WEBVTT 00:00.509 --> 00:02.453 Well , ladies and gentlemen , good 00:02.453 --> 00:04.519 morning . Thank you very much for 00:04.530 --> 00:07.349 coming along . It's my great honor and 00:07.360 --> 00:09.310 pleasure to welcome you here this 00:09.319 --> 00:11.470 morning . To hear from the honorable 00:11.479 --> 00:13.979 Kathleen Hicks , the US Deputy 00:13.989 --> 00:16.100 Secretary of Defense , who's going to 00:16.100 --> 00:18.629 talk about lessons on current conflicts 00:18.639 --> 00:21.360 for the future character of war . We're 00:21.370 --> 00:23.389 also joined this morning by our 00:23.399 --> 00:26.209 incoming director General Rachel who 00:26.219 --> 00:28.386 will be chairing the discussion . I'll 00:28.386 --> 00:30.579 introduce both properly shortly , uh 00:30.590 --> 00:32.812 but should start first of all with some 00:32.812 --> 00:34.701 ground rules and guidance for the 00:34.701 --> 00:36.923 session . First , we have no fire alarm 00:36.923 --> 00:38.740 planned . So in the event of an 00:38.750 --> 00:41.939 emergency , please follow Russi staff 00:41.950 --> 00:44.459 who will help you exit the building and 00:44.470 --> 00:47.720 flee for your lives . Secondly , you 00:47.729 --> 00:50.080 may post on social media about the 00:50.090 --> 00:53.970 event , but now is your opportunity to 00:53.979 --> 00:56.500 ensure that your electronic devices are 00:56.509 --> 00:58.990 turned silent and not going to go off 00:59.000 --> 01:01.459 with your witty ring tone half way 01:01.470 --> 01:03.959 through the lecture . Please do not be 01:03.970 --> 01:07.250 caught out . Third in terms of the 01:07.260 --> 01:09.800 format for the event today , it will be 01:09.809 --> 01:12.110 a talk by the deputy secretary followed 01:12.120 --> 01:14.830 by a fireside chat . Albeit we don't 01:14.839 --> 01:17.819 actually have a fire to be beside , but 01:18.040 --> 01:19.910 that will then be followed by a 01:19.919 --> 01:22.669 moderated discussion between Rachel and 01:22.790 --> 01:24.512 Dr Hicks . And then after that 01:24.519 --> 01:26.669 concludes , there will be a brief 01:26.680 --> 01:29.510 opportunity for audience Q and A but I 01:29.519 --> 01:32.500 do mean brief . So please be concise if 01:32.510 --> 01:34.677 we come to you with an opportunity for 01:34.677 --> 01:37.410 questions . And finally , possibly most 01:37.419 --> 01:39.650 importantly , in terms of attribution , 01:39.910 --> 01:42.300 all three elements , the talk , the 01:42.309 --> 01:45.040 discussion and the Q and A will be on 01:45.050 --> 01:48.769 the record and are being recorded given 01:48.779 --> 01:51.430 world events . We are fortunate to have 01:51.440 --> 01:53.551 such a distinguished speaker today to 01:53.551 --> 01:56.910 draw upon her extensive experience . Dr 01:56.980 --> 01:59.730 Kathleen Hicks has spent over 30 years 01:59.739 --> 02:01.830 in national security roles , having 02:01.839 --> 02:03.950 started her career as a civil servant 02:03.950 --> 02:07.370 at the US Department of Defense in 1993 02:07.599 --> 02:09.543 before being appointed to multiple 02:09.543 --> 02:12.949 posts in policy strategy and plans 02:12.960 --> 02:15.839 amongst others in between those roles . 02:15.850 --> 02:17.850 She's been a senior fellow and more 02:17.850 --> 02:20.072 recently a senior vice president at the 02:20.072 --> 02:21.839 US Center for Strategic and 02:21.850 --> 02:24.279 International Studies in Washington DC , 02:24.520 --> 02:26.131 as well as Director of their 02:26.131 --> 02:28.187 International Security program . She 02:28.187 --> 02:30.229 currently serves as the 35th Deputy 02:30.240 --> 02:32.407 Secretary of Defense and she was sworn 02:32.407 --> 02:34.919 into that office on 9 February 2021 . 02:35.990 --> 02:38.160 Rachel has just finished being the US 02:38.169 --> 02:40.280 Secretary of Defense's Representative 02:40.280 --> 02:42.391 in Europe and the defense adviser for 02:42.391 --> 02:44.558 the US mission to NATO . Before that , 02:44.558 --> 02:46.780 she also had an extensive career in the 02:46.780 --> 02:49.002 dod including actually three years over 02:49.002 --> 02:51.169 here in the UK in London , assigned to 02:51.169 --> 02:53.350 the strategy unit in the Uk's Ministry 02:53.360 --> 02:55.649 of Defense . And that was involved 02:55.660 --> 02:57.759 working on the defense green paper 02:57.770 --> 02:59.990 published at the time . Then the 2010 03:00.000 --> 03:02.111 strategic defense and security view , 03:02.111 --> 03:05.070 the SSR and the 2012 defense engagement 03:05.080 --> 03:07.619 strategy . Her career also included 03:07.630 --> 03:09.686 work for leading think tanks such as 03:10.100 --> 03:12.220 CSIS . There's a theme here , the 03:12.229 --> 03:14.118 Danish Institute of International 03:14.118 --> 03:16.580 Affairs in Copenhagen and the Prague 03:16.589 --> 03:18.929 Center of the East West Institute . She 03:18.940 --> 03:21.051 starts officially as our new director 03:21.051 --> 03:22.718 general on 6 January . So I'm 03:22.718 --> 03:24.884 endeavoring not to get myself fired in 03:24.884 --> 03:28.139 advance . Now , drawing lessons from 03:28.149 --> 03:30.770 contemporary conflict is obviously not 03:30.779 --> 03:32.940 a new subject and indeed , it's 03:32.949 --> 03:35.119 essentially the core reason why Rusi 03:35.130 --> 03:38.000 was founded in the first place . But 03:38.009 --> 03:40.630 recent history has given us a rich seam 03:40.639 --> 03:42.861 of operational experience from which to 03:42.861 --> 03:45.460 mine with the caution that we need to 03:45.470 --> 03:47.449 be careful about drawing the right 03:47.460 --> 03:50.059 lessons from conflict and not focusing 03:50.070 --> 03:52.300 on the wrong ones . A particular hot 03:52.309 --> 03:54.899 topic has been the pace of change and 03:54.910 --> 03:57.199 some quite harsh headlines for Western 03:57.210 --> 03:59.449 militaries on both our readiness and 03:59.460 --> 04:01.649 our ability to adapt , particularly in 04:01.660 --> 04:03.660 working with industry , the private 04:03.869 --> 04:07.740 private sector and society . Dr Hicks 04:07.750 --> 04:09.940 has been prominent in promoting the US 04:09.949 --> 04:12.740 replicator initiative which is a dod 04:12.750 --> 04:15.059 attempt to accelerate the delivery of 04:15.070 --> 04:17.779 innovative capabilities to military 04:17.790 --> 04:21.209 forces at a speed and scale that 04:21.220 --> 04:24.100 bests existing systems and processes 04:25.010 --> 04:26.709 with the UK obviously facing 04:26.720 --> 04:28.942 significant challenges and transforming 04:28.942 --> 04:30.831 our own armed forces and with the 04:30.831 --> 04:32.998 defense review , obviously under way , 04:32.998 --> 04:35.220 there is much to learn Dr Hicks . Thank 04:35.220 --> 04:37.331 you very much for coming in today and 04:37.331 --> 04:37.260 over to you . 04:46.769 --> 04:48.825 Well , thank you very much , Matthew 04:48.825 --> 04:50.880 and good morning to everyone . It is 04:50.880 --> 04:53.230 truly great to be back at the Royal 04:53.239 --> 04:56.350 United Services Institute across the 04:56.359 --> 04:59.100 pond . Rusi is well recognized for its 04:59.109 --> 05:01.799 incisive research and broad convening 05:01.809 --> 05:04.420 power on defense and security matters . 05:05.519 --> 05:07.589 And as the specter of state on state 05:07.600 --> 05:09.933 war returned to Europe with a vengeance . 05:09.933 --> 05:13.660 In February 2022 we've needed Rusi and 05:13.670 --> 05:16.109 other independent research centers now 05:16.119 --> 05:20.049 more than ever . Notably Rusi scholars 05:20.059 --> 05:22.290 and fellows like Jack Watling , Emily , 05:22.299 --> 05:24.410 Ferris Nick Reynolds , Emma Butcher , 05:24.410 --> 05:27.380 Noah Sylvia and Moore have illuminated 05:27.390 --> 05:30.329 many technical tactical and operational 05:30.339 --> 05:33.459 lessons from Ukraine , the UK and other 05:33.470 --> 05:35.414 militaries over these past several 05:35.414 --> 05:39.279 years , every war offers a 05:39.290 --> 05:41.529 window into how future wars will be 05:41.540 --> 05:44.350 waged . Unquestionably , Russia's war 05:44.359 --> 05:46.950 against Ukraine has much to tell us . 