WEBVTT

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I ask unanimous consent that the chair

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be authorized to declare a recess at

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any time without objection , so ordered .

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I ask unanimous consent that Mr .

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Garamendi be allowed to participate in

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today's hearing after all subcommittee

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members have had an opportunity to ask

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questions . Is there an objection ?

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Seeing none without objection , non

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subcommittee members will be recognized

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at the appropriate time for 5 minutes .

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Good morning and welcome everyone to

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the first hearing for the Sea Power and

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Projection Forces Subcommittee this

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Congress . We have many familiar faces

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on the subcommittee as well as some new

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ones . I look forward to working with

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everyone to address pressing national

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security issues within our jurisdiction .

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Perhaps the biggest issue is the one

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we're discussing today , which is our

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struggles with designing and building

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ships . The United States is a maritime

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nation . And we cannot fulfill our

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historical role in the maritime domain

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without our surface surface ship and

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submarine fleet . Unfortunately , China

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and our peer competitors have also

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studied Mayhan's work . They show the

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value of maritime strength and have

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made significant leaps in the size of

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their commercial fleet as well as their

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naval strength . If we expect to deter

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or defeat any peer adversary , we must

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maintain America's command of the

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world's oceans . We have a requirement

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for 381 ships based on the most recent

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battle force ship assessment and

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requirement report of 2023 .

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Unfortunately , the most recent 30 year

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shipbuilding plan lays on a path where

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we wouldn't meet that mark until 2050 .

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That plan also makes assumptions on

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procurement costs and the rate of ship

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delivery that may no longer be viable .

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The results of last year's 45 day

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shipbuilding review showed many

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programs were significantly behind

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schedule . Some of the expected delays

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are alarming . For example , delivery

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of the constellation class frigate is

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expected to be delayed for 3 years .

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However , it is unclear what lessons we

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have learned from that review , and

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President Trump is right to order

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another . These problems are why I'm so

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excited about the president's plan to

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stand up a dedicated shipbuilding

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office in the White House . This is a

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critical step towards ensuring that

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shipbuilding remains a national

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priority and that we take a whole of

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government approach to strengthening

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our industrial base . Interaction is

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not an option because our shipbuilding

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struggles are more than just scheduled

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delays . Our witnesses from GAO and CBO

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have published several reports

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detailing severe cost overruns and

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extreme increases in unit costs for

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many programs . If this trend continues ,

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we may not be able to recapitalize our

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fleet without sacrificing other budget

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priorities to address these challenges ,

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we need more than just small

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adjustments . We need a bold and

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comprehensive commitment to rebuilding

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our shipbuilding industrial base . That

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is why I introduced the bipartisan

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Ships Act in the 118th Congress and I'm

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working to reintroduce it this Congress .

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Investments in modernizing shipyards ,

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strengthening workforce development ,

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and stabilizing supply chains as

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outlined in the Ships Act will be a key

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to ensuring that we can sustain a

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modern capable navy while reducing

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dependence on foreign suppliers . It

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will also create thousands of good

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paying American jobs . Strengthen

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communities to say this plainly , we

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must act now whether through changes to

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our procurement processes , stronger

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industrial based investments , or

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cultural shifts within shipbuilding

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program offices , we need to make these

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decisions sooner rather than later . I

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look forward to having a frank

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conversation today and hope that we'll

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be able to examine our current problem

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through real transparency . Thank you

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to our witnesses for your participation

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at the hearing . And I look forward to

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your testimony . I now recognize the

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ranking member Joe Courtney , my friend ,

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for an opening statement . Thank you ,

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uh , Mr . Chairman , and , um , uh ,

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again , to our witnesses , uh , you

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know this is obviously our lead off ,

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um , hearing which obviously I think

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speaks volumes about the priority that

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the subcommittee . Uh , gives to this

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issue and actually the Armed Services

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Committee , uh , as a whole , Article

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One , Section 8 Clause 13 , uh , states ,

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uh , Congress shall provide and

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maintain the navy , not the president ,

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not the Navy , um , so obviously the ,

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um , opportunity and , um , uh ,

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mandate for us to to move forward

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really rests with uh the Article One ,

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branch of government and again I agree

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with , uh . Uh , Mr . Kelly's , uh ,

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sort of strategic , uh , description of

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what we're looking at , um , in terms

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of the need for strengthening the sea

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services and expanding , uh , the fleet

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size , um , whether it's Indo Paycom ,

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Europe , Northern Command Southern

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Command , you know , Central command ,

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it's , you know , the , the , the the

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combatant commander's demand for . Uh ,

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navy ships , uh , and Coast Guard ships

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for that matter , uh , outstrips

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obviously the , the size of the fleet ,

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and we have to do everything we can to ,

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to expand capacity and accelerate , uh ,

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production cadence , uh , to meet the

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moment that's there . I have a

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statement which I'm not gonna read all

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the way through because again we have

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lots of testimony to hear and I wanna

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give also members an opportunity but I

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would just note a couple of things

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reviewing your testimony . Which is

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that this subcommittee has not been a

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bystander over the last 10 years in

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terms of real meaningful changes that

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are happening uh and helping in terms

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of , uh , you know , cost effectiveness

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and efficiency in the ship building

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process , um , the National Sea based

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deterrence fund which , uh , again is

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on the books . Um , created multi-year

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authorities for the construction of the

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Columbia class submarine and again we

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have the numbers which shows the

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savings , uh , that that multi-year

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process has actually generated and ,

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and again the feedback whether . It's

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from the shipyards or the supply chain

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um have emphasized over and over again

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how valuable um that change in terms of

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the procurement process has has been in

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terms of , you know , getting what the

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navy describes as the most important

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acquisition program , uh , in their

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portfolio , uh , recapitalizing our

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ballistic submarine fleet . Um , number

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2 , the submarine industrial base

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funding which , uh , started in 2018

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again originated on this subcommittee ,

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a recognition , uh , by a lot of us who

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represent , um , shipyards that

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investing in workforce supply chain and

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facility . Um , had to be basically

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increased outside of just the regular

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procurement line items . Uh , the first

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year we did it in 2018 with , uh , Jim

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Lanjaman , it was a $20 million plus up .

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To the Navy's budget it was actually

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some resistance within the Navy in

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terms of doing that , but now we're $6

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billion into this enterprise , uh ,

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which again has had extremely strong

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bipartisan , uh , results and again I

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think that whether it's down in Alabama

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where the strategic outsourcing is

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happening at Austal Shipyard , uh , now ,

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uh , Philadelphia Shipyard is gonna be ,

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um , again part of this , uh , process

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in terms of large . Metal fabrication

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to again take man hours out of New

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England and Virginia . I mean it's ,

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it's starting to to pay , uh , real ,

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uh , dividends . Lastly , the , the

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vessel construction manager , uh , at

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MayAD in terms of the , uh , maritime

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training ships which again the Sea

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Power subcommittee gave the authority ,

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uh , to MayorAD to go outside the

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normal Navy procurement process and uh

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I'll provide a uh private sector .

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Model in terms of the contract design

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and execution , uh , if anybody goes up

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there and Mr . Norcross is right across

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the river from it , um , you'll see

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that those 6 600 ft plus ships are , uh ,

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being delivered on time within that

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contract structure , um , and frankly

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we need to and then Mr . Sydell and I

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had a talk about this in the office the

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other day , you know , those are the

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kind of tools that we need to implement

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in terms of getting . Uh , as the

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president said , you know , faster and

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bigger , um , and , and , and , and

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again we can , we can sort of be a big

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partner , uh , in terms of , uh , uh ,

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producing that . So my last sort of

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concern is and I'm hearing this , I had

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a supply chain event up in Hartford

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yesterday . The tariff impact in terms

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of steel prices and other commodities

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that go into shipbuilding is being

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impacted . I mean that is just the ,

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the rolled steel increase since January

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is like 26% , uh , in terms of just

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what , what , um , vendors are , are

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seeing out there and I think frankly ,

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you know , that's part of this issue

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which is that when we're talking about

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cost overruns and the GAO report goes

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into it in chapter and verse . Um , you

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know , we've gotta , you know , think

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holistically here in terms of just this

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is not just uh an NDAA issue . This is

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there's large , um , you know ,

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policy issues that , um , that even

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tariffs are gonna impact . Uh , whether

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or not we can build , um , steel ships

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with nickel alloy coming from Canada ,

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I mean , it's just that's , that's just

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the reality that's there , you know ,

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we gotta , everybody's gotta be , you

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know , they're head on a swivel in

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terms of really looking around and

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making sure that we're making good and

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smart choices again , the Office of

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Shipbuilding which the White House is

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set up . Manned by Ian Bennett , Mr .

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Kelly's , uh , staffer , I , I think is

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a very encouraging , um , sign . We're

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very excited and we're hoping that the

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SAS initiative which faltered , um , at

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the end of last the last administration ,

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is something that again people are

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gonna take another fresh look at if we

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want to accelerate and expand the size

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of , uh . Of shipping , that's probably

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a longer statement than my written

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statement . I apologize to the members

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that are there , uh , but again , it ,

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it , I think there's a lot of passion

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and interest in this issue , and again ,

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um , we got a great panel here today to

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explore that and without a yield back .

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Mr . Courtney and I , neither one ever

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talked very long . That that highlights

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the importance of this hearing that we

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felt the need to talk that long about

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this very important thing . I first

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recognized for 5 minutes . Doctor Brett

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Seidle , uh , who serves as the

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principal civilian deputy to the

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assistant secretary of the Navy for

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Research Development and acquisition ,

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he is currently acting as the assistant

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secretary of the Navy for RDNA . Prior

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to his service within the Department of

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the Navy , he had an extensive private

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sector career in automotive

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manufacturing . Doctor Sottle , uh ,

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you were recognized for 5 minutes .

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Thank you . Chairman Kelly , ranking

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member Courtney and distinguished

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members of this subcommittee , good

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morning . Thank you for the opportunity

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to appear before you today to address

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the state of US shipbuilding . Prior to

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assuming duties in January as acting

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assistant secretary of the Navy for

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research , development and acquisition ,

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I spent almost half my career in the

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private sector running manufacturing

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organizations before leading change in

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our naval research and development

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establishment for the past 20 years . I

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also spent time leading our nation's

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public shipyards as the acting

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executive director of NAVCO4 . I'd also

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like to welcome my esteemed

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co-witnesses , Doctor Eric Labs , Ms .

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Shelby Oakley , and Mr . Ron O'Rourke .

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I am very familiar with your work , uh ,

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and respect the passion you bring to

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these endeavors and the impact your

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work has on strengthening our great

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navy . I believe we have much in common .

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As I was not raised in the shipbuilding

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environment and therefore not saddled

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with preconceived notions of this is

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how we've always done it , I certainly

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welcome informed perspectives from

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those who are passionate about

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strengthening our fleet . I am ,

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however , proud of our navy on a myriad

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of fronts . US shipbuilders continue to

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produce the highest quality , safest

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and most advanced warships on the globe .

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I have taken to saying every time I

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speak publicly in this role that the

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finest navy ever assembled in the

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history of the world is coming to a

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theater near you . And they're bringing

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their A game . And at a time when

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outstanding performance against

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adversaries is needed in contested

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maritime commons from the Red Sea to

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the Western Pacific , that is exactly

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what our navy is delivering , and I for

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one , am proud to be a part of those

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efforts . However , the US shipbuilding

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industry is challenged to produce the

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quantity of ships at the rate required

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for lasting effect , sustainable growth

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in the battle force inventory , and the

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Navy is challenged in providing

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consistent direction as the

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underpinning for their success . On

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balance , cost and scheduled

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performance remain challenged with

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deliveries approximately 1 to 3 years

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late and costs rising faster than

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overall inflation . These issues are

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prevalent across the nuclear and

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conventional shipbuilding communities

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with both navy and industry sharing

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responsibility . Some of our challenges

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include atrophy of the manufacturing

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sector , depressed investment ,

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workforce shortages , diminished

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proficiency , as well as supply chain

13:16.830 --> 13:20.000
disruptions . Historic underinvestment

13:20.000 --> 13:22.056
and industry consolidation following

13:22.056 --> 13:24.111
the end of the Cold War have reduced

13:24.111 --> 13:26.280
competition and capacity at the tier

13:26.280 --> 13:28.280
one shipyards and their suppliers ,

13:28.559 --> 13:30.337
leading to resource constrained

13:30.337 --> 13:32.448
scheduling that is behind our targets

13:32.520 --> 13:34.590
burdensome acquisition processes ,

13:34.960 --> 13:37.419
pre-COVID contracts , and shifting navy

13:37.419 --> 13:40.679
requirements also contribute . Having

13:40.679 --> 13:43.000
said the above , I firmly believe our

13:43.000 --> 13:45.222
collective challenges can be overcome .

13:45.429 --> 13:47.485
And this committee has my passionate

13:47.485 --> 13:49.818
commitment to collaborate with Congress ,

13:50.099 --> 13:52.080
industry , academia , training

13:52.080 --> 13:54.580
organizations , trade associations , as

13:54.580 --> 13:56.580
well as all levels of government in

13:56.580 --> 13:58.859
pursuit of improved cost and scheduled

13:58.859 --> 14:01.530
performance . I intend to look forward

14:01.900 --> 14:04.140
to drive change and collaborate with

14:04.140 --> 14:06.251
our industry partners in healthy ways

14:06.251 --> 14:09.140
to improve American shipbuilding . My

14:09.140 --> 14:10.900
most enduring focus will be on

14:10.900 --> 14:13.520
improving trust . Accountability and

14:13.520 --> 14:15.187
credibility with Congress and

14:15.187 --> 14:17.340
shipbuilders , which is critical to

14:17.340 --> 14:19.118
leading the type of improvement

14:19.118 --> 14:21.118
necessary for our continued success

14:21.118 --> 14:23.229
around the globe . Our nation and the

14:23.229 --> 14:25.789
world needs the strength of our navy ,

14:26.030 --> 14:28.252
and my intent is to do everything in my

14:28.252 --> 14:30.479
power to deliver on that promise . I'm

14:30.479 --> 14:32.368
excited to be here today and look

14:32.368 --> 14:34.590
forward to answering your questions . I

14:34.590 --> 14:36.812
now recognize Doctor Eric Labs , who is

14:36.812 --> 14:38.923
a senior analyst for naval forces and

14:38.923 --> 14:40.923
weapons at the Congressional Budget

14:40.923 --> 14:43.090
Office . He has published many studies

14:43.090 --> 14:45.312
related to today's topic , and his work

14:45.312 --> 14:47.535
has helped inform much of his uh , much

14:47.535 --> 14:49.590
of this subcommittee's work . Doctor

14:49.590 --> 14:51.590
Labs , you are now recognized for 5

14:51.590 --> 14:53.090
minutes . Chairman Kelly ,

14:53.090 --> 14:55.146
Representative Courtney , members of

14:55.146 --> 14:57.257
the subcommittee , it's a pleasure to

14:57.257 --> 14:59.368
be here today to discuss the state of

14:59.368 --> 15:01.535
US shipbuilding . Mr . Chairman , with

15:01.535 --> 15:00.929
your permission , I'd like to submit my

15:00.929 --> 15:03.096
statement for the record and summarize

15:03.096 --> 15:06.080
a few key points . First , costs for

15:06.080 --> 15:08.191
Navy shipbuilding programs have grown

15:08.191 --> 15:10.549
and are growing . Cost overruns for 46

15:10.549 --> 15:12.660
ships the Navy has under construction

15:12.660 --> 15:14.660
grew threefold over the past budget

15:14.660 --> 15:17.150
year from $3.4 billion to $10.4 billion .

15:18.330 --> 15:20.799
The Navy's 2025 shipbuilding program is

15:20.799 --> 15:23.119
the most expensive one to date . CBO

15:23.119 --> 15:25.230
estimates it would cost an average of

15:25.230 --> 15:27.452
$40 billion per year every year between

15:27.452 --> 15:30.159
now and 2054 to buy the 364-ish new

15:30.159 --> 15:33.239
ships in the Navy's plan , which is 46%

15:33.239 --> 15:35.183
more than the average shipbuilding

15:35.183 --> 15:37.461
appropriation over the last five years .

15:37.461 --> 15:39.880
In addition , by 2054 , the Navy's top

15:39.880 --> 15:41.936
line would need to increase by 13 in

15:41.936 --> 15:43.991
real terms to pay for the associated

15:43.991 --> 15:47.299
costs of operating a larger fleet . The

15:47.299 --> 15:49.521
successful implementation of the Navy's

15:49.521 --> 15:51.355
plan depends on the shipbuilding

15:51.355 --> 15:53.466
industrial base being able to recover

15:53.466 --> 15:55.521
from its current challenges over the

15:55.521 --> 15:57.577
next 15 years , and those challenges

15:57.577 --> 15:57.320
are the most severe that I have seen in

15:57.320 --> 15:59.264
the 30 years I've been CBO's naval

15:59.264 --> 16:01.760
analyst . One of the reasons naval

16:01.760 --> 16:03.982
shipbuilding is challenging was that in

16:03.982 --> 16:06.149
the face of the headwinds of COVID and

16:06.149 --> 16:07.649
the decline of interest in

16:07.649 --> 16:09.982
manufacturing jobs in the United States ,

16:09.982 --> 16:12.149
the shipbuilding program progressively

16:12.149 --> 16:14.427
increased the demand for naval tonnage .

16:14.427 --> 16:16.538
Between 2014 and 2024 , the amount of

16:16.538 --> 16:18.649
naval tonnage under construction rose

16:18.649 --> 16:21.919
by 80% from 68,000 tons to 123,000 tons

16:21.919 --> 16:24.239
annually for combat ships , the

16:24.239 --> 16:27.320
increase was 65% . Submarine tonnage

16:27.320 --> 16:30.510
alone increased by 70% . That required

16:30.510 --> 16:32.454
a substantial increase in shipyard

16:32.454 --> 16:34.510
labor and the yards for a variety of

16:34.510 --> 16:36.454
reasons were not able to keep up .

16:37.539 --> 16:40.309
Under the 2025 plan , the growth and

16:40.309 --> 16:42.531
demand for naval tonnage would continue

16:42.580 --> 16:44.780
between now and 2034 , the average

16:44.780 --> 16:46.836
amount of tonnage under construction

16:46.836 --> 16:48.739
would increase by another 45% for

16:48.739 --> 16:51.059
combat ships would grow by another 50%

16:51.059 --> 16:54.409
and remain there for 2054 . In

16:54.409 --> 16:56.131
particular , submarine tonnage

16:56.131 --> 16:58.298
construction would increase by another

16:58.298 --> 17:00.187
70% and would only abate once the

17:00.187 --> 17:02.890
Columbia class was complete . Those

17:02.890 --> 17:04.890
developments have led to lengthened

17:04.890 --> 17:06.834
construction times for ships . For

17:06.834 --> 17:08.834
example , aircraft carriers used to

17:08.834 --> 17:10.946
take 8 years to build . Now they take

17:10.946 --> 17:13.057
11 . In the 2000s , attack submarines

17:13.057 --> 17:15.390
took 6 years to build . Now they take 9 .

17:15.390 --> 17:17.612
Destroyers and amphibious assault ships

17:17.612 --> 17:19.612
used to take 5 years to build . Now

17:19.612 --> 17:21.779
they also take 9 years to build . That

17:21.779 --> 17:23.890
then led to substantial cost growth .

17:23.890 --> 17:25.946
For example , tax submarines used to

17:25.946 --> 17:28.168
cost about $3 billion a few years ago .

17:28.168 --> 17:30.112
Now they cost $4.5 billion and are

17:30.112 --> 17:32.334
still growing . Destroyers used to cost

17:32.334 --> 17:34.839
$1.9 billion and now they cost $2.5

17:34.839 --> 17:37.006
billion and only about a third of that

17:37.006 --> 17:38.839
cost growth can be attributed to

17:38.839 --> 17:41.040
shipbuilding inflation . The result of

17:41.040 --> 17:43.262
the shipbuilding delays is a fleet that

17:43.262 --> 17:45.484
is much smaller than it otherwise could

17:45.484 --> 17:47.707
have been . Between 2019 and 2040 , the

17:47.707 --> 17:50.680
navy lost and will lose 234 ship

17:50.680 --> 17:52.736
service years from ships that should

17:52.736 --> 17:54.847
have been commissioned but were not .

