WEBVTT

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The hour of 9:30 has arrived and and

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this hearing will come back to order .

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We've already had a classified part of

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the hearing , um , beginning at 8 a.m. ,

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but , uh , at this point we held a

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hearing on the US Indo-Pacific Command

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and the US Force Korea . At the outset ,

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I want to thank Admiral Paparo and

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General Brunson for their distinguished

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service to our country . Last year at

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this hearing I said that the balance of

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power in the Indo-Pacific was shifting

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in China's favor . Since then , the

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Chinese Communist Party has

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significantly increased its coercive

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activity toward Taiwan and the

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Philippines . Last week , the Chinese

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conducted an exercise called Straight

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Thunder 2025A . This exercise

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demonstrated the extent to which the

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People's Liberation Army . Could

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execute a maritime blockade of Taiwan

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and pummeled with missile strikes as

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China conducts more exercises with

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Taiwan in mind . It also escalates the

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rhetoric against the island . Last week ,

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Chinese military officials called uh

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Taiwan's democratically elected

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president a parasite . The Chinese have

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also substantially increased their

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harassment of our Filipino allies .

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China's vast maritime militia backed by

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the PLA Navy and Chinese Coast Guard is

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using increasingly aggressive tactics

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to advance its expansive claims in the

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South China Sea . The 2nd Thomas Scholl

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remains a major flashpoint . Chinese

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maritime militias have tried to keep

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the grounded Filipino navy ship , the

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Sierra Madre , from being resupplied .

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Secretary Hegseth recently visited the

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region . I was pleased to see that he

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reaffirmed our mutual defense treaty

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with the Philippines , reminding the

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world that the treaty applies to

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attacks on the Filipino armed forces

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anywhere in the South China Sea . Even

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so , it is clear that the Chinese have

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been emboldened . By 4 years of

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weakness during uh the past

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administration , there is another

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reason China has become so confident in

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its maligned schemes . Xi Jinping has

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steadily modernized his military , and

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that hardware has made him more brazen .

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China boasts the world's largest navy .

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And also has an air force that is

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capable of denying the the US air

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superiority in the first island chain .

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We'll certainly want to ask about that ,

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gentlemen . It's missile force can

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saturate our theater defenses . China

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has been expanding its nuclear arsenal

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at a pace that far outstrips our own .

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Multiple Stratcom commanders have

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called China's growth breathtaking . In

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just a few short years , Beijing has

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built more intercontinental ballistic

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missile launchers than the United

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States . Meanwhile , our own

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modernization programs languish from

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past neglect , but China is not the

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only urgent threat in the Indo-Pacific .

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The Biden administration chose to

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ignore North Korea . It allowed Kim

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Jong Un to increase his nuclear arsenal

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and project . His military into

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European theater to aid Vladimir Putin

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and Russia's war against Ukraine . Kim

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Jong Un has abandoned the goal of

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unification of the Korean Peninsula and

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again we'll want to talk about that and

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has declared South Korea to be the

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principal enemy . The North Korean

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nuclear and missile arsenal continues

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to grow and diversify . With the rogue

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nation adopting a strategic doctrine

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that embraces nuclear first use .

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Kim will surely seek remuneration for

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his support to Moscow . The Russian

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technology transfers and military

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assistance Kim receives will help him

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to further strengthen his strategic

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military forces , missile forces . The

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continued demonstrations of Russia ,

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China , and North Korea aligning and

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cooperating should be of great concern

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to all the West . This concern should

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then lead to action if we are to

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maintain global peace and stability .

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We must continue taking steps now to

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rebuild our military and reestablish

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deterrence . As I noted in um my piece

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through Strength report last May . It's

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time to make a generational investment

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in our national security . I do believe

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that , uh , view is bipartisan . We

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must be able not only to deter and

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defeat the People's Liberation Army but

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also to maintain deterrence in other

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theaters . Our adversaries led by

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Beijing are playing a . A global game

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we must be smarter and more agile than

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they are across the board . Last year ,

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Endo Paycom's unfunded requirements

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list totaled $3.5 billion . This

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year's unfunded requirement list was

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$11 billion and virtually none of that

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was funded under the full year CR .

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This is unacceptable and also I , I

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hope we're , we're gonna get from

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everyone . An accurate and full

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um assessment of the , the

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various unfunded requirements . We need

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real growth in the FY26 budget request

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in addition to a historic defense

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reconciliation package , we need more

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survivable long range munitions , more

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assured US command and control systems ,

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and improved ability to counter .

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China's increasingly capable cyber and

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space systems . We need a wholesale

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overhaul of our logistics

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infrastructure and a rapid deployment

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of unmanned systems . We need a

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renaissance in our camouflage and

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deception programs that we need a

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drastic improvement in our shipbuilding .

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The risk is simply too high for us to

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avoid making these changes , so I look

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forward to hearing from our

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distinguished , um , and well informed

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witnesses . And , um , having a candid

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conversation about what this committee

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and this Senate and this Congress can

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do this year to address these

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challenges . Senator Reed , thank you

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very much , Mr . Chairman and Admiral

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Paparo , General Brunson , welcome . Uh ,

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thank you for appearing today and

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please convey our thanks to the men and

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women serving under your commands and

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defending us . This is a challenging

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time for our forces in the Indo-Pacific .

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China is deploying a wide range of

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military , economic , and political

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pressures against its neighbors while

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aggressively challenging America's

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leadership in the region . The United

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States does not seek conflict with

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China , but we have deep economic and

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security interests in the Indo-Pacific

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that must continue to be protected

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through strong deterrence and smart

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competition . Several months ago I

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traveled to Guam , South Korea , and

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the Philippines to assess our part in

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the region . I observed a number of

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joint military exercises , met with all

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our leaders , spoke with foreign

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business leaders , and inspected our

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military infrastructure . Overall , I

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was impressed with our progress ,

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particularly the development of our

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partnership with the Philippines and

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the remarkable emerging partnership

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between Korea and Japan . These

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relationships should inspire us to

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redouble the development of networks

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like the Quad , Baucus , and ASEAN as

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we bring other nations into our

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security cooperation efforts . Indeed ,

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as countless US military leaders and

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diplomats have told me , the key

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asymmetric advantage our nation has

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over China is our network of allies and

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partners . With that in mind , I am

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concerned that the Trump administration

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is unraveling much of the progress

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we've made . Many observers fear that

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President Trump may shrink the US troop

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presence in Korea and Japan . Reduce

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our military exercises with both

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nations and scale back plans for a

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joint forces headquarters in Japan .

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Despite the fact that Korea and Japan

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contribute significantly to burden

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sharing and hosting our forces ,

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although the president has temporarily

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suspended tariffs against our closest

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allies and partners , the last few days

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have undoubtedly sown seeds of doubt

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about America's stability and

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trustworthiness , feelings that would

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be amplified if the president decides

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to reinstate the sanctions after 90

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days . In addition to dismantling

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America's soft power tools like the US

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Agency for International Development ,

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President Trump's actions served only

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to push our friends away from us , and

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That is not appropriate . Admiral

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General Brunson , you engage with our

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foreign partners every day , both as a

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matter of diplomatic leadership and

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military necessity . I'm interested in

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your views on how tensions with our

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allies would disadvantage your forces

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and America's interest in the region .

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Admiral Paparo , Taiwan remains the

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most dangerous flashpoint in our

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competition with China . We have seen a

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recent surge of aggressive Chinese

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military exercises around Taiwan's

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airspace and territorial waters , and

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the world has a right to be concerned

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in several consecutive national defense

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authorization acts , this committee has

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provided . Security assistance tools to

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help develop Taiwan's capabilities and

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strengthen our own posture . In

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particular , the Taiwan Security

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Cooperation Initiative and the

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Indo-Pacific Campaigning Initiative

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should enable greater support and

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training for Taiwan . And facilitate

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Indopecom's increased exercises and

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freedom of navigation operations

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consistent with the Taiwan Relations

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Act . However , your command has once

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again had to divert ships and aircraft

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for prolonged and intensive operations

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in the Middle East . Admiral Paparo , I

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would like to know your assessment of

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Indo Paycom's readiness to carry out

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your missions as well as the United

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States's broader strategy in the region .

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Key to America's success in the

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Indo-Pacific is the posture of our

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forces in South Korea . As I mentioned ,

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I am encouraged by the recent progress

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we have seen in the trilateral

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relationship among South Korea , Japan ,

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and the United States , and I hope that

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developments like these will provide

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more opportunities to engage other

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regional partners . As we do so , we

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must continue to manage the threat

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posed by North Korea . We know that Kim

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Jong Un continues to view nuclear

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weapons as the ultimate deterrence

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against foreign intervention , and he

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tends to gain international acceptance

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as the nuclear armed state . North

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Korea's relationships with Russia also

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continues to grow , especially in light

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of North Korea sending troops and

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weapons to support Putin's invasion of

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Ukraine , and Kim Jong Un is likely

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receiving technical assistance from

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Russia from missile and nuclear

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capability . General , I would

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appreciate your view on the current

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threat from North Korea and how your

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forces are maintaining readiness

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through training and exercises with

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their South Korean counterparts . Again ,

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thank you to our witnesses . I look

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forward to testimonies . Thank you , Mr .

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Chairman . Thank you , uh , we now

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recognize , um , each of our panelists

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for opening statements , and General

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Brunson , you went first in the closed

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session . Would you like to do that

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again ? My boss says ,

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yes , so I do . Thank you for giving me

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at least the illusion of choice .

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Chairman Wicker , ranking member Reid

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and distinguished members of this

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committee , thank you for the

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opportunity to speak to you today . I'm

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honored to appear before you for my

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first posture , uh , hearing in front

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of this committee as the commander of

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United States Forces Korea Combined

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Forces Command and United Nations

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Command . I'd like to take a moment

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just to simply thank you all for your

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steadfast leadership , your friendship ,

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and your critical support to our

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service members , their families , our

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civilians and the contractors who

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support us around the globe , but I

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especially want to thank you for your

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continued time and attention to the

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people of the Republic of Korea and the

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soldiers , sailors , airmen , guardian ,

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and marines who served there on the

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peninsula . I'd also like to thank the

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Korean people right now for their

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continued resilience through challenges

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and hard times . I'd like to thank them

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for their dedication to our alliance .

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And I'd also like to thank them for

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their continued provision of an

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environment that allows us to build

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sustain and retain the readiness that

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we develop on the peninsula . In my

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career , every opportunity that I've

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had to lead our nation's men and women

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has been an honor . It's a privilege to

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serve alongside Admiral Paparo , our

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friends , our partners and allies in

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the region , working to strengthen our

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ties to further security , freedom and

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prosperity amongst the nations . For

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over 75 years , we've invested our

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national treasure in the Republic of

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Korea and remain the last US fighting

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force on the continent of Asia .

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The return on investment of US forces

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being stationed in Korea is not

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measured only in dollars , but in terms

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of access , forward basing , enduring

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partnerships , and deterrence . In 2024 ,

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the DPRK focused on advancing their

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cruise missile and hypersonic glide

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vehicle research and development

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programs , launching 47 ballistic

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missiles with one failed satellite

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launch attempt . Kim Jong Un also has

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two highly publicized visits to nuclear

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sites . And over the past year and a

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half , DPRK has exported munitions and

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troops to support Russia ,

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demonstrating the ability to provide

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external support while simultaneously

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advancing domestic capabilities . In

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the coming year , we expect the DPRK to

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further develop hypersonic and multiple

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independently targetable reentry

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vehicle MERV capabilities to complete

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his eighth party Congress goals . Kim

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Jong Un's leadership has shifted focus

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from reunification to declaring

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sovereignty . This change is evidenced

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by the hardening of DPRK's southern

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border , the rejection of reunification

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discussions , and the destruction of

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unification monuments and buildings .

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The DPRK continues to build its nuclear

14:18.919 --> 14:21.000
weapons program and boasts a Russian

14:21.000 --> 14:23.799
equipped , augmented modernized

14:23.799 --> 14:26.719
military force of over 1.3 million

14:26.719 --> 14:29.559
personnel . Lastly , DPRK's cyber

14:29.559 --> 14:31.840
threat is increasingly sophisticated ,

14:32.080 --> 14:34.247
as demonstrated by the recent theft of

14:34.247 --> 14:36.890
approximately $1.5 billion in

14:36.890 --> 14:40.299
cryptocurrency . In contrast to that ,

14:40.450 --> 14:43.650
I would speak to the Rock US Japan

14:43.650 --> 14:45.969
trilateral efforts which are bearing

14:45.969 --> 14:48.130
much fruit , not only in ballistic

14:48.130 --> 14:50.450
missile defense but in training and

14:50.450 --> 14:53.119
readiness developed on the peninsula .

14:53.530 --> 14:55.809
I thank you all for allowing me again

14:55.809 --> 14:57.920
to appear before you . I look forward

14:57.920 --> 15:00.142
to your questions and thank you . Thank

15:00.142 --> 15:03.219
you , General Admiral Paparo . Chairman

15:03.219 --> 15:05.052
Wicker , ranking member Reid and

15:05.052 --> 15:07.330
distinguished members of the committee ,

15:07.330 --> 15:09.552
thanks very much for the opportunity to

15:09.552 --> 15:11.775
appear . With me over my right shoulder

15:11.775 --> 15:13.886
is United States Indo Paycom's senior

15:13.886 --> 15:15.830
enlisted leader Fleet Master Chief

15:15.830 --> 15:18.190
Special Operations Dave Isom . He is ,

15:18.229 --> 15:20.007
this is his last hearing . He's

15:20.007 --> 15:22.007
retiring after 38 years of selfless

15:22.007 --> 15:24.469
service as a SEAL and special operator .

