WEBVTT

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We're joined by General , um , Gregory

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Gi . Thank you for being here from

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Northern Command and Admiral Alvin

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Holsey from Southern Command . The

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United States faces the most dangerous

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security environment it has entered

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since World War II . We know about the

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threats in Europe , Asia , and the

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Middle East , but we must not lose

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sight of threats in our own hemisphere .

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Both of these commanders face an

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increasingly complex set of actors who

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seek to harm Americans and undermine

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our interests . The Chinese Communist

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Party has exploited our poorest

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southern border to facilitate the

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trafficking of fentanyl and other

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deadly drugs . Beijing has brazenly

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violated US airspace . It has borrowed

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its cyber payloads into core US

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telecommunications infrastructure and

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spread its predatory economic practices

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to South America . China , Russia , and

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North Korea pose an increasing nuclear

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and conventional threat to key US

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cities , not to be outdone . Iran

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continues to try to kill Americans on

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our own soil . General Gio , I would

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like to hear your updates in three key

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areas . First , border security is a

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priority for the president , and I

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agree with his decision to declare a

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national emergency at the southern

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border . President Trump has asked you

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to deliver an updated plan to ensure

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border security . He's also directed

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you to assist law enforcement in its

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security and deportation operations .

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DOD has a lot to offer to support law

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enforcement . The . 2022 national

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defense strategy . Published by

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President Biden listed homeland defense

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as the military's first priority . So

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this is bipartisan . It is clear that

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the American people do believe that

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border security is national security .

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I look forward to hearing from you on

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your work in this area . Second ,

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President Trump has asked you to

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contribute to a new plan for homeland

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air and missile defense . I would

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welcome your insights in this effort .

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Please tell us where in your opinion

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new investments should be targeted . Do

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they involve updating our ground-based

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radars and building out new missile

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warning satellites ? Perhaps they

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involve developing the most cost

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effective methods of intercepting

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incoming crews and ballistic missiles .

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Third , you have led on the development

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of a new strategy for countering drones

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here in the homeland . My friend and

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ranking member , Jack Reed , held a

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great classified briefing on the

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Langley incursions . There have been

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numerous similar incidents since ,

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since all of them troubling . Senators

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Cotton and Gillibrand are working

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together on ways to counter drones . I

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would appreciate your comments on how

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we can be more effective in this space .

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Tell us what new authorities you need .

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Admiral Halsey , I would appreciate an

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update from you on how your adversaries

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are using economic coercion in key

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Latin American against key Latin

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American partners . The CCP aims to

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drive a wedge between US between the US

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and our neighbors . China hopes to

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reverse long standing policy

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recognizing Taiwan's independence , and

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it wants our allies to look the other

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way as it builds so-called gray zone

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dual use . Civil military

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infrastructure . Beijing is also trying

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to force our friends to rely on Huawei

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for telecommunications even as numerous

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Latin American leaders have adopted

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this CCP controlled TikTok app . We

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need to look no further than the Panama

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Canal . President Trump has rightly

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expressed concern about the PRC

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state-owned port infrastructure on

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either end of this vital maritime

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artery . Those PRC facilities pose a

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risk to the free flow of US flag

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merchant ships and US naval vessels .

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This issue must be addressed . There

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are additional troubling PRC

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developments in the SOCOM region . The

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PRC has leased a spaceport . In the

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remote Patagonia region of Argentina .

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That perch provides the communist

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Chinese with unprecedented surveillance

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capabilities in our own hemisphere .

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Since at least 2019 , Beijing has

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operated a spy base out of Cuba and has

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done so with impunity . Just last year

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in Lima , Peru , a PRC state-owned

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power company purchased the city's

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entire power grid . Meanwhile , Xi

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Jinping presided over the opening of a

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Chinese funded deep water port . Just

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north of Lima , which is capable of

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holding PRC warships . So Emeral Hosey ,

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I would like for you to update this

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committee on how you are integrating

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military and non-military tools to

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fight . Against these predatory

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techniques , despite the significant

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and growing security threats in the

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region , SOCOM is consistently

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under-resourced . To fulfill its many

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critical national security missions , I ,

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I look forward to hearing from you

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about how these resource constraints ,

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um , are affecting SOCOM . I would also

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like to learn how innovative solutions

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like the Office of Strategic Capital .

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Can be leveraged to close this resource

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gap . Again , I thank our witnesses for

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being here and for their earlier

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meetings with members of this committee ,

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and I now recognize my friend and the

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distinguished ranking member of the

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committee , Senator Reid . Thank you

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very much , Mr . Chairman , and let me

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join you in welcoming , uh , General

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Gregory Gio , uh , the commander of

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NorthCO , and Admiral Alvin Halsey to

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today's posture hearing the commander

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of the US Southcom . Gentlemen , over

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the past month , both of your commands

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have been ordered to conduct new

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missions in support of US border

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security and immigration enforcement .

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President Trump has deployed over 2000

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active duty soldiers and Marines to

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supplement the 2500 guard members and

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reservists already deployed to the

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southern border and has directed

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Northcom to seal the southern border .

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Additionally , last week , President

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Trump ordered the Defense Department to

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expand . The Department of Homeland

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Security's migrant operations center at

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Naval Station Guantanamo Bay , Cuba to

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accommodate up to 30,000 migrants and

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to begin transporting migrants via

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military aircraft to that facility .

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Thus far I understand that around 100

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migrants have been transported to

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Guantanamo , at least half of whom are

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being detained . Not at the migrant

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operation center , but at the detention

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center where alleged and convicted

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international war criminals are also

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housed . Border security and

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immigration enforcement is critical to

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our national security . But Guantanamo

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Bay is a dubious location to detain

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immigrants . The detention center has

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only been used for law of war detainees ,

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and it is unfortunate to equate

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immigrants with international war

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criminals . Further , the facilities at

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Guantanamo are in poor condition and

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are extremely understaffed . The US

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military , which is already stretched

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for resources , is now spending

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millions of dollars to use military

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aircraft and burning thousands of hours

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of military personnel time for these

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operations . While a naval station in

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Guantanamo does prepare for mass

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migration operations . These operations

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are for saving people . Leaving dire

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situations in Cuba or Haiti on unsafe

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craft , not moving individuals already

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in the United States to a place where

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the status of their rights is ambiguous ,

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I have questions about the legality of

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this operation , and I'm concerned that

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this is part of a broader effort by

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President Trump . To militarize

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immigration enforcement , I hope the

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President and Secretary Hier will use

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common sense , follow the law , and

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stop spending significant amounts of

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taxpayers' dollars on performative

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deportation activities . General Guillo ,

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Admiral Halsey , I would like to know

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how these immigration force missions

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are impacting the readiness of your

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forces . Shyifically , I would ask for

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your estimates of the course personnel .

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And resources required thus far and any

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concerns you have about the limitations

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you have to continue conducting such

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operations , particularly in light of

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your other critical missions . Indeed ,

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US Northern Command is key to our

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national security , as the principal

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command for protecting the American

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homeland . As we consider threats from

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China and other competitors , our very

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concept of homeland defense must evolve .

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General Gio Northcom publishes its

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homeland defense policy guidance to

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address this challenge , and we ask for

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an update on the status of its

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implementation and how it will

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transform the homeland defense plans of

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the department . The urgency of this

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mission has been made clear with the

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recent incursion of drones and

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unidentified aerial phenomenon in our

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airspace . America's skies and seas

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must be secure to protect our citizens ,

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and the department must pursue

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technologies that provide adequate

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detection . The Trump administration

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has proposed an Iron Dome program for

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North America and issued an executive

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order to develop additional defenses

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against crews , ballistic , and

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hypersonic missiles . I would note that

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many of these efforts have already been

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underway by the missile defense agency

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for years , and that the concept of

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space-based interceptors that President

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Trump is interested in has been debated

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and tested at enormous financial cost

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without significant promise . General

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Guillo , I would ask for an update on

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how the Homeland missile defense

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mission is proceeding and your view on

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how a space-based interceptor system

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could affect Russia's pursuit of a

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nuclear weapon in space . Turning to

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Southern Command and will hold it ,

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your command faces growing challenges

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from China and Russia in Latin America .

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The political and economic instability

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in the region presents a situation that

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our adversaries are seeking to exploit

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to increase their own influence . China

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in particular is expanding its presence

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in the region , including through

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investments in strategic infrastructure ,

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5G telecommunications , and an

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expanding network of space tracking

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installations . Admiral , you testified

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last year that the PRC and Russia are

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strategic competitors who seek to

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undermine democracy while gaining power

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and influence in the region and that

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partnerships are our best deterrents to

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countering shared security and economic

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concerns , but that for now the US

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remains a trusted partner or the

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trusted partner . US international

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development programs strengthen US

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partnership in the region which advance

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US national security objectives . Now

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that USAID has been dismantled , I am

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interested in your assessment of

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whether the US will remain the partner

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of choice in your AOR or whether China

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and Russia will use this as an

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opportunity to gain further inroads

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with our partners . I'm also interested

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in your assessment of how we might work

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strategically with our partners in the

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region to build resilience against

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these activities . SOCOM , like

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Northcom , continues to work closely

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with the US interagency to support

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counter-narcotics and

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countertransnational criminal

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organizations or TCO missions . I am

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concerned about the growing threats

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from TCOs and synthetic opioid

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trafficking , including fentanyl ,

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which are contributing to more than

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100,000 overdose deaths each year in

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the United States . Admiral , I would

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ask for an update on SOHCOM's work with

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partner nations and other US government

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agencies in counter-narcotic and

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counter TCO efforts , giving SOTHCOM's

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limited force posture and resources .

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Finally , we know that insecurity

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throughout Southcom area is

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contributing to the flow of migrants

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north to the US border . Economic

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instability , violence , and corruption

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continue to be a major source of

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insecurity in much of the region ,

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especially in the northern triangle

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countries of Honduras , Guatemala , and

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El Salvador . Admiral Holsing , I would

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like to know your views on what more

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can be done to help improve the

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situation and strengthen our broader

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security throughout the region . Thank

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you again to our witnesses . I look

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forward to your testimony . Thank you ,

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Mr . Chairman . Thank you . And we're

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now ready for testimony from our

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witnesses before we begin , uh , as

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members know , there are votes , 2

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votes beginning at 10 a.m. , um , and ,

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uh , I will , um , I'll , we'll keep

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the hearing going . Um , when the vote

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begins , I'll , I'll try to run over

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very quickly and come right back . In

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the meantime , uh , a , a member of ,

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uh , 0 , 10:30 , OK , um , uh , uh , a

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member of our committee will , uh ,

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will preside and we'll keep going . So ,

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uh , we are ready to begin testimony .

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General Gio , you are recognized with

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the thanks of the committee . Thank you ,

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thank you , Chairman Wicker , Ranking

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Member Reid and distinguished members

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of the committee . It's my honor to

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command the men and women of North

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American Aerospace Defense Command and

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United States Northern Command . I'm

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also pleased to appear alongside my US

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SOCOM shipmate Admiral Bull Halsey .

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It's I'd like to highlight three

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trends in particular that uh NORAD and

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Northcom . Faced with direct

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implications for homeland defense ,

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first is the growing cooperation

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between China , Russia , North Korea

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and Iran to challenge the United States .

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While their cooperation does not

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approach the level of complete

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integration demonstrated by the United

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States and Canada , their transfer of

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weapons , military technology , and

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basing access is cause for significant

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concern . The associated risks to North

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America have also grown as the number

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of Russian bomber incursions into the

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Alaska and Canadian air defense

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identification zones has returned to

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levels not seen since before the

14:18.811 --> 14:21.033
Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russian

14:21.033 --> 14:23.033
navy surface and subsurface vessels

14:23.033 --> 14:25.144
conducted out of area deployments off

14:25.144 --> 14:27.033
both US coasts , including in the

14:27.033 --> 14:29.200
vicinity of Alaska . Second , evolving

14:29.200 --> 14:31.144
technologies demand that NORAD and

14:31.144 --> 14:33.144
Northcom rapidly adjust our defense

14:33.144 --> 14:35.799
posture . Small uncrewed aircraft

14:35.799 --> 14:38.520
systems or UAS proliferate the open

14:38.520 --> 14:40.840
market and in the hands of malign

14:40.840 --> 14:43.229
actors pose a growing threat to safety

14:43.229 --> 14:45.479
and security . Likewise , as

14:45.479 --> 14:47.440
competitors continue to target US

14:47.440 --> 14:49.496
networks and critical infrastructure

14:49.496 --> 14:51.662
and cyberspace , a whole of government

14:51.662 --> 14:53.662
effort is increasingly necessary to

14:53.662 --> 14:55.662
mitigate potential harm . Finally ,

14:55.719 --> 14:57.941
non-state actors continue to target our

14:57.941 --> 14:59.997
homeland . Radical Islamic terrorist

14:59.997 --> 15:02.219
groups have rejuvenated attack planning

15:02.219 --> 15:04.719
and anti-American rhetoric intended to

15:04.719 --> 15:07.640
inspire lone wolf attacks like the

15:07.640 --> 15:10.460
daily New York New Year's Day attack in

15:10.750 --> 15:13.080
New Orleans , and transnational

15:13.080 --> 15:14.913
criminal cartels based in Mexico

15:14.913 --> 15:17.024
threaten US territorial integrity and

15:17.024 --> 15:19.770
the safety of our citizens . With that

15:19.770 --> 15:21.969
strategic backdrop , homeland defense

15:21.969 --> 15:24.210
is our command's top priority and

15:24.210 --> 15:26.210
essential task , and in mindset and

15:26.210 --> 15:28.239
action , nobody waits on NORAD or

15:28.239 --> 15:30.489
NORTHCO . The mantra proved true over

15:30.489 --> 15:32.711
the last year as the command's planning

15:32.711 --> 15:34.711
and preparation generated swift and

15:34.711 --> 15:36.600
effective responses to competitor

15:36.600 --> 15:38.378
actions , major disasters , and

15:38.378 --> 15:40.489
emerging requirements . Over the past

15:40.489 --> 15:42.211
12 months , NORAD and Northcom

15:42.211 --> 15:44.322
intercepted joint Russian and Chinese

15:44.322 --> 15:46.890
bombers off the Alaska coast , tracked

15:46.890 --> 15:49.223
Russian surface vessels off both coasts ,

15:49.250 --> 15:51.306
detected and assessed numerous North

15:51.306 --> 15:53.194
Korean missile launches , tracked

15:53.194 --> 15:55.361
multiple Chinese dual use military and

15:55.361 --> 15:57.528
research vessels in the Bering Sea and

15:57.528 --> 15:59.639
Arctic Ocean , supported Americans in

15:59.639 --> 16:01.750
needed following Hurricane Helene and

16:01.750 --> 16:03.979
wildfires in California . Posture to

16:03.979 --> 16:06.400
support uh Hurricane Milton response ,

16:06.690 --> 16:08.690
deployed troops and unique military

16:08.690 --> 16:10.912
capabilities such as airborne ISR along

16:10.912 --> 16:13.099
the US southern border , illuminated

16:13.099 --> 16:14.988
transnational criminal networks ,

16:15.049 --> 16:17.160
deployed military personnel to assist

16:17.160 --> 16:19.890
US Secret Service in securing 195

16:19.890 --> 16:21.890
presidential campaign events , and

16:21.890 --> 16:24.112
improved defensive capabilities against

16:24.112 --> 16:26.760
all threats ranging from ICBMs to small

16:26.760 --> 16:29.380
drones . Looking forward , Nora and

16:29.380 --> 16:31.640
Northcom modernization is crucial to

16:31.640 --> 16:34.020
our outpacing our competitors .

16:34.179 --> 16:36.401
Establishing a layered domain awareness

16:36.401 --> 16:38.568
network from seabed to space to detect

16:38.568 --> 16:40.568
and track threats approaching North

16:40.568 --> 16:42.623
America is critical to immediate and

16:42.623 --> 16:44.846
future mission requirements because you

16:44.846 --> 16:46.901
can't defeat what you can't see . To

16:46.901 --> 16:49.068
that end , I appreciate the department

16:49.068 --> 16:51.346
and congressional support for fielding .

16:51.346 --> 16:53.123
All domain capabilities such as

16:53.123 --> 16:54.957
airborne moving target indicator

16:54.957 --> 16:57.012
satellites over the horizon radars ,

16:57.012 --> 16:59.309
the E7 wedge tail , and an integrated

16:59.309 --> 17:01.031
undersea surveillance system .

17:01.820 --> 17:03.987
Defending our borders , establishing a

17:03.987 --> 17:06.209
continental missile shield , protecting

17:06.209 --> 17:08.098
critical infrastructure and force

17:08.098 --> 17:09.653
projection capability , and

17:09.653 --> 17:11.820
safeguarding our citizens will require

17:11.820 --> 17:13.876
the best our nations have to offer ,

17:13.876 --> 17:15.987
and I'm grateful to the committee for

17:15.987 --> 17:17.876
your ongoing support of NORAD and

17:17.876 --> 17:19.987
Northcom's vital missions . Thank you

17:19.987 --> 17:21.987
again for the opportunity to appear

17:21.987 --> 17:21.439
today , and I look forward to your

17:21.439 --> 17:24.739
questions . We have the watch . Thank

17:24.739 --> 17:26.850
you , General Admiral Holsey , you're

17:26.850 --> 17:30.770
recognized . Chairman Wicker , ranking

17:30.770 --> 17:32.937
member Reid , distinguished members of

17:32.937 --> 17:35.048
the committee , I'm humbled to appear

17:35.048 --> 17:37.103
before you today as the thirty-third

17:37.103 --> 17:36.609
commander of the United States Southern

17:36.609 --> 17:38.719
Command . We are a war fighting

17:38.719 --> 17:40.830
organization , and I've moved forward

17:40.830 --> 17:42.997
to lead this command service members ,

17:42.997 --> 17:44.997
civilians , contractors , and their

17:44.997 --> 17:46.886
families as we foster democracy ,

17:46.886 --> 17:49.108
security , shared prosperity throughout

17:49.108 --> 17:51.330
the Western Hemisphere . I'm honored to

17:51.330 --> 17:53.386
testify alongside General Gio as the

17:53.386 --> 17:55.608
relationship between NorthCOM and SOCOM

17:55.608 --> 17:57.775
is vital to the safety and security of

17:57.775 --> 17:59.830
our homeland . The United States and

17:59.830 --> 18:01.941
our partners in Latin America and the

18:01.941 --> 18:01.750
Caribbean are linked together not

18:01.750 --> 18:03.989
simply by history and geography but by

18:03.989 --> 18:06.430
family bonds , cultural traditions ,

18:06.869 --> 18:08.980
security , and economic cooperation ,

18:08.980 --> 18:11.147
and a steadfast devotion to democratic

18:11.147 --> 18:13.202
values . This enduring commitment to

18:13.202 --> 18:15.258
these values is a cornerstone of our

18:15.258 --> 18:17.313
collective partnership . Together we

18:17.313 --> 18:19.500
seek to achieve lasting security ,

18:19.599 --> 18:21.710
stability , and prosperity throughout

18:21.710 --> 18:23.949
the Americas . Today this vision is

18:23.949 --> 18:26.349
imperiled by a host of threats . These

18:26.349 --> 18:28.460
threats include strategic competition

18:28.460 --> 18:30.989
from China and Russia , the impact of

18:30.989 --> 18:33.156
transnational criminal organizations ,

18:33.156 --> 18:35.211
the complex transboundary challenges

18:35.670 --> 18:37.781
such as irregular migration , natural

18:37.781 --> 18:40.069
disasters , eroding democracies , food

18:40.069 --> 18:42.430
and water insecurity . China is our

18:42.430 --> 18:44.790
pacing threat and continues to its

18:44.790 --> 18:46.846
methodical encouraging to our shared

18:46.846 --> 18:48.846
neighborhood , wilding diplomatic ,

18:48.846 --> 18:51.068
informational , military , and economic

18:51.068 --> 18:53.179
influence to export its authoritarian

18:53.179 --> 18:56.150
model to the region . Most focus to the

18:56.150 --> 18:58.317
east and west when they think of great

18:58.317 --> 19:00.539
power competition . A look to our South

19:00.539 --> 19:02.261
reveals that China has already

19:02.261 --> 19:04.261
established a strong presence . Its

19:04.261 --> 19:06.039
predatory and opaque investment

19:06.039 --> 19:08.150
practices , resource extraction , and

19:08.150 --> 19:10.261
potential due use projects from ports

19:10.261 --> 19:12.206
to space threaten the security and

19:12.206 --> 19:14.160
sovereignty of our partners while

19:14.160 --> 19:15.938
jeopardizing the United States'

19:15.938 --> 19:17.882
national security . Simultaneously

19:17.882 --> 19:19.882
Russia supports like-minded regimes

19:19.882 --> 19:22.260
like Cuba , Nicaragua , and Venezuela

19:22.260 --> 19:24.260
using disinformation , military

19:24.260 --> 19:26.380
engagements , arms sales force

19:26.380 --> 19:28.660
projection . Moscow is now attempting

19:28.660 --> 19:30.438
to undermine the United States'

19:30.438 --> 19:32.660
leadership , interests and influence in

19:32.660 --> 19:34.827
the region . Meanwhile , TCOs continue

19:34.827 --> 19:36.771
to fuel instability throughout the

19:36.771 --> 19:38.827
region . They exploit the permissive

19:38.827 --> 19:40.660
environment and engage in brutal

19:40.660 --> 19:42.716
violence , illicit trafficking , and

19:42.716 --> 19:42.670
other criminal activities to undermine

19:42.670 --> 19:44.448
the rule of law and disrupt the

19:44.448 --> 19:46.559
legitimate government functions , and

19:46.559 --> 19:48.503
they're having devastating effects

19:48.503 --> 19:50.781
which are spill over into our homeland ,

19:50.781 --> 19:53.003
destroying lives . Border security is a

19:53.003 --> 19:55.003
concern for us all . SOCOM recently

19:55.003 --> 19:57.170
stood up . Joint Task Force served the

19:57.170 --> 19:59.392
guard in at Naval Station in Guantanamo

19:59.392 --> 20:01.503
Bay . In support of the Department of

20:01.503 --> 20:03.614
Homeland Security to provide safe and

20:03.614 --> 20:05.614
humane care of illegal aliens until

20:05.614 --> 20:07.837
they are returned to their countries of

20:07.837 --> 20:10.059
origin . Our time is now deliberate and

20:10.059 --> 20:12.003
meaningful action to address these

20:12.003 --> 20:14.281
threats is required . Well this region ,

20:14.281 --> 20:16.281
our neighborhood , will continue to

20:16.281 --> 20:18.226
change . Partnerships are our most

20:18.226 --> 20:20.448
effective approach to countering shared

20:20.448 --> 20:22.448
security and economic concerns that

20:22.448 --> 20:24.781
enable our enduring trust in the region .

20:24.781 --> 20:26.670
However , we cannot take this for

20:26.670 --> 20:28.837
granted . To be a trusted partner , we

20:28.837 --> 20:30.670
must be credible , present , and

20:30.670 --> 20:33.020
engaged . During my tenure at SOFCOM ,

20:33.030 --> 20:35.086
I've witnessed how enduring presence

20:35.086 --> 20:37.197
builds trust . As a result , partners

20:37.197 --> 20:39.197
prefer to work with us over China ,

20:39.197 --> 20:41.363
Russia , and other nations to overcome

20:41.363 --> 20:43.197
their most pressing challenges .

20:43.197 --> 20:45.308
SOFCOMs continue to stand shoulder to

20:45.308 --> 20:47.363
shoulder with our partners . We have

20:47.363 --> 20:49.586
and will continue to respond rapidly to

20:49.586 --> 20:51.752
crises in any form . Together with our

20:51.752 --> 20:53.752
partners , we're building their cap

20:53.752 --> 20:56.086
building capacity to mitigate , respond ,

20:56.086 --> 20:58.419
and recover from our collective threats .

20:58.419 --> 20:57.979
Sustained investment and security

20:57.979 --> 21:00.020
cooperation , joint exercises ,

21:00.099 --> 21:02.140
disaster assistance among other

21:02.140 --> 21:04.251
initiatives enable us to innovate and

21:04.251 --> 21:06.500
deliver at the point of need as this

21:06.500 --> 21:08.556
department sharpens its war fighting

21:08.556 --> 21:10.667
edge . I'm grateful for the continued

21:10.667 --> 21:12.833
support of Congress today . This vital

21:12.833 --> 21:14.833
support to defending the democratic

21:14.833 --> 21:17.056
principles and interests that underpins

21:17.056 --> 21:18.944
the stability , prosperity in the

21:18.944 --> 21:21.167
region . And ultimately the security of

21:21.167 --> 21:23.389
our nation . Thank you again , Chairman

21:23.389 --> 21:25.556
Wicker , thank you Me Reed and members

21:25.556 --> 21:27.778
of the committee for this opportunity .

21:27.778 --> 21:27.569
I look forward to your questions .

21:27.780 --> 21:30.058
Thank you very much for your testimony .