17:54.847 --> 17:56.847
In the critical period from 2027 to

17:56.847 --> 17:59.013
2030 , the fleet will be smaller by 20

17:59.013 --> 18:00.839
ships , mostly a loss of attack

18:00.839 --> 18:03.660
submarines and destroyers . So what can

18:03.660 --> 18:05.882
be done about it ? As this committee is

18:05.882 --> 18:08.104
well aware , CBO cannot by statute make

18:08.104 --> 18:10.271
policy recommendations . However , one

18:10.271 --> 18:12.382
way to think about this problem would

18:12.382 --> 18:14.549
be to focus on the key roadblocks to a

18:14.549 --> 18:16.216
more efficient and productive

18:16.216 --> 18:18.382
shipbuilding enterprise . In my view ,

18:18.382 --> 18:20.104
nothing is more important than

18:20.104 --> 18:22.327
addressing the critical labor shortages

18:22.327 --> 18:24.382
that afflict all of the shipbuilding

18:24.382 --> 18:26.327
and public maintenance yards . For

18:26.327 --> 18:26.290
years , recruitment at the yards has

18:26.290 --> 18:28.439
been hard retention is even harder ,

18:28.770 --> 18:30.826
especially in the critical trades of

18:30.826 --> 18:32.437
welders , ship fitters , and

18:32.437 --> 18:34.603
pipefitters . Many , if not all of the

18:34.603 --> 18:36.603
yards report attrition rates in the

18:36.603 --> 18:38.826
touch labor force of 20% or more in the

18:38.826 --> 18:40.770
critical trades I just mentioned ,

18:40.770 --> 18:42.719
attrition is running at 30% . Any

18:42.719 --> 18:44.441
policy that improves the labor

18:44.441 --> 18:46.441
situation is worth considering from

18:46.441 --> 18:48.569
substantially increasing wages to

18:48.569 --> 18:50.513
improving benefits to helping make

18:50.513 --> 18:52.569
housing more affordable to providing

18:52.569 --> 18:54.625
tax benefits for doing this critical

18:54.625 --> 18:56.847
work , to improving the quality of life

18:56.847 --> 18:59.013
in the shipyards to increasing the use

18:59.013 --> 19:01.347
of robotics and automation . In my view ,

19:01.347 --> 19:03.513
without fully addressing the challenge

19:03.513 --> 19:05.569
of labor , all other efforts will be

19:05.569 --> 19:07.791
marginal . A second consideration would

19:07.791 --> 19:09.902
be to diversify the Navy shipbuilding

19:09.902 --> 19:12.013
portfolio such that other yards could

19:12.013 --> 19:11.859
be brought into the production business

19:12.150 --> 19:14.094
with the existing yards running at

19:14.094 --> 19:16.150
capacity and more diversification of

19:16.150 --> 19:18.317
shipbuilder is also worth discussing ,

19:18.317 --> 19:20.539
and that would mean considering changes

19:20.539 --> 19:22.761
to what the Navy is planning to buy . I

19:22.761 --> 19:24.594
would like to close on a note of

19:24.594 --> 19:26.706
caution . It has taken us a long time

19:26.706 --> 19:26.489
to get into this situation , and it's

19:26.489 --> 19:28.711
going to take us a long time to get out

19:28.711 --> 19:30.878
of it . There is no silver bullet , no

19:30.878 --> 19:33.045
magical solution . It is going to take

19:33.045 --> 19:35.267
years if not decades of hard work and a

19:35.267 --> 19:37.433
lot of money to , if you'll permit the

19:37.433 --> 19:39.545
metaphor , right the ship . Thank you

19:39.545 --> 19:41.378
Mr . Chairman , and I'm happy to

19:41.378 --> 19:40.810
respond to any questions the

19:40.810 --> 19:43.760
subcommittee might have . Thank you . I

19:43.760 --> 19:45.989
now recognize Ms . Shelby Oakley . Ms .

19:46.079 --> 19:48.135
Shelby Oakley is the director in the

19:48.135 --> 19:50.199
Government Accountability Office's

19:50.199 --> 19:52.088
contracting and national security

19:52.088 --> 19:54.088
acquisitions teams focusing on Navy

19:54.088 --> 19:55.866
ship building and nuclear triad

19:55.866 --> 19:57.866
recapitalization . She's a frequent

19:57.866 --> 19:59.699
witness before the Armed Service

19:59.699 --> 20:01.643
Committee , and her team's work is

20:01.643 --> 20:03.977
invaluable to our efforts . Ms . Oakley ,

20:03.977 --> 20:06.143
you are now recognized for 5 minutes .

20:06.143 --> 20:07.921
Chairman Kelly , ranking member

20:07.921 --> 20:07.849
Courtney , and members of the

20:07.849 --> 20:10.016
subcommittee , thank you for having me

20:10.016 --> 20:12.238
here today to talk about the challenges

20:12.238 --> 20:14.293
the Navy is facing with shipbuilding

20:14.293 --> 20:16.405
and getting critical capabilities out

20:16.405 --> 20:18.489
to the fleet . I will discuss the

20:18.489 --> 20:20.600
persistent outcomes we have seen over

20:20.600 --> 20:22.770
the past two decades , the causes for

20:22.770 --> 20:25.239
the outcomes , and what the Navy can do

20:25.239 --> 20:27.680
to drive systemic change with the broad

20:27.680 --> 20:30.079
support it has from Congress . The

20:30.079 --> 20:32.359
reality is we have no more ships today

20:32.359 --> 20:35.079
than we did back in 2003 when the Navy

20:35.079 --> 20:37.246
released its 1st 30 year ship building

20:37.246 --> 20:39.810
plan calling for a substantial increase

20:39.810 --> 20:42.359
in fleet size . That's a serious

20:42.359 --> 20:44.581
problem , especially at a time when our

20:44.581 --> 20:46.800
near peer adversaries are rapidly

20:46.800 --> 20:49.000
expanding their fleets and fielding

20:49.000 --> 20:51.167
advanced technologies that could shift

20:51.167 --> 20:53.111
the balance of power away from the

20:53.111 --> 20:55.500
United States . The Navy's issues

20:55.500 --> 20:57.780
aren't new . For the last two decades

20:57.780 --> 20:59.391
we've reported that the Navy

20:59.391 --> 21:01.336
shipbuilding approach consistently

21:01.336 --> 21:04.060
leads to outcomes like cost overruns ,

21:04.300 --> 21:06.522
scheduled delays , and ships that don't

21:06.522 --> 21:08.522
provide the expected capabilities .

21:08.979 --> 21:10.979
We've also found that the current

21:10.979 --> 21:13.060
system isn't setting up the Navy and

21:13.060 --> 21:15.020
private industries talented and

21:15.020 --> 21:17.339
hardworking people for success . It's

21:17.339 --> 21:20.089
actually making their jobs harder . The

21:20.089 --> 21:22.145
Navy's poor shipbuilding performance

21:22.145 --> 21:24.699
stems from a myriad of issues . For

21:24.699 --> 21:26.532
instance , the Navy's budget and

21:26.532 --> 21:29.170
acquisition processes don't use the

21:29.170 --> 21:31.170
successful approaches of commercial

21:31.170 --> 21:33.560
companies that our work has found can

21:33.560 --> 21:35.338
be thoughtfully applied to Navy

21:35.338 --> 21:38.030
shipbuilding programs . The frigate

21:38.030 --> 21:40.520
program is a prime example . The Navy

21:40.520 --> 21:42.880
failed to ensure a stable design before

21:42.880 --> 21:45.280
starting construction , a leading

21:45.280 --> 21:47.920
practice in successful commercial

21:47.920 --> 21:50.359
shipbuilding , and as a result , the

21:50.359 --> 21:52.359
lead ship is now delayed at least 3

21:52.359 --> 21:55.500
years . And construction has stalled as

21:55.500 --> 21:57.722
the navy and shipbuilder try and figure

21:57.722 --> 21:59.722
out if the ship can even be built .

22:00.339 --> 22:02.506
Further , to secure funding , the navy

22:02.506 --> 22:05.699
often creates optimistic business cases .

22:05.979 --> 22:07.979
These business cases are frequently

22:07.979 --> 22:10.090
approved , although they don't always

22:10.090 --> 22:12.257
reflect what is achievable with time ,

22:12.257 --> 22:14.090
money , technology , or capacity

22:14.090 --> 22:16.380
available . They then subsequently

22:16.380 --> 22:18.699
unraveled during lead ship construction

22:18.699 --> 22:21.839
or even before . This requires that the

22:21.839 --> 22:24.040
navy divert resources from other

22:24.040 --> 22:26.599
priorities to shore up its existing

22:26.599 --> 22:29.280
ship building programs and delays the

22:29.280 --> 22:31.447
delivery of needed capabilities to the

22:31.447 --> 22:34.410
fleet . And it's not just ships . The

22:34.410 --> 22:36.299
Navy has struggled to field other

22:36.299 --> 22:38.077
critical capabilities needed to

22:38.077 --> 22:40.250
maintain maritime dominance . For

22:40.250 --> 22:42.361
example , the Navy has funded work on

22:42.361 --> 22:44.770
robotic autonomous systems for over 30

22:44.770 --> 22:47.369
years , yet it has very few fielded

22:47.369 --> 22:50.439
assets to show for it . The challenges

22:50.439 --> 22:52.606
also don't stop with the budgeting and

22:52.606 --> 22:54.606
acquisition processes , as has been

22:54.606 --> 22:56.661
mentioned , the Navy is also dealing

22:56.661 --> 22:58.772
with private shipyards that are aging

22:58.772 --> 23:00.606
and workforce shortages that are

23:00.606 --> 23:02.661
further contributing to the negative

23:02.661 --> 23:04.959
shipbuilding outcomes . Our work has

23:04.959 --> 23:06.737
shown private industry has been

23:06.737 --> 23:08.626
reluctant to invest on its own to

23:08.626 --> 23:11.339
address these issues . The Navy and DOD

23:11.339 --> 23:13.689
have invested billions of dollars .

23:13.979 --> 23:15.868
However , the Navy doesn't have a

23:15.868 --> 23:18.140
strategy to address these issues or

23:18.140 --> 23:20.196
credible measures to ensure that the

23:20.196 --> 23:22.084
billions of dollars in government

23:22.084 --> 23:24.196
investments that are supported by the

23:24.196 --> 23:26.307
Congress in this industrial base will

23:26.307 --> 23:28.900
actually make a difference . The bottom

23:28.900 --> 23:31.780
line , marginal change will not fix the

23:31.780 --> 23:34.380
persistently poor outcomes , and more

23:34.380 --> 23:37.380
money alone is not the solution . If

23:37.380 --> 23:39.491
the navy doesn't look introspectively

23:39.491 --> 23:41.939
and make bold systemic changes , the

23:41.939 --> 23:43.883
consequences are only going to get

23:43.883 --> 23:46.339
worse . Technology is evolving fast and

23:46.339 --> 23:48.506
our adversaries are not waiting around

23:48.506 --> 23:52.099
for us to catch up . Our almost 60 open

23:52.099 --> 23:53.877
recommendations related to ship

23:53.877 --> 23:56.099
building can provide a path forward for

23:56.099 --> 23:58.420
the navy . For example , the Navy could

23:58.420 --> 24:00.800
establish a more agile and acquisition

24:00.800 --> 24:03.180
and budgeting processes so that

24:03.180 --> 24:05.291
programs are structured for iteration

24:05.479 --> 24:08.119
to deliver capability quickly and add

24:08.119 --> 24:10.520
capability as technology advances and

24:10.520 --> 24:12.920
threats change . They could leverage

24:12.920 --> 24:14.809
quality information that includes

24:14.809 --> 24:17.109
realistic assessment of risk to inform

24:17.109 --> 24:19.239
program cost and schedule estimates .

24:20.199 --> 24:22.421
They could develop and leverage digital

24:22.421 --> 24:24.719
tools to gain information about design

24:24.719 --> 24:27.380
feasibility earlier and better

24:27.380 --> 24:30.880
incorporate feedback from the fleet and

24:30.880 --> 24:32.880
then use this information to ensure

24:32.880 --> 24:34.991
ship designs are stable before making

24:34.991 --> 24:37.047
major commitments to buy new ships .

24:37.660 --> 24:39.660
With the navy pressing to keep pace

24:39.660 --> 24:41.660
with near peer adversaries that are

24:41.660 --> 24:43.699
growing increasingly capable , the

24:43.699 --> 24:45.810
cracks in its approach to acquisition

24:45.810 --> 24:48.000
are more pronounced than ever . If the

24:48.000 --> 24:50.290
Navy continues with business as usual ,

24:50.540 --> 24:52.762
we should expect these cracks to create

24:52.762 --> 24:54.818
an increasingly stark divide between

24:54.818 --> 24:57.020
the Navy's aspirations for a larger ,

24:57.180 --> 24:59.609
more capable fleet and reality .

25:00.280 --> 25:02.280
Without change this reality could

25:02.280 --> 25:04.989
manifest as a shrinking less capable

25:04.989 --> 25:07.510
fleet which ultimately is unable to

25:07.510 --> 25:09.732
project the superior force the Navy has

25:09.732 --> 25:12.520
at its disposal today . Chairman Kelly ,

25:12.530 --> 25:14.641
ranking member Courtney , and members

25:14.641 --> 25:16.863
of the subcommittee , this concludes my

25:16.863 --> 25:18.863
statement . I'm happy to answer any

25:18.863 --> 25:21.030
questions you have . Thank you . I now

25:21.030 --> 25:23.141
recognize Mr . Ronald O'Rourke . Mr .

25:23.141 --> 25:25.380
O'Rourke is a naval affairs analyst for

25:25.380 --> 25:27.602
the Congressional Research Service . He

25:27.602 --> 25:29.824
has authored many relevant articles and

25:29.824 --> 25:31.991
reports on today's topic and conducted

25:31.991 --> 25:33.991
extensive research on ship building

25:33.991 --> 25:35.936
programs . Mr . O'Rourke , you are

25:35.936 --> 25:38.579
recognized for 5 minutes . Chairman

25:38.579 --> 25:40.468
Kelly , ranking member Courtney ,

25:40.930 --> 25:42.541
distinguished members of the

25:42.541 --> 25:44.374
subcommittee , thank you for the

25:44.374 --> 25:46.652
opportunity to appear before you today .

25:47.170 --> 25:49.392
The Navy is currently facing challenges

25:49.392 --> 25:52.810
in designing ships , building ships ,

25:53.339 --> 25:56.229
crewing ships , and maintaining ships .

25:56.589 --> 25:58.700
It's the most significant combination

25:58.700 --> 26:00.756
of challenges for the Navy that I've

26:00.756 --> 26:04.619
seen in my 41 years at CRS . The

26:04.619 --> 26:06.841
requirements process is central to Navy

26:06.841 --> 26:08.841
ship acquisition , but it can cause

26:08.841 --> 26:11.819
ship design to grow in size and cost

26:11.819 --> 26:14.041
during the conceptual design phase , as

26:14.041 --> 26:16.209
happened with the Zumwalt destroyer .

26:16.430 --> 26:18.263
It can undermine apparent design

26:18.263 --> 26:20.486
acquisition strategy as appears to have

26:20.486 --> 26:22.597
happened with the constellation class

26:22.597 --> 26:24.597
frigate , and it can lead to design

26:24.597 --> 26:26.652
construction concurrency as happened

26:26.652 --> 26:28.819
with the litoral combat ship program .

26:29.589 --> 26:31.200
The projected delays in navy

26:31.200 --> 26:33.367
shipbuilding are quite significant and

26:33.367 --> 26:35.422
industrial base capacity constraints

26:35.422 --> 26:37.311
are present at both shipyards and

26:37.311 --> 26:39.920
supplier firms as Doctor Labs mentioned

26:40.260 --> 26:42.339
workforce challenges are a central

26:42.339 --> 26:44.699
factor . Some observers have

26:44.699 --> 26:46.532
characterized the situation as a

26:46.532 --> 26:48.477
strategic liability for the United

26:48.477 --> 26:51.880
States in competing with China . My

26:51.880 --> 26:54.599
prepared statement presents 15 options

26:54.599 --> 26:57.060
for expanding and using shipbuilding

26:57.060 --> 26:59.500
capacity . Many of them relate to the

26:59.500 --> 27:01.479
workforce . Most of them are being

27:01.479 --> 27:04.119
pursued to some degree by the navy and

27:04.119 --> 27:06.175
industry , but could be pursued more

27:06.175 --> 27:09.589
intensively or at broader scale . The

27:09.589 --> 27:11.811
Navy's current overall approach to ship

27:11.811 --> 27:13.922
acquisition , which might be referred

27:13.922 --> 27:16.256
to as the current American naval system ,

27:16.256 --> 27:18.367
includes three elements that I assess

27:18.367 --> 27:20.089
are contributing to the Navy's

27:20.089 --> 27:22.145
challenges in designing , building ,

27:22.145 --> 27:24.367
crewing , and maintaining ships first .

27:24.520 --> 27:26.631
The navy treats its force level goals

27:26.631 --> 27:28.989
for various ship types as more precise

27:28.989 --> 27:31.045
and durable than they really are and

27:31.045 --> 27:33.550
then chases those subject to change

27:33.550 --> 27:36.589
goals by continually tinkering with

27:36.589 --> 27:39.349
ship procurement profiles leading to

27:39.349 --> 27:41.016
production inefficiencies and

27:41.016 --> 27:44.060
industrial based challenges . Second ,

27:44.270 --> 27:46.650
the navy is suboptimizing ship design

27:46.650 --> 27:49.060
efforts at the individual ship level

27:49.670 --> 27:51.892
instead of optimizing them at the fleet

27:51.892 --> 27:54.059
wide level . In other words . The navy

27:54.059 --> 27:56.079
is building a fleet without truly

27:56.079 --> 27:58.530
designing a fleet , leading to

27:58.530 --> 28:00.641
challenges throughout the ship design

28:00.641 --> 28:02.863
build crew and maintain life cycle from

28:02.863 --> 28:04.920
trying to manage an assemblage of

28:04.920 --> 28:07.579
individually developed bespoke ship

28:07.579 --> 28:09.609
designs . And third , the Navy is

28:09.609 --> 28:11.498
developing ship building programs

28:11.498 --> 28:13.665
without adequately taking into account

28:13.665 --> 28:15.665
the features of the US society that

28:15.665 --> 28:17.887
will be called upon to design , build ,

28:17.887 --> 28:20.530
crew , and maintain those ships . A

28:20.530 --> 28:22.641
possible alternative approach for the

28:22.641 --> 28:25.089
navy , which might be referred to as a

28:25.089 --> 28:27.439
potential new American naval system

28:27.969 --> 28:29.802
could include the following five

28:29.802 --> 28:31.849
elements . First , make more

28:31.849 --> 28:33.571
comprehensive use of federated

28:33.571 --> 28:35.810
shipbuilding in which ship modules are

28:35.810 --> 28:37.754
built at facilities other than the

28:37.754 --> 28:40.170
final assembly yards so as to gain

28:40.170 --> 28:42.281
access to regional labor markets that

28:42.281 --> 28:44.448
are not significantly involved in navy

28:44.448 --> 28:47.410
shipbuilding . Second , move the navy

28:47.410 --> 28:49.380
toward a more comprehensive and

28:49.380 --> 28:51.689
systematic kit of parts approach in

28:51.689 --> 28:54.130
which standard components , uh , go

28:54.130 --> 28:55.852
into standard systems that are

28:55.852 --> 28:57.686
installed on ships with standard

28:57.686 --> 29:00.859
internal features . Third , focus ship

29:00.859 --> 29:03.130
design more on reducing the labor hours

29:03.130 --> 29:05.297
needed to build the ship following the

29:05.297 --> 29:07.297
South Korean approach to design for

29:07.297 --> 29:10.209
producibility . Fourth , move toward

29:10.209 --> 29:12.153
continuous production , which I'll

29:12.153 --> 29:15.030
outline in a moment . And 5th employ

29:15.030 --> 29:17.430
upfront fleet design , meaning the use

29:17.430 --> 29:20.189
of a generalized fleet design framework

29:20.189 --> 29:22.189
that incorporates the four things I

29:22.189 --> 29:24.078
just mentioned and the vetting of

29:24.078 --> 29:25.967
proposed shipbuilding programs in

29:25.967 --> 29:28.619
relation to that framework . That part

29:28.619 --> 29:30.619
about continuous production which I

29:30.619 --> 29:32.563
just mentioned could include first

29:32.563 --> 29:35.030
using multi-year contracting where cost

29:35.030 --> 29:37.869
effective . Second , managing changes

29:37.869 --> 29:40.000
in ship force levels not through

29:40.000 --> 29:42.670
changes in procurement profiles but

29:42.670 --> 29:44.719
instead through end of service life

29:44.719 --> 29:46.775
decisions following Japan's approach

29:46.775 --> 29:49.459
for its submarine force . Third ,

29:49.750 --> 29:52.270
moving to condition-based minimal loss

29:52.270 --> 29:55.140
procurement transitions in ship classes

29:55.140 --> 29:57.910
and 4th characterizing the future fleet

29:57.910 --> 30:00.229
in terms of steady procurement rates ,

30:00.349 --> 30:02.310
adopting what can be called a

30:02.310 --> 30:04.719
production centered or rate centered

30:04.719 --> 30:07.189
approach to the future fleet . This

30:07.189 --> 30:09.589
would be a new way to think about the

30:09.589 --> 30:11.619
future fleet and how to get there .