15:25.309 --> 15:27.531
Speaking of asymmetric advantages , the

15:27.531 --> 15:29.420
NCO Corps of the United States of

15:29.420 --> 15:31.510
America is one of the joint forces

15:31.510 --> 15:34.469
absolute asymmetric advantages . Fleet

15:34.469 --> 15:36.950
ISOM's leadership in this critical duty

15:36.950 --> 15:38.783
has been exemplary . It has been

15:38.783 --> 15:41.270
indispensable to my own transition as

15:41.270 --> 15:43.789
the commander of US Indo-PACO . He's

15:43.789 --> 15:46.011
been indispensable to me personally . I

15:46.011 --> 15:48.320
honor his service . Uh , in a region

15:48.320 --> 15:50.376
that's home to over half the Earth's

15:50.376 --> 15:52.542
surface and half the operational joint

15:52.542 --> 15:54.849
force , Indopeycom faces a confluence

15:54.849 --> 15:57.729
of challenges . China's unprecedented

15:57.729 --> 16:00.659
aggression and military modernization

16:00.929 --> 16:03.239
poses a serious threat to the homeland ,

16:03.369 --> 16:06.799
our allies and our partners . In 2024 ,

16:07.090 --> 16:08.701
the People's Liberation Army

16:08.701 --> 16:10.590
demonstrated growing capabilities

16:10.590 --> 16:12.757
through persistent pressure operations

16:12.757 --> 16:14.868
with military pressure against Taiwan

16:14.868 --> 16:18.099
increasing by 300% . China's

16:18.099 --> 16:20.369
increasingly aggressive actions near

16:20.369 --> 16:23.159
Taiwan are not just exercises they are

16:23.159 --> 16:26.049
rehearsals and while the PLA attempts

16:26.049 --> 16:28.409
to intimidate the people of Taiwan and

16:28.409 --> 16:30.760
demonstrate coercive capabilities ,

16:31.090 --> 16:33.650
these actions are backfiring , drawing

16:33.650 --> 16:35.729
increased global attention and

16:35.729 --> 16:38.409
accelerating Taiwan's own defense

16:38.409 --> 16:41.549
preparations . As General Brunson said ,

16:41.650 --> 16:43.761
North Korea's development of advanced

16:43.761 --> 16:45.928
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles

16:45.928 --> 16:47.983
pose a direct threat to our homeland

16:47.983 --> 16:49.950
and our allies and our executing a

16:49.950 --> 16:52.880
deepening cooperation with Russia .

16:53.179 --> 16:55.290
Russia's growing military cooperation

16:55.290 --> 16:57.123
with China adds another layer of

16:57.123 --> 16:59.068
complexity , creating a compounded

16:59.068 --> 17:00.679
challenge with the deepening

17:00.679 --> 17:02.859
cooperation among China , Russia , and

17:02.859 --> 17:05.109
North Korea , and China and Russia's

17:05.109 --> 17:08.239
Pacific fleet is a growth enterprise .

17:08.900 --> 17:11.819
US Indo Paycom deters these challenges

17:11.819 --> 17:13.930
to regional stability and competition

17:13.930 --> 17:15.986
and crisis while maintaining the the

17:15.986 --> 17:18.500
availability to prevail , but that

17:18.500 --> 17:21.500
margin is eroding as chairman and and

17:21.500 --> 17:24.459
ranking member have discussed in 2024

17:24.459 --> 17:27.810
we've conducted 120 joint exercises ,

17:27.819 --> 17:30.489
among them 20 major joint exercises ,

17:30.500 --> 17:32.611
including not just the US Joint Force

17:32.611 --> 17:34.770
but allies and partners . We continue

17:34.770 --> 17:36.770
to strengthen the relationship with

17:36.770 --> 17:38.881
Japan . South Korea , Australia , the

17:38.881 --> 17:40.826
Philippines , India , Taiwan , the

17:40.826 --> 17:42.640
ASEAN nations , Pacific island

17:42.640 --> 17:44.560
countries , and in fact European

17:44.560 --> 17:46.680
partners are active in the in the

17:46.689 --> 17:49.079
theater as the first priorities , we

17:49.079 --> 17:51.310
must be dominant in space and across

17:51.310 --> 17:53.599
the information environment leveraging

17:53.599 --> 17:56.449
capabilities to counter . There the uh

17:56.449 --> 17:58.689
counter the PRC's command control ,

17:58.699 --> 18:00.143
intelligence surveillance

18:00.143 --> 18:02.680
reconnaissance and targeting complex .

18:02.969 --> 18:05.829
This will enable us to gain a nonlinear

18:05.829 --> 18:07.996
advantage over potential adversaries ,

18:07.996 --> 18:10.969
in fact , to maintain and increase the

18:10.969 --> 18:13.449
nonlinear advantage to maintain

18:13.449 --> 18:15.338
credible deterrence , Indo Paycom

18:15.338 --> 18:17.005
requires additional sustained

18:17.005 --> 18:19.689
investment in long range survivable

18:19.689 --> 18:21.949
fires in integrated air and missile

18:21.949 --> 18:24.709
defense , in force sustainment . Uh ,

18:24.719 --> 18:27.280
with an emphasis on autonomy and AI

18:27.280 --> 18:30.349
driven systems . Uh , China's

18:30.349 --> 18:32.589
outproducing the United States in air

18:32.589 --> 18:34.550
missile , maritime , and space

18:34.550 --> 18:37.390
capability and accelerating these . I

18:37.390 --> 18:39.334
remain confident in our deterrence

18:39.334 --> 18:41.760
posture , but the trajectory must

18:41.760 --> 18:43.949
change . The Pacific deterrent

18:43.949 --> 18:46.790
Initiative should counter the China

18:46.790 --> 18:48.846
threat by investing in key readiness

18:48.846 --> 18:52.300
and capability which would in fact , uh ,

18:52.430 --> 18:56.150
if funded . Uh , advance the

18:56.150 --> 18:58.369
intent of this initiative and deliver

18:58.369 --> 19:01.349
major posture improvement . Deterrence

19:01.349 --> 19:04.069
remains our highest duty . However ,

19:04.119 --> 19:06.063
that must be backed up by the real

19:06.063 --> 19:09.040
capability to prevail in combat . The

19:09.040 --> 19:10.869
joint force remains confident ,

19:10.959 --> 19:13.439
resolute and determined to prevail .

19:14.469 --> 19:16.525
Thank you for your attention . Thank

19:16.525 --> 19:18.747
you . I look forward to the questions .

19:18.747 --> 19:20.858
Thank you . Well , thank you both for

19:20.858 --> 19:20.150
your testimony and for your service .

19:20.290 --> 19:23.510
Let us , let's start with uh General

19:23.510 --> 19:26.670
Brunson , um . Just

19:27.979 --> 19:31.339
Quickly , yes or no . Korea , North

19:31.339 --> 19:33.459
Korea continues to expand its nuclear

19:33.459 --> 19:36.660
weapons arsenal , correct ? And they

19:36.660 --> 19:39.859
continue to um expand their delivery

19:39.859 --> 19:41.939
systems of nuclear weapons . Is that

19:41.939 --> 19:45.150
correct ? Yes sir . OK , you know , you

19:45.150 --> 19:47.670
never know , uh , what , uh , whether

19:47.670 --> 19:49.448
to believe what you read in the

19:49.448 --> 19:51.559
newspapers and see on the media , but

19:51.559 --> 19:53.670
there are reports that some mid-level

19:53.670 --> 19:55.337
officials in the Pentagon are

19:55.337 --> 19:57.226
considering reducing our military

19:57.226 --> 20:00.670
presence on the Korean Peninsula to

20:00.670 --> 20:02.726
focus instead on the China threat in

20:02.726 --> 20:05.069
defense of the US homeland . uh , if

20:05.069 --> 20:08.829
our strategy in Korea is to .

20:09.920 --> 20:13.390
Deter war and win it if we have to ,

20:13.819 --> 20:16.770
uh , would that be a good or bad idea ?

20:19.020 --> 20:21.420
Senator , to , uh , chairman to to

20:21.420 --> 20:23.476
reduce the force becomes problematic

20:23.476 --> 20:25.642
and I won't speak to policy , but what

20:25.642 --> 20:27.587
we do provide there , sir , is the

20:27.587 --> 20:29.819
potential to impose cost in the East

20:29.819 --> 20:32.339
Sea to Russia , the potential to impose

20:32.339 --> 20:35.569
costs in the West Sea to China and to

20:35.579 --> 20:37.969
continue to deter against North Korea

20:37.969 --> 20:40.489
as it currently stands . I'm trying to

20:40.489 --> 20:42.729
focus right now on the capabilities

20:42.729 --> 20:44.890
necessary to do all those things that

20:44.890 --> 20:47.890
we might participate routinely in the

20:47.890 --> 20:49.890
campaign that my boss is fighting ,

20:49.890 --> 20:52.449
which is to prepare , deter , and then

20:52.449 --> 20:54.760
prevail in conflict should it come ,

20:54.969 --> 20:56.747
but the forces in Korea play an

20:56.747 --> 20:58.969
important role and over 75 years

20:58.969 --> 21:01.430
they've done the same . Uh , Admiral ,

21:01.650 --> 21:04.880
uh , a significant reduction of , um ,

21:05.209 --> 21:07.376
of , uh , our military presence on the

21:07.376 --> 21:09.209
Korean Peninsula , good or bad ?

21:09.660 --> 21:11.827
inherently it would reduce our ability

21:11.827 --> 21:13.979
to prevail in conflict and and uh for

21:13.979 --> 21:16.140
both of you , would a conflict on the

21:16.140 --> 21:19.780
Korean Peninsula likely involve

21:19.780 --> 21:23.239
China ? Um , my belief is that , uh ,

21:23.250 --> 21:25.361
it would , there would be a risk that

21:25.361 --> 21:27.472
it would involve China and would have

21:27.472 --> 21:29.890
to be conducted carefully , uh , if it

21:29.890 --> 21:32.319
were so , and , uh , and so that risk

21:32.319 --> 21:34.329
has got to drive our calculus and

21:34.329 --> 21:37.650
Brunson . So our preparedness would

21:37.650 --> 21:39.761
prevent them from entering and in any

21:39.761 --> 21:41.817
conflict because of the potential to

21:41.817 --> 21:43.928
take them off their own party goals .

21:44.369 --> 21:46.510
OK , who wants to take the question

21:46.510 --> 21:50.329
about the um air superiority of

21:50.329 --> 21:53.609
um of the PRC over hours in that

21:53.609 --> 21:56.510
theater ? Chairman , uh , the People's

21:56.510 --> 21:58.790
Republic of China , uh , have an order

21:58.790 --> 22:02.630
of battle of 2100 fighters . Uh , an

22:02.630 --> 22:05.979
order battle of over 200 H6 bombers ,

22:06.589 --> 22:09.270
and they are producing , uh , fighters

22:09.270 --> 22:13.109
at a rate of 1.2 to 1 over the United

22:13.109 --> 22:15.229
States . Furthermore , uh , their

22:15.229 --> 22:17.173
advanced air to air missile , long

22:17.173 --> 22:19.819
range air to air missiles also present

22:19.819 --> 22:23.030
a tremendous threat . Uh , if you don't

22:23.030 --> 22:25.349
hold the high ground along the first

22:25.349 --> 22:28.609
island chain . You are vastly limited

22:28.609 --> 22:30.619
in your ability to operate . Uh , I

22:30.619 --> 22:32.841
think everybody knows the importance of

22:32.841 --> 22:34.619
the high ground , so ceding air

22:34.619 --> 22:37.630
superiority , um , is a is a , uh , is

22:37.630 --> 22:40.420
not an option if we intend to maintain

22:40.420 --> 22:43.339
uh capability against our adversaries

22:43.339 --> 22:45.561
and the ability to support our allies .

22:45.561 --> 22:49.500
Admiral , is it a fact that China is

22:49.500 --> 22:51.660
now capable of denying US air

22:51.660 --> 22:54.140
superiority in the first island chain ?

22:55.229 --> 22:57.930
Uh I , you know , I give them high

22:57.930 --> 23:00.949
marks and their ability to do that . Uh ,

23:01.099 --> 23:03.859
I have some game too . And air

23:03.859 --> 23:06.026
superiority , you know , air supremacy

23:06.026 --> 23:08.081
is the complete mastery of the air .

23:08.081 --> 23:10.300
Neither side will enjoy that , but

23:10.300 --> 23:12.619
it'll be my job to contest air

23:12.619 --> 23:16.060
superiority to protect those forces

23:16.060 --> 23:18.116
that are on the first island chain ,

23:18.116 --> 23:21.180
such as , uh , 3 , 33rd Marine

23:21.180 --> 23:23.380
Expeditionary Force , and also to

23:23.380 --> 23:25.579
provide windows of air superiority in

23:25.579 --> 23:27.619
order to achieve our effects . Um ,

23:27.750 --> 23:31.050
Admiral , um , Kim Jong Un is

23:31.619 --> 23:34.859
not . Um , motivated

23:34.859 --> 23:38.630
uh by , um , charity in

23:38.630 --> 23:40.989
helping Russia and Ukraine , what does

23:40.989 --> 23:43.229
he expect back ? What's he likely to

23:43.229 --> 23:45.340
get back ? Chairman , he , he expects

23:45.390 --> 23:47.612
concessions . He's doing it in order to

23:47.612 --> 23:49.223
gain concessions , and those

23:49.223 --> 23:50.780
concessions would be , uh ,

23:50.949 --> 23:53.060
modernization of their air defenses ,

23:53.109 --> 23:55.229
uh , specifically the MiG 29 , the SU

23:55.229 --> 23:57.689
27 . Uh , advanced help for their

23:57.689 --> 24:00.109
surface to air missiles , quieting

24:00.109 --> 24:02.280
technology for their submarines , uh ,

24:02.729 --> 24:04.951
additional help in order to instantiate

24:04.951 --> 24:07.560
a ballistic missile , uh , submarine ,

24:07.719 --> 24:10.410
uh , as well , and then , um , likely ,

24:10.530 --> 24:13.489
uh , propulsion . Help and potentially

24:13.489 --> 24:16.130
even help with the reentry vehicles for

24:16.130 --> 24:19.280
their burgeoning nuclear program . OK ,

24:19.489 --> 24:21.656
thank you . We'll take another round .

24:21.656 --> 24:23.545
Let me just make sure that people

24:23.545 --> 24:25.600
understand General Brunson . You are

24:25.600 --> 24:27.878
USA commander , United Nations Command ,

24:27.878 --> 24:29.933
combined Forces Command , and United

24:29.933 --> 24:32.100
States Forces Korea . You , you do not

24:32.100 --> 24:35.040
answer at all to the United Nations

24:35.250 --> 24:38.010
headquartered in New York City , do you ?

24:38.709 --> 24:40.931
No , sir . Those authorities go through

24:40.931 --> 24:42.765
the chairman to the Secretary of

24:42.765 --> 24:44.931
Defense and then on to the president .

24:44.931 --> 24:46.598
OK , totally different , um ,

24:46.598 --> 24:48.876
organization . Thank you very much and ,

24:48.876 --> 24:51.153
um , the distinguished ranking members .

24:51.153 --> 24:53.265
Thank you very much , Mr . Chairman .

24:53.265 --> 24:55.320
First , let me begin by thanking the

24:55.320 --> 24:57.487
command Master Chief for his dedicated

24:57.487 --> 24:57.339
service to the nation . Thank you ,

24:57.349 --> 24:59.510
Chief . And , uh , let me associate

24:59.510 --> 25:01.621
myself with Honorable power's comment

25:01.621 --> 25:03.788
that our asymmetric advantage , one of

25:03.788 --> 25:05.621
the keys is our non-commissioned

25:05.621 --> 25:08.150
officers , uh , General Brunson , uh .

