,757
have a , a really important 

1368
00:54:22,757 --> 00:54:24,646
responsibility just to manage the 

1369
00:54:24,646 --> 00:54:27,709
transition from the Ohio class to 

1370
00:54:27,719 --> 00:54:30,669
Columbia to be , to make sure that um 

1371
00:54:30,959 --> 00:54:34,389
we have the warheads necessary um to , 

1372
00:54:34,399 --> 00:54:37,510
to um put on those , 

1373
00:54:37,520 --> 00:54:40,679
those uh boats that are out there . 

1374
00:54:41,010 --> 00:54:44,739
Um How , how are you 

1375
00:54:44,750 --> 00:54:47,379
managing all of that ? What , what 

1376
00:54:47,389 --> 00:54:49,290
input do you have there ? Because 

1377
00:54:49,300 --> 00:54:53,250
that's what 60 70% of warheads that 

1378
00:54:53,260 --> 00:54:56,530
are , that are deployed . Uh How are 

1379
00:54:56,540 --> 00:54:59,610
you able to , um , control the 

1380
00:54:59,620 --> 00:55:02,729
timeline and make sure we can meet it 

1381
00:55:02,739 --> 00:55:04,969
by getting all these , all of the 

1382
00:55:04,979 --> 00:55:08,469
factions together ? Yes , ma'am . So , 

1383
00:55:08,479 --> 00:55:11,659
um administrator , Doctor Adams , uh 

1384
00:55:11,669 --> 00:55:13,836
you know , how's this ? I think it's a 

1385
00:55:13,836 --> 00:55:15,891
whole of navy effort with the way we 

1386
00:55:15,891 --> 00:55:17,836
originally structured , the way we 

1387
00:55:17,836 --> 00:55:19,725
would transition between Ohio and 

1388
00:55:19,725 --> 00:55:21,836
Columbia . And that's why if you look 

1389
00:55:21,836 --> 00:55:23,947
at the decision that was made when we 

1390
00:55:23,947 --> 00:55:25,558
said we were going to have a 

1391
00:55:25,558 --> 00:55:27,502
replacement for Ohio , we made the 

1392
00:55:27,502 --> 00:55:29,558
decision that ostensibly the weapons 

1393
00:55:29,558 --> 00:55:31,780
system that I'm responsible for and the 

1394
00:55:31,780 --> 00:55:34,058
warheads that go on that weapon system , 

1395
00:55:34,058 --> 00:55:36,169
we are ostensibly picking that up and 

1396
00:55:36,169 --> 00:55:38,149
moving it to Columbia . So from a 

1397
00:55:38,159 --> 00:55:39,992
design development perspective , 

1398
00:55:39,992 --> 00:55:42,159
although there are a few differences , 

1399
00:55:42,159 --> 00:55:44,215
um it is essentially the same system 

1400
00:55:44,215 --> 00:55:46,381
and as we manage this transition , the 

1401
00:55:46,381 --> 00:55:49,669
way we've done it is as a , a uh Ohio 

1402
00:55:49,679 --> 00:55:51,959
will come offline , we take those 

1403
00:55:51,969 --> 00:55:54,191
assets and then we'll load those onto a 

1404
00:55:54,191 --> 00:55:56,370
Columbia . So that's how we guarantee 

1405
00:55:56,379 --> 00:55:58,601
that when we're asked to meet operation 

1406
00:55:58,601 --> 00:56:00,657
global citadel requirements for us , 

1407
00:56:00,657 --> 00:56:02,935
Strategic Command , we have the assets , 

1408
00:56:02,935 --> 00:56:05,159
we have the timing because we will not 

1409
00:56:05,340 --> 00:56:07,507
download anything before we know we've 

1410
00:56:07,507 --> 00:56:09,729
got the new platform to upload . So I'm 

1411
00:56:09,729 --> 00:56:11,729
able to manage all of that with the 

1412
00:56:11,729 --> 00:56:13,989
assets we have so that as the timing 

1413
00:56:14,000 --> 00:56:16,600
works , we control when that will occur 

1414
00:56:16,629 --> 00:56:18,780
and there will not be a gap . No , 

1415
00:56:18,790 --> 00:56:20,846
ma'am . As a matter of fact , as you 

1416
00:56:20,846 --> 00:56:22,957
are very aware to ensure that there's 

1417
00:56:22,957 --> 00:56:24,679
not a gap , although not in my 

1418
00:56:24,679 --> 00:56:27,310
portfolio , the navy has decided we are 

1419
00:56:27,320 --> 00:56:29,989
looking at a certain number of Ohio 

1420
00:56:30,000 --> 00:56:32,709
class that we could potentially extend 

1421
00:56:32,909 --> 00:56:35,020
in the event that a Columbia may show 

1422
00:56:35,020 --> 00:56:37,020
up late . So we can always meet the 

1423
00:56:37,020 --> 00:56:38,965
stratcom requirements of operation 

1424
00:56:38,965 --> 00:56:41,020
Global Citadel . Yes , ma'am . Thank 

1425
00:56:41,020 --> 00:56:43,020
you very much . Uh General Lucier . 