21:30.058 --> 21:33.130
Um , let's get started , uh , quickly ,

21:33.300 --> 21:35.780
General Gio , uh , you , you can see

21:35.780 --> 21:39.449
from Senator Reed , uh , and , uh ,

21:39.619 --> 21:42.650
me , we're , we're interested in , uh ,

21:42.660 --> 21:45.640
in , um , the executive order to renew

21:45.640 --> 21:47.418
America's aging missile defense

21:47.418 --> 21:50.520
architecture . So , um , I'll jump

21:50.520 --> 21:52.742
right in there . So how are we gonna do

21:52.742 --> 21:54.964
this ? uh , what are the options ? What

21:54.964 --> 21:57.329
are your top , uh , priorities with

21:57.329 --> 21:59.162
respect to upgrading our air and

21:59.162 --> 22:01.385
missile defenses , what role do you see

22:01.385 --> 22:04.160
space-based capabilities in this effort

22:04.160 --> 22:06.890
and is our industrial base primed to

22:06.890 --> 22:09.112
execute this mission ? So what are your

22:09.112 --> 22:12.959
top priorities ? Chairman ,

22:13.000 --> 22:16.000
the , uh , top priority in that uh in

22:16.000 --> 22:18.189
our efforts to meet the direction of

22:18.189 --> 22:20.439
the executive order is first and

22:20.439 --> 22:22.599
foremost to establish uh increased

22:22.599 --> 22:24.766
domain awareness . Uh , as I mentioned

22:24.766 --> 22:26.766
in the opening comments , you can't

22:26.766 --> 22:28.766
defeat what you can't see , and the

22:28.766 --> 22:30.488
adversaries have an increasing

22:30.488 --> 22:32.543
capability of , uh , reaching us and

22:32.543 --> 22:34.710
threatening us from ranges beyond what

22:34.710 --> 22:36.821
uh some of our current , uh , systems

22:36.821 --> 22:39.160
can detect and track . So the first

22:39.160 --> 22:43.089
layer of any uh approach to uh

22:43.089 --> 22:46.109
defending uh the the United States or

22:46.109 --> 22:48.469
North America uh from the uh NORAD

22:48.469 --> 22:52.109
perspective would be a a sensor layer

22:52.109 --> 22:56.069
from seabed to space of systems that uh

22:56.069 --> 22:58.180
can detect threats uh from a further

22:58.180 --> 23:01.189
distance . Uh , those are seabed ground

23:01.189 --> 23:03.790
based airbase such as the E7 and then

23:03.790 --> 23:05.869
spacebased systems for detecting

23:05.869 --> 23:09.140
tracking and warning . Inside of that I

23:09.140 --> 23:12.609
think we build on our existing uh GBI

23:12.609 --> 23:15.459
and NGI capabilities , the ground-based

23:15.459 --> 23:17.292
interceptors and next generation

23:17.292 --> 23:19.140
interceptors to defeat uh

23:19.140 --> 23:21.251
intercontinental ballistic missiles .

23:21.251 --> 23:23.584
Let me interject uh on the sensor layer .

23:23.584 --> 23:25.418
How soon can we get there ? Uh ,

23:25.418 --> 23:27.196
Chairman , some of those , uh ,

23:27.196 --> 23:29.529
capabilities are right on the edge . Uh ,

23:29.529 --> 23:31.696
others are probably 3 to 5 years out ,

23:31.910 --> 23:34.021
but I think , uh , within inside of a

23:34.021 --> 23:35.854
year we could have a significant

23:35.854 --> 23:37.854
capability that could network those

23:37.854 --> 23:40.449
into a single uh sensing grid . All

23:40.449 --> 23:42.849
right , well then , then go ahead uh on

23:42.849 --> 23:44.849
if you've got anything to say about

23:44.849 --> 23:47.410
space-based or our industrial base

23:47.410 --> 23:49.569
capabilities , uh , chairman ,

23:49.969 --> 23:52.709
cooperation with the industrial uh base

23:52.709 --> 23:54.930
is is critical , uh , so they can keep

23:54.930 --> 23:56.930
pace with . Uh , not only our

23:56.930 --> 23:59.041
requirements , but those requirements

23:59.041 --> 24:01.097
are based on the capabilities of the

24:01.097 --> 24:02.763
adversaries which are rapidly

24:02.763 --> 24:04.652
increasing , so I can't emphasize

24:04.652 --> 24:07.010
enough the need to develop systems and

24:07.010 --> 24:09.232
move them left on the timeline to field

24:09.232 --> 24:11.454
them more quickly to achieve our goal .

24:12.239 --> 24:15.609
OK , and , um , again , the , uh ,

24:15.619 --> 24:17.452
ranking member and I spoke about

24:17.452 --> 24:19.859
fentanyl deaths . The estimate I have

24:19.859 --> 24:23.619
is more than 225,000 Americans are

24:23.619 --> 24:26.660
estimated to have been killed because

24:26.660 --> 24:30.099
of fentanyl overdoses , um , from 2021

24:30.099 --> 24:33.969
to 2023 . Um , So

24:33.969 --> 24:37.050
uh what uh what progress are we making

24:37.050 --> 24:40.890
there ? Um , who's to blame ? I

24:40.890 --> 24:44.300
understand . Uh , that , uh , we ,

24:44.380 --> 24:46.491
we've been told in the past there are

24:46.491 --> 24:49.260
more Russian GRU spies operating in

24:49.260 --> 24:52.449
Mexico City than anywhere in the world .

24:52.849 --> 24:54.960
Um , is that true and what's Northcom

24:54.960 --> 24:58.359
doing and needing to do ? Chairman ,

24:58.579 --> 25:01.780
the , uh , the , the fentanyl crisis is

25:01.780 --> 25:03.780
a , is a significant concern to our

25:03.780 --> 25:06.219
command . Uh , we have a number of

25:06.219 --> 25:08.497
intel analysts that work with the , uh ,

25:08.497 --> 25:10.608
interagency and lead federal agencies

25:10.608 --> 25:12.608
to provide , uh , intelligence that

25:12.608 --> 25:14.619
gets after the cartel networks that

25:14.619 --> 25:17.180
drive , uh , the production and

25:17.180 --> 25:19.619
distribution of fentanyl , uh , and

25:19.619 --> 25:22.099
pushes it across the border . Recently

25:22.099 --> 25:24.699
we've been , uh , permitted to increase

25:24.699 --> 25:27.530
our , uh . ISR , our intelligence

25:27.530 --> 25:30.760
surveillance and uh reconnaissance to ,

25:30.849 --> 25:34.719
uh , permitted by Mexico , uh , no ,

25:34.890 --> 25:38.209
by , uh by the department , sir , um .

25:39.140 --> 25:41.029
But uh we do have uh intelligence

25:41.029 --> 25:43.979
sharing with Mexico to show them uh

25:44.410 --> 25:46.299
what we see and we have increased

25:46.299 --> 25:48.729
cooperation with Mexico , uh to go uh

25:48.729 --> 25:51.089
address the cartel violence in in terms

25:51.089 --> 25:54.930
of , uh , sending more troops and so

25:54.930 --> 25:56.763
because time is limited , we had

25:56.763 --> 25:58.708
225,000 in a 3 year space . Are we

25:58.708 --> 26:02.119
making any progress now , now it's 2025 .

26:05.020 --> 26:08.930
From our perspective . No , I , I

26:08.930 --> 26:10.930
wouldn't say it's better , but I do

26:10.930 --> 26:13.097
think , uh , Chairman , that we have a

26:13.097 --> 26:14.930
better foundation now that we've

26:14.930 --> 26:17.152
increased the intelligence to , to make

26:17.152 --> 26:19.319
a rapid progress against this threat .

26:19.510 --> 26:22.010
It definitely needs to get better . And

26:22.010 --> 26:24.369
so tell us what you need and uh thank

26:24.369 --> 26:26.202
you for your efforts . You got 8

26:26.202 --> 26:29.729
seconds . More , uh , more ISR is the

26:29.729 --> 26:32.099
first and then , uh , expanded

26:32.099 --> 26:34.640
authorities would be required to , uh ,

26:34.810 --> 26:37.510
uh , more advise and assist types of

26:37.510 --> 26:39.650
operations between our forces and the

26:39.650 --> 26:41.930
tier one Mexican forces . We want to be

26:41.930 --> 26:43.986
your teammate there , Senator Reid .

26:44.640 --> 26:46.751
Thank you very much , Mr . Chairman .

26:46.751 --> 26:48.862
And General Guillo following along in

26:48.862 --> 26:50.973
your questioning of the chairman with

26:50.973 --> 26:53.140
respect to the space-based systems and

26:53.640 --> 26:55.696
used both for acquisition of targets

26:55.696 --> 26:59.599
and perhaps for uh Contact

26:59.599 --> 27:02.069
with targets , uh , you need to

27:02.069 --> 27:04.402
unfettered access to the expand is that .

27:05.560 --> 27:09.390
Fair to say . Senator , uh , to

27:09.390 --> 27:11.279
have to properly employ all those

27:11.279 --> 27:13.057
systems , we would have to have

27:13.390 --> 27:15.910
uninterrupted and complete access to

27:15.910 --> 27:18.589
the entire spectrum . And as a result ,

27:18.670 --> 27:21.270
uh , the proposed spectrum auctions

27:21.270 --> 27:23.270
would complicate significantly your

27:23.270 --> 27:25.270
ability to carry out that mission ,

27:25.349 --> 27:27.869
Senator , uh , compromising that part

27:27.869 --> 27:29.702
of the spectrum is a significant

27:29.702 --> 27:32.109
concern to me and the systems necessary

27:32.109 --> 27:34.053
for homeland defense . Thank you ,

27:34.053 --> 27:36.053
General . And General , also , uh ,

27:36.053 --> 27:38.220
there's approximately 2000 active duty

27:38.220 --> 27:40.387
personnel now down at the border and ,

27:40.387 --> 27:43.069
uh . There's always an opportunity cost ,

27:43.479 --> 27:45.312
whatever you do , and one of the

27:45.312 --> 27:47.257
opportunity costs obviously is the

27:47.257 --> 27:49.535
readiness and training of these troops .

27:49.535 --> 27:51.757
Are you aware of what training is being

27:51.757 --> 27:54.359
missed , deferred , or , uh , ignored

27:54.359 --> 27:57.339
because of this deployment ? Senator ,

27:57.829 --> 28:00.069
first , all of the forces that come to

28:00.069 --> 28:02.349
us from the services are extremely well

28:02.349 --> 28:04.293
trained , disciplined , and highly

28:04.293 --> 28:06.369
qualified . If they are conducting

28:06.369 --> 28:08.536
missions that are outside their normal

28:08.536 --> 28:11.890
specialty , uh , we have a series of 5

28:11.890 --> 28:14.329
work days , 1 training day , and then 1

28:14.329 --> 28:16.107
day off each week , and in that

28:16.107 --> 28:18.170
training day , uh , we prescribe our

28:18.170 --> 28:20.392
leadership to make sure that the forces

28:20.392 --> 28:22.392
that are operating outside of their

28:22.392 --> 28:24.614
standard specialty have the opportunity

28:24.614 --> 28:26.726
to train and maintain some of those .

28:26.726 --> 28:28.892
Skills some of the other , some of the

28:28.892 --> 28:31.130
others such as helicopter pilots and uh

28:31.130 --> 28:33.130
some of the infantry are doing work

28:33.130 --> 28:35.352
that is already in line with theirs and

28:35.352 --> 28:37.574
I think they maintain their readiness .

28:37.574 --> 28:39.741
So you know , in a rough metric , uh ,

28:39.741 --> 28:41.741
uh , 1 out of 5 days it's , uh , my

28:41.741 --> 28:43.963
math is terrible . I went to West Point

28:43.963 --> 28:46.489
and so now they're doing 20% of the uh

28:46.489 --> 28:48.600
training they would have done at home

28:48.600 --> 28:51.660
base . Uh , uh , yes , sir . Thank you .

28:53.560 --> 28:55.782
I didn't have the privilege of going to

28:55.782 --> 28:58.060
Navy or Air Force , so forgive my math ,

28:58.060 --> 29:01.949
uh . Ahoy , um .

29:03.589 --> 29:07.089
Can you give us a a a concise but

29:07.189 --> 29:10.020
uh detailed description of your role ,

29:10.310 --> 29:12.829
SouthCO's role at Guantanamo's migrant

29:12.829 --> 29:16.790
detention center and the GTF Gitmo ,

29:16.910 --> 29:20.670
the uh Uh , yes , Senator ,

29:21.160 --> 29:24.000
so SOCOM , uh , plans and postures has

29:24.000 --> 29:25.833
always over the years to conduct

29:25.833 --> 29:28.199
migrant operations . Uh , in fact , one

29:28.199 --> 29:30.421
of our enduring missions is to plan for

29:30.421 --> 29:33.479
a mass migration scenario , uh , on the

29:33.479 --> 29:35.949
current situation , what we're doing is ,

29:35.959 --> 29:38.869
um , uh , modifying our existing plan

29:39.239 --> 29:42.099
to be able to support the migrant ops

29:42.319 --> 29:44.880
at JTF , uh , at , at Gippo , the naval

29:44.880 --> 29:47.430
station . And uh to provide safe and

29:47.430 --> 29:49.390
humane care in support of the

29:49.390 --> 29:51.501
Department of Homeland Security . Now

29:51.501 --> 29:53.612
to be clear , there are two different

29:53.612 --> 29:55.829
sides of the base . One is the naval

29:55.829 --> 29:57.940
station , uh , both are naval station

29:57.940 --> 30:00.162
Gitmo , but you have the MOC , which is

30:00.162 --> 30:02.310
a a migrant operation center where we

30:02.310 --> 30:04.310
are actually setting up tents , and

30:04.310 --> 30:06.366
then you have JTF Gitmo on the other

30:06.366 --> 30:08.421
side of the island which we have the

30:08.421 --> 30:11.250
law of war detainees . Uh , now , have

30:11.250 --> 30:13.194
you estimated the cost that you're

30:13.194 --> 30:16.920
going to incur DOD Southcom for your

30:16.920 --> 30:18.864
operations ? You have to construct

30:18.864 --> 30:21.530
facilities for 30,000 individuals ,

30:21.890 --> 30:24.057
which would include mess halls , which

30:24.057 --> 30:26.223
would include the healthcare centers ,

30:26.223 --> 30:29.400
uh , sanitation provisions , etc . Uh ,

30:29.560 --> 30:31.893
how much money is that going to cost us ?

30:31.893 --> 30:33.782
So right now , sir , we're in the

30:33.782 --> 30:35.727
initial phase of this process , so

30:35.727 --> 30:35.670
we're in a , it's a tailored approach

30:35.670 --> 30:37.989
to get to 30,000 if that is desired .

30:38.199 --> 30:40.366
So right now where we stand , we're in

30:40.366 --> 30:42.532
the initial phases , so we'll get some

30:42.532 --> 30:44.588
numbers to you , but right now we're

30:44.588 --> 30:46.755
still building out . We have forces on

30:46.755 --> 30:46.479
the ground , and that process is still

30:46.479 --> 30:50.030
in place , sir . Thank you . Uh , going

30:50.030 --> 30:52.150
back , General Gio , to , uh , the

30:52.150 --> 30:54.039
concept of Iron Dome , unlike the

30:54.039 --> 30:55.872
Israelis , this is not a missile

30:55.872 --> 30:58.550
defense system . This is a system of

30:58.550 --> 31:02.109
systems , and , uh , one of the most

31:02.109 --> 31:04.109
important aspects of the system , I

31:04.109 --> 31:06.053
think you've already alluded to is

31:06.053 --> 31:07.780
detection , uh , rather than

31:07.869 --> 31:10.229
interception . Uh , is that fair ?

31:12.160 --> 31:14.327
Senator , I , I agree with you . The ,

31:14.327 --> 31:16.549
the first and most critical part is the

31:16.549 --> 31:19.319
detection capability , and , uh , I met

31:19.319 --> 31:21.541
recently with the defense minister from

31:21.541 --> 31:23.708
Canada . They are very much interested

31:23.708 --> 31:25.652
in participating . They have legal

31:25.652 --> 31:28.800
obstacles , but they assume they can

31:28.800 --> 31:30.479
jump over them , very much

31:30.479 --> 31:32.535
participating in the missile defense

31:32.535 --> 31:35.390
system , and their best contribution

31:35.390 --> 31:37.279
could be come in what way , sir ?

31:38.560 --> 31:40.469
Senator , I , I welcome their

31:40.469 --> 31:42.691
participation . I think the first would

31:42.691 --> 31:44.691
be to buy into our domain awareness

31:44.691 --> 31:46.691
expansion , whether ground-based or

31:46.691 --> 31:48.913
space-based , and then further down the

31:48.913 --> 31:50.969
line if they get defeat mechanisms ,

31:50.969 --> 31:52.802
see how they would mesh with our

31:52.802 --> 31:54.858
existing , uh , defense mechanisms ,

31:54.858 --> 31:56.969
defeat mechanisms , uh , in a similar

31:56.969 --> 31:58.969
way that we employ fighter aircraft

31:58.969 --> 32:01.025
with NORAD , perhaps we could do the

32:01.025 --> 32:03.247
same with , uh , missile defeat systems

32:03.247 --> 32:05.469
from the ground . Thank you very much ,

32:05.469 --> 32:07.413
gentlemen . Thank you , sir . Uh ,

32:07.459 --> 32:10.040
thank you , uh , um , Mr . Ranking

32:10.040 --> 32:12.709
member . Perhaps that would be , uh ,

32:12.719 --> 32:15.520
one way that Canada could begin to meet

32:15.520 --> 32:19.400
its NATO , um , requirement is , as far

32:19.400 --> 32:22.119
as defense spending as a , uh , portion

32:22.119 --> 32:25.390
of , of their GDP . Let me ask both

32:25.390 --> 32:28.839
witnesses to move the microphones a

32:28.839 --> 32:31.640
little closer and , uh , and then I

32:31.640 --> 32:33.560
recognize Senator Fisher and then

32:33.560 --> 32:36.180
Senator Shaheen . Thank you Mr .

32:36.189 --> 32:38.133
Chairman and thank you , Admiral .

32:38.189 --> 32:40.790
Thank you , General , for your service

32:40.790 --> 32:42.910
to this country . The work you do is

32:42.910 --> 32:45.380
extremely important . Thank you , uh ,

32:45.390 --> 32:48.420
general . You're gonna hear I think a

32:48.420 --> 32:51.500
lot about uh spectrum because here in

32:51.500 --> 32:53.979
the Senate we're discussing that and

32:53.979 --> 32:57.290
general you were um talking about

32:57.619 --> 33:01.609
um that many think that the Iron Dome

33:01.859 --> 33:05.020
for America is similar to what we see

33:05.020 --> 33:08.800
in Israel uh it is not . It

33:08.800 --> 33:11.719
is not , uh , what we're looking at is

33:11.719 --> 33:14.150
you said we can't defeat what we can't

33:14.150 --> 33:17.280
see , so we have to be able to increase

33:17.280 --> 33:20.750
domain awareness . An increasing domain

33:20.750 --> 33:24.430
awareness means that we need additional

33:24.430 --> 33:28.199
radars , um , terrestrial , airborne ,

33:28.630 --> 33:30.869
space-based , underwater you hit that

33:30.869 --> 33:33.229
in your opening comments . I'm trying

33:33.229 --> 33:35.589
to hit it more here to make , to make a

33:35.589 --> 33:38.030
point , uh , not just with the media

33:38.030 --> 33:41.069
but with my colleagues as well . All of

33:41.069 --> 33:44.550
those systems depend on spectrum , the

33:44.550 --> 33:46.772
spectrum that the Department of Defense

33:46.772 --> 33:49.780
has , is that true ? Yes , Senator ,

33:49.900 --> 33:53.810
that's exactly correct . Can can those

33:53.810 --> 33:57.760
systems function if if there's a lot of

33:57.760 --> 34:00.810
noise , which means additional users

34:00.810 --> 34:03.800
close by , uh , and creating a lot of

34:03.800 --> 34:06.239
noise . No , Senator , we have to have

34:06.239 --> 34:08.239
complete control of the spectrum to

34:08.239 --> 34:10.350
operate our systems effectively , and

34:10.350 --> 34:12.790
operating those systems effectively

34:13.280 --> 34:15.840
means protecting the homeland , correct ?

34:16.570 --> 34:18.626
Yes , ma'am . That's the purpose for

34:18.626 --> 34:20.889
all of our systems . It all centers on

34:20.889 --> 34:24.309
homeland defense . Thank you . To move

34:24.309 --> 34:26.979
to a different topic , General , um ,

34:27.019 --> 34:29.029
you predicted during the posture

34:29.029 --> 34:32.069
hearing last year that Chinese and

34:32.069 --> 34:34.339
Russian aircraft , you said that they

34:34.339 --> 34:37.138
flew a mission into Alaska air defense

34:38.388 --> 34:41.249
identification zone . Do you assess

34:41.388 --> 34:43.749
that the United States will see more of

34:43.749 --> 34:47.668
this from China , whether it's aircraft

34:47.668 --> 34:51.030
or ships or submarines ? Senator , I do

34:51.030 --> 34:52.919
think that they'll increase their

34:52.919 --> 34:55.689
presence both uh independently as well

34:55.689 --> 34:57.578
as increased cooperation with the

34:57.578 --> 34:59.830
Russians in the air , in the maritime

34:59.830 --> 35:02.570
and under sea . And in that

35:02.570 --> 35:06.010
cooperation um with the

35:06.010 --> 35:08.177
Russians , what do you worry about the

35:08.177 --> 35:10.949
most ? What I worry about the most is

35:10.949 --> 35:13.280
that uh instead of just weapons and

35:13.280 --> 35:15.447
technology that they will trade access

35:15.447 --> 35:17.502
which would shorten our timelines to

35:17.502 --> 35:20.449
react to uh either country's military

35:20.449 --> 35:23.040
capabilities . Are there any

35:23.040 --> 35:26.840
authorities or capabilities that um

35:27.219 --> 35:31.149
North Northcom and NORAD would need in

35:31.149 --> 35:34.729
order to protect your AOR ? Senator ,

35:34.780 --> 35:36.947
the , the most important capability we

35:36.947 --> 35:38.836
would need is the improved domain

35:38.836 --> 35:41.002
awareness , uh , to allow us to see at

35:41.002 --> 35:42.724
further ranges as the military

35:42.724 --> 35:44.336
capabilities improved by the

35:44.336 --> 35:46.336
adversaries . We have to match that

35:46.336 --> 35:48.447
with our detection capability at this

35:48.447 --> 35:50.391
time . I don't , I do not lack any

35:50.391 --> 35:53.139
authorities . Uh , Admiral , since you

35:53.139 --> 35:55.850
took over command , uh , late last year ,

35:55.939 --> 35:58.820
what is your assessment of China's

35:58.820 --> 36:01.929
long-term strategic , uh , objectives

36:01.929 --> 36:05.580
in your AOR ? Thank you ,

36:05.629 --> 36:08.550
Senator . The , uh , PRC has continued

36:08.550 --> 36:10.606
to do their expanding their economic

36:10.606 --> 36:12.709
engagement to , uh , having more

36:12.709 --> 36:14.709
influence and diplomatic and , uh ,

36:14.709 --> 36:16.598
political influence in the in the

36:16.598 --> 36:18.653
region , and they're continuing with

36:18.653 --> 36:20.653
the Belt and Road initiative , uh ,

36:20.653 --> 36:20.149
throughout , uh , currently 22

36:20.149 --> 36:22.260
countries are members of the Belt and

36:22.260 --> 36:24.427
Road Initiative . And so they continue

36:24.427 --> 36:26.593
to go down this path . The state owned

36:26.593 --> 36:26.540
enterprises , the Huawei hold the all

36:26.540 --> 36:28.707
nine yards . So that's just one aspect

36:28.707 --> 36:30.873
of it . The aspect is more critical to

36:30.873 --> 36:32.651
me as a military officer is the

36:32.651 --> 36:34.707
military view , right ? So right now

36:34.707 --> 36:36.707
when I think about , uh , uh , deep

36:36.707 --> 36:38.707
water ports , uh , dual use sites ,

36:38.707 --> 36:40.540
facilities , so deep water ports

36:40.540 --> 36:42.707
support of Chang Kai in Peru . I think

36:42.707 --> 36:42.379
about the space enabling infrastructure .

36:42.525 --> 36:44.605
Uh , throughout the AR , at least 10

36:44.605 --> 36:46.696
PRCs linked space sites across 5

36:46.696 --> 36:48.863
countries in the region . Then you get

36:48.863 --> 36:51.029
into the 5G , the Huawei , right ? You

36:51.029 --> 36:52.936
get into the , uh , the safe city

36:52.936 --> 36:55.047
technologies , so they continue to do

36:55.047 --> 36:57.269
this , and when our partners , uh , use

36:57.269 --> 36:59.380
Huawei and and safe City technology ,

36:59.380 --> 37:01.436
now they're they're having threat of

37:01.436 --> 37:03.380
having Chinese technology on their

37:03.380 --> 37:05.325
critical . For infrastructure . So

37:05.325 --> 37:07.547
again we have to continue to block them

37:07.547 --> 37:07.322
out and find ways to deliver for our

37:07.322 --> 37:09.961
partners and so I do that by engaging

37:09.961 --> 37:12.128
security cooperation as well as trying

37:12.128 --> 37:13.794
to make sure from an economic

37:13.794 --> 37:15.683
standpoint working throughout the

37:15.683 --> 37:17.794
region and working with uh the Office

37:17.794 --> 37:19.794
of Security uh uh Strategic Capital

37:19.794 --> 37:21.961
Exim Bank , and others to find ways to

37:21.961 --> 37:24.201
block out the PRC . Thank you , thank

37:24.201 --> 37:27.122
you both . Senator Shaheen and then

37:27.122 --> 37:30.060
Cotton . Thank you both for being here

37:30.060 --> 37:32.171
and for your service to the country ,

37:32.739 --> 37:36.739
uh , General Gio , um , I'm not sure if

37:36.739 --> 37:39.419
any resources are coming from the

37:39.419 --> 37:40.919
operations in your area of

37:40.919 --> 37:43.459
responsibility to address some of the

37:43.459 --> 37:45.459
flights that have been transporting

37:45.459 --> 37:47.459
migrants out of the country , but I

37:47.459 --> 37:49.626
understand that last week an Air Force

37:49.626 --> 37:52.100
C-17 transported 104 migrants from the

37:52.100 --> 37:54.600
United States to India . That flight

37:54.600 --> 37:57.159
cost the American taxpayers $2.5

37:57.159 --> 37:59.239
million and I understand that we're

37:59.239 --> 38:01.760
currently spending nearly $30,000 an

38:01.760 --> 38:04.149
hour for every deportation flight

38:04.149 --> 38:06.260
that's being run by the military when

38:06.260 --> 38:08.149
Homeland Security used to charter

38:08.149 --> 38:10.316
flights like these at less than 1/3 of

38:10.316 --> 38:12.679
the cost or $8500 an hour , doesn't

38:12.679 --> 38:15.012
seem to me like a very effective use of .