25:09.209 --> 25:11.609
You , uh , have indicated the

25:11.609 --> 25:13.839
importance of our forces on the Korean

25:13.839 --> 25:16.130
Peninsula . Can you also elaborate on

25:16.130 --> 25:18.186
the support and the magnitude of the

25:18.186 --> 25:20.369
burden sharing that the South Koreans

25:20.369 --> 25:21.425
contribute to us ?

25:24.589 --> 25:27.170
Yes , Senator Reed , um , so , so first

25:27.170 --> 25:29.189
I would like to say that forward

25:29.819 --> 25:33.170
presence provides unmatched access , uh ,

25:33.219 --> 25:36.300
unmatched deterrence at minimal cost

25:36.300 --> 25:38.467
comparatively speaking by other forces

25:38.467 --> 25:40.633
that are , uh , stationed forward . We

25:40.633 --> 25:42.411
recently received help from the

25:42.411 --> 25:44.411
Department of Defense with our tour

25:44.411 --> 25:46.411
normalization which brings tours in

25:46.411 --> 25:49.300
Korea on par with other Oona locations

25:49.300 --> 25:51.260
which changes our exposure to the

25:51.260 --> 25:53.260
region and our understanding of the

25:53.260 --> 25:56.180
adversaries therein . I would also say

25:56.479 --> 26:00.359
that uh 2100 US companies

26:00.359 --> 26:02.469
have ties to the Republic of Korea .

26:02.719 --> 26:06.599
That's 450,000 jobs that are a part of

26:06.599 --> 26:08.560
that . That's a piece that I think

26:08.560 --> 26:10.838
that's critical to know and understand .

26:10.838 --> 26:12.893
And I would also say that we receive

26:12.893 --> 26:15.479
about half a billion dollars a year in

26:15.479 --> 26:18.270
Korean related construction that builds

26:18.599 --> 26:20.750
the brand new school on , uh , on

26:20.750 --> 26:23.089
Pyeongtae at Camp Humphreys that builds

26:23.089 --> 26:24.922
additional towers . To house our

26:24.922 --> 26:27.079
families in quality housing that also

26:27.079 --> 26:29.839
builds skiffs for us right now in the

26:29.839 --> 26:32.061
Republic of Korea that we might be able

26:32.061 --> 26:34.172
to do the important work to stay tied

26:34.172 --> 26:36.283
to Indo Paycom . I would also like to

26:36.283 --> 26:38.839
say that in kind , the overall

26:38.839 --> 26:41.119
contribution in the past , uh , fiscal

26:41.119 --> 26:45.079
year was about 1.4 trillion won , which

26:45.079 --> 26:47.023
works out to be close to a billion

26:47.023 --> 26:48.857
dollars worth of support that we

26:48.857 --> 26:50.912
receive in kind and also . Mentioned

26:50.912 --> 26:52.800
the continued and growing uh

26:52.800 --> 26:54.578
maintenance repair and overhaul

26:54.578 --> 26:56.920
facilities that exist on the East Sea

26:56.920 --> 26:59.142
and the West Sea uh that we've utilized

26:59.142 --> 27:01.309
most recently to bring the Wally Shara

27:01.309 --> 27:03.920
back out of out of uh that overhaul and

27:03.920 --> 27:05.920
looking better than ever that Cesar

27:05.920 --> 27:08.560
Chavez also visited recently , um , but

27:08.560 --> 27:10.671
there is a lot that we get some of it

27:10.671 --> 27:13.680
is is fiscal and monetary , others of

27:13.680 --> 27:16.000
it is material that's irreplaceable .

27:16.819 --> 27:18.979
Uh , General Bruns , again , uh , in

27:18.979 --> 27:21.699
previous National Defense Off acts , we

27:21.699 --> 27:23.939
have established a manpower floor of

27:23.939 --> 27:27.140
28,500 troops , uh ,

27:28.469 --> 27:30.630
As a demonstration of our unwavering

27:30.630 --> 27:32.797
commitment to the US Republic of Korea

27:32.797 --> 27:35.030
alliance and also the strategic reasons

27:35.030 --> 27:37.869
you said , would you uh suggest we

27:37.869 --> 27:41.430
include such language again ? Yes sir ,

27:41.560 --> 27:43.800
thank you . uh , Admiral Paro , can you

27:43.800 --> 27:45.967
give us your perception as the overall

27:45.967 --> 27:49.119
commander of the uh value of the South

27:49.119 --> 27:51.520
Korean forces , uh , to us and the

27:51.520 --> 27:53.742
presence of our troops on the peninsula

27:53.742 --> 27:55.964
together with the contributions they're

27:55.964 --> 27:58.298
making the South Koreans ranking member ,

27:58.298 --> 28:00.520
uh , in addition to the , uh , elements

28:00.520 --> 28:03.040
laid out by uh General Brunson . Um ,

28:03.319 --> 28:06.439
Korea makes significant contributions

28:06.439 --> 28:09.089
outside the , uh , the Korean , uh ,

28:09.119 --> 28:11.949
peninsula , and that is , uh , in their ,

28:12.119 --> 28:14.479
uh , in their participation in

28:14.479 --> 28:17.479
multilateral exercises , uh , including

28:17.479 --> 28:19.701
Pacific Partnership among many others ,

28:19.880 --> 28:22.119
and so , uh , in the ability of that

28:22.119 --> 28:25.099
force to deter conflict . The ability

28:25.099 --> 28:27.459
of that force to avoid from having two

28:27.459 --> 28:30.420
conflicts at once by dint of the

28:30.420 --> 28:33.180
strength of the of the capability and

28:33.180 --> 28:35.402
by what they're doing in the trilateral

28:35.402 --> 28:37.619
relationship with Japan , uh , that

28:37.619 --> 28:39.675
growing trilateral relationship with

28:39.675 --> 28:42.420
Japan and on their path to become a

28:42.420 --> 28:45.339
global pivotal state , uh , they are a

28:45.339 --> 28:47.430
key partner in the , in the , uh ,

28:47.459 --> 28:49.540
Western Pacific with a purview that

28:49.540 --> 28:51.318
goes far beyond just the Korean

28:51.318 --> 28:53.540
Peninsula . Thank you very much , sir .

28:53.540 --> 28:55.310
uh . I mentioned in my opening

28:55.310 --> 28:57.270
statement that currently you have

28:57.270 --> 28:59.670
forces that have been transferred into

28:59.670 --> 29:01.949
uh CENTCOM , uh , the conference and

29:01.949 --> 29:04.910
carrier group . Open sources suggests

29:04.910 --> 29:08.219
6B-2 bombers are Diego Garcia with

29:08.219 --> 29:10.430
supplementary tankers . Uh , what

29:10.430 --> 29:12.541
effect does these , uh , have on your

29:12.541 --> 29:16.459
capabilities ? Presently , uh , for ,

29:16.550 --> 29:18.660
for Carl Vinson , um , we do have

29:18.660 --> 29:20.827
George Washington coming out of , uh ,

29:20.827 --> 29:22.938
Yukoski very shortly and Nimitz is at

29:22.938 --> 29:26.209
sea , and , um , but , um , you know .

29:27.650 --> 29:29.650
We have to maintain a high state of

29:29.650 --> 29:32.199
indications and warning , uh , so that

29:32.199 --> 29:34.359
we can get those forces back if there

29:34.359 --> 29:37.000
is a crisis with greater exigence than

29:37.000 --> 29:39.599
there is one in the SENCOMAOR , and I

29:39.599 --> 29:41.599
owe the secretary and the president

29:41.680 --> 29:44.520
constant vigilance on this and a

29:44.520 --> 29:46.569
constant awareness of that force's

29:46.569 --> 29:49.439
ability to fled , which is assigned to

29:49.439 --> 29:51.880
US NOACO , it's Carl Vinson strike

29:51.880 --> 29:54.709
group and a Patriot battalion . Uh , if

29:54.709 --> 29:57.109
need be they return to the Indo-Pecom

29:57.109 --> 29:59.276
theater for a higher priority threat .

29:59.319 --> 30:01.541
Thank you very much , gentlemen . Thank

30:01.541 --> 30:03.430
you , Mr . Chairman . Thank you ,

30:03.430 --> 30:05.208
Senator Reid . Senator Cotton ,

30:05.208 --> 30:07.541
gentlemen , welcome back , um , Admiral ,

30:07.541 --> 30:09.319
let's take a step back to first

30:09.319 --> 30:11.375
principles . We've talked a lot here

30:11.375 --> 30:13.430
about the threat that China poses to

30:13.430 --> 30:15.597
Taiwan and what you're doing to try to

30:15.597 --> 30:17.949
address that threat . Um , I'd like you

30:17.949 --> 30:20.489
to explain why . That threat is so

30:20.489 --> 30:22.920
severe , you know , some people might

30:22.920 --> 30:25.142
look at the map and say , well , Taiwan

30:25.142 --> 30:27.253
is a small island and it's really far

30:27.253 --> 30:29.476
from us and it's really close to them .

30:29.476 --> 30:32.349
And China has marched into Tibet in the

30:32.349 --> 30:35.270
past and they've marched into Hong Kong

30:35.459 --> 30:37.570
in the past and that was bad and they

30:37.570 --> 30:39.792
shouldn't have done those things but it

30:39.792 --> 30:41.959
didn't lead to World War and it didn't

30:41.959 --> 30:44.380
lead to Great Depression um on the

30:44.380 --> 30:46.569
other side you've got one of your

30:47.219 --> 30:49.170
ancestors so to speak , Douglas

30:49.170 --> 30:51.479
MacArthur . Who said at the dawn of the

30:51.479 --> 30:53.680
Korean War that the domination of

30:53.680 --> 30:55.847
Taiwan by an unfriendly power would be

30:55.847 --> 30:58.280
a disaster of utmost importance to the

30:58.280 --> 31:00.447
United States . He was speaking then ,

31:00.447 --> 31:03.119
as we do today of communist China . um ,

31:03.170 --> 31:05.119
Ian Easton , a Naval War College

31:05.119 --> 31:07.119
professor and one of the military's

31:07.119 --> 31:09.230
leading experts on Taiwan , says that

31:09.230 --> 31:11.452
it's possible that the Chinese invasion

31:11.452 --> 31:13.508
of Taiwan would cause a 21st century

31:13.508 --> 31:15.630
version of the Great Depression , and

31:15.630 --> 31:17.741
the famed investor Ken Griffin put it

31:17.741 --> 31:19.908
more bluntly , it's an immediate Great

31:19.908 --> 31:21.908
Depression . So , so why is it that

31:21.908 --> 31:23.852
Taiwan is different ? Why , why is

31:23.852 --> 31:25.852
Taiwan such a hot flash point ? Why

31:25.852 --> 31:27.408
could it lead not only to a

31:27.408 --> 31:29.574
catastrophic war but also global Great

31:29.574 --> 31:31.741
Depression ? Why should Americans care

31:31.741 --> 31:33.797
about an island on the other side of

31:33.797 --> 31:35.852
the world ? Senator Cotton , at that

31:35.852 --> 31:38.074
last point is quite salient . Uh , many

31:38.074 --> 31:40.241
a research organization postulate that

31:40.241 --> 31:42.408
conflict in the Western Pacific , uh ,

31:42.408 --> 31:44.540
over the Taiwan question would result

31:44.540 --> 31:48.459
in a 25% GDP contraction . In Asia

31:48.689 --> 31:52.150
and a knock-on effect of 10 to 12% GDP

31:52.150 --> 31:54.390
reduction in the United States of

31:54.390 --> 31:58.150
America with uh unemployment spiking 7

31:58.150 --> 32:01.030
to 10 points above base and likely

32:01.030 --> 32:04.670
500,000 excess deaths of despair above

32:04.670 --> 32:07.680
base as well . And uh this is just the

32:07.680 --> 32:10.290
importance of the regional stability to

32:10.290 --> 32:12.760
the world economy and its effect on

32:12.760 --> 32:15.650
people's lives and this is uh this is

32:15.650 --> 32:17.594
viewed as a function of freedom of

32:17.594 --> 32:20.410
navigation it's a function of the uh

32:20.410 --> 32:23.560
world dependency on semiconductors , uh ,

32:23.650 --> 32:25.619
in the longer term . Uh , for the

32:25.619 --> 32:27.841
United States , our strategic center of

32:27.841 --> 32:29.939
gravity is our is our network of

32:29.939 --> 32:32.260
alliances and partners . The sum total

32:32.260 --> 32:36.209
of 350 million people's talent , 130

32:36.209 --> 32:39.459
million Japanese , 130 million

32:39.459 --> 32:42.699
Philippines , 25 million Australians ,

32:42.890 --> 32:45.300
uh , not to mention 500 million in

32:45.300 --> 32:48.260
Europe as well as partners in across

32:48.260 --> 32:50.920
the globe . Uh , the knock-on effect of

32:50.920 --> 32:53.400
the brittleness of that network of

32:53.400 --> 32:55.520
alliances and partners partnerships

32:55.520 --> 32:58.520
means that some of the states could

32:58.520 --> 33:02.040
confer and be and submit to the PRC's

33:02.040 --> 33:04.959
mode of exploitation and route to their

33:04.959 --> 33:07.959
long range goal of setting the setting

33:07.959 --> 33:11.680
the rules of the world and reaping the

33:11.680 --> 33:14.280
benefits of that . Uh , and then

33:14.280 --> 33:17.560
finally some nations in the area of

33:17.560 --> 33:20.459
responsibility will submit , but others

33:20.459 --> 33:22.570
it would never happen just because of

33:22.570 --> 33:25.959
the historic tensions and in that case

33:25.959 --> 33:28.160
the proliferation question comes to

33:28.160 --> 33:30.839
mind with nuclear armed states that are

33:30.839 --> 33:32.895
treaty allies with the United States

33:33.079 --> 33:36.079
and minimal warning for launch among

33:36.079 --> 33:38.969
those nuclear states . Uh , it is a

33:38.969 --> 33:41.136
vital interest for the United States .