1426
00:56:43,020 --> 00:56:45,330
Nice to see you , sir . I am pleased to 

1427
00:56:45,340 --> 00:56:47,173
see that the Air Force has moved 

1428
00:56:47,173 --> 00:56:50,389
forward with say , can you provide us 

1429
00:56:50,399 --> 00:56:52,909
with an update on the program and how 

1430
00:56:52,919 --> 00:56:56,669
uh fiscal year 25 the budget request is 

1431
00:56:56,679 --> 00:57:00,679
gonna support um that specific 

1432
00:57:00,689 --> 00:57:03,590
part of our NC three architecture . Yes , 

1433
00:57:03,600 --> 00:57:05,711
Senator Fisher , we're really excited 

1434
00:57:05,711 --> 00:57:07,933
about the decision and the announcement 

1435
00:57:07,933 --> 00:57:10,639
of the industry partner that was 

1436
00:57:10,649 --> 00:57:13,840
selected for the Strategic Airborne 

1437
00:57:13,850 --> 00:57:16,560
Operation Center , Sierra Sierra Nevada 

1438
00:57:16,570 --> 00:57:18,348
Corporation was selected by the 

1439
00:57:18,348 --> 00:57:21,229
department and the threshold number of 

1440
00:57:21,239 --> 00:57:24,320
the platform is uh six aircraft with 

1441
00:57:24,330 --> 00:57:26,590
the objective number of the platform is 

1442
00:57:26,600 --> 00:57:30,070
eight aircraft . The 25 budget I think 

1443
00:57:30,159 --> 00:57:33,649
like we previously talked about briefly 

1444
00:57:33,659 --> 00:57:35,326
is primarily for research and 

1445
00:57:35,326 --> 00:57:37,492
development and uh as well as starting 

1446
00:57:37,492 --> 00:57:39,492
to look at some of the construction 

1447
00:57:39,492 --> 00:57:41,548
projects required for the additional 

1448
00:57:41,548 --> 00:57:43,659
aircraft uh that will be based at off 

1449
00:57:43,659 --> 00:57:45,937
an air force base in Omaha . Thank you , 

1450
00:57:47,929 --> 00:57:50,151
Senator Kelly . Thank you , Mr Chairman 

1451
00:57:50,300 --> 00:57:52,411
and thank you to all of our witnesses 

1452
00:57:52,411 --> 00:57:54,522
for being here today . I'd like to uh 

1453
00:57:54,522 --> 00:57:56,633
talk a little bit about the submarine 

1454
00:57:56,633 --> 00:57:58,879
launched cruise missile . Um The 

1455
00:57:58,889 --> 00:58:01,449
nuclear version Slick A man , the 

1456
00:58:01,459 --> 00:58:03,459
development of Slick A man has been 

1457
00:58:03,459 --> 00:58:06,330
driven by a perceived need for 

1458
00:58:06,340 --> 00:58:08,451
