1 00:00:00,500 --> 00:00:02,839 The readiness subcommittee today meets 2 00:00:02,839 --> 00:00:06,010 to receive testimony on the posture of 3 00:00:06,010 --> 00:00:07,889 the United States Transportation 4 00:00:07,889 --> 00:00:10,640 Command US Transom , and I wanna thank 5 00:00:10,640 --> 00:00:13,060 our witness this afternoon , General 6 00:00:13,060 --> 00:00:15,227 Reid , for being here today , sir , it 7 00:00:15,227 --> 00:00:17,504 was good meeting with you earlier , uh , 8 00:00:17,504 --> 00:00:19,560 in the week . I wanna say up front , 9 00:00:19,560 --> 00:00:21,870 Transom , uh , is a very , very 10 00:00:21,870 --> 00:00:24,840 important combatant command . It's not 11 00:00:24,840 --> 00:00:26,896 the one that you always hear about , 12 00:00:26,896 --> 00:00:28,784 but it's really critical . To our 13 00:00:28,784 --> 00:00:30,729 military , our readiness , and our 14 00:00:30,780 --> 00:00:33,529 ability to win wars , and our ability 15 00:00:33,529 --> 00:00:36,250 to project power and sustain our forces . 16 00:00:36,979 --> 00:00:39,099 As a senator from Alaska , I'm keenly 17 00:00:39,099 --> 00:00:41,043 aware of the unique challenges and 18 00:00:41,043 --> 00:00:44,459 strategic opportunities . Our state 19 00:00:44,459 --> 00:00:46,292 presents in the broader national 20 00:00:46,292 --> 00:00:48,348 security landscape , but we are also 21 00:00:48,348 --> 00:00:50,403 operating in an area where logistics 22 00:00:50,403 --> 00:00:53,560 and sustainment are no longer a given 23 00:00:53,560 --> 00:00:56,209 in any potential conflict . What used 24 00:00:56,209 --> 00:00:59,009 to be an asterisk or an incorrect 25 00:00:59,369 --> 00:01:01,369 assumption or what they call in the 26 00:01:01,369 --> 00:01:05,040 military fairy dusting away , a problem , 27 00:01:05,400 --> 00:01:08,839 uh , on DOD's part with regard to 28 00:01:08,839 --> 00:01:12,339 sustained . And contested logistics has 29 00:01:12,339 --> 00:01:14,980 allowed our adversaries such as China 30 00:01:14,980 --> 00:01:16,702 and Russia to actively develop 31 00:01:16,702 --> 00:01:19,459 capabilities aimed at disrupting our 32 00:01:19,459 --> 00:01:23,019 mobility and sustainment operations 33 00:01:23,019 --> 00:01:26,290 across multiple domains . Current the 34 00:01:26,300 --> 00:01:28,411 theaters from the Indo-Pacific region 35 00:01:28,411 --> 00:01:30,522 to the Arctic to the European theater 36 00:01:30,522 --> 00:01:32,739 in the Middle East all present 37 00:01:32,739 --> 00:01:35,669 significant . Unique challenges in 38 00:01:35,669 --> 00:01:39,069 military contested logistics . Our 39 00:01:39,069 --> 00:01:41,589 military must ensure that pre-position 40 00:01:41,589 --> 00:01:44,819 stockpiles , robust transportation 41 00:01:44,819 --> 00:01:47,620 networks , and hardened infrastructure 42 00:01:47,620 --> 00:01:51,120 are available to sustain forces in high 43 00:01:51,120 --> 00:01:53,750 end conflicts . I'm particularly 44 00:01:53,750 --> 00:01:56,430 interested in how Transom is addressed 45 00:01:56,430 --> 00:01:59,500 in contested logistics through enhanced 46 00:01:59,500 --> 00:02:02,919 resiliency . In sea lift , airlift , 47 00:02:03,220 --> 00:02:06,610 and overland transportation , I would 48 00:02:06,610 --> 00:02:08,499 also like to hear your thoughts , 49 00:02:08,499 --> 00:02:10,721 General , on how we can better leverage 50 00:02:10,721 --> 00:02:12,443 infrastructure , our ports and 51 00:02:12,443 --> 00:02:14,889 airfields to strengthen our power 52 00:02:14,889 --> 00:02:16,889 projection capabilities in both the 53 00:02:16,889 --> 00:02:20,490 Arctic and the Indo-Pacific regions 54 00:02:20,809 --> 00:02:23,479 as to as the Air Force looks to the KC 55 00:02:23,479 --> 00:02:26,690 46 and other next generation programs 56 00:02:26,690 --> 00:02:29,949 for its air refueling needs . We cannot 57 00:02:29,949 --> 00:02:31,919 forget about the programs that are 58 00:02:31,919 --> 00:02:34,839 actually doing today's missions . The 59 00:02:34,839 --> 00:02:38,360 KC-135 has been a cornerstone of the US 60 00:02:38,360 --> 00:02:41,399 Air Force's air mobility and refueling 61 00:02:41,399 --> 00:02:44,720 capabilities since the 1950s . 62 00:02:45,580 --> 00:02:47,802 That's not an incorrect statement since 63 00:02:47,802 --> 00:02:51,360 the 1950s , but it needs advances in 64 00:02:51,360 --> 00:02:54,110 technology to evolve with military 65 00:02:54,110 --> 00:02:56,250 needs . While this is not a budget 66 00:02:56,250 --> 00:02:58,417 hearing today , I hope General Reed to 67 00:02:58,417 --> 00:03:00,649 hear about how Transcom has informed 68 00:03:00,649 --> 00:03:03,690 the Air Force's tanker strategy moving 69 00:03:03,690 --> 00:03:06,289 forward , especially in light of the 70 00:03:06,289 --> 00:03:09,729 long delays in KC-46 deliveries and 71 00:03:09,729 --> 00:03:12,809 recent reports about cracks in certain 72 00:03:12,809 --> 00:03:15,610 components of the aircraft . Air 73 00:03:15,610 --> 00:03:17,777 refueling tankers play a vital role in 74 00:03:17,777 --> 00:03:19,832 extending the range and endurance of 75 00:03:19,832 --> 00:03:21,710 fighter aircraft , bombers , 76 00:03:21,800 --> 00:03:24,240 surveillance planes , enabling them to 77 00:03:24,240 --> 00:03:26,309 perform long range missions without 78 00:03:26,309 --> 00:03:28,600 relying on forward operating bases . 79 00:03:29,330 --> 00:03:31,589 They are crucial to America's Fight 80 00:03:31,589 --> 00:03:34,130 tonight mandate and as we talked about 81 00:03:34,130 --> 00:03:37,169 earlier , uh , general , uh , this 82 00:03:37,169 --> 00:03:39,391 morning , they're actually very crucial 83 00:03:39,391 --> 00:03:41,336 in my home state of Alaska , where 84 00:03:41,336 --> 00:03:44,660 Russian and Chinese incursions into our 85 00:03:44,660 --> 00:03:47,960 aid is over the last year have spiked . 86 00:03:48,369 --> 00:03:50,147 The men and women who fly these 87 00:03:50,147 --> 00:03:52,130 intercept missions from Alaska do 88 00:03:52,130 --> 00:03:55,770 nearly 2000 mile round trips . To 89 00:03:55,770 --> 00:03:58,330 intercept Russian and Chinese strategic 90 00:03:58,330 --> 00:04:01,119 bombers , and they of course rely 91 00:04:01,119 --> 00:04:04,779 heavily on Transom tankers to get them 92 00:04:04,779 --> 00:04:07,320 to the intercept and to get them home 93 00:04:07,690 --> 00:04:10,009 safely . We also want to hear about the 94 00:04:10,009 --> 00:04:12,231 challenges with regard to ship building 95 00:04:12,369 --> 00:04:15,289 and military sea lift command , which 96 00:04:15,289 --> 00:04:19,170 is another element of what Transcom 97 00:04:19,170 --> 00:04:22,589 does . And does so well . Modernization 98 00:04:22,589 --> 00:04:25,070 of our sealift capacity must be a top 99 00:04:25,070 --> 00:04:27,869 priority if we are to maintain our 100 00:04:27,869 --> 00:04:30,309 ability to surge forces anywhere in the 101 00:04:30,309 --> 00:04:34,160 world in a crisis . The recently 102 00:04:34,160 --> 00:04:36,929 initiated tanker security program is a 103 00:04:36,929 --> 00:04:39,290 natural progression , but broader 104 00:04:39,290 --> 00:04:41,512 efforts are needed to ensure that we do 105 00:04:41,512 --> 00:04:44,649 not face a mobility crisis in the 106 00:04:44,649 --> 00:04:46,649 coming decade . I'm particularly 107 00:04:46,649 --> 00:04:48,816 interested in hearing about the status 108 00:04:48,816 --> 00:04:51,779 of sea lift recapitalization efforts , 109 00:04:52,089 --> 00:04:54,570 including any challenges Transcom is 110 00:04:54,570 --> 00:04:57,450 encountering so that when the FY26 111 00:04:57,450 --> 00:05:00,269 president budget . Is released we can 112 00:05:00,269 --> 00:05:03,149 follow up to see if funding support is 113 00:05:03,149 --> 00:05:06,549 needed to accelerate modernization 114 00:05:06,549 --> 00:05:09,649 efforts . The well-being of our troops 115 00:05:09,649 --> 00:05:11,760 and their families is obviously a top 116 00:05:11,760 --> 00:05:13,850 priority of this committee . We must 117 00:05:13,850 --> 00:05:17,250 ensure that the different changes that 118 00:05:17,250 --> 00:05:19,760 we've seen in the global household 119 00:05:19,760 --> 00:05:23,649 contract goods challenges are made in a 120 00:05:23,649 --> 00:05:26,149 way that provides seamless transitions 121 00:05:26,489 --> 00:05:28,433 during permanent change of station 122 00:05:28,433 --> 00:05:31,010 moves . General Reid , I look forward 123 00:05:31,010 --> 00:05:34,230 to . getting an update on this program , 124 00:05:34,510 --> 00:05:36,399 um , in light of the challenges . 125 00:05:36,410 --> 00:05:38,410 Finally , I wanna thank the men and 126 00:05:38,410 --> 00:05:41,290 women of US Transom for the critical 127 00:05:41,290 --> 00:05:44,489 work they do every day to sustain our 128 00:05:44,489 --> 00:05:47,290 military forces and project power 129 00:05:47,290 --> 00:05:49,450 globally . Again , this is a . 130 00:05:50,089 --> 00:05:53,320 Incredible combatant command that not 131 00:05:53,320 --> 00:05:54,987 enough Americans know about , 132 00:05:55,359 --> 00:05:57,640 understand and appreciate and this 133 00:05:57,640 --> 00:06:00,049 hearing is in part to help change that . 134 00:06:00,279 --> 00:06:03,070 With that , I wanna recognize ranking 135 00:06:03,070 --> 00:06:05,279 member Senator Hirono for her opening 136 00:06:05,279 --> 00:06:07,350 remarks . Thank you very much , Mr . 137 00:06:07,359 --> 00:06:09,415 Chairman , and , uh , General Reed , 138 00:06:09,415 --> 00:06:11,526 it's good to see you . Thank you very 139 00:06:11,526 --> 00:06:14,109 much for your service . Uh , Senator 140 00:06:14,109 --> 00:06:16,165 Sullivan , it's good to continue our 141 00:06:16,165 --> 00:06:18,387 work on this subcommittee this time you 142 00:06:18,387 --> 00:06:20,553 as chair and me as ranking , so , uh , 143 00:06:20,619 --> 00:06:23,450 we will continue our efforts together . 144 00:06:24,459 --> 00:06:26,348 General Reed , thank you for your 145 00:06:26,348 --> 00:06:28,570 service to our nation , and I thank the 146 00:06:28,570 --> 00:06:31,100 service members under your command 147 00:06:31,100 --> 00:06:33,619 around the globe conducting missions 148 00:06:33,619 --> 00:06:37,179 even as we speak . Transom plays plays 149 00:06:37,179 --> 00:06:39,570 a critical role in the movement of 150 00:06:39,570 --> 00:06:41,980 people , supplies , and equipment 151 00:06:41,980 --> 00:06:45,239 anywhere in the world . Your command 152 00:06:45,239 --> 00:06:48,160 remains the backbone of our military to 153 00:06:48,160 --> 00:06:50,630 ensure the joint force remains agile 154 00:06:50,630 --> 00:06:53,480 and responsive . However , as the 155 00:06:53,480 --> 00:06:55,600 landscape for logistics continues to 156 00:06:55,600 --> 00:06:58,600 evolve , we must adapt to the new 157 00:06:58,600 --> 00:07:02,000 reality . And full spectrum of 158 00:07:02,000 --> 00:07:05,359 emerging threats ranging from cyber 159 00:07:05,359 --> 00:07:08,760 attacks to kinetic strikes on ports and 160 00:07:08,760 --> 00:07:11,519 airfields and we need to recognize that 161 00:07:11,519 --> 00:07:14,160 contested logistics will be a 162 00:07:14,160 --> 00:07:18,049 battlefield in itself . Fortunately the 163 00:07:18,049 --> 00:07:21,864 Air Forces . taking steps to modernize 164 00:07:21,864 --> 00:07:25,424 its aerial refueling fleet , shifting 165 00:07:25,424 --> 00:07:27,785 toward a new tanker design that can 166 00:07:27,785 --> 00:07:30,625 operate in contested environments . The 167 00:07:30,625 --> 00:07:33,904 blended wing body BWB 168 00:07:33,904 --> 00:07:37,545 aircraft is a promising solution 169 00:07:37,545 --> 00:07:40,809 offering . 90% more range 170 00:07:41,100 --> 00:07:44,010 upwards of 50% more fuel efficiency , 171 00:07:44,140 --> 00:07:48,010 80% more fuel off board capability 172 00:07:48,010 --> 00:07:51,989 for sort0 generations , takes up to 40 , 173 00:07:52,140 --> 00:07:55,450 40% less space on airfields , flies 174 00:07:55,450 --> 00:07:59,059 2000 ft higher , and requires . 175 00:07:59,820 --> 00:08:03,239 Less landing and a takeoff distance . 176 00:08:04,339 --> 00:08:06,450 All I can say is wow and very 177 00:08:06,450 --> 00:08:08,728 impressive . We have to make it happen . 178 00:08:09,019 --> 00:08:11,075 Beyond these critical benefits , the 179 00:08:11,075 --> 00:08:13,869 blended wing body design would save . 180 00:08:14,609 --> 00:08:18,570 Uh , and at least $900 million 181 00:08:18,570 --> 00:08:22,450 per year on fuel , $900 182 00:08:22,450 --> 00:08:25,299 million . In the short term , 3D 183 00:08:25,299 --> 00:08:27,970 printed micro veins on transport 184 00:08:27,970 --> 00:08:31,290 aircraft reduced drag pay for itself in 185 00:08:31,290 --> 00:08:34,859 just seven months . And 186 00:08:34,859 --> 00:08:38,140 yield a few percentages on fuel . 187 00:08:39,119 --> 00:08:42,400 As well , while that may not sound like 188 00:08:42,400 --> 00:08:45,679 much at first glance , the DOD spends 189 00:08:45,679 --> 00:08:49,000 over $10 billion each 190 00:08:49,000 --> 00:08:52,880 year on operational energy costs . 191 00:08:53,859 --> 00:08:57,130 To be clear Investing in operational 192 00:08:57,130 --> 00:08:59,489 energy programs is not just about cost 193 00:08:59,489 --> 00:09:01,900 savings it directly enhances our 194 00:09:01,900 --> 00:09:04,700 lethality , readiness , and ability to 195 00:09:04,700 --> 00:09:08,049 sustain operations in the Indo-Pacific 196 00:09:08,049 --> 00:09:12,000 and beyond . Unfortunately , the 197 00:09:12,000 --> 00:09:15,760 Transcom assets have been recently 198 00:09:15,760 --> 00:09:18,960 used in a very inefficient manner and 199 00:09:18,960 --> 00:09:20,904 at great cost to the Department of 200 00:09:20,904 --> 00:09:23,719 Defense , all for , in my view , 201 00:09:23,960 --> 00:09:27,299 political show . The use of C-17s and 202 00:09:27,299 --> 00:09:30,700 C-130s to transport some 203 00:09:30,700 --> 00:09:34,700 5000 migrants at 3 times the 204 00:09:34,700 --> 00:09:38,059 cost of DHS chartered flights and the 205 00:09:38,059 --> 00:09:41,340 DOD electing to do so on a non . 206 00:09:41,900 --> 00:09:44,700 Reimbursable basis is not only 207 00:09:44,700 --> 00:09:47,419 inefficient but also detracts from our 208 00:09:47,419 --> 00:09:50,869 core military mission . Just last year , 209 00:09:50,979 --> 00:09:53,380 the Department of Homeland Security 210 00:09:53,380 --> 00:09:56,900 removed over 685,000 211 00:09:56,900 --> 00:10:00,130 individuals without DOD assistance , 212 00:10:00,859 --> 00:10:03,650 the largest amount of people since 213 00:10:03,650 --> 00:10:07,140 2011 , obviously during the Biden years 214 00:10:07,140 --> 00:10:10,090 that we , DHS managed to do this . Yet 215 00:10:10,090 --> 00:10:13,369 the DOD has opted to fly at least 3 216 00:10:13,369 --> 00:10:15,969 times to India each trip costing 217 00:10:15,969 --> 00:10:19,570 taxpayers over $2.5 million and at 218 00:10:19,570 --> 00:10:23,419 least one of which . Tasked a refueling 219 00:10:23,419 --> 00:10:26,020 tanker to fly from New Jersey to 220 00:10:26,020 --> 00:10:29,570 Honolulu only to return the next day . 221 00:10:29,979 --> 00:10:32,179 Beyond the questionable legal basis 222 00:10:32,179 --> 00:10:34,820 under which this is occurring , I want 223 00:10:34,820 --> 00:10:37,619 to know who is making the decision to 224 00:10:37,619 --> 00:10:41,380 fly in such an inefficient and costly 225 00:10:41,380 --> 00:10:44,419 manner . There was a time when my 226 00:10:44,419 --> 00:10:47,179 Republican counterparts would object to 227 00:10:47,179 --> 00:10:50,169 DOD writing a blank check to do the job 228 00:10:50,169 --> 00:10:54,059 of another government agency . Transcom 229 00:10:54,059 --> 00:10:56,669 must remain focused on strategic 230 00:10:56,669 --> 00:11:00,440 mobility and not burdened with missions 231 00:11:00,440 --> 00:11:03,450 that are outside its intended purpose . 