33:41.136 --> 33:43.489
My job is to have a force ready to make

33:43.489 --> 33:45.711
those choices , you know , I don't make

33:45.711 --> 33:47.656
the choices on whether or not it's

33:47.656 --> 33:49.822
important or not . I'm explicating how

33:49.822 --> 33:51.989
it is , and my job is to present those

33:51.989 --> 33:54.211
options to the commander in chief to be

33:54.211 --> 33:56.378
ready to fight and win . And and to be

33:56.378 --> 33:58.378
clear , a lot , if not all of those

33:58.378 --> 34:00.939
consequences would follow . Whatever

34:00.939 --> 34:03.689
the outcome of a conflict over Taiwan ,

34:03.859 --> 34:06.081
whether China succeeds in going for the

34:06.081 --> 34:08.379
jugular or fails or there's some kind

34:08.379 --> 34:11.379
of indecisive outcome , simply having

34:11.379 --> 34:13.379
the conflict over Taiwan , which is

34:13.379 --> 34:15.546
such a center of gravity in the modern

34:15.546 --> 34:17.546
economy , could lead to many of the

34:17.546 --> 34:19.601
consequences you just outlined . Yes

34:19.601 --> 34:21.601
sir , um , yeah , I can't quote the

34:21.601 --> 34:24.149
source . I will later , but , um , uh ,

34:24.219 --> 34:25.997
most of the things I've studied

34:25.997 --> 34:28.080
indicate that , uh , uh , American

34:28.080 --> 34:31.649
intervention would have that impact .

34:32.300 --> 34:34.244
A successful American intervention

34:34.244 --> 34:36.356
would potentially , uh , do so . So ,

34:36.356 --> 34:39.689
um , uh , still a grave result , but ,

34:39.810 --> 34:42.820
um , half as grave with this with

34:42.820 --> 34:45.169
savings of , uh , a lot of human misery ,

34:46.080 --> 34:50.050
um . So the key then is . To prevent

34:50.050 --> 34:52.050
the war from happening in the first

34:52.050 --> 34:53.883
place , we don't want to be in a

34:53.883 --> 34:55.939
situation where we have to win a war

34:55.939 --> 34:57.939
over Taiwan we want to stop it from

34:57.939 --> 34:59.939
happening and the way to do that is

34:59.939 --> 35:02.330
through strong military and resolute

35:02.330 --> 35:05.370
confident leadership . What do you need

35:05.370 --> 35:09.330
most ? That you don't have right now to

35:09.330 --> 35:11.441
deter that conflict from happening in

35:11.441 --> 35:14.350
the first place . Senator , um ,

35:14.909 --> 35:18.070
counter C5 ISR capabilities in cyber

35:18.070 --> 35:21.070
space counter space to ensure that the

35:21.070 --> 35:23.126
United States can see , understand ,

35:23.126 --> 35:25.590
decide , act , assess , learn faster

35:25.590 --> 35:28.989
than the PRC is can , uh , to enhance

35:28.989 --> 35:32.070
our ability to blind , to deceive and

35:32.070 --> 35:34.750
to destroy the adversaries' ability to

35:34.750 --> 35:37.959
see and sense and then in addition . Uh ,

35:37.969 --> 35:40.025
the requirement to affect those long

35:40.025 --> 35:42.620
range fires and effects , uh , that

35:42.620 --> 35:44.509
make the joint force effective in

35:44.509 --> 35:46.540
attacking centers of gravity , the

35:46.540 --> 35:48.540
platforms that they ride on , the

35:48.540 --> 35:50.969
sustainment that sustains them ,

35:51.100 --> 35:53.580
absolutely key and critical foundation ,

35:53.739 --> 35:55.795
and then the critical infrastructure

35:55.795 --> 35:57.795
across the theater that enables the

35:57.795 --> 35:59.628
force to reach the principles of

35:59.628 --> 36:01.850
expanded maneuver and puts geography on

36:01.850 --> 36:03.906
our side , which it is . Thank you .

36:06.929 --> 36:08.985
Thank you , Senator Cotton . Senator

36:08.985 --> 36:11.429
Hirono , you are recognized . Thank you .

36:12.659 --> 36:15.100
Welcome I Paparo , it's always good to .

37:26.560 --> 37:29.350
Very large funding gap is not addressed .

37:30.060 --> 37:33.479
In this year's NDAA . Uh , the joint

37:33.479 --> 37:35.639
force , the , the trajectory that I'm

37:35.639 --> 37:38.679
discussing , uh , continues . The joint

37:38.679 --> 37:41.959
force has an eroded capability to

37:41.959 --> 37:44.469
prevail . It manifests itself in lost

37:44.469 --> 37:47.629
people . In lost capability in lost

37:47.629 --> 37:50.080
money and lost time , and it confers to

37:50.080 --> 37:52.840
the confidence of the PRC and

37:52.840 --> 37:56.280
inherently erodes deterrence as they

37:56.280 --> 37:58.760
see more and more uh they see the

37:58.760 --> 38:00.816
potential of their prevailing in the

38:00.816 --> 38:03.038
conflict themselves and achieving their

38:03.038 --> 38:06.320
goals by aggression . Emma Papa , by

38:06.320 --> 38:08.653
the way , uh , thank you for explaining ,

38:08.653 --> 38:10.876
um , uh , to this committee the , the ,

38:10.876 --> 38:13.560
uh , importance of , of the Taiwan

38:13.560 --> 38:16.040
situation because often I get asked why

38:16.040 --> 38:18.270
should we our country care . About

38:18.280 --> 38:20.391
Taiwan , so thank you for that , uh ,

38:20.399 --> 38:22.343
regarding the , the dismantling of

38:22.343 --> 38:24.639
USAID and the impacts , um , on us

38:24.639 --> 38:27.280
whenever the uh United States creates a

38:27.280 --> 38:30.590
void such as by ending foreign aid , uh ,

38:30.600 --> 38:32.879
such as , uh , through USAID , it has

38:32.879 --> 38:35.399
an impact on our asymmetric advantage

38:35.399 --> 38:39.000
which also include our uh partners and

38:39.000 --> 38:41.360
alliances . How does ending foreign

38:41.360 --> 38:43.527
assistance programs and other regional

38:43.527 --> 38:46.520
aid efforts impact Indo Paycom security

38:46.520 --> 38:49.330
cooperation . Missions and the

38:49.330 --> 38:51.552
command's relationship with partners in

38:51.552 --> 38:54.040
the region . Senator , uh , those other ,

38:54.100 --> 38:56.100
those other instruments of national

38:56.100 --> 38:58.100
power , uh , are very important and

38:58.100 --> 39:00.044
they're critical to our ability to

39:00.044 --> 39:02.156
fight and win . My understanding is ,

39:02.156 --> 39:04.639
is that , uh , that , uh , the US aid

39:04.639 --> 39:07.449
is under review and I continue to

39:07.449 --> 39:10.060
advocate for it . Uh , the loss of that ,

39:10.169 --> 39:13.770
the PRC would , would , uh , see the

39:13.770 --> 39:15.992
opportunity and they would seize it and

39:15.992 --> 39:18.580
they frequently do . Uh , wherever they

39:18.580 --> 39:20.750
see a void , they fill it in in order

39:20.750 --> 39:24.080
to , uh , confer more influence , um ,

39:24.350 --> 39:26.709
to , uh , uh , to their own national

39:26.709 --> 39:28.669
power . So indeed if China is our

39:28.669 --> 39:30.979
facing threat , we know , uh , that

39:30.979 --> 39:33.379
every time we create a void in any part

39:33.379 --> 39:35.669
of uh particularly in the in the ecom

39:35.669 --> 39:37.790
area , including by the way , uh

39:37.790 --> 39:39.830
providing assistance to our compact

39:39.830 --> 39:42.750
nation friends that uh China just steps

39:42.750 --> 39:45.310
right in and , uh , fills that void .

39:46.179 --> 39:48.860
General Bronson , you raised an

39:48.860 --> 39:50.899
important point in your opening

39:51.260 --> 39:53.790
statement regarding North Korea hackers

39:53.790 --> 39:57.489
stealing 1.5 billion , probably more

39:57.699 --> 40:01.370
in cryptocurrency to fund their uh

40:01.580 --> 40:03.699
military and at the same time the

40:03.699 --> 40:06.780
Justice Department has disbanded a team

40:06.780 --> 40:09.540
of prosecutors targeting crypto crimes .

40:09.620 --> 40:13.620
Does that concern you ? Uh , good

40:13.620 --> 40:15.787
morning , madam Senator . First , that

40:15.787 --> 40:17.898
that does not bother me at all . What

40:17.898 --> 40:19.564
I'm thinking about is all the

40:19.564 --> 40:21.787
instruments of military power that have

40:21.787 --> 40:23.898
to be brought to bear to stop illicit

40:23.898 --> 40:26.300
activity . That is only one of the

40:26.300 --> 40:28.356
illegal things they're doing . We've

40:28.356 --> 40:30.522
talked a lot about what is North Korea

40:30.522 --> 40:32.744
getting from Russia . One of the things

40:32.744 --> 40:34.633
they're getting is the ability to

40:34.633 --> 40:37.679
circumvent sanctions and that theft is

40:37.679 --> 40:40.020
a piece of that . Ma'am , I'm also

40:40.020 --> 40:42.187
encouraged by the fact that we can see

40:42.187 --> 40:44.409
what's going on . Do you have , uh , do

40:44.409 --> 40:46.631
you have an awareness of the Department

40:46.631 --> 40:48.798
of Justice's , uh , team that targeted

40:48.798 --> 40:50.909
and basically was able to prosecute ,

40:50.909 --> 40:53.131
uh , to the tune of billions of dollars

40:53.131 --> 40:55.260
of crypto crimes ? Are you aware of

40:55.260 --> 40:57.620
that team , highly successful team that

40:57.620 --> 41:01.250
is being disbanded ? Yes , ma'am . I am

41:01.250 --> 41:03.350
aware of that team . However , I

41:03.350 --> 41:05.572
believe that we have the instruments to

41:05.572 --> 41:07.739
continue to proceed to prosecute these

41:07.739 --> 41:11.270
crimes . That's somewhat reassuring ,

41:11.310 --> 41:14.110
but um I think that with all the crimes

41:14.110 --> 41:16.332
that are going on in the crypto space ,

41:16.332 --> 41:17.999
I think that we should not be

41:17.999 --> 41:20.110
disbanding any uh .

41:21.409 --> 41:24.350
Efforts that we have in in that space .

41:24.639 --> 41:26.919
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Thank you

41:26.919 --> 41:29.080
Senator Hirono . Senator Ernst , you

41:29.080 --> 41:31.024
are recognized . Thank you , Madam

41:31.024 --> 41:33.024
Chair and gentlemen , thank you for

41:33.024 --> 41:35.024
being here , Admiral Paparo and and

41:35.024 --> 41:37.191
General Brunson , Chief , good luck to

41:37.191 --> 41:39.302
you in your retirement . Thank you so

41:39.302 --> 41:41.358
much for your service . Um , I'll go

41:41.358 --> 41:43.302
ahead and start with Indo Paycom .

41:43.302 --> 41:45.413
Admiral , thank you so much . As , as

41:45.413 --> 41:47.191
you've clearly laid out for the

41:47.191 --> 41:49.413
committee today , the Indo-Pacific is ,

41:49.413 --> 41:51.524
is growing very , uh , dangerous . It

41:51.524 --> 41:54.409
is . Extremely complex , uh , our

41:54.409 --> 41:56.770
deterrence deterrence depends not just

41:56.770 --> 41:59.530
on our war fighting capability but also

41:59.530 --> 42:02.860
on the ability to sustain our

42:02.860 --> 42:05.169
operations . Um , I started my career

42:05.169 --> 42:07.489
as an engineer , became a transporter ,

42:07.560 --> 42:10.600
and ended my career as a logistician ,

42:10.850 --> 42:13.449
not a big topic here in this committee ,

42:13.540 --> 42:16.649
but it is absolutely necessary that we

42:16.649 --> 42:19.939
talk about it . Um , if we wish to win

42:19.939 --> 42:21.995
the fight , we've got to sustain the

42:21.995 --> 42:24.340
fight . So , uh , Admiral , what gaps

42:24.340 --> 42:27.159
still exist in our theater logistics

42:27.159 --> 42:30.040
network that put our forward posture at

42:30.040 --> 42:32.310
risk ? Morning , Senator . Uh ,

42:32.540 --> 42:34.860
significant gaps in sea lift . Uh ,

42:34.939 --> 42:37.340
first , the combat logistics force in

42:37.340 --> 42:40.379
total is about 60% of the actual

42:40.379 --> 42:42.820
requirement . We account for that by

42:42.820 --> 42:45.379
hiring console tankers and by and by

42:45.379 --> 42:47.435
contracting other capabilities , but

42:47.435 --> 42:49.546
when the unforgiving hour comes , the

42:49.546 --> 42:51.435
only ships that will be . Able to

42:51.435 --> 42:53.889
commit to uh areas to put into harm's

42:53.889 --> 42:56.969
way will be gray ships and as I uttered

42:56.969 --> 42:59.770
these words , 17 of those combat

42:59.770 --> 43:02.250
logistics for ships are laid up for

43:02.250 --> 43:05.080
lack of manpower . Uh , in addition ,

43:05.370 --> 43:07.250
uh , I , I , I discussed in the

43:07.250 --> 43:09.583
previous committee we have to have . Uh ,

43:09.583 --> 43:12.699
many millions of pounds of fuel of , of

43:12.699 --> 43:15.610
jet fuel in the air for every , uh ,

43:15.620 --> 43:19.209
capability and so our tanker fleet is ,

43:19.340 --> 43:22.060
uh , is , uh , below , uh , what we

43:22.060 --> 43:24.060
need . We account for that for some

43:24.060 --> 43:26.060
contract air services as well , but

43:26.060 --> 43:28.227
once again those same factors obtained

43:28.379 --> 43:30.546
for you have to have a , uh , you have

43:30.546 --> 43:32.709
to have a gray tail . And uh and then

43:32.709 --> 43:35.939
finally just cargo lift and the number

43:35.939 --> 43:39.800
of short tons of C-17 lift like

43:39.800 --> 43:42.590
for instance , uh , just having moved a

43:42.590 --> 43:45.649
Patriots uh battalion into the

43:45.649 --> 43:48.820
SENCOMAOR , it took 73

43:49.280 --> 43:52.350
C17 loads to move that Patriot

43:52.350 --> 43:55.179
battalion 73 , what's that

43:55.179 --> 43:59.120
73 , uh , of one

43:59.120 --> 44:02.469
battalion . Of a force element so

44:02.469 --> 44:06.110
our lift requirements uh are are must

44:06.110 --> 44:09.239
be paid attention to . And , um , I

44:09.239 --> 44:11.510
share your passion for sustainment .

44:11.639 --> 44:13.479
That's what won World War II .