30:12.900 --> 30:14.789
This potential new American naval

30:14.789 --> 30:16.900
system is by no means the only option

30:16.900 --> 30:19.122
for addressing the Navy's challenges in

30:19.122 --> 30:21.067
designing , building , crewing and

30:21.067 --> 30:23.067
maintaining ships , and it wouldn't

30:23.067 --> 30:25.209
solve all those challenges . As Ms .

30:25.219 --> 30:27.108
Oakley mentioned , continuing the

30:27.108 --> 30:29.339
Navy's current approach , however , is

30:29.339 --> 30:31.339
likely to lead to a continuation of

30:31.339 --> 30:33.339
these challenges . Chairman Kelly ,

30:33.339 --> 30:35.339
ranking member Courtney , thank you

30:35.339 --> 30:37.339
again for the opportunity to appear

30:37.339 --> 30:39.506
before you today , and I'll be pleased

30:39.506 --> 30:41.283
to respond to any questions the

30:41.283 --> 30:43.395
subcommittee may have . Thank all our

30:43.395 --> 30:45.561
witnesses . I now recognize myself for

30:45.561 --> 30:47.670
5 minutes . Uh , Doctor Seidle , I'm

30:47.670 --> 30:49.900
worried about the mixed demand signals

30:49.900 --> 30:52.109
that we send uh industry with constant

30:52.109 --> 30:54.331
fluctuation in our 30 year shipbuilding

30:54.331 --> 30:56.770
plans . How can we send clear demand

30:56.770 --> 30:58.770
signals to industry so that they're

30:58.770 --> 31:00.881
able to invest in their own workforce

31:00.881 --> 31:04.119
and technical capacity . And also a

31:04.119 --> 31:05.841
separate question , how is the

31:05.841 --> 31:08.439
Department of the Navy working on GAO's

31:08.439 --> 31:10.495
recommendations as well as improving

31:10.495 --> 31:12.106
the culture of procurement ?

31:16.800 --> 31:19.729
Thank you , Chairman Kelly . I

31:19.739 --> 31:21.739
appreciate the question , uh , and

31:21.739 --> 31:24.017
thanks for the time last week too . Uh ,

31:24.017 --> 31:27.520
I've had a chance to get down , um . To

31:27.520 --> 31:29.631
your neck of the woods and visit with

31:29.631 --> 31:31.742
Ingalls and see what they're doing uh

31:31.742 --> 31:33.798
in that arena and I think it gets to

31:33.798 --> 31:36.839
the first question that is around uh

31:36.839 --> 31:38.640
how do we ensure that we keep a

31:38.640 --> 31:40.849
constant flow of product through our

31:40.849 --> 31:42.905
shipyards . I do think it's critical

31:42.905 --> 31:44.959
and it's not lost on me that that

31:44.959 --> 31:47.199
organization has the DDGs and the

31:47.199 --> 31:49.479
amphibs we've done some multi-ship

31:49.479 --> 31:51.920
procurements uh to make sure that they

31:51.920 --> 31:54.239
are staying fed well and as a result .

31:54.569 --> 31:56.680
There's consistency in approach and ,

31:56.680 --> 31:58.736
and I think certainly in the amphibs

31:58.736 --> 32:00.958
it's one of the success stories that we

32:00.958 --> 32:03.180
have where ships are being delivered on

32:03.180 --> 32:06.359
time and on budget so uh it it strikes

32:06.359 --> 32:08.640
us to think about how we handle that

32:08.640 --> 32:12.260
holistically , uh , for the rest of our

32:12.260 --> 32:14.371
shipbuilders to make sure that that's

32:14.371 --> 32:16.920
happening writ large , um . I think a

32:16.920 --> 32:18.809
part of it is being a little more

32:18.809 --> 32:21.031
directive in that workload . I think we

32:21.031 --> 32:23.198
do understand which yards can do which

32:23.198 --> 32:25.253
work which platforms are best suited

32:25.253 --> 32:27.476
for that , and we need to be thoughtful

32:27.476 --> 32:29.587
in doing that to keep the , the whole

32:29.587 --> 32:31.642
enterprise fed well so that they can

32:31.642 --> 32:33.864
manage their workforce , their hiring ,

32:33.864 --> 32:35.800
um , and retention issues . So my

32:35.800 --> 32:38.829
commitment to you is to , to work , um ,

32:38.839 --> 32:41.006
with our partners back in the Pentagon

32:41.006 --> 32:43.228
to make sure we try to do that well for

32:43.228 --> 32:45.410
you . To your point about GAO

32:45.410 --> 32:48.250
recommendations , uh , I've had

32:48.250 --> 32:50.930
conversations with Ms Oakley before .

32:51.219 --> 32:53.859
Uh , I agree with , uh , much of what

32:53.859 --> 32:56.369
she has said . I think there's real

32:56.369 --> 32:59.020
opportunity space there , um , and

32:59.020 --> 33:00.964
quite frankly I think sometimes we

33:00.964 --> 33:03.260
spend a lot of our time , uh ,

33:03.270 --> 33:06.099
communicating via reports , uh , back

33:06.099 --> 33:08.210
and forth to each other as opposed to

33:08.210 --> 33:10.321
working closely together to get after

33:10.321 --> 33:12.488
it and so my commitment to her and her

33:12.488 --> 33:14.710
team . Is that we'll lean into that and

33:14.710 --> 33:16.932
get after some of those recommendations

33:16.932 --> 33:18.932
because quite frankly they resonate

33:18.932 --> 33:18.760
with me on a lot of different fronts .

33:19.680 --> 33:21.847
And and just I wanna know , you know ,

33:21.890 --> 33:24.001
we're the greatest maritime nation in

33:24.001 --> 33:26.209
the history of the world and we're

33:26.209 --> 33:28.209
still that and there's no reason we

33:28.209 --> 33:30.153
can't continue to be that , but it

33:30.153 --> 33:32.376
takes doing things not the same old way

33:32.376 --> 33:34.320
but it takes taking a hard look at

33:34.320 --> 33:36.542
ourselves and getting better . Oakley ,

33:36.542 --> 33:38.265
the GAO has identified several

33:38.265 --> 33:40.487
opportunities for the Navy to modernize

33:40.487 --> 33:42.487
its practices to support timely and

33:42.487 --> 33:44.098
predictable outcomes for the

33:44.098 --> 33:46.209
constellation class frigate and other

33:46.209 --> 33:47.987
future programs . Which of your

33:47.987 --> 33:50.153
recommendations relating to design and

33:50.153 --> 33:52.153
procurement remain outstanding ? We

33:52.153 --> 33:54.042
have several recommendations both

33:54.042 --> 33:56.098
specifically directed at the frigate

33:56.098 --> 33:58.320
program and then also about the broader

33:58.320 --> 34:00.542
design approach that the Navy uses that

34:00.542 --> 34:02.709
remain open , specifically with regard

34:02.709 --> 34:04.765
to the frigate , um , we recommended

34:04.765 --> 34:08.010
that they take a look at developing the

34:08.010 --> 34:10.310
basic and functional design of the ship

34:10.770 --> 34:12.937
before beginning construction at least

34:12.937 --> 34:14.937
of the second , um , ship since the

34:14.937 --> 34:17.048
first ship is already underway , um .

34:17.048 --> 34:19.214
That remains open and we know that the

34:19.214 --> 34:20.937
navy and the builder are doing

34:20.937 --> 34:23.048
significant work now to really mature

34:23.048 --> 34:25.290
that design and it's that key that um

34:25.290 --> 34:27.610
commercial shipbuilders follow in

34:27.610 --> 34:29.810
maturing that design so that what they

34:29.810 --> 34:31.866
know when they start bending metal ,

34:31.866 --> 34:34.032
they start construction . That they're

34:34.032 --> 34:36.199
gonna get what they expect to get when

34:36.199 --> 34:38.310
they get when they when when they are

34:38.310 --> 34:40.366
gonna get it and so those are really

34:40.366 --> 34:42.421
some of the key recommendations that

34:42.421 --> 34:44.421
we've made to frigate but also writ

34:44.421 --> 34:46.310
large with regard to their design

34:46.310 --> 34:48.366
performance . The other thing that I

34:48.366 --> 34:50.477
would mention is um really leveraging

34:50.477 --> 34:52.770
technology um to be able to exercise

34:52.770 --> 34:55.289
the . Design earlier on to understand

34:55.289 --> 34:58.648
the implication of changes , specs

34:58.648 --> 35:00.958
requirements that you know creep , um ,

35:00.968 --> 35:03.190
and what those implications could be on

35:03.190 --> 35:05.301
the design of the ship so that that's

35:05.301 --> 35:07.569
all worked out before you begin

35:07.569 --> 35:09.680
construction of the ship and then are

35:09.680 --> 35:11.680
in the business of doing rework and

35:11.680 --> 35:13.791
having to fix things that you realize

35:13.791 --> 35:16.110
can't work . Thank you . And as noted ,

35:16.229 --> 35:18.285
uh , I'm yielding back my time and I

35:18.285 --> 35:20.396
will hold everyone . I will adhere to

35:20.396 --> 35:22.285
the 5 minute rule today . So Mr .

35:22.285 --> 35:24.229
Courtney , you're recognized for 5

35:24.229 --> 35:26.340
minutes . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

35:26.340 --> 35:28.507
Um , Mr . Labs , I wanna thank you for

35:28.507 --> 35:31.360
focusing on workforce in terms of , um ,

35:31.389 --> 35:33.389
you know , the moment that we're in

35:33.389 --> 35:35.500
right now because , uh , there's just

35:35.500 --> 35:37.959
no question that , um . If you , uh ,

35:38.169 --> 35:40.649
Matt , um , Sermon over at the Navy ,

35:40.810 --> 35:42.921
uh , points to a fact that at the end

35:42.921 --> 35:46.739
of the Cold War 45 , uh , 35%

35:47.090 --> 35:49.169
of the American workforce was in

35:49.169 --> 35:51.169
manufacturing , you know , you fast

35:51.169 --> 35:54.419
forward to 2025 , it's less than 15% .

35:54.729 --> 35:56.785
So you know , when you , you sort of

35:56.785 --> 35:59.007
look back at how we built 5000 ships in

35:59.007 --> 36:01.118
World War II . And we're able to turn

36:01.118 --> 36:03.118
on the industrial base so quickly I

36:03.118 --> 36:05.340
mean again you actually had a workforce

36:05.340 --> 36:07.062
that was primed whether it was

36:07.062 --> 36:08.896
commercial ship building or auto

36:09.050 --> 36:11.629
manufacturing to , to basically , um ,

36:11.689 --> 36:14.010
you know , shift into into that type of

36:14.010 --> 36:16.330
production , um , so you know clearly

36:16.330 --> 36:19.050
with the 15% uh workforce we're a

36:19.050 --> 36:20.939
bigger country but still you know

36:20.939 --> 36:23.106
that's that's a a hill that we have to

36:23.106 --> 36:26.050
climb in terms of making um metal

36:26.050 --> 36:29.020
trades more attractive . Again , uh ,

36:29.080 --> 36:33.010
uh , in Groton in 2023 we ,

36:33.139 --> 36:35.669
they , they hired 5300 workers between

36:35.669 --> 36:37.558
Groton and Quonset Point . That's

36:37.558 --> 36:39.836
bigger than World War Two numbers , uh ,

36:39.836 --> 36:42.002
if you , if you go back historically .

36:42.370 --> 36:44.860
You know , as part of that process , uh ,

36:44.870 --> 36:46.870
there was a metal trades collective

36:46.870 --> 36:48.537
bargaining agreement that was

36:48.537 --> 36:50.648
negotiated that actually gave a boost

36:50.648 --> 36:53.830
to to wages , um , over the lifetime

36:53.830 --> 36:57.340
was about 25-30% increase in pay and

36:57.340 --> 37:00.350
protected , uh , benefits as well . Um ,

37:00.580 --> 37:02.929
they , they have over 80% retention ,

37:03.260 --> 37:05.538
um , it , it's , uh , you know , again ,

37:05.538 --> 37:07.538
sort of defies all the conventional

37:07.538 --> 37:09.760
wisdom about the fact that , you know ,

37:09.760 --> 37:11.871
people are flushing out after they're

37:11.871 --> 37:13.871
getting hired . We , we passed wage

37:13.871 --> 37:15.982
improvement language in the submarine

37:15.982 --> 37:18.204
supplemental in December , uh , when we

37:18.204 --> 37:20.038
again gave a boost to the to the

37:20.038 --> 37:22.260
submarine account that's there , um ,

37:22.550 --> 37:25.870
the SARS , uh , proposal , the and

37:25.870 --> 37:27.870
again for some of the new members ,

37:27.870 --> 37:29.926
it's the shipyard accountability and

37:29.926 --> 37:31.981
work for supply . Uh , uh , proposal

37:31.981 --> 37:34.030
navies developed would actually

37:34.030 --> 37:36.629
turbocharge that wage improvement

37:36.629 --> 37:38.407
opportunity , and I know that's

37:38.407 --> 37:40.629
something the White House is looking at

37:40.629 --> 37:42.573
in terms of their , um , executive

37:42.573 --> 37:42.360
order . We've got to make the

37:42.360 --> 37:44.249
differential between working in a

37:44.249 --> 37:46.360
shipyard in the metal trades better ,

37:46.639 --> 37:48.695
significantly better than working in

37:48.695 --> 37:50.917
retail , which is what it which existed

37:50.917 --> 37:52.861
during the Cold War . So maybe you

37:52.861 --> 37:54.972
could just sort of comment on that in

37:54.972 --> 37:54.840
terms of just how you incentivize

37:54.840 --> 37:57.189
people to , uh , to go into the trades .

37:57.889 --> 38:00.111
Um , uh , thank , thank you , uh , Mr .

38:00.111 --> 38:02.167
Courtney , for that question , and ,

38:02.167 --> 38:04.111
and I quite agree with pretty much

38:04.111 --> 38:06.222
everything that you have said . I , I

38:06.222 --> 38:08.445
am not an economist by training , but I

38:08.445 --> 38:07.949
work in an organization chock full of

38:07.949 --> 38:10.171
economists , and every time I have this

38:10.171 --> 38:12.282
conversation with , you know , people

38:12.282 --> 38:14.338
at my place , they said , Well , why

38:14.338 --> 38:13.750
don't we just pay these workers more ?

38:13.790 --> 38:16.012
And I think that is the ultimately that

38:16.012 --> 38:18.234
is going to be a key part of the answer

38:18.234 --> 38:20.290
here . And you're absolutely right ,

38:20.290 --> 38:22.512
and I've been fortunate enough to visit

38:22.512 --> 38:22.250
various shipyards and you could see the

38:22.250 --> 38:24.417
differential . It was not that great .

38:24.417 --> 38:26.583
You could drive by a subway that would

38:26.583 --> 38:28.806
advertise $18 an hour plus benefits and

38:28.806 --> 38:31.028
the shipyards were paying $20 or $21 an

38:31.028 --> 38:33.209
hour , but shipyard work is hot , it's

38:33.209 --> 38:36.010
cold , it's , it's unpleasant . So in

38:36.010 --> 38:37.954
my view , the differential between

38:37.954 --> 38:40.288
retail or even other manufacturing , uh ,

38:40.288 --> 38:42.969
sectors in in the areas that surround

38:42.969 --> 38:45.136
the shipyard has got to be much , much

38:45.136 --> 38:47.191
greater than it currently is . And ,

38:47.191 --> 38:49.136
and it's not just wages so I think

38:49.136 --> 38:51.358
wages is important , especially for the

38:51.358 --> 38:51.060
entry level workers , but it's other

38:51.060 --> 38:53.282
things improving the quality of life to

38:53.282 --> 38:55.739
doing what you can to sort of make that

38:55.739 --> 38:57.906
process in the yards easier for them ,

38:57.906 --> 39:00.800
improving benefits , um , uh , of of

39:00.800 --> 39:03.379
various kinds , um , affordability of

39:03.379 --> 39:05.490
housing has become a big challenge to

39:05.490 --> 39:07.712
some of these yards . One of the things

39:07.712 --> 39:09.768
that the effects of COVID was that a

39:09.768 --> 39:09.620
lot of people in cities went to sort of

39:09.620 --> 39:11.620
buy water . Front property which is

39:11.620 --> 39:13.676
where shipyards are and because they

39:13.676 --> 39:15.787
could work remotely from there so you

39:15.787 --> 39:17.898
have places like Bath , Maine , which

39:17.898 --> 39:20.120
is expensive properties is expensive it

39:20.120 --> 39:20.004
is in Northern Virginia , a fact that

39:20.004 --> 39:22.226
when I learned up there sort of shocked

39:22.226 --> 39:24.448
me . So anything that sort of goes just

39:24.448 --> 39:27.024
down the path of increasing um the the

39:27.034 --> 39:28.955
the wages for the for the for the

39:28.955 --> 39:31.011
skilled laborers that we have in the

39:31.011 --> 39:32.955
shipyards , I think it's something

39:32.955 --> 39:35.122
worth considering and and discussing .

39:35.122 --> 39:37.233
SAS is one mechanism to do it . It is

39:37.233 --> 39:39.566
not the only mechanism that can be done ,

39:39.566 --> 39:41.511
but it is certainly , uh , I think

39:41.511 --> 39:41.389
we're on the right path because to me

39:41.389 --> 39:43.556
when I look at where were we in the in

39:43.556 --> 39:45.389
those earlier years when we were

39:45.389 --> 39:47.611
producing ships faster and where are we

39:47.611 --> 39:49.722
now , the big issue to me is is labor

39:49.959 --> 39:52.015
and Doctor Sedell , really quick , I

39:52.015 --> 39:54.237
mean , obviously we've got to make this

39:54.237 --> 39:56.459
workforce , um . You know , actually be

39:56.459 --> 39:58.737
do better , um , and there's good news .