232 00:11:04,090 --> 00:11:06,820 Transcom would be far better off 233 00:11:06,820 --> 00:11:09,380 returning to its rightful focus on 234 00:11:09,380 --> 00:11:12,520 contested logistics . Because energy 235 00:11:12,520 --> 00:11:14,780 security remains a critical challenge . 236 00:11:16,210 --> 00:11:18,409 Our forces in the Indo-Pacific , for 237 00:11:18,409 --> 00:11:22,289 example , at Quadline . At all rely on 238 00:11:22,289 --> 00:11:25,530 vulnerable fuel shipments in the event 239 00:11:25,530 --> 00:11:28,250 of conflict , these fuel supply lines 240 00:11:28,250 --> 00:11:31,119 would be prime targets for adversaries . 241 00:11:31,409 --> 00:11:33,599 A more resilient energy strategy 242 00:11:33,599 --> 00:11:37,059 incorporating distributed energy assets 243 00:11:37,330 --> 00:11:39,609 and more efficient technologies is 244 00:11:39,609 --> 00:11:42,119 essential for maintaining operational 245 00:11:42,450 --> 00:11:45,880 effectiveness . TransCom is a key 246 00:11:45,880 --> 00:11:48,460 pillar of our national security , but 247 00:11:48,460 --> 00:11:51,039 we must ensure that it remains focused 248 00:11:51,039 --> 00:11:53,929 on its core mission , whether by 249 00:11:53,929 --> 00:11:56,280 modernizing our tanker fleet or 250 00:11:56,280 --> 00:11:58,239 strengthening contested logistic 251 00:11:58,239 --> 00:12:00,859 capabilities , we must make the right 252 00:12:00,859 --> 00:12:03,140 contested , the right , uh , 253 00:12:03,150 --> 00:12:05,799 investments and the policy decisions . 254 00:12:05,880 --> 00:12:08,239 So General Reed , again , I thank you 255 00:12:08,239 --> 00:12:10,350 for your leadership . Look forward to 256 00:12:10,350 --> 00:12:12,960 your testimony . And uh thank you 257 00:12:12,960 --> 00:12:15,182 Senator Hirono . I see that we have the 258 00:12:15,182 --> 00:12:17,460 ranking member of the entire committee , 259 00:12:17,460 --> 00:12:19,293 the former chairman of the Armed 260 00:12:19,293 --> 00:12:21,349 Services Committee here with us , my 261 00:12:21,349 --> 00:12:23,571 good friend Senator Jack Reed . Senator 262 00:12:23,571 --> 00:12:26,039 Reed , would you wish to , uh , say a 263 00:12:26,039 --> 00:12:28,830 few opening comments ? Uh , Mr . 264 00:12:28,840 --> 00:12:30,507 Chairman , thank you for your 265 00:12:30,507 --> 00:12:32,729 hospitality , but I would just wait for 266 00:12:32,729 --> 00:12:35,062 my questions . Thank you very much . OK , 267 00:12:35,062 --> 00:12:37,062 thank you . Um , General Reed , the 268 00:12:37,062 --> 00:12:39,062 floor is yours and a longer written 269 00:12:39,062 --> 00:12:41,229 statement , uh , we can . Make sure it 270 00:12:41,229 --> 00:12:43,007 gets submitted for the record . 271 00:12:45,630 --> 00:12:47,574 Chairman Sullivan , ranking member 272 00:12:47,574 --> 00:12:49,686 Hirono , distinguished members of the 273 00:12:49,686 --> 00:12:51,741 subcommittee , good afternoon . I am 274 00:12:51,741 --> 00:12:53,630 honored to join you today with my 275 00:12:53,630 --> 00:12:55,686 lovely bride Len and senior enlisted 276 00:12:55,686 --> 00:12:57,630 leader Chief Master Sergeant Brian 277 00:12:57,630 --> 00:12:59,630 Krazelnick to represent the men and 278 00:12:59,630 --> 00:12:59,349 women of the United States 279 00:12:59,349 --> 00:13:01,799 Transportation Command . A war fighting 280 00:13:01,799 --> 00:13:03,910 command , we project , maneuver , and 281 00:13:03,910 --> 00:13:05,799 sustain the joint force anytime , 282 00:13:05,880 --> 00:13:08,159 anywhere in support of our national 283 00:13:08,159 --> 00:13:10,789 objectives . Our war fighting elements 284 00:13:10,789 --> 00:13:13,150 consist of 3 service component commands , 285 00:13:13,500 --> 00:13:15,278 Military surface deployment and 286 00:13:15,278 --> 00:13:18,919 distribution command . Military Sealift 287 00:13:18,919 --> 00:13:21,239 Command , Air Mobility Command , and 288 00:13:21,239 --> 00:13:23,183 our direct subordinate , the Joint 289 00:13:23,183 --> 00:13:25,739 Enabling Capabilities Command . Beyond 290 00:13:25,739 --> 00:13:28,739 our core military units , US Transcom 291 00:13:28,739 --> 00:13:31,099 maintains strong partnerships with the 292 00:13:31,099 --> 00:13:33,155 commercial transportation industry , 293 00:13:33,260 --> 00:13:35,580 our fourth component to fully execute 294 00:13:35,580 --> 00:13:37,460 our unified command plan tasks . 295 00:13:38,630 --> 00:13:40,741 Today's security environment presents 296 00:13:40,741 --> 00:13:42,797 numerous complex challenges to force 297 00:13:42,797 --> 00:13:45,469 projection and logistics as adversaries 298 00:13:45,469 --> 00:13:47,525 actively seek to disrupt , degrade , 299 00:13:47,549 --> 00:13:49,909 and deny our transportation networks , 300 00:13:50,309 --> 00:13:52,420 especially within the homeland . With 301 00:13:52,420 --> 00:13:55,270 85% of US combat power residing within 302 00:13:55,270 --> 00:13:57,048 the continental United States , 303 00:13:57,150 --> 00:13:59,549 resilient transportation networks 304 00:13:59,549 --> 00:14:01,438 fortified against malicious cyber 305 00:14:01,438 --> 00:14:04,320 attacks now prioritize the crucial fort 306 00:14:04,320 --> 00:14:07,169 to port transportation segment . Even 307 00:14:07,169 --> 00:14:09,169 after overcoming initial deployment 308 00:14:09,169 --> 00:14:11,113 disruptions , we must continuously 309 00:14:11,113 --> 00:14:13,650 enhance our material capabilities to 310 00:14:13,650 --> 00:14:15,440 maintain a decisive advantage . 311 00:14:16,630 --> 00:14:19,400 Decisive advantage demands a modernized 312 00:14:19,400 --> 00:14:22,210 and connected sea lift , airlift , and 313 00:14:22,210 --> 00:14:25,250 air refueling fleet . By 2032 , 314 00:14:25,260 --> 00:14:27,820 54% of our government owned sea lift 315 00:14:27,820 --> 00:14:29,709 ships will reach the end of their 316 00:14:29,709 --> 00:14:32,109 service life . To support our maritime 317 00:14:32,109 --> 00:14:34,239 industrial base and protect a healthy 318 00:14:34,239 --> 00:14:38,070 pool of qualified uh crews to crew the 319 00:14:38,070 --> 00:14:40,630 vessels , we need a we need fully 320 00:14:40,630 --> 00:14:42,659 funded maritime security program , 321 00:14:42,869 --> 00:14:45,549 tanker security program , the Jones Act , 322 00:14:45,590 --> 00:14:47,868 and adherence to cargo preference laws . 323 00:14:48,659 --> 00:14:50,890 The start of a recapitalization plan is 324 00:14:50,890 --> 00:14:53,250 due for our airlift fleet because of 325 00:14:53,250 --> 00:14:55,289 the long lead time for platform 326 00:14:55,289 --> 00:14:58,010 development . We welcome the service 327 00:14:58,010 --> 00:15:00,121 led recapitalization plans of the air 328 00:15:00,121 --> 00:15:02,280 refueling fleet which must continue 329 00:15:02,280 --> 00:15:05,469 uninterrupted into the future . Even 330 00:15:05,469 --> 00:15:07,580 after the Air Force accepts the final 331 00:15:07,580 --> 00:15:10,549 contract at KC 46 , the average age of 332 00:15:10,549 --> 00:15:13,909 the remaining KC-135 fleet will be 67 333 00:15:13,909 --> 00:15:16,190 years old . Finally , we remain 334 00:15:16,190 --> 00:15:18,780 committed to the ongoing transformation 335 00:15:18,780 --> 00:15:21,002 of the global household goods program . 336 00:15:23,109 --> 00:15:26,419 Moving is an integral part of our life 337 00:15:26,419 --> 00:15:28,869 and while most of us relocate every 2 338 00:15:28,869 --> 00:15:31,229 to 3 years and learn better ways of 339 00:15:31,229 --> 00:15:33,669 doing it every time we move , it is 340 00:15:33,669 --> 00:15:35,700 always challenging . The department 341 00:15:35,700 --> 00:15:37,589 began transitioning to the Global 342 00:15:37,589 --> 00:15:40,109 household goods contract or GHC in 343 00:15:40,109 --> 00:15:43,190 April 2024 with the goal of providing 344 00:15:43,190 --> 00:15:45,190 an improved moving experience for 345 00:15:45,190 --> 00:15:47,246 service members and their families . 346 00:15:47,409 --> 00:15:49,590 This transformation is a monumental 347 00:15:49,590 --> 00:15:52,429 task and reaches into every aspect of a 348 00:15:52,429 --> 00:15:55,239 service member's relocation . And 349 00:15:55,239 --> 00:15:58,039 because GHC is reshaping how we move 350 00:15:58,039 --> 00:16:01,659 service members . Their families and 351 00:16:01,659 --> 00:16:03,940 their memories we remain in close 352 00:16:03,940 --> 00:16:06,059 collaboration with the services to 353 00:16:06,059 --> 00:16:08,580 identify and then take action to 354 00:16:08,580 --> 00:16:11,549 resolve issues . Because we are 355 00:16:11,549 --> 00:16:13,327 centered on service members and 356 00:16:13,327 --> 00:16:15,549 families just this past week we made an 357 00:16:15,549 --> 00:16:17,716 adjustment to the transfer rate to the 358 00:16:17,716 --> 00:16:19,849 prime contractor and while it has not 359 00:16:19,849 --> 00:16:22,090 been an easy path , there have been 360 00:16:22,090 --> 00:16:24,530 issues there should be no doubt we will 361 00:16:24,530 --> 00:16:27,409 see this through . These challenges may 362 00:16:27,409 --> 00:16:30,049 sound daunting , however , US Transcom 363 00:16:30,049 --> 00:16:32,271 has the global transportation awareness 364 00:16:32,271 --> 00:16:34,493 and authorities to address them , and I 365 00:16:34,493 --> 00:16:36,716 will be clear that I have no doubt that 366 00:16:36,716 --> 00:16:38,716 our professionals will overcome any 367 00:16:38,716 --> 00:16:40,827 disruption . We are emboldened by our 368 00:16:40,827 --> 00:16:43,479 guiding principles to be ready , united , 369 00:16:43,719 --> 00:16:47,270 and decisive . US Transom was created 370 00:16:47,270 --> 00:16:49,492 as a purpose-built force to provide the 371 00:16:49,492 --> 00:16:51,714 essential surface , ocean , and airlift 372 00:16:51,714 --> 00:16:53,492 capacity to project and sustain 373 00:16:53,492 --> 00:16:55,714 American military power anywhere in the 374 00:16:55,714 --> 00:16:58,919 world at any time . Thank you for your 375 00:16:58,919 --> 00:17:00,975 continued and unwavering support for 376 00:17:00,975 --> 00:17:03,141 our mission and our people . I welcome 377 00:17:03,141 --> 00:17:05,419 your questions and together we deliver . 378 00:17:05,448 --> 00:17:07,448 Thank you , General , and thank you 379 00:17:07,448 --> 00:17:09,559 again to you and the men and women of 380 00:17:09,559 --> 00:17:11,838 US Transcom , uh , for the exceptional 381 00:17:11,838 --> 00:17:14,005 work that they do . I'm gonna yield my 382 00:17:14,005 --> 00:17:16,239 first round of questioning to my 383 00:17:16,239 --> 00:17:18,239 colleague Senator Fisher , and then 384 00:17:18,239 --> 00:17:20,295 we'll go in the regular order here . 385 00:17:20,295 --> 00:17:22,628 Senator Hirono will be next . Thank you , 386 00:17:22,628 --> 00:17:24,683 Senator Sullivan , and thank you for 387 00:17:24,683 --> 00:17:26,906 your courtesy and letting me go ahead . 388 00:17:27,270 --> 00:17:30,189 Welcome General Reed . During your 389 00:17:30,189 --> 00:17:32,245 confirmation hearing , you described 390 00:17:32,245 --> 00:17:34,910 how you intended to sharpen Transom's 391 00:17:34,910 --> 00:17:37,619 contribution to the lethal joint force . 392 00:17:37,910 --> 00:17:40,839 This includes a ready tanker fleet that 393 00:17:40,839 --> 00:17:43,829 is able to support both contingencies 394 00:17:43,829 --> 00:17:46,430 around the world and Stratcom and also 395 00:17:46,430 --> 00:17:48,829 NorthCO missions that we have here in 396 00:17:48,829 --> 00:17:51,910 the homeland . As the B-21 bomber 397 00:17:51,910 --> 00:17:54,780 enters service , which will modernize 398 00:17:54,780 --> 00:17:57,219 and increase and increase our bomber 399 00:17:57,219 --> 00:17:59,949 fleet , we must also ensure that we 400 00:17:59,949 --> 00:18:02,400 have an adequate tanker fleet to 401 00:18:02,400 --> 00:18:04,829 support this platform and the important 402 00:18:04,829 --> 00:18:07,579 missions it will perform . I understand 403 00:18:07,579 --> 00:18:09,412 that the Air Force will make the 404 00:18:09,412 --> 00:18:11,239 ultimate decision on its tanker 405 00:18:11,239 --> 00:18:13,979 acquisition strategy , but I'd like to 406 00:18:13,979 --> 00:18:16,420 better understand how Transcom is 407 00:18:16,420 --> 00:18:18,380 working with the Air Force to 408 00:18:18,380 --> 00:18:22,339 communicate its requirements . Or do 409 00:18:22,339 --> 00:18:26,260 you ? Expressing your needs 410 00:18:26,260 --> 00:18:29,099 to , to the Air Force on what you need 411 00:18:29,099 --> 00:18:32,739 to support a nuclear bomber force so 412 00:18:32,739 --> 00:18:35,939 that it remains effective and um and a 413 00:18:35,939 --> 00:18:37,739 credible deterrent globally . 414 00:18:40,189 --> 00:18:42,245 Yes , Senator , just within the last 415 00:18:42,245 --> 00:18:44,411 month my staff and I took a trip to US 416 00:18:44,411 --> 00:18:46,522 Stratcom and we sat down with the the 417 00:18:46,522 --> 00:18:48,633 commander there and his staff to hold 418 00:18:48,633 --> 00:18:50,689 war fighter talks , uh , during that 419 00:18:50,689 --> 00:18:52,689 time we described , uh , what it is 420 00:18:52,689 --> 00:18:55,000 that he's called to do so that we can , 421 00:18:55,130 --> 00:18:57,760 uh , more efficiently and effectively 422 00:18:58,410 --> 00:19:00,632 understand how we need to be there with 423 00:19:00,632 --> 00:19:02,577 him during that same time we got a 424 00:19:02,577 --> 00:19:04,688 really deep understanding in terms of 425 00:19:04,688 --> 00:19:06,895 how they plan to . Deploy their new 426 00:19:06,895 --> 00:19:09,694 aircraft and uh that will drive a 427 00:19:09,694 --> 00:19:11,861 slightly different way in which we are 428 00:19:11,861 --> 00:19:13,916 to support them which actually means 429 00:19:13,916 --> 00:19:15,972 that it's going to be a a little bit 430 00:19:15,972 --> 00:19:18,165 higher requirement uh specifically in 431 00:19:18,175 --> 00:19:21,135 in in the in the fuel transfer as a 432 00:19:21,135 --> 00:19:23,079 result , he and I are both working 433 00:19:23,079 --> 00:19:24,935 together to go to the service to 434 00:19:24,935 --> 00:19:27,334 explain to them what's uh what's 435 00:19:27,334 --> 00:19:29,445 required and what's expected in order 436 00:19:29,445 --> 00:19:31,445 for us to work together to get that 437 00:19:31,445 --> 00:19:33,667 done . If there's anything we can do on 438 00:19:33,667 --> 00:19:35,890 this committee uh to help you with that 439 00:19:35,890 --> 00:19:38,530 endeavor , please let me know . Yes , 440 00:19:38,569 --> 00:19:40,920 Senator , thank you , thank you , uh , 441 00:19:40,969 --> 00:19:43,530 General Reed , it is clear that in a 442 00:19:43,530 --> 00:19:46,089 great power conflict , the US would be 443 00:19:46,089 --> 00:19:50,010 unlikely to achieve the level of air or 444 00:19:50,010 --> 00:19:52,489 sea superiority that it achieved in 445 00:19:52,489 --> 00:19:55,709 recent wars . This means that ships and 446 00:19:55,709 --> 00:19:57,900 aircraft that will be part of any sea 447 00:19:57,900 --> 00:20:01,339 lift or airlift effort must be prepared 448 00:20:01,339 --> 00:20:04,469 to operate in a contested environment 449 00:20:04,750 --> 00:20:07,270 with the assumption that they will be 450 00:20:07,270 --> 00:20:10,119 targeted in various ways to prevent 451 00:20:10,119 --> 00:20:12,660 material from reaching its destination . 