44:14.280 --> 44:16.080
Absolutely . So , um , those

44:16.080 --> 44:18.247
logisticians , the , the maintenance ,

44:18.247 --> 44:20.790
uh , dudes and dudes that are out there ,

44:21.080 --> 44:23.080
uh , working every day to make sure

44:23.080 --> 44:25.270
that our , our warriors are able to ,

44:25.280 --> 44:28.229
uh , fight the good fight . Um , so

44:28.760 --> 44:30.760
with that we , you talked about

44:30.760 --> 44:33.320
contractors and we use them extensively .

44:33.739 --> 44:35.500
Uh , but how can Congress help

44:35.500 --> 44:37.699
accelerate the improvements necessary

44:37.699 --> 44:40.659
in Indo Paycom when that that hour

44:40.659 --> 44:43.370
comes ? Well , I think we've got to get

44:43.370 --> 44:47.169
at the problems of why our why we don't

44:47.169 --> 44:49.336
have enough combat logistics force and

44:49.336 --> 44:51.336
that's ship building , why we don't

44:51.336 --> 44:53.558
have enough labor and those are looking

44:53.558 --> 44:55.929
hard at pay and incentives in order to

44:55.929 --> 44:58.729
recruit and retain uh retain those

44:58.729 --> 45:02.129
people um rates of production and , uh ,

45:02.139 --> 45:05.360
diversifying the tanker fleet is key ,

45:05.570 --> 45:08.010
and then , um , and then , uh , you

45:08.010 --> 45:10.800
know , continuing on to find uh

45:10.800 --> 45:13.179
alternative . Alternatives of lift

45:13.179 --> 45:15.820
capability that we can order into

45:15.820 --> 45:18.409
harm's way and then over top of all of

45:18.409 --> 45:20.580
this , uh , we're incorporating

45:20.580 --> 45:22.780
artificial intelligence tools with

45:22.780 --> 45:25.820
command and control to tools so that

45:25.820 --> 45:27.820
it's not an on demand system but so

45:27.820 --> 45:30.500
that uh we are executing that

45:30.500 --> 45:33.010
absolutely indispensable joint function

45:33.260 --> 45:36.379
as effectively as we possibly can you

45:36.379 --> 45:38.212
uh you know we are an AI enabled

45:38.212 --> 45:40.435
headquarters and that's important too ,

45:40.435 --> 45:43.320
but . Um , you can't AI your way out of

45:43.320 --> 45:46.590
a material deficiency . Right , I agree

45:46.590 --> 45:48.757
completely , and we need to spend more

45:48.757 --> 45:50.701
time on this topic , but just very

45:50.701 --> 45:53.034
briefly , General Brunson , I apologize .

45:53.034 --> 45:55.260
I've got 30 seconds . We rely heavily

45:55.260 --> 45:57.500
on allies , neighbors , friends , or

45:57.500 --> 45:59.560
force multipliers , but so do our

45:59.560 --> 46:01.616
adversaries . We've heard that there

46:01.616 --> 46:03.838
are North Koreans now that are fighting

46:03.838 --> 46:07.649
the fight over in . Um , in Ukraine ,

46:07.820 --> 46:09.764
can you tell us what are the North

46:09.764 --> 46:11.876
Koreans learning from this experience

46:11.876 --> 46:13.931
and what will they take back to your

46:13.931 --> 46:16.153
region ? Ma'am , I , I've , I've said ,

46:16.153 --> 46:18.042
uh , several times now in several

46:18.042 --> 46:19.987
hearings that we can't confuse the

46:19.987 --> 46:22.153
tactical lessons that they're learning

46:22.153 --> 46:24.376
with strategic benefit . What we've got

46:24.376 --> 46:26.709
to understand is that they've gone over ,

46:26.709 --> 46:28.931
they've done some things . There's been

46:28.931 --> 46:30.820
strategic movement . There's been

46:30.820 --> 46:30.429
operational maneuver that they're

46:30.429 --> 46:32.969
learning some things , but it's the

46:32.969 --> 46:35.080
technology that's coming back in that

46:35.080 --> 46:37.136
is a threat to the Republic of Korea

46:37.136 --> 46:39.247
and the world . Wonderful . Thank you

46:39.247 --> 46:41.136
gentlemen very much . Thank you ,

46:41.136 --> 46:43.302
Senator Ernst . Senator King , you are

46:43.302 --> 46:45.469
recognized . Thank you , Madam Chair .

46:45.469 --> 46:47.413
Um , General Brunson , without our

46:47.413 --> 46:49.525
presence on the , on the microphone ,

46:49.525 --> 46:51.469
without our presence on the Korean

46:51.469 --> 46:53.959
Peninsula , would , uh , Kim invade the

46:53.959 --> 46:57.929
South ? Sir , I , I

46:57.929 --> 47:00.096
would tell you that I don't believe he

47:00.096 --> 47:02.370
would , um , but what I would tell you

47:02.370 --> 47:04.370
is he would take advantage of other

47:04.370 --> 47:06.530
weapons and systems that he has

47:06.530 --> 47:10.050
conventional to limit the Republic of

47:10.050 --> 47:12.272
Korea's great growth that's taken place

47:12.272 --> 47:14.729
over the past 75 years . I think that

47:14.729 --> 47:16.673
if we look at the hardening that's

47:16.673 --> 47:18.785
occurred on his border at the present

47:18.785 --> 47:20.840
time , the fences have been raised ,

47:20.840 --> 47:22.507
mines have been seated in the

47:22.507 --> 47:24.673
demilitarized zone , uh . I think that

47:24.673 --> 47:26.840
what we see is , why , why is he doing

47:26.840 --> 47:28.840
that ? Is there any threat that the

47:28.840 --> 47:31.062
South Koreans are going to invade North

47:31.062 --> 47:30.840
Korea , sir , I think it's as much

47:30.840 --> 47:33.239
about the things that he's broadcast in

47:33.239 --> 47:35.439
open source that he is a sovereign

47:35.439 --> 47:37.495
nation . He's not looking to work at

47:37.495 --> 47:39.639
reunification . He's blown up all the

47:39.639 --> 47:41.600
means of industry in the DMZ . I

47:41.600 --> 47:43.433
thought you said in your opening

47:43.433 --> 47:45.267
testimony he's not talking about

47:45.267 --> 47:47.544
reunification . He's talking about one .

47:47.544 --> 47:49.711
Whole country is doesn't that imply an

47:49.711 --> 47:51.822
invasion of the South ? No , sir , he

47:51.822 --> 47:53.878
considers himself sovereign north of

47:53.878 --> 47:56.290
the MDL , sir , which he claims is his

47:56.290 --> 47:59.010
southern boundary now . So he's

47:59.010 --> 48:02.080
accepted the boundary , in which case

48:02.080 --> 48:04.689
if you testified he wouldn't invade .

48:05.500 --> 48:06.959
Then why are we there ?

48:09.909 --> 48:12.360
Um , I think it's , uh , Senator , I

48:12.360 --> 48:14.416
don't think it's a matter of whether

48:14.416 --> 48:16.471
he'll invade or not . I think that ,

48:16.471 --> 48:18.638
that , uh , these intentions to cordon

48:18.638 --> 48:20.582
off North Korea could very well be

48:20.582 --> 48:22.889
temporary . And so to say , will he

48:22.889 --> 48:25.056
invade or won't he invade , you know ,

48:25.056 --> 48:27.222
we're talking about probabilities with

48:27.222 --> 48:29.222
the loss of the force on the Korean

48:29.222 --> 48:29.209
Peninsula , there's a higher

48:29.209 --> 48:31.542
probability that he would invade . Well ,

48:31.542 --> 48:33.598
that was my expectation when I asked

48:33.598 --> 48:35.820
that question . I , I would assume that

48:35.820 --> 48:37.542
if we weren't there , it would

48:37.542 --> 48:39.709
encourage him to , to take steps to to

48:39.709 --> 48:42.510
try to cripple the South . I think it's

48:42.510 --> 48:44.677
essential we have a treaty ally . It's

48:44.677 --> 48:46.732
the number 10 economy in the world .

48:46.732 --> 48:49.066
Our economies are very much intertwined .

48:49.066 --> 48:51.520
Uh , KJU's intentions could shift with

48:51.520 --> 48:54.280
the wind , and he's built a military

48:54.280 --> 48:56.391
that is designed to impose tremendous

48:56.391 --> 48:58.679
costs directly on South Korea . It's

48:58.679 --> 49:00.457
very important we maintain that

49:00.457 --> 49:02.679
deterrent . I agree , and to the extent

49:02.679 --> 49:04.512
that the South Korean economy is

49:04.512 --> 49:06.623
somehow affected or diminished , that

49:06.623 --> 49:08.840
would be , that would be against our

49:08.840 --> 49:10.951
interests because of the relationship

49:10.951 --> 49:13.118
that we have . Yes , Senator , and I ,

49:13.118 --> 49:15.340
I misheard you , so please forgive me ,

49:15.340 --> 49:17.562
but as I mentioned previously , 2100 US

49:17.562 --> 49:19.784
countries tied to the Republic of South

49:19.784 --> 49:22.739
Korea , uh , 450,000 jobs as well .

49:23.030 --> 49:25.270
Thank you . Um , this is sort of an

49:25.270 --> 49:27.548
intelligent question , General Brunson ,

49:27.548 --> 49:29.709
but I know you have intelligence . Do

49:29.709 --> 49:31.876
the north , I didn't mean that the way

49:31.876 --> 49:34.042
it sounded . I know you have access to

49:34.042 --> 49:35.987
intelligence assets . How's that ?

49:37.389 --> 49:40.679
Better , yeah . Um . Do the North

49:40.679 --> 49:42.639
Koreans know the extent to which

49:42.639 --> 49:45.840
they're being screwed by the regime and

49:45.840 --> 49:48.062
we've all seen the famous picture of no

49:48.062 --> 49:50.199
lights in North Korea and South Korea

49:50.199 --> 49:52.879
is full of energy and , and , and

49:52.879 --> 49:55.080
prosperity . Do the North Koreans have

49:55.080 --> 49:57.919
any inkling of the , of the , the way

49:57.919 --> 50:00.189
that they're being , uh , their

50:00.189 --> 50:01.967
opportunities in life are being

50:01.967 --> 50:04.629
diminished by this regime ? As Senator ,

50:04.739 --> 50:06.906
I , I would , uh , I would answer that

50:06.906 --> 50:09.017
having fully listened to the question

50:09.017 --> 50:11.128
that I might answer it correctly this

50:11.128 --> 50:13.128
time . I would fully answer that by

50:13.128 --> 50:15.350
looking at the forces that they sent to

50:15.350 --> 50:18.399
Ukraine to that fight absolutely died

50:18.399 --> 50:21.399
in the wool ideologues who are tied to

50:21.399 --> 50:23.669
and believe in that regime that exists

50:23.669 --> 50:25.669
there . I think a great many of the

50:25.669 --> 50:27.830
people are are not wedding to what's

50:27.830 --> 50:29.886
going on there , but the elites , as

50:29.886 --> 50:31.886
long as he maintains control of the

50:31.886 --> 50:33.886
elites , there was a recent article

50:33.886 --> 50:36.052
that talked about the things that he's

50:36.052 --> 50:38.274
doing to circumvent sanctions and other

50:38.274 --> 50:40.219
things to continue to bring , uh ,

50:40.219 --> 50:42.274
luxury goods into his country and as

50:42.274 --> 50:44.330
long as the luxury goods don't go to

50:44.330 --> 50:46.497
the people , no , no , sir , the point

50:46.497 --> 50:48.608
I'm making is , is that as long as he

50:48.608 --> 50:50.830
can sort of provide a palliative to the

50:50.830 --> 50:52.663
elites . The other folks won't .

50:52.663 --> 50:54.274
There's no way that they get

50:54.274 --> 50:56.386
communications in or out . One of the

50:56.386 --> 50:58.441
things that was coming from the NGOs

50:58.441 --> 51:01.580
going to the north was radios . And

51:01.580 --> 51:03.889
those things then begat , you know ,

51:04.100 --> 51:06.379
feces balloons and garbage balloons

51:06.379 --> 51:08.601
back to the south . So I would say that

51:08.601 --> 51:11.219
the rank and file everyday people other

51:11.219 --> 51:12.886
than those within the special

51:12.886 --> 51:14.886
operations units are not witting to

51:14.886 --> 51:16.886
anything outside of their country .

51:16.886 --> 51:18.608
That certainly is , is , is my

51:18.608 --> 51:20.500
impression , Admiral , uh , final

51:20.500 --> 51:23.379
question , if , if we pull back in

51:23.379 --> 51:25.323
terms of our support for Ukraine ,

51:25.323 --> 51:28.899
would that incentivize . Japan , South

51:28.899 --> 51:32.300
Korea to develop their own uh capacity ,

51:32.500 --> 51:34.659
including a nuclear capacity . There

51:35.899 --> 51:38.066
Senator , I'm ignorant of the policy .

51:38.066 --> 51:40.399
I don't know the policy that's going on .

51:40.399 --> 51:42.399
It's another theater , but I'll say

51:42.399 --> 51:44.621
that Russian failed . I'm sorry , did I

51:44.621 --> 51:46.843
say Ukraine ? I , I meant Taiwan . OK ,

51:46.843 --> 51:49.066
if we , if we withdrew our support from

51:49.066 --> 51:51.232
Taiwan , would that , uh , incentivize

51:51.232 --> 51:53.729
Japan and South Korea to develop

51:53.729 --> 51:55.785
independent capacity , including the

51:55.785 --> 51:57.785
possibility of nuclear weapons ? My

51:57.785 --> 52:01.169
assessment is yes . Thank you . Thank

52:01.169 --> 52:03.169
you . Admiral , go ahead and answer

52:03.169 --> 52:05.336
that question with regard to Ukraine .

52:05.679 --> 52:08.179
Um , so without , uh , without , you

52:08.179 --> 52:10.401
know , I , I'm in the Indo-Pacific , so

52:10.401 --> 52:12.512
I don't have , uh , perfect knowledge

52:12.512 --> 52:15.489
of the ongoing , um , but my assessment

52:15.489 --> 52:18.899
and it's it's to a very deep extent

52:19.139 --> 52:21.550
back in the intel record is that

52:21.899 --> 52:24.929
Russian failure and or Russian success

52:25.419 --> 52:27.141
has the effect of deterring or

52:27.141 --> 52:29.800
emboldening emboldening . The People's

52:29.800 --> 52:31.911
Republic of China and they've already

52:31.911 --> 52:33.979
taken notice of the tremendous costs

52:33.979 --> 52:37.070
that Russia has endured . Mr . Chairman ,

52:37.260 --> 52:39.371
thank you , Mr . Chairman , thank you

52:39.371 --> 52:41.316
for that because that's , that's a

52:41.316 --> 52:43.482
question I would have asked if I'd had

52:43.482 --> 52:45.704
another 10 seconds . Thank you . And it

52:45.704 --> 52:47.704
only took us 59 seconds . Thank you

52:47.704 --> 52:49.760
very much , uh , Senator Scott . You

52:49.760 --> 52:49.620
are recognized . Thank you , Chairman .