39:58.737 --> 40:00.848
I mean they handle virtual technology

40:00.848 --> 40:03.015
and digital technology , which is no ,

40:03.015 --> 40:05.181
you know , hopefully gonna help , um ,

40:05.181 --> 40:05.179
improve things but again the job

40:05.179 --> 40:07.419
training , um , we gotta get that right

40:07.419 --> 40:09.540
mixture not too hot , not too cold in

40:09.540 --> 40:11.939
terms of the immersion into the , the

40:11.939 --> 40:14.300
metal trades welding electricians , and

40:14.300 --> 40:16.411
I know the Navy is definitely pushing

40:16.411 --> 40:18.540
to get that , um , that type of model

40:18.540 --> 40:20.540
through . I I apologize I guess I'm

40:20.540 --> 40:22.651
about to run out of time , so I yield

40:22.651 --> 40:24.762
back , but maybe we can . Uh , get an

40:24.762 --> 40:26.818
answer for the record later . If you

40:26.818 --> 40:28.929
can get us an answer for the record ,

40:28.929 --> 40:31.096
maybe it'll come up , uh , do you know

40:31.096 --> 40:30.969
I now recognize Mr . Whitman . Well ,

40:31.010 --> 40:33.232
thank you , Mr . Chairman . I'd like to

40:33.232 --> 40:35.454
thank our witnesses . Ms Oakley , you ,

40:35.454 --> 40:37.510
uh , brought it , uh , out , I think

40:37.510 --> 40:39.677
very succinctly and clearly . Uh , the

40:39.677 --> 40:39.290
names have changed , but the song

40:39.290 --> 40:41.401
remains the same . It's been the same

40:41.401 --> 40:43.689
for the last two decades . We know what

40:43.689 --> 40:45.800
we need to do . We just can't seem to

40:45.800 --> 40:48.010
find a way to get it done . We see

40:48.010 --> 40:49.732
issues with workforce that's a

40:49.732 --> 40:51.954
continuing theme . We see an issue with

40:51.954 --> 40:53.954
design maturity , design completely

40:53.954 --> 40:56.010
complete uh completeness . We see an

40:56.010 --> 40:58.121
issue with maintaining the ships that

40:58.121 --> 40:59.899
we allegedly are supposed to be

40:59.899 --> 41:02.121
building and we look at AOO operational

41:02.121 --> 41:04.177
availability to go down . I mean all

41:04.177 --> 41:06.399
these things are mind bogglingly simple

41:06.495 --> 41:08.662
yet it can't we can't seem to get to a

41:08.662 --> 41:10.828
place to address him and Doctor Seidel

41:10.828 --> 41:13.051
and and Mr . O'Rourke and Ms . Oakley ,

41:13.051 --> 41:15.273
I want to begin with you . Give me your

41:15.273 --> 41:17.217
perspective you spoke a little bit

41:17.217 --> 41:19.328
about this . You know , we talk about

41:19.328 --> 41:21.439
workforce , yet we have a maintenance

41:21.439 --> 41:24.040
industry that has roller coaster rides

41:24.040 --> 41:26.207
for lots of ships in the yard and then

41:26.207 --> 41:28.429
the ships disappear . We lay people off

41:28.429 --> 41:30.484
with the same skills that we need in

41:30.484 --> 41:32.596
the build yards and yet we don't seem

41:32.596 --> 41:32.479
to want to integrate those two

41:32.479 --> 41:34.535
enterprises which use the same skill

41:34.535 --> 41:37.540
sets . We also too look at uh how do we

41:37.540 --> 41:39.689
make sure that we are are getting

41:39.689 --> 41:41.800
designs complete ? We know when we go

41:41.800 --> 41:43.800
to the art like constellation class

41:43.800 --> 41:45.745
it's gonna be 85% complete certain

41:45.745 --> 41:47.967
uncertainty goes out the door , and yet

41:47.967 --> 41:50.022
we change that and now it's only 15%

41:50.022 --> 41:52.022
complete in design . I mean we know

41:52.022 --> 41:53.800
what it takes to successfully .

41:53.840 --> 41:56.510
Entertain and execute these enterprises ,

41:56.679 --> 41:58.623
yet we keep going back to the same

41:58.623 --> 42:00.735
place . Tell me , tell me , how do we

42:00.735 --> 42:03.830
make meaningful changes that will last

42:03.830 --> 42:06.699
and that will be transformational to

42:06.699 --> 42:09.080
what needs to happen both in the ship

42:09.080 --> 42:11.247
building and ship maintenance industry

42:11.247 --> 42:13.302
because you can't separate the two ,

42:13.302 --> 42:15.524
they both have to happen the same way .

42:15.524 --> 42:17.636
Doctor Silo begin with you then go to

42:17.636 --> 42:17.120
Miss Oakley and then Mr . O'Rourke .

42:20.949 --> 42:23.959
Thank you for that question , sir , um ,

42:23.969 --> 42:26.025
and I appreciate being here today to

42:26.025 --> 42:29.100
talk about this . Listen , I think , um .

42:30.129 --> 42:32.290
First , importantly , the work that

42:32.290 --> 42:34.401
this committee has done supporting us

42:34.401 --> 42:36.623
with the maritime industrial base funds

42:36.770 --> 42:38.770
previously the submarine industrial

42:38.770 --> 42:40.937
base funds is a big part of what we're

42:40.937 --> 42:42.659
doing . We stood up the direct

42:42.659 --> 42:44.826
reporting program . Manager office for

42:44.826 --> 42:47.048
the maritime industrial base , the DDRA

42:47.048 --> 42:49.250
Mib last September , uh , this , this

42:49.250 --> 42:52.000
body has given us over $4 billion just

42:52.000 --> 42:53.944
in the last two years that gets at

42:53.944 --> 42:56.169
these issues . We are putting that

42:56.169 --> 42:58.129
money on the workforce hiring and

42:58.129 --> 43:00.296
retention issues . We're putting it on

43:00.296 --> 43:02.296
supply chain network issues . We're

43:02.296 --> 43:04.649
driving modernization , uh , and

43:04.649 --> 43:07.409
advanced manufacturing into the yards .

43:07.939 --> 43:09.661
You know , I , I will say this

43:09.661 --> 43:12.270
workforce piece , this , uh , atrophy

43:12.270 --> 43:15.060
of that sector in my opinion is

43:15.060 --> 43:17.116
fundamental to everything that we're

43:17.116 --> 43:19.282
talking about . We really have to find

43:19.282 --> 43:21.282
a way . I , I often say back when I

43:21.282 --> 43:23.979
worked in the private sector , uh . We

43:23.979 --> 43:26.379
were paying $30 it was $335 minimum

43:26.379 --> 43:29.379
wage , and uh we were paying $13 an

43:29.379 --> 43:31.810
hour for manufacturing labor 3 or 4x

43:31.810 --> 43:35.260
today it's 1.2 , 1.3 X . uh , we're

43:35.260 --> 43:37.689
trying to get after that um and I think ,

43:38.060 --> 43:40.282
you know , I'll be quick here because I

43:40.282 --> 43:42.282
know we , we want other folks to be

43:42.282 --> 43:42.179
able to talk , but just in the

43:42.179 --> 43:44.110
workforce piece we stood up build

43:44.110 --> 43:46.320
submarines . Dotcom we've had over 3

43:46.320 --> 43:48.042
million hits on that since its

43:48.042 --> 43:50.239
inception led to 2.5 million

43:50.239 --> 43:53.959
applications , 9700 employees hired for

43:53.959 --> 43:56.209
the submarine industrial base in 23 , a

43:56.209 --> 43:59.239
40% improvement , another 10K in

43:59.239 --> 44:02.280
24 real metrics , real progress . We're

44:02.280 --> 44:04.502
gonna see that play out on the back end

44:04.502 --> 44:06.558
of this to drive production . But uh

44:06.558 --> 44:08.613
there's goodness happening . I wanna

44:08.613 --> 44:08.229
make sure I get to Miss Oakley . Mr .

44:08.310 --> 44:10.588
O'Rourke . Oakley , I'll be real quick .

44:10.588 --> 44:12.477
You hit the nail on the head with

44:12.477 --> 44:14.366
regard to the overlap between the

44:14.366 --> 44:16.532
repair and shipbuilding workforces and

44:16.532 --> 44:18.588
the industrial base , and that's why

44:18.588 --> 44:20.699
our recent report on the shipbuilding

44:20.699 --> 44:20.389
and ship repair industrial base

44:20.389 --> 44:22.500
recommended that the Navy put forth a

44:22.500 --> 44:24.389
strategy for how they're going to

44:24.389 --> 44:26.333
invest in both of these industrial

44:26.333 --> 44:28.556
bases to ensure that they're both going

44:28.556 --> 44:30.611
to be positioned to not only deliver

44:30.611 --> 44:32.389
the ships that we need but also

44:32.389 --> 44:34.556
maintain and sustain those ships for .

44:34.556 --> 44:36.778
Our fleet and then secondly I think one

44:36.778 --> 44:39.000
important thing to note about design is

44:39.000 --> 44:41.056
that the Navy's own design workforce

44:41.056 --> 44:43.278
in-house has significantly atrophied as

44:43.278 --> 44:45.333
well and I think that that's part of

44:45.333 --> 44:47.333
the problem that you're seeing with

44:47.333 --> 44:49.556
regard to reviewing the design progress

44:49.556 --> 44:52.340
and really understanding how how much

44:52.340 --> 44:54.507
uh how mature these designs are before

44:54.507 --> 44:56.618
we're making these critical decisions

44:56.618 --> 44:58.840
and I know they're focused on improving

44:58.840 --> 45:01.007
that as well and I think that's a good

45:01.007 --> 45:00.860
approach . Thank you , Mr . O'Rourke .

45:01.989 --> 45:04.340
I'll make 4 quick points . Uh , first ,

45:04.379 --> 45:07.139
of the various options in my testimony ,

45:07.540 --> 45:10.169
uh , the one that has the most promise

45:10.169 --> 45:12.300
for achieving results the soonest is

45:12.300 --> 45:14.522
the one that Dr . Labs has focused on ,

45:14.522 --> 45:18.419
which is increasing wages . Um , second ,

45:18.780 --> 45:21.500
uh , the design issue on the , uh , the

45:21.500 --> 45:23.699
frigate program is another workforce

45:23.699 --> 45:26.939
issue because . Um , once you abandoned

45:26.939 --> 45:29.500
the parent design strategy , you threw

45:29.500 --> 45:31.780
that into the hands of the ship design

45:31.780 --> 45:34.002
community to redesign the ship . Well ,

45:34.002 --> 45:36.224
we have a shortage of ship designers in

45:36.224 --> 45:38.336
this country and naval architects and

45:38.336 --> 45:40.391
marine engineers , so that's another

45:40.391 --> 45:42.447
workforce issue and again . That's a

45:42.447 --> 45:44.669
wages issue because these are engineers

45:44.669 --> 45:46.669
that could take engineering jobs in

45:46.669 --> 45:48.558
other parts of the economy . Mr .

45:48.558 --> 45:50.669
O'Rourke , I'm , I'm , I'm , I , in ,

45:50.669 --> 45:53.002
in deference to the chairman , I listen ,

45:53.002 --> 45:52.510
I want to take your , your additional

45:52.510 --> 45:54.621
two suggestions for the record , Mr .

45:54.621 --> 45:56.621
Chairman , you please , if you will

45:56.621 --> 45:58.621
provide those . I now recognize the

45:58.621 --> 45:58.340
gentleman from New Jersey , Mr .

45:58.479 --> 46:00.590
Norcross . Thank you , Chairman , and

46:00.590 --> 46:02.923
the witnesses for being here today . Uh ,

46:02.923 --> 46:05.560
I'm entering my second decade on this

46:05.560 --> 46:09.520
subcommittee and As Mr . Whitman

46:09.520 --> 46:12.199
just said , reoccurring issues a death

46:12.199 --> 46:15.290
by 1000 cuts . We are not talking about

46:15.290 --> 46:18.750
anything new today . Maybe outside of

46:18.750 --> 46:20.972
the labor issue that we weren't talking

46:20.972 --> 46:23.083
about 10 years ago , it's all there ,

46:23.120 --> 46:26.810
uh . In most major yards you have

46:26.810 --> 46:29.770
commercial military some are combined ,

46:29.810 --> 46:31.921
some aren't . We have large and small

46:31.921 --> 46:33.929
ones which we see here and then you

46:33.929 --> 46:35.985
build and repair going after what uh

46:35.985 --> 46:39.050
Rob Whitman talked about . The idea

46:39.050 --> 46:41.929
that We have lost our industrial base

46:41.929 --> 46:44.096
comes down to one issue . We all short

46:44.096 --> 46:46.969
it . The commercial side is gone if it

46:46.969 --> 46:49.219
wasn't for the Jones Act . Jones Act

46:49.219 --> 46:51.275
said we have to have that industrial

46:51.275 --> 46:53.909
base , but it has not been enough . uh ,

46:54.090 --> 46:56.201
in the Philadelphia yard right across

46:56.201 --> 46:58.570
the river from my district we've seen

46:58.570 --> 47:01.850
where Hanway has come in looking to

47:01.879 --> 47:04.101
immediately look to double what they're

47:04.101 --> 47:05.935
doing because they're doing very

47:05.935 --> 47:08.157
different than the old acres yard . And

47:08.157 --> 47:10.101
then what they're doing is looking

47:10.101 --> 47:12.268
across the river , quite frankly in my

47:12.268 --> 47:14.212
district to look at the newest and

47:14.212 --> 47:16.212
heaviest roll on roll off port with

47:16.212 --> 47:18.268
plenty of room to build what they're

47:18.268 --> 47:20.840
talking about . But it still comes down

47:20.840 --> 47:23.919
to each of you said labor , the idea

47:23.919 --> 47:26.070
that we can attract that next

47:26.070 --> 47:29.830
generation . Is a relatively simple

47:29.830 --> 47:32.070
thing to fix . I come from the building

47:32.070 --> 47:34.939
trades . We don't have any problem

47:34.939 --> 47:36.995
hiring electricians , you know why ?

47:37.379 --> 47:39.490
Because we pay them well . You talked

47:39.490 --> 47:41.490
about what you used to pay them and

47:41.490 --> 47:43.712
what you pay them now and then you look

47:43.712 --> 47:45.935
at the leadership of those yards , what

47:45.935 --> 47:47.879
they were paid years ago they went

47:47.879 --> 47:50.300
different ways . This is the simplest

47:50.300 --> 47:53.820
thing to fix , give the workers value

47:53.820 --> 47:56.780
that we care about what they do . And

47:56.780 --> 47:59.739
pay them the right amount of money . It

47:59.739 --> 48:02.139
really is that simple . You can get the

48:02.139 --> 48:04.540
people if you treat them well and you

48:04.540 --> 48:06.580
pay them well and diversify that

48:06.580 --> 48:09.139
workforce . So let me go down the line

48:09.139 --> 48:11.500
here starting with you , Doctor Sydell .

48:12.750 --> 48:14.806
Labor issues . Do you agree with the

48:14.806 --> 48:17.028
wage issues being number one ? If not ,

48:17.028 --> 48:18.972
please tell me what the number one

48:18.972 --> 48:21.194
issue with labor is . Thank you sir . I

48:21.194 --> 48:23.250
know , I absolutely believe that the

48:23.250 --> 48:25.417
labor issue is the number one , and if

48:25.417 --> 48:27.528
you just think about what it means if

48:27.528 --> 48:29.639
you took the extreme case and we were

48:29.639 --> 48:31.806
paying 3 or 4X , people would actually

48:31.806 --> 48:33.694
show up in droves to work in this

48:33.694 --> 48:33.540
environment . It's a very purpose

48:33.540 --> 48:35.707
driven life supporting the navy they'd

48:35.707 --> 48:37.873
be all about it . Thank you , Doctor .

48:38.229 --> 48:40.889
Uh , uh , Mr . Norcross , as my opening

48:40.889 --> 48:42.833
statement indicated , I completely

48:42.833 --> 48:45.111
agree that is why I focused on it , Ms .

48:45.111 --> 48:47.333
Oakley . I completely agree and want to

48:47.333 --> 48:49.500
let you know that we have ongoing work

48:49.500 --> 48:51.445
looking at the shipbuilding trades

48:51.445 --> 48:53.556
workforce where we're hopefully gonna

48:53.556 --> 48:55.611
get into more details on what can be

48:55.611 --> 48:59.530
done , Mr . O'Rourke . I see wages as

48:59.530 --> 49:01.530
one of the two chief issues and the

49:01.530 --> 49:03.752
other is geographic distribution of the

49:03.752 --> 49:05.974
work . Federated shipbuilding can allow

49:05.974 --> 49:08.086
us to tap into regional labor markets

49:08.086 --> 49:10.308
across the country that are not already

49:10.308 --> 49:12.197
tapped out for their potential to

49:12.197 --> 49:14.419
generate people who would be interested

49:14.419 --> 49:16.197
in ship building , so wages and

49:16.197 --> 49:18.086
geographic distribution . So Mr .

49:18.086 --> 49:21.679
Chairman . All 4 agree , all 4 agree .

49:22.409 --> 49:24.520
Pay the people what they're worth and

49:24.520 --> 49:26.742
you can get them done on time . I yield

49:26.742 --> 49:28.909
back . Mr . Norcross , if it was up to

49:28.909 --> 49:32.500
me , I would pay him , uh , and . Yeah ,

49:33.520 --> 49:35.959
I , I now recognize for 5 minutes

49:35.959 --> 49:38.126
Doctor DesJarlais of Tennessee . Thank

49:38.126 --> 49:40.126
you , Chairman . Ms . Oakley , uh ,

49:40.126 --> 49:42.181
last September , GAO issued a report

49:42.181 --> 49:44.181
outlining the challenges facing the

49:44.181 --> 49:46.292
Columbia class submarine program . As

49:46.292 --> 49:48.403
you know , the timely delivery of the

49:48.403 --> 49:50.626
submarines is critical for the nation's

49:50.626 --> 49:52.681
nuclear deterrence posture . Yet the

49:52.681 --> 49:54.626
first submarine is projected to be

49:54.626 --> 49:56.848
delivered over a year late and hundreds

49:56.848 --> 49:56.659
of millions of dollars over budget .

49:56.959 --> 49:59.181
Can you provide a brief overview of the

49:59.181 --> 50:01.403
most pressing challenges affecting this

50:01.403 --> 50:03.181
platform ? And your your report

50:03.181 --> 50:05.292
includes recommendation for immediate

50:05.292 --> 50:07.570
reforms that the Navy should undertake ,

50:07.570 --> 50:09.681
but is there any specific action that

50:09.681 --> 50:11.681
you believe Congress should take as

50:11.681 --> 50:13.959
well ? Thanks for that question . Yeah ,

50:13.959 --> 50:15.903
we've been looking at the Columbia

50:15.903 --> 50:17.959
class program since 2017 , and we've

50:17.959 --> 50:20.181
been identifying issues that were gonna

50:20.181 --> 50:22.015
be challenges and risks for this

50:22.015 --> 50:24.126
program all along , uh , specifically

50:24.126 --> 50:26.348
right now , the biggest challenges that

50:26.348 --> 50:26.270
they're facing are with material

50:26.270 --> 50:28.820
availability and workforce shortages

50:29.149 --> 50:31.371
and not just workforce shortages , also

50:31.371 --> 50:33.371
workforce capacity . So when you're

50:33.371 --> 50:35.260
trying to build up a workforce so

50:35.260 --> 50:37.482
significantly to be able to do the work

50:37.482 --> 50:39.705
that you need done . You experience the

50:39.705 --> 50:41.760
issue called green labor where um it

50:41.760 --> 50:43.816
just takes a lot longer uh for those

50:43.816 --> 50:46.300
folks to do things and it also requires

50:46.300 --> 50:48.500
a lot more detailed information to be

50:48.500 --> 50:50.500
provided to them and I think that's

50:50.500 --> 50:52.667
been one of the biggest struggles that

50:52.667 --> 50:54.833
that program has dealt with at this at

50:54.833 --> 50:56.889
this point in time . I think the one

50:56.889 --> 50:59.056
thing that I would also say is is that

50:59.056 --> 51:01.167
we've made various recommendations to

51:01.167 --> 51:03.167
the Columbia Class program over the

51:03.167 --> 51:04.833
years to really do a critical

51:04.833 --> 51:07.056
assessment of the risks that are facing

51:07.056 --> 51:09.167
that program to ensure that everybody

51:09.167 --> 51:11.350
has a good understanding of what it's

51:11.350 --> 51:13.350
actually going to cost and how long

51:13.350 --> 51:15.350
it's actually going to take , and I

51:15.350 --> 51:17.517
think some of those . Risks are coming

51:17.517 --> 51:16.979
to roost now that they haven't

51:16.979 --> 51:19.090
critically assessed . One final thing

51:19.090 --> 51:21.340
I'll mention is that Columbia Class and

51:21.340 --> 51:23.929
Virginia class are so interrelated , um ,

51:23.939 --> 51:25.995
and any issues on Columbia Class are

51:25.995 --> 51:28.020
gonna rightly affect Virginia class

51:28.020 --> 51:30.187
because of the shared builders and the

51:30.187 --> 51:32.187
shared industrial base . We've been

51:32.187 --> 51:35.040
recommending since 2022 . That the Navy

51:35.040 --> 51:37.199
get the uh builders to update their

51:37.199 --> 51:39.280
integrated enterprise plan , which

51:39.280 --> 51:41.600
would identify the resources needed

51:41.600 --> 51:43.489
across the programs to be able to

51:43.489 --> 51:45.544
execute these programs at that 2 + 1

51:45.544 --> 51:47.656
rate . And they have yet to update it

51:47.656 --> 51:49.709
since 2019 , so I think that's one

51:49.709 --> 51:51.876
clear recommendation that I would call

51:51.876 --> 51:53.931
to your attention . Thank you . Your

51:53.931 --> 51:55.931
report also noted that the Navy has

51:55.931 --> 51:57.598
received billions in supplier

51:57.598 --> 51:59.487
development funding , yet there's

51:59.487 --> 51:59.189
little evidence that these investments

51:59.189 --> 52:01.300
have led to measurable improvements .