452 00:20:13,069 --> 00:20:16,310 I appreciated our discussion on this 453 00:20:16,310 --> 00:20:18,869 topic during your confirmation hearing 454 00:20:18,869 --> 00:20:21,036 and in our meeting we had in the skiff 455 00:20:21,036 --> 00:20:24,410 last week . Since you've taken command , 456 00:20:24,619 --> 00:20:27,910 what steps have you taken to better 457 00:20:27,910 --> 00:20:30,770 prepare Transom to perform strategic 458 00:20:30,770 --> 00:20:33,489 lift in a contested environment ? 459 00:20:35,699 --> 00:20:37,810 Senator , one of the things that I've 460 00:20:37,810 --> 00:20:39,866 done is I've made travels around the 461 00:20:39,866 --> 00:20:41,977 world to talk to my peers . Um , I've 462 00:20:41,977 --> 00:20:44,088 looked at the , the world as they see 463 00:20:44,088 --> 00:20:46,310 it . I've looked at the threats as they 464 00:20:46,310 --> 00:20:48,532 see it , and I've also , uh , made sure 465 00:20:48,532 --> 00:20:50,477 that our staffs are working closer 466 00:20:50,477 --> 00:20:52,588 together in the planning aspect which 467 00:20:52,588 --> 00:20:54,699 is actually carrying over into how we 468 00:20:54,930 --> 00:20:57,579 exercise together . So with that being 469 00:20:57,579 --> 00:21:00,089 said , uh , we have a much better 470 00:21:00,089 --> 00:21:02,599 understanding . Of what uh the 471 00:21:02,599 --> 00:21:05,400 adversaries are likely to do , um , how 472 00:21:05,400 --> 00:21:07,760 they would uh fight what they're most 473 00:21:07,760 --> 00:21:10,189 likely to do and with that being said , 474 00:21:10,390 --> 00:21:12,279 uh , we adapt that to the plans , 475 00:21:12,319 --> 00:21:14,263 evaluate how that would change the 476 00:21:14,263 --> 00:21:16,097 force , look to see what kind of 477 00:21:16,097 --> 00:21:18,319 options we have left , and then what we 478 00:21:18,319 --> 00:21:20,430 can decide to do from that point on . 479 00:21:20,430 --> 00:21:22,849 So , uh , it's a very robust way ahead , 480 00:21:22,859 --> 00:21:25,349 ma'am . You know , as you know , our 481 00:21:25,349 --> 00:21:27,469 sealift assets are important to 482 00:21:27,469 --> 00:21:29,910 ensuring that our forces and material 483 00:21:29,910 --> 00:21:33,380 arrive on time . Uh , in enough 484 00:21:33,380 --> 00:21:36,359 time to rapidly execute their mission . 485 00:21:36,689 --> 00:21:38,619 Unfortunately over the years , an 486 00:21:38,619 --> 00:21:41,199 integral part of our sealift fleet , 487 00:21:41,569 --> 00:21:44,359 the ready reserve force has suffered 488 00:21:44,359 --> 00:21:47,689 from a reduction in capacity and 489 00:21:47,689 --> 00:21:50,099 readiness as a result of the aging 490 00:21:50,099 --> 00:21:53,910 vessels and the underinvestment . Given 491 00:21:53,910 --> 00:21:56,319 this situation , can you provide an 492 00:21:56,319 --> 00:21:58,839 update on the recapitalization of the 493 00:21:58,839 --> 00:22:01,569 ready reserve fleet and how you're 494 00:22:01,880 --> 00:22:04,800 working uh with MARRAD to increase 495 00:22:04,800 --> 00:22:08,050 capability and capacity in that regard ? 496 00:22:09,359 --> 00:22:12,550 Together we're working to uh get ships 497 00:22:12,550 --> 00:22:15,390 in any way that we absolutely can . Uh , 498 00:22:15,469 --> 00:22:18,709 the address last night um by the by the 499 00:22:18,709 --> 00:22:20,989 commander in chief stated that sealift 500 00:22:20,989 --> 00:22:23,211 is absolutely something that we need to 501 00:22:23,211 --> 00:22:25,378 do . Uh , he intends to make sure that 502 00:22:25,378 --> 00:22:27,545 we can return to the seas , so we need 503 00:22:27,545 --> 00:22:29,656 to both build it here and we actually 504 00:22:29,656 --> 00:22:32,270 need to buy used . Could you repeat 505 00:22:32,270 --> 00:22:34,989 your last sentence , please ? Uh , yes 506 00:22:34,989 --> 00:22:36,989 ma'am . We need to build new and we 507 00:22:36,989 --> 00:22:39,050 need to buy used . Thank you , sir . 508 00:22:41,050 --> 00:22:43,106 Thank , thank you , Senator Fisher . 509 00:22:43,119 --> 00:22:45,770 Senator Hirono . Thank you , Mr . 510 00:22:45,780 --> 00:22:49,380 Chairman . General , uh , Reed , 511 00:22:49,839 --> 00:22:52,180 um , a next generation tanker , and I , 512 00:22:52,229 --> 00:22:54,285 I mentioned , I mentioned this in my 513 00:22:54,285 --> 00:22:56,229 opening statement in the form of a 514 00:22:56,229 --> 00:22:59,900 blended wing body aircraft would save 515 00:22:59,900 --> 00:23:03,660 between 30 to 50% in fuel , which would 516 00:23:03,660 --> 00:23:06,219 be invaluable to operations in the 517 00:23:06,219 --> 00:23:09,069 Indo-Pacific in terms of extended range 518 00:23:09,069 --> 00:23:10,902 shortage generation and reducing 519 00:23:10,902 --> 00:23:13,829 contested logistics vulnerabilities as 520 00:23:13,829 --> 00:23:16,469 a pilot who has flown more than 3500 521 00:23:16,469 --> 00:23:18,580 hours . In various types of transport 522 00:23:18,580 --> 00:23:21,305 aircraft , how important is it for the 523 00:23:21,305 --> 00:23:24,064 Air Force to continue investing in the 524 00:23:24,064 --> 00:23:26,964 blended wing body and other operational 525 00:23:26,964 --> 00:23:30,675 energy programs , and do you think they 526 00:23:30,944 --> 00:23:34,064 have benefits that increase lethality 527 00:23:34,064 --> 00:23:35,265 and readiness ? 528 00:23:39,099 --> 00:23:41,349 Senator , we are , um , actively 529 00:23:41,349 --> 00:23:44,699 advocating for any and all technology 530 00:23:44,699 --> 00:23:47,380 that can make sure that we can use the 531 00:23:47,380 --> 00:23:49,739 least amount of fuel possible that our 532 00:23:49,739 --> 00:23:52,300 aircraft can go as long as possible and 533 00:23:52,300 --> 00:23:54,467 they can stay aloft as long as they as 534 00:23:54,467 --> 00:23:57,479 as as they can . As we have been 535 00:23:57,479 --> 00:24:00,619 looking at uh what's possible in order 536 00:24:00,619 --> 00:24:02,841 to operate some of the criteria that we 537 00:24:02,841 --> 00:24:05,280 also look at is , um , as you mentioned 538 00:24:05,280 --> 00:24:08,199 in in your statement , is how long or 539 00:24:08,199 --> 00:24:10,479 how short of a runway can we operate on 540 00:24:10,800 --> 00:24:12,967 and balance that with how much fuel we 541 00:24:12,967 --> 00:24:15,022 can carry and then how far we can go 542 00:24:15,160 --> 00:24:17,300 when it comes to force projection and 543 00:24:17,300 --> 00:24:19,430 sustainment of the force , the more 544 00:24:19,430 --> 00:24:21,670 fuel efficient an aircraft is , then 545 00:24:21,670 --> 00:24:23,800 the more effective we'll be and also 546 00:24:23,800 --> 00:24:26,349 the more options we will have . So of 547 00:24:26,349 --> 00:24:29,349 all of the these uh uh you're open to 548 00:24:29,349 --> 00:24:31,709 um other developments that would save 549 00:24:31,709 --> 00:24:34,859 you fuel , etc . but with the a blended 550 00:24:34,859 --> 00:24:37,630 wing body development be one of those 551 00:24:37,630 --> 00:24:40,589 uh important modernizations that you 552 00:24:40,589 --> 00:24:44,300 would , uh , you hope . Will come 553 00:24:44,300 --> 00:24:47,729 about ? Ma'am , it's a very promising 554 00:24:47,729 --> 00:24:49,896 technology and uh if it's something we 555 00:24:49,896 --> 00:24:51,979 can get and something we can use , I 556 00:24:51,979 --> 00:24:53,923 will absolutely take it . Uh , the 557 00:24:53,923 --> 00:24:56,859 other thing that uh we consider is that 558 00:24:56,859 --> 00:24:59,459 at some point the commercial world will 559 00:24:59,459 --> 00:25:01,579 most likely catch up with this , and 560 00:25:01,579 --> 00:25:03,635 when they're able to produce it , we 561 00:25:03,635 --> 00:25:05,857 will already have done the work to make 562 00:25:05,857 --> 00:25:07,746 sure that we can use it as well . 563 00:25:09,810 --> 00:25:12,170 I mentioned in my opening the the this 564 00:25:12,170 --> 00:25:14,530 uh the the consternation uh with the 565 00:25:14,530 --> 00:25:17,359 use of your assets to transport . 566 00:25:18,589 --> 00:25:20,699 Frankly , just a very few , uh , 567 00:25:20,709 --> 00:25:23,829 migrants , uh , at a cost in the 568 00:25:23,829 --> 00:25:26,270 instance that that I mentioned at the 569 00:25:26,270 --> 00:25:28,750 cost of 2.5 million to move only about 570 00:25:28,750 --> 00:25:31,530 100 migrants in uh to India , uh , 571 00:25:31,550 --> 00:25:34,709 contrast with um the prior 572 00:25:34,709 --> 00:25:38,119 administration , uh , it was uh 573 00:25:38,119 --> 00:25:41,739 685,000 people were 574 00:25:42,069 --> 00:25:45,089 removed . Through Homeland Security's 575 00:25:45,089 --> 00:25:47,849 own programs , uh , so , uh , you know , 576 00:25:47,930 --> 00:25:50,449 I wanted to know because this is very 577 00:25:50,449 --> 00:25:53,839 out of proportion in my view to , uh , 578 00:25:53,969 --> 00:25:57,199 what should be undertaken by TransCom . 579 00:25:57,410 --> 00:26:00,800 So who makes the decision to fly in 580 00:26:01,050 --> 00:26:03,640 this inefficient manner using your 581 00:26:03,640 --> 00:26:07,609 assets ? The 582 00:26:07,609 --> 00:26:10,050 Department of Homeland Security is the 583 00:26:10,050 --> 00:26:13,089 lead agency for this , um , uh , in 584 00:26:13,089 --> 00:26:14,978 that the Department of Defense is 585 00:26:14,978 --> 00:26:17,930 supporting them . The lead combatant 586 00:26:17,930 --> 00:26:20,890 command within our department is NOCOM , 587 00:26:21,290 --> 00:26:23,346 and we work with them to receive the 588 00:26:23,346 --> 00:26:26,199 task to actually fly sorties . So 589 00:26:26,199 --> 00:26:28,199 you're saying that you did not make 590 00:26:28,199 --> 00:26:30,421 this decision to use your assets to fly 591 00:26:30,421 --> 00:26:32,680 100 people to India . No , ma'am , I 592 00:26:32,680 --> 00:26:34,920 did not . Oh , are you gonna be tasked 593 00:26:34,920 --> 00:26:37,089 to do more of this kind of transport ? 594 00:26:39,619 --> 00:26:41,452 Ma'am , if I get the task , I'll 595 00:26:41,452 --> 00:26:43,452 absolutely fly it . But do you have 596 00:26:43,452 --> 00:26:45,563 some sort of an understanding already 597 00:26:45,563 --> 00:26:47,508 of what the expectations are , and 598 00:26:47,508 --> 00:26:50,130 these are all non-reimbursable to you 599 00:26:50,739 --> 00:26:54,650 events . Ma'am , in a few conversations 600 00:26:54,650 --> 00:26:57,689 that I've had , uh , I , uh , am to 601 00:26:57,689 --> 00:27:00,050 expect maybe more flights . Um , I will 602 00:27:00,050 --> 00:27:02,217 tell you that within the last 48 hours 603 00:27:02,217 --> 00:27:05,890 we have not flown any . I , I think 604 00:27:05,890 --> 00:27:08,189 that that that uh is it is really 605 00:27:08,189 --> 00:27:10,245 important for me at least , says the 606 00:27:10,245 --> 00:27:12,356 ranking person on this committee that 607 00:27:12,356 --> 00:27:14,411 we express our concern to you , uh , 608 00:27:14,411 --> 00:27:16,578 that this would not be the kind of use 609 00:27:16,578 --> 00:27:19,119 of your assets that we should , uh , 610 00:27:19,130 --> 00:27:21,569 contemplate and uh since you are not 611 00:27:21,569 --> 00:27:23,680 the person to make that decision that 612 00:27:23,680 --> 00:27:25,847 there's , uh , there are no guarantees 613 00:27:25,847 --> 00:27:28,599 that uh that this use . Of your assets 614 00:27:28,599 --> 00:27:32,560 will not continue and so um if you are 615 00:27:32,560 --> 00:27:36,079 given this decision to transport more 616 00:27:36,079 --> 00:27:38,400 people , I would like this committee to 617 00:27:38,400 --> 00:27:41,380 be informed of that and as of now there 618 00:27:41,390 --> 00:27:43,612 there you have no um that's what you're 619 00:27:43,612 --> 00:27:45,779 telling me no idea whether you will be 620 00:27:45,779 --> 00:27:48,199 tasked to conduct this kind of mission 621 00:27:48,199 --> 00:27:51,439 in a way that uh I think it's not part 622 00:27:51,439 --> 00:27:54,160 of your mission . So will you let this 623 00:27:54,160 --> 00:27:56,760 committee know if you uh begin to use 624 00:27:56,760 --> 00:27:58,593 your assets for these kinds of . 625 00:27:59,900 --> 00:28:02,640 Transport ? Yes , I will . Thank you . 626 00:28:03,910 --> 00:28:05,930 So you did mention that you have an 627 00:28:05,930 --> 00:28:09,689 aging fleet and uh there is the 628 00:28:09,689 --> 00:28:12,880 possibility of your purchasing used 629 00:28:12,880 --> 00:28:15,680 ships from um other countries and I 630 00:28:15,680 --> 00:28:18,969 think we put a limit on what you can do 631 00:28:18,969 --> 00:28:20,969 there for for the long term , yes , 632 00:28:20,969 --> 00:28:23,080 obviously I think we need to create a 633 00:28:23,080 --> 00:28:25,329 capability for shipbuilding , uh , 634 00:28:25,349 --> 00:28:27,516 because you have an aging fleet , um , 635 00:28:27,516 --> 00:28:29,571 but for the short term what would be 636 00:28:29,571 --> 00:28:32,800 helpful to you ? In the short term we 637 00:28:32,800 --> 00:28:36,079 would uh need maximum flexibility to 638 00:28:36,079 --> 00:28:38,119 buy used foreign ships on the 639 00:28:38,119 --> 00:28:40,880 commercial market , um , obtain those 640 00:28:40,880 --> 00:28:43,390 ships , refurb them here in the states , 641 00:28:43,459 --> 00:28:46,479 and then uh put those uh ships to . So 642 00:28:46,479 --> 00:28:48,757 we , Mr . Chairman , if you don't mind , 643 00:28:48,757 --> 00:28:50,812 uh , we put a limit on the number of 644 00:28:50,812 --> 00:28:52,868 these kinds of ships , so I'm asking 645 00:28:52,868 --> 00:28:55,090 whether in the short term how many more 646 00:28:55,090 --> 00:28:57,201 ships would you like to be authorized 647 00:28:57,201 --> 00:28:59,880 to buy from foreign sources . Yes , I 648 00:28:59,880 --> 00:29:02,047 would , uh , I am asking for the limit 649 00:29:02,047 --> 00:29:04,920 to be raised beyond 10 to allow us to 650 00:29:04,920 --> 00:29:07,310 actually shop the market . Currently 651 00:29:07,310 --> 00:29:09,869 there are 10 ships available for us to 652 00:29:09,880 --> 00:29:13,560 to pursue . Are you asking for 653 00:29:13,560 --> 00:29:16,540 authorization to buy 10 more ? I'm 654 00:29:16,540 --> 00:29:18,651 asking authorization to buy 10 more . 655 00:29:19,550 --> 00:29:21,717 Well , good luck with that . No , that 656 00:29:21,717 --> 00:29:23,949 was , forget I said that . I mean , we 657 00:29:23,949 --> 00:29:26,171 want you to be able to do your job . uh 658 00:29:26,171 --> 00:29:28,282 just one more thing you mentioned the 659 00:29:28,282 --> 00:29:30,338 Jones Act . There's , uh , there are 660 00:29:30,338 --> 00:29:32,505 people who sometimes do not understand 661 00:29:32,505 --> 00:29:34,727 the importance of the Jones Jones Act . 662 00:29:34,727 --> 00:29:36,782 Can you very briefly tell us why the 663 00:29:36,782 --> 00:29:38,949 Jones Act is important to TransCom and 664 00:29:38,949 --> 00:29:41,390 and to national security ? The Jones 665 00:29:41,390 --> 00:29:44,439 Act allows us to actually have uh 666 00:29:44,439 --> 00:29:47,229 shipping resources here and a fleet and 667 00:29:47,229 --> 00:29:49,750 so because of that act we actually have 668 00:29:49,750 --> 00:29:52,599 a way to uh make sure that we can build 669 00:29:52,599 --> 00:29:55,910 ships here in the United States that we 670 00:29:55,910 --> 00:29:57,790 can sail those ships to maintain 671 00:29:57,790 --> 00:30:00,390 commerce , that we can actually produce 672 00:30:00,390 --> 00:30:02,334 the crews that actually sail those 673 00:30:02,334 --> 00:30:04,589 ships so that we have a core of folks 674 00:30:04,589 --> 00:30:07,329 that can actually operate at the same 675 00:30:07,329 --> 00:30:10,510 time . Um , if the nation needs folks 676 00:30:10,510 --> 00:30:13,469 to go to sea , we can , uh , call on 677 00:30:13,469 --> 00:30:15,910 that force to actually sail , and there 678 00:30:15,910 --> 00:30:18,077 are citizens , and then , uh , we will 679 00:30:18,077 --> 00:30:20,299 be more secure in that way . Yeah , one 680 00:30:20,299 --> 00:30:22,188 aspect of the Jones that are very 681 00:30:22,188 --> 00:30:24,299 important is that , uh , you can work 682 00:30:24,299 --> 00:30:26,270 with uh the commercial shippers , 683 00:30:26,430 --> 00:30:28,910 private sector ships , isn't that 684 00:30:28,910 --> 00:30:30,854 correct ? That's correct , ma'am . 685 00:30:30,854 --> 00:30:33,077 Thank you . Thank you , Mr . Chairman , 686 00:30:33,077 --> 00:30:32,709 for your indulgence . Thank you , 687 00:30:32,760 --> 00:30:34,760 Senator Hirono , uh , General , I'm 688 00:30:34,760 --> 00:30:36,871 gonna ask my round of questions now , 689 00:30:36,871 --> 00:30:39,550 um . Let me just follow up on a couple 690 00:30:39,550 --> 00:30:42,520 of questions Senator Hirono asked for 691 00:30:42,520 --> 00:30:46,390 the going above the 10 ship , uh , 692 00:30:46,400 --> 00:30:49,349 cap , does that require you , is there 693 00:30:49,349 --> 00:30:51,405 a waiver authority that we can grant 694 00:30:51,405 --> 00:30:54,469 that can be granted by someone in DOD , 695 00:30:54,479 --> 00:30:56,560 or does that require a change in 696 00:30:56,560 --> 00:31:00,469 legislation ? Uh , Chairman , that's a 697 00:31:00,469 --> 00:31:02,670 change in in the AA and so if we can 698 00:31:02,670 --> 00:31:05,739 get that change , um , ideally , uh , 699 00:31:05,750 --> 00:31:07,880 what we would need to recap the fleet 700 00:31:08,150 --> 00:31:11,150 are 4 ships a year , um , and if 701 00:31:11,150 --> 00:31:13,206 they're available on the market , we 702 00:31:13,206 --> 00:31:15,428 would pursue that at a minimum we would 703 00:31:15,428 --> 00:31:17,539 need 2 a year , OK ? And let me ask , 704 00:31:17,539 --> 00:31:20,290 um , um , 2 years ago your predecessor 705 00:31:20,290 --> 00:31:24,160 told us that by 2023 . 37 of the 706 00:31:24,160 --> 00:31:27,239 50 government owned surge sealift ships 707 00:31:27,239 --> 00:31:29,760 will approach the end of their service 708 00:31:29,760 --> 00:31:32,800 life . Uh , Military sea lift command 709 00:31:32,800 --> 00:31:35,359 and the Navy announced in November that 710 00:31:35,359 --> 00:31:39,349 it would sideline 17 ships from the 711 00:31:39,349 --> 00:31:41,989 MSC to ease the stress of civilian 712 00:31:42,439 --> 00:31:45,280 mariners . Uh , these ships obviously 713 00:31:45,280 --> 00:31:47,558 play a very important role like oilers . 714 00:31:48,369 --> 00:31:50,479 Uh , hospital ships , cable layers . 715 00:31:50,969 --> 00:31:52,969 Can you walk us through the current 716 00:31:52,969 --> 00:31:55,191 Transom plan , general , for increasing 717 00:31:55,191 --> 00:31:57,250 and manning maintenance programs for 718 00:31:57,250 --> 00:32:00,810 the MSC vessels so they are not left 719 00:32:00,810 --> 00:32:02,421 sidelined in the long term ? 720 00:32:04,459 --> 00:32:07,859 Chairman , on the Navy side , the MSC 721 00:32:07,859 --> 00:32:10,099 commander with this Navy hat made that 722 00:32:10,099 --> 00:32:12,810 decision , uh , mainly for the welfare 723 00:32:12,810 --> 00:32:15,819 of the crews and so the problem is is 724 00:32:15,819 --> 00:32:17,930 that those are civilian mariner crews 725 00:32:17,930 --> 00:32:20,489 that's correct . And so , uh , the , 726 00:32:20,609 --> 00:32:22,849 the challenge there is that , uh , with 727 00:32:22,849 --> 00:32:24,960 the number of ships and the shortfall 728 00:32:24,960 --> 00:32:27,099 of the cruise , it was very hard to 729 00:32:27,099 --> 00:32:29,099 manage the cruise in a way that was 730 00:32:29,099 --> 00:32:30,932 sustainable and so he did that . 731 00:32:31,510 --> 00:32:34,229 Separate from that for uh under the 732 00:32:34,229 --> 00:32:36,285 Department of Transportation and the 733 00:32:36,285 --> 00:32:39,430 maritime administration um what we're 734 00:32:39,430 --> 00:32:42,750 seeking to do there is for the civilian 735 00:32:42,750 --> 00:32:44,806 crews that we have there , these are 736 00:32:44,806 --> 00:32:46,806 merchant mariners in the commercial 737 00:32:46,806 --> 00:32:49,790 fleet that when called come to sail 738 00:32:49,790 --> 00:32:52,670 with us and support our needs . What we 739 00:32:52,670 --> 00:32:55,709 would like to do for them is to buy to 740 00:32:55,709 --> 00:32:58,660 build new ships if we can . And to buy 741 00:32:58,660 --> 00:33:01,099 younger used ships so that they have 742 00:33:01,099 --> 00:33:03,920 much better equipment in that same way 743 00:33:03,920 --> 00:33:05,920 when they have the better equipment 744 00:33:06,099 --> 00:33:08,210 then they're more likely to stay with 745 00:33:08,210 --> 00:33:10,210 us and that is our way to make sure 746 00:33:10,210 --> 00:33:13,000 that we can uh sustain that force . OK , 747 00:33:13,099 --> 00:33:14,060 thank you , um . 748 00:33:17,079 --> 00:33:18,857 We've recently seen a number of 749 00:33:18,857 --> 00:33:21,023 incidents in the Taiwan Strait and the 750 00:33:21,023 --> 00:33:24,119 Baltic Sea whereby undersea cables were 751 00:33:24,119 --> 00:33:26,520 damaged or destroyed by ships with 752 00:33:26,520 --> 00:33:29,869 connections to Russia and China . Can 753 00:33:29,869 --> 00:33:32,091 you talk specifically about the current 754 00:33:32,091 --> 00:33:34,979 condition of our cable layers and 755 00:33:35,270 --> 00:33:37,709 whether or not you think we are ready 756 00:33:37,709 --> 00:33:41,260 to respond to the types of attacks 757 00:33:41,550 --> 00:33:45,000 we may see in any kind of conflict or 758 00:33:45,670 --> 00:33:47,892 heck the Russians and Chinese are doing 759 00:33:47,892 --> 00:33:50,949 it in non-conflict situations that 760 00:33:50,949 --> 00:33:54,709 relate to um our undersea cables . 761 00:33:55,800 --> 00:33:57,689 By the way , I know you know this 762 00:33:57,689 --> 00:33:59,689 general , nearly 95% of the world's 763 00:33:59,689 --> 00:34:02,400 internet traffic , um . Goes through 764 00:34:02,400 --> 00:34:06,359 these cables . Chairman , those are 765 00:34:06,359 --> 00:34:10,330 specialty ships that we have , um . We 766 00:34:10,330 --> 00:34:12,330 don't have very many of them , uh , 767 00:34:12,449 --> 00:34:14,671 they are old , uh , the ships that crew 768 00:34:14,671 --> 00:34:16,505 them , uh , those ships are very 769 00:34:16,505 --> 00:34:18,505 capable . um , those are also ships 770 00:34:18,505 --> 00:34:20,560 that , uh , we actually need to make 771 00:34:20,560 --> 00:34:22,838 sure that they're that they're younger , 772 00:34:22,838 --> 00:34:24,838 uh , that they're faster , and that 773 00:34:24,838 --> 00:34:26,949 they're more reliable as well . Do we 774 00:34:26,949 --> 00:34:28,893 have any ships online that you see 775 00:34:28,893 --> 00:34:31,409 coming into the fleet that are those 776 00:34:31,409 --> 00:34:33,353 kind of ships you just described , 777 00:34:33,409 --> 00:34:36,229 Chairman , I do not . Let me ask about 778 00:34:36,229 --> 00:34:38,648 another challenge that you highlighted 779 00:34:38,648 --> 00:34:41,509 and uh Senator Fisher already mentioned . 780 00:34:42,158 --> 00:34:44,269 Um , can you walk me through the kind 781 00:34:44,269 --> 00:34:46,968 of broader readiness concerns that you 782 00:34:46,968 --> 00:34:50,519 have with the KC-135 and KC 46 , 783 00:34:51,089 --> 00:34:54,208 uh , tankers ? Um , I know this is a 784 00:34:54,208 --> 00:34:57,208 top priority , so how you integrate 785 00:34:57,208 --> 00:34:59,430 them , how you use one set , which is , 786 00:34:59,448 --> 00:35:01,918 as you mentioned , up to 70 years old , 787 00:35:02,358 --> 00:35:04,529 um , and then the incoming one that's 788 00:35:04,529 --> 00:35:06,696 been plagued with problems , I think . 789 00:35:07,399 --> 00:35:09,343 Boeing really needs to get its act 790 00:35:09,343 --> 00:35:11,343 together on this . Um , what's your 791 00:35:11,343 --> 00:35:13,510 sense of how we're integrating that in 792 00:35:13,510 --> 00:35:15,566 your strategic plan ? Chairman , the 793 00:35:15,566 --> 00:35:18,409 KC-135 is a fantastic airplane . Um , I 794 00:35:18,409 --> 00:35:20,465 was qualified in it once and uh it's 795 00:35:20,465 --> 00:35:22,687 got me around the world and , and , and 796 00:35:22,687 --> 00:35:25,760 back . Um , it needs to consistently be 797 00:35:25,760 --> 00:35:28,639 looked , uh , looked at to improve , uh , 798 00:35:28,649 --> 00:35:31,600 to update , um , over the . Years we've 799 00:35:31,600 --> 00:35:34,780 um increased the electronics in it um 800 00:35:35,100 --> 00:35:37,139 years back we improved the the 801 00:35:37,139 --> 00:35:39,649 propulsion systems but as we go forward , 802 00:35:39,659 --> 00:35:41,770 what's the most important for that is 803 00:35:41,770 --> 00:35:43,770 that it gets connected to the joint 804 00:35:43,770 --> 00:35:46,570 force . Connectivity is king for that 805 00:35:47,060 --> 00:35:49,282 aircraft as it goes forward and if it's 806 00:35:49,282 --> 00:35:51,449 not connected , it's not as survivable 807 00:35:51,449 --> 00:35:55,020 as it should be . The KC 46 , uh , is a 808 00:35:55,020 --> 00:35:57,131 great airplane as well . I've had the 809 00:35:57,131 --> 00:35:59,800 fortune to to fly it . Um , there are 810 00:35:59,800 --> 00:36:02,360 some things that the manufacturer needs 811 00:36:02,360 --> 00:36:04,600 to fix , but when that airplane works 812 00:36:04,600 --> 00:36:07,760 it works in fine fashion . Uh , it is 813 00:36:07,760 --> 00:36:09,927 an airplane that I think that they are 814 00:36:09,927 --> 00:36:12,149 going to fix . We need to stick with it 815 00:36:12,149 --> 00:36:14,149 and we need to keep going . Great , 816 00:36:14,149 --> 00:36:16,979 thank you , General Senator Reid . Well , 817 00:36:17,060 --> 00:36:19,338 thank you very much , uh Mr . Chairman , 818 00:36:19,338 --> 00:36:21,580 and welcome General Reed . I , I must 819 00:36:21,580 --> 00:36:23,802 say that's quite an impressive name you 820 00:36:23,802 --> 00:36:26,060 have . I , I'm very impressed . No 821 00:36:26,060 --> 00:36:28,300 relation , I assume . Uh , we are 822 00:36:28,300 --> 00:36:30,356 related , uh , in an emotional way . 823 00:36:30,356 --> 00:36:32,467 We're both committed to the country . 824 00:36:32,959 --> 00:36:35,350 Um , he's much more fitter than I . 825 00:36:35,879 --> 00:36:37,959 General Reed , uh , Transom relies 826 00:36:37,959 --> 00:36:40,159 heavily on commercial aircraft in 827 00:36:40,159 --> 00:36:42,590 peacetime and also depends on 828 00:36:42,590 --> 00:36:45,159 commercial aircraft who participate in 829 00:36:45,159 --> 00:36:48,389 the civil reserve air fleet craft . Ah , 830 00:36:48,590 --> 00:36:51,439 for wartime needs . And craft 831 00:36:51,439 --> 00:36:53,661 participants are always concerned about 832 00:36:53,661 --> 00:36:56,159 how much cargo capacity Transcom will 833 00:36:56,159 --> 00:36:58,939 purchase from them . First , are you 834 00:36:58,939 --> 00:37:01,340 taking action to rely more heavily on 835 00:37:01,340 --> 00:37:03,500 craft fleet in peacetime ? 836 00:37:06,409 --> 00:37:08,770 Senator , uh , we do have access to 837 00:37:08,770 --> 00:37:11,169 those aircraft . What's , uh , most 838 00:37:11,169 --> 00:37:13,370 important to note is that , uh , uh , 839 00:37:13,379 --> 00:37:15,601 craft , if we were to activate it would 840 00:37:15,601 --> 00:37:18,300 be in case of wartime or a severe 841 00:37:18,300 --> 00:37:21,060 crisis , um , in , in return of those 842 00:37:21,060 --> 00:37:23,171 aircraft being in the craft program , 843 00:37:23,171 --> 00:37:26,330 uh , we do use them and , uh , they are 844 00:37:26,330 --> 00:37:29,270 able to operate . With us , but what's 845 00:37:29,270 --> 00:37:32,189 most important is , is , uh , when we 846 00:37:32,189 --> 00:37:34,949 have the need for something beyond what 847 00:37:34,949 --> 00:37:37,280 we have in the gray hall , uh , they 848 00:37:37,280 --> 00:37:40,020 make themselves available in this way , 849 00:37:40,189 --> 00:37:42,411 uh , we can keep them ready and trained 850 00:37:42,411 --> 00:37:44,633 to operate with us and in this way also 851 00:37:44,633 --> 00:37:47,139 for the organic craft that we have , uh , 852 00:37:47,149 --> 00:37:50,590 we can use them for uh higher priority 853 00:37:50,590 --> 00:37:53,360 uh sorties . Now , uh , 854 00:37:54,469 --> 00:37:56,636 There's been some discussion about the 855 00:37:56,636 --> 00:37:59,120 transportation of detainees and others . 856 00:37:59,469 --> 00:38:01,247 Have you considered using craft 857 00:38:01,247 --> 00:38:03,760 participants rather than military 858 00:38:03,760 --> 00:38:07,699 aircraft to move these people ? Senator , 859 00:38:07,780 --> 00:38:10,340 right now , uh , we have authorization 860 00:38:10,340 --> 00:38:12,580 to fly these sorties in support of the 861 00:38:12,580 --> 00:38:14,636 Department of Homeland Security on a 862 00:38:14,636 --> 00:38:17,969 non-reimbursable , uh , uh , structure , 863 00:38:18,260 --> 00:38:20,482 so , uh , as such , I'm not able to use 864 00:38:20,482 --> 00:38:23,969 craft . So , uh , DOD is paying for , 865 00:38:24,479 --> 00:38:27,250 uh , this movement of detainees . 866 00:38:27,699 --> 00:38:30,419 That's correct , Senator . Uh , as I 867 00:38:30,419 --> 00:38:33,860 mentioned in our meeting , uh , I heard 868 00:38:33,860 --> 00:38:37,020 that the Air Force personnel on these 869 00:38:37,020 --> 00:38:39,580 aircraft were not , uh , wearing name 870 00:38:39,580 --> 00:38:43,459 tags or , uh , this unit symbol . Is 871 00:38:43,459 --> 00:38:45,459 that accurate and what can be done 872 00:38:45,459 --> 00:38:48,300 about that ? Uh , that is accurate , 873 00:38:48,340 --> 00:38:50,618 Senator , and , uh , if you don't mind , 874 00:38:50,618 --> 00:38:52,562 uh , I'd like to discuss that in a 875 00:38:52,562 --> 00:38:54,729 separate session's quite right , sir . 876 00:38:54,729 --> 00:38:56,784 I appreciate that . Thank you . Uh , 877 00:38:59,179 --> 00:39:01,123 We've talked a lot about contested 878 00:39:01,123 --> 00:39:04,580 logistics here and what requirements 879 00:39:04,580 --> 00:39:07,379 are you trying to levy on the system to 880 00:39:07,379 --> 00:39:10,149 get the services to pay greater 881 00:39:10,149 --> 00:39:12,300 attention on operating the logistics 882 00:39:12,300 --> 00:39:15,020 systems in contested areas , the 883 00:39:15,020 --> 00:39:17,076 requirements you're asking for . Can 884 00:39:17,076 --> 00:39:20,479 you please describe those ? One of the 885 00:39:20,479 --> 00:39:22,757 clearest ways that we're doing that is , 886 00:39:22,757 --> 00:39:24,923 uh , in our new role , uh , for global 887 00:39:24,923 --> 00:39:28,320 bulk fuel management and delivery as we 888 00:39:28,320 --> 00:39:30,919 do , uh , fuel assessments . Uh , we 889 00:39:30,919 --> 00:39:32,919 are doing fuel assessments with our 890 00:39:32,919 --> 00:39:35,560 fellow combatant commands . Uh , we did 891 00:39:35,560 --> 00:39:39,120 an initial one with Endo Paycom . Um , 892 00:39:39,320 --> 00:39:41,431 we learned some lessons in that one . 