52:50.620 --> 52:52.787
Thank both of you for uh what you do .

52:52.787 --> 52:54.842
Uh , thank you for the men and women

52:54.842 --> 52:57.689
you uh you uh you serve with . um , so

52:57.689 --> 52:59.856
Admiral Paparo , how much of your time

52:59.856 --> 53:02.050
do you spend , uh , trying to

53:02.050 --> 53:04.919
anticipate or counter actions by , uh ,

53:04.929 --> 53:08.000
communist China ? Senator Scott , um .

53:09.370 --> 53:12.520
Uh , that consumes my , my duties ,

53:12.810 --> 53:15.250
which is a constant stare , uh , the

53:15.250 --> 53:17.689
constant , uh , analysis of

53:17.689 --> 53:19.689
intelligence sources of open source

53:19.689 --> 53:21.467
sources , and then the physical

53:21.467 --> 53:23.522
movement on the ground to be able to

53:23.522 --> 53:25.689
see and understand , to anticipate and

53:25.689 --> 53:27.911
to be able to pace their actions , uh ,

53:27.911 --> 53:31.219
that look to coerce . Uh , uh , Taiwan

53:31.219 --> 53:33.010
and to bring , uh , to , uh ,

53:33.020 --> 53:35.300
demonstrate the , uh , prospect of

53:35.300 --> 53:37.939
settling the matter by force and number

53:37.939 --> 53:40.699
2 , their encroachment on treaty allies

53:40.699 --> 53:42.921
in the Philippines as well encroachment

53:42.921 --> 53:45.143
on partners in the South China Sea with

53:45.143 --> 53:47.419
their , uh , excessive and illogical

53:47.419 --> 53:49.475
claims in their nine-dash line claim

53:49.620 --> 53:51.889
and their uh their continuing ability

53:51.889 --> 53:55.709
to , um , you know , build ships . Yeah ,

53:55.870 --> 53:58.500
airplanes , weapons , all these things ,

53:58.709 --> 54:00.765
does that cause , cause you to spend

54:00.765 --> 54:02.987
more time and money ? Yes , yes , sir ,

54:03.030 --> 54:05.252
absolutely they built combatants at the

54:05.252 --> 54:08.750
rate of 6 to 1.8 to the United States ,

54:09.350 --> 54:12.110
um , and I could go through every force

54:12.110 --> 54:14.443
element , uh , that we're talking about .

54:14.850 --> 54:17.520
You know , before they joined the World

54:17.520 --> 54:19.840
Trade Organization and before we

54:19.840 --> 54:22.000
allowed them to , uh , basically sell

54:22.000 --> 54:24.056
whatever they want to this country ,

54:24.056 --> 54:26.167
did they have a military that you had

54:26.167 --> 54:25.830
to spend a lot of time worrying about ?

54:27.060 --> 54:29.419
Just by dint of the weight of the uh

54:29.419 --> 54:32.100
civilization we worried about it um you

54:32.100 --> 54:34.322
know we've had , we , we , we've had to

54:34.322 --> 54:36.600
worry about this now for uh since uh

54:36.820 --> 54:40.260
you know , 1949 but uh it's

54:40.260 --> 54:43.340
step level change in the last , uh , 20

54:43.340 --> 54:45.507
years they've increased their military

54:45.507 --> 54:48.379
10 to 15 fold , right ? So if they

54:48.379 --> 54:50.379
didn't have the economy they have ,

54:50.379 --> 54:52.546
which is completely created by selling

54:52.546 --> 54:55.060
uh . Goods and services to the um

54:55.060 --> 54:57.171
American citizens they would not have

54:57.171 --> 54:59.227
the resources that you would have to

54:59.227 --> 55:01.227
spend your time and money to try to

55:01.227 --> 55:03.171
counteract . The society has grown

55:03.171 --> 55:05.393
greatly that was a matter of design for

55:05.393 --> 55:07.282
the international community , but

55:07.282 --> 55:09.338
unanticipated was the aggression and

55:09.338 --> 55:11.399
the build up that followed . So your

55:11.399 --> 55:13.621
life would be better if , if American ,

55:13.679 --> 55:15.846
no American bought any Chinese product

55:15.846 --> 55:17.790
to use any service and no American

55:17.790 --> 55:20.000
dollar went to communist China . Uh ,

55:20.050 --> 55:22.217
I'll say that , uh , China's inability

55:22.217 --> 55:24.520
to pump resources into its national

55:24.520 --> 55:26.742
defense enterprise , which is bolstered

55:26.742 --> 55:29.320
by its trade position , uh , is a

55:29.320 --> 55:31.719
direct corollary to the success of

55:31.719 --> 55:34.310
their business model . So would you

55:34.310 --> 55:36.366
recommend the American citizens stop

55:36.366 --> 55:38.439
buying Chinese products and stop uh

55:38.439 --> 55:41.459
using Chinese services ? I'd recommend

55:41.459 --> 55:44.270
that uh we build greater resilience and

55:44.270 --> 55:46.437
that we beat them on market principles

55:46.437 --> 55:48.550
and um and so uh I don't wanna go

55:48.550 --> 55:51.189
beyond my remit as a as a military

55:51.189 --> 55:53.356
officer . All right , let's talk about

55:53.356 --> 55:55.411
naval readiness and specifically the

55:55.411 --> 55:57.633
C-130s . The Marine Corps and Air Force

55:57.633 --> 55:59.800
are 100% recapitalized on the C-130s .

55:59.800 --> 56:02.510
The Navy needs over 30 C-130s and yet

56:02.510 --> 56:04.621
to program for this critical tactical

56:04.621 --> 56:07.270
airlift platform . The the Navy now I

56:07.270 --> 56:09.437
think only has 10 contract . Does that

56:09.437 --> 56:11.548
concern you ? Uh , should we be doing

56:11.548 --> 56:13.714
something about it ? As discussed with

56:13.714 --> 56:16.550
the Senator Ernst , uh , is sustainment

56:16.550 --> 56:18.606
is in fact what won the Second World

56:18.606 --> 56:20.328
War . That's what our would-be

56:20.328 --> 56:22.494
adversaries believe and have studied ,

56:22.494 --> 56:24.439
and everything that confers to our

56:24.439 --> 56:26.494
ability to execute lift and C-130 is

56:26.494 --> 56:28.439
one of a kind with its short field

56:28.439 --> 56:30.606
operations with its capacity . Uh , it

56:30.606 --> 56:32.383
remains absolutely relevant and

56:32.383 --> 56:34.494
indispensable today , and , uh , we ,

56:34.494 --> 56:36.606
we , we can't neglect it . It's a key

56:36.606 --> 56:38.828
priority for Indo Paycom . Do you think

56:38.828 --> 56:40.994
there is a role for dual use uncrude ,

56:40.994 --> 56:43.050
uh , air , airlift capabilities in a

56:43.050 --> 56:45.580
contested logistics environment ? Uh ,

56:45.629 --> 56:48.189
I think , uh , you know , I'm the

56:48.189 --> 56:50.389
precepts of unmanned is never send a

56:50.389 --> 56:52.333
human being to do something that a

56:52.333 --> 56:54.870
machine can do and , uh , and so , uh ,

56:54.989 --> 56:57.211
so , you know , inherently we're moving

56:57.211 --> 56:59.322
in that direction and I'd welcome the

56:59.322 --> 57:02.080
ability to . Uh , execute that lift and

57:02.080 --> 57:04.136
it would also give me the ability to

57:04.340 --> 57:06.419
diversify the places that we do

57:06.419 --> 57:10.169
bringing smaller payloads into , uh ,

57:10.179 --> 57:12.659
simultaneously smaller maneuvering

57:12.659 --> 57:15.020
units and would enhance our ability to

57:15.020 --> 57:17.187
sustain by the speed it would confer .

57:18.489 --> 57:20.545
General Mahoney testified before the

57:20.545 --> 57:22.656
readiness subcommittee that 13 , only

57:22.656 --> 57:24.767
13 of 32 amphibious ships are ready .

57:25.310 --> 57:27.421
How does this state of the amphibious

57:27.421 --> 57:29.477
fleet impact your ability to do your

57:29.477 --> 57:32.560
job ? Uh , the amphibious fleet is , is ,

57:32.570 --> 57:35.570
uh . Is indispensable ,

57:36.260 --> 57:38.093
uh , that , you know , the whole

57:38.093 --> 57:40.149
principle of sustaining and moving a

57:40.149 --> 57:42.340
four ships exist to move people , mass

57:42.340 --> 57:44.507
and energy from one place to the other

57:44.507 --> 57:47.620
place efficiently . And uh our

57:47.620 --> 57:51.060
amphibious forces under-resourced and

57:51.060 --> 57:53.379
not ready enough . All right . Thank

57:53.379 --> 57:56.300
you . Uh , thank you very much ,

57:56.469 --> 57:59.389
Senator Shaheen . Thank you , Mr .

57:59.399 --> 58:01.455
Chairman and thank you both for your

58:01.455 --> 58:03.677
service and for being here today . Um ,

58:04.919 --> 58:07.030
Admiral Paparo , I think I understood

58:07.030 --> 58:09.086
you to say in your opening statement

58:09.086 --> 58:11.030
that we must be active across the

58:11.030 --> 58:14.850
information environment . So ,

58:15.139 --> 58:17.195
one of the things that's happened in

58:17.195 --> 58:19.083
the last month is that we have um

58:21.879 --> 58:25.270
Stopped . We've pulled the plug on

58:25.270 --> 58:27.437
Voice of America and Radio Free Asia .

58:27.969 --> 58:30.025
Um , we had a hearing in the Foreign

58:30.025 --> 58:32.136
Relations Committee earlier this year

58:32.136 --> 58:34.136
where it was pointed out to us that

58:34.136 --> 58:35.969
China is spending over a billion

58:35.969 --> 58:38.191
dollars a year , a billion dollars with

58:38.191 --> 58:41.469
a B on information , um . Systems and

58:41.469 --> 58:43.270
efforts to provide mis and

58:43.270 --> 58:45.870
disinformation across the region and

58:45.870 --> 58:48.780
across the world . So what are we doing

58:48.780 --> 58:51.199
to counter that and how does the loss

58:51.199 --> 58:54.739
of um something like Radio Free Asia

58:54.739 --> 58:57.260
affect our ability to counter what the

58:57.510 --> 59:01.409
PRC is doing ? China and it's um it's

59:01.409 --> 59:04.889
uh political works division and uh it's

59:04.889 --> 59:07.879
united front is incredibly active ,

59:08.280 --> 59:11.250
effective , and untruthful . In the

59:11.250 --> 59:14.209
information space and the delivery of

59:14.209 --> 59:17.770
uh of truthful information uh really

59:17.770 --> 59:20.530
bolstered by free speech having respect

59:20.530 --> 59:22.641
for everybody and everybody's ability

59:22.641 --> 59:25.649
to discern truth from lies is

59:25.649 --> 59:28.449
absolutely vital . Uh , we do have a uh

59:28.449 --> 59:31.610
an effort , uh , that is a companion

59:31.610 --> 59:33.580
that that is , uh , where , uh ,

59:33.610 --> 59:35.777
special operations . Command is nested

59:35.777 --> 59:37.332
within this unit with their

59:37.332 --> 59:39.540
capabilities uh to execute information

59:39.540 --> 59:41.484
operations but it's focused on the

59:41.484 --> 59:44.300
military space as it should be uh given

59:44.300 --> 59:46.356
the fact that we're in the uh in the

59:46.356 --> 59:49.310
military but uh in my opinion we must

59:49.310 --> 59:52.560
work hard uh to counter . Uh ,

59:52.570 --> 59:55.580
PRC misinformation and

59:55.580 --> 59:58.050
disinformation and our own principles

59:58.050 --> 01:00:00.610
of free speech , um , greatly enable us

01:00:00.610 --> 01:00:02.832
to have faith in , in people to be able

01:00:02.832 --> 01:00:06.699
to suss out truth from lies . And can

01:00:06.699 --> 01:00:08.755
you talk about why that matters when

01:00:08.755 --> 01:00:10.977
we're talking about military conflict ?

01:00:11.689 --> 01:00:13.745
Uh , matters because , uh , in order

01:00:13.745 --> 01:00:16.078
for us to , uh , achieve the effects of ,

01:00:16.078 --> 01:00:18.459
of , uh , expanded maneuver , our

01:00:18.459 --> 01:00:20.570
network of alliances and partnerships

01:00:20.570 --> 01:00:22.681
is the strategic center of gravity of

01:00:22.681 --> 01:00:24.830
the United States of America and so

01:00:24.830 --> 01:00:26.774
inherently because governments are

01:00:26.774 --> 01:00:29.020
accountable to the people they serve .

01:00:29.580 --> 01:00:31.739
That public opinion will have a great

01:00:31.739 --> 01:00:33.739
bearing on whether or not uh those

01:00:33.739 --> 01:00:37.540
allies and partners are a party uh to

01:00:37.540 --> 01:00:40.540
you know to enable a coalition because

01:00:40.540 --> 01:00:42.707
the the the the bigger the coalition ,

01:00:42.707 --> 01:00:44.762
the greater legitimacy , the greater

01:00:44.762 --> 01:00:46.984
capability , the greater access spacing

01:00:46.984 --> 01:00:49.449
and overflight . Thank you . Um ,

01:00:49.699 --> 01:00:52.989
clearly we need to do better . General

01:00:52.989 --> 01:00:56.729
Brunson , um . South Korea and Japan

01:00:56.729 --> 01:00:58.896
recently renewed negotiations with the

01:00:58.896 --> 01:01:01.250
PRC toward free trade talks that have

01:01:01.250 --> 01:01:04.409
been stalled since 2012 . Um , I'm

01:01:04.409 --> 01:01:07.810
concerned that the tariffs that have

01:01:07.810 --> 01:01:09.810
been announced and withdrawn , then

01:01:09.810 --> 01:01:12.530
announced and withdrawn , um , are

01:01:12.530 --> 01:01:14.697
pushing our allies toward closer trade

01:01:14.697 --> 01:01:16.697
and integration with countries like

01:01:16.697 --> 01:01:19.399
China and that that poses security risk ,

01:01:19.810 --> 01:01:23.379
um , so . From an integration and

01:01:23.379 --> 01:01:25.435
cooperation perspective , do you see

01:01:25.435 --> 01:01:27.546
any challenges that would be posed by

01:01:27.546 --> 01:01:29.601
renewed economic talks between China

01:01:29.601 --> 01:01:31.435
and our closest allies in Asia ?