deterrence against the growing Russia 

1459
00:58:08,709 --> 00:58:11,149
and China nuclear threat . And Russia , 

1460
00:58:11,379 --> 00:58:13,729
as we all know , maintains a stockpile 

1461
00:58:13,909 --> 00:58:17,750
of um maybe about 2000 low yield 

1462
00:58:17,770 --> 00:58:20,770
tactical warheads and has an employment 

1463
00:58:20,780 --> 00:58:22,836
doctrine that envisions some limited 

1464
00:58:22,836 --> 00:58:26,620
nuclear use . Uh The slick of men is 

1465
00:58:26,629 --> 00:58:28,796
theoretically meant to ensure that our 

1466
00:58:28,796 --> 00:58:30,685
adversaries know that we have the 

1467
00:58:30,685 --> 00:58:33,629
ability to respond in kind in short . 

1468
00:58:33,639 --> 00:58:35,695
It should give us more flexibility , 

1469
00:58:35,695 --> 00:58:37,861
but I'm concerned that we are spending 

1470
00:58:37,861 --> 00:58:39,969
money and taxing our manufacturing 

1471
00:58:39,979 --> 00:58:42,219
capacity for a redundant capability 

1472
00:58:42,629 --> 00:58:46,139
with the addition of the B 61-13 

1473
00:58:46,750 --> 00:58:48,861
and the uh Slick a man , the National 

1474
00:58:48,861 --> 00:58:50,972
Nuclear Security Administration has a 

1475
00:58:50,972 --> 00:58:52,639
lot on its plate . We're also 

1476
00:58:52,639 --> 00:58:56,500
developing a uh W 76-2 

1477
00:58:56,510 --> 00:58:59,350
low yield warhead and the air force is 

1478
00:58:59,360 --> 00:59:01,249
soon going to have the long range 

1479
00:59:01,249 --> 00:59:05,020
standoff missile on A B 21 and it's uh 

1480
00:59:05,030 --> 00:59:08,760
W 80 warhead has a low yield option 

1481
00:59:09,070 --> 00:59:11,780
with it . I'm also concerned about the 

1482
00:59:11,790 --> 00:59:13,623
changes we would have to make to 

1483
00:59:13,623 --> 00:59:15,620
Virginia class subs to accommodate 

1484
00:59:16,169 --> 00:59:18,620
Slicker Men . So Vice Admiral Wolf , 

1485
00:59:18,969 --> 00:59:21,550
what would it cost the Navy in time 

1486
00:59:21,560 --> 00:59:24,830
funds long term limitations to take 

1487
00:59:24,840 --> 00:59:26,729
conventional torpedoes off of our 

1488
00:59:26,729 --> 00:59:30,340
attack submarines to accommodate a low 

1489
00:59:30,350 --> 00:59:33,629
yield nuclear weapon slicker in . 

1490
00:59:34,439 --> 00:59:36,772
Yes , Senator , thanks for the question . 