52:01.300 --> 52:03.300
What information should the Navy be

52:03.300 --> 52:05.467
collecting to assess the effectiveness

52:05.467 --> 52:07.689
of these programs ? Yeah , absolutely .

52:07.689 --> 52:07.610
I want to be clear that it is gonna

52:07.610 --> 52:09.969
take time to see results , right ? You

52:09.969 --> 52:11.858
know , this is a long term effort

52:11.858 --> 52:14.010
that's going to uh be required , but

52:14.010 --> 52:15.843
the problem is it's a short-term

52:15.843 --> 52:17.788
challenge . We're facing near peer

52:17.788 --> 52:19.843
threats like we haven't faced before

52:19.843 --> 52:22.169
and so . What our concern is , is that

52:22.169 --> 52:24.360
the Navy hasn't positioned itself to

52:24.360 --> 52:26.479
know whether or not the investments

52:26.479 --> 52:28.368
that it's making in the submarine

52:28.368 --> 52:30.590
industrial base are indeed paying off .

52:30.590 --> 52:32.368
They can tell you if a piece of

52:32.368 --> 52:34.639
equipment was bought or if workforce

52:34.639 --> 52:36.750
was hired or . Or you know , whatever

52:36.750 --> 52:39.254
the case , but really understanding is

52:39.254 --> 52:41.365
that moving us in the right direction

52:41.365 --> 52:43.587
in terms of the outputs that we need to

52:43.587 --> 52:45.754
be able to meet our goals that's where

52:45.754 --> 52:47.976
we're pushing the navy to develop those

52:47.976 --> 52:49.921
outcome-based metrics that they're

52:49.921 --> 52:52.032
gonna be tracking and we hope they do

52:52.032 --> 52:54.087
it . Because honestly we can't get 5

52:54.087 --> 52:56.310
years down the road dumping billions of

52:56.310 --> 52:58.476
dollars into this and realize that our

52:58.476 --> 53:00.643
investments didn't pay off . They have

53:00.643 --> 53:02.810
to be successful . Would it be helpful

53:02.810 --> 53:02.770
if this committee considered

53:02.770 --> 53:05.169
introducing reporting requirements on

53:05.169 --> 53:07.280
supplier investment effectiveness to

53:07.280 --> 53:09.613
improve transparency and accountability ?

53:09.613 --> 53:11.836
I think any support that this committee

53:11.836 --> 53:13.947
can give to the Navy's action in this

53:13.947 --> 53:16.002
regard would be important . OK , are

53:16.002 --> 53:18.113
there any specific supplier component

53:18.113 --> 53:20.113
types that have consistently caused

53:20.113 --> 53:22.336
problems ? If so , what steps should be

53:22.336 --> 53:24.447
taken to strengthen the supplier base

53:24.447 --> 53:26.558
as a whole ? I it ranges , you know ,

53:26.590 --> 53:28.812
there's a number of issues . Forging is

53:28.812 --> 53:30.923
one of the biggest challenges , and ,

53:30.923 --> 53:33.034
you know , the Navy is really doing a

53:33.034 --> 53:35.257
good job of trying to target what those

53:35.257 --> 53:37.312
key issues are in terms of the , the

53:37.312 --> 53:39.479
bottlenecks um by identifying critical

53:39.479 --> 53:41.760
suppliers . Um , and also I would like

53:41.760 --> 53:43.760
to call out that the Navy is taking

53:43.760 --> 53:45.871
some steps to try and address some of

53:45.871 --> 53:48.038
these supplier base issues through the

53:48.038 --> 53:49.760
use of technology and additive

53:49.760 --> 53:51.927
manufacturing , and I think that those

53:51.927 --> 53:54.038
are very promising approaches that if

53:54.038 --> 53:55.871
the committee were to um provide

53:55.871 --> 53:59.000
support in in terms of um of , of , you

53:59.000 --> 54:01.222
know , encouraging the navy to continue

54:01.222 --> 54:03.444
down that path to address some of these

54:03.444 --> 54:05.667
challenges , it would be a good thing .

54:05.667 --> 54:07.778
OK , thank you all for your testimony

54:07.778 --> 54:07.560
today , Mr . Chairman . I yield my time

54:07.560 --> 54:09.004
and Mr . Whitman's back .

54:11.699 --> 54:13.643
I now recognize the gentleman from

54:13.643 --> 54:15.643
Maine , uh , an important member of

54:15.643 --> 54:17.866
this subcommittee , Mr . Golden . Thank

54:17.866 --> 54:20.060
you , sir . Uh , Mr . O'Rourke , in

54:20.060 --> 54:22.179
your testimony or written testimony

54:22.179 --> 54:23.735
anyway , you talked about a

54:23.735 --> 54:25.957
shipbuilding lessons learned process at

54:25.957 --> 54:28.060
GD BIW one of two yards building

54:28.060 --> 54:32.020
destroyers . So up in BIW for years ,

54:32.219 --> 54:34.290
a lot of the workers carried around

54:34.290 --> 54:36.512
their own version of lessons learned in

54:36.512 --> 54:39.330
a little notebook , uh , that they use

54:39.699 --> 54:41.866
out on the job . So I'm I'm curious if

54:41.866 --> 54:44.088
you could elaborate on how you envision

54:44.088 --> 54:46.421
these lessons learned centers operating .

54:46.669 --> 54:49.580
Is this a place where shipbuilders can

54:49.580 --> 54:52.899
go to learn the lessons from the

54:52.899 --> 54:54.955
perspective of the navy or is it the

54:54.955 --> 54:57.121
other way around ? Is it both ? And if

54:57.121 --> 54:59.500
I could just , you know , tip my hat a

54:59.500 --> 55:01.444
little bit in one direction , what

55:01.444 --> 55:03.620
other ways could the navy not just

55:03.850 --> 55:06.100
utilize the skills of shipbuilders but

55:06.100 --> 55:08.267
also their wisdom and knowledge of how

55:08.267 --> 55:11.679
to go about doing it ? Yeah , as I

55:11.679 --> 55:13.735
indicated in my statement , although

55:13.735 --> 55:16.000
the term that is often used as lessons

55:16.000 --> 55:18.709
learned , I've , uh , observed many

55:18.709 --> 55:21.040
occasions over the years where the navy

55:21.040 --> 55:23.360
appears to not really have learned the

55:23.360 --> 55:25.709
lesson but simply note it and then

55:26.040 --> 55:28.590
eventually forget it only to have it be

55:28.959 --> 55:32.320
rediscovered the hard way years later

55:32.320 --> 55:36.280
by um uh practitioners that uh come

55:36.639 --> 55:39.879
after them . Uh , and so as a

55:39.879 --> 55:42.157
consequence of making that observation ,

55:42.280 --> 55:44.502
uh , one option that can arise would be

55:44.502 --> 55:46.613
to create a navy shipbuilding lessons

55:46.613 --> 55:48.790
learned center , and I first , uh ,

55:48.919 --> 55:50.919
presented that option before , uh ,

55:50.919 --> 55:53.439
this committee 10 or 11 years ago in

55:53.439 --> 55:55.495
testimony , so this is nothing new .

55:56.260 --> 55:58.939
That lessons learned center can be as

55:58.939 --> 56:01.560
simple as a physical meaning a shelf

56:01.560 --> 56:04.179
collection of past experiences that

56:04.179 --> 56:06.068
have been written down from prior

56:06.068 --> 56:08.379
programs or it could be the electronic

56:08.379 --> 56:10.379
version of that sort of thing today

56:10.379 --> 56:12.459
computer files it could be both . It

56:12.459 --> 56:15.060
can be made available to practitioners

56:15.060 --> 56:17.004
within the navy . It could be made

56:17.004 --> 56:19.338
available to people within the industry .

56:19.338 --> 56:21.393
I don't see why you couldn't make it

56:21.393 --> 56:23.504
available to anybody or everybody who

56:23.504 --> 56:25.580
might stand to benefit from it . I

56:25.580 --> 56:27.524
don't see the option as being that

56:27.524 --> 56:29.524
complicated . It's just a matter of

56:29.524 --> 56:31.691
deciding that you want to do that . We

56:31.691 --> 56:33.524
have lessons learned centers for

56:33.524 --> 56:35.580
battlefield lessons and how to fight

56:35.580 --> 56:37.691
wars . This would be an analog within

56:37.691 --> 56:40.320
the production sphere . Thank you . Uh ,

56:40.370 --> 56:42.314
shifting gears a little bit , Ms .

56:42.314 --> 56:44.481
Oakley , the Marine Corps is unable to

56:44.481 --> 56:46.037
maintain their USC Title 10

56:46.037 --> 56:48.259
requirements because of the amphib ship

56:48.259 --> 56:50.203
availability , which isn't at full

56:50.203 --> 56:52.259
capacity , mostly due to maintenance

56:52.259 --> 56:54.426
restraints . I say this because you've

56:54.426 --> 56:56.648
talked about this quite a bit in recent

56:56.648 --> 56:58.703
months on a podcast and your reports

56:58.703 --> 57:00.926
and in written testimony . So how do we

57:00.926 --> 57:03.092
go about fixing this issue , or is the

57:03.092 --> 57:05.280
problem simply that 31 minimum amphib

57:05.280 --> 57:08.409
ships isn't gonna be enough ? Yeah , I

57:08.409 --> 57:10.242
think you know our report on the

57:10.242 --> 57:12.298
amphibious ships really highlights a

57:12.298 --> 57:14.353
key challenge in some of these major

57:14.353 --> 57:16.465
modernization and maintenance periods

57:16.465 --> 57:18.631
that go on that do directly affect the

57:18.631 --> 57:20.965
availability and readiness of the fleet ,

57:20.965 --> 57:23.020
and the amphibs are no no difference

57:23.020 --> 57:25.187
with half of the amphib fleet being in

57:25.187 --> 57:27.353
unsatisfactory condition , it makes it

57:27.353 --> 57:29.298
very difficult to imagine that the

57:29.298 --> 57:31.409
Marine Corps's requirements are going

57:31.409 --> 57:33.353
to be able to be met in the coming

57:33.353 --> 57:35.242
years because it also relies on .

57:35.242 --> 57:37.353
Increasing the pace of acquisition of

57:37.353 --> 57:39.179
the amphibs , which , given the

57:39.179 --> 57:41.179
challenges that we're talking about

57:41.179 --> 57:43.179
today with regard to the industrial

57:43.179 --> 57:45.512
base and and being able to support that ,

57:45.512 --> 57:47.512
I'm not certain is very realistic .

57:47.540 --> 57:50.090
Thank you . Uh , I think I want to

57:50.090 --> 57:52.399
point out to that for years the , uh ,

57:52.439 --> 57:54.439
the signal from the navy to destroy

57:54.439 --> 57:56.495
your yards was to get to 3 ships per

57:56.495 --> 57:58.717
year . Um , then they suddenly came out

57:58.717 --> 58:00.530
with just a 9 + 1 multi-year

58:00.530 --> 58:03.010
procurement . I think we're kind of on

58:03.010 --> 58:05.066
pace maybe to go beyond that , which

58:05.066 --> 58:07.449
will drive up costs . Um , what do you

58:07.449 --> 58:09.727
have to say about that , Mr . O'Rourke ,

58:09.727 --> 58:12.969
and , and what other um platforms might

58:12.969 --> 58:15.080
benefit from a multi-year procurement

58:15.080 --> 58:17.358
that currently doesn't have one . Yeah ,

58:17.358 --> 58:19.580
the navy used multi-year procurement uh

58:19.580 --> 58:22.030
with the destroyers um since the mid

58:22.030 --> 58:25.469
90s if I recall right , and um almost

58:25.469 --> 58:27.636
all of the Virginia class submarines ,

58:27.636 --> 58:29.691
all but three of them have been done

58:29.691 --> 58:31.802
under uh multi-year contracting of uh

58:31.802 --> 58:35.070
one form uh or another . It is an

58:35.070 --> 58:37.237
optional element of what I refer to in

58:37.237 --> 58:39.510
my testimony as the broader effort

58:39.510 --> 58:41.732
toward continuous production . It's the

58:41.732 --> 58:43.954
one that is most well recognized people

58:43.954 --> 58:46.121
are most familiar with because we have

58:46.121 --> 58:48.177
been . Uh , doing it for such a long

58:48.177 --> 58:51.219
time , um , and , uh , it is something

58:51.219 --> 58:53.219
that can be applied to other ship

58:53.219 --> 58:54.780
building programs , uh , if

58:54.780 --> 58:57.219
policymakers agree that that would be

58:57.219 --> 58:59.659
cost effective . This committee and the

58:59.659 --> 59:01.826
Congress as a whole has a long history

59:01.826 --> 59:04.048
of providing approvals for various ship

59:04.048 --> 59:06.139
building programs to use these

59:06.139 --> 59:08.695
contracting forms . Uh , over the years

59:08.695 --> 59:11.145
it is a way of providing stability and

59:11.145 --> 59:14.455
continuity to the industry and , uh ,

59:14.745 --> 59:17.024
uh , as such , as I mentioned a moment

59:17.024 --> 59:19.364
ago it can form a part of the broader

59:19.665 --> 59:21.745
uh option that I discussed that I

59:21.745 --> 59:23.905
referred to as continuous production

59:23.905 --> 59:26.310
right thank you Mr . Chair . I now

59:26.310 --> 59:27.977
recognize the member from the

59:27.977 --> 59:30.088
Commonwealth of Virginia who has such

59:30.088 --> 59:32.254
great vision and brings such strategic

59:32.254 --> 59:34.588
vision to this committee , Ms . Higgins .

59:34.588 --> 59:36.643
Thank you very much , Mr . Chair and

59:36.643 --> 59:38.699
thank you to our panelists for being

59:38.699 --> 59:37.949
here . I have the privilege of

59:37.949 --> 59:39.505
representing Virginia's 2nd

59:39.505 --> 59:41.505
congressional district , so Hampton

59:41.505 --> 59:43.671
Roads , home to Huntington Eagles just

59:43.671 --> 59:45.393
outside my district , and most

59:45.393 --> 59:47.439
importantly , so much . Prepare and

59:47.439 --> 59:49.860
shipbuilding people . So , so listening

59:49.860 --> 59:51.971
to you all , uh , it's a lot , it's a

59:51.971 --> 59:53.971
lot . It's , I wish it was a little

59:53.971 --> 59:56.082
more positive direction , but I think

59:56.082 --> 59:56.080
there's some important lessons for

59:56.080 --> 59:58.302
Congress to learn . We can't keep doing

59:58.302 --> 01:00:00.191
what we're doing , I think is the

01:00:00.191 --> 01:00:02.358
bottom line , and it is encouraging to

01:00:02.358 --> 01:00:04.580
have the President of the United States

01:00:04.580 --> 01:00:06.802
stand up to state of the Union and talk

01:00:06.802 --> 01:00:08.913
about prioritizing shipbuilding . The

01:00:08.913 --> 01:00:08.689
fact that we have now a new office of

01:00:08.689 --> 01:00:10.800
shipbuilding , these are all steps in

01:00:10.800 --> 01:00:13.022
the right direction , but I think we're

01:00:13.022 --> 01:00:12.790
gonna need to see some , some big

01:00:12.790 --> 01:00:14.790
overarching changes . And what does

01:00:14.790 --> 01:00:16.790
that look like ? I mean , the ideas

01:00:16.790 --> 01:00:18.901
you've talked about today between the

01:00:18.901 --> 01:00:21.123
technology , we , we can build unmanned

01:00:21.123 --> 01:00:23.290
aircraft using robotics . Why can't we

01:00:23.290 --> 01:00:23.219
do better with especially ship

01:00:23.219 --> 01:00:25.552
components ? I mean , the design aspect ,

01:00:25.552 --> 01:00:27.497
I have a , a son who studied naval

01:00:27.497 --> 01:00:29.608
architecture at the Naval Academy . I

01:00:29.608 --> 01:00:29.570
know it was one of the few schools that

01:00:29.570 --> 01:00:31.681
they actually have that that degree ,

01:00:31.681 --> 01:00:33.792
so . What can we do , you know , to ,

01:00:33.792 --> 01:00:35.903
to incentivize kids just to go to the

01:00:35.903 --> 01:00:37.903
design piece the labor challenges ,

01:00:37.903 --> 01:00:40.014
it's hard for me to listen to you all

01:00:40.014 --> 01:00:42.126
talk about . I sat on the recruitment

01:00:42.126 --> 01:00:44.181
retention Quality of life task force

01:00:44.181 --> 01:00:46.237
that we did from this committee last

01:00:46.237 --> 01:00:45.889
year where we looked at all of those

01:00:45.889 --> 01:00:47.833
things for our active duty side we

01:00:47.833 --> 01:00:49.833
improved . Paying compensation , we

01:00:49.833 --> 01:00:51.778
improved the house and we improved

01:00:51.778 --> 01:00:53.667
childcare , the health care , the

01:00:53.667 --> 01:00:55.556
spouse employment . It's the same

01:00:55.556 --> 01:00:57.667
issues that you all are talking about

01:00:57.667 --> 01:00:57.379
and we took 29 amendments that came out

01:00:57.379 --> 01:00:59.601
of the Senate to the tune of $5 billion

01:00:59.601 --> 01:01:01.712
that we're making sure in this year's

01:01:01.712 --> 01:01:03.546
continuing resolution that we're

01:01:03.546 --> 01:01:05.768
passing that we're gonna hopefully pass

01:01:05.768 --> 01:01:07.935
today because it's so meaningful to us

01:01:07.935 --> 01:01:10.157
that work that we did because we cannot

01:01:10.157 --> 01:01:10.149
keep this all volunteer force without

01:01:10.149 --> 01:01:12.629
those those quality of life changes for

01:01:12.629 --> 01:01:14.907
active duty , but the same can be said ,

01:01:14.907 --> 01:01:16.851
not just for shipbuilding and ship

01:01:16.851 --> 01:01:19.185
repair , but for our MSC . task as well ,

01:01:19.185 --> 01:01:21.185
and we know that with our navy , we

01:01:21.185 --> 01:01:23.185
can't do the job that we need to do

01:01:23.185 --> 01:01:25.351
without our military sealift command ,

01:01:25.351 --> 01:01:27.629
which is also important in my district .

01:01:27.629 --> 01:01:27.300
We've had the opportunity to visit ,

01:01:27.310 --> 01:01:29.550
but But we can incorporate these

01:01:29.550 --> 01:01:31.750
changes across the board . Uh , you

01:01:31.750 --> 01:01:33.972
know , it's , it's interesting that the

01:01:33.972 --> 01:01:35.861
geographic issue , you know , the

01:01:35.861 --> 01:01:37.528
living along the coastline is

01:01:37.528 --> 01:01:39.694
historically expensive . I can speak ,

01:01:39.694 --> 01:01:41.806
you know , speak to that from Hampton

01:01:41.806 --> 01:01:41.800
Roads area , but can we build

01:01:41.800 --> 01:01:44.022
components in places like the Midwest ?

01:01:44.022 --> 01:01:46.133
I know we're doing it in Virginia and

01:01:46.133 --> 01:01:48.244
Danville . We've got a great center ,

01:01:48.244 --> 01:01:50.467
but when we take people out of Danville

01:01:50.467 --> 01:01:52.633
where they're from and move them , you

01:01:52.633 --> 01:01:52.030
know , to other parts where there may

01:01:52.030 --> 01:01:53.808
be shipbuilding . It's a harder

01:01:53.808 --> 01:01:55.919
transition . So what , what does that

01:01:55.919 --> 01:01:58.086
modular component look like and that ,

01:01:58.086 --> 01:02:00.252
that build , I think there's ways that

01:02:00.252 --> 01:01:59.899
we can , we can do things . But I want

01:01:59.899 --> 01:02:01.955
to talk specifically and I , we , we

01:02:01.955 --> 01:02:04.121
printed this poster about the military

01:02:04.121 --> 01:02:06.177
seal of command and And there are so

01:02:06.177 --> 01:02:08.399
many ships that that we can be building

01:02:08.399 --> 01:02:10.566
that are not warships . I understand ,

01:02:10.566 --> 01:02:10.290
you know , building the warships

01:02:10.290 --> 01:02:12.401
domestically and what that looks like

01:02:12.401 --> 01:02:14.568
and our challenges that we're going to

01:02:14.568 --> 01:02:16.623
work through . But on the MSC side ,

01:02:16.623 --> 01:02:18.790
like , for example , we used to have 8

01:02:18.790 --> 01:02:20.957
AOEs . We're down to 2 . We're down to

01:02:20.957 --> 01:02:20.750
2 of these , these are , if we don't

01:02:20.750 --> 01:02:22.917
ships and food and supplies , we can't

01:02:22.917 --> 01:02:25.028
keep the fleet at sea . So , so I'm ,

01:02:25.129 --> 01:02:27.185
I'm really focused and I think we're

01:02:27.185 --> 01:02:29.351
not , we're leaving these guys kind of

01:02:29.351 --> 01:02:31.573
out of the equation sometimes , but How

01:02:31.573 --> 01:02:33.685
can we , how can we do better on this

01:02:33.685 --> 01:02:35.796
side of the house ? Is it something I

01:02:35.796 --> 01:02:38.018
know a few of you have spoken about the

01:02:38.018 --> 01:02:39.740
South Koreans specifically and

01:02:39.740 --> 01:02:41.962
involving some of our allied partners ,

01:02:41.962 --> 01:02:41.949
but what does that look like ? What is

01:02:41.949 --> 01:02:44.005
it , is it , is it a , is a place we

01:02:44.005 --> 01:02:46.060
need to pursue that we need to use ,

01:02:46.060 --> 01:02:48.227
think outside the box and be using our

01:02:48.227 --> 01:02:50.282
allied partners , especially when it

01:02:50.282 --> 01:02:52.505
comes to this MSC type leader . I can't

01:02:52.505 --> 01:02:54.671
do it all domestically . So what can I

01:02:54.671 --> 01:02:56.893
do because I , I want them as soon as I

01:02:56.893 --> 01:02:56.709
can get them , but But are there any of

01:02:56.709 --> 01:02:58.765
you you can speak to just especially

01:02:58.765 --> 01:03:00.876
the use of allied partners for things

01:03:00.876 --> 01:03:04.709
like military seal of command ? Um , I ,

01:03:04.830 --> 01:03:07.239
if it's all right , I'll , I'll answer

01:03:07.239 --> 01:03:09.379
take an answer that question . Um ,

01:03:09.949 --> 01:03:11.782
again , sort of , I'm not in the

01:03:11.782 --> 01:03:13.838
business of making recommendations ,

01:03:13.838 --> 01:03:15.616
but I would sort of answer this

01:03:15.616 --> 01:03:17.449
question this way is that if you

01:03:17.449 --> 01:03:19.560
believe you need a larger fleet , you

01:03:19.560 --> 01:03:21.671
need to recapitalize both the warship

01:03:21.671 --> 01:03:21.389
fleets as well as the military sea lift

01:03:21.389 --> 01:03:24.229
command . Then I think that and given

01:03:24.229 --> 01:03:26.062
that the the capacity of current

01:03:26.062 --> 01:03:28.219
shipbuilding yards is , you know , is

01:03:28.229 --> 01:03:30.510
is full , looking at the question of

01:03:30.510 --> 01:03:33.110
our allies being able to supply some of

01:03:33.110 --> 01:03:35.277
these types of ships is something that

01:03:35.277 --> 01:03:37.499
is worth considering . Um , there's all

01:03:37.499 --> 01:03:39.610
kinds of advantages and disadvantages

01:03:39.610 --> 01:03:41.666
of bringing the , the allies and and

01:03:41.666 --> 01:03:40.760
partners into the ship building

01:03:40.760 --> 01:03:42.750
portfolio , whether domestic or

01:03:42.750 --> 01:03:44.972
overseas , but you know , in December ,

01:03:44.972 --> 01:03:47.139
President Trump , he made a suggestion

01:03:47.139 --> 01:03:49.306
along those lines in an interview with

01:03:49.306 --> 01:03:51.417
the press and . It seems like the the

01:03:51.417 --> 01:03:51.050
the public would , would , would

01:03:51.050 --> 01:03:53.106
benefit from that . The Japanese and

01:03:53.106 --> 01:03:55.217
the Koreans in particular are , are ,

01:03:55.217 --> 01:03:57.439
you know , build outstanding ships that

01:03:57.439 --> 01:03:59.661
fall into the military sea lift command

01:03:59.661 --> 01:04:01.828
portfolio if you're talking about robo

01:04:01.828 --> 01:04:01.290
ships and cargo ships and things like

01:04:01.290 --> 01:04:03.290
that . Some of the more specialized

01:04:03.290 --> 01:04:05.123
ships under the military sealift

01:04:05.123 --> 01:04:07.290
command might still be better built in

01:04:07.290 --> 01:04:09.290
American yards , but it is at least

01:04:09.290 --> 01:04:11.290
worth having that public debate and

01:04:11.290 --> 01:04:13.568
having that conversation about whether ,

01:04:13.568 --> 01:04:13.159
um , you know , others need to be

01:04:13.159 --> 01:04:15.381
brought into it , not only for Navy but

01:04:15.381 --> 01:04:17.659
also Coast Guard and , and icebreakers .

01:04:17.659 --> 01:04:17.429
That would be another place to sort of

01:04:17.429 --> 01:04:20.020
have that conversation as well . I

01:04:20.020 --> 01:04:22.131
agree , do any of any you others have

01:04:22.131 --> 01:04:23.353
thoughts on on that ?

01:04:27.030 --> 01:04:30.020
Well , in my 8 seconds , I'll just say

01:04:30.020 --> 01:04:32.131
committed to working with Marad and ,

01:04:32.131 --> 01:04:34.909
and , and ensuring that we prioritize

01:04:34.909 --> 01:04:36.909
uh military sea lift command in the

01:04:36.909 --> 01:04:39.020
build of those ships . I think , uh ,

01:04:39.229 --> 01:04:41.451
you know , rising tide raises all boats

01:04:41.451 --> 01:04:43.451
and certainly the commercial sector

01:04:43.451 --> 01:04:45.507
getting stronger is gonna help us to

01:04:45.507 --> 01:04:47.507
and what we're doing in the defense

01:04:47.507 --> 01:04:49.729
sector , so all committed . Thank you .

01:04:49.729 --> 01:04:51.618
I think it's a warrants a further

01:04:51.618 --> 01:04:53.785
discussion , but thank you so much for

01:04:53.785 --> 01:04:55.785
your opinion . I yield back . I now

01:04:55.785 --> 01:04:57.896
recognize the gentleman from the UP .

01:04:57.896 --> 01:05:00.639
Mr . Bergman Thank you , Mr . Chairman ,

01:05:00.889 --> 01:05:03.639
um . Being a Marine , you , I'm not

01:05:03.639 --> 01:05:05.750
gonna waste your time , our time , or

01:05:05.750 --> 01:05:09.100
anybody else's time , um , so any one

01:05:09.100 --> 01:05:11.267
of you can or all of you can offer the

01:05:11.360 --> 01:05:13.471
comment if you choose . Does the Navy

01:05:13.471 --> 01:05:16.449
currently have the capability to put

01:05:16.449 --> 01:05:20.320
pun intended the necessary rudder into

01:05:20.320 --> 01:05:22.959
this big ship called shipbuilding ship

01:05:22.959 --> 01:05:25.929
repair ship design ? Does the is the

01:05:25.929 --> 01:05:28.949
navy currently structured to actually

01:05:28.949 --> 01:05:31.270
be able to do that ? Yes or no ?

01:05:33.439 --> 01:05:35.550
You don't have to give me why they're

01:05:35.550 --> 01:05:38.919
not just yes or no . No . No . OK .

01:05:39.520 --> 01:05:42.949
Anybody else ? Did anybody ,

01:05:43.270 --> 01:05:47.060
anybody gonna offer a yes ? OK , so

01:05:47.060 --> 01:05:49.300
let's move on from that then um .

01:05:51.669 --> 01:05:53.780
Somebody said commercial shipbuilding

01:05:53.780 --> 01:05:56.002
still exists because of the Jones Act .

01:05:56.550 --> 01:05:58.772
I heard that within the last 24 hours .

01:05:59.419 --> 01:06:01.308
Anybody want to comment on that ?

01:06:06.510 --> 01:06:09.129
Um , as , as you well know ,

01:06:09.320 --> 01:06:11.653
Congressman , there is very little , um ,

01:06:11.653 --> 01:06:13.764
commercial ship building done in , in

01:06:13.764 --> 01:06:15.653
American shipyards today . To the

01:06:15.653 --> 01:06:17.709
extent that there is some commercial

01:06:17.709 --> 01:06:19.876
shipbuilding that does occur , it does

01:06:19.876 --> 01:06:21.876
seem to me that they , it is mostly

01:06:21.876 --> 01:06:23.876
Jones Act ships , which is building

01:06:23.876 --> 01:06:25.876
ships for intra , uh , uh , intra-U

01:06:25.876 --> 01:06:28.098
United States , uh , trade uh between ,

01:06:28.098 --> 01:06:30.209
you know , one US port and another US

01:06:30.209 --> 01:06:33.120
port . So , um , that is simply the

01:06:33.120 --> 01:06:35.176
current description of , of where we

01:06:35.176 --> 01:06:37.360
are today , OK . Uh , thank you , uh ,

01:06:37.479 --> 01:06:39.560
Mr . O'Rourke , you , you cited the

01:06:39.560 --> 01:06:41.671
South Korean model and we just talked

01:06:41.671 --> 01:06:43.893
about it in , in the last questioning ,

01:06:43.893 --> 01:06:47.229
um . Could you name one or two things

01:06:47.229 --> 01:06:49.340
that the South Korean model ?

01:06:51.239 --> 01:06:54.270
Exhibits utilizes that maybe you think

01:06:54.270 --> 01:06:56.179
we should adopt .

01:06:58.350 --> 01:07:00.572
Uh , I think the Navy certainly has the

01:07:00.572 --> 01:07:03.389
opportunity to adopt uh those practices

01:07:03.389 --> 01:07:06.459
that the South Koreans follow that , uh ,

01:07:06.469 --> 01:07:08.691
I mentioned in my testimony . In fact ,

01:07:08.691 --> 01:07:12.149
I became aware of them , uh , via a

01:07:12.149 --> 01:07:15.330
conference , um . Of , uh , two

01:07:15.330 --> 01:07:17.441
professional societies that relate to

01:07:17.441 --> 01:07:19.663
marine engineers and they were speaking

01:07:19.663 --> 01:07:21.830
mostly to Navy people and it was their

01:07:21.830 --> 01:07:23.830
view that those practices should be

01:07:23.830 --> 01:07:25.997
imported into the Navy's own practices

01:07:25.997 --> 01:07:28.052
so right from the outset , the whole

01:07:28.389 --> 01:07:31.794
reason for my awareness of . South

01:07:31.794 --> 01:07:34.425
Korea's practices in that regard came

01:07:34.425 --> 01:07:36.514
from professional conferences where

01:07:36.514 --> 01:07:38.635
people working in the field were

01:07:38.635 --> 01:07:41.504
telling that to the navy . OK , so my

01:07:41.504 --> 01:07:43.905
understanding of what you said was um

01:07:44.155 --> 01:07:46.377
some professionals who were attending a

01:07:46.377 --> 01:07:48.544
conference referenced the South Korean

01:07:48.544 --> 01:07:50.711
model as a positive . OK , are there ,

01:07:50.711 --> 01:07:52.715
are there any other countries that

01:07:52.715 --> 01:07:56.000
would . Come close to

01:07:56.610 --> 01:07:58.610
the South Korean model or something

01:07:58.610 --> 01:08:00.777
else that you know that we could learn

01:08:00.777 --> 01:08:02.777
from or partner with or however you

01:08:02.777 --> 01:08:04.999
wanna call it . Yes , the other country

01:08:04.999 --> 01:08:07.110
you could learn from is Japan . Japan

01:08:07.110 --> 01:08:06.889
and South Korea are often mentioned

01:08:06.889 --> 01:08:09.770
almost side by side when people talk

01:08:09.770 --> 01:08:13.090
about um best practices uh on a world

01:08:13.090 --> 01:08:15.419
standard in shipbuilding . And there

01:08:15.419 --> 01:08:18.140
are two things that you could learn

01:08:18.140 --> 01:08:20.700
from uh the Japanese . One , which you

01:08:20.700 --> 01:08:22.922
can also learn from the South Korean is

01:08:22.922 --> 01:08:25.459
how to manage shipyard operations more

01:08:25.459 --> 01:08:27.620
efficiently in terms of training new

01:08:27.620 --> 01:08:29.859
workers and staying on top of and

01:08:29.859 --> 01:08:32.026
managing the material flow through the

01:08:32.026 --> 01:08:34.100
shipyard . And secondly , you could

01:08:34.100 --> 01:08:37.060
learn from Japan the model of keeping

01:08:37.060 --> 01:08:39.339
the procurement rate steady even as

01:08:39.339 --> 01:08:42.740
four size changes by managing it at the

01:08:42.740 --> 01:08:45.018
back end through end of life decisions ,

01:08:45.020 --> 01:08:48.049
not through upfront procurement uh rate

01:08:48.049 --> 01:08:50.970
tinkering OK . Uh , are there any other

01:08:50.970 --> 01:08:53.229
countries , uh , uh , just are there

01:08:53.229 --> 01:08:55.285
any other countries anywhere else in

01:08:55.285 --> 01:08:57.451
the world , any part of the world that

01:08:57.589 --> 01:08:59.756
I mean right now we're focused kind of

01:08:59.756 --> 01:09:01.867
on one part of the world here , South

01:09:01.867 --> 01:09:03.978
Korea and Japan . Are there any other

01:09:03.978 --> 01:09:06.089
parts of the world that may not be as

01:09:06.089 --> 01:09:08.660
quite the top tier but definitely would

01:09:08.660 --> 01:09:11.029
be you , you could look at the European

01:09:11.029 --> 01:09:14.100
yards as well . Japan and South Korea

01:09:14.310 --> 01:09:17.290
are in competition with China . So they

01:09:17.290 --> 01:09:19.401
are trying to hold on to their market

01:09:19.401 --> 01:09:21.930
share against the Chinese , uh ,

01:09:21.939 --> 01:09:24.180
shipbuilding and so they are laser

01:09:24.180 --> 01:09:26.640
focused on making their own operations .

01:09:27.069 --> 01:09:29.259
So they're the same as the example

01:09:29.259 --> 01:09:31.910
that's a long time ago there was Ford ,

01:09:32.100 --> 01:09:34.490
GM and Chrysler all in Detroit area

01:09:34.819 --> 01:09:37.299
competing for the future of the market .

01:09:37.500 --> 01:09:39.556
Now this is a different . Example of

01:09:39.556 --> 01:09:42.250
that it it is because right now those

01:09:42.250 --> 01:09:44.472
three countries , China , South Korea ,

01:09:44.520 --> 01:09:47.109
and Japan account for more than 90% of

01:09:47.109 --> 01:09:49.109
the world , uh , commercial ship

01:09:49.109 --> 01:09:51.509
building market . Uh , China is like 40

01:09:51.509 --> 01:09:54.189
to 50% and then South Korea 30% more or

01:09:54.189 --> 01:09:57.629
less , and Japan 20% . OK , I wanna get

01:09:57.629 --> 01:09:59.629
Doctor Seidle . I wanna give Doctor

01:09:59.629 --> 01:10:02.470
that's just a second . I know my can

01:10:02.470 --> 01:10:04.414
Doctor Seidle , give me a quick 10

01:10:04.414 --> 01:10:06.637
seconds . Yeah , hey , I just wanted to

01:10:06.637 --> 01:10:08.414
say you move fast on that first

01:10:08.414 --> 01:10:10.581
question about are we structured to do

01:10:10.581 --> 01:10:12.748
the right thing . In my opinion , we ,

01:10:12.748 --> 01:10:14.359
we can and are , and there's

01:10:14.359 --> 01:10:16.581
improvements that can be made , right ?

01:10:16.581 --> 01:10:16.140
So I think it can happen . Thank you ,

01:10:16.149 --> 01:10:18.316
Mr . Chairman back . Thank you . I now

01:10:18.316 --> 01:10:20.371
recognize the gentleman from Texas ,

01:10:20.371 --> 01:10:22.260
Doctor Jackson . Thank you , Mr .

01:10:22.260 --> 01:10:24.316
Chairman . Uh , most of my questions

01:10:24.316 --> 01:10:24.140
has actually been addressed . I'm just

01:10:24.140 --> 01:10:26.362
gonna ask you one real quick question .

01:10:26.362 --> 01:10:28.140
I apologize if this was already

01:10:28.140 --> 01:10:27.819
addressed before I came into the room ,

01:10:27.899 --> 01:10:30.100
but , uh , I just wanted , wondering ,

01:10:30.220 --> 01:10:32.442
uh , with regards to , uh , some of the

01:10:32.442 --> 01:10:34.609
innovative technology that's out there

01:10:34.609 --> 01:10:36.387
nowadays , uh , production line

01:10:36.387 --> 01:10:38.553
automation , artificial intelligence ,

01:10:38.553 --> 01:10:40.664
robotics , um , you know , could this

01:10:40.664 --> 01:10:42.831
deliver additional capacity ? I mean ,

01:10:42.831 --> 01:10:42.819
I know it can , and efficiency in

01:10:42.819 --> 01:10:45.140
shipbuilding . Is it , how , how

01:10:45.140 --> 01:10:47.362
aggressive are we being on this front ?

01:10:47.362 --> 01:10:49.529
And I had another question and I , and

01:10:49.529 --> 01:10:51.696
I'm not , uh , Saying that this is the

01:10:51.696 --> 01:10:51.585
primary reason by any means , uh ,

01:10:51.675 --> 01:10:53.731
because my , uh , uh , colleagues on

01:10:53.731 --> 01:10:55.786
the left have pointed this out a few

01:10:55.786 --> 01:10:55.706
times to me when I brought this up .

01:10:55.956 --> 01:10:58.755
But what role does organized labor play

01:10:58.755 --> 01:11:00.977
in this as well ? Because it seems like

01:11:00.977 --> 01:11:03.199
when you have a lot of these , uh , you

01:11:03.199 --> 01:11:03.155
know , uh , these hardworking

01:11:03.155 --> 01:11:04.766
blue-collar jobs , uh , like

01:11:04.766 --> 01:11:06.877
shipbuilding , uh , there's organized

01:11:06.877 --> 01:11:08.988
labor has a big part in this and they

01:11:08.988 --> 01:11:10.655
really push back sometimes on

01:11:10.655 --> 01:11:10.596
automation . And I think what's been

01:11:10.596 --> 01:11:12.652
mentioned is like , look , if we can

01:11:12.652 --> 01:11:14.652
make things more efficient , we can

01:11:14.652 --> 01:11:16.818
expand the production and , you know ,

01:11:16.818 --> 01:11:16.715
there's more work for and you can , you

01:11:16.715 --> 01:11:18.826
can keep this . Same number of people

01:11:18.826 --> 01:11:20.937
just employ them in different areas ,

01:11:20.937 --> 01:11:22.882
but it seems like there's a lot of

01:11:22.882 --> 01:11:24.937
pushback . I mean , you know , the ,

01:11:24.937 --> 01:11:24.452
the , sometimes organized labor doesn't

01:11:24.452 --> 01:11:26.396
believe that . They don't buy that

01:11:26.396 --> 01:11:28.563
argument . And when it comes to things

01:11:28.563 --> 01:11:28.131
like automating the , you know , the

01:11:28.131 --> 01:11:30.298
gate at the entrance to the shipyard ,

01:11:30.298 --> 01:11:32.131
they don't want to automate that

01:11:32.131 --> 01:11:34.353
because that's someone's job . So , are

01:11:34.353 --> 01:11:36.687
we overcoming that ? Are we , are , are ,

01:11:36.687 --> 01:11:38.798
you know , is , is this , is this the

01:11:38.798 --> 01:11:40.909
future of shipbuilding is , is , uh ,

01:11:40.909 --> 01:11:43.020
some of the stuff I mentioned and are

01:11:43.020 --> 01:11:42.852
we working with organized labor to come

01:11:42.852 --> 01:11:44.796
up with , uh , ways to do that and

01:11:44.796 --> 01:11:47.629
still employ people ? Yeah , so I'll

01:11:47.629 --> 01:11:49.851
take that question . Uh , listen , we ,

01:11:49.851 --> 01:11:51.930
we are spending a lot of effort on

01:11:51.930 --> 01:11:54.097
modernization of the yards , trying to

01:11:54.097 --> 01:11:56.430
drive in , uh , advanced manufacturing

01:11:56.430 --> 01:11:58.486
techniques . Uh , we're also working

01:11:58.486 --> 01:12:00.899
with our supply chain network . The mid

01:12:00.899 --> 01:12:03.089
monies that we talked about are , are

01:12:03.089 --> 01:12:05.470
going toward those efforts we have

01:12:05.470 --> 01:12:08.029
right now quickly over 700 projects

01:12:08.029 --> 01:12:10.930
with 300 . Uh , different suppliers

01:12:10.930 --> 01:12:14.049
across 33 states and there's 11%

01:12:14.049 --> 01:12:16.049
improvement in performance for them

01:12:16.049 --> 01:12:18.271
that that are undertaking those from an

01:12:18.271 --> 01:12:20.160
advanced manufacturing technology

01:12:20.160 --> 01:12:22.327
perspective , especially an additive ,

01:12:22.327 --> 01:12:24.549
uh , we'll do an SSGN availability here

01:12:24.549 --> 01:12:26.493
shortly that'll have 33 additively

01:12:26.493 --> 01:12:28.569
manufactured parts and , uh , would

01:12:28.569 --> 01:12:30.810
have never couldn't have been sourced

01:12:30.810 --> 01:12:32.866
any other way . And and some of them

01:12:32.866 --> 01:12:35.339
will be subs safe so I think we are

01:12:35.339 --> 01:12:37.709
driving that kind of , uh , those kind

01:12:37.709 --> 01:12:39.876
of capabilities into our yards and our

01:12:39.876 --> 01:12:42.450
supply chain network . I haven't heard

01:12:42.450 --> 01:12:44.850
that the organized labor piece , uh ,

01:12:44.879 --> 01:12:47.540
is a problem at this at this point and ,

01:12:47.620 --> 01:12:49.898
and I honestly don't expect it will be ,

01:12:49.898 --> 01:12:52.339
even though I respect what you said as

01:12:52.339 --> 01:12:54.620
a guy who used to work with UAW a lot

01:12:54.620 --> 01:12:56.842
too . I've watched us automate yards in

01:12:56.842 --> 01:12:59.180
the automotive sector or automate

01:12:59.180 --> 01:13:01.259
plants and uh . And , and there's

01:13:01.259 --> 01:13:03.580
always some work and some initial

01:13:03.580 --> 01:13:05.802
pushback , but we typically get through

01:13:05.802 --> 01:13:07.913
that , and I expect we can as well in

01:13:07.913 --> 01:13:10.136
the , in the maritime industrial base .

01:13:10.136 --> 01:13:12.024
Oh , OK , I appreciate that . And

01:13:12.024 --> 01:13:14.136
before I just have 2 minutes left , I

01:13:14.136 --> 01:13:13.620
was gonna give you guys the opportunity ,

01:13:13.660 --> 01:13:15.993
the ones that didn't get to answer , uh ,

01:13:15.993 --> 01:13:17.827
Ms . Kagan's question while I go

01:13:17.827 --> 01:13:19.882
because one of my questions also was

01:13:19.882 --> 01:13:22.160
about our ability to allow some of our ,

01:13:22.160 --> 01:13:24.493
uh , uh , some of our allies to help us ,

01:13:24.493 --> 01:13:24.220
and not only shipbuilding with the

01:13:24.220 --> 01:13:26.331
maintenance and stuff . I know when I

01:13:26.331 --> 01:13:28.498
was over in Australia recently talking

01:13:28.498 --> 01:13:30.831
about Aus , uh , there were plans to To ,

01:13:30.831 --> 01:13:32.998
uh , to build some shipyards and stuff

01:13:32.998 --> 01:13:32.750
over there and , you know , so that it

01:13:32.750 --> 01:13:34.917
could , you know , basically help us .

01:13:34.917 --> 01:13:37.028
I know that I would prefer that we do

01:13:37.028 --> 01:13:36.979
everything here in the United States ,

01:13:37.069 --> 01:13:39.402
you know , obviously , but , uh , I , I ,

01:13:39.402 --> 01:13:41.513
you know , we can all see the writing

01:13:41.513 --> 01:13:41.310
on the wall that that's a long time

01:13:41.310 --> 01:13:43.421
coming before we get to where we need

01:13:43.421 --> 01:13:45.477
to be . Is this a way to help us get

01:13:45.477 --> 01:13:47.699
there faster ? They would provide inter

01:13:47.699 --> 01:13:49.477
intermediate maintenance , uh ,

01:13:49.477 --> 01:13:49.350
capability , things of that nature if

01:13:49.350 --> 01:13:51.683
we're fighting over in the Indo-Pacific ,

01:13:51.683 --> 01:13:53.906
we , you know , I think it , you know ,

01:13:53.906 --> 01:13:56.072
it's , it's a national security , uh ,

01:13:56.072 --> 01:13:55.029
asset as well .

01:14:01.850 --> 01:14:04.017
Listen , the Aus partnership obviously

01:14:04.017 --> 01:14:06.239
very important to us and uh we're doing

01:14:06.239 --> 01:14:08.240
everything in our power , uh , to

01:14:08.240 --> 01:14:10.890
support the 1 + 2 and 1 + 2.33 to get

01:14:10.890 --> 01:14:13.370
there . I think it does help us and and

01:14:13.370 --> 01:14:15.890
having strong relationships , um , in

01:14:15.890 --> 01:14:17.890
that trilateral agreement certainly

01:14:17.890 --> 01:14:19.890
very critical . I'll yield so other

01:14:19.890 --> 01:14:23.029
folks can have a chance . I would just

01:14:23.029 --> 01:14:25.251
make one comment that that there's kind

01:14:25.251 --> 01:14:27.251
of a a delicate balance that has to

01:14:27.251 --> 01:14:29.196
happen with the industrial base in

01:14:29.196 --> 01:14:31.196
terms of keeping the yards that you

01:14:31.196 --> 01:14:33.029
have existing healthy , um , and

01:14:33.029 --> 01:14:35.310
inserting new yards into the industrial

01:14:35.310 --> 01:14:37.759
base . It becomes a little bit of a Of

01:14:37.759 --> 01:14:40.080
a balance that has to be made because

01:14:40.080 --> 01:14:42.600
um of the fluctuations in the flow

01:14:42.600 --> 01:14:44.600
through of of ship programs through

01:14:44.600 --> 01:14:46.959
these yards you know any one bad year

01:14:46.959 --> 01:14:49.279
could result in laying off employees in

01:14:49.279 --> 01:14:51.279
some of our existing yards and so I

01:14:51.279 --> 01:14:53.995
think a real holistic look at . What

01:14:53.995 --> 01:14:56.106
the solutions are to be able to shore

01:14:56.106 --> 01:14:58.217
up that industrial base and ensure we

01:14:58.217 --> 01:15:00.439
have a vibrant commercial ship building

01:15:00.794 --> 01:15:02.738
industry that then supplements and

01:15:02.738 --> 01:15:05.174
augments um our naval shipbuilding

01:15:05.174 --> 01:15:07.745
industry as I think a key area should

01:15:07.745 --> 01:15:09.912
be a key area of focus going forward .

01:15:10.245 --> 01:15:12.356
Thank you , ma'am . And it looks like

01:15:12.356 --> 01:15:14.578
I'm out of time , so I'll just leave it

01:15:14.578 --> 01:15:14.205
there . I'll yell back . Thank you , Mr .

01:15:14.285 --> 01:15:16.424
Chairman . Now the gentleman from

01:15:16.424 --> 01:15:19.250
Louisiana , Mr . Higgins . Thank you ,

01:15:19.259 --> 01:15:22.700
Mr . Chairman . That the chairman , my

01:15:22.700 --> 01:15:24.779
colleagues , I think , I think we

01:15:24.779 --> 01:15:27.540
recognize the significance of of

01:15:27.540 --> 01:15:30.020
today's hearing we have to tackle this

01:15:30.020 --> 01:15:32.187
thing . The United States shipbuilding

01:15:32.187 --> 01:15:36.129
industry . Has the capacity to meet our

01:15:36.129 --> 01:15:38.640
nation's maritime needs yet we've seen .

01:15:39.330 --> 01:15:43.069
In modern history . We've seen a

01:15:43.069 --> 01:15:45.399
disturbing trend of inconsistent

01:15:45.399 --> 01:15:47.819
government contracting , excessive

01:15:48.600 --> 01:15:51.279
program engineering design changes that

01:15:51.279 --> 01:15:54.629
are endless . lack of long term

01:15:54.629 --> 01:15:58.549
commitment . That when all

01:15:58.549 --> 01:16:00.990
combined it it that prevents

01:16:00.990 --> 01:16:02.879
shipbuilders , especially smaller

01:16:02.879 --> 01:16:05.350
shipbuilders which have historically

01:16:05.350 --> 01:16:07.689
carried a great burden of our our

01:16:08.310 --> 01:16:10.459
requirements of our nation of floated

01:16:10.459 --> 01:16:12.870
navy that's indomitable around the

01:16:12.870 --> 01:16:15.189
world , we need our , our smaller

01:16:15.189 --> 01:16:17.310
shipbuilders across the country to be

01:16:17.310 --> 01:16:20.450
vibrant and successful . But we , we

01:16:20.450 --> 01:16:22.729
have baked in a formula that makes it

01:16:22.729 --> 01:16:24.840
quite difficult for them to perform .

01:16:26.049 --> 01:16:29.970
And Investments and like

01:16:29.970 --> 01:16:32.729
workforce expansion and infrastructure

01:16:32.729 --> 01:16:36.240
for the smaller shipyards requires

01:16:36.689 --> 01:16:40.169
uh a a solid long term commitment with

01:16:40.169 --> 01:16:42.336
their government partners when they're

01:16:42.336 --> 01:16:45.060
building vessels . So that they can be

01:16:45.060 --> 01:16:47.180
healthy and and vibrant and have the

01:16:47.180 --> 01:16:49.569
strong workforce with time on the job

01:16:49.569 --> 01:16:51.859
and the appropriate infrastructure and

01:16:51.859 --> 01:16:54.370
modernization to perform on the next

01:16:54.370 --> 01:16:57.259
contract so the revitalization of our

01:16:57.259 --> 01:16:59.580
ship building industry could very well .

01:17:00.379 --> 01:17:02.709
Determine the outcome of our next

01:17:02.709 --> 01:17:04.750
conflict , so we have a heavy

01:17:04.750 --> 01:17:07.040
responsibility here to pay attention to

01:17:07.040 --> 01:17:11.020
it . And I'd like to to direct

01:17:11.339 --> 01:17:13.561
my first question more if I have time ,

01:17:13.561 --> 01:17:17.479
but Ms . Oakley . Um , Given the

01:17:17.479 --> 01:17:19.720
strategic importance of strengthening

01:17:19.720 --> 01:17:21.887
our domestic shipbuilding base , which

01:17:21.887 --> 01:17:25.509
is a common theme here today . Um ,

01:17:25.589 --> 01:17:28.759
what , what do you see as the , the

01:17:28.759 --> 01:17:32.240
primary obstacle regarding what I refer

01:17:32.240 --> 01:17:36.149
to as the baked into the formula coming

01:17:36.149 --> 01:17:39.950
from , from the Navy and DOD regarding

01:17:39.950 --> 01:17:43.470
constant design changes and

01:17:43.470 --> 01:17:46.740
uh and a moving target for for our

01:17:46.740 --> 01:17:48.709
shipbuilding industry . Could you

01:17:48.709 --> 01:17:50.959
address that please ? Yeah , I think

01:17:50.959 --> 01:17:53.181
there's a couple of things . um , in my

01:17:53.181 --> 01:17:55.403
opening I mentioned that the Navy often

01:17:55.403 --> 01:17:57.681
puts forward optimistic business cases ,

01:17:57.681 --> 01:17:59.737
right ? So the best case scenario in

01:17:59.737 --> 01:18:01.459
terms of the cost and schedule

01:18:01.459 --> 01:18:03.515
estimates , given the risks that are

01:18:03.515 --> 01:18:05.626
apparent on these programs , everyone

01:18:05.626 --> 01:18:07.459
knew that this was going to be a

01:18:07.459 --> 01:18:09.570
challenge to build up , for example ,

01:18:09.570 --> 01:18:09.520
for the Columbia class program , the

01:18:09.520 --> 01:18:11.687
Virginia class , um , maintaining both

01:18:11.687 --> 01:18:13.631
of those at the same time . But we

01:18:13.631 --> 01:18:16.009
didn't act on that information soon

01:18:16.009 --> 01:18:18.229
enough to be able to respond and so I

01:18:18.229 --> 01:18:20.399
think that really critically examining

01:18:20.399 --> 01:18:22.810
soon enough but but you're describing

01:18:22.810 --> 01:18:25.689
years past , correct ? Yeah , yes ma'am ,

01:18:25.770 --> 01:18:28.270
please continue . Um , so I think one

01:18:28.270 --> 01:18:30.419
of the biggest challenges with regard

01:18:30.419 --> 01:18:32.086
to what we've seen . And navy

01:18:32.086 --> 01:18:34.379
shipbuilding over the years in in in

01:18:34.379 --> 01:18:36.779
respects to design is , is that not

01:18:36.779 --> 01:18:39.049
enough work is done up front to be able

01:18:39.049 --> 01:18:40.938
to know what we're signing on the

01:18:40.938 --> 01:18:43.930
dotted line for and how would you I can

01:18:43.930 --> 01:18:46.490
shift because I , I'm respectful of

01:18:46.490 --> 01:18:48.970
your time and the and and the ticking

01:18:48.970 --> 01:18:52.200
clock here , um , regarding

01:18:52.490 --> 01:18:55.930
American yards and and shipbuilding and

01:18:55.930 --> 01:18:58.609
uh how the how the Jones Act plugs in

01:18:58.609 --> 01:19:01.990
there , uh , and . Would you

01:19:01.990 --> 01:19:05.549
address the the consequences

01:19:05.790 --> 01:19:08.680
of overdependence from an American

01:19:08.680 --> 01:19:10.902
perspective and a national security and

01:19:10.902 --> 01:19:13.680
indeed a world security perspective for

01:19:13.680 --> 01:19:16.109
America's , uh , the danger of

01:19:16.109 --> 01:19:18.549
overdependence on foreign shipyards and

01:19:18.549 --> 01:19:20.910
how that plugs into the Jones Act , for

01:19:20.910 --> 01:19:23.660
instance , in the icebreaker realm , um ,

01:19:23.669 --> 01:19:25.891
I , I think the ships should be made in

01:19:25.891 --> 01:19:28.002
America . Would you address that that

01:19:28.002 --> 01:19:29.613
topic please , Ms . Oakley .

01:19:31.879 --> 01:19:34.101
I think there's always a challenge with

01:19:34.101 --> 01:19:36.979
regard to um leveraging our allies and

01:19:36.979 --> 01:19:39.201
leveraging foreign shipyards for things

01:19:39.201 --> 01:19:41.035
that are critical to our own war

01:19:41.035 --> 01:19:43.090
fighting efforts , and I think there

01:19:43.090 --> 01:19:46.020
has to be a real understanding of what

01:19:46.020 --> 01:19:48.740
the impacts of that are when making

01:19:48.740 --> 01:19:51.979
those decisions , um , also balanced

01:19:51.979 --> 01:19:54.000
with what can . Our industrial base

01:19:54.000 --> 01:19:56.250
realistically provide us and I think

01:19:56.250 --> 01:19:58.361
that that's part of the problem right

01:19:58.361 --> 01:20:00.649
now is that we're hoping that this

01:20:00.649 --> 01:20:02.816
industrial base can be mobilized to be

01:20:02.816 --> 01:20:04.816
able to meet our needs and grow our

01:20:04.816 --> 01:20:07.669
fleet to 380 . Would you agree that on

01:20:07.669 --> 01:20:09.930
to identify the a category of vessels

01:20:09.930 --> 01:20:12.770
as say crucial vessels , would you

01:20:12.770 --> 01:20:16.209
agree generally that uh that American

01:20:16.209 --> 01:20:18.376
treasures should be should be invested

01:20:18.376 --> 01:20:20.487
in American shipyards in the building

01:20:20.487 --> 01:20:23.060
of crucial vessels ? I mean , I would

01:20:23.060 --> 01:20:25.338
say that the Navy would agree with you .

01:20:25.338 --> 01:20:27.504
I don't know that I necessarily have a

01:20:27.504 --> 01:20:29.671
position on that . Thank you , madam ,

01:20:29.671 --> 01:20:31.838
for an honest answer , Mr . Chairman .

01:20:31.838 --> 01:20:34.060
I yield . I now recognize the gentleman

01:20:34.060 --> 01:20:36.004
from Guam who is such an important

01:20:36.004 --> 01:20:38.060
member of this subcommittee and also

01:20:38.060 --> 01:20:40.004
has a very strategic region of the

01:20:40.004 --> 01:20:39.660
world which he represents , Mr .

01:20:39.779 --> 01:20:41.950
Morland . Thank you , Mr . Mr .