01:01:33.560 --> 01:01:35.729
Ma'am , I'll , I'll answer by what I'm

01:01:35.729 --> 01:01:38.250
seeing on the peninsula right now . My

01:01:38.250 --> 01:01:41.250
concerns would be , um , my hackles

01:01:41.250 --> 01:01:43.194
would raise if you will , and I'll

01:01:43.194 --> 01:01:45.306
allow my boss to answer for the wider

01:01:45.306 --> 01:01:47.810
region , but If we were not continuing

01:01:47.810 --> 01:01:49.810
to move along the pathway for the

01:01:49.810 --> 01:01:52.969
bilaterally agreed upon Ocon transfer ,

01:01:53.050 --> 01:01:55.272
if we weren't able to move on that path

01:01:55.272 --> 01:01:57.328
by way of economic challenges facing

01:01:57.328 --> 01:01:59.889
the nation , that would bother me if we

01:01:59.889 --> 01:02:02.969
had impacts that led to lessening human

01:02:02.969 --> 01:02:05.850
and procedural interoperability coupled

01:02:05.850 --> 01:02:08.370
with technological interoperability

01:02:08.370 --> 01:02:10.314
being lost that would concern me .

01:02:11.830 --> 01:02:14.310
And I think Admiral Paparo made a very

01:02:14.310 --> 01:02:16.780
good case on the economic um

01:02:17.070 --> 01:02:19.126
circumstances earlier in response to

01:02:19.126 --> 01:02:21.237
Senator Cotton's question , but I , I

01:02:21.237 --> 01:02:23.709
wanna ask a follow up on this with

01:02:23.709 --> 01:02:26.909
respect to um the political dynamics

01:02:26.909 --> 01:02:29.189
and uh the Republic of Korea which you

01:02:29.189 --> 01:02:31.469
referred to in your opening testimony

01:02:31.469 --> 01:02:34.500
and um . The democratic process is

01:02:34.500 --> 01:02:37.050
playing out , but we expect an election

01:02:37.340 --> 01:02:40.020
and are , there are concerns that

01:02:40.020 --> 01:02:41.853
depending on the outcome of that

01:02:41.853 --> 01:02:43.520
election , it will affect our

01:02:43.520 --> 01:02:46.239
relationship with ROK . Ma'am , the

01:02:46.239 --> 01:02:48.429
realities of the region where Korea

01:02:48.429 --> 01:02:51.949
sits , the adversaries which they can ,

01:02:52.060 --> 01:02:54.870
uh , impose cost upon is going to keep

01:02:54.870 --> 01:02:57.530
us in good stead going forward . Thank

01:02:57.790 --> 01:03:00.989
you . Thank you both . Thank you very

01:03:00.989 --> 01:03:03.560
much , Senator Budd . Thank you ,

01:03:03.600 --> 01:03:05.656
Chairman . And again , thank you all

01:03:05.656 --> 01:03:07.767
both for being here . Good to see you

01:03:07.767 --> 01:03:09.656
again . So last weekend , a fresh

01:03:09.656 --> 01:03:11.711
rotation of fighter units arrived at

01:03:11.711 --> 01:03:14.080
Kadina Air Base , including the 336

01:03:14.080 --> 01:03:16.191
fighter squadron from Seymour Johnson

01:03:16.191 --> 01:03:19.179
Air Force Base . Can you speak to their

01:03:19.280 --> 01:03:22.030
mission while deployed and how they fit

01:03:22.030 --> 01:03:24.100
into the larger strategy , Admiral

01:03:24.510 --> 01:03:27.939
Senator Budd , good morning . Uh , Kade

01:03:27.939 --> 01:03:30.820
Air Cadeen Air Force Base , um , and

01:03:30.820 --> 01:03:33.042
the wing there , um , is a , you know ,

01:03:33.139 --> 01:03:36.209
a critical mobile dynamic capability ,

01:03:36.580 --> 01:03:39.070
uh , that is just not fixed in Kadina

01:03:39.379 --> 01:03:41.560
but has the ability to move throughout

01:03:41.560 --> 01:03:43.679
the the area of responsibility under

01:03:43.679 --> 01:03:45.979
the principles of agile combat

01:03:45.979 --> 01:03:49.820
employment and so , um , this is our on

01:03:49.820 --> 01:03:53.409
point contact layer . Uh , immediate

01:03:53.409 --> 01:03:56.260
ability to impose costs , immediate

01:03:56.260 --> 01:03:59.899
ability to achieve , uh , ephemeral

01:04:00.469 --> 01:04:02.909
air superiority in the AOR , and it's a

01:04:02.909 --> 01:04:05.699
foundation on which , uh , the larger ,

01:04:05.989 --> 01:04:09.229
uh , um , the , the larger forces that

01:04:09.229 --> 01:04:12.300
would flow in in the event of a

01:04:12.300 --> 01:04:15.850
conflict , uh , rests . And the 5th Air

01:04:15.850 --> 01:04:18.128
Force , uh , 5th Air Force , of course ,

01:04:18.128 --> 01:04:20.669
is the headquarters in Yokota , uh ,

01:04:20.679 --> 01:04:23.100
with the wing in , in , uh , Masawa and

01:04:23.100 --> 01:04:25.322
the wing in Kadina . So it's absolutely

01:04:25.322 --> 01:04:28.510
crucial . Thank you for that . Heaven

01:04:28.510 --> 01:04:30.566
forbid , I mean , we hope this never

01:04:30.566 --> 01:04:32.788
happens , but should deterrents fail in

01:04:32.788 --> 01:04:35.010
the region , does the strike Eagle have

01:04:35.010 --> 01:04:37.232
a strike Eagle have a role to play that

01:04:37.232 --> 01:04:39.566
can't be accomplished by other fighters ?

01:04:39.566 --> 01:04:41.566
Yes sir , it does . And I mean with

01:04:41.566 --> 01:04:43.677
F-15 EX coming on board and with what

01:04:43.677 --> 01:04:46.360
that portends , uh , with its dominant

01:04:46.360 --> 01:04:48.419
electronic warfare capability in

01:04:48.419 --> 01:04:50.989
addition . To the already dominant

01:04:50.989 --> 01:04:54.739
elements of range , speed , sensors

01:04:55.050 --> 01:04:57.800
and payload of the mighty eagle ,

01:04:58.050 --> 01:05:01.040
former Eagle pilot myself on exchange ,

01:05:01.409 --> 01:05:03.530
um , but , uh , without being a homer

01:05:03.530 --> 01:05:06.810
for it , uh , indispensable . Thank you

01:05:06.810 --> 01:05:09.143
for that . No switch gears a little bit .

01:05:09.800 --> 01:05:12.050
Can you both elaborate on the demand

01:05:12.050 --> 01:05:14.360
for special operations forces and how

01:05:14.360 --> 01:05:16.304
you're currently resourced to meet

01:05:16.304 --> 01:05:18.527
those demands and general , we'll start

01:05:18.527 --> 01:05:20.879
with you in Korea . Sir , Special

01:05:20.879 --> 01:05:23.120
Operations Command Korea is uh

01:05:23.120 --> 01:05:25.199
augmented within our headquarters by

01:05:25.199 --> 01:05:28.050
some , um , Very particular

01:05:28.050 --> 01:05:30.209
intelligence assets I would , I would

01:05:30.209 --> 01:05:33.060
call them , uh , that help us to best

01:05:33.060 --> 01:05:34.850
see sense and understand on the

01:05:34.850 --> 01:05:37.729
peninsula itself . uh SOC Corps is

01:05:37.729 --> 01:05:40.959
commanded presently by uh a one star

01:05:40.959 --> 01:05:43.739
National Guard officer uh very capable

01:05:43.739 --> 01:05:46.370
formation in terms of ensuring that our .

01:05:46.514 --> 01:05:49.185
Partners around the region , not just

01:05:49.185 --> 01:05:51.745
uh the Koreans but uh all forces that

01:05:51.745 --> 01:05:53.856
come to the peninsula to train , uh ,

01:05:53.856 --> 01:05:55.912
maintain great awareness of not only

01:05:55.912 --> 01:05:57.905
the region but uh the discrete

01:05:57.905 --> 01:06:00.127
activities that might occur should they

01:06:00.127 --> 01:06:02.238
need to happen . Most recently in the

01:06:02.238 --> 01:06:04.294
West Sea , uh , we're able to during

01:06:04.294 --> 01:06:06.405
Freedom Shield conduct an air assault

01:06:06.405 --> 01:06:08.238
uh while being in the daytime it

01:06:08.238 --> 01:06:10.814
allowed us to take the Korean forces

01:06:11.024 --> 01:06:13.024
and bring them to a higher state of

01:06:13.024 --> 01:06:14.746
readiness than they'd achieved

01:06:14.746 --> 01:06:16.580
previously . Thank you , General

01:06:16.580 --> 01:06:18.635
Admiral . You've talked about , uh ,

01:06:18.635 --> 01:06:20.913
previously being underinvested in soft .

01:06:21.659 --> 01:06:23.715
Uh , do you care to expand on that ?

01:06:23.715 --> 01:06:26.090
Yeah , Senator , um , currently we , we

01:06:26.090 --> 01:06:27.840
have a we have a counterterror

01:06:27.840 --> 01:06:29.951
operation that's ongoing in this , in

01:06:29.951 --> 01:06:31.951
the , uh , South Philippine Islands

01:06:31.951 --> 01:06:33.840
Operation Pacific Eagle . Uh , in

01:06:33.840 --> 01:06:36.409
addition , uh , the special operations

01:06:36.409 --> 01:06:39.570
forces are a critical contributor to

01:06:39.570 --> 01:06:41.792
our counter command control information

01:06:41.792 --> 01:06:43.570
surveillance reconnaissance and

01:06:43.570 --> 01:06:46.090
targeting efforts . Uh , in addition ,

01:06:46.320 --> 01:06:49.189
uh , special operations forces , uh ,

01:06:49.199 --> 01:06:51.679
are , uh , actively augment and are a

01:06:51.679 --> 01:06:53.879
part of our intelligence collection ,

01:06:54.159 --> 01:06:56.326
and this is all notwithstanding , uh ,

01:06:56.326 --> 01:06:58.548
the immediate ability to do some of the

01:06:58.548 --> 01:07:00.881
more traditional roles as direct action .

01:07:00.959 --> 01:07:03.070
And so I've been working closely with

01:07:03.070 --> 01:07:05.399
General Fenton on this , uh , to , to

01:07:05.399 --> 01:07:08.949
be able to define , uh , to , to define

01:07:09.070 --> 01:07:11.750
to him exactly how much special

01:07:11.750 --> 01:07:14.850
operations forces . That we have , but

01:07:15.020 --> 01:07:17.379
I , I , I believe that we want and well

01:07:17.379 --> 01:07:20.139
I know what I want and we need more ,

01:07:20.340 --> 01:07:23.449
and I can gain a lot of early leverage

01:07:23.739 --> 01:07:25.906
and a lot of deterrent capability with

01:07:25.906 --> 01:07:28.479
more soft . Thank you , Admiral General ,

01:07:28.770 --> 01:07:31.010
does the increased military cooperation

01:07:31.010 --> 01:07:33.439
between DPRK , Russia , and China

01:07:34.209 --> 01:07:37.290
concern you as it relates to containing

01:07:37.290 --> 01:07:39.346
escalation on the Korean Peninsula ?

01:07:39.346 --> 01:07:41.568
And if so , what does that mean for the

01:07:41.568 --> 01:07:45.260
role of SAF in prevention ? Well , it ,

01:07:45.310 --> 01:07:47.669
it does worry me . It worries me by

01:07:47.669 --> 01:07:49.780
virtue of the fact of the things that

01:07:49.780 --> 01:07:51.836
I'm seeing that soft helps us to see

01:07:51.836 --> 01:07:54.110
whether that be with uh them operating

01:07:54.110 --> 01:07:56.350
their own UAS or whether that's them

01:07:56.350 --> 01:07:59.500
doing operations in the in the region ,

01:07:59.709 --> 01:08:01.598
uh , most recently during Freedom

01:08:01.598 --> 01:08:04.159
Shield we saw Chinese ships violate .

01:08:04.449 --> 01:08:06.820
And come across the northern limit line

01:08:07.030 --> 01:08:09.197
in the West Sea and in the East Sea we

01:08:09.197 --> 01:08:11.229
had violation of the the Korean Air

01:08:11.229 --> 01:08:13.750
defense identification zone by the

01:08:13.750 --> 01:08:16.390
Russians and seeing them work together

01:08:16.390 --> 01:08:18.509
along with the information what was

01:08:18.509 --> 01:08:20.731
going on in the information environment

01:08:20.731 --> 01:08:22.787
so helps me to counter some of those

01:08:22.787 --> 01:08:24.953
things because what happened was North

01:08:24.953 --> 01:08:27.120
Korea said hey they need to stop these

01:08:27.120 --> 01:08:29.176
illegal . Exercises working together

01:08:29.176 --> 01:08:31.349
with the US and Iraq coming together

01:08:31.559 --> 01:08:33.519
and then you had these two other

01:08:33.519 --> 01:08:35.918
adversaries take actions in the region

01:08:35.918 --> 01:08:38.085
which have to be countered and I don't

01:08:38.085 --> 01:08:40.769
mean countered in a uh kinetic fashion

01:08:40.769 --> 01:08:43.229
but there are non-kinetic things that

01:08:43.238 --> 01:08:45.405
that sock core allows us to do that we

01:08:45.405 --> 01:08:47.571
might counter in the information space

01:08:47.571 --> 01:08:49.682
and other domains to continue on with

01:08:49.682 --> 01:08:51.738
our mission . Thank you both . Thank

01:08:51.738 --> 01:08:54.398
you , Senator , Senator Kaine . Thank

01:08:54.398 --> 01:08:56.342
you , Mr . Chair and thanks to our

01:08:56.342 --> 01:08:58.342
witnesses , um . Admiral Papa , I'd

01:08:58.342 --> 01:09:00.454
like to direct this question to you .