1491
00:59:36,772 --> 00:59:38,828
So certainly , um , we've started to 

1492
00:59:38,828 --> 00:59:40,883
look at that and actually there is a 

1493
00:59:40,883 --> 00:59:42,995
report out already to Congress at the 

1494
00:59:42,995 --> 00:59:44,939
classified level for some of those 

1495
00:59:44,939 --> 00:59:46,995
initial impacts . But based on where 

1496
00:59:46,995 --> 00:59:49,106
the nd A this past year , um asked us 

1497
00:59:49,106 --> 00:59:51,106
to go look and with support uh from 

1498
00:59:51,106 --> 00:59:53,328
this committee and others , we've asked 

1499
00:59:53,328 --> 00:59:55,439
for flexibility because we absolutely 

1500
00:59:55,439 --> 00:59:57,383
recognize yes , there will be some 

1501
00:59:57,383 --> 01:00:00,100
impact to our SSN force . But if , if 

1502
01:00:00,110 --> 01:00:01,888
you look at the options that it 

1503
01:00:01,888 --> 01:00:04,054
provides to the president and if we're 

1504
01:00:04,054 --> 01:00:07,000
allowed to go look at how to not impact 

1505
01:00:07,010 --> 01:00:09,066
anything else to your point with the 

1506
01:00:09,066 --> 01:00:10,899
nuclear modernization that we're 

1507
01:00:10,899 --> 01:00:13,066
already doing for the triad , which is 

1508
01:00:13,066 --> 01:00:15,288
absolutely fundamental . We are looking 

1509
01:00:15,288 --> 01:00:17,288
at what options we can provide that 

1510
01:00:17,288 --> 01:00:19,340
will give us that capability with 

1511
01:00:19,350 --> 01:00:22,820
minimum impact uh for both the Navy and 

1512
01:00:22,830 --> 01:00:25,080
for N NSA to go make this happen . So 

1513
01:00:25,229 --> 01:00:27,451
we are in the process of looking at all 

1514
01:00:27,451 --> 01:00:29,507
that right now with , with the added 

1515
01:00:29,507 --> 01:00:31,785
flexibility that we've asked for today , 

1516
01:00:31,785 --> 01:00:35,300
I I read the report yesterday and you 

1517
01:00:35,310 --> 01:00:37,429
say limited impact and I don't wanna 

1518
01:00:37,439 --> 01:00:40,149
get into details of a , of a classified 

1519
01:00:40,159 --> 01:00:43,229
report . Um but some of it did not seem 

1520
01:00:44,840 --> 01:00:46,896
like the different options that were 

1521
01:00:46,896 --> 01:00:49,780
given were not limited impact . And I 

1522
01:00:49,800 --> 01:00:51,967
want you to go into a little bit about 

1523
01:00:51,967 --> 01:00:54,022
what , what would we need to do to a 

1524
01:00:54,022 --> 01:00:56,090
Virginia class sub in terms of 

1525
01:00:56,100 --> 01:00:59,969
modifications , um , and cost to the 

1526
01:00:59,979 --> 01:01:03,280
sub itself and to the extent you can do 

1527
01:01:03,290 --> 01:01:05,234
it here a little bit about how the 

1528
01:01:05,234 --> 01:01:09,080
operations could change for in order to 

1529
01:01:09,090 --> 01:01:12,189
put that capability onto a uh Virginia 

1530
01:01:12,199 --> 01:01:14,255
class of attack sub . Yes , sir . So 

1531
01:01:14,255 --> 01:01:16,590
certainly from a cost perspective , um , 

1532
01:01:16,750 --> 01:01:18,806
it would be premature to give you an 

1533
01:01:18,806 --> 01:01:20,917
exact cost of what we think a program 

1534
01:01:20,917 --> 01:01:23,083
like that would cost . That's why part 

1535
01:01:23,083 --> 01:01:25,250
of what we're going to look at in this 

1536
01:01:25,250 --> 01:01:27,139
next year is to your point , what 

1537
01:01:27,139 --> 01:01:29,083
solutions are out there that would 

1538
01:01:29,083 --> 01:01:31,459
minimize the number of modifications we 

1539
01:01:31,469 --> 01:01:33,691
would have to make to one of our SSNS . 

1540
01:01:33,691 --> 01:01:35,802
Uh And , and you particularly pointed 

1541
01:01:35,802 --> 01:01:37,913
out Virginia , there is no doubt that 

1542
01:01:37,913 --> 01:01:40,159
based on the solution , uh the impacts 

1543
01:01:40,169 --> 01:01:43,209
could be great greater or they could be 

1544
01:01:43,219 --> 01:01:45,275
less depending on which is why we've 

1545
01:01:45,275 --> 01:01:47,497
asked for the flexibility to be able to 

1546
01:01:47,497 --> 01:01:49,552
go look at multiple solutions to try 

1547
01:01:49,552 --> 01:01:51,719
and weigh that . That's from an impact 

1548
01:01:51,719 --> 01:01:53,800
to , to the actual platform . And we 

1549
01:01:53,810 --> 01:01:55,921
believe that there's other things out 

1550
01:01:55,921 --> 01:01:58,088
there and , and I , I can't talk about 

1551
01:01:58,088 --> 01:01:59,921
them here that might get us to a 

1552
01:01:59,921 --> 01:02:02,088
capability that would actually , and I 

1553
01:02:02,088 --> 01:02:04,088
do believe , minimize the impact of 

1554
01:02:04,090 --> 01:02:06,368
modifications we would have to make to . 

1555
01:02:06,560 --> 01:02:08,893
All right , we're gonna understand that . 

1556
01:02:08,893 --> 01:02:11,116
Now , from an operational perspective , 

1557
01:02:11,116 --> 01:02:13,227
you're absolutely right . Anytime you 

1558
01:02:13,227 --> 01:02:15,393
have a conventional uh uh mission with 

1559
01:02:15,393 --> 01:02:17,616
a nuclear mission . You have to be very 

1560
01:02:17,616 --> 01:02:19,616
careful to segregate those and make 

1561
01:02:19,616 --> 01:02:21,504
sure that , that our war fighters 

1562
01:02:21,504 --> 01:02:23,735
understand how that operates again as 

1563
01:02:23,745 --> 01:02:25,801
we come through . Material solutions 

1564
01:02:25,804 --> 01:02:28,415
impacts to , to the fleet will also be 

1565
01:02:28,425 --> 01:02:30,524
taken into account as we get through 

1566
01:02:30,534 --> 01:02:32,645
what a solution would look like . And 

1567
01:02:32,645 --> 01:02:34,645
then it's just gonna be a matter of 

1568
01:02:34,645 --> 01:02:36,867
what would the cost of that solution be 

1569
01:02:36,867 --> 01:02:38,923
as we lock in and what support do we 

1570
01:02:38,923 --> 01:02:41,034
need to go make that happen ? One big 

1571
01:02:41,034 --> 01:02:43,090
concern I have is when you look at a 

1572
01:02:43,090 --> 01:02:45,256
conflict between the United States and 

1573
01:02:45,256 --> 01:02:47,478
a near peer adversary that has maybe in 

1574
01:02:47,478 --> 01:02:49,645
some cases could have a bigger fleet , 

1575
01:02:49,850 --> 01:02:52,679
both in naval and merchant vessels . 

1576
01:02:52,929 --> 01:02:56,120
Our submarine capability is substantial . 

1577
01:02:56,270 --> 01:02:58,929
It's significant , it would , it would 

1578
01:02:58,939 --> 01:03:00,772
um weigh heavily in that kind of 

1579
01:03:00,772 --> 01:03:02,883
conflict . And when I think about the 

1580
01:03:02,883 --> 01:03:05,139
probability of firing a conventional 

1581
01:03:05,149 --> 01:03:07,820
torpedo , you know , out of a submarine , 

1582
01:03:08,040 --> 01:03:11,050
you know , out of a torpedo tube , um 

1583
01:03:11,060 --> 01:03:13,282
and the likelihood of having to do that 

1584
01:03:13,282 --> 01:03:15,370
multiple times and , and just the 

1585
01:03:15,379 --> 01:03:18,030
rather shallow depth of a magazine and 

1586
01:03:18,040 --> 01:03:20,262
not a lot of rounds you have aboard the 

1587
01:03:20,262 --> 01:03:22,429
sub . Sure , certainly you could , you 

1588
01:03:22,429 --> 01:03:24,540
can , you know , re reload , but that 

1589
01:03:24,540 --> 01:03:26,373
takes some time and there's risk 

1590
01:03:26,373 --> 01:03:29,000
involved in doing that , weighing that 

1591
01:03:29,379 --> 01:03:33,070
with the very unlikely event 

1592
01:03:33,169 --> 01:03:35,629
that we would deploy a tactical nuclear 

1593
01:03:35,639 --> 01:03:38,709
weapon in combat . One of my biggest 

1594
01:03:38,719 --> 01:03:41,350
concerns is that we would be giving up 

1595
01:03:41,540 --> 01:03:44,520
something we really need for something 

1596
01:03:44,530 --> 01:03:48,330
we are unlikely to use . Yes , sir . I 

1597
01:03:48,340 --> 01:03:50,507
appreciate that . And certainly all of 

1598
01:03:50,507 --> 01:03:52,451
those discussions will , will take 

1599
01:03:52,451 --> 01:03:54,562
place as we look at what , what , how 

1600
01:03:54,562 --> 01:03:56,673
do you weigh options available to the 

1601
01:03:56,673 --> 01:03:58,896
President for a deterrent capability as 

1602
01:03:58,896 --> 01:04:01,062
opposed to a conventional capability ? 

1603
01:04:01,062 --> 01:04:03,173
And certainly , uh the next year will 

1604
01:04:03,173 --> 01:04:05,396
inform us a lot more on how we're going 

1605
01:04:05,396 --> 01:04:07,562
to get at being able to balance all of 

1606
01:04:07,562 --> 01:04:07,340
that . Thank you , Admiral . Thank you , 

1607
01:04:07,350 --> 01:04:09,517
Mr Chairman to follow up Admiral . The 

1608
01:04:09,517 --> 01:04:11,429
theory is that if all we have is 

1609
01:04:11,439 --> 01:04:13,669
massive retaliation , that's not 

1610
01:04:13,679 --> 01:04:16,100
credible in response to a tactical use 

1611
01:04:16,110 --> 01:04:18,110
by an adversary . Isn't that really 

1612
01:04:18,110 --> 01:04:19,999
what we're talking about here ? I 

1613
01:04:19,999 --> 01:04:21,943
certainly in a regional conflict . 

1614
01:04:21,943 --> 01:04:24,110
Absolutely , sir . There , there is no 

1615
01:04:24,110 --> 01:04:26,221
doubt . Um , and , and you know , and 

1616
01:04:26,221 --> 01:04:28,388
to Senator Kelly's point , although we 

1617
01:04:28,388 --> 01:04:30,666
have deployed a 76 2 and we're , we're , 

1618
01:04:30,666 --> 01:04:32,888
we're done with that . So we've , we've 

1619
01:04:32,888 --> 01:04:34,943
gotten that impact out of N NSA . Um 

1620
01:04:35,030 --> 01:04:37,363
You know , you , you ask yourself again , 

1621
01:04:37,363 --> 01:04:39,474
is that a credible scenario ? Um , if 

1622
01:04:39,474 --> 01:04:41,530
you're trying to deter in a regional 

1623
01:04:41,530 --> 01:04:43,641
controversial , all of those things , 

1624
01:04:43,641 --> 01:04:45,863
Russians are talking all the time about 

1625
01:04:45,863 --> 01:04:48,030
using the possibility of using nuclear 

1626
01:04:48,030 --> 01:04:47,524
weapons as Senator Kelly points out 

1627
01:04:47,534 --> 01:04:49,478
part of their doctrine escalate to 

1628
01:04:49,478 --> 01:04:51,701
deescalated . Yes , sir . And it really 

1629
01:04:51,701 --> 01:04:53,756
is a matter of , as you talked again 

1630
01:04:53,756 --> 01:04:55,423
earlier about a second strike 

1631
01:04:55,423 --> 01:04:57,935
capability , anything that we can do to 

1632
01:04:57,945 --> 01:05:00,725
cause China or Russia to have pause on 

1633
01:05:00,735 --> 01:05:02,791
whether they would even consider any 

1634
01:05:02,791 --> 01:05:05,175
type of , of nuclear response . That's 

1635
01:05:05,185 --> 01:05:07,296
really what we're trying to get after 

1636
01:05:07,296 --> 01:05:09,518
with all these systems . Thank you . Um 

1637
01:05:09,518 --> 01:05:11,852
I , I want to ask a very basic question . 

1638
01:05:11,939 --> 01:05:14,161
The idea of the Ohio class and then the 

1639
01:05:14,161 --> 01:05:16,560
Columbia class with the ICBM S goes 

1640
01:05:16,570 --> 01:05:19,070
back , I know with ballistic missiles . 

1641
01:05:19,080 --> 01:05:21,399
Sorry , goes back many years . That 

1642
01:05:21,409 --> 01:05:23,631
decision was made . I don't know , 3040 

1643
01:05:23,631 --> 01:05:25,631
years ago when this was first being 

1644
01:05:25,631 --> 01:05:28,790
discussed , are we making a 

1645
01:05:28,800 --> 01:05:31,770
mistake by sticking with ballistic 

1646
01:05:31,780 --> 01:05:35,540
missiles and not moving toward uh 

1647
01:05:36,020 --> 01:05:38,449
hypersonic cruise missiles or some ? Uh 

1648
01:05:38,469 --> 01:05:40,780
uh , in other words , the problem with , 

1649
01:05:40,790 --> 01:05:43,012
as we , we had a hearing last week with 

1650
01:05:43,012 --> 01:05:44,734
the missile defense agency , a 

1651
01:05:44,734 --> 01:05:46,901
ballistic missile , sir , Isaac Newton 

1652
01:05:46,901 --> 01:05:49,123
can tell you where it's going to land . 

1653
01:05:49,123 --> 01:05:51,290
It's , it's , I wouldn't say it's easy 

1654
01:05:51,290 --> 01:05:53,457
to intercept , but it's much easier to 

1655
01:05:53,457 --> 01:05:55,512
intercept than a maneuverable cruise 

1656
01:05:55,512 --> 01:05:57,290
missile . Should we be thinking 

1657
01:05:57,290 --> 01:05:59,457
fundamentally about ? Are we putting a 

1658
01:05:59,457 --> 01:06:02,439
seventies or eighties weapon on this 

1659
01:06:02,449 --> 01:06:04,560
modern submarine ? Maybe we should be 

1660
01:06:04,560 --> 01:06:06,616
thinking about what these submarines 

1661
01:06:06,616 --> 01:06:08,893
are going to be armed with . Is that a , 

1662
01:06:08,893 --> 01:06:11,116
is that an off the wall idea or is that 

1663
01:06:11,116 --> 01:06:13,282
something that you're thinking about , 

1664
01:06:13,282 --> 01:06:12,979
sir ? That , that's a difficult 

1665
01:06:12,989 --> 01:06:14,656
question to answer in , in an 

1666
01:06:14,656 --> 01:06:16,711
unclassified scenario . I'd , I'd be 

1667
01:06:16,711 --> 01:06:18,933
more than happy to have that discussion 

1668
01:06:18,933 --> 01:06:20,989
in a classified setting , but here's 

1669
01:06:20,989 --> 01:06:23,100
what I would tell you . Um , based on 

1670
01:06:23,100 --> 01:06:25,156
technology and the things that we're 

1671
01:06:25,156 --> 01:06:27,378
all experiencing , we , there is no one 

1672
01:06:27,378 --> 01:06:29,600
solution that fits every scenario where 

1673
01:06:29,600 --> 01:06:31,489
we could think about how we would 

1674
01:06:31,489 --> 01:06:33,600
credibly deter our adversaries . So I 

1675
01:06:33,600 --> 01:06:35,822
think certainly the , the triad that we 

1676
01:06:35,822 --> 01:06:37,878
have today still remains the bedrock 

1677
01:06:37,878 --> 01:06:39,767
and the foundation of our nuclear 

1678
01:06:39,767 --> 01:06:41,711
deterrent capability . There is no 

1679
01:06:41,711 --> 01:06:43,767
doubt when we talk about things like 

1680
01:06:43,767 --> 01:06:45,822
sea launch cruise missile or we talk 

1681
01:06:45,822 --> 01:06:45,699
about some of these other things , 

1682
01:06:45,709 --> 01:06:47,709
there is a place for them and those 

1683
01:06:47,709 --> 01:06:49,598
discussions need to be had in the 

1684
01:06:49,598 --> 01:06:51,709
future . I just want to be sure those 

1685
01:06:51,709 --> 01:06:51,679
discussions are happening and that 

1686
01:06:51,689 --> 01:06:54,739
we're not just doing what we've done . 

1687
01:06:55,840 --> 01:06:58,062
You know , we've never done it that way 

1688
01:06:58,062 --> 01:07:00,118
before . I hate that attitude . So I 

1689
01:07:00,118 --> 01:07:02,173
just want to be sure there are those 

1690
01:07:02,173 --> 01:07:04,229
discussions . Yes , sir . We do have 

1691
01:07:04,229 --> 01:07:06,396
those discussions all the time . Thank 

1692
01:07:06,396 --> 01:07:09,959
you , Senator Fisher . Thank you , Mr 

1693
01:07:09,969 --> 01:07:12,025
Chairman . I , I don't have any more 

1694
01:07:12,025 --> 01:07:14,629
questions but I appreciate um , your , 

1695
01:07:14,639 --> 01:07:17,290
your answer to Senator Kelly about 

1696
01:07:17,300 --> 01:07:19,350
Slick a man . And I , I think it's 

1697
01:07:19,360 --> 01:07:22,070
extremely important that um not only do 

1698
01:07:22,080 --> 01:07:24,820
we look at um what our adversaries are 

1699
01:07:24,830 --> 01:07:28,669
doing and , and their um their comments 

1700
01:07:28,679 --> 01:07:31,629
that they , their public comments that 

1701
01:07:31,639 --> 01:07:34,639
they make , that we have to be able to 

1702
01:07:34,649 --> 01:07:36,870
have different options . And so I 

1703
01:07:36,879 --> 01:07:40,209
really appreciate um the 

1704
01:07:40,219 --> 01:07:44,189
work that uh that you do on that and 

1705
01:07:44,199 --> 01:07:46,610
to make sure that that a president 

1706
01:07:46,620 --> 01:07:49,379
would have options that would only 

1707
01:07:49,649 --> 01:07:53,560
add to the deterrence to make sure we 

1708
01:07:53,570 --> 01:07:55,570
would never have to use them . So , 

1709
01:07:55,570 --> 01:07:58,969
thank you . Uh I want to conclude the 

1710
01:07:58,979 --> 01:08:00,868
hearing but General Bossier , you 

1711
01:08:00,868 --> 01:08:03,320
mentioned the , the , the new NAOC and 

1712
01:08:03,330 --> 01:08:05,729
a group of us almost 10 years ago , 

1713
01:08:05,739 --> 01:08:07,830
went on one of the NAOS around the 

1714
01:08:07,840 --> 01:08:09,949
country on a flight with a simulated 

1715
01:08:09,959 --> 01:08:11,959
attack . And it was one of the most 

1716
01:08:11,959 --> 01:08:13,959
sobering experiences of my life . I 

1717
01:08:13,959 --> 01:08:17,370
would urge you to think about inviting 

1718
01:08:17,379 --> 01:08:19,379
members of the committee members of 

1719
01:08:19,379 --> 01:08:21,601
congress to , to take that trip because 

1720
01:08:21,601 --> 01:08:23,712
it , it , it , it takes it out of the 

1721
01:08:23,712 --> 01:08:25,935
hearing room and becomes much more real 

1722
01:08:25,935 --> 01:08:28,529
as you think about what challenges this 

1723
01:08:28,540 --> 01:08:30,596
country might face . What challenges 

1724
01:08:30,596 --> 01:08:32,709
the president might face in a , in a 

1725
01:08:32,720 --> 01:08:34,942
situation that was what came through to 

1726
01:08:34,942 --> 01:08:37,164
me was that clock on the wall that told 

1727
01:08:37,164 --> 01:08:39,498
you how long you had to make a decision . 

1728
01:08:39,498 --> 01:08:41,553
I want to thank you all for the work 

1729
01:08:41,553 --> 01:08:43,553
that you do . It's some of the most 

1730
01:08:43,553 --> 01:08:45,498
important work uh that , that this 

1731
01:08:45,498 --> 01:08:47,720
government is doing . Deterrence is the 

1732
01:08:47,720 --> 01:08:49,942
bedrock of our strategy . You're on the 

1733
01:08:49,942 --> 01:08:51,998
front line of deterrence . Thank you 

1734
01:08:51,998 --> 01:08:54,331
very much . I appreciate your testimony . 

1735
01:08:54,331 --> 01:08:54,149
We'll hold the record open for 

1736
01:08:54,160 --> 01:08:56,271
additional thoughts and testimony and 

1737
01:08:56,271 --> 01:08:58,649
questions from our members . Uh But uh 

1738
01:08:58,660 --> 01:09:00,549
for today , thank you so much for 

1739
01:09:00,549 --> 01:09:02,549
joining us . Thank you . Hearing is 

1740
01:09:02,549 --> 01:09:02,879
adjourned .