01:20:42.060 --> 01:20:44.227
Chairman , and , uh , for holding this

01:20:44.227 --> 01:20:46.116
hearing today to discuss , as you

01:20:46.116 --> 01:20:48.282
mentioned , this critical shipbuilding

01:20:48.282 --> 01:20:50.227
need , and Guam is a key strategic

01:20:50.227 --> 01:20:53.120
asset . In the Indo-Pacific and playing

01:20:53.120 --> 01:20:55.470
a crucial role in defending our nation ,

01:20:55.939 --> 01:20:57.883
its location makes it an important

01:20:57.883 --> 01:21:00.106
logistical hub for moving personnel and

01:21:00.106 --> 01:21:02.660
supplies to support our presence in the

01:21:02.660 --> 01:21:05.520
region . Our nation faces challenges

01:21:05.520 --> 01:21:08.049
across the defense industry base ,

01:21:08.700 --> 01:21:10.939
particularly with shipyards and

01:21:10.939 --> 01:21:14.089
shipbuilding . The ship repair facility

01:21:14.089 --> 01:21:17.450
in Guam was closed in 1997

01:21:18.060 --> 01:21:20.479
during the BAC process . But the

01:21:20.479 --> 01:21:22.839
equipment was left behind and still

01:21:22.839 --> 01:21:25.439
there today with the increasing threats

01:21:25.439 --> 01:21:28.200
and Indo-Pacific , we must focus on

01:21:28.200 --> 01:21:30.720
improving our readiness . This means

01:21:30.720 --> 01:21:32.664
having the right infrastructure to

01:21:32.664 --> 01:21:34.930
support our navy ships and submarines

01:21:35.250 --> 01:21:38.120
which are essential for deterrence and

01:21:38.120 --> 01:21:40.850
protection in the region as we prepare

01:21:40.850 --> 01:21:43.439
for future conflicts , it's vital to

01:21:43.439 --> 01:21:45.919
maximize all available resources to

01:21:45.919 --> 01:21:49.000
enhance ship maintenance and repair

01:21:49.000 --> 01:21:51.310
capabilities . We cannot overlook

01:21:51.310 --> 01:21:53.532
Wang's potential to provide the support

01:21:53.532 --> 01:21:55.509
needed to keep our military assets

01:21:55.509 --> 01:21:58.509
ready and operational in this key

01:21:58.509 --> 01:22:02.120
region . So my question , uh , for Mr .

01:22:02.129 --> 01:22:04.790
Rourke , you mentioned that poor

01:22:04.790 --> 01:22:07.299
planning scheduling . And funding are

01:22:07.299 --> 01:22:09.700
the main challenges affecting the

01:22:09.700 --> 01:22:11.890
timely completion of ship maintenance

01:22:11.890 --> 01:22:14.649
and repairs . Do you believe having

01:22:14.660 --> 01:22:17.520
having ship repair capabilities in Guam

01:22:17.979 --> 01:22:20.020
could help mitigate the scheduling

01:22:20.020 --> 01:22:22.850
issues by cutting down the return time

01:22:22.850 --> 01:22:24.740
from Hawaii to the mainland ?

01:22:27.129 --> 01:22:30.080
I know that the Navy is interested in

01:22:30.080 --> 01:22:33.029
improving its ability to perform ship

01:22:33.029 --> 01:22:36.310
maintenance in the uh Indo-Pacific

01:22:36.310 --> 01:22:38.750
region , and that extends even to a

01:22:38.750 --> 01:22:41.029
navy interest in wanting to understand

01:22:41.029 --> 01:22:43.196
what foreign shipyards can do in terms

01:22:43.196 --> 01:22:45.362
of battle damage repair during time of

01:22:45.362 --> 01:22:47.418
conflict if the Navy's interested in

01:22:47.418 --> 01:22:50.270
that then uh it would uh make sense for

01:22:50.270 --> 01:22:52.270
the navy to be interested in making

01:22:52.270 --> 01:22:54.109
sure that they are taking uh uh

01:22:54.109 --> 01:22:56.580
advantage of the opportunity . That

01:22:56.580 --> 01:22:58.859
Guam presents for ship repair both on a

01:22:58.859 --> 01:23:00.979
day to day basis and again for battle

01:23:00.979 --> 01:23:03.201
damage repair during time of conflict .

01:23:03.201 --> 01:23:05.257
Uh , thank you . And as my colleague

01:23:05.257 --> 01:23:07.700
mentioned , Guam is USA we can trust US

01:23:07.700 --> 01:23:10.180
soil our ship repair folks over there

01:23:10.180 --> 01:23:12.402
as well . So thank , thank you for your

01:23:12.402 --> 01:23:14.458
answer . This question is for Doctor

01:23:14.458 --> 01:23:16.629
Shade . But your testimony highlighted

01:23:16.790 --> 01:23:18.568
the importance of expanding and

01:23:18.568 --> 01:23:21.319
modernizing key production and repair

01:23:21.319 --> 01:23:23.490
facilities for our nation's security

01:23:23.879 --> 01:23:26.479
given Guam's strategic location , what

01:23:26.479 --> 01:23:29.040
efforts are being made to reauthorize

01:23:29.040 --> 01:23:31.810
the lease for the Guam shipyard repair

01:23:31.810 --> 01:23:34.640
facility to enhance capabilities in the

01:23:34.640 --> 01:23:38.149
Indo Pacific ? Sir , thank you .

01:23:38.279 --> 01:23:41.430
Obviously a very critical spot for us

01:23:41.430 --> 01:23:43.597
because of everything going on in that

01:23:43.597 --> 01:23:45.208
region . We are having those

01:23:45.208 --> 01:23:48.399
discussions right now around where we

01:23:48.399 --> 01:23:50.455
are trying to do our ship repair and

01:23:50.455 --> 01:23:52.288
ship maintenance . I concur with

01:23:52.288 --> 01:23:55.279
everything Mr . O'Rourke said also and

01:23:55.279 --> 01:23:57.799
I my commitment to you is to continue

01:23:57.799 --> 01:24:00.359
to have that discussion , uh , to try

01:24:00.359 --> 01:24:02.359
and get to a , a good solution that

01:24:02.359 --> 01:24:04.870
helps all of us , uh , and improves our

01:24:04.870 --> 01:24:07.439
tactical advantage there . I appreciate

01:24:07.439 --> 01:24:09.720
that and also along with your constant

01:24:09.720 --> 01:24:12.279
uh fight to let them know that we're

01:24:12.279 --> 01:24:14.446
there we're ready to serve and Guam is

01:24:14.446 --> 01:24:16.668
USA so let's let's help out one another

01:24:16.668 --> 01:24:18.835
so I appreciate that a lot . I mean it

01:24:18.835 --> 01:24:21.057
appreciate it and one more question for

01:24:21.057 --> 01:24:22.779
you please how can the federal

01:24:22.779 --> 01:24:24.835
government leverage partnership with

01:24:24.835 --> 01:24:27.057
local workforce development programs to

01:24:27.057 --> 01:24:29.279
address the shortage of skilled workers

01:24:29.279 --> 01:24:31.439
in the defense industry based to meet

01:24:31.439 --> 01:24:34.700
production demands ? Yeah , I think ,

01:24:34.830 --> 01:24:37.870
uh , we are doing a lot of those things

01:24:37.870 --> 01:24:41.160
both local regions and nationally . We

01:24:41.160 --> 01:24:43.020
stood up the accelerated , uh ,

01:24:43.109 --> 01:24:44.776
training facility for defense

01:24:44.776 --> 01:24:46.899
manufacturing in Danville . We have ,

01:24:47.029 --> 01:24:49.950
uh , 6 regional pipelines and 1

01:24:49.950 --> 01:24:52.620
national pipeline , uh , all part of

01:24:52.620 --> 01:24:55.229
the SIB and MIB monies that that you

01:24:55.229 --> 01:24:57.765
have also graciously funded us for . So

01:24:57.765 --> 01:24:59.876
we're putting that to good use to get

01:24:59.876 --> 01:25:02.245
after , uh , trades and labor for the

01:25:02.245 --> 01:25:04.725
yards , um , and think we're , we're

01:25:04.725 --> 01:25:07.003
gonna , we're having good effect there .

01:25:07.003 --> 01:25:09.169
I think it still then goes back to the

01:25:09.169 --> 01:25:11.336
attrition issues and what are we doing

01:25:11.336 --> 01:25:13.169
with wages to make sure that our

01:25:13.169 --> 01:25:15.058
retention once we get them . Uh ,

01:25:15.058 --> 01:25:17.225
allows us to keep them so that we , we

01:25:17.225 --> 01:25:19.336
make the inroads that we need , but ,

01:25:19.336 --> 01:25:21.336
but we're after that . I appreciate

01:25:21.336 --> 01:25:23.169
that we have a lot of young kids

01:25:23.169 --> 01:25:25.392
anxious to help our nation and get that

01:25:25.392 --> 01:25:27.558
good education so with your support we

01:25:27.558 --> 01:25:27.419
can help fund that so I appreciate it .

01:25:27.669 --> 01:25:29.780
Thank you to the panels . Thank you ,

01:25:29.780 --> 01:25:31.891
Mr . Chairman and you're back . Thank

01:25:31.891 --> 01:25:34.002
you . I now , uh , recognize a little

01:25:34.002 --> 01:25:36.113
bit out of order my good friend , the

01:25:36.113 --> 01:25:38.058
ranking member Mr . Courtney for 5

01:25:38.058 --> 01:25:40.113
minutes of questions upon which I'll

01:25:40.113 --> 01:25:42.280
close after . Great , thank you , uh ,

01:25:42.280 --> 01:25:44.613
Mr . Chairman and um . Uh , Ms . Oakley ,

01:25:44.613 --> 01:25:46.669
I , I just wanted to go back to your

01:25:46.669 --> 01:25:48.836
comments regarding , uh , requirements

01:25:48.836 --> 01:25:50.836
and design , uh , completion before

01:25:50.836 --> 01:25:50.689
construction , which I could not agree

01:25:50.689 --> 01:25:52.800
with you more , um , but I , in terms

01:25:52.800 --> 01:25:54.967
of the Columbia program because it was

01:25:54.967 --> 01:25:57.189
sort of that was sort of in your in the

01:25:57.189 --> 01:26:00.660
mix there , um , when Columbia cut its

01:26:00.660 --> 01:26:03.770
first deal , it was 87% design complete ,

01:26:04.020 --> 01:26:05.964
um , which , and I'm old enough to

01:26:05.964 --> 01:26:08.089
remember the Ohio class . Submarine

01:26:08.089 --> 01:26:10.459
program which it's replacing um it was

01:26:10.459 --> 01:26:13.709
less than 20% at that time . A lot of

01:26:13.709 --> 01:26:16.020
land-based testing has been done for ,

01:26:16.089 --> 01:26:18.350
you know , the propulsers uh you know ,

01:26:18.589 --> 01:26:20.859
before it even got near the submarine

01:26:20.859 --> 01:26:23.620
for um . Uh , assembly , uh , that's

01:26:23.620 --> 01:26:25.787
there and I think again that reduced a

01:26:25.787 --> 01:26:28.009
lot of risk , uh , during the process .

01:26:28.009 --> 01:26:30.231
It's late right now , no question about

01:26:30.231 --> 01:26:32.398
it . There are two reasons . Number 12

01:26:32.398 --> 01:26:34.287
primary reasons the power turbine

01:26:34.287 --> 01:26:36.620
generator is late coming from Sunnydale ,

01:26:36.620 --> 01:26:38.731
uh , north of Grumman it's a , it's a

01:26:38.731 --> 01:26:40.959
new technology . First in the of its

01:26:40.959 --> 01:26:43.070
time , I mean it's gonna take a while

01:26:43.070 --> 01:26:45.181
to , to , to , but they can't sort of

01:26:45.181 --> 01:26:47.348
um build the rest of the submarine and

01:26:47.348 --> 01:26:49.570
then have to cut it open to insert that

01:26:49.570 --> 01:26:51.792
they have to wait for it and the bow is

01:26:51.792 --> 01:26:53.681
late from from Newport News again

01:26:53.681 --> 01:26:55.626
there's a tier team that's uh down

01:26:55.626 --> 01:26:57.848
there working in terms of trying to get

01:26:57.848 --> 01:26:59.737
that but in terms of , you know ,

01:26:59.737 --> 01:27:01.848
really , um , a , a program where the

01:27:01.848 --> 01:27:03.848
requirements and design was done up

01:27:03.848 --> 01:27:05.848
front . I mean , honestly , Admiral

01:27:05.848 --> 01:27:08.080
Papano I think did an outstanding job .

01:27:08.410 --> 01:27:10.709
In terms of just relentlessly pushing

01:27:10.709 --> 01:27:14.549
um that sort of sequence uh as as that

01:27:14.549 --> 01:27:16.438
program uh was going into place ,

01:27:16.709 --> 01:27:18.509
Doctor Seidel , in terms of the

01:27:18.509 --> 01:27:20.700
requirements issue again GAO is right

01:27:20.700 --> 01:27:22.811
about the fact that you know this has

01:27:22.811 --> 01:27:24.867
been whether frigate and some of the

01:27:24.867 --> 01:27:27.033
other LCS just that was changing , you

01:27:27.033 --> 01:27:29.144
know , it seemed like every hearing C

01:27:29.144 --> 01:27:31.311
Power held during the over the years .

01:27:31.311 --> 01:27:33.810
Um , the , the vessel contract manager

01:27:34.100 --> 01:27:36.100
that I mentioned in opening remarks

01:27:36.100 --> 01:27:38.156
where , uh , we used to , you know ,

01:27:38.156 --> 01:27:40.378
commercial model for , for the maritime

01:27:40.378 --> 01:27:42.489
training ships which can be converted

01:27:42.489 --> 01:27:44.544
into a you know , uh , uh , sea lift

01:27:44.544 --> 01:27:47.180
vessel at time of emergency . I mean it

01:27:47.180 --> 01:27:49.124
worked and it just , it seems like

01:27:49.124 --> 01:27:51.347
we've had Navy personnel come visit the

01:27:51.347 --> 01:27:53.410
Philly shipyard to to see it for

01:27:53.410 --> 01:27:55.521
themselves again it just feels like .

01:27:56.120 --> 01:27:58.120
You know , we , we've gotta go more

01:27:58.120 --> 01:28:00.287
with the navy in terms of just getting

01:28:00.287 --> 01:28:02.564
them to let go , maybe even , you know ,

01:28:02.564 --> 01:28:04.676
some of the less exquisite vessels to

01:28:04.676 --> 01:28:06.787
just sort of , you know , follow what

01:28:06.787 --> 01:28:08.953
the , the commercial industry is doing

01:28:08.953 --> 01:28:08.759
so that we can speed things up . I mean ,

01:28:08.819 --> 01:28:11.041
I was wondering if you could comment on

01:28:11.041 --> 01:28:13.097
that . Yeah , two things . One , you

01:28:13.097 --> 01:28:15.263
know , to the point about design , and

01:28:15.263 --> 01:28:17.263
we've had a lot of discussion about

01:28:17.263 --> 01:28:19.529
that today . I feel like for success in

01:28:19.529 --> 01:28:22.160
this arena , it's rigor and discipline

01:28:22.410 --> 01:28:25.649
and requirements than design and

01:28:25.649 --> 01:28:27.760
production because if you're rigorous

01:28:27.760 --> 01:28:29.816
about all three then things flow you

01:28:29.816 --> 01:28:31.982
don't get out of sequence material you

01:28:31.982 --> 01:28:33.982
don't have those kind of issues . I

01:28:33.982 --> 01:28:36.316
think we have an insatiable demand , uh ,

01:28:36.316 --> 01:28:38.482
appetite for capabilities at times for

01:28:38.482 --> 01:28:40.538
good reason . Uh , we are the finest

01:28:40.538 --> 01:28:42.538
navy ever assembled because we have

01:28:42.538 --> 01:28:44.205
capabilities that outpace our

01:28:44.205 --> 01:28:46.870
adversaries and so , um , when we come

01:28:46.870 --> 01:28:49.037
to those crossroads we always struggle

01:28:49.037 --> 01:28:51.350
to say stop , um , we've already

01:28:51.350 --> 01:28:53.350
snapped a chalk line and we need to

01:28:53.350 --> 01:28:55.406
stay with the design we have so that

01:28:55.406 --> 01:28:57.517
it's more producible for our industry

01:28:57.517 --> 01:29:00.290
partners so , so I think . I know we

01:29:00.290 --> 01:29:02.720
know what to do to make that better .

01:29:02.890 --> 01:29:04.501
We've got to be rigorous and

01:29:04.501 --> 01:29:06.668
disciplined and doing it to your point

01:29:06.668 --> 01:29:08.279
about Mayorad and the vessel

01:29:08.279 --> 01:29:10.446
construction manager , uh , I've taken

01:29:10.446 --> 01:29:12.557
several briefs on that now . I concur

01:29:12.557 --> 01:29:12.009
with you . It looks like they've been

01:29:12.009 --> 01:29:15.169
very successful , um , control some of

01:29:15.169 --> 01:29:17.280
the little R requirements compared to

01:29:17.280 --> 01:29:19.336
the big R requirements and and and .

01:29:19.336 --> 01:29:21.391
And have led to some decreased costs

01:29:21.391 --> 01:29:23.558
there that I think looks good so I I I

01:29:23.558 --> 01:29:25.613
intend to go meet with them and have

01:29:25.613 --> 01:29:27.780
some real discussion . I think there's

01:29:27.780 --> 01:29:29.780
some opportunity uh in our space to

01:29:29.780 --> 01:29:31.947
take that model and use it for some of

01:29:31.947 --> 01:29:34.113
the work that we're doing and , and my

01:29:34.113 --> 01:29:36.225
commitment is to lean in and and work

01:29:36.225 --> 01:29:35.479
to try to do that . I mean that's great

01:29:35.479 --> 01:29:37.535
to hear and anything we can do to to

01:29:37.535 --> 01:29:39.649
push that along , um , appreciate it

01:29:39.649 --> 01:29:41.819
for sure , um . Uh , Ms . Oakley ,

01:29:41.899 --> 01:29:44.010
again , I'm was glad to hear that you

01:29:44.010 --> 01:29:46.177
now are gonna be focusing on workforce

01:29:46.177 --> 01:29:48.121
training as part of a project that

01:29:48.121 --> 01:29:50.288
Sarah . I really encourage you to come

01:29:50.288 --> 01:29:52.455
up to Groton and see the manufacturing

01:29:52.455 --> 01:29:54.677
pipeline again that reason why they hit

01:29:54.677 --> 01:29:56.677
that 5300 higher number it was 4000

01:29:56.677 --> 01:29:58.455
last year and having such great

01:29:58.455 --> 01:30:00.566
retention is because of the design of

01:30:00.566 --> 01:30:02.899
the curriculum , OK , and it , and it's ,

01:30:02.899 --> 01:30:05.010
it's , um , it's something now that I

01:30:05.010 --> 01:30:07.232
think other regions , uh , are starting

01:30:07.232 --> 01:30:09.455
to emulate because . You know , if it's

01:30:09.455 --> 01:30:11.677
too short , then your , your people are

01:30:11.677 --> 01:30:13.566
gonna flush out once they see the

01:30:13.566 --> 01:30:15.566
reality of a shipyard . If it's too

01:30:15.566 --> 01:30:15.169
long , it's just too long . We , we

01:30:15.169 --> 01:30:17.113
need it faster . So again , I hope

01:30:17.113 --> 01:30:19.280
you'll take up my invitation . We have

01:30:19.280 --> 01:30:21.336
definitely been there and we will be

01:30:21.336 --> 01:30:23.669
back . Great , thank you . I yield back .

01:30:23.669 --> 01:30:25.725
Well , I can't let him do that . You

01:30:25.725 --> 01:30:27.891
need to come to Pascagoula and see how

01:30:27.891 --> 01:30:29.836
it's really done and how it's done

01:30:29.836 --> 01:30:32.002
right , uh , and has been for a long ,

01:30:32.002 --> 01:30:34.058
long time , uh , but with that being

01:30:34.058 --> 01:30:36.225
said , I thank all of you witnesses so

01:30:36.225 --> 01:30:38.169
much for being here today . You've

01:30:38.169 --> 01:30:40.391
added a great contribution . This was a

01:30:40.391 --> 01:30:42.558
great hearing and it's a great hearing

01:30:42.558 --> 01:30:42.319
because of the great witnesses we have .

01:30:42.609 --> 01:30:44.831
Thank you and with that this hearing is

01:30:44.831 --> 01:30:44.970
adjourned .