893 00:39:41,560 --> 00:39:44,760 we next took the assessment to CEO . Um , 894 00:39:44,770 --> 00:39:47,169 and as part of that , uh , when we look 895 00:39:47,169 --> 00:39:49,409 at where the fuel should be , um , how 896 00:39:49,409 --> 00:39:51,131 it should be set up , what the 897 00:39:51,131 --> 00:39:53,409 infrastructure is , and , uh , how to 898 00:39:53,409 --> 00:39:55,409 meet the needs , we also run a 899 00:39:55,409 --> 00:39:59,120 contested logistics scenario on it , um , 900 00:39:59,129 --> 00:40:01,209 and then once we do that , uh , that 901 00:40:01,209 --> 00:40:03,409 allows us insight into what's required 902 00:40:03,409 --> 00:40:06,379 from the theater as well . And , uh , 903 00:40:06,389 --> 00:40:09,030 general , we all recognize the 904 00:40:09,030 --> 00:40:11,086 importance of cyber , in fact , it's 905 00:40:11,086 --> 00:40:13,363 more important , it seems every moment , 906 00:40:13,363 --> 00:40:16,550 uh . The 907 00:40:17,469 --> 00:40:19,820 Uh , issue of cyber seems to be 908 00:40:19,820 --> 00:40:22,060 particularly uh challenging when it 909 00:40:22,060 --> 00:40:24,116 comes to our civilian aircraft , the 910 00:40:24,116 --> 00:40:26,338 craft aircraft . Could you tell us what 911 00:40:26,338 --> 00:40:28,610 you're trying to do to enhance their 912 00:40:28,610 --> 00:40:30,979 cybersecurity and their and their 913 00:40:30,979 --> 00:40:33,090 ability to communicate with Air Force 914 00:40:33,090 --> 00:40:36,929 aircraft ? Uh , the cyber domain is 915 00:40:36,929 --> 00:40:39,199 very problematic , especially for US 916 00:40:39,199 --> 00:40:41,370 Transcom , because , uh , as stated 917 00:40:41,370 --> 00:40:43,148 before , most of our capability 918 00:40:43,148 --> 00:40:45,330 actually resides in the commercial 919 00:40:45,330 --> 00:40:47,760 realm . So their networks are not 920 00:40:47,760 --> 00:40:49,760 within ours and they're not as 921 00:40:49,760 --> 00:40:52,159 protected as ours . Uh , fortunately we 922 00:40:52,159 --> 00:40:54,439 have a lot of help , uh , with law 923 00:40:54,439 --> 00:40:57,330 enforcement , um , also cyber command 924 00:40:57,560 --> 00:40:59,959 and also with the US Coast Guard to 925 00:40:59,959 --> 00:41:02,449 make sure that we can , uh , share 926 00:41:02,449 --> 00:41:05,110 information , we can collaborate , uh , 927 00:41:05,120 --> 00:41:07,320 both for aircraft and for sealift . 928 00:41:08,399 --> 00:41:10,566 Thank you very much . Thank you , Mr . 929 00:41:10,566 --> 00:41:12,677 Chairman . Thank you , Senator Reid . 930 00:41:12,677 --> 00:41:14,899 Senator Scott , thank you , thank you , 931 00:41:14,899 --> 00:41:16,955 Chairman . Um , to Reed , thanks for 932 00:41:16,955 --> 00:41:19,010 your service . Um , I appreciate the 933 00:41:19,010 --> 00:41:21,232 opportunity to sit down with you , um , 934 00:41:21,232 --> 00:41:23,649 and thank , thank you for Your service , 935 00:41:23,729 --> 00:41:25,673 your family service , everything , 936 00:41:25,673 --> 00:41:28,360 everything you do go navy . Um , it's I 937 00:41:28,360 --> 00:41:30,249 understand that the Department of 938 00:41:30,249 --> 00:41:32,360 Defense is now moving service members 939 00:41:32,360 --> 00:41:34,471 and their families under a new global 940 00:41:34,471 --> 00:41:36,416 household goods contract with peak 941 00:41:36,416 --> 00:41:36,189 moving season just around the corner . 942 00:41:36,550 --> 00:41:38,717 Can you share some of the feedback you 943 00:41:38,717 --> 00:41:40,939 received on implementing the contract ? 944 00:41:40,939 --> 00:41:43,161 And can you explain the Army's decision 945 00:41:43,161 --> 00:41:44,994 to pause moves under this , uh , 946 00:41:44,994 --> 00:41:47,050 program that do not have enough lead 947 00:41:47,050 --> 00:41:49,290 time ? Senator Folston , uh , first and 948 00:41:49,290 --> 00:41:51,969 foremost , the , the reason for the 949 00:41:51,969 --> 00:41:55,300 contract is to . Correct 950 00:41:56,360 --> 00:41:58,320 Past performance that wasn't uh as 951 00:41:58,320 --> 00:42:00,800 strong as it should be uh to get after 952 00:42:00,800 --> 00:42:02,911 years of frustration from those of us 953 00:42:02,911 --> 00:42:05,600 who move and also years of frustration 954 00:42:05,600 --> 00:42:07,959 from yourselves um to help us to try to 955 00:42:07,959 --> 00:42:10,959 fix it um in this transition what we 956 00:42:10,959 --> 00:42:14,199 are actually doing is we are having a 957 00:42:14,199 --> 00:42:16,280 transformation within a market that 958 00:42:16,280 --> 00:42:19,540 still exists . And uh with this 959 00:42:19,540 --> 00:42:21,899 transformation we actually have a 960 00:42:21,899 --> 00:42:25,080 structure um both uh IT 961 00:42:25,669 --> 00:42:29,459 and uh with uh uh rule structure that 962 00:42:29,459 --> 00:42:31,979 actually uh that actually allows us to 963 00:42:31,979 --> 00:42:34,201 see more what's happening in the market 964 00:42:34,340 --> 00:42:36,451 to monitor trends that are positive , 965 00:42:36,459 --> 00:42:38,737 monitor trends that are not so much so , 966 00:42:38,780 --> 00:42:41,002 and actually have the tools to actually 967 00:42:41,002 --> 00:42:43,250 do something about it . We are about 2 968 00:42:43,250 --> 00:42:47,090 years into what is actually a 10 year 969 00:42:47,090 --> 00:42:49,312 contract , if you will , basic contract 970 00:42:49,312 --> 00:42:52,090 of 6 years with 41 year options so 971 00:42:52,090 --> 00:42:54,530 we're fairly new at this . um , there 972 00:42:54,530 --> 00:42:56,760 are some performance issues we are able 973 00:42:56,760 --> 00:42:58,982 to see those and we're actually able to 974 00:42:58,982 --> 00:43:01,570 do something about that , uh , with 975 00:43:01,570 --> 00:43:03,681 regards to the comment about what the 976 00:43:03,681 --> 00:43:05,792 army has done , uh , the army has not 977 00:43:05,792 --> 00:43:08,250 paused their participation in the 978 00:43:08,250 --> 00:43:10,340 contract . Um , what we're doing 979 00:43:10,340 --> 00:43:12,620 instead is , uh , we in conjunction 980 00:43:12,620 --> 00:43:15,540 with the services are monitoring the 981 00:43:15,540 --> 00:43:18,090 rate of the transfer to the contract 982 00:43:18,620 --> 00:43:20,810 because this is not about the vendor , 983 00:43:21,020 --> 00:43:23,139 it's not about the program it's about 984 00:43:23,379 --> 00:43:26,260 those who move and so as we support 985 00:43:26,260 --> 00:43:29,379 those who move we will match them up uh 986 00:43:29,379 --> 00:43:32,260 for success as we um help this uh 987 00:43:32,350 --> 00:43:35,780 uh help the transformation mature . 988 00:43:36,280 --> 00:43:38,502 So you've got enough capacity to do the 989 00:43:38,502 --> 00:43:40,502 moves because I guess the summer is 990 00:43:40,502 --> 00:43:42,558 your biggest moves , is that right ? 991 00:43:42,558 --> 00:43:44,780 Just based on Summer is the peak season 992 00:43:44,780 --> 00:43:46,947 and uh usually during that time , um , 993 00:43:46,947 --> 00:43:48,891 uh , both combined , uh , KOus and 994 00:43:48,891 --> 00:43:50,780 Oconus , it's about 300,000 moves 995 00:43:50,780 --> 00:43:52,724 although we are not , um , putting 996 00:43:52,724 --> 00:43:55,439 Oconus moves out just yet , um , but 997 00:43:55,439 --> 00:43:57,661 with that , uh , we have moves that are 998 00:43:57,661 --> 00:44:00,310 still in the contract piece and there 999 00:44:00,310 --> 00:44:02,532 are still moves that are in the current 1000 00:44:02,532 --> 00:44:04,643 system as well . And what's happening 1001 00:44:04,643 --> 00:44:06,810 with the international moves ? Is that 1002 00:44:06,810 --> 00:44:09,143 being impacted at all ? Not at all . Uh , 1003 00:44:09,143 --> 00:44:11,489 that's designed to come at a much later 1004 00:44:11,489 --> 00:44:13,545 date once we solve , uh , this piece 1005 00:44:13,545 --> 00:44:16,820 here . Um , our our ready 1006 00:44:16,820 --> 00:44:18,987 reserve force program plays a critical 1007 00:44:18,987 --> 00:44:21,060 role in making , um , you know , our 1008 00:44:21,060 --> 00:44:23,282 ability to deliver , uh , equipment and 1009 00:44:23,282 --> 00:44:25,610 critical supplies . Um , with about 20 1010 00:44:25,610 --> 00:44:27,777 of those , we got 20 of the ships that 1011 00:44:27,777 --> 00:44:29,999 are over 50 years old . Do you have any 1012 00:44:29,999 --> 00:44:32,110 concerns about the military's ability 1013 00:44:32,110 --> 00:44:35,969 to keep up ? I do , um , these , these 1014 00:44:36,060 --> 00:44:38,116 ships are really , really old , um , 1015 00:44:38,169 --> 00:44:40,500 the reliability of them , uh , 1016 00:44:40,510 --> 00:44:42,677 sometimes aren't questioned because of 1017 00:44:42,677 --> 00:44:45,379 that . Um , I take my hat off to the 1018 00:44:45,379 --> 00:44:47,601 crews that are actually on them to keep 1019 00:44:47,601 --> 00:44:49,823 them warm , um , but to give an idea of 1020 00:44:49,823 --> 00:44:51,935 the state of the ships , uh , some of 1021 00:44:51,935 --> 00:44:53,990 these ships are still run by steam , 1022 00:44:53,990 --> 00:44:56,212 and the last time that I was on a steam 1023 00:44:56,212 --> 00:44:58,659 ship , um , I was a high schooler and 1024 00:44:58,659 --> 00:45:02,050 Navy junior ROTC . Um , and so the 1025 00:45:02,050 --> 00:45:04,272 sailors that we actually put on these , 1026 00:45:04,272 --> 00:45:06,439 uh , these ships and the crews that we 1027 00:45:06,439 --> 00:45:08,328 put on these ships , they deserve 1028 00:45:08,328 --> 00:45:12,010 something younger . So do you 1029 00:45:12,010 --> 00:45:14,343 think if uh if we had a conflict in the , 1030 00:45:14,343 --> 00:45:16,399 um , Asia Pacific , do you think you 1031 00:45:16,399 --> 00:45:20,179 could perform ? We could 1032 00:45:20,320 --> 00:45:22,260 perform , uh , we would have some 1033 00:45:22,260 --> 00:45:24,538 challenges with that we would struggle , 1034 00:45:24,538 --> 00:45:26,639 um , but we would not perform to the 1035 00:45:26,639 --> 00:45:28,917 level that I would like to . Thank you , 1036 00:45:28,919 --> 00:45:32,149 General . Thank you , Chairman . Thank 1037 00:45:32,149 --> 00:45:34,371 you , Senator Scott . Senator Shaheen . 1038 00:45:36,290 --> 00:45:38,457 Well , thank you , Mr . Chairman . I'm 1039 00:45:38,457 --> 00:45:40,479 happy to defer to our chairman of . 1040 00:45:42,110 --> 00:45:44,310 Thank you . Um , thank you , General 1041 00:45:44,310 --> 00:45:47,110 Reed , for being here and for taking 1042 00:45:47,110 --> 00:45:49,550 time to meet with me before this 1043 00:45:49,550 --> 00:45:53,229 hearing . Um , as we discussed in that 1044 00:45:53,229 --> 00:45:55,659 office meeting . New Hampshire is home 1045 00:45:55,659 --> 00:45:58,830 to the 157th air refueling wing . It's 1046 00:45:58,830 --> 00:46:02,070 the only KC 46 wing in the country to 1047 00:46:02,070 --> 00:46:04,300 reach an initial operating capacity . 1048 00:46:04,629 --> 00:46:07,729 Had to get that in . Um , but you 1049 00:46:07,729 --> 00:46:10,850 referenced this in your previous 1050 00:46:10,850 --> 00:46:13,330 statements that , um , Transom has 1051 00:46:13,330 --> 00:46:15,409 assessed that the aerial refueling 1052 00:46:15,409 --> 00:46:18,929 fleet of KC-135s and KC-46s 1053 00:46:19,330 --> 00:46:21,552 would be subject to considerable stress 1054 00:46:21,552 --> 00:46:24,449 during wartime . And as you're looking 1055 00:46:24,449 --> 00:46:27,090 at what this new administration is 1056 00:46:27,090 --> 00:46:29,201 talking about with respect to funding 1057 00:46:29,201 --> 00:46:31,850 cuts in the defense budget , is the KC 1058 00:46:31,850 --> 00:46:34,409 46 program exempt from those funding 1059 00:46:34,409 --> 00:46:38,310 cuts ? Uh , senator , in this case 1060 00:46:38,310 --> 00:46:40,477 I would have to defer to the Air Force 1061 00:46:40,477 --> 00:46:42,590 for that , um , but I have spoken to 1062 00:46:42,590 --> 00:46:44,923 the service and I've let them know that , 1063 00:46:44,923 --> 00:46:46,923 uh , I am concerned in terms of the 1064 00:46:46,923 --> 00:46:49,129 choices that they have to make . Um , 1065 00:46:49,469 --> 00:46:51,302 we absolutely have to have those 1066 00:46:51,302 --> 00:46:54,580 aircraft fully supported and funded and , 1067 00:46:54,590 --> 00:46:56,534 uh , whatever I can do to help the 1068 00:46:56,534 --> 00:46:58,750 service I'll certainly do that . Well 1069 00:46:58,750 --> 00:47:00,861 thank you . I , I agree with that and 1070 00:47:00,861 --> 00:47:03,179 as we discussed again in that meeting , 1071 00:47:03,469 --> 00:47:05,590 um , the ongoing logistic composite 1072 00:47:05,590 --> 00:47:08,229 model which I know the , the chairman 1073 00:47:08,229 --> 00:47:10,285 of the subcommittee understands well 1074 00:47:10,285 --> 00:47:12,451 because it's been an issue in Alaska , 1075 00:47:12,451 --> 00:47:14,618 um , but they're doing the study right 1076 00:47:14,618 --> 00:47:16,840 now at peace and it's the result of the 1077 00:47:16,840 --> 00:47:18,562 Air National Guard's releveing 1078 00:47:18,562 --> 00:47:20,969 initiative , um , which . Under the 1079 00:47:20,969 --> 00:47:23,929 current um projections would reduce the 1080 00:47:23,929 --> 00:47:27,770 157's ability to support Transom by 1081 00:47:27,770 --> 00:47:31,209 22% . Would that have an impact on 1082 00:47:31,489 --> 00:47:34,129 um your needs ? Should , should you 1083 00:47:34,129 --> 00:47:37,810 need um to use that um 1084 00:47:37,810 --> 00:47:41,729 157th for a refueling mission ? 1085 00:47:43,300 --> 00:47:45,522 Uh , senator , in this case I'd have to 1086 00:47:45,522 --> 00:47:47,744 defer to the service in terms of , uh , 1087 00:47:47,744 --> 00:47:50,022 what they see as the outcomes for that . 1088 00:47:50,022 --> 00:47:52,133 However , uh , that being said , uh , 1089 00:47:52,133 --> 00:47:54,800 being familiar with that model , um , I 1090 00:47:54,800 --> 00:47:56,967 know that they're going to take a very 1091 00:47:56,967 --> 00:47:58,840 good look at , uh , not only the 1092 00:47:58,840 --> 00:48:01,550 aircraft itself , uh , which , uh , 1093 00:48:01,560 --> 00:48:04,199 will change how folks work on it , but 1094 00:48:04,199 --> 00:48:06,366 they will also look at how we use that 1095 00:48:06,366 --> 00:48:08,088 aircraft in the unit that it's 1096 00:48:08,088 --> 00:48:10,310 associated with . So the fact that it's 1097 00:48:10,310 --> 00:48:12,199 in a reserve component is another 1098 00:48:12,199 --> 00:48:14,421 aspect of actually looking at how folks 1099 00:48:14,421 --> 00:48:17,330 will work the tasks um that should get 1100 00:48:17,330 --> 00:48:19,497 looked at um when they work that study 1101 00:48:19,497 --> 00:48:22,639 and um I'll wait to see how that uh 1102 00:48:23,330 --> 00:48:25,929 study concludes . Well , thank you . I 1103 00:48:25,929 --> 00:48:28,096 appreciate that and I know that you're 1104 00:48:28,096 --> 00:48:30,318 looking for opportunities to come up to 1105 00:48:30,318 --> 00:48:32,679 peace to see firsthand how the 157th is 1106 00:48:32,679 --> 00:48:35,120 operating and . How they're working 1107 00:48:35,169 --> 00:48:37,810 with the KC 46 , so I look forward to 1108 00:48:37,810 --> 00:48:40,169 welcoming you there sometime in the 1109 00:48:40,169 --> 00:48:43,040 near future . And uh if I may add , uh , 1110 00:48:43,050 --> 00:48:46,449 yes , your unit was the first one KC 46 1111 00:48:46,449 --> 00:48:49,090 that we employed um they went to CEO 1112 00:48:49,090 --> 00:48:51,159 and uh they did a fantastic job . So 1113 00:48:51,159 --> 00:48:53,437 thank you so much for that . Thank you . 1114 00:48:53,437 --> 00:48:55,603 Um , we will definitely make sure that 1115 00:48:55,603 --> 00:48:57,929 the 157 knows that you said that . I 1116 00:48:57,929 --> 00:49:01,100 appreciate that , um . We also 1117 00:49:01,100 --> 00:49:02,989 discussed your desire to increase 1118 00:49:02,989 --> 00:49:04,989 Transcom's sea lift capacity . It's 1119 00:49:04,989 --> 00:49:06,656 something that you've already 1120 00:49:06,656 --> 00:49:08,822 referenced here , um , and to increase 1121 00:49:08,822 --> 00:49:12,370 the The 10 ship limit on the buy used 1122 00:49:13,239 --> 00:49:15,939 again . I know that 1123 00:49:17,270 --> 00:49:19,381 You are not the person who's going to 1124 00:49:19,381 --> 00:49:22,040 decide about the 8% cuts that are being 1125 00:49:22,040 --> 00:49:24,318 projected at the Department of Defense , 1126 00:49:24,318 --> 00:49:28,090 but if you had to cut 8% out of 1127 00:49:28,090 --> 00:49:31,360 um your sea lift capacity , what would 1128 00:49:31,360 --> 00:49:34,080 that mean for your ability to address 1129 00:49:34,080 --> 00:49:36,247 the mission that you're charged with ? 1130 00:49:38,169 --> 00:49:40,270 In our pursuit to buy used on the 1131 00:49:40,270 --> 00:49:41,992 market that would uh limit the 1132 00:49:41,992 --> 00:49:43,881 flexibility that we would have to 1133 00:49:43,881 --> 00:49:45,992 actually shop the market and find the 1134 00:49:45,992 --> 00:49:48,048 ships that we need and get them at a 1135 00:49:48,048 --> 00:49:50,489 suitable price . So as you're thinking 1136 00:49:50,489 --> 00:49:54,110 about . You have the 1137 00:49:54,110 --> 00:49:56,830 capacity to do 10 ships this year . Is 1138 00:49:56,830 --> 00:49:59,989 that correct ? Under the NDAA and 1139 00:49:59,989 --> 00:50:02,870 hopefully we can get another 10 ships . 1140 00:50:03,030 --> 00:50:05,989 So , what are you hoping to get within 1141 00:50:05,989 --> 00:50:09,189 the next , um , this year in terms of 1142 00:50:09,189 --> 00:50:11,389 that additional sea lift capacity ? 1143 00:50:13,270 --> 00:50:15,270 This year , the most immediate need 1144 00:50:15,270 --> 00:50:17,437 would be to make sure that we can have 1145 00:50:17,437 --> 00:50:20,590 on the order of about 210 million that 1146 00:50:20,590 --> 00:50:22,701 would allow us to secure two ships on 1147 00:50:22,701 --> 00:50:24,701 the market , uh , make sure that we 1148 00:50:24,701 --> 00:50:27,429 could get them into a shipyard , and 1149 00:50:27,429 --> 00:50:30,429 then reflag them within about 9 to 14 1150 00:50:30,429 --> 00:50:32,590 months . And how concerned are you 1151 00:50:32,590 --> 00:50:34,590 about having the civilian workforce 1152 00:50:34,590 --> 00:50:36,534 that it's going to take to operate 1153 00:50:36,534 --> 00:50:39,290 those ships ? Right now we have the 1154 00:50:39,290 --> 00:50:41,520 workforce . My main concern is making 1155 00:50:41,520 --> 00:50:43,520 sure that I have a young , reliable 1156 00:50:43,520 --> 00:50:46,010 ship to keep the workforce . Thank you . 1157 00:50:46,179 --> 00:50:48,401 Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Thank you , 1158 00:50:48,401 --> 00:50:50,735 Senator Shaheen . It's good to know the . 1159 00:50:50,735 --> 00:50:53,310 157th is up and running with the I 1160 00:50:53,310 --> 00:50:55,270 didn't know the KC-46 had a full 1161 00:50:55,270 --> 00:50:57,437 squatter , so that's great . We'd we'd 1162 00:50:57,437 --> 00:50:59,437 love to have you come and visit . I 1163 00:50:59,437 --> 00:51:01,437 would love to see it . That's great 1164 00:51:01,437 --> 00:51:01,189 news . We want them all over the 1165 00:51:01,189 --> 00:51:03,300 country . Uh , we are honored to have 1166 00:51:03,300 --> 00:51:05,356 our chairman of the full committee , 1167 00:51:05,356 --> 00:51:07,522 Senator Wicker . Mr . Chairman , floor 1168 00:51:07,522 --> 00:51:09,578 is yours . Yes , we don't need to be 1169 00:51:09,578 --> 00:51:12,810 cutting the KC 46 , um , 1170 00:51:13,229 --> 00:51:16,350 program . Uh , now let's see , um . 1171 00:51:16,989 --> 00:51:19,929 I , I don't know if contested logistics 1172 00:51:19,929 --> 00:51:23,050 has been asked in in this regard , but 1173 00:51:23,050 --> 00:51:25,330 there's been conversation about 1174 00:51:25,330 --> 00:51:29,120 coalescing um around a single manager 1175 00:51:29,449 --> 00:51:32,290 for contested logistics so let's talk 1176 00:51:32,290 --> 00:51:36,250 about that , um . Is it time to look 1177 00:51:36,250 --> 00:51:38,860 for a single manager for contested ? 1178 00:51:39,689 --> 00:51:43,489 Logistics and might . Uh , trends 1179 00:51:43,489 --> 00:51:47,489 come be , um , where that role 1180 00:51:47,489 --> 00:51:49,600 might be assigned . If the bloom goes 1181 00:51:49,600 --> 00:51:52,270 up . Do you think the department 1182 00:51:52,270 --> 00:51:54,790 currently has a joint contested 1183 00:51:54,790 --> 00:51:57,620 logistics strategy in place that would 1184 00:51:57,620 --> 00:51:58,580 be successful ? 1185 00:52:01,520 --> 00:52:03,742 When faced with a conflict we figure it 1186 00:52:03,742 --> 00:52:05,909 out , Senator and so whether or not we 1187 00:52:05,909 --> 00:52:08,131 could get the job done or not we'll get 1188 00:52:08,131 --> 00:52:10,187 the job done but to your question in 1189 00:52:10,187 --> 00:52:13,229 terms of having a structure and someone 1190 00:52:13,229 --> 00:52:15,639 who can lead that way prior to a 1191 00:52:15,639 --> 00:52:18,520 conflict , um , there , uh , I am aware 1192 00:52:18,520 --> 00:52:20,687 of the deep discussions we've had some 1193 00:52:20,687 --> 00:52:22,742 of those , and it is time to look at 1194 00:52:22,742 --> 00:52:24,853 some aspect of that . Can you give us 1195 00:52:24,853 --> 00:52:28,610 your best advice here ? Senator , my 1196 00:52:28,610 --> 00:52:32,110 best advice is , uh , to allow me to 1197 00:52:32,649 --> 00:52:34,816 look at that and structure that , uh , 1198 00:52:34,816 --> 00:52:37,100 figure out how best Transcom can 1199 00:52:37,100 --> 00:52:39,100 contribute to that with the current 1200 00:52:39,100 --> 00:52:41,322 authorities that we already have , um , 1201 00:52:41,322 --> 00:52:43,810 it's aligned in a good way and I think 1202 00:52:43,810 --> 00:52:46,899 there's a way forward . Um , OK , more 1203 00:52:46,899 --> 00:52:48,909 later on that , um . 1204 00:52:52,449 --> 00:52:56,320 The There there's been um . 1205 00:52:57,379 --> 00:53:00,320 The , the , the Red Hill facility . Has 1206 00:53:00,320 --> 00:53:03,520 been closed . It amplifies the 1207 00:53:03,520 --> 00:53:05,131 logistical challenges in the 1208 00:53:05,131 --> 00:53:07,242 Indo-Pacific , I think you'll agree . 1209 00:53:08,649 --> 00:53:11,159 Uh , what about 1210 00:53:11,689 --> 00:53:15,489 levering existing US flag platform 1211 00:53:15,489 --> 00:53:18,860 supply vessels ? To enhance military 1212 00:53:18,860 --> 00:53:21,459 sustainment capabilities in the region . 1213 00:53:21,949 --> 00:53:24,060 My understanding is that there are at 1214 00:53:24,060 --> 00:53:27,889 least 13 at sea resupply ships , um , 1215 00:53:28,489 --> 00:53:31,919 afloat and ashore near this 1216 00:53:32,540 --> 00:53:34,651 environment . What do you think about 1217 00:53:34,651 --> 00:53:38,050 that ? If I understand your question , 1218 00:53:38,129 --> 00:53:40,489 you're asking , um , how do we uh work 1219 00:53:40,489 --> 00:53:42,545 fuel in the theater , whether it's a 1220 00:53:42,545 --> 00:53:44,929 shore or a float um that is one of the 1221 00:53:44,929 --> 00:53:47,479 things that we look at in Transom , uh , 1222 00:53:47,489 --> 00:53:49,656 when it comes to the ships to actually 1223 00:53:49,656 --> 00:53:52,280 do that , um , we also , we are looking 1224 00:53:52,280 --> 00:53:54,600 to the employment strategy of the 1225 00:53:54,610 --> 00:53:57,370 theater commander in terms of , uh , 1226 00:53:57,689 --> 00:53:59,633 how he would want to move the fuel 1227 00:53:59,633 --> 00:54:01,633 around , uh , to look at where that 1228 00:54:01,633 --> 00:54:03,633 fuel needs to be . When it comes to 1229 00:54:03,633 --> 00:54:05,745 some of the vessels that we would use 1230 00:54:05,745 --> 00:54:07,967 for that , um , I , I understand that , 1231 00:54:07,967 --> 00:54:10,189 um , that there is a class of ship that 1232 00:54:10,189 --> 00:54:12,520 has uh been mentioned to me that's 1233 00:54:12,520 --> 00:54:15,070 built here in the states , um , that , 1234 00:54:15,090 --> 00:54:17,199 uh , shallow draft vessel has some 1235 00:54:17,199 --> 00:54:19,560 potential , um , perhaps in the dry 1236 00:54:19,560 --> 00:54:21,560 cargo arena but not necessarily for 1237 00:54:21,560 --> 00:54:24,030 fuels because the uh tanks that it has 1238 00:54:24,030 --> 00:54:26,959 is uh only uh uh single layer . 1239 00:54:27,840 --> 00:54:31,699 OK , uh , so . Uh , right now , 1240 00:54:31,830 --> 00:54:34,590 uh , where would you say the plans are ? 1241 00:54:34,719 --> 00:54:36,775 I is it just some , I think you said 1242 00:54:36,775 --> 00:54:38,989 you're looking at it . You don't 1243 00:54:38,989 --> 00:54:42,229 specifically have plans yet to leverage 1244 00:54:42,229 --> 00:54:45,739 those platforms . Uh , we do not , 1245 00:54:45,830 --> 00:54:48,370 uh , chairmen have plans to leverage 1246 00:54:48,370 --> 00:54:51,020 those particular ships . OK . And , uh , 1247 00:54:51,030 --> 00:54:53,363 and then one other thing , uh , on , um . 1248 00:54:55,189 --> 00:54:58,840 Unfunded requirements um . You 1249 00:54:58,840 --> 00:55:01,007 said during your confirmation you'd be 1250 00:55:01,007 --> 00:55:02,840 a fierce advocate to get all the 1251 00:55:02,840 --> 00:55:05,007 equipment that that our folks needed . 1252 00:55:05,040 --> 00:55:06,818 Do , uh , do we still have your 1253 00:55:06,818 --> 00:55:09,040 commitment that you're going to give us 1254 00:55:09,040 --> 00:55:12,040 a complete list of what you need in 1255 00:55:12,040 --> 00:55:14,280 terms of these unfunded requirements ? 1256 00:55:15,560 --> 00:55:17,689 Chairman , I am a fierce advocate to 1257 00:55:17,689 --> 00:55:20,080 give the force whatever they need using 1258 00:55:20,080 --> 00:55:22,719 any lever that I have right now for an 1259 00:55:22,719 --> 00:55:25,040 unfunded requirement since I have not 1260 00:55:25,040 --> 00:55:27,096 seen the budget . Um , I'm not there 1261 00:55:27,096 --> 00:55:29,590 yet . Oh , OK , yes , but , but , um , 1262 00:55:30,320 --> 00:55:34,070 my , um , exhortation to you is , 1263 00:55:34,399 --> 00:55:37,520 um , that you not hold back on what you 1264 00:55:37,520 --> 00:55:39,899 need . Tell us , I mean you , you , 1265 00:55:40,000 --> 00:55:42,167 you're new and you and you haven't had 1266 00:55:42,167 --> 00:55:44,409 it . A chance to assess all this , but 1267 00:55:44,409 --> 00:55:46,631 do I have your commitment that you will 1268 00:55:46,631 --> 00:55:48,889 give us as complete a list as possible 1269 00:55:48,889 --> 00:55:50,945 of those requirements ? Absolutely , 1270 00:55:50,945 --> 00:55:53,000 Chairman . All right , thank you and 1271 00:55:53,000 --> 00:55:55,222 thank you , Mr . Chairman . Thank you , 1272 00:55:55,222 --> 00:55:57,222 Mr . Chairman Senator Warren . uh , 1273 00:55:57,222 --> 00:55:59,445 thank you , Mr . Chairman and thank you 1274 00:55:59,445 --> 00:56:01,556 for holding this hearing . So Transom 1275 00:56:01,556 --> 00:56:03,778 is responsible for making sure that our 1276 00:56:03,778 --> 00:56:05,945 military and our allies get everything 1277 00:56:05,945 --> 00:56:08,056 they need to win on the battlefield , 1278 00:56:08,056 --> 00:56:10,439 whether it is a new engine for a 1279 00:56:10,439 --> 00:56:12,699 fighter jet in the Middle East or a 1280 00:56:13,080 --> 00:56:15,949 missile battery in the Philippines , 1281 00:56:16,199 --> 00:56:18,840 and that means that Transom knows 1282 00:56:18,840 --> 00:56:22,600 better than anyone why it is a very big 1283 00:56:22,600 --> 00:56:25,310 problem if the military doesn't have 1284 00:56:25,310 --> 00:56:27,719 the right to repair its own equipment . 1285 00:56:28,169 --> 00:56:30,409 General Reed , one of Transom's major 1286 00:56:30,409 --> 00:56:34,090 workhorses is the C5M 1287 00:56:34,090 --> 00:56:36,850 Super Galaxy , a strategic transport 1288 00:56:36,850 --> 00:56:40,209 aircraft that carries cargo and DOD 1289 00:56:40,209 --> 00:56:43,530 personnel all around the world . But in 1290 00:56:43,530 --> 00:56:47,459 2022 , it was able to fly its 1291 00:56:47,459 --> 00:56:51,000 mission only 52% of the time . 1292 00:56:51,409 --> 00:56:54,040 That means that nearly half the times 1293 00:56:54,040 --> 00:56:56,770 that commanders needed it , it wasn't 1294 00:56:56,770 --> 00:56:59,709 there . Congress saw this , said that 1295 00:56:59,709 --> 00:57:01,870 is not acceptable , and gave the Air 1296 00:57:01,870 --> 00:57:05,850 Force $10 billion to fix that problem , 1297 00:57:05,949 --> 00:57:09,270 General Reid . About how often was the 1298 00:57:09,270 --> 00:57:12,790 C5 mission ready the next year after he 1299 00:57:12,790 --> 00:57:13,790 got the money ? 1300 00:57:16,510 --> 00:57:18,732 Uh , what I can tell you is that , uh , 1301 00:57:18,732 --> 00:57:21,889 in 2023 , the mission capable rate of 1302 00:57:21,889 --> 00:57:25,550 the C5 was about 46% , about 46% . So 1303 00:57:25,550 --> 00:57:28,409 it went from 52% to 46% . 1304 00:57:29,280 --> 00:57:31,290 So we could reasonably ask what 1305 00:57:31,290 --> 00:57:33,959 happened . Well , the Air Force said 1306 00:57:34,280 --> 00:57:36,969 the supply chain for replacement parts 1307 00:57:36,969 --> 00:57:40,729 had dried up and when companies can't 1308 00:57:40,729 --> 00:57:44,719 or won't meet DOD's needs , one option 1309 00:57:44,719 --> 00:57:47,159 is for the military to actually make 1310 00:57:47,159 --> 00:57:49,270 the parts themselves , so you can get 1311 00:57:49,270 --> 00:57:51,215 things up and running . It's often 1312 00:57:51,215 --> 00:57:54,909 cheaper and faster anyway . But you 1313 00:57:54,909 --> 00:57:57,350 can't do that if big defense 1314 00:57:57,350 --> 00:57:59,629 contractors slip restrictions into 1315 00:57:59,629 --> 00:58:02,909 their contracts that deny the military 1316 00:58:02,909 --> 00:58:05,489 the technical data that they need to be 1317 00:58:05,489 --> 00:58:07,711 able to make these repairs . So General 1318 00:58:07,711 --> 00:58:10,290 Reed , it's your responsibility to make 1319 00:58:10,290 --> 00:58:12,429 sure the war fighter gets everything 1320 00:58:12,429 --> 00:58:15,370 that they need . How important is it to 1321 00:58:15,370 --> 00:58:18,840 national security for C5s to be ready 1322 00:58:18,840 --> 00:58:21,889 to respond to commander's requests to 1323 00:58:21,889 --> 00:58:24,020 carry cargo and personnel ? 1324 00:58:26,229 --> 00:58:29,750 The C-5 is a key aircraft for us , um , 1325 00:58:29,820 --> 00:58:32,100 and some of the things that we may be 1326 00:58:32,100 --> 00:58:34,156 asked to do in the future , it would 1327 00:58:34,156 --> 00:58:36,322 actually produce about 20% of the lift 1328 00:58:36,322 --> 00:58:39,239 for us . So , so you need this thing 1329 00:58:39,239 --> 00:58:43,020 ready to go . So Transcon's job is 1330 00:58:43,020 --> 00:58:45,242 getting harder here because our enemies 1331 00:58:45,242 --> 00:58:47,929 are making it more difficult to send 1332 00:58:47,929 --> 00:58:51,050 ships and planes to our troops , as , 1333 00:58:51,439 --> 00:58:53,661 uh , Senator Wicker was talking about a 1334 00:58:53,661 --> 00:58:55,383 minute ago , this is contested 1335 00:58:55,383 --> 00:58:58,889 logistics . And Transcon models show 1336 00:58:58,889 --> 00:59:01,149 that the fight to get into the fight 1337 00:59:01,659 --> 00:59:03,770 means that getting critical materials 1338 00:59:03,770 --> 00:59:06,600 to our troops is only gonna get harder 1339 00:59:06,600 --> 00:59:09,909 over time . That means the last thing 1340 00:59:09,909 --> 00:59:12,030 our troops should be doing is waiting 1341 00:59:12,030 --> 00:59:15,550 around for contractors who charge more 1342 00:59:15,550 --> 00:59:18,540 for slower repairs . So General Reed , 1343 00:59:18,949 --> 00:59:21,060 do you agree that giving the military 1344 00:59:21,060 --> 00:59:24,629 more flexibility to repair parts in the 1345 00:59:24,629 --> 00:59:27,350 field will increase our military 1346 00:59:27,350 --> 00:59:29,989 readiness ? I do , Senator . Good . 1347 00:59:30,469 --> 00:59:32,691 Thank you , General Reed . Uh , Senator 1348 00:59:32,691 --> 00:59:35,149 Grassley and I got a provision into 1349 00:59:35,149 --> 00:59:38,530 last year's NDAA . For the military to 1350 00:59:38,530 --> 00:59:41,090 start a pilot program to reverse 1351 00:59:41,090 --> 00:59:44,600 engineer parts for sole source 1352 00:59:44,600 --> 00:59:47,330 programs . It's a good start , but it 1353 00:59:47,330 --> 00:59:49,810 is a backstop because reverse 1354 00:59:49,810 --> 00:59:52,050 engineering can actually take years to 1355 00:59:52,050 --> 00:59:55,360 get done . But if DOD 1356 00:59:55,360 --> 00:59:57,530 negotiates with contractors for the 1357 00:59:57,530 --> 01:00:00,760 right to repair from the start . That 1358 01:00:00,760 --> 01:00:02,959 means our men and women in uniform get 1359 01:00:02,959 --> 01:00:05,719 their equipment faster and at a lower 1360 01:00:05,719 --> 01:00:08,800 cost to the taxpayers . That is exactly 1361 01:00:08,800 --> 01:00:11,250 what my service member right to repair 1362 01:00:11,250 --> 01:00:14,250 Act does . It has bipartisan support 1363 01:00:14,250 --> 01:00:16,583 here in the Senate and on the committee . 1364 01:00:16,959 --> 01:00:18,719 What's happening right now is 1365 01:00:18,719 --> 01:00:21,320 fundamentally wrong , and we can put a 1366 01:00:21,320 --> 01:00:23,598 stop to it . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . 1367 01:00:24,449 --> 01:00:26,505 Thank you , Senator Warren , Senator 1368 01:00:26,505 --> 01:00:28,616 King . Thank you Mr . Chair . General 1369 01:00:28,616 --> 01:00:30,671 Reed , good to see you . I wanna ask 1370 01:00:30,671 --> 01:00:32,505 about a couple of topics my , my 1371 01:00:32,505 --> 01:00:34,505 colleagues have covered some of the 1372 01:00:34,505 --> 01:00:36,282 others that I hope to ask about 1373 01:00:36,282 --> 01:00:38,227 adequately . Um , one is about the 1374 01:00:38,227 --> 01:00:40,393 connection if we want to have adequate 1375 01:00:40,393 --> 01:00:42,449 sea lift for military purposes , the 1376 01:00:42,449 --> 01:00:44,505 connection between that and our food 1377 01:00:44,505 --> 01:00:46,560 aid programs , so . You know , we're 1378 01:00:46,560 --> 01:00:48,699 all grappling with um cuts , pauses . 1379 01:00:48,709 --> 01:00:50,709 The Supreme Court rendered a ruling 1380 01:00:50,709 --> 01:00:52,729 today that may reopen the door on 1381 01:00:53,020 --> 01:00:55,649 humanitarian assistance through USAID . 1382 01:00:56,110 --> 01:00:59,300 Um , food aid , about 40% of our 1383 01:00:59,300 --> 01:01:01,578 humanitarian aid programs are food aid , 1384 01:01:01,578 --> 01:01:03,909 and it's the delivery of US grown food 1385 01:01:03,909 --> 01:01:07,429 to other nations . Just using Africa , 1386 01:01:07,510 --> 01:01:09,732 the African continent , as an example , 1387 01:01:10,110 --> 01:01:12,221 the US flagged ships that deliver the 1388 01:01:12,221 --> 01:01:14,388 aid sort of count on that as what they 1389 01:01:14,388 --> 01:01:16,939 call one leg of a three-legged stool . 1390 01:01:17,310 --> 01:01:19,477 They transfer food aid , they transfer 1391 01:01:19,477 --> 01:01:22,590 DOD cargo , and they transfer FMS or 1392 01:01:22,590 --> 01:01:25,189 other executive agency cargo and by 1393 01:01:25,189 --> 01:01:27,300 transferring all of those and earning 1394 01:01:27,300 --> 01:01:29,411 revenue for doing it , it maintains a 1395 01:01:29,411 --> 01:01:31,356 business model where they can keep 1396 01:01:31,356 --> 01:01:33,356 these ships available for seal lift 1397 01:01:33,356 --> 01:01:35,300 capacity . If food aid were to 1398 01:01:35,300 --> 01:01:37,620 disappear and one leg of that 1399 01:01:37,620 --> 01:01:39,842 three-legged sew were to go away , what 1400 01:01:39,842 --> 01:01:42,290 would the effect be on the availability 1401 01:01:42,659 --> 01:01:46,139 of US flag vessels to uh be around when 1402 01:01:46,139 --> 01:01:48,361 we need it for sea lift , uh , chores ? 1403 01:01:49,840 --> 01:01:52,159 US flag vessels with US crews are 1404 01:01:52,159 --> 01:01:54,679 critical . Um , we need to make sure 1405 01:01:54,679 --> 01:01:57,199 that they can go to sea and stay afloat 1406 01:01:57,570 --> 01:02:00,320 um by us following cargo preference 1407 01:02:00,320 --> 01:02:04,000 laws , um , we can actually provide the 1408 01:02:04,000 --> 01:02:06,649 material for them to actually sail . uh , 1409 01:02:06,840 --> 01:02:09,062 what that does is it makes them ready . 1410 01:02:09,062 --> 01:02:11,284 I need them ready . um , I need them to 1411 01:02:11,284 --> 01:02:13,229 have a job and know that they have 1412 01:02:13,229 --> 01:02:15,396 something that they can do and so when 1413 01:02:15,396 --> 01:02:17,451 they actually get called to be there 1414 01:02:17,451 --> 01:02:19,784 for the nation , they're actually there . 1415 01:02:19,784 --> 01:02:21,896 Um , if for some reason they were not 1416 01:02:21,896 --> 01:02:24,062 there , then we don't have US citizens 1417 01:02:24,062 --> 01:02:26,173 supporting us at sea . And , and this 1418 01:02:26,173 --> 01:02:28,340 is really important that my colleagues 1419 01:02:28,340 --> 01:02:30,618 did a good job of asking , for example , 1420 01:02:30,618 --> 01:02:32,729 about the need to purchase more , you 1421 01:02:32,729 --> 01:02:34,729 know , high quality used vessels so 1422 01:02:34,729 --> 01:02:36,840 we'd have more sealift capacity . But 1423 01:02:36,840 --> 01:02:39,062 with the existing capacity we have , if 1424 01:02:39,062 --> 01:02:41,062 we were to fundamentally change the 1425 01:02:41,062 --> 01:02:43,284 sort of business model that keeps those 1426 01:02:43,284 --> 01:02:45,507 ships ready and on the water by cutting 1427 01:02:45,507 --> 01:02:47,507 out one part of their revenue , the 1428 01:02:47,507 --> 01:02:49,784 food aid , for example , then would we , 1429 01:02:49,784 --> 01:02:52,989 we would reduce even further the uh 1430 01:02:52,989 --> 01:02:55,156 capacity that we need so that it might 1431 01:02:55,156 --> 01:02:57,211 not be available at the time that we 1432 01:02:57,211 --> 01:02:59,433 need it . Would you agree with that ? I 1433 01:02:59,433 --> 01:03:01,600 agree . um , thank you for that . Um , 1434 01:03:01,600 --> 01:03:03,767 my colleagues asked some questions and 1435 01:03:03,767 --> 01:03:05,822 you talked in your opening testimony 1436 01:03:05,822 --> 01:03:07,989 about the uh . The DOD contract for uh 1437 01:03:07,989 --> 01:03:09,989 the global housing goods contract , 1438 01:03:09,989 --> 01:03:13,429 40,000 DOD personnel in 1439 01:03:13,429 --> 01:03:16,070 Virginia , I'm sorry , 120,000 active 1440 01:03:16,070 --> 01:03:18,237 duty in Virginia and assuming you move 1441 01:03:18,237 --> 01:03:20,350 about every 3 years , that's 40,000 1442 01:03:20,350 --> 01:03:22,989 moves out and 40,000 moves in . You 1443 01:03:22,989 --> 01:03:24,878 talked a little bit about how the 1444 01:03:24,878 --> 01:03:26,989 transition is going , but there was a 1445 01:03:26,989 --> 01:03:28,989 specific question I wanted to ask . 1446 01:03:29,189 --> 01:03:31,149 There's uh something called the uh 1447 01:03:31,149 --> 01:03:33,371 continuing to use the tender of service 1448 01:03:33,371 --> 01:03:36,270 legacy program . During the ongoing GHC 1449 01:03:36,270 --> 01:03:38,326 ramp up program , so the kind of the 1450 01:03:38,326 --> 01:03:40,326 old way of doing it . Now the rates 1451 01:03:40,326 --> 01:03:42,492 associated with the legacy program are 1452 01:03:42,492 --> 01:03:44,510 often 20% to 30% higher than those 1453 01:03:44,510 --> 01:03:47,820 outlined in the GHC contract . So 1454 01:03:47,820 --> 01:03:49,989 understandably some suppliers might be 1455 01:03:49,989 --> 01:03:52,580 hesitant to transition to the GHC 1456 01:03:52,580 --> 01:03:54,747 program if they're able to secure more 1457 01:03:54,747 --> 01:03:57,030 favorable rates by remaining under the 1458 01:03:57,030 --> 01:03:59,790 legacy system . So this creates an odd 1459 01:03:59,790 --> 01:04:01,623 situation where two programs are 1460 01:04:01,623 --> 01:04:03,870 unintentionally positioned against one 1461 01:04:03,870 --> 01:04:06,469 another . And Transcom can incur 1462 01:04:06,469 --> 01:04:08,525 significantly higher costs under the 1463 01:04:08,525 --> 01:04:10,302 legacy program . So how are you 1464 01:04:10,302 --> 01:04:12,525 managing this legacy to GHC programs so 1465 01:04:12,525 --> 01:04:14,247 that there's not this perverse 1466 01:04:14,247 --> 01:04:16,136 incentive to remain in the legacy 1467 01:04:16,136 --> 01:04:18,302 program because the rates are higher . 1468 01:04:18,649 --> 01:04:22,159 So the rates are uh set by a what we 1469 01:04:22,159 --> 01:04:25,469 call a government constructed uh cost 1470 01:04:25,889 --> 01:04:28,800 and uh we are only uh we are only able 1471 01:04:28,800 --> 01:04:31,022 to adjust those rates once a year which 1472 01:04:31,022 --> 01:04:33,244 actually happens in May . So once again 1473 01:04:33,244 --> 01:04:35,411 we're in a situation where , uh , to , 1474 01:04:35,411 --> 01:04:38,360 uh , allow the process to go , um , we 1475 01:04:38,360 --> 01:04:40,582 have to wait until May when we have the 1476 01:04:40,582 --> 01:04:42,760 next opportunity to opportunity to 1477 01:04:42,760 --> 01:04:45,429 adjust the rates which we will do . Uh , 1478 01:04:45,550 --> 01:04:47,661 those rates will be more in line with 1479 01:04:47,661 --> 01:04:49,883 the constructed costs , so therefore it 1480 01:04:49,883 --> 01:04:52,250 will be uh less of an incentive to stay 1481 01:04:52,250 --> 01:04:55,830 outside than to join . The GHC . Great , 1482 01:04:55,919 --> 01:04:57,975 I , I'll follow back up after May to 1483 01:04:57,975 --> 01:05:00,030 see how much we've narrowed that gap 1484 01:05:00,030 --> 01:05:02,197 and whether that's doing what it needs 1485 01:05:02,197 --> 01:05:04,419 to do . I will express my support for a 1486 01:05:04,419 --> 01:05:06,419 position I think my colleagues have 1487 01:05:06,419 --> 01:05:08,363 already gotten at that if you need 1488 01:05:08,363 --> 01:05:10,530 authorization within within the NDA to 1489 01:05:10,530 --> 01:05:12,530 expand the fleet by purchasing more 1490 01:05:12,530 --> 01:05:14,752 high quality uh used vessels , uh , I , 1491 01:05:14,800 --> 01:05:16,856 I , I really would like to make sure 1492 01:05:16,856 --> 01:05:19,078 you have that authority , and I'll join 1493 01:05:19,078 --> 01:05:21,244 with my colleagues to see if we can be 1494 01:05:21,244 --> 01:05:23,578 helpful in that regard . I'll yell back , 1495 01:05:23,578 --> 01:05:25,633 Mr . Thank you . Thank you , Senator 1496 01:05:25,633 --> 01:05:27,856 Kaine . Uh , general , we're gonna do a 1497 01:05:27,856 --> 01:05:29,856 quick second round of questions and 1498 01:05:29,856 --> 01:05:31,911 then , uh , I'll , I'll , we'll move 1499 01:05:31,911 --> 01:05:31,659 this to a classified setting for a 1500 01:05:31,659 --> 01:05:33,939 couple of additional questions . I 1501 01:05:33,939 --> 01:05:37,570 wanna do , uh . Uh Go over 1502 01:05:37,570 --> 01:05:41,500 this um . Map and handout that you and 1503 01:05:41,500 --> 01:05:44,300 I discussed in our meeting today you 1504 01:05:44,300 --> 01:05:46,300 know there's a lot of discussion on 1505 01:05:46,300 --> 01:05:48,522 what's happening on the southern border 1506 01:05:48,522 --> 01:05:50,689 and not so much about what's happening 1507 01:05:50,689 --> 01:05:52,911 on the northern border and as you and I 1508 01:05:52,911 --> 01:05:54,967 talked about we've had a really high 1509 01:05:54,967 --> 01:05:57,260 level of Russian and Chinese um . 1510 01:05:58,000 --> 01:06:01,050 Incursions both into our AI and into 1511 01:06:01,050 --> 01:06:05,010 our EEZ on the water , uh , and 1512 01:06:05,010 --> 01:06:07,330 very disturbingly and unprecedented , a 1513 01:06:07,330 --> 01:06:09,409 lot of number of these are joint 1514 01:06:10,219 --> 01:06:14,090 Chinese Russian uh operations including 1515 01:06:14,090 --> 01:06:17,129 uh strategic bear bomber and Chinese , 1516 01:06:17,209 --> 01:06:19,889 uh , strategic bomber incursions into 1517 01:06:19,889 --> 01:06:22,479 our 8 days this past summer with armed 1518 01:06:22,969 --> 01:06:26,899 MiG fighters , um , as you know . The 1519 01:06:26,899 --> 01:06:29,500 operations to go intercept these uh 1520 01:06:29,500 --> 01:06:32,340 incursions take a lot of work . Our 1521 01:06:32,340 --> 01:06:34,507 young men and women in the military do 1522 01:06:34,507 --> 01:06:36,979 a fantastic job up in Alaska , but they 1523 01:06:36,979 --> 01:06:40,050 also need a lot of tanker support for 1524 01:06:40,050 --> 01:06:42,383 these kind of missions . Similarly with , 1525 01:06:42,383 --> 01:06:44,939 uh , they need fuel support for our 1526 01:06:44,939 --> 01:06:47,540 navy when we're doing operations , uh . 1527 01:06:48,229 --> 01:06:50,507 In the northern Pacific and the Arctic , 1528 01:06:50,507 --> 01:06:52,618 which we've been doing a lot over the 1529 01:06:52,618 --> 01:06:55,699 last 3 summers . Additionally , there's 1530 01:06:55,699 --> 01:06:58,040 a lot of attention paid to the Central 1531 01:06:58,040 --> 01:07:01,979 and South Pacific logistics lanes for 1532 01:07:01,979 --> 01:07:04,899 any kind of conflict in Taiwan , but I 1533 01:07:04,899 --> 01:07:07,219 think it's important to also look at 1534 01:07:07,219 --> 01:07:10,719 the northern . Pacific logistic lanes 1535 01:07:10,719 --> 01:07:13,429 as it relates to any kind of conflict 1536 01:07:13,429 --> 01:07:16,800 like that during World War II , General 1537 01:07:16,800 --> 01:07:20,250 Simon . Bolivia Buckner called the 1538 01:07:20,250 --> 01:07:22,472 Aleutian Island chain , which obviously 1539 01:07:22,472 --> 01:07:25,409 goes out there , a spear pointing right 1540 01:07:25,409 --> 01:07:28,290 at the heart of imperial Japan , and by 1541 01:07:28,290 --> 01:07:30,401 that he meant it was a very strategic 1542 01:07:30,401 --> 01:07:33,850 location not only attacking uh Japan 1543 01:07:33,850 --> 01:07:36,489 but for getting logistics into the 1544 01:07:36,489 --> 01:07:38,969 fight as our forces throughout the 1545 01:07:38,969 --> 01:07:42,679 Pacific move closer to Japan . 1546 01:07:43,050 --> 01:07:45,217 Um , right now , if you look at one of 1547 01:07:45,217 --> 01:07:47,840 the ports there , the port of Adak . It 1548 01:07:47,840 --> 01:07:50,820 is on this map , a closed US Navy base 1549 01:07:50,820 --> 01:07:52,931 that is a gateway to the Arctic , but 1550 01:07:52,931 --> 01:07:56,219 is also on the flank of China . It um 1551 01:07:57,270 --> 01:08:00,270 It has 3 piers , nearly 1552 01:08:00,270 --> 01:08:04,219 22 nearly 8000 ft runways , and 1553 01:08:04,610 --> 01:08:07,340 one of the largest bulk fuel storage 1554 01:08:07,340 --> 01:08:10,479 facilities in the world . lot of people 1555 01:08:10,479 --> 01:08:12,820 don't know that . So , uh , the 1556 01:08:12,820 --> 01:08:15,540 distance to in terms of , uh , where 1557 01:08:15,540 --> 01:08:19,020 Adex sits is about 2900 nautical miles 1558 01:08:19,020 --> 01:08:22,259 from Okinawa , uh , while our good 1559 01:08:22,259 --> 01:08:24,830 friends in Hawaii are about 4000 1560 01:08:24,830 --> 01:08:27,459 nautical miles from Okinawa , making 1561 01:08:27,459 --> 01:08:30,770 ADAC the closest US port , um , outside 1562 01:08:30,770 --> 01:08:34,049 of Guam to Okinawa to 1563 01:08:34,299 --> 01:08:37,259 Taiwan . President Trump has talked 1564 01:08:37,259 --> 01:08:40,819 about . Ensuring Alaska gets more 1565 01:08:40,819 --> 01:08:43,140 defense investment as we fully rebuild 1566 01:08:43,140 --> 01:08:46,020 our military , especially as Russia and 1567 01:08:46,020 --> 01:08:48,187 China are making menacing moves in the 1568 01:08:48,187 --> 01:08:51,290 Pacific , Admiral Paparo and General 1569 01:08:51,890 --> 01:08:54,819 Gio have testified that AIDA would 1570 01:08:54,819 --> 01:08:56,763 provide them with very significant 1571 01:08:56,763 --> 01:09:00,740 logistical and basing needs and that we 1572 01:09:00,740 --> 01:09:03,069 should reopen it , uh , in terms of 1573 01:09:03,069 --> 01:09:05,859 logistics , including with the shutting 1574 01:09:05,859 --> 01:09:09,199 down a red hill . Um , what's your 1575 01:09:09,199 --> 01:09:11,488 thought on this base in terms of her 1576 01:09:11,488 --> 01:09:15,429 logistics capability , um , uh , 1577 01:09:15,719 --> 01:09:19,438 fighter and , um , aviation and navy 1578 01:09:19,438 --> 01:09:21,605 shipping support . There's also it was 1579 01:09:21,605 --> 01:09:24,479 a submarine base there . Um , I'd like 1580 01:09:24,479 --> 01:09:26,146 your view on that , General . 1581 01:09:30,759 --> 01:09:33,120 No Northcom , uh , when it comes to the 1582 01:09:33,120 --> 01:09:36,319 great state of Alaska , uh , and the 1583 01:09:36,319 --> 01:09:38,152 forces that they have there do a 1584 01:09:38,152 --> 01:09:40,263 fantastic job of letting us know when 1585 01:09:40,263 --> 01:09:43,350 they need our help and so whenever , uh , 1586 01:09:43,359 --> 01:09:45,415 they ask , we're always there , um , 1587 01:09:45,415 --> 01:09:48,160 we've never failed them , um , as they 1588 01:09:48,160 --> 01:09:50,310 continue to look at how far forward , 1589 01:09:50,379 --> 01:09:53,430 uh , they can go for the extension , um , 1590 01:09:53,439 --> 01:09:55,439 if they're going to be present , so 1591 01:09:55,439 --> 01:09:57,609 will we . Uh , coming from the other 1592 01:09:57,609 --> 01:09:59,729 direction , Admiral Paparo , I have 1593 01:09:59,729 --> 01:10:01,930 given him my word that , uh , I will 1594 01:10:01,930 --> 01:10:03,986 always be there with him wherever he 1595 01:10:04,169 --> 01:10:06,370 needs us to be . If there's an 1596 01:10:06,370 --> 01:10:08,314 opportunity to establish more of a 1597 01:10:08,314 --> 01:10:10,649 footprint in the region , we will be 1598 01:10:10,649 --> 01:10:13,209 there as well . And let me ask just 1599 01:10:13,209 --> 01:10:15,320 real quickly , you , uh , you were up 1600 01:10:15,320 --> 01:10:17,487 in Alaska recently . I appreciated the 1601 01:10:17,487 --> 01:10:20,729 visit in January . um , can you give me 1602 01:10:20,729 --> 01:10:22,896 a sense of kind of lessons learned ? I 1603 01:10:22,896 --> 01:10:25,062 know you're at the port of Anchorage , 1604 01:10:25,062 --> 01:10:27,140 which is a really important DOD 1605 01:10:27,140 --> 01:10:29,810 strategic port . Again relating to 1606 01:10:29,810 --> 01:10:31,754 these kind of logistical issues we 1607 01:10:31,754 --> 01:10:33,977 think it's important to have additional 1608 01:10:33,977 --> 01:10:36,359 infrastructure capability in my state 1609 01:10:36,359 --> 01:10:39,669 but any um any main takeaways from the 1610 01:10:39,879 --> 01:10:42,229 visit you had in January general and I 1611 01:10:42,240 --> 01:10:44,520 I really appreciate you coming up to 1612 01:10:44,520 --> 01:10:47,100 our great state . Chairman , it was a 1613 01:10:47,100 --> 01:10:48,767 great visit . Uh , went there 1614 01:10:48,767 --> 01:10:51,009 intentionally in the winter time , uh , 1615 01:10:51,060 --> 01:10:53,410 to see the conditions there . Um , 1616 01:10:53,740 --> 01:10:56,500 unfortunately it was colder in Illinois 1617 01:10:56,500 --> 01:10:58,556 than it was in Alaska , and I got in 1618 01:10:58,556 --> 01:11:00,778 trouble , we had a little bit of a warm 1619 01:11:00,778 --> 01:11:03,000 winter , particularly with the Iditarod 1620 01:11:03,000 --> 01:11:06,339 last week , but , uh , being in in 1621 01:11:06,339 --> 01:11:09,180 Alaska again and having a really good 1622 01:11:09,180 --> 01:11:11,640 feeling standing there . Almost 1623 01:11:11,640 --> 01:11:13,862 standing on top of the world looking at 1624 01:11:13,862 --> 01:11:16,029 what's around us and how close it is , 1625 01:11:16,029 --> 01:11:18,140 it is uh incredibly strategic and the 1626 01:11:18,140 --> 01:11:20,029 reach that you can have from that 1627 01:11:20,029 --> 01:11:22,819 location is incredible and it's a big 1628 01:11:22,819 --> 01:11:25,709 advantage to the United States , um , 1629 01:11:25,720 --> 01:11:28,680 and looking at the port of Alaska and 1630 01:11:28,680 --> 01:11:30,680 that port cluster , I was very 1631 01:11:30,680 --> 01:11:32,847 impressed with what I saw there , um . 1632 01:11:33,330 --> 01:11:36,270 Uh , the port is well situated where it 1633 01:11:36,270 --> 01:11:38,437 is despite the fact that there was ice 1634 01:11:38,437 --> 01:11:40,603 on the sea , um , they were still able 1635 01:11:40,603 --> 01:11:43,830 to operate . Um , the ability of the 1636 01:11:43,830 --> 01:11:45,790 port authority to adapt to the 1637 01:11:45,790 --> 01:11:48,250 conditions , um , the snow and the ice 1638 01:11:48,250 --> 01:11:50,472 didn't stop them . Uh , there was a tre 1639 01:11:50,472 --> 01:11:52,472 a tremendous amount that we learned 1640 01:11:52,472 --> 01:11:54,528 there in terms of , um , how to just 1641 01:11:54,528 --> 01:11:56,959 adapt , period . Uh , the other thing 1642 01:11:56,959 --> 01:11:59,879 was , Um , I was very impressed with 1643 01:11:59,879 --> 01:12:02,399 the , uh , conditions in terms of the 1644 01:12:02,399 --> 01:12:05,359 tides and the tide swings , which I 1645 01:12:05,359 --> 01:12:07,470 understand can be as high as 12 to 17 1646 01:12:07,470 --> 01:12:10,120 ft swing , um , but the port 1647 01:12:10,120 --> 01:12:12,120 authorities there and the folks who 1648 01:12:12,120 --> 01:12:14,231 work the port , um , they know how to 1649 01:12:14,231 --> 01:12:16,287 time it and they know how to marshal 1650 01:12:16,287 --> 01:12:18,342 things . They know how to line it up 1651 01:12:18,342 --> 01:12:20,287 and when it comes time to load and 1652 01:12:20,287 --> 01:12:22,564 unload some of the best I've ever seen , 1653 01:12:22,564 --> 01:12:24,676 um , so I was incredibly impressed by 1654 01:12:24,676 --> 01:12:26,898 that . Um , with the US forces that are 1655 01:12:26,898 --> 01:12:29,140 there , uh , they have a very good 1656 01:12:29,140 --> 01:12:32,169 handle on their strategic role , um , 1657 01:12:32,270 --> 01:12:34,214 not only in terms of what they can 1658 01:12:34,214 --> 01:12:36,381 project , but the forces that they may 1659 01:12:36,381 --> 01:12:38,830 host to operate there or the forces 1660 01:12:38,830 --> 01:12:40,950 that will actually flow through . And 1661 01:12:40,950 --> 01:12:43,240 so , uh , when we combine all of that 1662 01:12:43,240 --> 01:12:45,296 together , um , I'm really impressed 1663 01:12:45,296 --> 01:12:47,629 with the platform we have in that state . 1664 01:12:48,270 --> 01:12:50,326 Great , thank you very much . I just 1665 01:12:50,326 --> 01:12:52,437 actually had a meeting with our mayor 1666 01:12:52,437 --> 01:12:54,270 of Anchorage and we had a lot of 1667 01:12:54,270 --> 01:12:56,492 discussion on the port and . We'll keep 1668 01:12:56,492 --> 01:12:58,659 you appraised on the , you know , uh , 1669 01:12:58,659 --> 01:13:00,881 refurbishing of that port . It's really 1670 01:13:00,881 --> 01:13:00,759 important for our military . It's also 1671 01:13:00,759 --> 01:13:02,703 really important for the people of 1672 01:13:02,703 --> 01:13:04,520 Alaska is that's where the vast 1673 01:13:04,520 --> 01:13:06,640 majority of our supplies and food and 1674 01:13:06,640 --> 01:13:09,319 everything and fuel come through the 1675 01:13:09,319 --> 01:13:11,486 port of Anchorage . We wanna keep that 1676 01:13:11,486 --> 01:13:13,430 viable , strong , and , um , we're 1677 01:13:13,430 --> 01:13:15,652 continuing to work on that with you and 1678 01:13:15,652 --> 01:13:17,708 Murad and others . So thank you very 1679 01:13:17,708 --> 01:13:21,310 much on that general . Senator locating 1680 01:13:21,310 --> 01:13:23,959 a fuel storage facility in Alaska the 1681 01:13:23,959 --> 01:13:26,080 closure . No , there's , there's one 1682 01:13:26,080 --> 01:13:29,919 that already exists . It's huge . Uh , 1683 01:13:30,080 --> 01:13:32,024 not really . That's crazy , yeah , 1684 01:13:32,589 --> 01:13:34,879 that's a potential help on Red Hill . 1685 01:13:37,720 --> 01:13:40,759 Yeah , well , you can continue to think 1686 01:13:40,759 --> 01:13:44,620 through that . This was an excuse me , 1687 01:13:44,910 --> 01:13:46,521 uh , this was an interesting 1688 01:13:46,521 --> 01:13:48,688 conversation because the fuel that was 1689 01:13:48,688 --> 01:13:50,799 sort of Red Hill was massive , mainly 1690 01:13:50,799 --> 01:13:52,799 to be used by the Air Force , and I 1691 01:13:52,799 --> 01:13:54,910 think uh that that there are concerns 1692 01:13:54,910 --> 01:13:57,021 relating to the , uh , how fuel ought 1693 01:13:57,021 --> 01:13:59,649 to be distributed . More than uh 1694 01:13:59,649 --> 01:14:01,970 located in Redhill . I have a question . 1695 01:14:02,049 --> 01:14:05,169 In July of 2021 , the GAO found that 1696 01:14:05,169 --> 01:14:07,959 ICE does not know the extent to which 1697 01:14:07,959 --> 01:14:10,089 its officers are taking enforcement 1698 01:14:10,089 --> 01:14:12,720 actions against individuals who could 1699 01:14:12,720 --> 01:14:16,299 be US . Citizens and between fiscal 1700 01:14:16,299 --> 01:14:19,970 year 15 to 2674 1701 01:14:20,419 --> 01:14:23,740 US citizens were arrested , 121 were 1702 01:14:23,740 --> 01:14:26,359 detained , and 70 were moved outside 1703 01:14:26,359 --> 01:14:29,799 the US by mistake . The 1704 01:14:29,799 --> 01:14:31,839 GAO recommended that ICE should 1705 01:14:31,839 --> 01:14:33,839 systematically collect and maintain 1706 01:14:33,839 --> 01:14:36,870 electronic data on its encounters with 1707 01:14:36,870 --> 01:14:40,529 individuals or whom for whom there is 1708 01:14:40,529 --> 01:14:44,000 pro uh probative evidence of US 1709 01:14:44,000 --> 01:14:47,689 citizenship , but ICE has yet to do so . 1710 01:14:47,959 --> 01:14:49,681 This lack of accountability is 1711 01:14:49,681 --> 01:14:52,020 troubling . General Reed ICE gives 1712 01:14:52,020 --> 01:14:55,029 Transcom a copy of every flight 1713 01:14:55,029 --> 01:14:57,660 manifest prior to transporting migrants , 1714 01:14:57,750 --> 01:15:01,299 but I understand that you take no steps 1715 01:15:01,589 --> 01:15:04,029 to verify the identity of the people 1716 01:15:04,029 --> 01:15:06,790 you are transporting on your aircraft . 1717 01:15:07,839 --> 01:15:11,750 Is that so ? Uh , 1718 01:15:11,870 --> 01:15:13,950 we do get a list of everyone that we 1719 01:15:13,950 --> 01:15:17,109 fly . However , uh , ICE maintains 1720 01:15:17,109 --> 01:15:20,069 control of everyone that's on the 1721 01:15:20,069 --> 01:15:22,419 aircraft . So from that standpoint , uh , 1722 01:15:22,430 --> 01:15:25,069 they have the responsibility for the 1723 01:15:25,069 --> 01:15:27,549 verification . And so since uh there 1724 01:15:27,549 --> 01:15:29,779 have been mistakes made by ICE in terms 1725 01:15:29,870 --> 01:15:32,229 of um uh erroneously transporting 1726 01:15:32,229 --> 01:15:34,396 people who are citizens that shouldn't 1727 01:15:34,396 --> 01:15:36,562 be transported , so that's a that's an 1728 01:15:36,562 --> 01:15:38,785 issue . Uh , do you know what the legal 1729 01:15:38,785 --> 01:15:41,339 basis is for transferring non-citizens 1730 01:15:41,339 --> 01:15:43,540 arrested inside the US via military 1731 01:15:43,540 --> 01:15:46,540 aircraft to a location outside the US 1732 01:15:46,540 --> 01:15:48,620 for deportation or detention ? 1733 01:15:50,879 --> 01:15:53,700 Uh , I do not know that completely . To 1734 01:15:53,700 --> 01:15:56,220 date , uh , have any US citizens or 1735 01:15:56,220 --> 01:15:58,540 individuals not charged with any crimes 1736 01:15:58,540 --> 01:16:02,180 been mistakenly flown to Guantanamo Bay 1737 01:16:02,419 --> 01:16:06,020 on Transcom assets ? I'm not aware of 1738 01:16:06,020 --> 01:16:08,459 any . What steps have you taken to 1739 01:16:08,459 --> 01:16:11,270 ensure the answer you just gave me is 1740 01:16:11,270 --> 01:16:12,049 accurate ? 1741 01:16:15,220 --> 01:16:17,276 Uh , for the air crew , we make sure 1742 01:16:17,276 --> 01:16:19,609 that they follow established procedures , 1743 01:16:19,609 --> 01:16:21,609 uh , to get a list of the folks and 1744 01:16:21,609 --> 01:16:24,169 also to make sure that , uh , uh , uh , 1745 01:16:24,220 --> 01:16:26,660 ICE is complying with the things that 1746 01:16:26,660 --> 01:16:28,716 they tell us that they need to do to 1747 01:16:28,716 --> 01:16:31,750 maintain control . We know that 1748 01:16:31,750 --> 01:16:35,259 Guantanamo Bay is subject to uh various 1749 01:16:35,259 --> 01:16:37,990 uh weather events and what is the 1750 01:16:37,990 --> 01:16:40,549 evacuation plan for all of the migrants 1751 01:16:40,549 --> 01:16:42,549 being sent to Guantanamo Bay in the 1752 01:16:42,549 --> 01:16:44,790 event of a hurricane or other disaster 1753 01:16:44,790 --> 01:16:46,990 in Cuba and this is especially 1754 01:16:46,990 --> 01:16:49,212 important in light of the fact that the 1755 01:16:49,212 --> 01:16:51,379 president said he's , uh , planning to 1756 01:16:51,379 --> 01:16:53,601 send some 30,000 migrants to Guantanamo 1757 01:16:54,029 --> 01:16:56,229 Bay . So do you know what what kind of 1758 01:16:56,229 --> 01:16:59,609 evacuation plans ? I would have to 1759 01:16:59,609 --> 01:17:01,950 defer that one to , to , I'd have to 1760 01:17:01,950 --> 01:17:05,600 defer that one to SEO . OK . 1761 01:17:05,680 --> 01:17:08,350 Another concern . Thank you very much , 1762 01:17:08,430 --> 01:17:09,430 Mr . Chairman . 1763 01:17:14,990 --> 01:17:17,046 Well , General , thank you very much 1764 01:17:17,046 --> 01:17:19,212 for your testimony , uh , what we plan 1765 01:17:19,212 --> 01:17:21,709 on doing , uh , we have a vote around 4 1766 01:17:22,240 --> 01:17:25,490 and um . Uh , we will , uh . 1767 01:17:26,419 --> 01:17:29,899 Close the hearing here , um , and , uh , 1768 01:17:29,910 --> 01:17:32,759 I wanna thank you if there's , um , 1769 01:17:33,439 --> 01:17:35,660 additional questions for the record 1770 01:17:35,660 --> 01:17:38,169 from members , we will send those to 1771 01:17:38,169 --> 01:17:40,660 you in the next couple days and we ask 1772 01:17:40,660 --> 01:17:43,729 that you try to um respond to those 1773 01:17:43,729 --> 01:17:47,500 within 2 weeks and we will reconvene 1774 01:17:47,979 --> 01:17:51,700 uh in SVC 217 for a 1775 01:17:51,700 --> 01:17:54,470 classified . Scene setter we'll try and 1776 01:17:54,470 --> 01:17:56,637 do that in the next 10 to 15 minutes . 1777 01:17:56,637 --> 01:17:59,870 We'll break now . um , I'm gonna go 1778 01:17:59,870 --> 01:18:02,450 vote , uh , and then we'll come down 1779 01:18:02,750 --> 01:18:04,740 and be ready to , uh , have a 1780 01:18:05,310 --> 01:18:08,149 classified update as well in uh in the 1781 01:18:08,149 --> 01:18:10,779 classified skiff , uh , in the Senate . 1782 01:18:10,830 --> 01:18:13,109 So with that , thank you again , very 1783 01:18:13,109 --> 01:18:15,331 informative hearing this hearing is now 1784 01:18:15,331 --> 01:18:16,799 adjourned . I think