38:15.034 --> 38:18.945
Our dollars , um , given the needs that

38:18.945 --> 38:21.145
you and Admiral Halsey talked about in

38:21.145 --> 38:25.145
terms of um what you um require for

38:25.145 --> 38:27.145
additional resources to address the

38:27.145 --> 38:29.985
threats facing the country . So can I

38:29.985 --> 38:33.024
ask , are you seeing any of the impacts

38:33.024 --> 38:36.145
of those costs yet on NorthCO's , um .

38:37.320 --> 38:40.709
Budget and um . Do you

38:41.350 --> 38:43.461
Do you know how those costs are being

38:43.461 --> 38:46.909
paid ? Senator , I have not seen any

38:46.909 --> 38:49.076
impact at this point , but I'll remain

38:49.076 --> 38:51.242
transparent with the committee if I do

38:51.242 --> 38:53.600
feel strained in that area . Uh , as

38:53.600 --> 38:55.767
you alluded to at the beginning , uh ,

38:55.800 --> 38:58.022
those flights are flown by US Transom ,

38:58.022 --> 39:00.244
so we coordinate with the border patrol

39:00.244 --> 39:02.120
to have the , uh , the migrants

39:02.120 --> 39:04.287
available , uh , but we do not operate

39:04.287 --> 39:07.409
those flights . Um , and do you know if

39:07.409 --> 39:09.810
Transcom is , if that's , those flights

39:09.810 --> 39:11.921
are coming out of Transcom's budget ?

39:13.270 --> 39:15.326
Ma'am , I can't say for sure , but ,

39:15.326 --> 39:18.889
but I assume they are . Um Mr .

39:18.979 --> 39:21.090
Chairman , I , I would hope that this

39:21.090 --> 39:23.257
committee would um request information

39:23.257 --> 39:25.639
about the cost of those flights and why

39:25.639 --> 39:27.820
we're doing them from , why the

39:27.820 --> 39:29.876
military is doing them as opposed to

39:29.876 --> 39:31.931
doing them the way we used to at 1/3

39:31.931 --> 39:35.229
the cost . Thank you for that

39:35.229 --> 39:37.699
suggestion , Senator . Admiral Halsey ,

39:37.870 --> 39:40.030
over the last year , we've actually

39:40.030 --> 39:42.669
seen an almost 15% decrease in drug

39:42.669 --> 39:46.149
overdose deaths , um , Illegal drugs ,

39:46.229 --> 39:48.062
however , as you pointed out and

39:48.062 --> 39:50.062
General Gio pointed out , are still

39:50.062 --> 39:52.173
killing nearly 90,000 Americans every

39:52.173 --> 39:55.110
year . Um , both of your commands rely

39:55.110 --> 39:57.510
on partnerships with governments and

39:57.510 --> 40:00.110
militaries in the region to help stop

40:00.110 --> 40:03.489
the flow of illegal drugs . So can you

40:03.489 --> 40:05.156
talk , um , Admiral Halsey in

40:05.156 --> 40:08.229
particular about um whether you're

40:08.229 --> 40:11.669
seeing any impact of the . Stop

40:11.669 --> 40:15.060
on our foreign assistance in countries

40:15.060 --> 40:18.260
in Latin America on the willingness of

40:18.260 --> 40:20.639
those countries to cooperate and then

40:20.939 --> 40:24.530
are you seeing or do you see the

40:25.260 --> 40:27.939
concern that China may move in in some

40:27.939 --> 40:31.050
of those areas where um our presence

40:31.050 --> 40:33.219
has is being discontinued ?

40:35.429 --> 40:37.659
Sara , thank you for that . China

40:37.659 --> 40:39.659
continues to look , uh , incredibly

40:39.659 --> 40:41.715
hard at every opportunity to come in

40:41.715 --> 40:43.881
and engage , so we can't take that for

40:43.881 --> 40:46.048
granted with regard to our partners in

40:46.048 --> 40:48.270
engaging , uh , in the , in the kind of

40:48.270 --> 40:50.048
drug piece they're they're very

40:50.048 --> 40:52.270
resilient , uh , some . Or our training

40:52.270 --> 40:54.437
that do the security cooperation , the

40:54.437 --> 40:56.603
exercises specifically focus on uh the

40:56.603 --> 40:58.715
counter drug uh flight fight . If you

40:58.715 --> 41:00.881
look into the uh Eastern Pacific right

41:00.881 --> 41:03.774
now , uh , in the 1st , 90 days , I'm

41:03.774 --> 41:05.941
sorry , since the 1st of January we've

41:05.941 --> 41:08.800
already , uh . uh , uh , interdict the

41:08.800 --> 41:11.760
50 metric tons of cocaine , right , and ,

41:11.790 --> 41:14.239
and actually arrested , uh , 84

41:14.239 --> 41:16.350
detainees . So again , when you think

41:16.350 --> 41:18.406
about this piece , uh , our partners

41:18.406 --> 41:20.350
are with us , so 80% of our , uh ,

41:20.350 --> 41:22.517
interdiction last year was done by our

41:22.517 --> 41:24.572
partners use actually a ship special

41:24.572 --> 41:26.350
mission . We actually bring out

41:26.350 --> 41:28.406
interceptors from our partners along

41:28.406 --> 41:28.239
with us and get after the fight . So

41:28.239 --> 41:30.461
they're all in with us . So I'd like to

41:30.461 --> 41:32.739
continue to do that security operation .

41:32.739 --> 41:34.683
I haven't seen any impacts at this

41:34.683 --> 41:37.017
point , but we'll look and I'll be , uh ,

41:37.017 --> 41:36.969
happy to let the community know . Thank

41:36.969 --> 41:38.858
you . And General Gio , as you're

41:38.858 --> 41:41.570
looking at um the challenges with our

41:41.570 --> 41:45.280
northern border . Are , are you finding

41:45.280 --> 41:48.360
Canada willing to cooperate in all of

41:48.360 --> 41:51.040
the ways that um are important as we're

41:51.040 --> 41:53.096
looking at the interdiction of drugs

41:53.096 --> 41:56.080
and other illegal activities across our

41:56.080 --> 41:58.909
border ? Yes , Senator , I am . I find

41:58.909 --> 42:01.020
that the uh my counterparts in Canada

42:01.020 --> 42:03.709
are very open to , uh , planning , uh ,

42:03.790 --> 42:05.734
potential , uh , partnering on the

42:05.734 --> 42:08.540
northern border to , to , uh , detect

42:08.540 --> 42:11.550
illegal crossings both ways , uh , in

42:11.550 --> 42:14.510
the future . And , and Canada has

42:14.510 --> 42:16.590
developed a plan to address their

42:16.590 --> 42:19.949
commitments to NorthCO . Um , are you

42:19.949 --> 42:22.350
seeing that beginning to be built out

42:22.350 --> 42:25.030
at this point , or is all that all

42:25.030 --> 42:27.870
still in the future ? And did we

42:27.870 --> 42:30.037
participate in the development of that

42:30.037 --> 42:31.989
plan ? Senator , they're very

42:31.989 --> 42:34.860
collaborative on uh defining the NORAD

42:34.860 --> 42:36.582
requirements , and their NORAD

42:36.582 --> 42:38.749
modernization is at the very beginning

42:38.749 --> 42:40.916
stages . We are seeing , uh , improved

42:40.916 --> 42:43.280
F-18 radars and missile capabilities

42:43.280 --> 42:45.447
already . Uh , the next step we'll see

42:45.447 --> 42:47.613
is the arrival of the F-35 in the next

42:47.613 --> 42:49.836
two years . Uh , so they're well on the

42:49.836 --> 42:52.058
track , but we do have some immediate ,

42:52.058 --> 42:54.113
uh , improvements with their F-18s .

42:54.113 --> 42:56.169
Great , thank you . Thank you both .

42:56.169 --> 42:58.760
Again , I'm looking forward to our

42:58.760 --> 43:02.209
friends in Canada , um . Fulfilling

43:02.209 --> 43:04.290
their commitment to NATO , Senator

43:04.290 --> 43:06.600
Cotton . Thank you gentlemen . Uh ,

43:06.679 --> 43:08.901
General Dio , as the chairman mentioned

43:08.901 --> 43:10.679
his opening statements , I have

43:10.679 --> 43:12.846
legislation with Senator Gillibrand to

43:12.846 --> 43:14.679
address the drone threat here in

43:14.679 --> 43:16.790
America . We seem to have drones just

43:16.790 --> 43:18.790
flying around everywhere , uh , and

43:18.790 --> 43:18.760
many times people don't know what's

43:18.760 --> 43:20.871
going on , most notably in the public

43:20.871 --> 43:23.719
eye late last year in New Jersey . Um ,

43:23.790 --> 43:25.679
this is also happening around our

43:25.679 --> 43:27.846
military bases a lot . Um , you've had

43:27.846 --> 43:29.679
drone incursions over Joint Base

43:29.679 --> 43:31.790
Langley , Wright Pat Air Force Base ,

43:31.790 --> 43:34.012
Vandenberg Space Force Base , Picatinny

43:34.012 --> 43:36.149
Arsenal , Anderson Air Force Base .

43:36.439 --> 43:38.989
Could you explain to us briefly , um ,

43:39.189 --> 43:41.245
what is the threat that these drones

43:41.245 --> 43:43.078
pose to US military operations ,

43:43.078 --> 43:46.260
facilities and personnel ? Senator ,

43:46.320 --> 43:48.653
the , the primary threat I see for them ,

43:48.653 --> 43:50.820
uh , in the way they've been operating

43:50.820 --> 43:52.598
is detection and , uh , perhaps

43:52.598 --> 43:54.764
surveillance of sensitive capabilities

43:54.764 --> 43:58.699
on our installations . And um and

43:58.699 --> 44:00.866
that's all installation not just super

44:00.866 --> 44:03.088
sensitive ones like nuclear sites it it

44:03.088 --> 44:05.032
could be our fighter bases or army

44:05.032 --> 44:07.088
bases or or naval bases or what have

44:07.088 --> 44:09.310
you . Uh , yes sir , there , there were

44:09.310 --> 44:12.169
350 detections , uh , reported last

44:12.169 --> 44:14.225
year on military installations , and

44:14.225 --> 44:16.739
that was , uh , 350 over a total of 100

44:16.739 --> 44:18.795
different installations of all types

44:18.795 --> 44:20.906
and levels of security , but it's the

44:20.906 --> 44:23.219
case right now that that only at

44:23.219 --> 44:25.386
certain sites which you might call the

44:25.386 --> 44:27.441
super sensitive . Sites like nuclear

44:27.441 --> 44:29.163
bases , do commanders have the

44:29.163 --> 44:29.104
authority to protect their airspace

44:29.104 --> 44:31.160
from these drone incursions ? That's

44:31.160 --> 44:33.215
correct , Senator . We call those uh

44:33.215 --> 44:35.326
covered installations and not all the

44:35.326 --> 44:37.271
in about , uh , half are covered ,

44:37.271 --> 44:39.215
which sounds crazy to me and I , I

44:39.215 --> 44:41.326
think most Americans would think it ,

44:41.326 --> 44:43.548
it doesn't show a lot of common sense .

44:43.548 --> 44:45.604
I mean base commanders at every base

44:45.604 --> 44:48.145
around America that they have the

44:48.145 --> 44:50.423
authority and they have the capability .

44:50.639 --> 44:52.695
To protect their perimeters , say if

44:52.695 --> 44:54.750
some terrorists got a dump truck and

44:54.750 --> 44:56.695
drove it through the front gate or

44:56.695 --> 44:58.750
we're trying to breach the perimeter

44:58.750 --> 45:00.972
fence , we would expect base commanders

45:00.972 --> 45:02.972
to protect their base with force if

45:02.972 --> 45:05.028
necessary . Is that correct ? That's

45:05.028 --> 45:07.139
correct , sir , and , and I would , I

45:07.139 --> 45:09.195
would propose and , and advocate for

45:09.195 --> 45:11.083
expansion of 130 I to include all

45:11.083 --> 45:12.972
military installations , not just

45:12.972 --> 45:14.972
covered installations . I'm glad to

45:14.972 --> 45:16.806
hear you say that because I have

45:16.806 --> 45:18.695
legislation to do just that , the

45:18.695 --> 45:20.917
counteract with Senator Gillibrand that

45:20.917 --> 45:23.028
again would give these commanders the

45:23.028 --> 45:24.972
legal authority they need plus the

45:24.972 --> 45:27.028
capability required to protect their

45:27.028 --> 45:29.083
bases from these kinds of incursions

45:29.083 --> 45:31.028
and then hold them accountable for

45:31.028 --> 45:33.083
doing so is that exactly what you're

45:33.083 --> 45:35.306
advocating for ? That is , sir , and if

45:35.306 --> 45:34.985
I could add , I'd also like to . The uh

45:35.185 --> 45:38.875
the range expanded to slightly

45:38.875 --> 45:40.986
beyond the installation so they don't

45:40.986 --> 45:43.208
have to wait for the threat to get over

45:43.208 --> 45:45.042
the installation before they can

45:45.042 --> 45:46.875
address it because many of these

45:46.875 --> 45:48.986
systems can use side looking or slant

45:48.986 --> 45:51.042
range and so they could , they could

45:51.042 --> 45:52.931
surveil the base from outside the

45:52.931 --> 45:54.708
perimeter and under the current

45:54.708 --> 45:56.708
authorities we can't address that .

45:56.708 --> 45:58.764
Even better . Now last year you also

45:58.764 --> 46:00.986
said that there were thousands of drone

46:00.986 --> 46:03.208
incursions over the southern border and

46:03.208 --> 46:05.319
just last week Mexican cartel leaders

46:05.319 --> 46:07.431
reportedly were reportedly authorized

46:07.431 --> 46:09.597
to use drones equipped with explosives

46:09.597 --> 46:11.929
against US border patrol agents . um ,

46:12.100 --> 46:14.322
now I know that this is primarily a DHS

46:14.322 --> 46:16.544
responsibility at the southern border ,

46:16.544 --> 46:19.939
but do you need authorization for DOD

46:19.939 --> 46:23.659
to share information with DHS and the

46:23.659 --> 46:25.381
border authorities about these

46:25.381 --> 46:27.889
incursions ? Yes , yes , Senator , I

46:27.889 --> 46:30.250
would like 1301 to be expanded to allow

46:30.250 --> 46:33.959
a seamless exchange of data on drones .

46:34.370 --> 46:36.537
Again , sounds like a great idea . I'm

46:36.537 --> 46:38.759
glad that Senator Gillibrand and I have

46:38.759 --> 46:40.759
legislation to do just that , and I

46:40.759 --> 46:42.759
hope that we can pass into law this

46:42.759 --> 46:45.092
year . Uh , thank you , General Admiral .

46:45.092 --> 46:46.926
Um , I , I know that the Navy is

46:46.926 --> 46:48.981
responsible for Guantanamo Bay , but

46:48.981 --> 46:50.981
Southern Command is responsible for

46:50.981 --> 46:53.203
some of the operations there to include

46:53.203 --> 46:55.092
the operations I gather uh of the

46:55.092 --> 46:57.092
violent . Illegal migrants who were

46:57.092 --> 46:57.040
recently transported , could you give

46:57.040 --> 46:58.984
us uh a little bit of sense of the

46:58.984 --> 47:01.207
security measures in place that protect

47:01.207 --> 47:03.318
against any risk of violent criminals

47:03.318 --> 47:05.373
and terrorists being held at Gitmo ?

47:06.229 --> 47:08.679
Senator , the , the , the JTF Gitmo is

47:08.679 --> 47:10.735
a , uh , the detention facility . We

47:10.735 --> 47:12.735
have highly trained , uh , military

47:12.735 --> 47:14.568
military police who come down on

47:14.568 --> 47:17.040
rotation with the , uh , guards force .

47:17.100 --> 47:18.933
They're on a one year rotation .

47:18.933 --> 47:21.156
They're highly qualified . They've been

47:21.156 --> 47:23.267
trained to do their mission . They've

47:23.267 --> 47:23.010
been doing it for years , uh ,

47:23.050 --> 47:25.272
throughout . So again , I think they're

47:25.272 --> 47:27.328
very capable of force and the , uh ,

47:27.328 --> 47:29.272
and they're ready to deal with any

47:29.272 --> 47:28.729
situation and you're confident that

47:28.729 --> 47:31.169
your personnel are are trained and

47:31.169 --> 47:33.225
ready to do that and and are safe in

47:33.225 --> 47:35.489
doing so 100% , sir . That's great

47:35.489 --> 47:37.545
because I'm also very confident that

47:37.545 --> 47:40.000
it's much safer . To have depraved

47:40.000 --> 47:42.530
savage criminals from other countries

47:42.530 --> 47:44.729
waiting at Guantanamo Bay for

47:44.729 --> 47:46.729
deportation than it is to have them

47:46.729 --> 47:48.810
waiting at a base on the American

47:48.810 --> 47:51.050
mainland soil where we hope they'd

47:51.050 --> 47:53.161
never be able to cause any problems ,

47:53.161 --> 47:55.383
but you never know . There are American

47:55.383 --> 47:57.217
citizens on those bases and just

47:57.217 --> 47:59.439
outside those bases , gentlemen , thank

47:59.439 --> 47:59.000
you again both for your appearance .

47:59.629 --> 48:01.573
Excellent point , Senator Cotton .

48:01.573 --> 48:03.462
Senator Hirono , and then Senator

48:03.462 --> 48:06.189
Sullivan . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

48:07.540 --> 48:10.399
Uh , General Giro , the president's

48:10.399 --> 48:13.270
recent missile defense executive order

48:13.270 --> 48:16.780
tasks you with providing , and I'm

48:16.780 --> 48:19.270
quoting an updated assessment of the

48:19.270 --> 48:21.120
strategic missile threat to the

48:21.120 --> 48:23.398
homeland , and quote that that is , uh ,

48:23.398 --> 48:25.879
the president's direction to you . I

48:25.879 --> 48:28.969
remain concerned about the . Viability

48:28.969 --> 48:32.419
of DOD strategy to defend Hawaii

48:32.510 --> 48:34.739
specifically from missile threats we're

48:34.739 --> 48:38.419
looking at China , North Korea examples

48:38.419 --> 48:41.100
will you commit to include the missile

48:41.100 --> 48:44.040
defense of Hawaii as part of your

48:44.040 --> 48:47.149
assessment ? Senator , I absolutely

48:47.149 --> 48:49.959
will . Uh , Hawaii is , uh , and the

48:49.959 --> 48:52.070
defense from ballistic missiles of uh

48:52.070 --> 48:54.550
for Hawaii is part of my , uh ,

48:54.560 --> 48:57.810
responsibility . Thank you again for

48:57.810 --> 49:00.449
you , General . Last year , the former

49:00.449 --> 49:03.199
National Guard Bureau chief testified

49:03.489 --> 49:05.719
that the border security mission

49:06.020 --> 49:09.219
provides no military training value .

49:09.800 --> 49:12.679
To guardsmen , no military training

49:12.679 --> 49:14.901
value to guardsmen and does not prepare

49:14.901 --> 49:17.469
troops for great power competition .

49:17.479 --> 49:20.479
Additionally , a GAO report from 2021

49:20.479 --> 49:23.919
found that multiple units lost critical

49:23.919 --> 49:25.959
training opportunities due to

49:25.959 --> 49:27.639
deployments to the border .

49:29.909 --> 49:33.870
OK . That of course impacts

49:33.870 --> 49:36.510
military and operational readiness .

49:36.879 --> 49:39.350
General , do you agree with the

49:39.350 --> 49:43.149
assessment that these missions provide

49:43.149 --> 49:45.870
no military training value to guardsmen ?

49:47.030 --> 49:49.030
Senator , I , I , I don't agree . I

49:49.030 --> 49:51.141
think that , uh , specifically in the

49:51.141 --> 49:53.141
helicopters and in our intel , uh ,

49:53.141 --> 49:54.919
specialties that are conducting

49:54.919 --> 49:57.086
missions on the southern border , uh ,

49:57.086 --> 49:59.252
those are exactly in line with their ,

49:59.252 --> 50:01.197
uh , trained specialty . However ,

50:01.197 --> 50:03.030
there are , uh , I , I certainly

50:03.030 --> 50:05.086
recognize there are areas where they

50:05.086 --> 50:07.030
are cross trained and they are not

50:07.030 --> 50:09.141
getting immediate , uh , uh , benefit

50:09.141 --> 50:11.389
to their primary specialty in in about

50:11.389 --> 50:15.179
half of those roles . So your testimony

50:15.179 --> 50:18.810
is that that that using uh military

50:18.810 --> 50:21.489
troops , our troops at the border , um ,

50:21.879 --> 50:24.810
but that is not gonna have an impact on

50:24.820 --> 50:27.540
on readiness . How many troops are do

50:27.540 --> 50:29.707
we have on the border right now and do

50:29.707 --> 50:31.540
you expect that number to grow ?

50:32.229 --> 50:34.780
Senator , we have , uh , 5000 Title 10

50:34.780 --> 50:37.179
forces on the southern border right now ,

50:37.350 --> 50:39.461
and I do expect that number to grow .

50:41.639 --> 50:44.800
As the ranking member on the readiness

50:44.800 --> 50:46.856
committee , I do have concerns about

50:46.856 --> 50:49.270
what these kinds of of of troop

50:49.270 --> 50:52.000
movements will do to to readiness .

50:52.429 --> 50:55.120
What specific military training events

50:55.120 --> 50:57.679
and readiness exercises will NORTHCOM

50:57.679 --> 51:00.919
forego due to the resource demands of

51:00.919 --> 51:04.639
the border mission ? Senator , to this

51:04.639 --> 51:06.889
point , uh , none have been altered ,

51:06.899 --> 51:08.843
and , and we don't project that we

51:08.843 --> 51:11.409
would lose any of our exercises as the

51:11.409 --> 51:13.520
forces are provided by the services .

51:13.610 --> 51:15.777
Uh , we still have the capabilities to

51:15.777 --> 51:18.054
conduct all of our scheduled exercises .

51:18.054 --> 51:20.719
Well , the GOA report in 2021 noted

51:20.719 --> 51:23.010
that there will be some critical

51:23.010 --> 51:25.010
training opportunities that will be

51:25.010 --> 51:27.232
lost , and I am going to follow up with

51:27.232 --> 51:29.969
you as to whether that is also what is

51:29.969 --> 51:32.820
happening for Admiral Hay . Uh , in

51:32.820 --> 51:34.542
your confirmation hearing last

51:34.542 --> 51:36.550
September , you stated that SOFCO's

51:36.939 --> 51:38.939
main campaigning tool is security

51:38.939 --> 51:41.239
cooperation utilizing a hollow

51:41.239 --> 51:43.969
government approach that includes USAID .

51:44.340 --> 51:46.507
How will President Trump's decision to

51:46.507 --> 51:48.729
freeze foreign assistance and dismantle

51:48.729 --> 51:51.540
USAID affect SOFCO's security

51:51.540 --> 51:55.469
cooperation mission ? Senator ,

51:55.679 --> 51:57.790
for right now as we look at the we're

51:57.790 --> 52:00.020
still assessing the impacts of uh USIED

52:00.199 --> 52:01.866
I'll tell you from a military

52:01.866 --> 52:03.977
standpoint I still can do my security

52:03.977 --> 52:06.143
cooperation at this time . And uh so I

52:06.143 --> 52:08.255
look to trade winds exercise right so

52:08.255 --> 52:10.760
that's one we do yearly uh and it

52:10.760 --> 52:13.159
focuses on the humanitarian assistance

52:13.159 --> 52:15.120
disaster release in the in the

52:15.120 --> 52:17.398
Caribbean , right ? So we go out there ,

52:17.398 --> 52:19.509
we do these missions , we're training

52:19.509 --> 52:21.842
our forces for earthquakes , hurricanes ,

52:21.842 --> 52:23.898
and the and the like . So those type

52:23.898 --> 52:25.787
opportunities give the , uh , our

52:25.787 --> 52:27.731
partners a chance to develop their

52:27.731 --> 52:29.620
skills for , uh , you know , uh ,

52:29.620 --> 52:31.929
emergencies or contingencies . I really

52:31.929 --> 52:34.409
don't see how in action like closing

52:34.409 --> 52:36.530
USAID , but would not have a negative

52:36.530 --> 52:38.697
impact on on on part of your mission .

52:40.280 --> 52:42.879
Regarding uh Guantanamo Bay , uh this

52:42.879 --> 52:46.179
is uh . Again for Admiral Halsey .

52:47.770 --> 52:49.889
SOCOM is responsible for implementing

52:49.889 --> 52:53.010
the president's directive to expand the

52:53.010 --> 52:55.169
detention center in Guantanamo Bay to

52:55.169 --> 52:59.090
hold 30,000 migrants . Admiral Halse ,

52:59.179 --> 53:01.449
who are these migrants and where will

53:01.449 --> 53:03.689
they be coming from and what is the

53:03.689 --> 53:07.350
estimated cost to . Lead the

53:07.350 --> 53:09.030
expansion and support of this

53:09.030 --> 53:10.974
development Department of Homeland

53:10.974 --> 53:13.459
Security mission including food ,

53:13.550 --> 53:16.459
medical care , construction , and

53:16.550 --> 53:18.590
sustainment . We're talking about a

53:18.590 --> 53:21.669
very big , I would say uh

53:21.669 --> 53:23.891
infrastructure that we're gonna need to

53:23.891 --> 53:27.750
house 30,000 migrants . Can you

53:27.750 --> 53:31.070
explain how all this is happening ? How

53:31.070 --> 53:34.870
much it will cost ? How it will impact

53:34.870 --> 53:36.037
Southcom's mission .

53:39.429 --> 53:41.629
Briefly running out of time . I've run

53:41.629 --> 53:43.685
out of time . So very , very briefly

53:43.685 --> 53:45.740
from the standpoint of who decides ,

53:45.740 --> 53:47.907
that's a DHS mission . They decide who

53:47.907 --> 53:50.073
comes to the , uh , the , uh , to , to

53:50.073 --> 53:52.185
the base , uh , for the migrant ops .

53:52.185 --> 53:54.296
Uh , they decide that point . We just

53:54.296 --> 53:56.407
support them . We're supported , uh ,

53:56.407 --> 53:58.518
DHS , uh , with regard to the pricing

53:58.518 --> 54:00.573
we're still understanding it . Phase

54:00.573 --> 54:00.209
approach right now and so we're gonna

54:00.209 --> 54:02.376
build it up as we understand how large

54:02.376 --> 54:04.542
we'll get we'll have a better uh focus

54:04.542 --> 54:07.179
on the price . So even if it's DHS , uh ,

54:07.770 --> 54:09.992
we're gonna wanna know how much this is

54:09.992 --> 54:12.214
actually gonna cost and I know that you

54:12.214 --> 54:14.381
were asked Mr . Chairman , thank you ,

54:14.381 --> 54:16.381
um , about the amount of money that

54:16.381 --> 54:20.139
went to . Deporting 104

54:20.139 --> 54:23.899
people to uh India . And

54:23.899 --> 54:26.659
whether or not that was appropriate use

54:26.659 --> 54:28.820
of your funds . Perhaps the witnesses

54:28.820 --> 54:30.876
can take that for the record and and

54:30.876 --> 54:33.060
also we'll have another round uh if we

54:33.060 --> 54:34.893
need to then we have the Senator

54:34.893 --> 54:37.171
Sullivan and Senator Kaine . Thank you ,

54:37.171 --> 54:39.282
Mr . Chairman , gentlemen , thank you

54:39.282 --> 54:41.282
for your testimony . I want to echo

54:41.282 --> 54:43.393
what the chairman's been saying we do

54:43.393 --> 54:43.379
need Canada to step up , you know ,

54:43.469 --> 54:45.699
when they , uh , don't meet their 2% .

54:46.850 --> 54:49.090
Uh , GDP NATO commitments and

54:49.090 --> 54:51.300
undermines the entire alliance . So I

54:51.300 --> 54:53.467
appreciate the chairman mentioned that

54:53.467 --> 54:55.689
General , uh , it was good to meet with

54:55.689 --> 54:57.744
you the other day . We had a meeting

54:57.744 --> 54:59.578
with senior Trump administration

54:59.578 --> 55:01.633
officials just a couple days ago , a

55:01.633 --> 55:03.800
number of senators who were focused on

55:03.800 --> 55:06.022
the border , and they focused like your

55:06.022 --> 55:08.300
testimony a lot on the northern border ,

55:08.300 --> 55:10.356
which I really appreciate . I have a

55:10.356 --> 55:12.411
chart here that depicts a lot of the

55:12.411 --> 55:14.929
air and sea incursions that we've seen .

55:15.330 --> 55:18.020
In the last few years it's been quite

55:18.020 --> 55:20.500
remarkable , particularly the joint

55:20.949 --> 55:24.860
Chinese Russian strategic bomber , um ,

55:25.429 --> 55:28.870
missions into our aid is and the joint

55:28.870 --> 55:30.814
Chinese Russian naval task force ,

55:30.830 --> 55:33.020
quite big , a 12 ship naval task force

55:33.659 --> 55:36.429
last summer . President Trump himself

55:36.429 --> 55:38.550
commented recently that we need to

55:38.550 --> 55:41.270
increase military investments in Alaska

55:41.270 --> 55:44.350
as Russia and China make more menacing .

55:45.090 --> 55:48.629
Moves in the region , um , that's a

55:48.629 --> 55:50.796
list that's just an example of all the

55:50.796 --> 55:53.530
different , uh , incursions , air and

55:53.530 --> 55:55.929
sea , just in the last 3 years , which

55:55.929 --> 55:59.090
is quite astounding . General , I wanna .

56:00.600 --> 56:02.560
Go a little bit more detail , your

56:02.560 --> 56:04.570
troops have done a great job of

56:04.570 --> 56:07.959
intercepting these uh strategic bombers

56:07.959 --> 56:10.237
by the way , they come with armed Migs ,

56:10.237 --> 56:12.379
right ? This is a serious incursion ,

56:12.489 --> 56:15.110
not easy to do . Our navy's done a good

56:15.110 --> 56:17.166
job , although the first time we had

56:17.166 --> 56:19.449
that joint Russian , uh , Chinese task

56:19.449 --> 56:21.227
force , we didn't have any navy

56:21.227 --> 56:22.949
response , nothing , which was

56:22.949 --> 56:25.570
ridiculous in my view , 1150 ft coast

56:25.570 --> 56:28.129
guard cutter , but these are difficult

56:28.129 --> 56:31.909
missions . Made more difficult , for

56:31.909 --> 56:34.689
example , when you're intercepting um

56:34.969 --> 56:37.136
strategic bombers , a lot of times our

56:37.389 --> 56:39.445
fighters are having to fly over 1000

56:39.445 --> 56:41.667
miles just to get to the end of the 80s

56:41.989 --> 56:45.850
to um . Intercept them . So my

56:45.850 --> 56:47.969
question , can you put the other side

56:47.969 --> 56:50.191
of the one with the map , the first one

56:50.191 --> 56:52.889
with the map . There you go . Um . Do

56:52.889 --> 56:55.111
you agree we need more infrastructure ?

56:55.489 --> 56:57.729
You and I've talked about reopening the

56:57.729 --> 57:01.449
airfield and the uh navy base at

57:01.449 --> 57:03.850
ADAC , which is out here on the

57:03.850 --> 57:07.729
Aleutian Island chain , or Utiavi in

57:07.729 --> 57:10.219
Barrow , Alaska to help with the SAR

57:10.219 --> 57:12.409
missions . Can you explain that in a

57:12.409 --> 57:15.090
little bit more detail ? Admiral Paparo

57:15.090 --> 57:17.600
is in agreement with you on this where

57:18.129 --> 57:20.240
these incursions are gonna increase .

57:20.709 --> 57:23.439
This is America , our northern border ,

57:23.969 --> 57:26.136
and yet the infrastructure we have for

57:26.136 --> 57:28.247
the young men and women who are doing

57:28.247 --> 57:30.489
these dangerous intercept missions both

57:30.489 --> 57:32.689
at sea and in the air , they need more

57:32.689 --> 57:35.610
infrastructure for their safety and for

57:35.610 --> 57:37.777
our rapid response . Do you agree with

57:37.777 --> 57:39.888
me that they do and would you support

57:39.888 --> 57:43.770
reopening the ADA naval base and the

57:43.770 --> 57:47.409
uh extension of the barrow runway .

57:48.370 --> 57:50.481
Which is way up there in the northern

57:50.481 --> 57:52.370
part of America , North America .

57:53.679 --> 57:55.901
Senator , I , I do agree with you and ,

57:55.901 --> 57:58.068
uh , as you mentioned , Admiral Paparo

57:58.068 --> 57:59.957
and I are very closely linked and

57:59.957 --> 58:01.957
aligned on all issues , uh , in the

58:01.957 --> 58:04.909
Pacific . Uh , I , I would support

58:04.909 --> 58:07.790
ADDAC for for sure for maritime and air

58:07.790 --> 58:09.734
access and as you pointed out dead

58:09.734 --> 58:11.901
horse or a point at the far north part

58:11.901 --> 58:14.123
of Alaska because those missions aren't

58:14.123 --> 58:17.270
only long , 1000 miles or more with 5

58:17.270 --> 58:19.620
or 6 or 7 air refuelings usually at

58:19.620 --> 58:21.590
night . Uh , but also the harsh

58:21.590 --> 58:23.812
conditions if , uh , a , a pilot should

58:23.812 --> 58:26.550
have to eject , uh , having those four

58:26.550 --> 58:28.772
points that that you mentioned uh would

58:28.772 --> 58:30.717
allow us to preposition search and

58:30.717 --> 58:32.661
rescue aircraft or be able to land

58:32.661 --> 58:34.550
there in an emergency , which are

58:34.550 --> 58:36.606
capabilities that we just don't have

58:36.606 --> 58:38.717
right now . Great , thank you on that

58:38.717 --> 58:40.883
and and again I wanna uh thank the men

58:40.883 --> 58:43.050
and women under your command . They do

58:43.050 --> 58:45.272
these intercept missions all the time .

58:45.272 --> 58:45.229
They're very tough they're dangerous .

58:45.899 --> 58:48.121
They don't make a lot of news down here

58:48.121 --> 58:50.232
in the lower 48 , but they're doing a

58:50.232 --> 58:52.177
great job . Let me turn to missile

58:52.177 --> 58:54.288
defense . Senator Cramer and I , uh ,

58:54.288 --> 58:56.399
recently introduced our Iron Dome Act

58:56.399 --> 58:58.566
that reinforces what President Trump's

58:58.566 --> 59:00.659
executive order does . That's a

59:00.659 --> 59:03.209
depiction of that covering the whole ,

59:04.100 --> 59:06.060
uh , United States with integrated

59:06.060 --> 59:08.227
missile defense systems to protect our

59:08.227 --> 59:10.899
homeland . I'd love , love to get

59:10.899 --> 59:13.177
co-sponsorships from all my colleagues ,

59:13.177 --> 59:16.500
my 2017 Advancing America's Missile

59:16.500 --> 59:18.667
Defense Act , which pretty much became

59:18.667 --> 59:22.590
law in the NDAA at 30 . Co-sponsors ,

59:22.909 --> 59:25.850
10 Democrats , 20 Republicans , but can

59:25.850 --> 59:28.229
I get your sense to first a commitment

59:28.229 --> 59:30.340
to work with me and Senator Cramer on

59:30.340 --> 59:32.590
that and then you mentioned the NGIs

59:32.590 --> 59:34.201
and the ground-based missile

59:34.201 --> 59:36.257
interceptors , uh , those are almost

59:36.257 --> 59:39.030
all based in Alaska . Why is it taking

59:39.030 --> 59:41.790
so long to fill those 20 silos that we

59:41.790 --> 59:44.030
just fill out that are needed and can I

59:44.030 --> 59:46.197
get your commitment to work with me as

59:46.197 --> 59:47.974
part of this Iron Dome Act ? To

59:47.974 --> 59:50.409
accelerate that . Senator , you have my

59:50.409 --> 59:52.631
full commitment to work with you on the

59:52.631 --> 59:54.687
Iron Dome . It's the core mission of

59:54.687 --> 59:56.770
NORAD and NORCO is to defend just as

59:56.770 --> 59:58.992
you described there , and you also have

59:58.992 --> 01:00:01.270
my full commitment to work to move all ,

01:00:01.290 --> 01:00:03.250
uh , uh , defense industrial based

01:00:03.250 --> 01:00:05.472
capabilities to the left to bring these

01:00:05.472 --> 01:00:07.770
capabilities earlier as our adversaries

01:00:07.770 --> 01:00:09.992
are advancing their capability , and we

01:00:09.992 --> 01:00:12.159
must keep pace . Thank you , General .

01:00:12.159 --> 01:00:14.326
I ask unanimous consent that the three

01:00:14.326 --> 01:00:16.989
charts . That Senator Sullivan referred

01:00:16.989 --> 01:00:19.310
to be admitted to the record at this

01:00:19.310 --> 01:00:21.669
point without without objection so

01:00:21.669 --> 01:00:23.836
ordered Senator Kaine and then Senator

01:00:23.836 --> 01:00:25.780
Scott . Thank you , Mr . Chair and

01:00:25.780 --> 01:00:27.613
thanks to our witnesses for your

01:00:27.613 --> 01:00:29.780
service , um . This morning I received

01:00:29.780 --> 01:00:32.159
an email from one of my long standing

01:00:32.159 --> 01:00:34.780
staff members and um Mark runs

01:00:34.780 --> 01:00:36.949
constituent services for me and he did

01:00:36.949 --> 01:00:39.159
so when I was governor as well . Mark

01:00:39.159 --> 01:00:41.215
graduated in Richmond from JR Tucker

01:00:41.215 --> 01:00:43.280
High School , kind of looked in the

01:00:43.280 --> 01:00:45.336
mirror and decided he wasn't college

01:00:45.336 --> 01:00:47.558
material yet and enlisted in the United

01:00:47.558 --> 01:00:49.724
States Marine Corps . Uh , Mark served

01:00:49.724 --> 01:00:51.613
for 4 years as an enlistee in the

01:00:51.613 --> 01:00:53.836
United States Marine Corps , and it put

01:00:53.836 --> 01:00:55.891
him on a path . It's been an amazing

01:00:55.891 --> 01:00:58.002
path . He finished his Marine service

01:00:58.002 --> 01:01:00.113
and then went . And got a social work

01:01:00.113 --> 01:01:01.891
degree at Virginia Commonwealth

01:01:01.891 --> 01:01:03.836
University and advice to any of my

01:01:03.836 --> 01:01:05.947
colleagues if you want somebody great

01:01:05.947 --> 01:01:08.169
in constituent services , pick a Marine

01:01:08.169 --> 01:01:10.336
with a social work degree . The dogged

01:01:10.336 --> 01:01:12.280
persistence of the Marines and the

01:01:12.280 --> 01:01:14.502
skill in working with organizations and

01:01:14.502 --> 01:01:16.669
listening to people of a social worker

01:01:16.669 --> 01:01:18.724
Mark exemplifies that . Mark sent me

01:01:18.724 --> 01:01:20.836
this morning , he reached out to send

01:01:20.836 --> 01:01:22.891
me this article that appeared on the

01:01:22.891 --> 01:01:24.780
10th of January in Military.com .

01:01:24.780 --> 01:01:26.836
Military drops recruiting efforts at

01:01:26.836 --> 01:01:28.891
prestigious Black Engineering Awards

01:01:28.891 --> 01:01:30.947
event . I'd like it entered into the

01:01:30.947 --> 01:01:32.724
record , Mr . Chair . First two

01:01:32.724 --> 01:01:35.058
paragraphs of the article here they are .

01:01:35.058 --> 01:01:37.280
The Army and other service branches are

01:01:37.280 --> 01:01:39.224
abandoning recruiting efforts at a

01:01:39.224 --> 01:01:41.224
prestigious black engineering event

01:01:41.224 --> 01:01:43.280
this week , turning down access to a

01:01:43.280 --> 01:01:45.600
key pool of highly qualified potential

01:01:45.600 --> 01:01:47.439
applicants amid President Donald

01:01:47.439 --> 01:01:49.800
Trump's purge of diversity initiatives

01:01:49.800 --> 01:01:52.159
in the military . Until this week ,

01:01:52.219 --> 01:01:54.163
Army Recruiting Command had a long

01:01:54.163 --> 01:01:56.300
standing public partnership with the

01:01:56.300 --> 01:01:58.467
Black Engineer of the Year Awards , or

01:01:58.467 --> 01:02:00.580
BYA , an annual conference that draws

01:02:00.580 --> 01:02:02.747
students , academics and professionals

01:02:02.747 --> 01:02:04.969
in science , technology , engineering ,

01:02:04.969 --> 01:02:07.590
and math , also known as STEM . The

01:02:07.590 --> 01:02:09.646
event which takes place in Baltimore

01:02:09.646 --> 01:02:11.757
has historically been a key venue for

01:02:11.757 --> 01:02:13.590
the Pentagon to recruit talent ,

01:02:13.590 --> 01:02:15.629
including awarding ROTC Corps

01:02:15.629 --> 01:02:17.979
scholarships and pitching military

01:02:17.979 --> 01:02:21.189
service to rising engineers . Past BA

01:02:21.189 --> 01:02:23.356
events have included the Army Chief of

01:02:23.356 --> 01:02:25.356
staff . and the defense secretary ,

01:02:25.356 --> 01:02:27.522
this is one of the most talent event ,

01:02:27.522 --> 01:02:29.745
dense events we do . One army recruiter

01:02:29.745 --> 01:02:32.475
told Military.com on the condition that

01:02:32.475 --> 01:02:34.754
their name not be used . Our footprint

01:02:34.754 --> 01:02:37.354
there has always been significant . We

01:02:37.354 --> 01:02:40.560
need the talent . My staffer Mark said

01:02:40.560 --> 01:02:42.727
to me when he sent me this article , I

01:02:42.727 --> 01:02:44.949
would never have served in the military

01:02:44.949 --> 01:02:46.893
if there weren't men and women who

01:02:46.893 --> 01:02:48.727
looked like me in the recruiting

01:02:48.727 --> 01:02:50.949
process . Limiting military recruitment

01:02:50.949 --> 01:02:53.116
to avoid qualified black applicants in

01:02:53.116 --> 01:02:55.260
the name of DEI will ultimately hurt

01:02:55.530 --> 01:02:58.770
our all voluntary military . I was

01:02:58.770 --> 01:03:00.810
intending to ask questions about

01:03:00.810 --> 01:03:03.600
NorthCO and SouthCO until I got Mark's

01:03:04.169 --> 01:03:05.336
email this morning .

01:03:07.040 --> 01:03:10.679
Intentionally avoiding an event chock

01:03:10.679 --> 01:03:13.629
full of STEM talent and engineers

01:03:14.360 --> 01:03:17.360
because it happens to be a draw for

01:03:17.360 --> 01:03:19.138
black engineers is more than an

01:03:19.138 --> 01:03:21.439
anti-DEI initiative . It is an

01:03:21.439 --> 01:03:23.760
intentional effort to avoid certain

01:03:23.760 --> 01:03:26.560
kinds of people in recruiting . The

01:03:26.560 --> 01:03:28.616
article goes on to say it's not just

01:03:28.616 --> 01:03:30.671
the army that has pulled out of this

01:03:30.671 --> 01:03:32.671
event all the service branches have

01:03:32.671 --> 01:03:35.459
pulled out of this event . And I just

01:03:35.459 --> 01:03:37.515
want to put this on the record . Two

01:03:37.515 --> 01:03:39.681
things happened on January 30th that I

01:03:39.681 --> 01:03:42.739
found very unusual . The President of

01:03:42.739 --> 01:03:44.906
the United States , Donald J . Trump ,

01:03:44.906 --> 01:03:47.017
did what every president since Gerald

01:03:47.017 --> 01:03:48.961
Ford has done on January 30th . He

01:03:48.961 --> 01:03:51.183
declared February Black History Month .

01:03:51.590 --> 01:03:53.757
And on January 31st , the Secretary of

01:03:53.757 --> 01:03:56.780
Defense , Pete Hegseth , put out a

01:03:56.780 --> 01:04:00.139
directive , identity months are dead at

01:04:00.139 --> 01:04:03.239
DOD . That that was not the newspaper

01:04:03.239 --> 01:04:05.429
headline summarizing the directive .

01:04:05.719 --> 01:04:07.600
That was the directive from the

01:04:07.600 --> 01:04:09.767
Secretary of Defense . Identity months

01:04:09.767 --> 01:04:11.989
are dead at DOD including Black History

01:04:11.989 --> 01:04:13.822
Month . So we have two events on

01:04:13.822 --> 01:04:15.979
January 31st . We have the president

01:04:16.159 --> 01:04:19.000
and commander in chief issuing the

01:04:19.000 --> 01:04:20.611
standard Black History Month

01:04:20.611 --> 01:04:23.439
proclamation for the nation , but

01:04:23.439 --> 01:04:26.750
apparently at DOD it's different . At

01:04:26.750 --> 01:04:29.399
DOD , Black History Month is dead . At

01:04:29.399 --> 01:04:32.760
DOD we won't go and recruit engineers

01:04:32.760 --> 01:04:34.959
who happen to be black to come in and

01:04:34.959 --> 01:04:36.848
serve at a time when we need more

01:04:36.848 --> 01:04:39.015
people serving in the military and all

01:04:39.015 --> 01:04:41.181
of our service branches are struggling

01:04:41.181 --> 01:04:44.830
with attracting talent . There's a lot

01:04:44.830 --> 01:04:46.774
of issues dealing with NorthCO and

01:04:46.774 --> 01:04:48.929
SOCOM . I'm glad my colleague , um ,

01:04:49.350 --> 01:04:51.406
Senator Cotton asked about UAS's . I

01:04:51.406 --> 01:04:53.294
had a whole series of questions I

01:04:53.294 --> 01:04:55.294
wanted to ask about Haiti and other

01:04:55.294 --> 01:04:57.517
SOCOM priorities . Admiral Halsey , I'm

01:04:57.517 --> 01:04:59.572
glad we had the chance to talk about

01:04:59.572 --> 01:05:01.739
those in my office . The United States

01:05:01.739 --> 01:05:04.939
military has been at the forefront . Of

01:05:04.939 --> 01:05:08.469
including talent of all kinds . With

01:05:08.469 --> 01:05:10.550
the actions on January 31 , the

01:05:10.550 --> 01:05:12.661
president acknowledging Black History

01:05:12.661 --> 01:05:14.772
Month , but within the DOD family now

01:05:14.772 --> 01:05:16.850
this is dead . I worry that the

01:05:16.850 --> 01:05:18.739
military will no longer be at the

01:05:18.739 --> 01:05:20.572
forefront , won't even be at the

01:05:20.572 --> 01:05:23.800
average , but will be behind , and that

01:05:24.020 --> 01:05:27.389
would be a terrible sellout . Of an

01:05:27.389 --> 01:05:30.050
amazing tradition . That our United

01:05:30.050 --> 01:05:32.161
States military should be very , very

01:05:32.161 --> 01:05:34.328
proud of with that , Mr . Chair , I'll

01:05:34.328 --> 01:05:36.272
back . Thank you , Senator Kaine .

01:05:36.272 --> 01:05:38.439
Senator Scott , thank you , Chairman .

01:05:38.439 --> 01:05:40.550
Uh , thank you for being here . Thank

01:05:40.550 --> 01:05:42.606
you for all the servicemen and women

01:05:42.606 --> 01:05:44.661
that , uh , served with you . So all

01:05:44.661 --> 01:05:44.639
these hearings are important . Uh ,

01:05:44.709 --> 01:05:46.876
this is an important one . I like this

01:05:46.876 --> 01:05:48.876
one a lot because SOCOM's here it's

01:05:48.876 --> 01:05:51.042
from my home state of , uh , Florida .

01:05:51.042 --> 01:05:52.820
I was hoping my good friend Dan

01:05:52.820 --> 01:05:54.765
Sullivan with Senator Sullivan was

01:05:54.765 --> 01:05:56.876
still here because all he talks about

01:05:56.876 --> 01:05:59.042
is Alaska all the time , so . Um , I'd

01:05:59.042 --> 01:06:01.209
like , uh , I one thing I would always

01:06:01.209 --> 01:06:03.320
like is if people understood the risk

01:06:03.320 --> 01:06:05.653
we're having in , um , in Latin America ,

01:06:05.653 --> 01:06:07.820
and I think we have to put more effort

01:06:07.820 --> 01:06:09.876
into it . I know Admiral Halsey , we

01:06:09.876 --> 01:06:11.931
talked about that , uh , yesterday ,

01:06:11.931 --> 01:06:13.987
and I know you're focused on it . So

01:06:13.987 --> 01:06:16.153
after years of Joe Biden's open border

01:06:16.153 --> 01:06:18.265
crisis wreaking havoc on our domestic

01:06:18.265 --> 01:06:17.879
security , with millions of illegal

01:06:17.879 --> 01:06:19.823
alien encounters at our border and

01:06:19.823 --> 01:06:21.657
appeasement dangers of dangerous

01:06:21.657 --> 01:06:23.823
regimes , the safety of our nation and

01:06:23.823 --> 01:06:25.935
communities are top of mind , I think

01:06:25.935 --> 01:06:28.157
for all of us . I think you have a very

01:06:28.157 --> 01:06:30.268
important job . uh , here as we bring

01:06:30.268 --> 01:06:32.379
back peace through strength , um , so

01:06:32.379 --> 01:06:34.657
let me just get to the questions first .

01:06:34.657 --> 01:06:36.601
General , President Trump recently

01:06:36.601 --> 01:06:38.657
signed two executive orders , one to

01:06:38.657 --> 01:06:38.080
seal the southern border , which is

01:06:38.080 --> 01:06:40.024
right , and another deploying 1500

01:06:40.024 --> 01:06:42.080
servicemen and women to the southern

01:06:42.080 --> 01:06:44.024
border , which none of us hoped he

01:06:44.024 --> 01:06:46.247
would have to do , but unfortunately he

01:06:46.247 --> 01:06:48.413
will have to do to secure the border .

01:06:48.413 --> 01:06:50.636
Can you speak to how the administration

01:06:50.636 --> 01:06:50.159
is preparing for and do you feel you

01:06:50.159 --> 01:06:52.215
have the capability to face down the

01:06:52.215 --> 01:06:54.437
cartels and other US enemies present in

01:06:54.437 --> 01:06:57.659
Mexico ? Senator , I do think that we

01:06:57.659 --> 01:06:59.889
have the capability and the support to

01:06:59.899 --> 01:07:02.219
to meet the requirements established in

01:07:02.219 --> 01:07:05.699
the executive orders . Uh , as , as you

01:07:05.699 --> 01:07:07.810
might know , we've doubled the number

01:07:07.810 --> 01:07:10.129
of Title 10 forces inside of a week

01:07:10.540 --> 01:07:12.979
down there , and they're operating in 7

01:07:12.979 --> 01:07:15.090
roles in support of the Department of

01:07:15.090 --> 01:07:17.201
Homeland Security and then we've also

01:07:17.201 --> 01:07:19.035
increased some uniquely military

01:07:19.035 --> 01:07:21.209
capabilities that will get after the

01:07:21.219 --> 01:07:23.386
the point you made , the cartels which

01:07:23.386 --> 01:07:25.608
are driving the illegal migration . And

01:07:25.608 --> 01:07:27.830
that's primarily through Airborne ISR ,

01:07:27.830 --> 01:07:29.941
uh , to get more information on those

01:07:29.941 --> 01:07:32.163
and figure out how we can counter their

01:07:32.163 --> 01:07:34.330
actions . You think there's any chance

01:07:34.330 --> 01:07:33.929
you're gonna need a carrier strike

01:07:33.929 --> 01:07:37.620
group in the Gulf of America , Senator ,

01:07:37.629 --> 01:07:39.851
at this time I haven't , uh , gotten to

01:07:39.851 --> 01:07:41.851
a carrier strike group , but I will

01:07:41.851 --> 01:07:43.962
need a significant increased maritime

01:07:43.962 --> 01:07:46.185
presence in cooperation with the , uh ,

01:07:46.185 --> 01:07:48.129
Coast Guard . Are the LCS chips at

01:07:48.129 --> 01:07:50.959
Mayport helpful at all ? Yes , sir ,

01:07:51.040 --> 01:07:53.096
those would be , uh , those would be

01:07:53.096 --> 01:07:55.207
right in line with what we're looking

01:07:55.207 --> 01:07:57.207
to do in the maritime . Thanks . So

01:07:57.207 --> 01:07:59.429
Admiral Halley , um , I've been up here

01:07:59.429 --> 01:08:01.373
about a little over 6 years and it

01:08:01.373 --> 01:08:03.318
seems like , and I think we talked

01:08:03.318 --> 01:08:02.860
about this a little bit . Indo Paycom

01:08:02.860 --> 01:08:04.979
and SINOM receive a majority of this

01:08:04.979 --> 01:08:06.923
committee's attention and a lot of

01:08:06.923 --> 01:08:08.812
their assets . Um , I think we're

01:08:08.812 --> 01:08:11.035
seeing a little bit of change with that

01:08:11.035 --> 01:08:13.257
under President Trump . SOCOM's area of

01:08:13.257 --> 01:08:15.312
responsibility faces real threats to

01:08:15.312 --> 01:08:17.368
our national security as we all know

01:08:17.368 --> 01:08:17.240
we've got problems in Cuba , Venezuela ,

01:08:17.290 --> 01:08:20.569
Nicaragua and potentially Colombia . Um ,

01:08:20.700 --> 01:08:22.811
so you might need additional assets ,

01:08:22.811 --> 01:08:24.922
especially with what China , Russia ,

01:08:24.922 --> 01:08:27.330
Iran . Uh , are doing in our in the

01:08:27.330 --> 01:08:29.169
region . Can you talk about the

01:08:29.169 --> 01:08:32.580
importance of having the right assets ,

01:08:32.890 --> 01:08:35.001
uh , at SOCOM to be able to , to deal

01:08:35.001 --> 01:08:38.310
with the threats ? Yes , Senator , to

01:08:38.310 --> 01:08:40.299
be clear , presence means power .

01:08:40.779 --> 01:08:42.950
Presence means relationships . And so

01:08:42.950 --> 01:08:45.061
not only when uh out of air deployers

01:08:45.061 --> 01:08:47.180
come or the TCOs are moving drugs ,

01:08:47.259 --> 01:08:49.426
when they see presence , it gives them

01:08:49.426 --> 01:08:51.910
pause , but also , uh , when we come

01:08:51.910 --> 01:08:53.854
down and work with our friends and

01:08:53.854 --> 01:08:55.910
partners in the in the region , they

01:08:55.910 --> 01:08:57.910
look for us as leadership . So when

01:08:57.910 --> 01:09:00.132
they see our ships , our aircraft , you

01:09:00.132 --> 01:09:02.243
know , our boots on the ground , work

01:09:02.243 --> 01:09:04.354
with them again and again . It builds

01:09:04.354 --> 01:09:04.310
those partnerships and it shows that we

01:09:04.310 --> 01:09:06.532
are there enduring and we can block out

01:09:06.532 --> 01:09:09.399
the PRC and others . Can you talk about

01:09:09.399 --> 01:09:11.510
the importance of Homestead Air Force

01:09:11.510 --> 01:09:14.569
Base , um , and , um , its mission ?

01:09:15.609 --> 01:09:19.539
Yes sir Yes sir , for Homestead Air Air

01:09:19.539 --> 01:09:21.872
Force Base , uh , located there in , uh ,

01:09:21.872 --> 01:09:24.150
uh , south south of Miami right now we ,

01:09:24.150 --> 01:09:26.317
we've used it in the past . Uh , we're

01:09:26.317 --> 01:09:28.483
using a Haiti operations as a jump off

01:09:28.483 --> 01:09:30.761
point . We use it in exercises as well .

01:09:30.761 --> 01:09:32.761
So again it's a key location when I

01:09:32.761 --> 01:09:34.872
think about , uh , contingencies down

01:09:34.872 --> 01:09:36.983
range and how I engage and using that

01:09:36.983 --> 01:09:39.317
as a , as a , uh , a base to , you know ,

01:09:39.317 --> 01:09:41.317
to forward deploy if you will , and

01:09:41.317 --> 01:09:43.595
also I'm looking at some opportunities ,

01:09:43.595 --> 01:09:45.539
uh , coming up for , uh , unmanned

01:09:45.539 --> 01:09:47.706
assets as well , so I continue to , to

01:09:47.706 --> 01:09:49.928
work on that . You think it needs to be

01:09:49.928 --> 01:09:51.928
returned as an active duty base . I

01:09:51.928 --> 01:09:54.150
think I think it's more of a in the Air

01:09:54.150 --> 01:09:56.317
Force , uh lane to answer that , but I

01:09:56.317 --> 01:09:58.372
could definitely use a a duty base ,

01:09:58.372 --> 01:10:01.470
sir . Thank you , Chair . No , uh ,

01:10:01.589 --> 01:10:02.589
sooner King .

01:10:05.560 --> 01:10:07.504
Thank you , Mr . Acting Chairman .

01:10:07.819 --> 01:10:10.419
Appreciate it first time , uh , big

01:10:10.419 --> 01:10:12.620
promotion as we're sitting here , news

01:10:12.620 --> 01:10:14.787
feeds often come across and I just saw

01:10:14.787 --> 01:10:16.953
one that the Department of Defense has

01:10:16.953 --> 01:10:19.959
indicated in its February and it's uh

01:10:20.100 --> 01:10:23.939
2025 procurement plan to buy $400

01:10:23.939 --> 01:10:25.939
million worth of Tesla trucks . I'm

01:10:25.939 --> 01:10:27.883
gonna just let that fact sink in .

01:10:27.883 --> 01:10:29.995
That's all I'm gonna say about that ,

01:10:30.529 --> 01:10:32.990
um . Uh , Admiral , you talked about

01:10:32.990 --> 01:10:35.109
the activity of the Chinese in , in

01:10:35.109 --> 01:10:38.060
Latin America . Would you , uh , uh ,

01:10:38.069 --> 01:10:40.600
would you ? Belie do you believe that

01:10:40.629 --> 01:10:44.339
that activity is #1 significant and #2

01:10:44.790 --> 01:10:46.623
increasing and the nature of the

01:10:46.623 --> 01:10:48.734
activity as I understand it is public

01:10:48.734 --> 01:10:51.950
works projects , uh , ports , two ports

01:10:51.950 --> 01:10:54.870
in Panama , for example , uh , is this

01:10:54.870 --> 01:10:57.092
significant activity on behalf of China

01:10:57.092 --> 01:10:59.729
and Latin America ? Uh , yes , Senator ,

01:10:59.810 --> 01:11:02.032
I think all their efforts from a , uh ,

01:11:02.129 --> 01:11:04.185
uh , infrastructure standpoint , the

01:11:04.185 --> 01:11:06.073
development of dual use sites and

01:11:06.073 --> 01:11:08.018
facilities is a challenge , and we

01:11:08.018 --> 01:11:09.962
should be concerned about that . I

01:11:09.962 --> 01:11:12.185
would point out to the committee that ,

01:11:12.185 --> 01:11:14.129
uh , two weeks ago we unilaterally

01:11:14.129 --> 01:11:16.018
disarmed in Latin America when we

01:11:16.018 --> 01:11:18.185
destroyed the agency for International

01:11:18.185 --> 01:11:20.296
Development because that's the agency

01:11:20.296 --> 01:11:22.462
that provides funds for these kinds of

01:11:22.462 --> 01:11:24.573
projects , so we basically we've left

01:11:24.573 --> 01:11:26.518
the field . In Latin America and I

01:11:26.518 --> 01:11:28.629
think that should be understood we're

01:11:28.629 --> 01:11:28.529
always talking about competition with

01:11:28.529 --> 01:11:31.049
China and the facing threat but here is

01:11:31.049 --> 01:11:33.689
a place where we basically have , as I

01:11:33.689 --> 01:11:35.745
say , left the field we've abdicated

01:11:35.745 --> 01:11:37.745
we've surrendered to China in Latin

01:11:37.745 --> 01:11:40.490
America by unilaterally and illegally

01:11:40.490 --> 01:11:43.899
and unconstitutionally abandoning the

01:11:43.899 --> 01:11:46.890
vehicle by which we were competing with

01:11:46.890 --> 01:11:49.859
them . Uh , in terms of , uh ,

01:11:49.870 --> 01:11:52.290
development and work in Latin America ,

01:11:52.370 --> 01:11:54.592
I just , I think that should be noted ,

01:11:54.879 --> 01:11:57.779
um . We've gone almost entirely through

01:11:57.779 --> 01:11:59.946
this hearing and not talked much about

01:11:59.946 --> 01:12:02.839
terrorism . I believe that in all the

01:12:02.839 --> 01:12:04.783
talk about pivoting to great power

01:12:04.783 --> 01:12:07.006
competition in the Indo-Pacific , we've

01:12:07.006 --> 01:12:09.061
taken our eye off terrorism , and it

01:12:09.061 --> 01:12:11.283
worries me that that's still a threat .

01:12:11.283 --> 01:12:13.759
General is terrorism still a threat uh

01:12:13.759 --> 01:12:15.537
to this country ? I believe you

01:12:15.537 --> 01:12:17.592
mentioned lone wolves , which is the

01:12:17.592 --> 01:12:19.815
most difficult kind of terrorism , uh ,

01:12:19.815 --> 01:12:22.379
to combat . Senator is still a uh a

01:12:22.379 --> 01:12:24.601
threat and a and concern and one of the

01:12:24.601 --> 01:12:27.220
primary focuses in the Northcom part of

01:12:27.220 --> 01:12:30.939
my job uh to to address that we have

01:12:30.939 --> 01:12:32.995
very close ties with Central Command

01:12:32.995 --> 01:12:35.299
and Special Operations Command to

01:12:35.299 --> 01:12:37.569
follow their operations in , uh ,

01:12:37.580 --> 01:12:39.979
overseas and they give me any

01:12:39.979 --> 01:12:43.220
indication of uh activities moving

01:12:43.220 --> 01:12:45.387
towards the United States that we have

01:12:45.387 --> 01:12:47.609
to plan for and of course we have great

01:12:47.609 --> 01:12:50.064
uh relations across the . Intel and

01:12:50.064 --> 01:12:52.464
interagency to ensure that we have a

01:12:52.464 --> 01:12:54.686
consolidated look at any terror threats

01:12:54.686 --> 01:12:56.797
to the US Well , I hope that there is

01:12:56.797 --> 01:12:59.104
significant emphasis because I worry

01:12:59.104 --> 01:13:01.271
that this is one of those things we're

01:13:01.271 --> 01:13:03.271
going to wake up and find ourselves

01:13:03.271 --> 01:13:06.185
under attack and everybody's going to

01:13:06.185 --> 01:13:09.825
say , well , what happened ? and it's a

01:13:09.825 --> 01:13:11.658
matter of taking our eye off the

01:13:11.658 --> 01:13:13.603
terrorism ball . That's one of the

01:13:13.603 --> 01:13:15.825
greatest threats to this country . Uh ,

01:13:15.825 --> 01:13:18.047
particularly if , uh , terrorists get a

01:13:18.047 --> 01:13:20.047
hold of nuclear material , uh , and

01:13:20.047 --> 01:13:22.103
there are a lot of there's a growing

01:13:22.103 --> 01:13:24.325
nuclear family including Iran and North

01:13:24.325 --> 01:13:26.325
Korea , uh , where nuclear material

01:13:26.325 --> 01:13:28.547
might become available , and that's the

01:13:28.547 --> 01:13:30.658
nightmare scenario because deterrence

01:13:30.658 --> 01:13:32.881
doesn't work with terrorists they don't

01:13:32.881 --> 01:13:35.047
care about dying and they don't have a

01:13:35.047 --> 01:13:36.825
capital city to to destroy . So

01:13:36.825 --> 01:13:39.609
intelligence and awareness of what the

01:13:39.609 --> 01:13:41.665
terrorists are thinking and planning

01:13:41.665 --> 01:13:43.720
and plotting , I think is absolutely

01:13:43.720 --> 01:13:47.600
critical , uh . Admiral , every year

01:13:47.890 --> 01:13:50.112
when we have this hearing , I talked to

01:13:50.112 --> 01:13:52.649
the SOCOM commander about the fact that

01:13:52.649 --> 01:13:56.129
we have intelligence reports about drug

01:13:56.129 --> 01:13:58.330
shipments coming to the US in the

01:13:58.330 --> 01:14:01.700
maritime domain and we have the assets

01:14:01.930 --> 01:14:05.399
to interdict 25% of them . To me that

01:14:05.410 --> 01:14:08.580
that is just straight up unconscionable .

01:14:08.790 --> 01:14:11.012
There are people dying in my state from

01:14:11.012 --> 01:14:12.734
fentanyl overdoses , from drug

01:14:12.734 --> 01:14:16.270
overdoses generally , and We're not

01:14:17.370 --> 01:14:20.379
Meeting because of a lack of basically

01:14:20.379 --> 01:14:23.939
allocation of assets , uh , the ,

01:14:23.970 --> 01:14:26.540
the drug shipments that we know about

01:14:26.819 --> 01:14:28.979
that's what's so , uh , objectionable

01:14:28.979 --> 01:14:31.620
about this , uh , is that percentage

01:14:31.620 --> 01:14:35.419
still , uh , reasonable 75% is , is

01:14:35.419 --> 01:14:37.475
not being , uh , interdicted that we

01:14:37.475 --> 01:14:39.859
know of ? Yes sir , about 10 to 20% is

01:14:39.859 --> 01:14:42.081
what we can get after what we see , yes

01:14:42.081 --> 01:14:44.549
sir . And that's because of a lack of

01:14:44.549 --> 01:14:46.827
assets . Is that , is that not correct ?

01:14:46.827 --> 01:14:49.049
They're just not enough . We don't have

01:14:49.049 --> 01:14:51.216
enough boats , ships , primary lack of

01:14:51.216 --> 01:14:53.271
assets , the lack of resources , ISR

01:14:53.271 --> 01:14:55.271
capability . Yes sir . Well , I , I

01:14:55.271 --> 01:14:57.105
would argue that again this is a

01:14:57.105 --> 01:14:59.327
misallocation of resources that here is

01:14:59.327 --> 01:15:02.600
a active attack on America that's

01:15:02.600 --> 01:15:06.270
killing our citizens and we don't , we

01:15:06.270 --> 01:15:09.205
don't have an . Enough , uh , ships and ,

01:15:09.325 --> 01:15:11.705
and whether it's coast guard or navy uh

01:15:11.705 --> 01:15:14.024
in the region to interdict these , uh ,

01:15:14.035 --> 01:15:16.145
these , uh , uh , drug shipments . I

01:15:16.145 --> 01:15:19.774
think that's a , uh , a , uh , uh , uh ,

01:15:19.785 --> 01:15:21.841
basically it's a dereliction of duty

01:15:21.841 --> 01:15:24.464
not of you but of the entire policy

01:15:24.464 --> 01:15:27.265
apparatus and this goes back 34

01:15:27.865 --> 01:15:29.865
administrations , uh , but it's one

01:15:29.865 --> 01:15:31.921
that I hope that this administration

01:15:31.921 --> 01:15:34.087
might pay some attention to . Uh , and

01:15:34.087 --> 01:15:36.087
correct , uh , uh , maybe there's a

01:15:36.087 --> 01:15:37.754
second round we'll talk about

01:15:37.754 --> 01:15:39.921
icebreakers . General , thank you very

01:15:39.921 --> 01:15:42.143
much , Mr . Chairman . Thanks , Senator

01:15:42.143 --> 01:15:43.976
King . What one thing did was it

01:15:43.976 --> 01:15:45.921
Secretary , was it , uh , state or

01:15:45.921 --> 01:15:45.580
defense about the Teslas , do you know ?

01:15:46.890 --> 01:15:49.057
My understanding it was the Department

01:15:49.057 --> 01:15:51.600
of Defense armored Tesla cyber trucks .

01:15:51.609 --> 01:15:54.529
OK . All right , Senator Biden , thank

01:15:54.529 --> 01:15:56.362
you , Chairman . Congrats on the

01:15:56.362 --> 01:16:00.279
promotion . Admiral General , thank you

01:16:00.279 --> 01:16:02.279
all for being here . uh , general ,

01:16:02.399 --> 01:16:04.621
enjoyed our conversation , uh , earlier

01:16:04.621 --> 01:16:06.677
this week , uh , and also just wanna

01:16:06.677 --> 01:16:08.899
thank you on behalf of those in Western

01:16:08.899 --> 01:16:11.066
North Carolina , uh , for your efforts

01:16:11.066 --> 01:16:13.232
there in the early days late September

01:16:13.232 --> 01:16:15.288
of last year , early October , there

01:16:15.288 --> 01:16:17.455
was some bureaucratic hand wringing at

01:16:17.455 --> 01:16:17.109
the top , but that was not from you ,

01:16:17.200 --> 01:16:19.350
that was not from our military . So ,

01:16:19.479 --> 01:16:21.590
um , again , thank you , uh , for all

01:16:21.590 --> 01:16:23.535
those in uniform who served , uh ,

01:16:23.535 --> 01:16:25.646
those out west . Uh , I want to shift

01:16:25.646 --> 01:16:27.590
to the southern border , and we've

01:16:27.590 --> 01:16:29.646
heard this a lot from our colleagues

01:16:29.646 --> 01:16:31.812
this morning , and I share the concern

01:16:31.812 --> 01:16:33.923
about fentanyl in North Carolina , we

01:16:33.923 --> 01:16:35.812
lose every single year , um , the

01:16:35.812 --> 01:16:38.049
totality of what we lost on 9/11 just

01:16:38.049 --> 01:16:40.129
in North Carolina . And that's our

01:16:40.129 --> 01:16:42.250
whole country compared to just my uh

01:16:42.250 --> 01:16:45.229
great state . um , I'm interested in

01:16:45.229 --> 01:16:47.529
stopping the supply of these Chinese

01:16:47.529 --> 01:16:49.879
precursors and chemicals that end up in

01:16:49.879 --> 01:16:52.560
Mexico and make their way here , um ,

01:16:52.569 --> 01:16:54.791
and also stopping the Chinese nationals

01:16:54.791 --> 01:16:56.569
that are being caught illegally

01:16:56.569 --> 01:16:58.930
crossing our southern border , um , in

01:16:58.930 --> 01:17:00.930
record numbers I think it's up by a

01:17:00.930 --> 01:17:03.640
factor of 50 from 2021 to

01:17:03.640 --> 01:17:07.600
2023 . So what concerns do you have ,

01:17:07.640 --> 01:17:10.250
if any ? That foreign malignant actors ,

01:17:10.330 --> 01:17:12.386
not just South American immigrants ,

01:17:12.386 --> 01:17:14.497
but they're using the southern border

01:17:14.497 --> 01:17:16.719
to access our nation . We'll start with

01:17:16.719 --> 01:17:19.470
you , Admiral . So

01:17:21.009 --> 01:17:23.120
As I look at the uh daring gap of the

01:17:23.120 --> 01:17:25.689
last uh year or so we did see an

01:17:25.689 --> 01:17:29.160
increase in the number of uh uh Chinese

01:17:29.160 --> 01:17:32.910
uh uh . Actors coming across , uh ,

01:17:32.919 --> 01:17:34.975
typically what we do is , uh , we've

01:17:34.975 --> 01:17:36.586
been working with the , uh ,

01:17:36.586 --> 01:17:38.808
Panamanians as well as Colombian , uh ,

01:17:38.808 --> 01:17:40.697
to kind of support them in , uh ,

01:17:40.697 --> 01:17:42.752
stopping the flow of migration . Now

01:17:42.752 --> 01:17:42.680
slowed down this year . I think

01:17:42.680 --> 01:17:44.736
President Molina was pretty clear to

01:17:44.736 --> 01:17:46.791
try to stop , uh , migration when he

01:17:46.791 --> 01:17:48.791
got in office . We supported from a

01:17:48.791 --> 01:17:50.902
logistics , intelligence and training

01:17:50.902 --> 01:17:50.839
equipment standpoint with Colombia and

01:17:50.839 --> 01:17:53.200
Panamanians . Uh , we saw the drop

01:17:53.200 --> 01:17:55.144
about 90% coming through the dairy

01:17:55.144 --> 01:17:57.367
right now , but we have to keep our eye

01:17:57.367 --> 01:18:00.600
on it , of course , general . Senator ,

01:18:00.629 --> 01:18:02.851
I , I , uh , want to thank you for your

01:18:02.851 --> 01:18:04.740
comments for the men and women of

01:18:04.740 --> 01:18:06.907
primarily of the 18th Airborne Corps .

01:18:06.907 --> 01:18:09.073
They did an outstanding job supporting

01:18:09.073 --> 01:18:11.185
their teammates in the , uh , western

01:18:11.185 --> 01:18:13.296
part of North Carolina . I appreciate

01:18:13.296 --> 01:18:15.462
that . Uh , I , I share the concern on

01:18:15.462 --> 01:18:17.790
the , uh , the intent of many that are

01:18:17.790 --> 01:18:19.901
crossing the border and in particular

01:18:19.901 --> 01:18:22.068
work closely with the border patrol to

01:18:22.068 --> 01:18:24.819
figure out why the Chinese migrants ,

01:18:25.169 --> 01:18:27.750
uh , one or so many and two , through

01:18:27.750 --> 01:18:31.180
such a uh a narrow corridor in the , uh ,

01:18:31.189 --> 01:18:34.140
San Diego region and my concern there

01:18:34.140 --> 01:18:37.350
is a , uh . A wolf in sheep's clothing

01:18:37.350 --> 01:18:39.572
coming across , uh , having someone who

01:18:39.572 --> 01:18:41.461
intends us harm , so we work very

01:18:41.461 --> 01:18:43.660
closely with the border patrol to see

01:18:43.660 --> 01:18:45.740
who is coming across and making sure

01:18:45.740 --> 01:18:48.470
that our intel agencies are tracking

01:18:48.470 --> 01:18:50.470
them . I'm encouraged by the recent

01:18:50.470 --> 01:18:53.220
decrease in detections and , uh , uh ,

01:18:53.229 --> 01:18:55.950
incursions across the border , uh , but ,

01:18:55.959 --> 01:18:57.959
uh , as I've mentioned before , the

01:18:57.959 --> 01:19:00.070
increase in uh military presence down

01:19:00.070 --> 01:19:02.181
there and some of the unique military

01:19:02.181 --> 01:19:04.348
capabilities , I hope will continue to

01:19:04.348 --> 01:19:06.899
seal that border . Thank you for that .

01:19:07.240 --> 01:19:09.351
uh , let's go , uh , to another topic

01:19:09.351 --> 01:19:11.240
which was previously discussed in

01:19:11.240 --> 01:19:13.839
regards to UAS , um , as you mentioned

01:19:13.839 --> 01:19:16.061
in your opening statement , um , and in

01:19:16.061 --> 01:19:18.640
the discussion with Senator Cotton , um .

01:19:19.370 --> 01:19:21.509
We've seen UAS incursions over

01:19:21.509 --> 01:19:24.189
sensitive sites , military bases , it's

01:19:24.189 --> 01:19:26.470
an alarming , uh , amount . Can you

01:19:26.470 --> 01:19:28.669
briefly , briefly describe how bases

01:19:28.669 --> 01:19:31.002
are determined to be covered facilities ?

01:19:31.002 --> 01:19:33.470
I say that in quotes , under Title 10

01:19:33.470 --> 01:19:36.629
Section 130 I entitling them to an

01:19:36.629 --> 01:19:39.970
active defense . Yes , Senator , uh ,

01:19:40.009 --> 01:19:41.953
to become a covered installation ,

01:19:41.953 --> 01:19:44.750
there's 9 criteria that , uh , any one

01:19:44.750 --> 01:19:46.750
of those could allow the base to be

01:19:46.750 --> 01:19:48.899
covered , uh , ranges from , uh ,

01:19:48.910 --> 01:19:50.966
nuclear deterrence , missile defense

01:19:50.966 --> 01:19:53.132
all the way down to if it's a , a test

01:19:53.132 --> 01:19:55.930
facility there . Roughly half of the

01:19:55.930 --> 01:19:58.689
360 installations in the US meet that

01:19:58.689 --> 01:20:01.819
criteria . Uh , my request and proposal

01:20:01.819 --> 01:20:04.290
would be is if we look at 130 I again

01:20:04.290 --> 01:20:06.660
would be to expand coverage to all

01:20:06.660 --> 01:20:08.810
military installations and not just

01:20:08.810 --> 01:20:11.750
those that are covered . Thank you . So

01:20:12.029 --> 01:20:14.029
as the lead synchronizer of counter

01:20:14.029 --> 01:20:16.629
unmanned aerial system operations in

01:20:16.629 --> 01:20:19.709
the US , um , how are you preparing our

01:20:19.709 --> 01:20:21.990
bases to defend themselves from these

01:20:21.990 --> 01:20:23.879
threats ? I know there's a policy

01:20:23.879 --> 01:20:25.990
discussion in your prior answer , but

01:20:25.990 --> 01:20:28.268
what are you doing right now ? Senator ,

01:20:28.268 --> 01:20:29.823
since we were received this

01:20:29.823 --> 01:20:32.399
responsibility in in November , uh ,

01:20:32.410 --> 01:20:34.577
we're responsible for coordinating any

01:20:34.577 --> 01:20:36.890
response . Uh , the authority to defend

01:20:36.890 --> 01:20:39.057
the base , as Senator Cotton mentioned

01:20:39.057 --> 01:20:41.279
remains with the installation commander

01:20:41.279 --> 01:20:43.223
and the services , but we can be a

01:20:43.223 --> 01:20:44.779
synchronizer role and are a

01:20:44.779 --> 01:20:46.723
synchronizer role , uh , to ensure

01:20:46.723 --> 01:20:49.057
standardized training response tactical ,

01:20:49.057 --> 01:20:51.350
uh , techniques and procedures , uh ,

01:20:51.359 --> 01:20:54.129
and if the base and the service aren't

01:20:54.129 --> 01:20:56.129
able to handle the incursion we can

01:20:56.129 --> 01:20:58.209
bring in . Uh , help from across the

01:20:58.209 --> 01:21:01.720
interagency and DOD to uh support and ,

01:21:01.729 --> 01:21:03.840
and perhaps most critically is we can

01:21:03.840 --> 01:21:05.951
work closely with the inter agency to

01:21:05.951 --> 01:21:08.118
give them the authority to operate the

01:21:08.118 --> 01:21:10.118
systems once they arrive due to our

01:21:10.118 --> 01:21:12.285
close relationship with the FAA and in

01:21:12.285 --> 01:21:12.069
the near future I think we will have

01:21:12.069 --> 01:21:14.180
our own capabilities to bring in from

01:21:14.180 --> 01:21:16.339
Northcom once we procured them , uh ,

01:21:16.430 --> 01:21:18.790
to assist if the service and the

01:21:18.790 --> 01:21:20.512
installation cannot handle the

01:21:20.512 --> 01:21:23.270
incursions . Thank you Mr . Chairman ,

01:21:23.430 --> 01:21:25.597
Mr . Chairman , in , in your absence I

01:21:25.597 --> 01:21:27.790
made a statement about uh the purchase

01:21:27.790 --> 01:21:30.830
of Tesla trucks . Uh , I was

01:21:30.830 --> 01:21:32.941
misinformed it was not the Department

01:21:32.941 --> 01:21:34.774
of Defense that's announced this

01:21:34.774 --> 01:21:37.108
purchase . It's the Department of State ,

01:21:37.108 --> 01:21:36.629
so I would just want to clarify the

01:21:36.629 --> 01:21:38.990
record . Thank you thank you very much

01:21:38.990 --> 01:21:41.899
for that , Senator Warren . Thank you

01:21:41.899 --> 01:21:45.620
Mr . uh Mr . Chairman . So the

01:21:45.620 --> 01:21:49.020
Trump administration is sending troops

01:21:49.020 --> 01:21:51.089
to the southern border and holding

01:21:51.089 --> 01:21:54.740
immigrants at Guantanamo , redirecting

01:21:54.740 --> 01:21:57.100
active duty military personnel from

01:21:57.100 --> 01:22:00.459
critical missions and costing taxpayers

01:22:00.459 --> 01:22:04.100
several times more than when DHS does

01:22:04.100 --> 01:22:06.759
the same job . That seems to be bad for

01:22:06.759 --> 01:22:08.537
national security , bad for our

01:22:08.537 --> 01:22:11.359
military families , and bad for

01:22:11.359 --> 01:22:14.209
America's bottom line . We've seen this

01:22:14.209 --> 01:22:16.040
before when the first Trump

01:22:16.040 --> 01:22:18.151
administration deployed troops to the

01:22:18.151 --> 01:22:21.200
border . It pegged the cost at a

01:22:21.200 --> 01:22:24.759
billion dollars over 3 years , but the

01:22:24.759 --> 01:22:27.359
GAO found that the Department of

01:22:27.359 --> 01:22:31.350
Defense estimates were not reliable

01:22:31.350 --> 01:22:35.009
and excluded significant costs .

01:22:35.479 --> 01:22:38.799
DOD reports to Congress missed more

01:22:38.799 --> 01:22:42.759
than half the . Actual total cost for

01:22:42.759 --> 01:22:45.879
entire fiscal years . So

01:22:45.879 --> 01:22:49.589
GAO made 7 detailed recommendations

01:22:50.049 --> 01:22:51.882
for the Department of Defense to

01:22:51.882 --> 01:22:55.279
improve its cost estimates , but 4

01:22:55.279 --> 01:22:57.669
years later , the Department of Defense

01:22:57.669 --> 01:23:00.959
has not executed a single one .

01:23:01.910 --> 01:23:05.229
Now DOD estimates that this new border

01:23:05.229 --> 01:23:08.910
deployment will cost almost a billion

01:23:08.910 --> 01:23:12.180
dollars over the next 8 months , but

01:23:12.180 --> 01:23:15.220
that may be another underestimate . So

01:23:15.750 --> 01:23:18.560
General Ga , you are overseeing the

01:23:18.560 --> 01:23:20.529
border deployment . Does

01:23:20.529 --> 01:23:23.259
underestimating the costs of an

01:23:23.259 --> 01:23:26.870
operation put future missions and

01:23:26.870 --> 01:23:28.950
future readiness at risk ?

01:23:30.759 --> 01:23:33.092
Senator , I would assume so , but I , I ,

01:23:33.092 --> 01:23:34.926
I think I need to point out that

01:23:34.926 --> 01:23:37.037
NorthCO is not appropriated funds for

01:23:37.037 --> 01:23:39.203
the Southwest border , and we've never

01:23:39.203 --> 01:23:41.092
had reprogramming or pass through

01:23:41.092 --> 01:23:43.259
funding . This is all done through the

01:23:43.259 --> 01:23:43.160
Department comptroller and the services .

01:23:43.279 --> 01:23:45.879
I , I appreciate that , but I'm asking

01:23:45.879 --> 01:23:47.879
the question about running past the

01:23:47.879 --> 01:23:49.879
limits and the consequences of that

01:23:50.399 --> 01:23:53.600
because the money has to come from

01:23:53.600 --> 01:23:55.767
somewhere and I'm concerned that we're

01:23:55.767 --> 01:23:57.933
gonna see the same problem that we saw

01:23:57.933 --> 01:24:00.640
the last time . Big costs and little

01:24:00.640 --> 01:24:03.640
transparency and accountability . When

01:24:03.640 --> 01:24:07.279
DOD has been tasked with doing DHS's

01:24:07.279 --> 01:24:11.270
job , it has cost taxpayers a lot

01:24:11.270 --> 01:24:14.850
more money . It costs 3 times more

01:24:15.200 --> 01:24:18.479
to deport migrants on military aircraft

01:24:18.479 --> 01:24:21.520
than civilian planes that ICE often

01:24:21.520 --> 01:24:25.439
uses and has cost ICE at least 5 times

01:24:25.439 --> 01:24:28.120
more per detention bed . To hold

01:24:28.120 --> 01:24:31.419
migrants at Guantanamo Naval Base than

01:24:31.419 --> 01:24:34.959
at facilities in the United States any

01:24:34.959 --> 01:24:37.879
time civilian authorities ask DOD for

01:24:37.879 --> 01:24:41.640
help , DOD is supposed to evaluate the

01:24:41.640 --> 01:24:45.270
request based on 6 criteria

01:24:45.270 --> 01:24:47.640
including cost , but we don't even have

01:24:47.640 --> 01:24:50.470
a cost estimate for the new Guantanamo

01:24:51.040 --> 01:24:53.899
operations , so Admiral Halsey . What

01:24:53.899 --> 01:24:56.740
do you expect the budgetary cost of

01:24:56.740 --> 01:25:00.709
South SOCOM's Guantanamo operations

01:25:00.709 --> 01:25:03.970
will be through the end of this fiscal

01:25:03.970 --> 01:25:07.669
year ? Senator , we're new into the

01:25:07.669 --> 01:25:10.790
process right now . We sur Mergy assets

01:25:10.790 --> 01:25:12.790
down there to start building up the

01:25:12.790 --> 01:25:15.012
camp . Uh , it's a phased approach , so

01:25:15.012 --> 01:25:16.957
it's not automatically going up to

01:25:16.957 --> 01:25:18.846
30,000 . So right now , so you're

01:25:18.846 --> 01:25:18.470
telling me you just , you actually

01:25:18.470 --> 01:25:20.581
don't know the cost yet , not at this

01:25:20.581 --> 01:25:22.748
point , ma'am , not at this point . So

01:25:22.748 --> 01:25:24.990
the decision to deploy . DOD personnel

01:25:24.990 --> 01:25:28.229
and assets was made without knowing the

01:25:28.229 --> 01:25:31.270
cost , which is exactly what DOD is

01:25:31.270 --> 01:25:33.549
supposed to consider in making the

01:25:33.549 --> 01:25:36.629
decision to deploy . Will you at least

01:25:36.629 --> 01:25:38.830
commit to provide that estimate to

01:25:38.830 --> 01:25:42.160
Congress as soon as you have it ? Yes ,

01:25:43.950 --> 01:25:46.006
All right . Yes , I will I will work

01:25:46.006 --> 01:25:45.490
with the OSD , um , I will hold you to

01:25:45.490 --> 01:25:46.490
that .

01:25:50.149 --> 01:25:52.649
I'm relying on both of you also to tell

01:25:52.649 --> 01:25:55.859
us if DOD blows past whatever

01:25:55.859 --> 01:25:59.109
estimates you give us given the

01:25:59.109 --> 01:26:01.830
potentially astronomical costs , will

01:26:01.830 --> 01:26:04.100
you commit to informing this committee

01:26:04.100 --> 01:26:06.790
if you determine that these operations

01:26:06.790 --> 01:26:09.229
are not militarily effective ?

01:26:10.759 --> 01:26:14.029
Uh , yes , Senator . You know , we need

01:26:14.029 --> 01:26:16.819
to know if the operations are having an

01:26:16.819 --> 01:26:19.419
unmanageable impact on readiness and

01:26:19.419 --> 01:26:22.660
morale . Political stunts like this can

01:26:22.660 --> 01:26:26.549
easily damage troop morale . Um , many

01:26:26.549 --> 01:26:28.382
Texas National Guard members who

01:26:28.382 --> 01:26:30.438
deployed to the southern border have

01:26:30.438 --> 01:26:32.779
felt isolated without purpose , and

01:26:32.779 --> 01:26:36.240
some have even . Committed suicide ,

01:26:36.560 --> 01:26:39.040
uh , I think it is important that we

01:26:39.040 --> 01:26:42.209
have better oversight over these plans

01:26:42.209 --> 01:26:45.009
and that we make these plans conform to

01:26:45.009 --> 01:26:47.120
the law . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:26:50.399 --> 01:26:52.359
Thank you very much , um .

01:26:54.600 --> 01:26:57.750
Um , yes , Senator , Senator King , uh ,

01:26:58.020 --> 01:27:00.060
11 , follow up , um .

01:27:01.640 --> 01:27:04.720
General , uh , give us an outline of

01:27:04.720 --> 01:27:07.629
the Russian activity and militarization

01:27:07.629 --> 01:27:10.120
of the Northern Arctic Ocean . I I

01:27:10.120 --> 01:27:12.231
don't know how to define northern and

01:27:12.231 --> 01:27:14.287
southern when you're coming from the

01:27:14.287 --> 01:27:16.509
North Pole , but , uh , the , the , the

01:27:16.509 --> 01:27:20.200
on the Russian shoreline . Senator ,

01:27:20.270 --> 01:27:23.040
over the last year , we've seen a

01:27:23.040 --> 01:27:25.096
significant increase in both Russian

01:27:25.096 --> 01:27:27.370
air and maritime activity uh in the

01:27:27.370 --> 01:27:30.240
vicinity of Alaska , uh , both in the

01:27:30.240 --> 01:27:32.680
bearing and up in the Arctic Ocean . In

01:27:32.680 --> 01:27:34.624
fact , the uh , incursions and the

01:27:34.624 --> 01:27:36.847
number of ships , uh , this past year ,

01:27:36.850 --> 01:27:39.729
uh , equal or exceeded the rate that it

01:27:39.729 --> 01:27:42.250
was before the Ukraine invasion , after

01:27:42.250 --> 01:27:44.306
which , uh , I think we all know the

01:27:44.370 --> 01:27:46.426
the numbers dropped , and we've also

01:27:46.426 --> 01:27:48.930
seen , uh , uh , increase in air

01:27:48.930 --> 01:27:51.979
patrols . On the eastern side , what we

01:27:51.979 --> 01:27:54.279
call the 2 o'clock approach through the

01:27:54.279 --> 01:27:57.859
uh Greenland and Iceland gap

01:27:57.859 --> 01:28:00.620
towards uh Maine in the northeast

01:28:00.620 --> 01:28:02.970
portion of the United States . Uh , so ,

01:28:03.259 --> 01:28:05.419
uh , I'm certainly concerned by that

01:28:05.419 --> 01:28:07.641
and , and I would expect the numbers on

01:28:07.641 --> 01:28:09.808
both sides of our coast to increase in

01:28:09.808 --> 01:28:12.141
the coming year and then also , uh , um ,

01:28:12.141 --> 01:28:14.363
sir , along those lines also , uh , the

01:28:14.363 --> 01:28:16.697
Russian out of area patrols for both uh .

01:28:16.697 --> 01:28:18.879
Surface and under sea uh was

01:28:18.879 --> 01:28:20.990
significant last year and I expect to

01:28:20.990 --> 01:28:23.101
see that on both coasts again and the

01:28:23.101 --> 01:28:25.212
Chinese are increasingly active , are

01:28:25.212 --> 01:28:27.268
they not ? Yes , sir , last year was

01:28:27.268 --> 01:28:29.435
the we saw the most Chinese vessels uh

01:28:29.435 --> 01:28:31.657
off the coast of Alaska than than we've

01:28:31.657 --> 01:28:33.712
ever seen in many simultaneously . I

01:28:33.712 --> 01:28:35.823
was at a conference some years ago on

01:28:35.823 --> 01:28:37.601
the Arctic and there was a huge

01:28:37.601 --> 01:28:39.935
delegation from China and I said , what ,

01:28:39.935 --> 01:28:39.919
what , what is China's interest ? They

01:28:39.919 --> 01:28:42.560
said , we are a near Arctic nation . My

01:28:42.560 --> 01:28:44.727
response was Maine is a near Caribbean

01:28:44.727 --> 01:28:48.040
state . Uh , they are very active and

01:28:48.040 --> 01:28:50.919
increasing their actions now . How

01:28:50.919 --> 01:28:53.359
about where are we ? Do we have a , a

01:28:53.359 --> 01:28:56.509
port for a facility , for example , uh ,

01:28:56.529 --> 01:28:58.870
uh , in the Arctic ? And secondly ,

01:28:59.160 --> 01:29:01.216
give us a breakdown of the status of

01:29:01.216 --> 01:29:03.520
icebreakers . We are , we are woefully

01:29:03.520 --> 01:29:05.576
inadequate in terms of icebreakers ,

01:29:05.576 --> 01:29:07.687
particularly for the use of the North

01:29:07.687 --> 01:29:10.160
Northwest Passage . Senator , I was

01:29:10.160 --> 01:29:12.382
gonna use the same word . Uh , we're in

01:29:12.382 --> 01:29:14.104
a woeful , uh , situation with

01:29:14.104 --> 01:29:16.327
icebreakers . Uh , the Coast Guard is ,

01:29:16.327 --> 01:29:18.549
uh , working very hard to increase that

01:29:18.549 --> 01:29:20.604
for us , uh , but at this time we're

01:29:20.604 --> 01:29:22.938
completely outnumbered with icebreakers ,

01:29:22.938 --> 01:29:25.271
but they're building one new icebreaker ,

01:29:25.271 --> 01:29:27.049
but it's , it's really merely a

01:29:27.049 --> 01:29:29.216
replacement for the ancient one that's

01:29:29.216 --> 01:29:31.271
about to go out of service , is that

01:29:31.271 --> 01:29:33.382
not correct ? It is so there's no net

01:29:33.382 --> 01:29:35.520
gain in icebreakers . That , that's

01:29:35.520 --> 01:29:37.631
right , Senator , and the icebreakers

01:29:37.631 --> 01:29:39.798
we have commute between the Arctic and

01:29:39.798 --> 01:29:41.909
the Antarctic . Is that not correct ?

01:29:41.909 --> 01:29:44.020
That that's correct as well . And how

01:29:44.020 --> 01:29:44.000
many icebreakers do you estimate the

01:29:44.000 --> 01:29:46.111
Russians have in the Arctic ? Between

01:29:46.111 --> 01:29:49.029
20 and 40 ? 20 and 40 to .

01:29:50.330 --> 01:29:53.439
Less than one , I would argue that the

01:29:53.439 --> 01:29:55.106
icebreakers are the essential

01:29:55.106 --> 01:29:57.399
infrastructure of the of the Arctic

01:29:57.399 --> 01:30:00.759
region and , uh , uh , to say we

01:30:00.759 --> 01:30:03.669
are inadequate and behind ,

01:30:04.359 --> 01:30:06.839
uh , where we should be is , is I

01:30:06.839 --> 01:30:09.061
believe an understatement . Thank you ,

01:30:09.061 --> 01:30:12.240
Mr . Chairman . Um , Senator King , um ,

01:30:12.569 --> 01:30:14.770
let me just say I think you'll find a

01:30:14.770 --> 01:30:18.359
lot of bipartisan support both in the

01:30:18.359 --> 01:30:21.319
Congress and in the administration for ,

01:30:21.410 --> 01:30:24.470
uh , a substantial increase

01:30:24.850 --> 01:30:27.017
quickly in our number of icebreakers .

01:30:27.160 --> 01:30:29.382
I , I , I believe that's the case , and

01:30:29.382 --> 01:30:31.604
I appreciate that , Mr . Chairman . All

01:30:31.604 --> 01:30:33.716
right , we have uh Senator Peters and

01:30:33.716 --> 01:30:35.716
then Senator Rosen . Thank you Mr .

01:30:35.716 --> 01:30:37.938
Chairman , gentlemen , thank you uh for

01:30:37.938 --> 01:30:40.104
uh your service to our country and for

01:30:40.104 --> 01:30:41.993
being here today as uh as ranking

01:30:41.993 --> 01:30:43.993
member of the Homeland Security and

01:30:43.993 --> 01:30:43.879
Government Affairs Committee , uh , as

01:30:43.879 --> 01:30:46.046
well as , uh , having served uh in the

01:30:46.046 --> 01:30:48.439
US Navy Reserve , I , I wanna echo some

01:30:48.439 --> 01:30:50.390
of my colleagues' concerns on the

01:30:50.390 --> 01:30:52.612
dangers of increasing the Department of

01:30:52.612 --> 01:30:54.990
Defense's role in uh border security

01:30:55.279 --> 01:30:57.799
and civil immigration uh enforcement .

01:30:58.069 --> 01:31:00.236
I'm gonna be following up uh with both

01:31:00.236 --> 01:31:02.291
uh the Department of the Defense and

01:31:02.291 --> 01:31:04.458
the Department of Homeland Security to

01:31:04.458 --> 01:31:06.513
get additional information including

01:31:06.513 --> 01:31:08.939
related to the uh DOD uh deportation

01:31:08.939 --> 01:31:11.899
flights and DHS's use of uh naval

01:31:11.899 --> 01:31:14.879
station , uh , Guantanamo Bay . Well ,

01:31:14.910 --> 01:31:17.220
my questions , uh , uh , uh , first ,

01:31:17.310 --> 01:31:19.310
uh , uh , General Gio , uh , as you

01:31:19.310 --> 01:31:21.740
have previously , uh , stated , the ,

01:31:21.750 --> 01:31:23.639
uh , successful execution of your

01:31:23.639 --> 01:31:25.750
mission as commander of both NORTHCOM

01:31:25.750 --> 01:31:27.910
and NORAD , uh , relies , and gives a

01:31:27.910 --> 01:31:29.830
quote , relies on uh cohesive

01:31:29.830 --> 01:31:32.220
strategies , integrated planning . And

01:31:32.220 --> 01:31:34.387
a collaboration across the , the whole

01:31:34.387 --> 01:31:36.387
of government and to quote , uh , I

01:31:36.387 --> 01:31:38.664
completely agree with , with that , uh ,

01:31:38.664 --> 01:31:40.720
and with your assessment and believe

01:31:40.720 --> 01:31:42.831
this also applies to executing , uh ,

01:31:42.831 --> 01:31:44.942
SOCOM , uh , missions as well . So my

01:31:44.942 --> 01:31:47.109
question for you , general , uh , uh ,

01:31:47.109 --> 01:31:48.942
your , uh , how do your commands

01:31:48.942 --> 01:31:50.331
collaborate with several

01:31:50.331 --> 01:31:52.387
intergovernmental agencies including

01:31:52.387 --> 01:31:54.498
the Department of Homeland Security ,

01:31:54.498 --> 01:31:56.609
Miss Missile Defense Agency , and the

01:31:56.609 --> 01:31:58.498
cyber and Infrastructure Security

01:31:58.498 --> 01:32:00.720
Agency . In executing your missions and

01:32:00.720 --> 01:32:02.553
how do you coordinate with these

01:32:02.553 --> 01:32:04.498
agencies and deconflict efforts to

01:32:04.498 --> 01:32:06.498
ensure the successful events of our

01:32:06.498 --> 01:32:08.720
homeland while certainly maintaining uh

01:32:08.720 --> 01:32:10.942
left of launch uh framework . Senator ,

01:32:10.942 --> 01:32:14.020
our partnership with uh DOD , other

01:32:14.020 --> 01:32:16.100
combatant commands , and the inter

01:32:16.100 --> 01:32:18.379
agency is , is critical to us . Uh ,

01:32:18.419 --> 01:32:20.475
the way we approach it is we have uh

01:32:20.475 --> 01:32:23.259
well over 100 liaison officers ,

01:32:23.299 --> 01:32:25.243
usually very high ranking , highly

01:32:25.243 --> 01:32:27.549
placed . And trusted from their uh home

01:32:27.549 --> 01:32:29.716
agencies that work in our headquarters

01:32:29.740 --> 01:32:32.149
and participate in every one of our uh

01:32:32.149 --> 01:32:35.830
morning updates uh uh intel uh

01:32:35.830 --> 01:32:38.069
and uh operations updates commanders

01:32:38.069 --> 01:32:40.236
updates as well as all of our planning

01:32:40.236 --> 01:32:42.180
efforts and then for the combatant

01:32:42.180 --> 01:32:44.402
commands uh we meet regularly , we talk

01:32:44.402 --> 01:32:46.629
regularly and uh just for example in

01:32:46.629 --> 01:32:49.569
this southern border , uh . The

01:32:49.569 --> 01:32:53.450
responsibility uh is is widely shared

01:32:53.450 --> 01:32:55.890
between USOCOM , US Northcom and

01:32:55.890 --> 01:32:58.009
Transom and the commanders and at all

01:32:58.009 --> 01:32:59.953
levels of our command we integrate

01:32:59.953 --> 01:33:02.009
daily in a number of uh different uh

01:33:02.009 --> 01:33:05.459
planning groups and sessions . Uh ,

01:33:05.500 --> 01:33:07.556
question for both of you , you , you

01:33:07.556 --> 01:33:09.419
both know , uh , uh , about the

01:33:09.419 --> 01:33:11.530
importance of artificial intelligence

01:33:11.530 --> 01:33:13.697
systems and the pivotal role that they

01:33:13.697 --> 01:33:15.919
play in informing commanders' decisions

01:33:15.919 --> 01:33:17.808
by predicting , uh , or providing

01:33:17.808 --> 01:33:19.586
predictive analysis , real-time

01:33:19.586 --> 01:33:21.586
decision support . Uh , and enhance

01:33:21.586 --> 01:33:23.697
situational awareness and , uh , in a

01:33:23.697 --> 01:33:25.697
future conflict . Uh , earlier this

01:33:25.697 --> 01:33:27.863
week we received a classified briefing

01:33:27.863 --> 01:33:30.086
from CENTCOM commander General Carrilla

01:33:30.086 --> 01:33:32.252
who , who shared those views as well .

01:33:32.252 --> 01:33:34.475
So my question to , to each of you is ,

01:33:34.475 --> 01:33:36.530
given the rapid advancements in AI ,

01:33:36.530 --> 01:33:38.752
how do you see AI shaping the future of

01:33:38.752 --> 01:33:40.863
commander's decisions , making , uh ,

01:33:40.863 --> 01:33:43.430
ability . Uh , defensive operations and

01:33:43.430 --> 01:33:45.486
weapons integration , uh , for , for

01:33:45.486 --> 01:33:47.770
both SOCOM and NorthCO , and , uh , how

01:33:47.770 --> 01:33:49.603
can we be helpful , uh , in your

01:33:49.603 --> 01:33:51.890
efforts to , to , to , uh , accelerate

01:33:51.890 --> 01:33:53.890
the use of these new technologies ,

01:33:54.410 --> 01:33:57.040
Senator , the , uh , use of AI is

01:33:57.040 --> 01:33:59.040
becoming more and more important in

01:33:59.040 --> 01:34:01.207
NORAD and Northcom . Uh , we currently

01:34:01.207 --> 01:34:03.429
use some capabilities in , uh , helping

01:34:03.429 --> 01:34:06.359
us look at imagery and find uh . Uh ,

01:34:06.399 --> 01:34:10.200
assets or , or activities , uh , with

01:34:10.200 --> 01:34:13.350
imagery using AI to help , uh , alert

01:34:13.600 --> 01:34:16.200
our intel analysts , uh , anything in

01:34:16.200 --> 01:34:18.144
the future that you'll see from us

01:34:18.144 --> 01:34:20.089
incorporating in , uh , artificial

01:34:20.089 --> 01:34:22.359
intelligence certainly will always have

01:34:22.359 --> 01:34:24.470
what we call the , you know , the man

01:34:24.470 --> 01:34:26.637
on the loop , uh , we will always have

01:34:26.637 --> 01:34:28.915
men and women . Uh , that are QCing it ,

01:34:28.915 --> 01:34:28.645
but we're finding that we can go

01:34:28.645 --> 01:34:31.165
through reams and reams of , uh ,

01:34:31.205 --> 01:34:33.604
information much quicker , and I , and

01:34:33.604 --> 01:34:35.715
I think that I should point out we're

01:34:35.715 --> 01:34:37.882
also looking to see what the adversary

01:34:37.882 --> 01:34:40.845
is doing with AI and how we might be

01:34:40.845 --> 01:34:43.725
vulnerable , uh , to , to them and

01:34:43.725 --> 01:34:45.564
their use of AI in our defensive

01:34:45.564 --> 01:34:47.805
capabilities . Thank you , Admiral .

01:34:49.060 --> 01:34:51.282
And Senator , at uh SoftCO we're in the

01:34:51.282 --> 01:34:53.227
process now of sending some of our

01:34:53.227 --> 01:34:55.171
senior leaders through training to

01:34:55.171 --> 01:34:57.338
actually learn more about AI so we can

01:34:57.338 --> 01:34:59.560
continue to use it . Uh , another thing

01:34:59.560 --> 01:34:59.229
we're doing it at Jad of South joint

01:34:59.229 --> 01:35:01.118
interagency Task Force South . We

01:35:01.118 --> 01:35:03.173
actually have an AI machine learning

01:35:03.173 --> 01:35:05.285
battle lab where we're able to take ,

01:35:05.285 --> 01:35:07.451
uh , 15 years of data , uh . Based off

01:35:07.451 --> 01:35:09.507
a ship size , you think about a drug

01:35:09.507 --> 01:35:11.562
drug smuggler ship size , location ,

01:35:11.562 --> 01:35:13.618
time of year , uh , expect a route ,

01:35:13.618 --> 01:35:15.785
and now we can use that predictably to

01:35:15.785 --> 01:35:17.729
locate our assets , uh , to , uh ,

01:35:17.729 --> 01:35:19.840
interdict them , and that's been very

01:35:19.840 --> 01:35:19.334
successful and we'll continue to look

01:35:19.334 --> 01:35:21.556
for some more support to get after that

01:35:21.556 --> 01:35:23.834
even , even faster . Thank you . Great ,

01:35:23.834 --> 01:35:26.056
thank you . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:35:26.056 --> 01:35:28.112
Thank you , Senator Peters , Senator

01:35:28.112 --> 01:35:31.709
Duckworth . Thank you , Mr .

01:35:31.720 --> 01:35:35.089
Chairman . I'm sorry . I , I should

01:35:35.089 --> 01:35:37.311
have , I should have recognized Senator

01:35:37.311 --> 01:35:39.680
Rosen first . I'm more than happy to .

01:35:40.609 --> 01:35:42.831
It's the first mistake I've made , um .

01:35:44.729 --> 01:35:47.189
Uh , yeah , Senator Kelly , thank you

01:35:47.189 --> 01:35:49.910
for unanimous consent , uh , to my left ,

01:35:50.200 --> 01:35:52.200
Senator Kelly . Thank you , Senator

01:35:52.200 --> 01:35:54.422
Rosen . Thank you , Senator Duckworth .

01:35:55.060 --> 01:35:56.616
Really appreciate it , um .

01:35:58.500 --> 01:36:02.500
So General Dio , um . And

01:36:02.500 --> 01:36:04.611
for , for both of you , Admiral , you

01:36:04.611 --> 01:36:06.667
as well . So both North Northcom and

01:36:06.667 --> 01:36:08.389
SouthCom have been tasked with

01:36:08.389 --> 01:36:10.222
supporting a border security and

01:36:10.222 --> 01:36:12.700
immigration enforcement mission . And

01:36:12.700 --> 01:36:14.644
while I agree that our immigration

01:36:14.644 --> 01:36:16.756
system's broken , and that we have to

01:36:16.756 --> 01:36:18.978
do more to secure the southern border ,

01:36:18.978 --> 01:36:21.200
I'm concerned about the effect of these

01:36:21.200 --> 01:36:25.049
missions on our military readiness . So

01:36:25.049 --> 01:36:27.950
General Gio last week over 100

01:36:27.950 --> 01:36:31.310
migrants were flown to India on a

01:36:31.310 --> 01:36:33.970
C-17 costing the American taxpayer

01:36:33.970 --> 01:36:36.910
approximately $2.5 million and using up

01:36:36.910 --> 01:36:39.990
the limited flight hours allocated to

01:36:39.990 --> 01:36:43.209
that aircraft . Using millAir costs

01:36:43.209 --> 01:36:47.149
around $28,000 an hour or so for

01:36:47.149 --> 01:36:50.819
a C-17 . That's 4 times as much

01:36:51.509 --> 01:36:53.700
if ICE would have chartered a flight .

01:36:54.649 --> 01:36:56.689
So given the strain on strategic

01:36:56.689 --> 01:36:59.450
airlift assets , are you concerned that

01:36:59.450 --> 01:37:02.450
continued use of C-17s and C-130s , and

01:37:02.450 --> 01:37:06.240
C-130s are less expensive but still .

01:37:06.930 --> 01:37:09.097
There are readiness issues with that .

01:37:09.097 --> 01:37:11.263
Are you concerned that using these for

01:37:11.263 --> 01:37:13.097
deportation flights could impact

01:37:13.097 --> 01:37:15.180
availability for higher priority

01:37:15.180 --> 01:37:18.040
missions ? Senator , we work closely

01:37:18.040 --> 01:37:20.479
with the Transportation command that uh

01:37:20.479 --> 01:37:23.200
operates these flights and uh are

01:37:23.200 --> 01:37:25.311
always uh looking to see if there are

01:37:25.311 --> 01:37:27.160
the authorities to contract that

01:37:27.160 --> 01:37:29.430
capability . Do you know what was uh

01:37:29.759 --> 01:37:31.870
what was dropped , what missions were

01:37:31.870 --> 01:37:35.350
dropped and . Uh , Admiral Halsey ,

01:37:35.950 --> 01:37:37.783
same for you . Do you know if we

01:37:37.783 --> 01:37:39.728
dropped any missions to be able to

01:37:39.728 --> 01:37:42.430
support the flights to India or Gitmo ?

01:37:43.250 --> 01:37:45.306
I did not know , sir . And Senator ,

01:37:45.306 --> 01:37:49.209
I'm not aware either . And

01:37:49.259 --> 01:37:51.481
are you aware what the chain of custody

01:37:51.481 --> 01:37:54.209
looks like for detainees ? As we

01:37:54.209 --> 01:37:57.279
transfer them . As as

01:37:57.450 --> 01:38:00.640
as far as right now , the , uh , DHS

01:38:00.640 --> 01:38:02.473
has the chain of custody for the

01:38:02.473 --> 01:38:04.696
detainees , uh , as far as those coming

01:38:04.696 --> 01:38:06.930
to uh Gitmo , so that's not a military

01:38:06.930 --> 01:38:09.160
responsibility at all , uh , no , sir .

01:38:09.839 --> 01:38:13.410
All right . And then Admiral , I've got

01:38:13.410 --> 01:38:15.910
a Question we talked a little bit in my

01:38:15.910 --> 01:38:19.339
office about this uh yesterday

01:38:20.140 --> 01:38:22.979
uh we're in the mid midst of a global

01:38:22.979 --> 01:38:25.069
strategic competition with China and

01:38:25.069 --> 01:38:28.439
China continues efforts to influence

01:38:28.439 --> 01:38:32.189
politics and societies in the

01:38:32.189 --> 01:38:34.467
western hemisphere in our neighborhood .

01:38:34.879 --> 01:38:36.950
And they use economic engagement to

01:38:36.950 --> 01:38:39.750
gain access and influence in countries

01:38:39.750 --> 01:38:41.972
in Latin America and in the Caribbean .

01:38:42.729 --> 01:38:44.580
So what's your assessment of the

01:38:44.580 --> 01:38:47.410
security situation in Panama ? And what

01:38:47.410 --> 01:38:51.009
is your strategy to deter CCP

01:38:51.580 --> 01:38:54.029
influence in the region . Without

01:38:54.279 --> 01:38:57.479
contesting Panama's control over the

01:38:57.479 --> 01:39:01.330
Panama Canal . So Senator , the ,

01:39:01.350 --> 01:39:03.406
uh , just like all places around the

01:39:03.406 --> 01:39:06.299
world now , uh , the China continues to

01:39:06.299 --> 01:39:08.700
gain their economic and infrastructure

01:39:08.700 --> 01:39:11.033
influence and so we know they have , uh ,

01:39:11.069 --> 01:39:14.069
um , uh , some controlling interests in

01:39:14.069 --> 01:39:16.125
ports on both ends of the canal . We

01:39:16.125 --> 01:39:17.847
know that they are , uh , have

01:39:17.847 --> 01:39:20.013
infrastructure projects as well . Uh ,

01:39:20.013 --> 01:39:22.180
my role as the SOCOM commander is to ,

01:39:22.350 --> 01:39:24.683
uh , defend the Panama Canal in time of ,

01:39:24.683 --> 01:39:26.628
uh , crisis or contingency , and I

01:39:26.628 --> 01:39:29.830
intend to do that . And do you agree

01:39:29.830 --> 01:39:32.149
that working with our partners would be

01:39:32.149 --> 01:39:35.000
part of this strategy ? Yes sir , and

01:39:35.000 --> 01:39:37.278
our partners , meaning the Panamanians ,

01:39:37.278 --> 01:39:39.389
yes sir , the Panamanians are , are ,

01:39:39.389 --> 01:39:41.667
are key to work with us . In fact , uh ,

01:39:41.667 --> 01:39:43.722
right now we have an exercise called

01:39:43.722 --> 01:39:45.889
Panamax we do every year and that's an

01:39:45.889 --> 01:39:47.667
exercise where we work with the

01:39:47.667 --> 01:39:49.889
Panamanians and our allies and partners

01:39:49.889 --> 01:39:49.640
in the region to do a scenario where we

01:39:49.640 --> 01:39:51.770
defend the Panama Canal . And just

01:39:51.770 --> 01:39:54.189
recently the uh Panamanian president

01:39:54.189 --> 01:39:56.300
mentioned that he wants to do Panamax

01:39:56.300 --> 01:39:58.578
in Panama so that's a a change , right ?

01:39:58.578 --> 01:40:00.745
So we're , we'll continue to work with

01:40:00.745 --> 01:40:02.967
our allies and partners , uh , continue

01:40:02.967 --> 01:40:05.133
to work with Panamanians and and uh as

01:40:05.133 --> 01:40:04.839
we go forward . And can you describe a

01:40:04.839 --> 01:40:06.839
little bit what that exercise would

01:40:06.839 --> 01:40:09.172
look like in Panama ? Yes sir , so , uh ,

01:40:09.172 --> 01:40:11.450
we think about , uh , nefarious actors ,

01:40:11.450 --> 01:40:14.799
uh , trying to , um , you know , create

01:40:14.799 --> 01:40:16.966
a , uh , explosion or something in the

01:40:16.966 --> 01:40:19.188
canal or stop up the canal . So again ,

01:40:19.279 --> 01:40:21.040
uh , as we're working and the

01:40:21.040 --> 01:40:23.262
approaches to the canal , so it's whole

01:40:23.262 --> 01:40:25.318
entire entire thing to include cyber

01:40:25.318 --> 01:40:27.484
activity as well . So again , in every

01:40:27.484 --> 01:40:29.651
exercise we do throughout the region ,

01:40:29.651 --> 01:40:31.873
there's always some cyber component and

01:40:31.873 --> 01:40:34.040
so we continue to work that . So we do

01:40:34.040 --> 01:40:36.262
have a strategy and this exercise being

01:40:36.262 --> 01:40:38.373
part of the strategy to counter . The

01:40:38.373 --> 01:40:41.359
PRC's influence in the region as it is

01:40:41.359 --> 01:40:43.359
today . Yes , sir , and , and to be

01:40:43.359 --> 01:40:45.081
clear , I think I go back to a

01:40:45.081 --> 01:40:47.415
statement I made earlier about presence ,

01:40:47.415 --> 01:40:47.080
right ? Uh , I need presence in the

01:40:47.080 --> 01:40:49.302
region , presence mean power , presence

01:40:49.302 --> 01:40:51.524
blocks out the PRC and so I'll continue

01:40:51.524 --> 01:40:53.691
to do that . All right , thank you and

01:40:53.691 --> 01:40:55.913
thank you , Mr . Chairman . Thank you ,

01:40:55.913 --> 01:40:57.747
Senator Kelly , uh , General and

01:40:57.747 --> 01:40:59.819
Admiral , um . Senator Kelly was not

01:40:59.819 --> 01:41:02.129
the first to , to mention the cost of

01:41:02.129 --> 01:41:05.169
Miller , as , uh , compared to the cost

01:41:05.169 --> 01:41:09.060
of a charter flight . Um , to , uh , to

01:41:09.060 --> 01:41:11.490
your knowledge , uh , are those figures

01:41:11.490 --> 01:41:15.040
correct ? Senator ,

01:41:15.169 --> 01:41:17.225
uh , to tell you the truth , I don't

01:41:17.225 --> 01:41:19.336
have knowledge of that because , uh ,

01:41:19.336 --> 01:41:20.947
those are all run through US

01:41:20.947 --> 01:41:20.879
Transportation Command . I , I don't

01:41:20.879 --> 01:41:23.101
have access to those numbers . OK , but

01:41:23.101 --> 01:41:25.323
you , but you're , uh , you'll get that

01:41:25.323 --> 01:41:26.601
to us , will you not ,

01:41:31.229 --> 01:41:33.229
Senator , uh , Chairman , of course

01:41:33.229 --> 01:41:31.770
I'll be very , I know , sir , but we

01:41:31.770 --> 01:41:33.959
can work together . Mr . Chairman , I

01:41:33.959 --> 01:41:36.181
can if I can just make one comment just

01:41:36.181 --> 01:41:38.810
from experience . About 21,000 pounds

01:41:38.810 --> 01:41:41.959
an hour of fuel for a C-17 . 737s about

01:41:41.959 --> 01:41:45.450
5000 pounds per hour per hour for for

01:41:45.450 --> 01:41:47.680
fuel costs . So just in fuel costs ,

01:41:47.850 --> 01:41:50.250
it's about a 4x . OK , thank you , but

01:41:50.250 --> 01:41:52.361
you will follow up the witnesses will

01:41:52.361 --> 01:41:54.583
follow up . I think we now have Senator

01:41:54.583 --> 01:41:56.583
Banks . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:41:56.583 --> 01:41:58.806
General Gio . The president's executive

01:41:58.806 --> 01:42:01.410
order to establish the Iron Dome for

01:42:01.410 --> 01:42:03.354
America stresses the need for both

01:42:03.354 --> 01:42:06.279
weapons to shoot down enemy missiles ,

01:42:06.569 --> 01:42:08.890
and also the satellites to track them .

01:42:09.910 --> 01:42:12.759
The EO called for the acceleration of

01:42:12.759 --> 01:42:15.040
the deployment of the hypersonic and

01:42:15.040 --> 01:42:17.709
ballistic tracking sensor layer .

01:42:17.919 --> 01:42:19.975
IfOCOM is going to have an effective

01:42:19.975 --> 01:42:22.479
Iron Dome for the US homeland , how

01:42:22.479 --> 01:42:24.423
important is it that we expand our

01:42:24.423 --> 01:42:26.312
fleet of ballistic and hypersonic

01:42:26.312 --> 01:42:28.090
missile tracking satellites and

01:42:28.090 --> 01:42:30.129
space-based sensors ? Senator ,

01:42:30.259 --> 01:42:32.370
expanding those capabilities would be

01:42:32.370 --> 01:42:34.259
imperative to having a successful

01:42:34.259 --> 01:42:36.560
shield over the , uh , North American

01:42:36.560 --> 01:42:38.782
continent . You expand on that . That's

01:42:38.782 --> 01:42:41.439
why that's important first and foremost ,

01:42:41.600 --> 01:42:44.000
uh , Senator , we have to detect

01:42:44.000 --> 01:42:46.111
anything that we want to defeat and ,

01:42:46.160 --> 01:42:48.910
uh , so the HBTSS that you described ,

01:42:49.189 --> 01:42:51.467
uh , is the first capability that , uh ,

01:42:51.467 --> 01:42:53.578
we think will reliably and accurately

01:42:53.578 --> 01:42:55.856
tracked . Uh , hypersonic missile , uh ,

01:42:55.856 --> 01:42:58.464
we have some capability already that

01:42:58.464 --> 01:43:00.575
can detect intercontinental ballistic

01:43:00.575 --> 01:43:02.742
missiles , but those are fairly , uh ,

01:43:02.742 --> 01:43:04.853
easy to track because their ballistic

01:43:04.853 --> 01:43:06.964
profile , whereas the hypersonics are

01:43:06.964 --> 01:43:09.242
both maneuverable and much faster , uh ,

01:43:09.242 --> 01:43:11.131
so getting the , uh , space-based

01:43:11.131 --> 01:43:13.186
capability to detect and track those

01:43:13.186 --> 01:43:15.408
that could cue defeat mechanisms in the

01:43:15.408 --> 01:43:17.631
end is imperative . How fast do we need

01:43:17.631 --> 01:43:19.908
them ? How fast we need the capability ?

01:43:20.060 --> 01:43:22.227
Yes , immediately , immediately , uh ,

01:43:22.270 --> 01:43:24.270
thank you for that . Admiral , uh ,

01:43:24.270 --> 01:43:26.326
some of my colleagues have said that

01:43:26.326 --> 01:43:28.381
the US military operations to defend

01:43:28.381 --> 01:43:30.326
the neutrality of the Panama Canal

01:43:30.326 --> 01:43:33.220
would be unprecedented or illegal . Do

01:43:33.220 --> 01:43:36.740
you agree with that ? Uh , senator ,

01:43:36.779 --> 01:43:38.501
that's more of a policy , uh ,

01:43:38.501 --> 01:43:40.668
discussion I think Department of State

01:43:40.668 --> 01:43:42.946
is better equipped to handle that . No ,

01:43:42.946 --> 01:43:45.057
no opinion on whether or not that's .

01:43:45.057 --> 01:43:47.223
Uh , if you were ordered to defend the

01:43:47.223 --> 01:43:49.335
Panama Canal , you would , that would

01:43:49.335 --> 01:43:51.168
be legal to do so . So my job as

01:43:51.168 --> 01:43:53.057
commander commander is to provide

01:43:53.057 --> 01:43:55.168
options to the president , sir . Um ,

01:43:55.168 --> 01:43:58.569
fair , fair enough , um , Mr . Chairman ,

01:43:58.609 --> 01:44:00.720
that's all I've got . I yelled back .

01:44:00.720 --> 01:44:02.942
Uh , thank you very much , Senator Rosa

01:44:02.942 --> 01:44:06.129
Rosen . Chairman Wicker , Ranking

01:44:06.129 --> 01:44:08.296
Member Reed for holding this hearing .

01:44:08.296 --> 01:44:10.185
I'd like to thank General Gio and

01:44:10.185 --> 01:44:12.407
Admiral Holsey for testifying today for

01:44:12.407 --> 01:44:14.629
your service , uh , to our country . We

01:44:14.629 --> 01:44:16.796
really appreciate you . I wanna talk a

01:44:16.796 --> 01:44:18.851
little bit about Guantanamo Bay . So

01:44:18.851 --> 01:44:21.073
Admiral Halsey , the administration has

01:44:21.073 --> 01:44:23.240
announced it's using our naval base at

01:44:23.240 --> 01:44:25.296
Guantanamo Bay to house undocumented

01:44:25.296 --> 01:44:27.240
individuals detained in the United

01:44:27.240 --> 01:44:29.129
States . And although I have deep

01:44:29.129 --> 01:44:31.351
concerns about this cruel and misguided

01:44:31.351 --> 01:44:33.573
policy , including about whether we can

01:44:33.573 --> 01:44:35.351
trust that ICE is not detaining

01:44:35.351 --> 01:44:37.351
American citizens , legal permanent

01:44:37.351 --> 01:44:39.573
residents , TPS recipients , dreamers ,

01:44:39.573 --> 01:44:42.839
or children in these facilities . But

01:44:43.529 --> 01:44:45.751
Admiral Halsey , understanding that you

01:44:45.751 --> 01:44:47.973
are only implementing policy decided by

01:44:47.973 --> 01:44:51.910
uh by others , um . How

01:44:51.910 --> 01:44:53.680
is DOD planning to pay for the

01:44:53.680 --> 01:44:57.189
transport and care and more importantly ,

01:44:57.520 --> 01:45:00.189
what are the divisions of the uh

01:45:00.189 --> 01:45:02.149
missions and the responsibilities

01:45:02.149 --> 01:45:03.982
between DOD and ICE are military

01:45:03.982 --> 01:45:06.093
personnel charged with the guarding ,

01:45:06.093 --> 01:45:07.871
carrying , feeding of people at

01:45:07.871 --> 01:45:09.927
Guantanamo Bay , so you're paying to

01:45:09.927 --> 01:45:12.093
get them there and are you , are you .

01:45:12.093 --> 01:45:13.982
Staffing when they are there . So

01:45:13.982 --> 01:45:16.149
Senator , we're not paying for them to

01:45:16.149 --> 01:45:18.371
arrive at I guess a more transcon would

01:45:18.371 --> 01:45:20.149
probably be able to answer that

01:45:20.149 --> 01:45:22.149
question there , uh , as far as our

01:45:22.149 --> 01:45:23.982
role is to provide safe , humane

01:45:23.982 --> 01:45:25.816
treatment of those , uh , in the

01:45:25.816 --> 01:45:27.816
facility , uh , to be clear , we've

01:45:27.816 --> 01:45:30.038
done this mission before from a migrant

01:45:30.038 --> 01:45:32.205
standpoint . I plan . Every year for a

01:45:32.205 --> 01:45:34.427
uh mass migration scenario so it's kind

01:45:34.427 --> 01:45:34.395
of a modification to the existing

01:45:34.395 --> 01:45:36.339
mission and again to bring them on

01:45:36.339 --> 01:45:38.794
board . The role of the uh military

01:45:38.794 --> 01:45:41.475
forces there is to provide uh uh

01:45:41.475 --> 01:45:44.225
supplies , food , care , shelter , uh ,

01:45:44.234 --> 01:45:48.049
medical support at this time . Well ,

01:45:48.200 --> 01:45:50.839
uh , I , I guess we , uh , have a lot

01:45:50.839 --> 01:45:52.672
of things to worry about in that

01:45:52.672 --> 01:45:55.000
whether it in , um , whether it impedes

01:45:55.000 --> 01:45:56.722
our readiness from a readiness

01:45:56.722 --> 01:45:58.667
perspective having to take care of

01:45:58.667 --> 01:46:00.556
migrants takes you away from your

01:46:00.556 --> 01:46:02.722
mission , but I , I'll move on because

01:46:02.722 --> 01:46:04.944
we only have 3 minutes . I want to talk

01:46:04.944 --> 01:46:06.833
to you , Admiral Halsey now about

01:46:06.833 --> 01:46:08.889
critical language skills because the

01:46:08.889 --> 01:46:11.000
Department of Defense is increasingly

01:46:11.000 --> 01:46:13.056
making investments on countering the

01:46:13.056 --> 01:46:15.111
People's Republic of China . Uh , we

01:46:15.111 --> 01:46:17.389
know they are a major threat to us and .

01:46:17.389 --> 01:46:19.611
Are there any concerns regarding a lack

01:46:19.611 --> 01:46:21.444
of language expertise needed for

01:46:21.444 --> 01:46:21.330
countries in SOCOM area of

01:46:21.330 --> 01:46:23.680
responsibility , especially considering

01:46:23.680 --> 01:46:25.791
the evolving situation at Gitmo , the

01:46:25.791 --> 01:46:27.569
potential need for more Spanish

01:46:27.569 --> 01:46:30.290
speakers , and how will the elimination

01:46:30.290 --> 01:46:32.919
of some of these diversity initiatives

01:46:32.930 --> 01:46:35.209
impact your ability to recruit and

01:46:35.209 --> 01:46:37.799
retain linguists , people who speak all

01:46:37.799 --> 01:46:39.632
of the different languages speak

01:46:39.632 --> 01:46:42.129
Chinese , um , to enable your critical

01:46:42.129 --> 01:46:45.330
mission . And to be clear , uh , uh ,

01:46:45.439 --> 01:46:47.217
Senator , we are a war fighting

01:46:47.217 --> 01:46:48.828
organization . It's our most

01:46:48.828 --> 01:46:50.772
fundamental duty is support in the

01:46:50.772 --> 01:46:52.995
Constitution , to ensure the safety and

01:46:52.995 --> 01:46:52.339
security of the American people . We

01:46:52.339 --> 01:46:54.339
look for talent throughout and so I

01:46:54.339 --> 01:46:56.561
think right now as I look at the , uh ,

01:46:56.561 --> 01:46:58.728
critical skills , uh , language skills

01:46:58.728 --> 01:47:00.950
in the , uh , so . throughout my entire

01:47:00.950 --> 01:47:03.061
headquarters . I'm , uh , have , uh ,

01:47:03.061 --> 01:47:05.228
several , uh , multilingual people and

01:47:05.228 --> 01:47:07.228
then , uh , we've been able to hire

01:47:07.228 --> 01:47:09.283
folks as well . We'll continue to do

01:47:09.283 --> 01:47:11.506
that and , uh , and that's kind of my ,

01:47:11.506 --> 01:47:13.617
uh , uh point to be made there this .

01:47:13.617 --> 01:47:15.950
Well , we just wanna be sure you're not ,

01:47:15.950 --> 01:47:18.117
um . Hampered in doing that because it

01:47:18.117 --> 01:47:20.061
is critical to have those language

01:47:20.061 --> 01:47:22.228
skills , um , I wanna move on and talk

01:47:22.228 --> 01:47:23.895
about , uh , with General Gio

01:47:23.895 --> 01:47:25.895
safeguarding domain awareness , you

01:47:25.895 --> 01:47:28.117
know , our competitors continue to feel

01:47:28.117 --> 01:47:30.172
advanced capabilities across domains

01:47:30.172 --> 01:47:32.395
that have the potential to threaten the

01:47:32.395 --> 01:47:34.561
homeland . In light of these threats ,

01:47:34.561 --> 01:47:36.783
North Northcom and NORAD have to ensure

01:47:36.783 --> 01:47:39.006
that the systems providing the homeland

01:47:39.006 --> 01:47:41.172
with domain awareness are survivable ,

01:47:41.172 --> 01:47:43.350
adaptable , and modern . In addition ,

01:47:43.720 --> 01:47:45.950
The systems must be hardened as they're

01:47:45.950 --> 01:47:47.910
going to be subject to an array of

01:47:47.910 --> 01:47:50.700
cyber attacks during any contingency .

01:47:50.870 --> 01:47:52.759
I'm encouraged by your efforts to

01:47:52.759 --> 01:47:54.750
modernize , but what steps are you

01:47:54.750 --> 01:47:56.917
currently taking to harden our command

01:47:56.917 --> 01:47:59.139
and control nodes , particularly in the

01:47:59.139 --> 01:48:01.083
cyber domain so that we're able to

01:48:01.083 --> 01:48:03.194
effectively share operational picture

01:48:03.194 --> 01:48:05.669
during a potential conflict ? Senator ,

01:48:05.729 --> 01:48:07.729
as you alluded to , the , uh , most

01:48:07.729 --> 01:48:09.840
persistent and present threat that we

01:48:09.840 --> 01:48:11.790
face in , uh , the NorthCO area of

01:48:11.790 --> 01:48:13.734
responsibility every day is in the

01:48:13.734 --> 01:48:15.959
cyber domain with hundreds or maybe

01:48:15.959 --> 01:48:18.229
even thousands of attacks or attempted

01:48:18.229 --> 01:48:21.410
attacks on our networks . So we , uh ,

01:48:21.430 --> 01:48:23.152
the way we harden that is , is

01:48:23.152 --> 01:48:25.540
primarily through , uh , uh , cyber

01:48:25.540 --> 01:48:27.762
protection teams that that we have that

01:48:27.762 --> 01:48:30.069
first look at our , uh , unique NORAD

01:48:30.069 --> 01:48:33.540
and NORCO , uh . Computer systems and

01:48:33.540 --> 01:48:36.729
networks and then across the uh DOD

01:48:36.729 --> 01:48:39.180
network uh in partnership with Cyber

01:48:39.180 --> 01:48:41.379
Command uh to make sure that those are

01:48:41.379 --> 01:48:43.546
protected and then when you go outside

01:48:43.546 --> 01:48:45.546
of that ring we look at uh critical

01:48:45.546 --> 01:48:49.379
infrastructure uh for uh uh uh

01:48:49.379 --> 01:48:51.379
capabilities that not only help the

01:48:51.379 --> 01:48:53.712
American citizens but also help the DOD .

01:48:53.712 --> 01:48:55.490
And then it's uh it's there's 4

01:48:55.490 --> 01:48:58.410
partners we have there the and 3 others

01:48:58.410 --> 01:49:01.330
in addition to Northcom CyberCom , uh ,

01:49:01.470 --> 01:49:04.140
the FBI and CISA , and we work very

01:49:04.140 --> 01:49:06.509
well with them , uh , to monitor the

01:49:06.509 --> 01:49:09.629
cyber , uh , uh , domain , uh , to

01:49:09.629 --> 01:49:11.685
ensure that all of those systems are

01:49:11.685 --> 01:49:13.700
protected . Thank you . Thank you ,

01:49:13.830 --> 01:49:15.886
Senator Rosen . Senator Tuberville .

01:49:15.970 --> 01:49:18.192
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Gentlemen ,

01:49:18.192 --> 01:49:20.414
thank you for being here and thanks for

01:49:20.414 --> 01:49:22.470
your service . Good visit with you ,

01:49:22.470 --> 01:49:24.414
both of you . You got tough jobs .

01:49:24.810 --> 01:49:26.699
General , um , you talked in your

01:49:26.699 --> 01:49:29.240
opening statement about the cooperation

01:49:29.240 --> 01:49:30.962
and the coming together of our

01:49:30.962 --> 01:49:34.839
adversaries . Uh What do we need

01:49:34.839 --> 01:49:36.895
to do and what do you need to do for

01:49:36.895 --> 01:49:39.359
the next 3 or 4 years to protect our

01:49:39.359 --> 01:49:41.879
country from those coalitions that are

01:49:41.879 --> 01:49:44.101
coming together , possibly for a threat

01:49:44.101 --> 01:49:47.959
to us ? Senator , first we need

01:49:47.959 --> 01:49:50.160
to continue to work on our ability to

01:49:50.160 --> 01:49:53.669
detect their activities , um . Not only

01:49:53.669 --> 01:49:55.613
are they working together but even

01:49:55.613 --> 01:49:57.780
independently they're increasing their

01:49:57.780 --> 01:50:00.259
own uh capabilities and they can uh

01:50:00.709 --> 01:50:02.876
they can affect us from further ranges

01:50:02.876 --> 01:50:04.542
than they could in years past

01:50:04.542 --> 01:50:06.709
individually and certainly combined uh

01:50:06.709 --> 01:50:08.876
that just magnifies that challenge and

01:50:08.876 --> 01:50:11.042
so our ability to detect them from all

01:50:11.042 --> 01:50:13.209
domains under sea all the way to space

01:50:13.390 --> 01:50:15.557
is , is the first so we can watch what

01:50:15.557 --> 01:50:17.557
they're doing and have awareness of

01:50:17.557 --> 01:50:19.723
what they're doing and then after that

01:50:19.723 --> 01:50:21.834
is just presence not only with the US

01:50:21.834 --> 01:50:23.779
uh forces but within our command .

01:50:23.779 --> 01:50:25.779
Anything that we can do uh with the

01:50:25.779 --> 01:50:28.259
Canadian Forces to show that uh we can

01:50:28.509 --> 01:50:30.676
one detect them and to respond to them

01:50:30.870 --> 01:50:32.814
in order to deter their activities

01:50:32.814 --> 01:50:34.981
would be the second uh emphasis that I

01:50:34.981 --> 01:50:37.203
have . That's the other question I want

01:50:37.203 --> 01:50:39.148
to ask you as we speak , how's our

01:50:39.148 --> 01:50:41.314
working relationship with our Canadian

01:50:41.314 --> 01:50:43.259
partners up North ? Senator , on a

01:50:43.259 --> 01:50:45.259
military to military , uh , basis ,

01:50:45.549 --> 01:50:48.259
it's outstanding . Uh , they are , it's

01:50:48.259 --> 01:50:51.129
uh NORAD is a binational command . And

01:50:51.129 --> 01:50:53.185
so they're partnered with the United

01:50:53.185 --> 01:50:55.450
States at every level uh of of the

01:50:55.450 --> 01:50:57.799
command and we we talked earlier about

01:50:57.799 --> 01:51:00.450
the uh first time ever the Chinese and

01:51:00.450 --> 01:51:02.339
the Russians flew together in the

01:51:02.339 --> 01:51:05.250
Arctic . Our intercept of that was with

01:51:05.250 --> 01:51:07.194
US and Canadian fighters that were

01:51:07.194 --> 01:51:09.859
completely integrated . Uh , so at the

01:51:09.859 --> 01:51:12.370
mil to mill level , uh , in NORAD ,

01:51:12.379 --> 01:51:14.379
it's , it's excellent and then also

01:51:14.379 --> 01:51:16.799
between Northcom and CAC , uh , the

01:51:16.799 --> 01:51:19.077
Canadian Joint Operations Command , uh ,

01:51:19.077 --> 01:51:21.077
there's several times where we have

01:51:21.077 --> 01:51:23.370
Russian or Chinese ships out in the ,

01:51:23.459 --> 01:51:26.140
uh , Arctic that are being patrolled by

01:51:26.140 --> 01:51:28.939
the Canadians , uh , out of US bases ,

01:51:28.950 --> 01:51:31.172
uh , to , to build that , uh , strength

01:51:31.172 --> 01:51:33.061
and relationship we have . Yeah ,

01:51:33.061 --> 01:51:35.283
speaking of the Arctic , do we actually

01:51:35.283 --> 01:51:38.089
have a icebreaker that works now ? Uh ,

01:51:38.240 --> 01:51:40.296
the , the Coast Guard , uh , has one

01:51:40.296 --> 01:51:42.462
that is , uh , was just repaired , but

01:51:42.462 --> 01:51:44.796
unfortunately it was out of service for ,

01:51:44.796 --> 01:51:47.018
uh , a , a period of time over the last

01:51:47.018 --> 01:51:49.240
few months , yeah . We obviously need ,

01:51:49.240 --> 01:51:51.462
need to add to that , I would , I would

01:51:51.462 --> 01:51:54.560
imagine , uh . Admiral . You and I

01:51:54.560 --> 01:51:56.560
talked about cell drones which were

01:51:56.560 --> 01:51:58.770
made in my great state of Alabama and

01:51:58.770 --> 01:52:02.160
uh Uh , can you give us this group a

01:52:02.160 --> 01:52:04.200
kind of a rundown of what you think

01:52:04.200 --> 01:52:06.040
about cell drones , your , your

01:52:06.040 --> 01:52:08.207
experience and the need , but probably

01:52:08.207 --> 01:52:10.318
for more all over the world . We have

01:52:10.318 --> 01:52:12.373
them in the Indo-Pacific and we have

01:52:12.373 --> 01:52:14.096
them in the Caribbean and your

01:52:14.096 --> 01:52:16.373
experience with cell drones . Uh , yes ,

01:52:16.373 --> 01:52:18.540
Senator over the last , uh , couple of

01:52:18.540 --> 01:52:20.707
years , uh , we've seen a decrement in

01:52:20.707 --> 01:52:22.929
Navy assets in the region and one thing

01:52:22.929 --> 01:52:25.151
that Navy has done with this new hybrid

01:52:25.151 --> 01:52:27.373
fleet , uh , out of , uh , NAVS South ,

01:52:27.373 --> 01:52:27.160
they've , uh , we've been able to

01:52:27.160 --> 01:52:28.993
incorporate cell drones into our

01:52:28.993 --> 01:52:31.271
mission sets . Uh , they provide great ,

01:52:31.271 --> 01:52:33.216
uh , domain awareness , and , uh ,

01:52:33.216 --> 01:52:34.993
right now we're doing Operation

01:52:34.993 --> 01:52:37.049
Southern Spear where I where at this

01:52:37.049 --> 01:52:39.216
point we'll have , uh , cell drones in

01:52:39.216 --> 01:52:41.438
the in the Caribbean and in the Eastern

01:52:41.438 --> 01:52:43.438
Pacific along with . Other unmanned

01:52:43.438 --> 01:52:45.382
assets to counter the drug fight ,

01:52:45.382 --> 01:52:45.060
right , so it gives me more maritime

01:52:45.060 --> 01:52:47.459
domain awareness and uh it it helps our

01:52:47.459 --> 01:52:49.570
partners as well because we're trying

01:52:49.570 --> 01:52:51.626
to bring them into this piece and so

01:52:51.626 --> 01:52:53.792
they have a better understanding . One

01:52:53.792 --> 01:52:53.020
thing our partners continue to ask for

01:52:53.020 --> 01:52:55.100
is uh domain awareness , uh , intel

01:52:55.100 --> 01:52:57.267
sharing . So again , uh , having those

01:52:57.267 --> 01:52:59.709
assets in the region , uh , for a lack

01:52:59.709 --> 01:53:01.876
of other assets is making a difference

01:53:01.876 --> 01:53:04.042
for me . Used for what main reason are

01:53:04.042 --> 01:53:05.987
they used for as we speak for drug

01:53:05.987 --> 01:53:08.153
runners . So right now it's a maritime

01:53:08.153 --> 01:53:09.820
domain awareness , so overall

01:53:09.820 --> 01:53:09.770
surveillance , right ? So they actually

01:53:09.770 --> 01:53:11.992
have the , the capability to patch back

01:53:11.992 --> 01:53:14.159
to our , our mock a maritime operation

01:53:14.159 --> 01:53:16.381
center in Na South . uh , so again they

01:53:16.381 --> 01:53:18.492
can pick up contacts and it completes

01:53:18.492 --> 01:53:20.159
the picture , right , and the

01:53:20.159 --> 01:53:22.381
information can sell . So if you spread

01:53:22.381 --> 01:53:24.437
these assets out they can cover more

01:53:24.437 --> 01:53:26.492
domain as opposed to just one ship .

01:53:26.492 --> 01:53:26.319
Yeah , as we speak , how many do you

01:53:26.319 --> 01:53:28.759
have operable in the Caribbean ? So

01:53:28.759 --> 01:53:31.720
right now I have uh I have 8 operation

01:53:31.720 --> 01:53:33.776
in the Caribbean and 3 in the , uh ,

01:53:33.776 --> 01:53:35.887
Eastern Pacific and more flowing in .

01:53:35.887 --> 01:53:37.887
So I have a total of 20 here in the

01:53:37.887 --> 01:53:39.776
next , uh , uh , couple of days .

01:53:39.776 --> 01:53:41.776
That's great . Well , we appreciate

01:53:41.776 --> 01:53:41.680
what what both of you do and anything

01:53:41.680 --> 01:53:43.902
we can do to help , let us know . Thank

01:53:43.902 --> 01:53:45.791
you , Mr . Chairman . Thank you ,

01:53:45.791 --> 01:53:48.069
Senator Tuberville . Senator Duckworth .

01:53:48.069 --> 01:53:50.236
Yeah , it's my turn . Thank you , Mr .

01:53:50.236 --> 01:53:52.709
Chairman and ranking member Reed , um .

01:53:53.060 --> 01:53:55.116
The number of troops assigned to the

01:53:55.116 --> 01:53:57.060
border mission continues to grow .

01:53:57.060 --> 01:53:59.282
We've had this discussion today , and ,

01:53:59.282 --> 01:54:01.282
but I want to emphasize it with the

01:54:01.282 --> 01:54:03.504
total expected to reach at least , uh ,

01:54:03.504 --> 01:54:05.727
uh , 3600 , and I think , General , you

01:54:05.727 --> 01:54:05.089
testified that it'll be maybe even

01:54:05.089 --> 01:54:07.299
upwards getting closer to 5000

01:54:07.299 --> 01:54:09.689
potentially . Um , this number includes

01:54:09.689 --> 01:54:11.800
some of our most experienced infantry

01:54:11.800 --> 01:54:13.689
and support units . Are we really

01:54:13.689 --> 01:54:15.911
preparing for a great power competition

01:54:15.911 --> 01:54:18.245
with the communist , uh , uh , uh , PRC ,

01:54:18.245 --> 01:54:20.245
or are we asking our marines to lay

01:54:20.245 --> 01:54:22.411
concertina wire at the border ? Are we

01:54:22.411 --> 01:54:24.633
asking our pilots to be combat ready or

01:54:24.633 --> 01:54:26.856
are they supporting deportation flights

01:54:26.856 --> 01:54:29.078
as we consider the ways that responding

01:54:29.078 --> 01:54:28.680
to these missions in NorthCOM and

01:54:28.680 --> 01:54:30.736
SouthCOM is impacting the military's

01:54:30.736 --> 01:54:33.040
ability to focus on the primary mission

01:54:33.040 --> 01:54:34.984
of great power competition and war

01:54:34.984 --> 01:54:37.040
fighting , we need to also factor in

01:54:37.040 --> 01:54:39.151
uncertain but rapidly increasing cost

01:54:39.151 --> 01:54:41.899
of DOD support at Guantanamo Bay . On

01:54:41.899 --> 01:54:43.621
January 29th , President Trump

01:54:43.621 --> 01:54:45.510
greenlighted the expansion of the

01:54:45.510 --> 01:54:47.700
migrant Operations Center or MOC at

01:54:47.700 --> 01:54:49.811
Guantanamo Bay , and as you're likely

01:54:49.811 --> 01:54:52.033
where this expansion comes with a range

01:54:52.033 --> 01:54:54.144
of costs that will impact the overall

01:54:54.144 --> 01:54:56.256
budget , everything from medical care

01:54:56.256 --> 01:54:56.060
and sanitation to education for

01:54:56.060 --> 01:54:58.459
migrants , as well as expenses tied to

01:54:58.459 --> 01:55:01.049
deploying military personnel to Gitmo .

01:55:01.140 --> 01:55:03.196
Admiral Halsey , could you provide a

01:55:03.196 --> 01:55:05.418
breakdown of the timeline and projected

01:55:05.418 --> 01:55:07.307
construction costs for increasing

01:55:07.307 --> 01:55:09.362
Gitmo's capacity to 30,000 people as

01:55:09.362 --> 01:55:11.584
outlined by the president's directive ?

01:55:12.709 --> 01:55:14.765
So at this time , uh , we're doing a

01:55:14.765 --> 01:55:16.765
phase approach . So right now we'll

01:55:16.765 --> 01:55:18.987
have a capability for about 2500 , uh ,

01:55:18.987 --> 01:55:21.153
cots , and that plan is gonna go up if

01:55:21.153 --> 01:55:23.153
we continue to phase it in , and we

01:55:23.153 --> 01:55:25.431
haven't decided that yet . I'm waiting ,

01:55:25.431 --> 01:55:24.930
uh , for the direction . So at the

01:55:24.930 --> 01:55:26.819
initial point I don't have a cost

01:55:26.819 --> 01:55:29.097
estimate of what would take for 30,000 ,

01:55:29.097 --> 01:55:31.319
uh , so right now we're still in the in

01:55:31.319 --> 01:55:33.486
the MC phase of it . Well , you have a

01:55:33.486 --> 01:55:33.410
presidential directive . Have you not

01:55:33.410 --> 01:55:35.529
started planning for to fulfill that

01:55:35.529 --> 01:55:37.585
directive ? So right now again we're

01:55:37.585 --> 01:55:40.669
it's a a a staged approach , uh , a

01:55:40.669 --> 01:55:42.725
tailored approach , right ? So right

01:55:42.725 --> 01:55:44.891
now we won't necessarily go , we don't

01:55:44.891 --> 01:55:44.850
know , we're working with DHS to

01:55:44.850 --> 01:55:47.128
understand the flow of , uh , migrants ,

01:55:47.128 --> 01:55:49.294
so we're not gonna go , we won't go to

01:55:49.294 --> 01:55:51.517
30,000 unless we know that migrant flow

01:55:51.517 --> 01:55:51.250
will come . So we're , we're waiting at

01:55:51.250 --> 01:55:53.930
this point . Well , as that process ,

01:55:53.970 --> 01:55:56.081
that planning process moves forward ,

01:55:56.081 --> 01:55:58.248
can you get me that those data ? Yes ,

01:55:58.740 --> 01:56:01.018
yes , we work through the uh OSD , yes .

01:56:01.180 --> 01:56:04.140
Thank you . The fiscal year , uh , 17

01:56:04.140 --> 01:56:06.850
MLCO actually , uh , a project for mass

01:56:06.850 --> 01:56:08.794
migration complex was actually for

01:56:08.794 --> 01:56:11.180
13,000 migrants , and it cost $33

01:56:11.180 --> 01:56:13.700
million in FY17 MLCO just as a

01:56:13.700 --> 01:56:15.859
comparison . It stands to reason that

01:56:15.859 --> 01:56:17.970
an expansion to more than double that

01:56:17.970 --> 01:56:20.299
capacity nearly 10 years later would

01:56:20.299 --> 01:56:22.620
almost most certainly cost much more

01:56:22.620 --> 01:56:24.842
than the $33 million that was projected

01:56:24.842 --> 01:56:27.899
to cost in FY17 . In addition to

01:56:27.899 --> 01:56:29.990
facilities costs in 2019 , the

01:56:29.990 --> 01:56:32.046
commander of detention ops estimated

01:56:32.046 --> 01:56:34.046
that it cost more than $100,000 for

01:56:34.046 --> 01:56:36.589
each guard . Each guard's nine month

01:56:36.589 --> 01:56:38.709
deployment to Gitmo cost taxpayers

01:56:38.709 --> 01:56:41.419
$100,000 . Admiral Holte , do you have ,

01:56:42.189 --> 01:56:44.411
um , as you're doing this , do you have

01:56:44.411 --> 01:56:46.411
an estimate for the personnel costs

01:56:46.411 --> 01:56:48.467
associated with this effort even for

01:56:48.467 --> 01:56:50.689
the 1st 2500 ? No , we do not yet , but

01:56:50.689 --> 01:56:52.770
I can say that the cost of running

01:56:52.770 --> 01:56:56.040
Gitmo at this point , just the facility ,

01:56:56.330 --> 01:56:58.108
the last several years has been

01:56:58.108 --> 01:57:00.108
approximately $100 million and $100

01:57:00.108 --> 01:57:02.330
million per year , yes , for the , uh ,

01:57:02.330 --> 01:57:04.386
JTF Gitmo facility along with the uh

01:57:04.386 --> 01:57:06.441
rotational force that comes in . And

01:57:06.441 --> 01:57:08.774
how many , how many detainees are there ?

01:57:08.774 --> 01:57:11.649
Uh , currently there are 30 detainees ,

01:57:11.660 --> 01:57:13.549
15 La War detainees , and then

01:57:13.549 --> 01:57:16.520
approximately 68 , uh , other detainees ,

01:57:16.649 --> 01:57:18.705
uh , detainees , but migrants , uh ,

01:57:18.705 --> 01:57:21.640
from the , uh , DHS . So to house 118

01:57:21.770 --> 01:57:24.439
detainees there and to maintain Gitmo ,

01:57:24.490 --> 01:57:27.009
it's costing taxpayers $100 million

01:57:27.009 --> 01:57:29.231
currently and we're gonna project to go

01:57:29.231 --> 01:57:31.009
up to $30 million for the Gitmo

01:57:31.009 --> 01:57:33.209
facility for the Gitmo facility just a

01:57:33.209 --> 01:57:35.430
facility , so the cost would be much

01:57:35.430 --> 01:57:38.580
higher than that . Um , what is the

01:57:38.580 --> 01:57:40.747
source of funding for the expansion of

01:57:40.747 --> 01:57:44.049
the MOC ? So right now as

01:57:44.049 --> 01:57:46.890
the forces flow in the services are

01:57:46.890 --> 01:57:48.723
bearing the initial cost for the

01:57:48.723 --> 01:57:50.723
initial flow and uh so that's where

01:57:50.723 --> 01:57:52.834
it's at right now , the services . So

01:57:52.834 --> 01:57:54.668
it's coming out of the service's

01:57:54.668 --> 01:57:56.834
pockets . What priorities will be left

01:57:56.834 --> 01:57:56.689
unfunded as a result of this shift in

01:57:56.689 --> 01:57:59.939
priorities ? I can't answer that ,

01:57:59.979 --> 01:58:01.923
ma'am . I think we have to ask the

01:58:01.923 --> 01:58:05.649
services OK . Um , I would also like to

01:58:05.649 --> 01:58:07.538
address accountability on the DOD

01:58:07.538 --> 01:58:09.482
flights . Admi Mayor Hoy , what is

01:58:09.482 --> 01:58:11.205
being done to ensure that risk

01:58:11.205 --> 01:58:13.316
mitigated is mitigated for pilots and

01:58:13.316 --> 01:58:15.482
what security measures are in place to

01:58:15.482 --> 01:58:17.689
manage the personnel on board ? Right

01:58:17.689 --> 01:58:20.049
now , the DHS actually are controls

01:58:20.049 --> 01:58:22.327
those flights along with Transcom . Uh ,

01:58:22.327 --> 01:58:24.160
Transcon probably have better uh

01:58:24.160 --> 01:58:26.271
understanding of the flow of migrants

01:58:26.271 --> 01:58:26.149
to their , uh , what they do on their

01:58:26.149 --> 01:58:28.370
air on the aircraft . So Transcom is

01:58:28.370 --> 01:58:30.839
responsible for the safety of the crew

01:58:30.839 --> 01:58:33.100
of the aircraft on those flights . Uh

01:58:33.100 --> 01:58:35.709
yes ma'am . I , I do think um that we

01:58:35.709 --> 01:58:38.390
need to run this down , um , and , and

01:58:38.390 --> 01:58:40.501
if the DOD does not take ownership of

01:58:40.501 --> 01:58:42.910
migrants boarding their aircraft , who

01:58:42.910 --> 01:58:44.966
on board the aircraft is responsible

01:58:44.966 --> 01:58:46.132
for the passengers ?

01:58:49.709 --> 01:58:51.765
Again , I would say that uh Transcom

01:58:51.765 --> 01:58:53.820
has a plan in place , uh , and , and

01:58:53.820 --> 01:58:55.820
Transcom would better have that the

01:58:55.820 --> 01:58:57.653
understanding of how they , uh ,

01:58:57.653 --> 01:58:59.820
protect the aircraft in flight . A lot

01:58:59.820 --> 01:58:59.529
of unanswered questions . Thank you .

01:58:59.859 --> 01:59:02.899
Thank you , Admiral , indeed and um .

01:59:03.709 --> 01:59:05.931
Senator Duckworth , this is part of our

01:59:05.931 --> 01:59:08.549
oversight responsibility . And , um ,

01:59:08.669 --> 01:59:12.350
and so I appreciate the member's uh uh

01:59:12.350 --> 01:59:14.406
participation today . This concludes

01:59:14.406 --> 01:59:16.517
the open portion of today's hearing .

01:59:16.517 --> 01:59:18.517
I'd like to thank our witnesses for

01:59:18.517 --> 01:59:20.628
their testimony . For the information

01:59:20.628 --> 01:59:22.628
of members questions for the record

01:59:22.628 --> 01:59:24.739
will be due to the committee within 2

01:59:24.739 --> 01:59:27.430
business days of the conclusion of this

01:59:27.430 --> 01:59:30.000
hearing . We will commence the closed

01:59:30.000 --> 01:59:32.799
portion of this hearing . In Senate

01:59:32.799 --> 01:59:36.330
security in 15 minutes , we are

01:59:36.330 --> 01:59:39.529
rescessed until 11:45 a.m.