05:48.459 --> 05:50.348 For instance , we're seeing novel 05:50.348 --> 05:52.181 applications of both old and new 05:52.181 --> 05:54.237 technologies , some of which will be 05:54.237 --> 05:56.403 significant factors in how wars of the 05:56.403 --> 05:59.709 future will likely be fought . The war 05:59.720 --> 06:01.910 has had major consequences , not only 06:01.920 --> 06:04.609 for Europe but also other regions , 06:04.619 --> 06:07.329 especially the Indo Pacific where over 06:07.339 --> 06:10.290 the last four years , we've sharpened 06:10.299 --> 06:12.570 our focus and strengthened our posture 06:12.649 --> 06:15.700 and capabilities in recognition of a 06:15.709 --> 06:17.929 long term strategic competition with 06:17.940 --> 06:21.230 the People's Republic of China . We've 06:21.239 --> 06:23.549 done so recognizing that competition 06:23.559 --> 06:26.720 does not mean conflict because no one 06:26.730 --> 06:28.786 should desire the global devastation 06:28.786 --> 06:31.130 that such a war would bring . That's 06:31.140 --> 06:33.200 why we seek to prevent conflict by 06:33.209 --> 06:35.320 deterring pr c aggression against the 06:35.320 --> 06:37.153 United States and our allies and 06:37.153 --> 06:39.429 partners and by defending our core 06:39.440 --> 06:42.850 national security interests and key to 06:42.859 --> 06:45.510 deterrence is being able to win if 06:45.519 --> 06:48.579 called to fight . Of course , there are 06:48.589 --> 06:50.799 differences between the regions and 06:50.809 --> 06:53.031 their security environments , but there 06:53.031 --> 06:55.190 are also similarities and takeaways 06:55.200 --> 06:58.079 that are transferable . We've seen that 06:58.089 --> 07:00.089 clearly and we know our competitors 07:00.089 --> 07:02.850 have seen it . That's why I wanted to 07:02.859 --> 07:05.070 come to Rusi today while I'm in London 07:05.079 --> 07:07.290 this week for the biannual US UK 07:07.739 --> 07:10.730 defense dialogue to share some of the 07:10.739 --> 07:13.017 lessons we're learning in the Pentagon , 07:13.260 --> 07:15.482 their implications for the Indo Pacific 07:15.482 --> 07:18.010 and beyond how we see the character of 07:18.019 --> 07:20.529 warfare changing and how we're changing 07:20.540 --> 07:22.750 ourselves to shape and master the 07:22.760 --> 07:26.760 future character of war . So a few 07:26.769 --> 07:29.959 quick stipulations upfront . First , to 07:29.970 --> 07:32.290 be clear , I'm focused today on changes 07:32.299 --> 07:34.890 in Moore's character , not its nature . 07:36.040 --> 07:38.529 I have no need to dispute Clausewitz 07:39.070 --> 07:42.119 that war is violent . It is foggy full 07:42.130 --> 07:44.186 of friction , fear , uncertainty and 07:44.186 --> 07:48.100 chance . There has been so much 07:48.109 --> 07:50.440 needless bloodshed in Russia's war 07:50.450 --> 07:53.089 against Ukraine and such a high cost 07:53.100 --> 07:55.044 paid , especially by the people of 07:55.044 --> 07:58.750 Ukraine . That's one reason why war is 07:58.760 --> 08:01.209 always the last thing we want . 08:02.239 --> 08:05.239 Second , human beings have a perfectly 08:05.250 --> 08:07.730 imperfect record of predicting the 08:07.739 --> 08:10.600 future , let alone the weak . So I'm 08:10.609 --> 08:12.649 careful here to avoid sweeping 08:12.660 --> 08:14.549 statements that leave no room for 08:14.549 --> 08:17.950 nuance . Wisdom requires knowing your 08:17.959 --> 08:20.015 limitations after all . And there is 08:20.015 --> 08:21.829 irreducible uncertainty in 08:21.839 --> 08:25.290 international security affairs . When 08:25.299 --> 08:27.188 future casting , it's tempting to 08:27.188 --> 08:29.799 proclaim a paradigm shift . Even though 08:29.809 --> 08:31.587 we've all heard those that were 08:31.587 --> 08:33.809 premature or still haven't panned out . 08:35.039 --> 08:37.340 It's also tempting to critique heralds 08:37.349 --> 08:39.539 of revolution where evolution seems 08:39.549 --> 08:42.159 more evident . I won't give in to 08:42.169 --> 08:46.169 either temptation . Today , there is 08:46.179 --> 08:48.401 a tendency in our field to either fight 08:48.401 --> 08:50.735 the last war or to suffer from next war . 08:50.735 --> 08:52.820 Itis I have seen the pendulum swing 08:52.830 --> 08:54.919 between those mentalities since my 08:54.929 --> 08:57.179 first job in the Pentagon over 30 years 08:57.190 --> 09:00.929 ago . Instead of picking 09:00.940 --> 09:03.320 sides , we must inhabit the tension 09:03.330 --> 09:06.130 between them if we can , success is not 09:06.140 --> 09:08.251 guaranteed . But it's more within our 09:08.251 --> 09:10.489 grasp if we can't , failure is all but 09:10.500 --> 09:13.530 certain . That's because technology 09:13.539 --> 09:15.595 warfare and the operational concepts 09:15.595 --> 09:18.090 where they intersect are never static . 09:18.099 --> 09:20.650 They are always in motion . And while 09:20.659 --> 09:22.830 it can take years or even decades to 09:22.840 --> 09:24.950 fully grasp their consequences , it 09:24.960 --> 09:27.510 behooves us to discern key themes as 09:27.520 --> 09:30.799 soon as we are able after all doing so , 09:30.809 --> 09:32.849 can save lives , secure national 09:32.859 --> 09:34.940 interests and even deter future 09:34.950 --> 09:38.239 conflict . So here are four early 09:38.250 --> 09:40.472 insights from the war in Ukraine that I 09:40.472 --> 09:42.361 believe had impact for the future 09:42.361 --> 09:45.530 character of war . The first insight is 09:45.539 --> 09:48.049 that quality intelligence and is is an 09:48.059 --> 09:51.059 enduring advantage . Prior to February 09:51.070 --> 09:54.450 24th , 2022 few countries expected 09:54.460 --> 09:57.489 Russia to further invade Ukraine . We 09:57.500 --> 10:00.940 knew otherwise , thankfully , we saw 10:00.950 --> 10:03.172 the enormous build up of Russian forces 10:03.172 --> 10:05.400 early . We had enough confidence in the 10:05.409 --> 10:07.409 indications and warnings and enough 10:07.409 --> 10:09.739 credibility to disseminate the 10:09.750 --> 10:11.979 information and rally our friends and 10:11.989 --> 10:14.469 allies . Not everyone believed it at 10:14.479 --> 10:16.590 first , but those who did were better 10:16.590 --> 10:19.960 prepared . The second insight which was 10:19.969 --> 10:22.500 evident soon after the wider war began 10:22.510 --> 10:24.960 was this , you can have all the 10:24.969 --> 10:26.969 elements of an advanced military on 10:26.969 --> 10:29.890 paper . But if you can't bring it all 10:29.900 --> 10:32.011 together into an integrated system of 10:32.011 --> 10:34.780 systems , if you don't have consistent 10:34.789 --> 10:37.799 operational , know how winning is tough . 10:38.590 --> 10:40.701 We saw this clearly in Russia's early 10:40.701 --> 10:42.701 battlefield failures and it's still 10:42.701 --> 10:44.923 worth noting almost three years later . 10:46.190 --> 10:48.246 It's not as though Russia's military 10:48.246 --> 10:50.250 was inexperienced in modern warfare 10:50.260 --> 10:52.427 with operations under their belts from 10:52.427 --> 10:54.739 Chechnya , Georgia , Syria and even 10:54.750 --> 10:58.630 Ukraine starting in 2014 . But 10:58.640 --> 11:00.529 Ukraine had been working with the 11:00.529 --> 11:02.640 United States and other partners like 11:02.640 --> 11:04.909 the UK since then , training to defend 11:04.919 --> 11:08.349 itself those efforts paid off early . 11:09.700 --> 11:12.280 It's a reminder of an enduring reality , 11:12.289 --> 11:14.719 readiness training and operational art , 11:14.729 --> 11:17.549 especially on how to aggregate systems 11:17.559 --> 11:19.919 in depth across time and space are 11:19.929 --> 11:22.239 often more important for military power 11:22.400 --> 11:24.599 than numbers or technology alone . 11:25.080 --> 11:28.690 Indeed , a military force can add up to 11:28.700 --> 11:30.533 less than the sum of its parts . 11:31.729 --> 11:33.951 Historically , that kind of integration 11:33.951 --> 11:35.951 and ability to operate jointly is a 11:35.951 --> 11:38.359 relative strength of the US military 11:38.369 --> 11:41.960 and our closest allies like the UK and 11:41.969 --> 11:43.913 we're always getting better , both 11:43.913 --> 11:46.359 individually and together by constantly 11:46.369 --> 11:49.020 marrying new operational concepts with 11:49.030 --> 11:52.520 game changing capabilities . We've of 11:52.530 --> 11:54.770 course seen Russia adapt and improve 11:54.780 --> 11:57.450 with time , which brings me to a third 11:57.460 --> 12:00.979 insight , protracted warfare is alive 12:00.989 --> 12:03.020 and well , even among advanced 12:03.030 --> 12:06.849 militaries , as Rusi scholars noted 12:06.859 --> 12:09.640 two years ago , Putin planned to take 12:09.650 --> 12:13.650 over Ukraine within 10 days to date . 12:13.849 --> 12:16.669 He's missed his target timeline 100 12:16.679 --> 12:19.380 times over , he underestimated 12:19.390 --> 12:22.109 Ukraine's will to fight and ability to 12:22.119 --> 12:25.380 innovate and frankly so did many in the 12:25.390 --> 12:28.690 West . Even with the best intelligence 12:28.700 --> 12:30.760 apparatus in the world , you won't 12:30.770 --> 12:34.200 always get everything right . The clear 12:34.210 --> 12:37.799 takeaway is no one should underestimate 12:37.809 --> 12:40.929 the ability of an educated networked , 12:41.200 --> 12:44.109 capable society to self organize and 12:44.119 --> 12:47.650 resist aggression . Those societal 12:47.659 --> 12:49.715 strengths in Ukraine have made their 12:49.715 --> 12:51.820 resistance even more challenging for 12:51.830 --> 12:54.590 Russia . The Ukrainians are showing how 12:54.599 --> 12:57.590 effectively a smaller adversary can tie 12:57.599 --> 12:59.979 down a larger one with the right 12:59.989 --> 13:03.859 capabilities and support . A big 13:03.869 --> 13:05.940 reason . Why is the fourth insight , 13:05.950 --> 13:07.506 which is that alliances and 13:07.506 --> 13:09.570 partnerships are an asymmetric 13:09.580 --> 13:12.159 advantage , especially when the free 13:12.169 --> 13:15.109 world comes together to provide 13:15.119 --> 13:17.008 security assistance , such as air 13:17.008 --> 13:19.229 defenses , artillery vehicles , 13:19.239 --> 13:22.349 munitions , and more to impose costs 13:22.359 --> 13:25.260 including with the many economic tools 13:25.270 --> 13:28.289 at our disposal and to defend the rules 13:28.299 --> 13:31.010 based international order that's had so 13:31.020 --> 13:33.729 much benefit to so many for so long 13:35.150 --> 13:38.070 from NATO to August and beyond . The 13:38.080 --> 13:40.809 United States and the UK are fortunate 13:40.820 --> 13:43.469 to be among dozens of like minded 13:43.479 --> 13:45.849 friends and allies who are partners of 13:45.859 --> 13:49.729 choice . We share values , we 13:49.739 --> 13:52.419 train together deeply . We provide each 13:52.429 --> 13:55.590 other access bases and overflight . Our 13:55.599 --> 13:57.599 capabilities are seamlessly 13:57.609 --> 13:59.390 interoperable and increasingly 13:59.400 --> 14:02.250 interchangeable . Our supply chains 14:02.260 --> 14:05.510 strengthen one another . That's the 14:05.520 --> 14:07.580 result of decades . In some cases , 14:07.590 --> 14:09.929 centuries of mutual investment in our 14:09.940 --> 14:12.520 relationships , we can never take that 14:12.530 --> 14:14.799 for granted . And that's particularly 14:14.809 --> 14:17.229 true of this special relationship . 14:18.750 --> 14:20.760 Not every country enjoys these 14:20.770 --> 14:22.989 advantages . Our competitors 14:23.000 --> 14:26.450 undoubtedly wish they did because long 14:26.460 --> 14:28.659 wars are hard to fight without many 14:28.669 --> 14:31.690 friends and they're even harder to win 14:31.919 --> 14:33.975 when you're stuck with bedfellows of 14:33.975 --> 14:37.809 last resort . Whereas genuine enduring 14:37.820 --> 14:40.669 alliances afford a unique sense of 14:40.679 --> 14:44.400 resilience . It's an ad hoc 14:44.409 --> 14:46.719 arsenal autocracies that has kept 14:46.729 --> 14:49.440 Russia in the fight so far . Despite 14:49.450 --> 14:51.283 the impact of what Putin cobbled 14:51.283 --> 14:53.799 together , a willingness to send parts 14:53.809 --> 14:55.929 weapons and troops doesn't mean 14:55.940 --> 14:58.010 everyone's getting along . Although 14:58.020 --> 15:01.369 it's still concerning to see more 15:01.380 --> 15:03.549 serious collaboration would be even 15:03.559 --> 15:07.479 more concerning for our part , we 15:07.489 --> 15:09.239 are rebuilding our arsenal of 15:09.250 --> 15:12.109 democracies , plural because our 15:12.119 --> 15:15.469 alliances make our industries stronger , 15:16.510 --> 15:18.700 perversely for Russia . Putin's 15:18.710 --> 15:21.530 aggression led to clearer more public 15:21.539 --> 15:23.650 conversations about the transatlantic 15:23.650 --> 15:25.539 defense , industrial base and the 15:25.539 --> 15:28.210 challenges of capability production at 15:28.219 --> 15:31.530 scale , enabling us to make necessary 15:31.539 --> 15:33.372 investments to get . After those 15:33.372 --> 15:36.929 challenges like maximizing production 15:36.940 --> 15:39.070 of key munitions , including new or 15:39.080 --> 15:41.820 lower cost munitions for a range of 15:41.830 --> 15:45.419 warfighting scenarios , investing in 15:45.429 --> 15:47.151 our shipbuilding and submarine 15:47.151 --> 15:49.207 industrial base , which also matters 15:49.207 --> 15:52.520 for aus using on shoring and friend 15:52.530 --> 15:54.619 shoring to secure supply chains from 15:54.630 --> 15:57.369 critical minerals to microchips and 15:57.380 --> 16:00.500 expanding cove co production and co 16:00.539 --> 16:02.929 sustainment with allies and partners . 16:03.559 --> 16:06.469 We're doing all this because production 16:06.479 --> 16:10.380 is deterrence and while the engines 16:10.390 --> 16:13.179 of production never spin up to 100% 16:13.190 --> 16:15.559 overnight , the war in Ukraine 16:15.570 --> 16:17.900 galvanized democratic societies to 16:17.909 --> 16:20.159 jumpstart their industries and deepen 16:20.169 --> 16:22.010 their stockpiles to better deter 16:22.020 --> 16:24.242 aggression and prepare for the future . 16:26.359 --> 16:28.526 So what should these insights mean for 16:28.526 --> 16:32.229 the Indo Pacific and the Pr C for one 16:32.239 --> 16:34.830 Moscow's early battlefield struggles 16:34.969 --> 16:37.469 should be deeply concerning for Beijing . 16:37.799 --> 16:39.966 This is especially true because the PL 16:39.966 --> 16:42.099 A is far less experienced in modern 16:42.109 --> 16:44.429 warfare than the Russian military . The 16:44.440 --> 16:47.150 PL A hasn't fought a war in 40 years . 16:48.750 --> 16:50.729 Meanwhile , Ukraine's example of 16:50.739 --> 16:52.795 resistance and innovation against an 16:52.795 --> 16:54.979 aggressor should also be appreciated 16:54.989 --> 16:57.840 clearly on both sides of the Taiwan 16:57.849 --> 16:59.820 Strait in the South China Sea and 16:59.830 --> 17:03.690 elsewhere . If the PR C were to pursue 17:03.700 --> 17:05.644 aggression against a neighbor , it 17:05.644 --> 17:07.811 would likely find what Russia found in 17:07.811 --> 17:10.500 Ukraine that both sides must be 17:10.510 --> 17:13.000 prepared for a drawn out protracted 17:13.010 --> 17:15.810 fight where the costs for all only go 17:15.819 --> 17:19.810 up over time . And the power of what 17:19.819 --> 17:22.099 like-minded friends and allies can do 17:22.109 --> 17:24.959 together is also on clear display in 17:24.969 --> 17:27.579 the Indo Pacific where we've seen what 17:27.589 --> 17:29.609 Secretary Austin has called a new 17:29.619 --> 17:32.469 convergence of our allies and partners 17:32.479 --> 17:35.170 around a shared vision of security from 17:35.180 --> 17:37.469 Northeast Asia down to Australia and 17:37.479 --> 17:41.280 the Pacific Islands nowhere is 17:41.290 --> 17:44.000 that convergence clearer than in August 17:44.010 --> 17:46.066 where we're working closely with our 17:46.066 --> 17:48.619 British and Australian allies to field 17:48.630 --> 17:50.741 algorithms that are already enhancing 17:50.741 --> 17:53.239 anti submarine warfare capabilities to 17:53.250 --> 17:55.949 launch UK torpedoes from us , platforms 17:55.959 --> 17:58.260 and vice versa and to advance our 17:58.270 --> 18:00.119 capabilities and hypersonics and 18:00.130 --> 18:02.939 combined autonomy among many others . 18:04.800 --> 18:07.040 Again , an instigator of conflict in 18:07.050 --> 18:09.106 the Indo Pacific would find the same 18:09.106 --> 18:12.410 outcome Moscow has found in Europe that 18:12.420 --> 18:14.849 military aggression won't achieve your 18:14.859 --> 18:17.119 objectives quickly , that you will 18:17.130 --> 18:20.209 become increasingly isolated . And that 18:20.219 --> 18:22.209 above and beyond the military 18:22.219 --> 18:25.089 consequences , the free world can 18:25.099 --> 18:28.150 impose severe economic and reputational 18:28.160 --> 18:32.000 costs in such a conflict . An aggressor 18:32.010 --> 18:33.819 may find that global goodwill 18:33.829 --> 18:36.319 evaporates quickly because most 18:36.329 --> 18:38.550 countries don't want to be associated 18:38.560 --> 18:40.671 with a nation that bullies or invades 18:40.671 --> 18:42.504 its neighbors no matter how much 18:42.504 --> 18:46.060 they've been debt trapped . Of course , 18:46.069 --> 18:49.219 not every lesson from UK Ukraine can or 18:49.229 --> 18:51.451 should translate to the Indo Pacific or 18:51.451 --> 18:53.670 elsewhere . There are noteworthy 18:53.680 --> 18:56.979 regional differences . For example , 18:56.989 --> 18:59.060 the Indo Pacific doesn't have a NATO 18:59.180 --> 19:01.839 nor do we seek it to . Instead , 19:01.849 --> 19:04.071 there's something even better suited to 19:04.071 --> 19:06.293 the region , an organic broad community 19:06.293 --> 19:08.719 of nations that wants the Indo Pacific 19:08.729 --> 19:11.400 to remain free , open , stable , 19:11.410 --> 19:13.880 peaceful and prosperous for everyone . 19:14.290 --> 19:16.457 That's what America and our allies and 19:16.457 --> 19:20.130 partners want too . Another difference . 19:20.209 --> 19:23.250 Taiwan is an island , 100 and 10 miles 19:23.260 --> 19:26.329 off the coast of the Pr C mainland . In 19:26.339 --> 19:28.810 that respect , Russia had it easier 19:28.819 --> 19:30.763 since an amphibious landing is the 19:30.763 --> 19:33.239 world's hardest military operation . 19:33.670 --> 19:36.050 But still the Kremlin failed to take 19:36.060 --> 19:39.880 over Ukraine like they planned . While 19:39.890 --> 19:42.079 the Pr C claims there are no 19:42.089 --> 19:44.311 similarities . We know they're watching 19:44.311 --> 19:46.145 this war closely and taking away 19:46.145 --> 19:48.699 lessons . Although observing lessons is 19:48.709 --> 19:50.542 very different from implementing 19:50.542 --> 19:53.920 lessons . So we will keep a close eye 19:53.930 --> 19:56.099 on what they learn and will remain 19:56.109 --> 19:57.900 ready to deter aggression . 20:00.010 --> 20:02.349 It's clear why Beijing is watching this 20:02.359 --> 20:04.770 war closely because after almost three 20:04.780 --> 20:07.589 years , we have seen the character of 20:07.599 --> 20:11.449 warfare change . At first emerging 20:11.459 --> 20:13.348 capabilities and concepts used in 20:13.348 --> 20:16.280 Ukraine and smaller wars prior seemed 20:16.290 --> 20:19.780 like minor adaptations enabled by a 20:19.790 --> 20:21.512 global diffusion of commercial 20:21.512 --> 20:25.349 technology . They've since become more 20:25.359 --> 20:27.579 broad-based shifts embedded into the 20:27.589 --> 20:30.550 conduct of the war and these trends 20:30.560 --> 20:33.099 will surely echo in future wars for at 20:33.109 --> 20:36.979 least the next generation . One trend 20:36.989 --> 20:38.822 is how commercial technology and 20:38.822 --> 20:41.770 approaches with few modifications are 20:41.780 --> 20:44.880 proving useful again and again from 20:44.890 --> 20:47.001 proliferated commercial satellites to 20:47.001 --> 20:48.920 small airborne drones to cloud 20:48.930 --> 20:52.739 computing . Decades after talk of 20:52.750 --> 20:55.028 network centric warfare first appeared , 20:55.199 --> 20:57.310 we're watching what happens when it's 20:57.310 --> 20:59.969 applied at scale and we're seeing how 20:59.979 --> 21:02.250 dual use technologies and talent can 21:02.260 --> 21:05.550 help deliver it . Widespread 21:05.560 --> 21:07.727 connectivity and widespread electronic 21:07.727 --> 21:10.050 warfare have created new opportunities 21:10.060 --> 21:11.910 and new challenges for maneuver 21:11.920 --> 21:15.400 dispersal sensing and concealment . If 21:15.410 --> 21:18.800 you can be seen , you can be hit that's 21:18.810 --> 21:20.699 driving innovation in operational 21:20.699 --> 21:23.199 concepts , capabilities and even force 21:23.209 --> 21:27.060 design . It's also a key factor in 21:27.069 --> 21:29.236 our iterative development , deployment 21:29.236 --> 21:31.750 and use of combined joint all domain 21:31.760 --> 21:34.349 command and control or CJD C two , 21:34.760 --> 21:37.050 which draws upon America's current 21:37.060 --> 21:39.930 global lead in software and responsible 21:39.939 --> 21:42.520 A I to give us and our allies and 21:42.530 --> 21:44.849 partners a clear decision advantage . 21:46.079 --> 21:48.459 Because when we can see ourselves and 21:48.469 --> 21:50.900 potential adversaries clearly , when we 21:50.910 --> 21:53.140 make the battle space more transparent 21:53.150 --> 21:56.619 than ever for us , we can sense , make 21:56.630 --> 21:59.579 sense and act faster while still 21:59.589 --> 22:01.311 maintaining human judgment and 22:01.311 --> 22:03.900 responsibility over use of force the 22:03.910 --> 22:07.910 best of both worlds . Another trend 22:07.920 --> 22:11.270 which some call precise mass is the use 22:11.280 --> 22:13.630 of lower cost attrit autonomous 22:13.640 --> 22:16.689 capabilities alongside more traditional 22:16.699 --> 22:18.599 forces to increase the scale and 22:18.609 --> 22:20.979 accuracy of surveillance and attacks . 22:22.510 --> 22:24.949 The Russia Ukraine war didn't start 22:24.959 --> 22:27.250 this trend but it did accelerate it and 22:27.260 --> 22:29.569 it's shown how precise mass contributes 22:29.579 --> 22:32.089 to magazine depth which is critical in 22:32.099 --> 22:34.199 production of excuse me protraction 22:34.209 --> 22:37.979 scenarios . Today dod S 22:37.989 --> 22:40.670 replicator initiative is one way we're 22:40.680 --> 22:43.000 embracing precise mass for the future 22:43.089 --> 22:45.311 and putting it into production at speed 22:45.311 --> 22:48.400 and scale replicators . Initial focus 22:48.410 --> 22:50.609 is fielding multiple thousands of at 22:50.619 --> 22:52.841 tradable autonomous systems in multiple 22:52.841 --> 22:55.390 domains by August of 2025 . 22:56.589 --> 22:58.969 It's a pathfinder that is not only on 22:58.979 --> 23:01.650 track to meet this operational goal but 23:01.660 --> 23:03.640 also to speed the scaling of 23:03.650 --> 23:06.069 responsible autonomy more broadly 23:07.869 --> 23:09.758 and will continue to adapt as our 23:09.758 --> 23:11.813 competitors . And adversaries do the 23:11.813 --> 23:13.979 same . That's partly why replicators 23:13.989 --> 23:16.640 second iteration will scale systems to 23:16.650 --> 23:18.706 counter the threat of small airborne 23:18.706 --> 23:20.539 drones in line with our recently 23:20.539 --> 23:22.400 released strategy for countering 23:22.410 --> 23:26.079 unmanned systems . Precise 23:26.089 --> 23:28.910 mass exemplifies a fusion of old and 23:28.920 --> 23:32.189 new throughout history . Mass was often 23:32.199 --> 23:35.390 decisive in warfare until Cold War era 23:35.400 --> 23:37.567 tech breakthroughs provided the United 23:37.567 --> 23:39.589 States and European allies an 23:39.599 --> 23:42.130 opportunity to trade mass for greater 23:42.140 --> 23:45.699 precision . Now , the ubiquity of 23:45.709 --> 23:47.765 commercially available precision has 23:47.765 --> 23:50.609 made mass matter yet again , even as 23:50.619 --> 23:53.280 precision continues to improve military 23:53.290 --> 23:56.459 efficacy and efficiency and contribute 23:56.469 --> 23:58.525 to the protection of noncombatants . 23:59.949 --> 24:01.880 The fusion between old and new 24:01.890 --> 24:04.150 technology in Ukraine like small drones 24:04.160 --> 24:06.819 enabling real time artillery correction 24:07.089 --> 24:09.359 also represents a broader trend we're 24:09.369 --> 24:12.819 likely to see in future wars . While 24:12.829 --> 24:15.459 each kind of tech has its community of 24:15.469 --> 24:17.930 producers and evangelists like the 24:17.939 --> 24:20.849 bomber and fighter mafias of old . Each 24:20.859 --> 24:23.160 one claiming they matter most . The 24:23.170 --> 24:26.900 reality is that both matter we need on 24:26.910 --> 24:29.599 crude systems and 155 millimeter 24:29.609 --> 24:32.589 artillery rounds and both are needed at 24:32.599 --> 24:36.339 scale . Future full spectrum 24:36.349 --> 24:38.469 wars will likely be characterized by 24:38.479 --> 24:41.699 high low mixes of capabilities , some 24:41.709 --> 24:44.219 large expensive exquisite systems , 24:44.229 --> 24:46.800 collaborating with far more systems 24:46.810 --> 24:50.000 that are small , smart , cheap and used 24:50.010 --> 24:52.750 en masse . And the important 24:52.760 --> 24:55.150 innovations we often see in times of 24:55.160 --> 24:57.439 conflict will likely come at the 24:57.449 --> 25:00.810 intersection of the two , the best 25:00.819 --> 25:03.030 militaries will master both and the 25:03.040 --> 25:05.500 greatest advantage is likely to accrue 25:05.619 --> 25:08.109 to those who are able to combi combine 25:08.119 --> 25:11.010 extant and emerging capabilities to 25:11.020 --> 25:12.890 most effectively achieve their 25:12.900 --> 25:16.829 operational objectives . At the 25:16.839 --> 25:19.229 same time , the Russia , Ukraine war 25:19.239 --> 25:21.949 reaffirms that technology , whether old , 25:21.959 --> 25:25.060 new or both is seldom itself 25:25.069 --> 25:27.760 determinative . For instance , we've 25:27.770 --> 25:30.189 repeatedly seen Russia raining down 25:30.199 --> 25:32.170 joint firepower strikes to try to 25:32.180 --> 25:35.270 capture Ukrainian territory that alone 25:35.280 --> 25:37.447 didn't get the job done even when they 25:37.447 --> 25:39.558 were expanding their best munitions . 25:40.579 --> 25:42.650 Remember , they used hypersonic 25:42.660 --> 25:44.709 missiles to virtually no strategic 25:44.719 --> 25:47.550 effect . Ukraine even took some of the 25:47.560 --> 25:49.949 hype out of hypersonics when a patriot 25:49.959 --> 25:51.959 battery intercepted a Russian Kinal 25:52.160 --> 25:55.709 last year , make no mistake taking and 25:55.719 --> 25:58.790 holding territory still requires a 25:58.800 --> 26:02.060 capable ground force to 26:02.069 --> 26:04.459 determine which militaries would win a 26:04.469 --> 26:07.699 future war . Look at the quality of 26:07.709 --> 26:09.376 their people , their existing 26:09.376 --> 26:11.153 capabilities and their emerging 26:11.153 --> 26:13.979 technologies and look at how they fuse 26:13.989 --> 26:16.660 all three into new ways of fighting , 26:16.670 --> 26:19.270 operating and adopting innovation at 26:19.280 --> 26:23.069 speed and scale today . No one does 26:23.079 --> 26:25.135 that better than the US military and 26:25.135 --> 26:27.489 allies like the UK and we've got the 26:27.500 --> 26:30.709 best people doing it to boot that will 26:30.719 --> 26:32.890 drive and sustain our military edge , 26:32.900 --> 26:35.079 not just tomorrow , but for years and 26:35.089 --> 26:39.079 decades to come , I'll conclude 26:39.089 --> 26:41.020 today with two key tenants for 26:41.030 --> 26:43.086 policymakers that I hope we all take 26:43.089 --> 26:46.449 away for the long haul . Both go beyond 26:46.459 --> 26:50.189 the character of warfare first . 26:50.199 --> 26:52.088 While I can't say how the Russian 26:52.088 --> 26:54.143 Ukraine conflict will end . Everyone 26:54.143 --> 26:56.939 should remember that appeasement , only 26:56.949 --> 27:00.650 emboldens aggressors , those who would 27:00.660 --> 27:03.089 say it's just Crimea or it's just the 27:03.099 --> 27:05.660 Donbass should remember those who said 27:05.670 --> 27:07.890 almost a century ago . It's just 27:07.900 --> 27:10.900 Austria and it's just the Sudetenland . 27:11.390 --> 27:14.109 Remember the price paid by so many when 27:14.119 --> 27:18.040 Poland came next . Second is 27:18.050 --> 27:20.380 that as individual democracies and as 27:20.390 --> 27:23.150 Democratic allies , we have what it 27:23.160 --> 27:26.260 takes to outlast and prevail over any 27:26.270 --> 27:29.530 who would see our democracies die to be 27:29.540 --> 27:32.160 sure that requires the sustained effort 27:32.170 --> 27:34.859 of committed citizens , day in and day 27:34.869 --> 27:37.640 out to preserve self-government , to 27:37.650 --> 27:39.800 build trust and to uphold democratic 27:39.810 --> 27:43.170 principles and the rule of law that is 27:43.180 --> 27:45.236 no small thing and we cannot take it 27:45.236 --> 27:47.849 for granted . The years to come will 27:47.859 --> 27:50.119 test our mettle . They will try our 27:50.130 --> 27:53.140 souls , but we need not wither against 27:53.150 --> 27:55.150 the howling winds of autocracy that 27:55.150 --> 27:58.079 sweep the globe we can withstand . We 27:58.089 --> 28:01.680 have before . Remember that the 28:01.689 --> 28:03.633 strongest , strongest parts of our 28:03.633 --> 28:05.609 militaries , our nations and our 28:05.619 --> 28:08.709 alliance do not come from cutting edge 28:08.719 --> 28:11.359 capabilities , the size of our forces 28:11.369 --> 28:13.660 or even the novelty of our technologies 28:13.670 --> 28:17.380 and operational concepts in any long 28:17.390 --> 28:19.900 term strategic competition . Those are 28:19.910 --> 28:22.040 inherently transient advantages and 28:22.050 --> 28:25.130 they will be contested . Instead . Our 28:25.140 --> 28:27.339 most enduring advantage comes from 28:27.349 --> 28:29.609 fundamentals that no military in a 28:29.619 --> 28:32.619 democracy can shape or own alone 28:32.829 --> 28:35.339 because they are the lifeblood of open 28:35.349 --> 28:38.790 societies that we defend our economies , 28:39.219 --> 28:42.329 our cultures , our ideas born of free 28:42.339 --> 28:44.689 minds , free markets and free people . 28:45.319 --> 28:47.699 Those are our greatest advantages and a 28:47.709 --> 28:50.050 source of tremendous comparative 28:50.060 --> 28:53.339 advantage as long as they last . So 28:53.349 --> 28:54.750 shall we thank you . 29:08.180 --> 29:10.180 Well , that was so much to digest . 29:10.180 --> 29:12.402 Very fascinating , compelling lessons , 29:12.402 --> 29:14.569 very insightful . Thank you for taking 29:14.569 --> 29:16.513 the time to at least get us on the 29:16.513 --> 29:18.347 right track to drawing the right 29:18.347 --> 29:20.347 lessons and in particular , drawing 29:20.347 --> 29:22.569 those links between what we're learning 29:22.569 --> 29:24.569 from the Ukraine conflict to how it 29:24.569 --> 29:26.847 could apply in the Indo Pacific . That , 29:26.847 --> 29:29.069 that is the right way to look at things 29:29.069 --> 29:31.180 in such an interconnected world . But 29:31.180 --> 29:33.347 my first question is going to bring us 29:33.347 --> 29:35.569 a little closer to home . You were just 29:35.569 --> 29:37.569 here for the biannual defense talks 29:37.569 --> 29:39.760 with the UK , which is in the midst of 29:39.770 --> 29:42.280 the strategic defense review . And I'm 29:42.290 --> 29:44.346 sure a lot of people in the audience 29:44.346 --> 29:46.457 would , would love to hear from you . 29:46.457 --> 29:49.000 Um You know , what issues or questions 29:49.010 --> 29:51.232 would the Department of Defense like to 29:51.232 --> 29:53.454 see considered in that SDR we have such 29:53.454 --> 29:55.288 a close relationship in terms of 29:55.290 --> 29:57.979 intelligence , the nuclear relationship 29:57.989 --> 30:00.560 operations . Are there certain areas 30:00.569 --> 30:02.760 where UK investments are focused would 30:02.770 --> 30:05.319 particularly help complement what the 30:05.329 --> 30:08.680 US is doing ? Absolutely . Um I do want 30:08.689 --> 30:10.356 to first take a moment to say 30:10.356 --> 30:12.411 congratulations and thank you to you 30:12.411 --> 30:14.578 for Rachel for um becoming the next eg 30:14.578 --> 30:16.467 here . I think you're gonna be an 30:16.467 --> 30:18.578 incredible leader for the institution 30:18.578 --> 30:20.578 and to Karen , who has been such an 30:20.578 --> 30:22.467 incredible leader here at Roy for 30:22.467 --> 30:24.133 almost the last decade , just 30:24.133 --> 30:26.189 tremendous . Um uh Thanks to you for 30:26.189 --> 30:28.522 hosting me . Yeah , we have as you know , 30:28.522 --> 30:30.689 from your time here , as you said , an 30:30.689 --> 30:32.880 embed um this was introduced uh uh 30:32.890 --> 30:35.140 previously from the Defense Department 30:35.150 --> 30:37.317 to the Ministry of Defense here in the 30:37.317 --> 30:40.459 UK , a very uh long , deep , enduring 30:40.469 --> 30:43.180 strategic uh set of relationships and 30:43.189 --> 30:46.160 conversations are discussions yesterday 30:46.170 --> 30:48.900 uh that I had over at the mog very much 30:48.910 --> 30:51.140 reflected that long history and , and 30:51.150 --> 30:54.209 the frankness , openness um and sharing 30:54.219 --> 30:56.800 of perspectives . And the SDR presents 30:56.810 --> 30:59.020 the newest opportunity really to do 30:59.030 --> 31:01.540 conti continue that uh strong uh 31:01.550 --> 31:05.390 tradition . So some of the issues 31:05.400 --> 31:07.289 are what I've just spoken about . 31:07.289 --> 31:09.511 They're about how all of our militaries 31:09.511 --> 31:11.733 need to be adapting and taking in these 31:11.733 --> 31:13.930 lessons of the old and the new , very 31:13.939 --> 31:16.170 challenging in the fiscal environment . 31:16.180 --> 31:18.349 I think that the UK faces . And so 31:18.469 --> 31:20.670 we're , we're of course interested in 31:20.680 --> 31:22.770 making sure that um there can be a 31:22.780 --> 31:25.550 sufficient provision of resources for 31:25.560 --> 31:28.229 defense here in the UK . But it's as I 31:28.239 --> 31:31.030 know , well as the deputy at Dod , um 31:31.040 --> 31:33.096 it's not just , it's insufficient to 31:33.096 --> 31:35.151 just look at it as money issue . You 31:35.151 --> 31:36.929 also have to look at how you're 31:36.929 --> 31:38.818 investing and how effective those 31:38.818 --> 31:40.929 capabilities can be . So we certainly 31:40.929 --> 31:43.512 value the U K's nuclear deterrent 31:43.522 --> 31:46.233 contributions very much the maritime 31:46.243 --> 31:47.965 capability , the ability to be 31:47.965 --> 31:50.473 expeditionary to operate throughout the 31:50.483 --> 31:54.306 world . And then I would say also there 31:54.316 --> 31:57.176 is a series of capabilities um where we 31:57.186 --> 31:58.742 work closely together where 31:58.742 --> 32:00.908 interoperability and even as I said in 32:00.908 --> 32:03.019 the talk , interchangeability becomes 32:03.019 --> 32:05.036 important . So the magazine depth 32:05.046 --> 32:08.276 munitions areas like that , let alone 32:08.286 --> 32:10.286 some of those advanced capabilities 32:10.286 --> 32:12.119 where we , we have to be able to 32:12.119 --> 32:13.953 interoperate and the command and 32:13.953 --> 32:16.286 control has to support that . Thank you . 32:16.520 --> 32:18.798 Yeah , that , that interoperability is , 32:18.798 --> 32:21.219 is a challenge of my time at NATO I I . 32:21.229 --> 32:23.949 Um we have pages and pages of standards 32:23.959 --> 32:25.681 but we fall a bit short on the 32:25.681 --> 32:27.920 implementation . So the attention that 32:27.930 --> 32:30.097 you and the deputy have put towards um 32:30.097 --> 32:32.208 improving , not just interoperability 32:32.208 --> 32:34.263 but interchange interchangeability . 32:34.263 --> 32:36.260 sorry , undersecretary's towards 32:36.310 --> 32:38.421 improving interchangeability is is is 32:38.421 --> 32:40.795 really important in this context . So 32:40.805 --> 32:42.805 maybe my second question is in that 32:42.805 --> 32:44.972 area . Um because in your speech , you 32:44.972 --> 32:47.635 mentioned um some great examples of co 32:47.734 --> 32:49.744 production , co development working 32:49.755 --> 32:51.811 together with our closest and allies 32:51.811 --> 32:53.811 and partners both in Europe and the 32:53.811 --> 32:56.765 Indo Pacific on um all phases of of , 32:56.775 --> 32:59.619 of production . Do you see scope for 32:59.630 --> 33:01.790 more of that ? We've given away a lot 33:01.800 --> 33:03.790 to Ukraine and , and some of those 33:03.800 --> 33:07.569 shortfalls in production capacity seem 33:07.579 --> 33:09.880 really acute . Is there scope for more 33:09.890 --> 33:11.890 cooper with our European allies and 33:11.890 --> 33:13.890 partners and Indo Pacific allies or 33:13.890 --> 33:16.349 partners in that regard ? Surely , yes , 33:16.359 --> 33:19.030 I think there are um I think what we 33:19.040 --> 33:22.219 have learned is that the idea of 33:22.229 --> 33:23.896 looking at this as individual 33:23.896 --> 33:27.319 industries , it it it's not actually 33:27.329 --> 33:30.000 been helpful to anyone . Uh So the 33:30.010 --> 33:32.010 ability to look at a European and a 33:32.010 --> 33:35.739 transatlantic defense industry sector 33:36.839 --> 33:38.950 and to your point , Rachel to also be 33:38.950 --> 33:41.117 thinking about our Indo Pacific allies 33:41.117 --> 33:43.228 and partners who also can bring a lot 33:43.228 --> 33:45.228 to the table and that includes both 33:45.228 --> 33:47.450 production but sustainment . You know , 33:47.450 --> 33:49.728 70% we talk about this a lot in the US , 33:49.728 --> 33:51.920 70% of what we spend on so called 33:51.930 --> 33:54.060 acquisition is actually sustainment . 33:54.979 --> 33:56.979 So while we put a lot of energy and 33:56.979 --> 33:58.979 time , I think collectively talking 33:58.979 --> 34:00.979 about co production , which is very 34:00.979 --> 34:02.812 important and cove which is very 34:02.812 --> 34:04.868 important . A lot of the money is in 34:04.868 --> 34:06.646 the back end . So um that those 34:06.646 --> 34:08.535 maintenance , facilities , repair 34:08.535 --> 34:10.368 facilities , et cetera . I think 34:10.368 --> 34:12.535 there's a lot of opportunity there aus 34:12.535 --> 34:15.069 is an area where we're all um engaged , 34:15.079 --> 34:17.618 but there are many others . So I think 34:17.628 --> 34:19.658 we have um taken some good steps 34:19.668 --> 34:21.668 forward on co production . Cove and 34:21.668 --> 34:23.835 other opportunities . I think there is 34:23.835 --> 34:26.057 a lot of more opportunity out there . I 34:26.057 --> 34:28.112 think industry um interested to work 34:28.112 --> 34:30.669 with us and one maybe a follow on to 34:30.679 --> 34:32.909 that question because here um and , and 34:32.919 --> 34:34.641 also at NATO , we got a lot of 34:34.641 --> 34:36.808 questions . Well , you know , you talk 34:36.808 --> 34:39.030 about Costa statement , you the US talk 34:39.030 --> 34:41.030 about Cove . Um but are , are , are 34:41.030 --> 34:42.975 some of our restrictions on export 34:42.975 --> 34:45.197 controls or intellectual property ? Are 34:45.197 --> 34:47.419 they following along as well ? Have you 34:47.419 --> 34:49.586 made progress in the department and in 34:49.586 --> 34:51.641 tearing down some of those perceived 34:51.641 --> 34:53.863 obstacles to that cooper operation , we 34:53.863 --> 34:55.808 have made progress . Um Another uh 34:55.808 --> 34:57.752 space though where I'd say there's 34:57.752 --> 34:59.919 always room for more . So again , with 34:59.919 --> 35:03.239 Aus , we had uh some major changes on 35:03.249 --> 35:06.208 our itar um regulations in order to 35:06.218 --> 35:09.829 enable the UK and Australia um uh to 35:09.839 --> 35:12.519 access usa wide , wide range of us 35:12.529 --> 35:14.585 technologies . We're looking for the 35:14.585 --> 35:16.807 same on the UK side and Australian side 35:16.807 --> 35:18.862 and of course , the UK has made some 35:18.862 --> 35:21.029 changes there as well . So it's a mu a 35:21.029 --> 35:24.939 mutual issue um on IP , uh I think 35:24.949 --> 35:26.949 that's a big issue with industry in 35:26.949 --> 35:29.139 particular , more so than the uh than 35:29.149 --> 35:32.479 um country to country . Um So making 35:32.489 --> 35:35.159 sure that we have as governments ways 35:35.169 --> 35:39.080 to um secure our rights on IP to make 35:39.090 --> 35:41.423 sure we can operate in the future again , 35:41.423 --> 35:45.020 to access all of this A I um capacity 35:45.030 --> 35:47.252 out there and data capacity out there . 35:47.252 --> 35:49.419 We need to be able to software upgrade 35:49.419 --> 35:51.530 quickly . We need the IP rights to be 35:51.530 --> 35:53.697 able to do that . That's a big area of 35:53.697 --> 35:55.863 focus for us . But I do think there is 35:55.863 --> 35:58.030 more room and um the national security 35:58.030 --> 36:00.030 adviser , Jake Sullivan just gave a 36:00.030 --> 36:01.974 speech last week on this topic and 36:01.974 --> 36:03.974 indicated there that the US is also 36:03.974 --> 36:06.086 looking at MTCR uh missile technology 36:06.086 --> 36:09.659 control regime uh shifts um that could 36:09.669 --> 36:13.669 allow for more sharing as well right 36:13.679 --> 36:16.100 trajectory . Um I want to open it to , 36:16.110 --> 36:18.221 to audience Q and A in a moment , but 36:18.221 --> 36:20.166 maybe I can just sneak one more in 36:20.166 --> 36:22.939 myself . Um Going back to um the 36:22.949 --> 36:25.780 Ukraine War we talked a lot about . Um 36:25.790 --> 36:27.512 and , and in your speech , you 36:27.512 --> 36:29.457 highlighted this the importance of 36:29.457 --> 36:32.010 combining and industrial capacity with 36:32.020 --> 36:34.330 ingenuity and innovation . But you 36:34.340 --> 36:36.449 didn't really touch on how Putin has 36:36.459 --> 36:38.570 used the threat of use of nuclear 36:38.580 --> 36:41.979 weapons as a , as a way to affect our 36:41.989 --> 36:44.211 decision making . Could you maybe say a 36:44.211 --> 36:46.045 little bit about what lessons or 36:46.045 --> 36:48.156 insight we can take from how the West 36:48.156 --> 36:50.267 has handled and managed through those 36:50.267 --> 36:52.489 nuclear threats ? Because they are very 36:52.489 --> 36:54.711 concerning , they are very concerning , 36:54.711 --> 36:57.199 they're been , you know , irresponsible . 36:57.209 --> 37:00.459 Uh We have approached this matter . Uh 37:00.469 --> 37:03.229 I think very soberly , uh we have taken 37:03.239 --> 37:06.040 a very strategic look at um our 37:06.050 --> 37:09.840 approach and um we have really 37:09.850 --> 37:12.072 looked at , you know , the integrated , 37:12.072 --> 37:14.128 what we call , you know , integrated 37:14.128 --> 37:16.183 deterrence approach , looking beyond 37:16.183 --> 37:18.350 just nuclear on our side , if you will 37:18.350 --> 37:20.830 to the full suite of cap , you know , 37:21.219 --> 37:23.699 everything from economic and diplomatic , 37:23.709 --> 37:25.598 but even within the Department of 37:25.598 --> 37:27.929 Defense , you know , our capability 37:27.939 --> 37:30.639 suite , well beyond nuclear . Um I 37:30.649 --> 37:33.070 think the key takeaway for Putin should 37:33.080 --> 37:36.780 be that uh uh just because you possess 37:36.790 --> 37:39.340 nuclear weapons doesn't mean you are 37:39.350 --> 37:41.870 not subject to the Charter UN Charter . 37:42.159 --> 37:45.040 Um And you don't have a free pass and I 37:45.050 --> 37:47.106 think that's what the free world has 37:47.106 --> 37:49.272 been able to demonstrate . But I think 37:49.272 --> 37:51.217 that's as much as I'll say on that 37:51.217 --> 37:53.439 topic . Excellent . Thank you . So if I 37:53.439 --> 37:55.860 turn to audience Q and A , uh what I'd 37:55.870 --> 37:58.203 like to do because I see a lot of hands , 37:58.203 --> 38:00.203 um , going up and we have a limited 38:00.203 --> 38:02.314 time is I'll group them in threes and 38:02.314 --> 38:04.592 then turn to the deputy to answer . Um , 38:04.592 --> 38:06.703 remember that we're on the record and 38:06.703 --> 38:08.926 when you give me your question , please 38:08.926 --> 38:10.648 introduce yourself um , before 38:10.648 --> 38:12.759 presenting your question . So let's , 38:12.759 --> 38:16.590 uh , start in the front row because , 38:19.959 --> 38:23.659 ok , uh to maintain the 38:23.669 --> 38:25.239 security of the ISIS and 38:28.800 --> 38:30.120 no , like , 38:34.570 --> 38:36.792 uh all group just to , to give you some 38:36.792 --> 38:38.848 some space to think about as well if 38:38.848 --> 38:40.903 that's OK . Uh Also in the front row 38:45.090 --> 38:46.423 and I'm just doing this 38:49.810 --> 38:50.080 and 38:53.899 --> 38:57.590 that . Mhm That I 39:04.840 --> 39:06.784 All right , maybe we'll stop there 39:06.784 --> 39:08.507 because that was kind of three 39:08.507 --> 39:11.889 questions , two on Syria and then 39:12.030 --> 39:15.570 one on the specifics of UK 39:15.820 --> 39:17.909 Sure on Syria , obviously a very 39:17.919 --> 39:20.750 rapidly evolving situation there . Our 39:20.760 --> 39:23.570 primary mission in Syria before these 39:23.580 --> 39:27.179 last few weeks events is was countering 39:27.189 --> 39:30.199 ISIS that continues to be our focus and 39:30.209 --> 39:32.669 you will have seen of course a strike 39:32.989 --> 39:35.219 that we took just over the weekend in 39:35.229 --> 39:38.899 furtherance of that . So that's 100 39:38.909 --> 39:41.076 we're focused on protecting our forces 39:41.076 --> 39:43.187 that are there doing the counter ISIS 39:43.187 --> 39:45.242 mission . We're focused on executing 39:45.242 --> 39:47.298 that counter ISIS mission and making 39:47.298 --> 39:49.298 clear that it is not acceptable for 39:49.298 --> 39:51.489 ISIS or elements akin to it to be part 39:51.500 --> 39:54.540 of , you know , the solution set there 39:54.550 --> 39:56.929 in Syria . The president has already 39:56.939 --> 39:59.050 come out to say that there's a lot of 39:59.050 --> 40:01.328 opportunity and hope we have for Syria . 40:01.328 --> 40:03.439 Uh uh and I would , I would emphasize 40:03.439 --> 40:05.495 that , but uh that hope comes with a 40:05.495 --> 40:08.169 lot of need for , you know , moving on 40:08.179 --> 40:10.290 to governance in Syria . And so we're 40:10.290 --> 40:12.401 going to be watching that there is uh 40:12.401 --> 40:15.790 no pressure underway um with regard to 40:15.800 --> 40:17.856 camps or prisons if that's the , the 40:17.856 --> 40:20.530 question , um uh that I am tracking 40:23.449 --> 40:26.909 and on the up , I apologies . I 40:27.209 --> 40:29.431 remember . What was the other one ? I'm 40:29.431 --> 40:33.010 sorry , it was the size of the UK . 40:33.870 --> 40:35.870 I here's what I would say . I , you 40:35.870 --> 40:37.939 know , in our own system , we work 40:37.949 --> 40:39.969 through all the time , the , the 40:39.979 --> 40:42.201 tradeoffs that you have to make between 40:42.201 --> 40:44.201 generally speaking , how ready your 40:44.201 --> 40:46.510 force is the size of your force and how 40:46.520 --> 40:48.687 much you're investing for the future . 40:48.687 --> 40:50.909 And I think it's important to carefully 40:50.909 --> 40:52.964 balance all of those things . So I'm 40:52.964 --> 40:55.187 not going to comment on the size of the 40:55.187 --> 40:57.242 military of the UK , but only to say 40:57.242 --> 40:59.187 that I think this review offers an 40:59.187 --> 41:01.464 opportunity probably as it does for us . 41:01.464 --> 41:03.464 When we go through these reviews to 41:03.464 --> 41:05.409 look af freshh at the balancing of 41:05.409 --> 41:07.631 those three attributes , you're ready , 41:07.631 --> 41:09.631 you're investing for the future and 41:09.631 --> 41:11.520 you're sized appropriately for um 41:11.520 --> 41:13.687 contingencies that could arise today . 41:13.979 --> 41:16.469 That's a very helpful construct . OK , 41:16.479 --> 41:18.889 so we'll go front row . 41:23.800 --> 41:25.800 Thank you , Deborah Haynes from Sky 41:25.800 --> 41:29.520 News . Can you give your 41:29.530 --> 41:32.350 assessment of what it means for 41:32.360 --> 41:35.679 Russia's limitations that it completely 41:35.689 --> 41:38.040 failed to prop up again ? The Assad 41:38.050 --> 41:41.850 regime and what is your assessment of 41:41.860 --> 41:43.916 its military bases there ? Is this ? 41:43.916 --> 41:45.916 How big a blow is this for Russia ? 41:52.340 --> 41:56.129 Hi . Uh I'm Niki . You sit . Um my 41:56.139 --> 41:57.972 question is about uh Ukraine and 41:57.972 --> 42:00.083 precisely about Russian launch of its 42:00.083 --> 42:02.340 new missiles or in Ukraine , has 42:02.350 --> 42:04.350 Pentagon conducted an assessment of 42:04.350 --> 42:06.350 this launch and where will and when 42:06.350 --> 42:08.379 will the United States be able to 42:08.389 --> 42:10.500 develop its own capabilities of its , 42:10.500 --> 42:14.149 of this kind ? Thank you , Jonathan . 42:17.250 --> 42:20.159 I need my , thank you , 42:22.090 --> 42:23.812 Jonathan is from here from the 42:23.812 --> 42:26.034 institute . Can I take you to the other 42:26.034 --> 42:29.760 side of the world and to aus how much 42:29.770 --> 42:32.320 is this arrangement ? Sue Jeris for the 42:32.330 --> 42:34.790 three countries ? And how much could 42:34.800 --> 42:37.969 other nations plug into it and 42:37.979 --> 42:40.010 connected to that ? Is there a 42:40.020 --> 42:43.949 consensus in Washington on August or do 42:43.959 --> 42:46.709 you see your opinions changing with the 42:46.719 --> 42:50.580 new administration ? Ok . So the first 42:50.590 --> 42:52.780 two questions were related to Russia , 42:53.810 --> 42:56.989 one about Russia's limits um I guess to 42:57.000 --> 42:59.000 foreign policy and operations given 42:59.000 --> 43:01.056 what happened in Syria and then some 43:01.056 --> 43:03.111 specific questions about the missile 43:03.111 --> 43:05.167 launch ? Sure . So um go backwards , 43:05.167 --> 43:08.040 maybe I'd say the same thing I said on 43:08.050 --> 43:11.870 the hypersonic use early on , you 43:11.879 --> 43:14.219 know , the new capabilities were used . 43:14.229 --> 43:16.879 We take note of that we assess that 43:16.889 --> 43:20.010 going forward . Don't see a significant 43:20.409 --> 43:23.050 affect strategically or operationally 43:23.060 --> 43:26.250 on the war with that use . I do think 43:26.260 --> 43:28.889 this is the collapse of the assad 43:28.899 --> 43:32.469 regime is a blow to Russia in the 43:32.479 --> 43:35.879 Middle East . I think you can , you 43:35.889 --> 43:38.610 know , time will be able to help us 43:38.620 --> 43:40.564 understand the connectivity of all 43:40.564 --> 43:42.676 these various trends . But there's no 43:42.676 --> 43:44.850 doubt that during the course of the 43:44.860 --> 43:47.120 Biden administration , you know , both 43:47.129 --> 43:50.489 the Iranian axis of resistance and 43:50.500 --> 43:54.020 Russia's failed 43:54.409 --> 43:58.020 attempt to overtake Ukraine . And now 43:58.030 --> 44:00.899 Syria are indications of weakness there . 44:00.909 --> 44:02.889 I think the Hezbollah ceasefire 44:02.899 --> 44:06.879 provides a sign of how one can 44:06.889 --> 44:09.929 come out of this into perhaps a more 44:09.939 --> 44:12.330 stable approach . And I'm hopeful that 44:12.340 --> 44:14.239 we can see more of those sort of 44:14.250 --> 44:18.139 peaceful ways forward . Excellent . And 44:18.149 --> 44:20.699 Jonathan's question was about a and how 44:20.709 --> 44:22.820 some of the work that you're doing in 44:22.820 --> 44:25.139 the defense industrial space could 44:25.149 --> 44:27.659 possibly translate in the European 44:27.669 --> 44:30.840 context ? Well , first of all , in Aus , 44:30.850 --> 44:32.850 I think part of the question too is 44:32.850 --> 44:34.850 about the sustainability of Aus and 44:34.850 --> 44:37.320 then the growing , growing the 44:37.330 --> 44:39.969 community of Aus . Um So I think 44:39.979 --> 44:42.146 there's absolutely opportunity both to 44:42.146 --> 44:44.312 sustain it and to grow it . I do think 44:44.312 --> 44:46.550 the focus is um for both pillars , 44:46.560 --> 44:48.949 making sure that the three founding 44:48.959 --> 44:51.139 members here are able to advance the 44:51.149 --> 44:52.816 capabilities of the submarine 44:52.816 --> 44:54.927 capability and of course the advanced 44:54.927 --> 44:57.093 technology capabilities , but advanced 44:57.093 --> 44:59.316 technology capabilities applied against 44:59.316 --> 45:01.538 key operational problems . These aren't 45:01.538 --> 45:03.538 fantastical issues , these are real 45:03.538 --> 45:05.427 world problems that we're working 45:05.427 --> 45:07.593 against . Um And then I think there is 45:07.593 --> 45:09.760 room to build on that or to build like 45:09.760 --> 45:12.370 in addition to build on that , to build 45:12.379 --> 45:15.550 like um constructs um to , to your 45:15.649 --> 45:18.149 point about Europe um the 45:18.159 --> 45:19.937 sustainability . Look , I think 45:19.937 --> 45:22.159 Secretary Austin just uh was asked this 45:22.159 --> 45:24.437 last week and I'll repeat what he said , 45:24.437 --> 45:26.659 which is , it's , it's to the strategic 45:26.659 --> 45:28.603 advantage of all partners and that 45:28.603 --> 45:30.659 includes the United States . I think 45:30.659 --> 45:32.603 it's been incredibly helpful uh to 45:32.603 --> 45:35.489 galvanize both what we can do on the 45:35.500 --> 45:37.949 innovation front and to strengthen the 45:37.959 --> 45:40.370 deterrent in the Indo Pacific that 45:40.379 --> 45:42.657 leads to stability in the Indo Pacific . 45:42.657 --> 45:44.770 What we want is the uh not war . What 45:44.780 --> 45:46.836 we want is the PR C to wake up every 45:46.836 --> 45:48.836 day and any other aggressor and say 45:48.836 --> 45:51.050 today is not the day . Um There's 45:51.060 --> 45:53.060 enough to turn out there , it's not 45:53.060 --> 45:55.060 worth the cost . And I think August 45:55.060 --> 45:57.189 advances that I think that's an 45:57.199 --> 45:59.229 excellent note to end on . Um once 45:59.239 --> 46:01.406 again , going back to the ties between 46:01.406 --> 46:04.280 the , the two theaters . Um And I wanna 46:04.290 --> 46:06.346 take an opportunity to thank you for 46:06.346 --> 46:08.457 all the work you've done to lay solid 46:08.457 --> 46:10.679 foundations in the department , whether 46:10.679 --> 46:12.846 it's um you know , the , the people in 46:12.846 --> 46:14.901 the department who , who really make 46:14.901 --> 46:16.790 the policy and , and carry things 46:16.790 --> 46:18.957 forward or really setting us on a nice 46:18.957 --> 46:21.012 trajectory in terms of innovation um 46:21.012 --> 46:23.234 operations and , and whatnot . So thank 46:23.239 --> 46:25.461 you so much and good luck with whatever 46:25.461 --> 46:26.790 is next . Thank you very much .