01:09:00.790 --> 01:09:03.339
The discussion has had an awful lot as

01:09:03.339 --> 01:09:06.830
it should about North Korea , about

01:09:06.830 --> 01:09:09.069
China . Um , I wanna ask you about the

01:09:09.069 --> 01:09:11.350
cooperation that we're seeing some of

01:09:11.350 --> 01:09:13.669
our adversaries engage in . So in the

01:09:13.669 --> 01:09:16.750
endOAO talk about joint

01:09:16.750 --> 01:09:19.709
activities between Russia , China , and

01:09:19.709 --> 01:09:22.390
North Korea and the growing closeness

01:09:22.390 --> 01:09:24.390
of the relationship and the threats

01:09:24.390 --> 01:09:26.450
that posed to . The work that we do

01:09:26.450 --> 01:09:28.450
with our allies . Morning , Senator

01:09:28.450 --> 01:09:31.339
Kaine . It's a transactional

01:09:31.339 --> 01:09:34.779
symbiosis where each state fulfills the

01:09:34.779 --> 01:09:37.419
other state's weakness to mutual

01:09:37.419 --> 01:09:39.779
benefit of each state , uh , you know ,

01:09:39.899 --> 01:09:42.066
of , of if for instance is that , uh ,

01:09:42.066 --> 01:09:45.100
China has provided 70% of the machine

01:09:45.100 --> 01:09:47.580
tools and 90% of the legacy chips

01:09:47.580 --> 01:09:50.020
that's enabled Russia to rebuild its

01:09:50.020 --> 01:09:53.029
war machine and then coming back to

01:09:53.029 --> 01:09:55.620
China is potentially submarine quieting

01:09:55.620 --> 01:09:57.731
help as well as other help in some of

01:09:57.731 --> 01:10:00.330
the areas where Russia is strong . Uh ,

01:10:00.830 --> 01:10:02.774
in addition , you've got the North

01:10:02.774 --> 01:10:05.029
Korea that are sending thousands ,

01:10:05.149 --> 01:10:07.390
maybe 100 hundreds of thousands of

01:10:07.390 --> 01:10:10.580
artillery shells and thousands of KN-24

01:10:11.069 --> 01:10:13.620
short range missiles to Russia with ,

01:10:13.709 --> 01:10:15.376
as General Brunson said , the

01:10:15.376 --> 01:10:17.709
expectations of concessions coming back ,

01:10:17.990 --> 01:10:20.020
uh , in the form of air defense ,

01:10:20.290 --> 01:10:22.319
surface to air missile help , uh ,

01:10:22.430 --> 01:10:24.430
quieting terror , uh , to help with

01:10:24.430 --> 01:10:26.541
their kilo submarine fleet , uh , and

01:10:26.541 --> 01:10:28.486
so forth . And then finally in the

01:10:28.486 --> 01:10:30.652
physical space this last summer . Um ,

01:10:30.689 --> 01:10:32.930
I saw the , uh , the longest range

01:10:32.930 --> 01:10:36.649
joint patrol of , of , uh , PLA Navy

01:10:36.649 --> 01:10:40.160
and Russian Pacific Fleet , uh ,

01:10:40.169 --> 01:10:42.970
formation in the Bering Sea . And so ,

01:10:43.049 --> 01:10:45.271
uh , they're deepening their ability to

01:10:45.271 --> 01:10:46.910
operate together and they're

01:10:46.910 --> 01:10:48.910
demonstrating that by going further

01:10:48.910 --> 01:10:51.040
afield and in and in and in , uh ,

01:10:51.049 --> 01:10:53.450
bigger form formations . Uh , quickly ,

01:10:53.490 --> 01:10:55.768
I just would like to ask for your , uh ,

01:10:55.768 --> 01:10:57.768
impression of the importance of the

01:10:57.768 --> 01:10:59.823
ACAS framework in the Indo-Pacific .

01:11:00.339 --> 01:11:03.689
Caucus is a it's a it's gonna confer a

01:11:03.689 --> 01:11:06.060
generational advantage on both

01:11:06.060 --> 01:11:09.100
countries uh but I cherish the

01:11:09.100 --> 01:11:11.259
advantage it confers on the United

01:11:11.259 --> 01:11:13.315
States of America and so uh you know

01:11:13.315 --> 01:11:16.350
I'll say first of all , uh . The

01:11:16.350 --> 01:11:18.859
ability to operate out of Stirling in

01:11:18.859 --> 01:11:22.339
uh in a submarine rotational force west

01:11:22.339 --> 01:11:24.819
in Sterling gives the American

01:11:24.819 --> 01:11:27.009
submarine force an Indian Ocean port .

01:11:28.080 --> 01:11:30.669
It gives us the ability to range the

01:11:30.669 --> 01:11:33.950
Indian Ocean ocean without limitation

01:11:33.950 --> 01:11:36.228
in the Straits of Malacca , the Lombok ,

01:11:36.228 --> 01:11:38.339
or the Sunda Strait . It's a straight

01:11:38.339 --> 01:11:40.419
shot to the South China Sea , uh ,

01:11:40.430 --> 01:11:43.390
closer and faster than Hawaii , San

01:11:43.390 --> 01:11:46.399
Diego , Bangor , Maine . Uh , and then ,

01:11:46.549 --> 01:11:48.450
and then , uh , Australia's

01:11:48.450 --> 01:11:50.890
contribution of , uh , into the defense

01:11:50.890 --> 01:11:53.330
industrial base , uh , $3 billion

01:11:53.330 --> 01:11:55.274
investment in the in the submarine

01:11:55.274 --> 01:11:57.108
defense industrial base . Yeah ,

01:11:57.108 --> 01:11:59.108
imagine Congress having that debate

01:11:59.108 --> 01:12:00.941
about whether we would invest $3

01:12:00.941 --> 01:12:03.052
billion in the Australian workforce .

01:12:03.052 --> 01:12:05.052
It would be a very tough discussion

01:12:05.052 --> 01:12:07.274
here . It'd be the fact that the , it'd

01:12:07.274 --> 01:12:06.930
be worth it , but the fact that the

01:12:06.930 --> 01:12:09.270
Australian parliament . Made that

01:12:09.270 --> 01:12:11.910
investment in the US workforce

01:12:11.910 --> 01:12:13.779
demonstrates the degree to which

01:12:13.779 --> 01:12:15.946
they're concerned about China . Let me

01:12:15.946 --> 01:12:18.001
just do one last thing here . Um , I

01:12:18.001 --> 01:12:20.112
have filed a resolution with a number

01:12:20.112 --> 01:12:22.790
of my colleagues to turn off the tariff ,

01:12:23.029 --> 01:12:25.470
the global tariffs imposed by the

01:12:25.470 --> 01:12:27.470
president last week , which are now

01:12:27.470 --> 01:12:29.692
somewhat on pause . There's still a 10%

01:12:29.692 --> 01:12:31.748
tariff . I'm not gonna ask you about

01:12:31.748 --> 01:12:33.859
the policy . But I just want to point

01:12:33.859 --> 01:12:35.803
out one of the reasons I filed the

01:12:35.803 --> 01:12:37.859
motion primarily it's because it's a

01:12:37.859 --> 01:12:37.720
tax increase on American consumers ,

01:12:37.790 --> 01:12:39.846
but I don't think , I don't think we

01:12:39.846 --> 01:12:42.419
should treat allies badly . Use

01:12:42.419 --> 01:12:44.641
Australia as an example . You've talked

01:12:44.641 --> 01:12:46.863
about how Aucus is very important . The

01:12:46.863 --> 01:12:48.752
president has imposed a tariff on

01:12:48.752 --> 01:12:51.009
Australia . We have a trade surplus

01:12:51.009 --> 01:12:53.270
with Australia , not a deficit . We

01:12:53.270 --> 01:12:55.430
have a trade surplus with Australia ,

01:12:55.669 --> 01:12:57.891
so why put a tariff on their products ?

01:12:58.189 --> 01:13:00.300
Um , how about other allies ? Japan ,

01:13:00.300 --> 01:13:03.299
25% tariff on Japan . Why

01:13:03.299 --> 01:13:06.790
25% ? The measure of the tariff was not

01:13:06.790 --> 01:13:09.229
Chinese trade barriers . It was the

01:13:09.229 --> 01:13:12.109
trade deficit that we have with Japan .

01:13:12.910 --> 01:13:15.149
Measured by deficit in goods , it did

01:13:15.149 --> 01:13:17.549
not include the full trade picture

01:13:17.549 --> 01:13:19.493
goods and services . If you add in

01:13:19.493 --> 01:13:21.509
services , all these trade deficits

01:13:21.509 --> 01:13:23.629
actually get narrow because the US is

01:13:23.629 --> 01:13:26.529
such a great exporter of services , but ,

01:13:26.540 --> 01:13:29.189
but even if there's a trade deficit in

01:13:29.189 --> 01:13:32.020
goods with Japan . Of course there is .

01:13:32.100 --> 01:13:35.500
The trade deficit is we buy more of

01:13:35.500 --> 01:13:38.819
their stuff than they buy of our stuff .

01:13:39.100 --> 01:13:41.211
Our population is 3 times the size of

01:13:41.211 --> 01:13:43.930
the Japanese population , so yes .

01:13:45.799 --> 01:13:49.240
We buy more Japanese goods with 340

01:13:49.240 --> 01:13:52.439
million people than 120 million people

01:13:52.439 --> 01:13:54.799
buy of American goods . And so we're

01:13:54.799 --> 01:13:57.080
gonna punish them for that . It makes

01:13:57.080 --> 01:14:00.040
no sense . The the primary reason I'm

01:14:00.040 --> 01:14:02.207
filed the challenge is because I don't

01:14:02.207 --> 01:14:04.373
want tax American consumers with a big

01:14:04.373 --> 01:14:06.373
national sales tax , but the tariff

01:14:06.373 --> 01:14:09.910
strategy that punishes allies

01:14:10.200 --> 01:14:13.799
is no way to be strong in

01:14:13.799 --> 01:14:16.439
an international world where the US has

01:14:16.439 --> 01:14:19.459
built allies over decades . That

01:14:19.549 --> 01:14:21.580
provides some of our greatest edge

01:14:21.870 --> 01:14:23.481
qualitative edge against our

01:14:23.481 --> 01:14:25.259
adversaries . So that's just an

01:14:25.259 --> 01:14:27.370
editorial comment , but thank you for

01:14:27.370 --> 01:14:29.819
your appearance . It surely is , um ,

01:14:29.830 --> 01:14:32.870
and , uh . Under the First Amendment

01:14:32.870 --> 01:14:35.092
you are entitled to that , but I didn't

01:14:35.092 --> 01:14:37.259
hear a question , so , uh , we'll move

01:14:37.259 --> 01:14:39.500
along to , uh , Senator Duckworth .

01:14:39.910 --> 01:14:42.077
Thank you , Mr . Chairman , although I

01:14:42.077 --> 01:14:43.854
do endorse my uh colleague from

01:14:43.854 --> 01:14:47.020
Virginia's uh uh . Editorial statement ,

01:14:47.149 --> 01:14:49.371
um , Admiral Paparo , General Brunson ,

01:14:49.371 --> 01:14:51.538
thank you for being here today and for

01:14:51.538 --> 01:14:53.705
sharing your assessment of our posture

01:14:53.705 --> 01:14:53.629
capabilities and readiness in the

01:14:53.629 --> 01:14:55.629
Indo-Pacific . One of my major

01:14:55.629 --> 01:14:57.709
priorities . Everyone knows I am

01:14:57.709 --> 01:15:00.229
Transom's biggest advocate , so I can't

01:15:00.229 --> 01:15:02.396
go through a posture hearing like this

01:15:02.396 --> 01:15:04.340
without asking questions about the

01:15:04.340 --> 01:15:06.451
logistical environment , um . That we

01:15:06.451 --> 01:15:08.618
will face if our nation's darkest days

01:15:08.618 --> 01:15:10.673
comes and we must fight a war in the

01:15:10.673 --> 01:15:12.562
Pacific preparing for the digital

01:15:12.562 --> 01:15:14.618
realities of large scale conflict is

01:15:14.618 --> 01:15:16.840
not only critical for the fight tonight

01:15:16.840 --> 01:15:19.245
scenario , but it is also key , uh , uh ,

01:15:19.254 --> 01:15:21.645
to deterrence . Uh , we must

01:15:21.645 --> 01:15:23.812
demonstrate to our adversaries that we

01:15:23.812 --> 01:15:26.089
have the capability to sustain a fight .

01:15:26.220 --> 01:15:28.331
Um , if necessary , even as they seek

01:15:28.331 --> 01:15:30.553
to contest that , to make it clear that

01:15:30.553 --> 01:15:32.664
such a war would be costly for all of

01:15:32.664 --> 01:15:35.250
us , and I applaud both your efforts to

01:15:35.250 --> 01:15:37.472
improve the logistical readiness of the

01:15:37.472 --> 01:15:39.750
force and with our allies and partners ,

01:15:39.750 --> 01:15:41.972
but I do think there's more to do , and

01:15:41.972 --> 01:15:44.306
I just start off with medical readiness .

01:15:44.306 --> 01:15:46.306
Um , we must improve our ability to

01:15:46.306 --> 01:15:48.306
provide life saving care to wounded

01:15:48.306 --> 01:15:47.899
service members , including the

01:15:47.899 --> 01:15:50.066
regional hospital access and effective

01:15:50.066 --> 01:15:51.899
aeromedical evacuation . We have

01:15:51.899 --> 01:15:55.049
partners in . The RO in Thailand and

01:15:55.049 --> 01:15:56.938
the Philippines that have medical

01:15:56.938 --> 01:15:58.771
facilities that meet US hospital

01:15:58.771 --> 01:16:00.771
certification standards , those are

01:16:00.771 --> 01:16:02.938
opportunities for us , uh , to develop

01:16:02.938 --> 01:16:04.660
those relationships . The Indo

01:16:04.660 --> 01:16:06.771
Pacific's vast distances , logistical

01:16:06.771 --> 01:16:08.882
challenges , and maritime environment

01:16:08.882 --> 01:16:10.605
present a much less permissive

01:16:10.605 --> 01:16:10.490
environment than for the medical

01:16:10.490 --> 01:16:12.601
mission than the global war on terror

01:16:12.601 --> 01:16:14.657
did . And as I've said before , long

01:16:14.657 --> 01:16:16.823
gone is the golden hour and we must do

01:16:16.823 --> 01:16:19.149
comprehensive planning . Um , to ensure

01:16:19.149 --> 01:16:21.093
that our war fighters have foreign

01:16:21.093 --> 01:16:22.816
medical facility access in the

01:16:22.816 --> 01:16:24.982
Indo-Pacific , this is why I secured a

01:16:24.982 --> 01:16:27.205
provision in the fiscal year 25 NDAA to

01:16:27.205 --> 01:16:29.093
establish an Indo-Pacific medical

01:16:29.093 --> 01:16:31.149
readiness program . