WEBVTT 00:01.360 --> 00:03.360 All right . Well , good afternoon , 00:03.360 --> 00:06.690 everyone . A few things here at the top 00:06.699 --> 00:08.532 and then we'll get right to your 00:08.532 --> 00:11.340 questions . Uh I mentioned it briefly 00:11.350 --> 00:13.619 yesterday at the off camera briefing . 00:13.630 --> 00:15.630 So I'd like to just provide a quick 00:15.630 --> 00:17.630 readout of Secretary Austin's phone 00:17.630 --> 00:19.519 call with Qatar's newly appointed 00:19.519 --> 00:21.630 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 00:21.630 --> 00:23.408 State for Defense Affairs . His 00:23.408 --> 00:25.408 Excellency , Sheikh Saud Al Thani . 00:25.408 --> 00:27.297 During their call , the secretary 00:27.297 --> 00:29.074 reaffirmed the US Qatar defense 00:29.074 --> 00:31.186 Partnership reviewed opportunities to 00:31.186 --> 00:33.241 enhance defense cooper operation and 00:33.241 --> 00:34.797 discussed regional security 00:34.797 --> 00:37.019 developments . The secretary emphasized 00:37.019 --> 00:39.241 the department's commitment to regional 00:39.241 --> 00:41.297 de escalation through deterrence and 00:41.297 --> 00:43.463 diplomacy including through us efforts 00:43.463 --> 00:45.630 to support implementation of the cease 00:45.630 --> 00:47.797 fire between Israel and Lebanon uphold 00:47.797 --> 00:50.019 the enduring defeat of Isis and degrade 00:50.019 --> 00:51.741 Houthi military capabilities , 00:51.741 --> 00:53.908 jeopardizing the free flow of commerce 00:53.908 --> 00:56.074 in the Red Sea . He further reinforced 00:56.074 --> 00:58.186 the urgent need to secure the release 00:58.186 --> 01:00.074 of all hostages held by Hamas and 01:00.074 --> 01:02.074 achieve achieve a ceasefire in Gaza 01:02.074 --> 01:04.297 readout of the call is now available on 01:04.297 --> 01:06.379 defense.gov . Also yesterday , us 01:06.389 --> 01:08.333 central command forces conducted a 01:08.333 --> 01:10.222 precision airstrike against a key 01:10.222 --> 01:12.333 command and control facility operated 01:12.333 --> 01:14.389 by Iran backed Houthis within Houthi 01:14.389 --> 01:16.556 controlled territory in Sana'a , Yemen 01:16.819 --> 01:18.652 per us . Central command's press 01:18.652 --> 01:20.763 release . The targeted facility was a 01:20.763 --> 01:22.930 hub for coordinating houthi operations 01:22.930 --> 01:24.819 such as attacks against us , navy 01:24.819 --> 01:26.875 warships and merchant vessels in the 01:26.875 --> 01:29.097 Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden . The 01:29.097 --> 01:30.986 strike reflects Centcom's ongoing 01:30.986 --> 01:33.152 commitment to protect us and coalition 01:33.152 --> 01:35.041 personnel , regional partners and 01:35.041 --> 01:37.208 international shipping . I would refer 01:37.208 --> 01:39.319 you to us central command for further 01:39.319 --> 01:41.541 questions . Finally , a quick update on 01:41.541 --> 01:43.708 the transition process yesterday . The 01:43.708 --> 01:45.930 department's transition director , Miss 01:45.930 --> 01:47.986 Jennifer Walsh , and representatives 01:47.986 --> 01:50.152 from the office of the General Council 01:50.152 --> 01:49.849 Washington headquarters services 01:49.860 --> 01:52.900 security office and the dod transition 01:52.910 --> 01:54.799 task force met with 11 members of 01:54.799 --> 01:57.250 President elect Trump's agency review 01:57.260 --> 02:00.120 team or art here in the Pentagon . In 02:00.129 --> 02:02.351 accordance with standard practice , the 02:02.351 --> 02:04.240 art members signed non disclosure 02:04.240 --> 02:06.129 agreements and discussed security 02:06.129 --> 02:08.073 procedures including information , 02:08.073 --> 02:10.240 security and next steps for transition 02:10.240 --> 02:12.462 efforts . Dod officials also showed the 02:12.462 --> 02:14.462 art members dedicated office spaces 02:14.462 --> 02:16.462 here in the Pentagon that have been 02:16.462 --> 02:18.629 reserved for their use for specific uh 02:18.629 --> 02:20.851 specific questions about the art team . 02:20.851 --> 02:22.796 I would refer you to the president 02:22.796 --> 02:24.907 elect's transition team will continue 02:24.907 --> 02:26.962 to provide updates on the transition 02:26.962 --> 02:26.750 efforts within the department as they 02:26.759 --> 02:28.940 become available and remain focused on 02:28.949 --> 02:30.727 ensuring a smooth , orderly and 02:30.727 --> 02:33.060 professional transition . And with that , 02:33.060 --> 02:35.639 take your questions , go to A P Tara . 02:35.710 --> 02:37.830 Thanks General Ryder . So um back to 02:37.839 --> 02:40.940 the drones . Um can 02:41.419 --> 02:44.460 you unequivocally say that none of the 02:44.470 --> 02:47.449 drones that are being spotted are dod 02:47.460 --> 02:50.070 assets or something that's being tested 02:50.289 --> 02:52.619 uh , within the defense department are 02:52.630 --> 02:54.630 all of these , either civilian or 02:54.639 --> 02:56.806 otherwise , but just not department of 02:56.806 --> 02:58.972 Defense drones . You talking about the 02:58.972 --> 03:01.139 drones in New Jersey up and down the , 03:01.139 --> 03:03.361 yes , they are not dod assets . None of 03:03.361 --> 03:05.583 them are to my knowledge . None of them 03:05.583 --> 03:07.639 are . Ok . And are there any sort of 03:07.639 --> 03:09.695 experimental programs going on where 03:09.695 --> 03:11.695 maybe there , you know , drones are 03:11.695 --> 03:13.972 being tested that to my knowledge ? No . 03:13.972 --> 03:16.028 Ok . Uh What about the ones that are 03:16.028 --> 03:17.972 flying over military bases at this 03:17.972 --> 03:19.695 point ? Um Have there been any 03:19.695 --> 03:22.160 possibilities of collecting , what sort 03:22.169 --> 03:24.280 of information these drones are doing 03:24.280 --> 03:26.447 or anything like that ? Yeah , again , 03:26.447 --> 03:28.391 just to , to kind of put this into 03:28.391 --> 03:31.119 context and I know that our colleagues 03:31.130 --> 03:34.960 at uh the White House FAA DH S FBI have 03:34.970 --> 03:37.192 all made this point . So over a million 03:37.192 --> 03:39.359 drones registered in the United States 03:39.359 --> 03:41.414 and on any given day , approximately 03:41.414 --> 03:44.639 8500 drones are uh you know , in flight . 03:45.149 --> 03:47.880 Uh And so , uh the vast majority of 03:47.889 --> 03:50.250 these drones are going to probably be 03:50.259 --> 03:52.820 recreational or hobbyist . Uh They're 03:52.830 --> 03:55.009 gonna be commercial drones , uh you 03:55.020 --> 03:57.353 know , used in things like architecture , 03:57.429 --> 04:01.270 uh engineering , uh farming , uh or 04:01.279 --> 04:03.557 they could be used for law enforcement . 04:03.557 --> 04:05.446 Is it possible that some of those 04:05.446 --> 04:07.779 drones could be up to uh malign uh 04:07.789 --> 04:10.210 activity ? It's entirely possible but 04:10.220 --> 04:13.289 the vast majority uh that is not , you 04:13.300 --> 04:15.580 know , the case , in the case of uh 04:15.589 --> 04:19.070 drones flying near or over us military 04:19.079 --> 04:20.968 installations , uh that in and of 04:20.968 --> 04:23.589 itself just given the volume of drone 04:23.600 --> 04:25.656 flights we see on a given day is not 04:25.656 --> 04:27.869 something that's new . Um We take all 04:27.880 --> 04:30.179 of those seriously . Uh , we will 04:30.190 --> 04:32.301 typically , you know , when we detect 04:32.301 --> 04:34.301 them , attempt to classify them and 04:34.301 --> 04:36.357 take appropriate measures . Uh Is it 04:36.357 --> 04:38.134 possible that some of those are 04:38.134 --> 04:40.246 surveilling ? Absolutely . Um But can 04:40.246 --> 04:42.523 you make that assumption in every case ? 04:42.523 --> 04:44.634 Not necessarily ? So , in each case , 04:44.634 --> 04:46.579 uh commanders have the authority , 04:46.579 --> 04:48.801 installation commanders and authorities 04:48.801 --> 04:50.468 have the authority to respond 04:50.468 --> 04:52.634 appropriately and we'll continue to do 04:52.634 --> 04:55.149 that topic . Ukraine , did the US have 04:55.160 --> 04:57.190 any role at all , either providing 04:57.200 --> 05:00.029 intelligence or otherwise in the , what 05:00.040 --> 05:02.096 looks like a targeted killing of the 05:02.096 --> 05:04.880 Russian general ? Yeah , I can tell you 05:04.890 --> 05:07.420 we were not aware of this operation in 05:07.429 --> 05:10.720 advance . We do not support or enable 05:10.730 --> 05:12.674 those kinds of activities seen the 05:12.674 --> 05:14.619 reports . Uh don't really have any 05:14.619 --> 05:16.674 information to provide uh other than 05:16.674 --> 05:18.730 what I've seen in the press . And so 05:18.730 --> 05:20.674 I'd have to refer you to the , the 05:20.674 --> 05:22.920 Ukrainians on that . Um Pat last year , 05:22.929 --> 05:26.739 us Transcom and US Air um and Air 05:26.750 --> 05:28.899 Mobility Command signed an agreement 05:28.910 --> 05:30.743 with a group called the National 05:30.743 --> 05:33.021 Aerospace Research and Technology Park . 05:33.021 --> 05:35.420 This is in Atlantic County , New Jersey 05:35.660 --> 05:38.000 and the agreement was to create a test 05:38.010 --> 05:41.519 and evaluation corridor for U AES 05:41.529 --> 05:44.339 UAs , excuse me , uh uh unmanned aerial 05:44.350 --> 05:47.059 systems and advanced air mobility . Is 05:47.070 --> 05:49.237 it possible that these drones that are 05:49.237 --> 05:51.292 being seen in New Jersey are part of 05:51.292 --> 05:53.403 that corridor that was created a year 05:53.403 --> 05:56.100 ago to test these kind of drones and 05:56.109 --> 05:58.165 unmanned systems . Yeah , and I know 05:58.165 --> 06:00.387 you're not gonna be surprised by this . 06:00.387 --> 06:02.331 Um But I've had some of your other 06:02.331 --> 06:04.665 colleagues reference that press release . 06:04.665 --> 06:06.831 Uh I did check with the joint staff to 06:06.831 --> 06:09.165 see if that was possible . Uh And again , 06:09.165 --> 06:11.165 received confirmation . No military 06:11.165 --> 06:13.053 operations , no military drone or 06:13.053 --> 06:14.887 experiment operations uh in this 06:14.887 --> 06:18.640 corridor . Thanks Pat . Um Going back 06:18.649 --> 06:20.929 to Russia , the , the general who was 06:20.940 --> 06:23.410 assassinated in Moscow . How 06:23.420 --> 06:25.364 significant is that ? Do you think 06:25.364 --> 06:27.142 that's going to change Russia's 06:27.142 --> 06:29.198 calculus at all ? Um in the war with 06:29.198 --> 06:31.440 Ukraine ? And um , what comments do you 06:31.450 --> 06:33.450 have on the accusations that he was 06:33.450 --> 06:35.450 responsible for the use of chemical 06:35.450 --> 06:37.561 weapons in Ukraine ? Um I , I'd refer 06:37.561 --> 06:39.339 you to Russia to talk about the 06:39.339 --> 06:41.617 potential impact . Um You know , again , 06:41.617 --> 06:44.010 II , I won't speak for Ukraine clearly . 06:44.299 --> 06:46.299 Uh , this is a , a senior commander 06:46.299 --> 06:48.466 within the Russian military overseeing 06:48.466 --> 06:51.239 uh significant capabilities . Um But 06:51.250 --> 06:53.920 again , um , like I highlighted or 06:53.929 --> 06:56.151 where those reports looking into them , 06:56.151 --> 06:58.262 but that's about all I'm gonna have . 06:58.262 --> 07:00.262 So , uh on drones for a second , uh 07:00.262 --> 07:02.318 what was the thinking behind sending 07:02.318 --> 07:04.485 additional detect and track systems to 07:04.570 --> 07:06.459 Picton Arsenal and naval weapons 07:06.470 --> 07:08.581 Station ? Earle ? And are there other 07:08.581 --> 07:10.803 facilities that might get more of these 07:10.803 --> 07:13.230 systems uh in the future ? Yeah . So a 07:13.239 --> 07:15.406 couple things . Uh , so first of all , 07:15.406 --> 07:17.517 again , a lot of , uh , focus on this 07:17.517 --> 07:19.739 right now for all the obvious reasons . 07:19.739 --> 07:21.628 Um , some of which includes those 07:21.628 --> 07:24.279 sitting in this room here . Um And so , 07:24.290 --> 07:26.359 um , we're gonna take this seriously 07:26.369 --> 07:28.702 and so ensuring that installations , uh , 07:28.709 --> 07:31.309 in this case , Petin , uh and Earl have 07:31.320 --> 07:33.899 the capabilities they need to detect , 07:34.200 --> 07:36.820 uh , to identify and track as 07:36.829 --> 07:39.450 appropriate , uh , in the event . Um , 07:39.769 --> 07:41.936 you know , there's drone activity near 07:41.936 --> 07:44.440 those facilities to your other question . 07:44.450 --> 07:46.799 You know , this is exactly what the 07:46.809 --> 07:49.790 counter uh unmanned systems strategy 07:49.799 --> 07:53.660 that dod put out . Um , recently talks 07:53.670 --> 07:55.649 about is looking at what are those 07:55.660 --> 07:58.290 priority installations , what are uh 07:58.299 --> 08:00.470 the trends when it comes to unmanned 08:00.480 --> 08:02.730 systems or uh unmanned aerial systems 08:02.739 --> 08:06.019 as well ? Uh And what does the dod need 08:06.029 --> 08:09.049 to be doing in order to uh address that 08:09.059 --> 08:11.799 issue , particularly when it poses a 08:11.809 --> 08:14.649 potential threat to our personnel or 08:14.660 --> 08:17.250 installations ? Uh You know , the thing 08:17.260 --> 08:18.982 is , is that I think we've all 08:18.982 --> 08:21.079 recognized the fact uh that unmanned 08:21.089 --> 08:23.440 systems are here to stay , they're a 08:23.450 --> 08:26.850 part of modern warfare . Uh And whether 08:26.859 --> 08:29.540 it's here in the homeland or overseas , 08:29.720 --> 08:31.664 uh We want to make sure that we're 08:31.664 --> 08:34.289 doing due diligence to um protect our 08:34.299 --> 08:36.466 forces and protect our equities from a 08:36.466 --> 08:38.632 national security standpoint . So , uh 08:38.632 --> 08:40.466 you know , I think you'll see us 08:40.466 --> 08:42.466 continuing to look at that . Um And 08:42.466 --> 08:44.632 it's something we're going to continue 08:44.632 --> 08:46.577 to take seriously what systems are 08:46.577 --> 08:46.530 being sent and when will they arrive . 08:47.429 --> 08:49.540 Um So , uh in addition to some of the 08:49.540 --> 08:51.707 capabilities that are already on these 08:51.707 --> 08:53.818 installations , uh these capabilities 08:53.818 --> 08:55.690 essentially will enhance space 08:55.700 --> 08:57.478 authorities ability to detect , 08:57.478 --> 09:00.849 identify track uass . Um So , for 09:00.859 --> 09:03.026 example , this could include active or 09:03.026 --> 09:05.026 passive detection capabilities . Uh 09:05.026 --> 09:07.770 plus capabilities uh like uh the the 09:07.780 --> 09:09.724 system known as drone busters , uh 09:09.724 --> 09:11.836 which is , you know , employees , non 09:11.836 --> 09:13.669 kinetic means to interrupt drone 09:13.669 --> 09:16.002 signals affect their ability to operate . 09:16.090 --> 09:18.760 Right ? Kelly , you mentioned that it 09:18.770 --> 09:21.080 wasn't all that unusual to see some 09:21.090 --> 09:22.923 drones over military bases . You 09:22.923 --> 09:24.923 mentioned this is becoming more and 09:24.923 --> 09:27.090 more of a common occurrence and in the 09:27.090 --> 09:29.299 use of drones , but what would 09:29.309 --> 09:31.531 constitute it as a threat ? What is the 09:31.531 --> 09:33.198 benchmark ? And have you been 09:33.198 --> 09:35.087 communicating with other military 09:35.087 --> 09:37.198 installations to be ready for more of 09:37.198 --> 09:39.142 these drones and how to spot if it 09:39.142 --> 09:41.198 could be a threat before it might be 09:41.198 --> 09:43.820 too late ? Yeah , again , you know , it 09:43.830 --> 09:45.997 won't surprise you . This is not a new 09:45.997 --> 09:48.330 conversation for us within dod . I mean , 09:48.330 --> 09:50.679 as I highlighted drones flying , uh 09:50.690 --> 09:52.900 whether here or overseas is not 09:52.909 --> 09:54.631 something new , right ? Uh And 09:54.631 --> 09:56.798 especially in the United States with a 09:56.798 --> 09:58.742 million registered drones and 8500 09:58.742 --> 10:01.059 flying on any given day uh similar to 10:01.070 --> 10:02.869 vehicles that may inadvertently 10:02.880 --> 10:05.609 approach a base . Uh The same can be 10:05.619 --> 10:09.559 true for drones as to what constitute a 10:09.570 --> 10:11.409 threat that obviously has to be 10:11.419 --> 10:13.409 assessed on a case by case basis 10:13.419 --> 10:15.669 depending on what the drone is doing , 10:15.679 --> 10:18.030 where it's going , you know . And so , 10:18.219 --> 10:20.570 um I'm not gonna provide a , a blanket 10:20.580 --> 10:23.299 definition . Um But again , the , the 10:23.309 --> 10:25.700 idea here is that uh by providing 10:25.710 --> 10:28.130 training capabilities , resources , uh 10:28.140 --> 10:30.307 commanders are able to assess and make 10:30.307 --> 10:32.473 those determinations . The other thing 10:32.473 --> 10:34.473 that I think it's very important to 10:34.473 --> 10:36.640 remember is that when we're here uh in 10:36.640 --> 10:39.609 the uh homeland , the authorities that 10:39.619 --> 10:42.580 the US military has to uh detect and 10:42.590 --> 10:44.700 track these kinds of things is much 10:44.710 --> 10:46.821 different than it would be if we were 10:46.821 --> 10:49.043 in a combat zone . In other words , the 10:49.043 --> 10:48.820 intelligence , surveillance and 10:48.830 --> 10:51.052 reconnaissance capabilities that we can 10:51.052 --> 10:54.450 employ outside the United States uh are 10:54.460 --> 10:56.627 much different for very good reasons . 10:56.627 --> 10:58.460 We don't collect intelligence on 10:58.460 --> 11:00.404 American citizens . And so that of 11:00.404 --> 11:02.516 course , uh appropriately requires to 11:02.520 --> 11:04.940 work very closely with local state and 11:04.950 --> 11:07.061 federal authorities , law enforcement 11:07.061 --> 11:09.179 authorities uh when necessary to 11:09.190 --> 11:10.968 address these threats . And you 11:10.968 --> 11:12.857 mentioned the White House and the 11:12.857 --> 11:15.079 administration did share a bit of their 11:15.079 --> 11:17.190 assessment of what these drones are , 11:17.190 --> 11:19.412 but we know lawmakers are being briefed 11:19.412 --> 11:21.357 on Capitol Hill and members of the 11:21.357 --> 11:23.357 public . Uh this isn't really , you 11:23.357 --> 11:25.412 know , sitting well with them . They 11:25.412 --> 11:27.301 aren't really kind of taking this 11:27.301 --> 11:29.412 explanation for those that really saw 11:29.412 --> 11:28.719 these drones with their own eyes . So 11:28.729 --> 11:30.909 what would you say to them ? Well , 11:30.919 --> 11:32.975 again , I , I don't definitely don't 11:32.975 --> 11:35.539 want to minimize uh the significant uh 11:35.549 --> 11:37.849 interest and the concern that people 11:37.859 --> 11:40.710 have . But again , I think um in , in 11:40.719 --> 11:44.500 the , the way that um you 11:44.510 --> 11:47.400 now have uh this modern technology and 11:47.409 --> 11:49.465 the ability you could go out of here 11:49.465 --> 11:51.520 right after this briefing and go and 11:51.520 --> 11:53.742 buy a drone and you could fly it around 11:53.742 --> 11:55.687 your neighborhood . And as long as 11:55.687 --> 11:57.853 you're flying it appropriately and not 11:57.853 --> 11:57.820 in restricted airspace , there's 11:57.830 --> 12:00.163 nothing illegal about flying that drone . 12:00.250 --> 12:02.320 So , uh again , just providing some 12:02.330 --> 12:04.386 perspective here . And I think , you 12:04.386 --> 12:06.386 know , the statement that the joint 12:06.386 --> 12:08.497 statement that we put out highlighted 12:08.497 --> 12:10.552 that the assessment in terms of what 12:10.552 --> 12:12.663 these reported sightings , uh , could 12:12.663 --> 12:14.830 be in terms of a combination of lawful 12:14.830 --> 12:16.941 commercial drones , hobbyist drones , 12:16.941 --> 12:19.052 law enforcement drones , uh , as well 12:19.052 --> 12:21.219 as manned , uh , fixed wing aircraft . 12:21.219 --> 12:23.669 Um , again , don't wanna minimize it . 12:23.859 --> 12:26.570 Uh , but I think it's , uh , important , 12:26.580 --> 12:28.950 understand too just the volume of drone 12:28.960 --> 12:31.071 activity , uh , that will likely only 12:31.071 --> 12:33.293 increase into the future . Uh , and the 12:33.293 --> 12:35.516 fact that it is legal to fly drones and 12:35.516 --> 12:37.627 if they go into restricted airspace , 12:37.627 --> 12:39.571 of course , we'll take appropriate 12:39.571 --> 12:41.929 action just , um , why does it have to 12:41.940 --> 12:44.162 be a classified briefing ? If these are 12:44.162 --> 12:46.107 just hobbyist drones , they're not 12:46.107 --> 12:47.773 military drones . Why is it a 12:47.773 --> 12:50.107 classified briefing on the Capitol Hill ? 12:50.107 --> 12:52.162 Um , I , I don't , I'd have to refer 12:52.162 --> 12:54.329 you to Congress on that . Um , again , 12:54.329 --> 12:56.107 um , you know , sharing as much 12:56.107 --> 12:58.273 information as , as we can here . Uh , 12:58.273 --> 13:00.440 I don't have the the briefing in front 13:00.440 --> 13:01.996 of me . So I can't tell you 13:01.996 --> 13:04.162 specifically , you know , what aspects 13:04.162 --> 13:03.940 are , are classified or not . I can 13:03.950 --> 13:06.006 assure you though that again , uh we 13:06.006 --> 13:08.172 are sharing as much , much information 13:08.172 --> 13:10.228 as we can uh based on what we know . 13:10.228 --> 13:12.450 Let me go to the other side of the room 13:12.450 --> 13:14.506 here , Chris , thanks , Pat . I have 13:14.506 --> 13:16.450 two questions on drones . Um One , 13:16.450 --> 13:18.561 there's a particular interest perhaps 13:18.561 --> 13:20.783 by us but also from the US government . 13:20.783 --> 13:23.006 Um regarding the drones in New Jersey , 13:23.006 --> 13:25.172 does the Pentagon have any indications 13:25.172 --> 13:27.172 that those drones in New Jersey are 13:27.172 --> 13:29.394 somehow different in size activity , et 13:29.394 --> 13:31.339 cetera . Then the drones have been 13:31.339 --> 13:33.450 spotted at Wright Patterson Air Force 13:33.450 --> 13:35.394 Base Hill Air Force Base and other 13:35.394 --> 13:37.394 locations in the past few days . Um 13:37.394 --> 13:39.506 Chris , what I would tell you is we , 13:39.506 --> 13:41.728 you know , we don't see a connection at 13:41.728 --> 13:43.506 this point between any of those 13:43.506 --> 13:45.672 activities . Uh Again , uh just taking 13:45.672 --> 13:47.617 a step back here , you know , 8500 13:47.617 --> 13:51.280 drone flights a day . Um But again , 13:51.289 --> 13:53.456 don't see a connection at this stage . 13:53.456 --> 13:55.622 And then my second question um has the 13:55.622 --> 13:57.789 Pentagon determined who is responsible 13:57.789 --> 14:00.011 for the drone incursions over the bases 14:00.011 --> 14:02.450 in the UK uh over the past month ? Um 14:02.909 --> 14:05.131 Yeah , to my knowledge , uh still being 14:05.131 --> 14:07.353 looked at , I'd have to refer you to uh 14:07.353 --> 14:10.070 the UK mod and US Air Forces in Europe , 14:10.340 --> 14:12.309 Janie . Thank you , general two 14:12.369 --> 14:14.859 locations on South Korea and China 14:14.869 --> 14:18.309 qualification on China's SP nine 14:18.320 --> 14:22.080 using drones . China conducted uh 14:22.090 --> 14:24.739 this criminal s pion 14:25.690 --> 14:29.419 activities using drones on us , 14:29.429 --> 14:31.799 aircraft carriers and military 14:31.809 --> 14:35.099 facilities and current in South Korea . 14:35.109 --> 14:37.960 What message do you want to send to 14:37.969 --> 14:41.500 China which poses a security threat 14:42.179 --> 14:46.030 to many allies ? What , what's the 14:46.039 --> 14:49.229 message to China ? Uh you know , look , 14:49.559 --> 14:51.670 Janie , I'm not going to get into any 14:51.670 --> 14:53.989 specific um you know , operations 14:54.000 --> 14:56.222 overseas other than to say , you know , 14:56.222 --> 14:58.278 we take force protection , operation 14:58.278 --> 15:00.609 security very seriously . Uh We value 15:00.619 --> 15:02.786 the partnerships that we have with our 15:02.786 --> 15:04.730 allies throughout the Indo Pacific 15:04.730 --> 15:06.675 region and worldwide uh as we work 15:06.675 --> 15:09.400 together towards our mutual security 15:09.409 --> 15:12.359 interests . And so uh where wherever 15:12.369 --> 15:14.536 there is a potential threat , um we of 15:14.536 --> 15:16.869 course , will take measures to mitigate . 15:16.869 --> 15:19.580 Um but I'll just leave it there on 15:19.590 --> 15:23.479 South Korea . The security vacuum is in 15:23.890 --> 15:27.159 chaos due to the president 15:27.169 --> 15:31.010 suspended his work and the military 15:31.020 --> 15:33.830 leadership also as , as well as you 15:33.840 --> 15:36.710 know , suspended . Is there any uh 15:36.719 --> 15:39.409 disruption in the US South Korea 15:39.419 --> 15:42.849 alliance ? And who is the Secretary 15:42.859 --> 15:45.049 Austin , the current , you know , 15:45.059 --> 15:49.030 dialogue partner ? Yeah . So right up 15:49.039 --> 15:51.206 front , I would say , and , and you've 15:51.206 --> 15:53.317 heard Secretary Austin say this , the 15:53.317 --> 15:55.483 alliance between the United States and 15:55.483 --> 15:57.706 the rok is ironclad , uh we continue to 15:57.706 --> 15:59.872 remain committed to peace and security 15:59.872 --> 16:02.309 of the Korean Peninsula . Uh And our 16:02.320 --> 16:04.809 combined defense posture remains strong . 16:05.109 --> 16:07.729 Um I know that uh General Acara spoke 16:07.739 --> 16:09.919 with the uh acting Republic of Korea 16:09.929 --> 16:12.619 President on Sunday . Uh He emphasized 16:12.630 --> 16:14.463 the strength of the alliance and 16:14.463 --> 16:16.297 reaffirmed commitment to preplan 16:16.297 --> 16:18.463 training and exercises . He also spoke 16:18.539 --> 16:20.706 uh with the Acting Minister of Defense 16:20.706 --> 16:24.099 on Thursday uh on the same topic . So , 16:24.260 --> 16:26.489 um , don't have anything to read out 16:26.500 --> 16:28.611 right now in terms of potential phone 16:28.611 --> 16:30.667 calls with Secretary Austin , uh and 16:30.667 --> 16:32.611 the acting Defense Minister in the 16:32.611 --> 16:34.722 future , but certainly we'll keep you 16:34.722 --> 16:36.778 updated . Let me go to you . I thank 16:36.778 --> 16:38.889 you very much , General , the Turkish 16:38.889 --> 16:40.722 Defense Minister says Ankara had 16:40.722 --> 16:40.619 proposed to Washington that they can 16:40.630 --> 16:42.940 assign three commander brigades to help 16:42.950 --> 16:45.119 fight Daesh and also control prisons 16:45.130 --> 16:47.352 where ISIS militants and their families 16:47.352 --> 16:49.241 are held . Those are your biggest 16:49.241 --> 16:51.352 concerns right now , especially after 16:51.352 --> 16:53.519 the fall of the Assad regime . So this 16:53.519 --> 16:55.741 is your NATO ally saying that surely if 16:55.741 --> 16:57.797 there was such a partnership between 16:57.797 --> 16:59.908 the US and Turkey , these are the two 16:59.908 --> 17:02.130 largest militaries within their lines . 17:02.130 --> 17:04.297 Why not just team up ? Is it just lack 17:04.297 --> 17:06.463 of trust ? You just don't believe them 17:06.463 --> 17:08.574 or you like to specifically work with 17:08.574 --> 17:10.352 the SDF ? Yeah , thanks for the 17:10.352 --> 17:10.180 question . You know , as , as you 17:10.189 --> 17:13.180 highlight Turkey is a very valued uh 17:13.189 --> 17:16.339 NATO ally and we continue to keep lines 17:16.349 --> 17:18.516 of communication open as it relates to 17:18.516 --> 17:20.738 the situation in Syria as it relates to 17:20.738 --> 17:23.479 regional security interests . Uh like 17:23.489 --> 17:25.500 ISIS , I don't have anything to 17:25.510 --> 17:27.739 announce in terms of any changes in US 17:27.750 --> 17:30.439 Force posture or how we're approaching 17:30.449 --> 17:32.959 the defeat ISIS mission . But I'm 17:32.969 --> 17:35.080 confident that we'll continue to keep 17:35.080 --> 17:37.329 having those conversations with Turkey 17:37.339 --> 17:39.450 and other regional partners . On this 17:39.450 --> 17:42.140 issue . The Turkish Foreign Minister 17:42.150 --> 17:44.750 just on the same day said that the YPG 17:44.859 --> 17:47.699 is called the SDF replied that the old 17:47.729 --> 17:51.180 itself will be destroyed in Syria . Is 17:51.189 --> 17:53.300 the United States going to militarily 17:53.300 --> 17:55.245 step in ? I've asked this question 17:55.245 --> 17:57.469 before because Turkey stresses it very 17:57.479 --> 17:59.312 clearly that they're going to be 17:59.312 --> 18:01.423 destroyed or you can work with us and 18:01.423 --> 18:03.479 we can sort out the Daesh problem in 18:03.479 --> 18:05.479 Syria . Like ho how do you approach 18:05.479 --> 18:07.701 this statement and like this behavior ? 18:07.701 --> 18:09.923 Yeah , I don't , I don't have a comment 18:09.923 --> 18:11.979 to provide on the foreign Minister's 18:11.979 --> 18:13.979 comment . Uh What I would say uh is 18:13.979 --> 18:15.979 what I've relayed before , which is 18:15.979 --> 18:17.868 that the SDF remains an important 18:17.868 --> 18:20.035 partner . Uh I think it's important to 18:20.035 --> 18:23.540 remember uh what Daesh or Isis is 18:23.550 --> 18:25.630 capable of as we've seen in the past 18:25.959 --> 18:28.015 and we all have a vested interest in 18:28.015 --> 18:30.910 ensuring that they cannot Resurge . Uh 18:30.920 --> 18:34.060 And so , uh I , I know again , we're 18:34.069 --> 18:36.400 speaking with our Turkish counterparts 18:36.410 --> 18:38.577 and others in the region as it relates 18:38.577 --> 18:41.109 to the challenges associated with Isis 18:41.310 --> 18:45.290 as well as the SDF and the role 18:45.300 --> 18:47.467 the continued important role they play 18:47.569 --> 18:50.369 uh in preventing a resurgence of Isis . 18:50.380 --> 18:52.324 And so , uh we'll continue to have 18:52.324 --> 18:55.060 those conversations . Um And uh I'll 18:55.069 --> 18:57.760 just leave it there . Let , let me get 18:57.770 --> 18:59.826 to a couple of other folks here real 18:59.826 --> 19:01.826 quick . Uh Let me go to , uh , Jeff 19:01.826 --> 19:04.199 Shole task and purpose . Thank you . 19:04.209 --> 19:06.265 Have any of the drone sightings been 19:06.265 --> 19:08.510 accompanied , uh , with sightings of a 19:08.520 --> 19:11.030 large rectangular black object 19:11.040 --> 19:13.040 sometimes called a monolith , often 19:13.040 --> 19:15.209 accompanied by Albach Art Tula by 19:15.219 --> 19:19.069 Richard Strauss . Yeah , thanks , Jeff . 19:19.079 --> 19:22.670 Um , I , I would probably have to 19:22.890 --> 19:25.369 think back to , uh , the words of a , a 19:25.380 --> 19:29.380 very wise prophet , um , Obiwan Kenobi 19:29.390 --> 19:31.557 who said these aren't the droit drones 19:31.557 --> 19:33.930 you're looking for . Uh But beyond that , 19:33.939 --> 19:36.410 um I'll just have to move along . Ok , 19:36.540 --> 19:38.651 let me go to Howard Altman War Zone . 19:39.280 --> 19:41.447 Thanks . Well , that was hard to top . 19:41.447 --> 19:43.558 I mean , I got two questions , one on 19:43.558 --> 19:45.780 the drones and one on Syria . Um I know 19:45.780 --> 19:48.219 you told Chris that these me are not 19:48.229 --> 19:49.951 seeing , you're not seeing any 19:49.951 --> 19:52.062 connections but in terms of visual or 19:52.062 --> 19:54.719 sensor data that is of the drones that 19:54.729 --> 19:57.699 have been seen over uh the US bases 19:57.709 --> 20:00.250 both uh Cona snow cones . What 20:00.260 --> 20:02.650 similarities are you seeing in visual 20:02.660 --> 20:05.630 and sensor data ? My question on Syria 20:05.640 --> 20:09.560 is um Muslim Abdi , the head of SDF 20:09.660 --> 20:12.859 is proposing a uh um a proposal to 20:12.869 --> 20:14.869 establish the Demilitarized Zone in 20:14.869 --> 20:17.170 Kobani with the redistribution of 20:17.180 --> 20:19.010 security forces under American 20:19.020 --> 20:21.359 supervision and presence is the eu 20:21.864 --> 20:24.734 familiar with this . Do you have any 20:24.755 --> 20:27.275 ability to uh um 20:28.494 --> 20:30.834 have additional forces or additional uh 20:30.844 --> 20:33.594 presence in that region ? Thanks . 20:33.935 --> 20:35.879 Thanks Howard . On , on your first 20:35.879 --> 20:37.935 question . Um I'm not gonna have any 20:37.935 --> 20:40.046 information to provide in terms of uh 20:40.046 --> 20:42.324 sensor data . Uh Other than again , as , 20:42.324 --> 20:44.694 as um I highlighted earlier , you know , 20:44.704 --> 20:48.199 we are employing uh a um 20:48.229 --> 20:52.020 variety of both passive and active 20:52.030 --> 20:55.660 sensors in order to uh detect uh a 20:55.829 --> 20:59.250 as it pertains to dod installations . 20:59.260 --> 21:01.371 And of course , um we're not the only 21:01.371 --> 21:03.538 ones in this business when it comes to 21:03.538 --> 21:05.482 us civil airspace . You know , I'd 21:05.482 --> 21:07.593 certainly refer you to DH S and , and 21:07.593 --> 21:09.959 FAA on that front . Um As far as Kobani 21:09.969 --> 21:12.880 goes and uh you know , the , the cease 21:12.890 --> 21:14.959 fire discussions between groups that 21:14.969 --> 21:17.530 are there and the SDF and others . Um 21:17.709 --> 21:19.876 You know , that's something that we're 21:19.876 --> 21:21.765 obviously monitoring closely as I 21:21.765 --> 21:23.987 highlighted to your colleague . I think 21:23.987 --> 21:25.987 uh we all have a vested interest in 21:25.987 --> 21:28.098 ensuring that groups in the region uh 21:28.098 --> 21:31.550 capitalize on the situation here 21:31.560 --> 21:35.270 to enable the people of Syria to uh to 21:35.280 --> 21:37.502 be able to have a better life than they 21:37.502 --> 21:39.669 did under the Assad regime . But as it 21:39.669 --> 21:41.669 relates to the US force presence in 21:41.669 --> 21:43.810 Syria , it is focused on the defeat 21:43.819 --> 21:46.050 ISIS mission . And so uh that's 21:46.060 --> 21:48.479 continues to be our focus and I'll just 21:48.489 --> 21:50.656 leave it there . Let me come back into 21:50.656 --> 21:52.640 the room . Noah specify where the 21:52.650 --> 21:54.650 strikes took place yesterday within 21:54.650 --> 21:56.817 Syria American equipment was used . Do 21:56.817 --> 21:58.817 you have anything more on that ? Uh 21:58.817 --> 22:01.094 What I could tell you , Noah is uh the , 22:01.150 --> 22:03.261 uh you're talking about the counter I 22:03.261 --> 22:05.594 or the counter Isis defeat ISIS strikes . 22:05.594 --> 22:07.539 Um Yes , those were in the Badilla 22:07.539 --> 22:10.250 Desert . Um , what I'm tracking is it 22:10.260 --> 22:14.079 was four separate locations . Um , and 22:14.290 --> 22:16.739 Suncom assesses that 12 is I uh , 22:16.750 --> 22:18.930 members were killed . Thank you , 22:20.449 --> 22:23.310 John . Thank you , General not Syria . 22:23.319 --> 22:25.579 Again , we know that you are actively 22:25.589 --> 22:28.920 involved in negotiation between the 22:28.930 --> 22:31.719 Syrian free Syrian army and the SDF , 22:31.729 --> 22:34.390 especially in the area of mem . Uh , 22:34.400 --> 22:37.310 but other than that in the south in 22:37.319 --> 22:39.770 cities like Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor , 22:40.290 --> 22:43.069 there are a lot of protests against the 22:43.324 --> 22:47.165 DF and especially the Arab population 22:47.175 --> 22:50.025 in this area . They claim that the SDF 22:50.035 --> 22:52.704 was collaborating with the Assad regime 22:52.714 --> 22:54.658 and they see them as complicit and 22:54.658 --> 22:56.658 after the fall of the regime , they 22:56.658 --> 22:58.770 want them out of their neighborhood . 22:58.770 --> 23:01.505 Uh What do you say about these kind of 23:01.515 --> 23:04.084 requests from the local Syrians in 23:04.094 --> 23:06.625 those areas ? And do you think that 23:06.635 --> 23:09.625 will create a possible threat for us 23:09.635 --> 23:12.560 forces ? Well , you know , uh as I'm 23:12.569 --> 23:14.791 sure you can appreciate , I'm not going 23:14.791 --> 23:17.449 to delve into uh domestic Syrian 23:17.699 --> 23:21.040 politics , other than to say , uh again , 23:21.089 --> 23:24.819 uh we recognize uh the , the situation 23:24.829 --> 23:26.880 right now in Syria is fragile , 23:26.890 --> 23:28.834 particularly as it remains rema uh 23:28.834 --> 23:31.660 relates to the post assad regime . Uh 23:31.670 --> 23:34.229 us forces have been working closely 23:34.239 --> 23:36.650 with SDF for years now on the defeat 23:36.660 --> 23:38.771 ISIS mission and that continues to be 23:38.771 --> 23:41.050 our focus won't speak for the SDF or 23:41.060 --> 23:43.219 what the local population may or may 23:43.229 --> 23:45.660 not be saying , other than again , uh I 23:45.670 --> 23:47.837 think we all have a vested interest in 23:47.837 --> 23:50.020 ensuring that ISIS is not allowed to 23:50.030 --> 23:52.540 regroup and research uh and return to 23:52.550 --> 23:54.989 the kinds of activities that we saw uh 23:55.010 --> 23:57.121 previously got time for just a couple 23:57.121 --> 24:00.880 more uh the leadership of the 24:00.989 --> 24:03.530 Assad regime , most of them who are 24:04.099 --> 24:07.349 involved in uh like slaughtering their 24:07.359 --> 24:10.660 own people and very possibly in the 24:10.670 --> 24:12.503 future , there will be courts uh 24:12.503 --> 24:14.949 against these names . Uh We know Bashar 24:14.959 --> 24:17.069 Al Assad flew right away to Moscow , 24:17.079 --> 24:19.349 but the rest of his team , do you have 24:19.359 --> 24:21.839 any idea how did they get out of the 24:21.849 --> 24:23.709 country or do you follow any 24:23.719 --> 24:25.890 intelligence about like personalities 24:25.900 --> 24:28.560 like ma uh I said , his brother . Yeah , 24:28.569 --> 24:30.625 I , I don't have anything to provide 24:30.625 --> 24:32.736 from the podium here . Let me go to m 24:32.736 --> 24:34.625 uh thank you , General Park . One 24:34.625 --> 24:37.660 question on Syria uh since last week . 24:37.670 --> 24:39.579 Uh like the Turkish backed Syrian 24:39.589 --> 24:42.339 national uh army and militants are 24:42.349 --> 24:46.060 amazing around the uh controlled areas 24:46.069 --> 24:49.130 of uh sef uh are you engaging with 24:49.140 --> 24:51.599 Turkey on this ? And do you think a 24:51.609 --> 24:53.839 Turkish in , in incursion into 24:53.849 --> 24:57.239 northeast of Syria is imminent ? Um 24:57.250 --> 24:59.359 Again , I won't speak for Turkey in 24:59.369 --> 25:01.425 terms of what they , they may or may 25:01.425 --> 25:03.480 not do . Um And then I'm sorry , the 25:03.480 --> 25:05.147 first part of your question , 25:05.147 --> 25:07.258 negotiating with who ? Yeah , like uh 25:07.258 --> 25:09.425 the Turkish backed forces in uh around 25:09.425 --> 25:11.536 Kobane . Uh I'm a around Kobane to uh 25:11.536 --> 25:13.536 invade Kobane Are you engaging with 25:13.536 --> 25:16.369 Turkey with this ? Uh Again , I , I 25:16.380 --> 25:18.547 think I kind of already addressed this 25:18.547 --> 25:20.880 broadly speaking . Uh The US is 25:20.890 --> 25:22.949 communicating with Turkey about the 25:22.959 --> 25:26.150 situation in Syria writ large uh and 25:26.199 --> 25:28.255 keeping lines of communication as it 25:28.255 --> 25:30.910 relates to the post assad assad regime 25:31.140 --> 25:33.510 uh trying to ensure that the people of 25:33.520 --> 25:36.109 Syria uh are able to experience uh 25:36.119 --> 25:38.400 security and stability . Um But from a 25:38.410 --> 25:40.959 US military standpoint , our focus in 25:40.969 --> 25:43.359 Syria continues to be on the uh 25:43.369 --> 25:45.849 enduring defeat of Isis . Ok . Let me 25:45.859 --> 25:47.915 get to Jim and then I'll come to you 25:47.915 --> 25:50.709 and then we'll close it up . Jim just 25:50.719 --> 25:53.239 uh uh to Syria again , given all the 25:53.250 --> 25:56.180 unrest are , are the uh and the uh 25:56.189 --> 25:58.660 counter ISIS mission , there are the US 25:58.670 --> 26:01.819 forces able to , to pursue that mission 26:01.829 --> 26:05.089 and is the uh force protection measures 26:05.540 --> 26:08.400 given the unrest adequate for uh what's 26:08.410 --> 26:11.160 happening now ? Yes . And I mean , that 26:11.170 --> 26:14.469 is evidenced by uh the ISIS counter 26:14.479 --> 26:16.750 ISIS strike we took a couple of days 26:16.760 --> 26:19.010 ago . So yes , they are able to conduct 26:19.020 --> 26:21.131 their mission . And of course , as it 26:21.131 --> 26:23.076 has always been , force protection 26:23.076 --> 26:25.187 remains a top priority for our forces 26:25.187 --> 26:28.550 in Syria to add more forces there . I 26:28.560 --> 26:30.671 don't have anything to announce right 26:30.671 --> 26:33.004 now in terms of change of force posture . 26:33.004 --> 26:35.116 Thank you . You've made it very clear 26:35.116 --> 26:37.116 that we are in Syria . The US is in 26:37.116 --> 26:39.395 Syria to counter ISIS . You said that 26:39.405 --> 26:42.234 several times . But our partner in that 26:42.244 --> 26:44.714 fight is the SDF and the commander is 26:44.724 --> 26:47.305 now saying that he wants to propose a 26:47.314 --> 26:49.675 Demilitarized Zone because of these 26:49.685 --> 26:52.114 tensions with Turkey and is asking for 26:52.125 --> 26:54.403 American supervision and presence . So , 26:54.403 --> 26:56.984 is the Pentagon willing to consider 26:56.994 --> 26:59.555 that proposal to have us boots on the 26:59.564 --> 27:01.994 ground in place to help um that 27:02.005 --> 27:05.540 Demilitarized Zone Carla , as I'm sure 27:05.550 --> 27:07.772 you can appreciate , I'm not gonna make 27:07.772 --> 27:09.828 policy from the the podium here . Um 27:09.828 --> 27:11.828 You know , obviously we continue to 27:11.828 --> 27:13.939 communicate very closely with the SDF 27:13.939 --> 27:15.994 as our defeat ISIS partner , but I'm 27:15.994 --> 27:18.161 not gonna have any updates on in terms 27:18.161 --> 27:20.272 of change of , of mission right now . 27:20.272 --> 27:22.328 Last question , Mike , I know you're 27:22.328 --> 27:24.550 hoping for a drone question . So let me 27:24.550 --> 27:28.099 blind you . Um You say you say that 27:28.109 --> 27:30.165 that there are these sightings , you 27:30.165 --> 27:32.165 know , why do most of the sightings 27:32.165 --> 27:35.280 seem to be around New Jersey ? I mean , 27:35.290 --> 27:37.290 it's the garden state and all , but 27:37.290 --> 27:39.290 what is so special about New Jersey 27:39.290 --> 27:41.512 that , that it's getting most attention 27:41.512 --> 27:43.846 from this . I've never seen drones here , 27:43.846 --> 27:43.689 I've never seen them flying around 27:43.699 --> 27:47.079 Virginia . Uh and second question , 27:47.089 --> 27:49.311 drone related question . I know we , we 27:49.311 --> 27:51.533 are building on the , you're developing 27:51.533 --> 27:53.867 the military's ability to detect drones . 27:53.867 --> 27:55.978 Are you also working on their ability 27:55.978 --> 27:58.900 to defeat drones in the air ? Yeah , 27:58.910 --> 28:01.709 absolutely . Um You know , to answer 28:01.719 --> 28:04.219 your last question , um , and , and I 28:04.229 --> 28:06.340 would encourage you to go take a look 28:06.340 --> 28:08.507 at the , the counter unmanned strategy 28:08.507 --> 28:10.785 that , that we put out . Um , you know , 28:10.785 --> 28:13.260 just last week , uh that talks about 28:13.270 --> 28:15.492 the approach that we're going to take . 28:15.492 --> 28:17.670 Uh And that includes , uh the ability 28:17.680 --> 28:19.902 to defeat drones both kinetically and , 28:19.902 --> 28:23.869 and non kinetically . Uh And so a again , 28:23.880 --> 28:26.660 looking at places like Ukraine , um , 28:26.670 --> 28:29.469 we've seen the impact that drones can 28:29.479 --> 28:31.590 have on the battlefield . And so it's 28:31.590 --> 28:33.757 something that the department's taking 28:33.757 --> 28:35.868 very seriously as for your question , 28:35.868 --> 28:37.701 in terms of the preponderance of 28:37.701 --> 28:39.868 sightings reported sightings , uh , in 28:39.868 --> 28:42.090 the New Jersey Northeast Corridor , I , 28:42.090 --> 28:44.201 I can't answer that question , Mike . 28:44.201 --> 28:46.535 Um , you know , again , I personal , uh , 28:46.535 --> 28:48.757 experience , I have seen drones in DC , 28:48.757 --> 28:50.701 I've seen drones , you know , uh , 28:50.701 --> 28:52.757 personal drones flying around . Uh , 28:52.757 --> 28:52.650 and as I've mentioned from this podium 28:52.660 --> 28:54.882 before , uh , one of my close relatives 28:54.882 --> 28:57.420 is a private drone operator . Uh , and 28:57.430 --> 28:59.152 I'm sure some of that person's 28:59.152 --> 29:01.152 neighbors have often wondered , you 29:01.152 --> 29:03.152 know , what , what that drone is is 29:03.152 --> 29:05.208 doing . Um , so , you know , without 29:05.208 --> 29:07.208 taking a holistic snapshot of every 29:07.208 --> 29:09.374 single privately operated drone across 29:09.374 --> 29:11.486 the United States , some of which can 29:11.486 --> 29:13.708 be that big , some of which can be that 29:13.708 --> 29:15.708 big . Uh , it's hard to know , uh , 29:15.708 --> 29:17.819 specifically , you know , why at this 29:17.819 --> 29:19.986 point in time . Uh , and , and again , 29:19.986 --> 29:21.763 as was highlighted in the joint 29:21.763 --> 29:23.819 statement , uh , you know , uh , the 29:23.829 --> 29:26.300 current assessment , uh , explains what 29:26.310 --> 29:28.500 we think most of those are , uh , to 29:28.510 --> 29:31.140 include piloted manned aircraft . Um , 29:31.150 --> 29:33.261 the last thing I would say on again , 29:33.261 --> 29:35.206 completely understand the concerns 29:35.206 --> 29:37.599 completely . Uh you know , uh we 29:37.660 --> 29:39.882 reinforce we're taking this seriously . 29:40.430 --> 29:43.849 Uh you know , it's uh sometimes uh when 29:43.859 --> 29:46.189 you focus on something suddenly you 29:46.199 --> 29:48.709 notice more . Uh And so , you know , 29:48.719 --> 29:50.775 there , there's always the potential 29:50.775 --> 29:52.497 that because of the heightened 29:52.497 --> 29:54.608 awareness , now we're just more aware 29:54.608 --> 29:56.608 um o of this particular issue , but 29:56.608 --> 29:58.608 again , we'll continue to take this 29:58.608 --> 30:00.719 very seriously . Uh We'll continue to 30:00.719 --> 30:02.941 take appropriate action . Uh , if , and 30:02.941 --> 30:04.886 when it's deemed that any of these 30:04.886 --> 30:07.108 drones near us , military installations 30:07.108 --> 30:08.886 pose a threat . Um , but in the 30:08.886 --> 30:10.941 meantime , uh , again , I think it's 30:10.941 --> 30:12.775 been very clear that we have not 30:12.775 --> 30:14.775 identified , uh , that any of these 30:14.819 --> 30:16.986 reported drone sightings were assessed 30:16.986 --> 30:19.040 as anomalous or that it presented a 30:19.050 --> 30:21.459 national security or public safety risk 30:21.469 --> 30:23.413 uh , over civilian airspace in New 30:23.413 --> 30:25.747 Jersey or other states in the northeast . 30:25.747 --> 30:27.580 All right . This is part of this 30:27.580 --> 30:29.525 testing corridor between Dover Air 30:29.525 --> 30:31.858 Force Base and Joint Base Maguire . Yes , 30:32.089 --> 30:36.079 thank you . Oh , I apologize . Um , 30:36.150 --> 30:38.372 based off his question . Now , you just 30:38.372 --> 30:40.619 came in the briefing room . So I came 30:40.680 --> 30:42.791 in , uh , you flew in on your drone . 30:43.500 --> 30:45.770 Um , but thank you , that's normally my 30:45.780 --> 30:49.089 pattern . But , um , um , 30:50.810 --> 30:52.921 you talked about the military bases . 30:52.921 --> 30:54.810 Has there been a surge in counter 30:54.810 --> 30:54.780 detection equipment that has been sent 30:54.790 --> 30:57.260 to military bases ? I'm aware that DH S 30:57.270 --> 30:59.939 and has sent other equipment to the New 30:59.949 --> 31:02.116 Jersey area . Is any of that ? Include 31:02.116 --> 31:04.227 dod equipment or is that strictly all 31:04.227 --> 31:06.282 DH S as I , as I highlighted earlier 31:06.282 --> 31:08.579 for Picatinny , um , we , we did send 31:08.589 --> 31:10.660 some additional , uh , active and 31:10.670 --> 31:13.069 passive detection capabilities as well 31:13.079 --> 31:15.829 as some uh counter drone capabilities . 31:16.030 --> 31:18.086 Um , those , those are the only ones 31:18.086 --> 31:20.252 and earl , those are the only ones I'm 31:20.252 --> 31:22.363 tracking right now . Um , but again , 31:22.363 --> 31:25.839 you know , uh , I , if we need to look 31:25.849 --> 31:27.960 at other installations , we certainly 31:27.960 --> 31:30.182 can , but I don't have anything else to 31:30.182 --> 31:32.293 active and passive . I mean , that is 31:32.293 --> 31:34.460 just strictly detection or is actually 31:34.460 --> 31:36.516 to bring drones down . So active and 31:36.516 --> 31:38.349 passive detection , uh different 31:38.349 --> 31:40.349 methods to be able to detect drones 31:40.349 --> 31:42.516 using different capabilities , right ? 31:42.516 --> 31:44.579 So uh passive measures would 31:44.589 --> 31:46.422 essentially be , it just has the 31:46.422 --> 31:48.880 ability to uh receive signals without 31:48.890 --> 31:51.219 emitting signals . Whereas active would 31:51.229 --> 31:53.451 be like radar , I bounce the signal off 31:53.451 --> 31:55.579 and it bounces back , right ? Um And 31:55.589 --> 31:57.422 then separate from that would be 31:57.422 --> 32:00.079 counter UAs capabilities , things like 32:00.089 --> 32:03.750 um the uh let me make sure I get the 32:03.760 --> 32:07.109 name right here like drone 32:07.119 --> 32:09.719 busters , uh which essentially uh you 32:09.729 --> 32:12.359 know , emits a signal which is able to 32:12.520 --> 32:16.119 um interrupt the signal on the drone 32:16.130 --> 32:18.297 which can affect its , its flight . So 32:18.297 --> 32:20.297 that , that's a methodology that we 32:20.297 --> 32:23.199 have uh that is able to essentially 32:23.209 --> 32:25.209 bring drones down non kinetically . 32:25.209 --> 32:27.265 Should we need to do that ? The DH S 32:27.265 --> 32:29.431 equipment similar to this or is that , 32:29.431 --> 32:31.376 I mean , I'd refer you to them but 32:31.376 --> 32:33.542 short answer is yes . Ok . All right . 32:33.542 --> 32:35.265 Thanks very much . Everybody . 32:35.265 --> 32:34.609 Appreciate it .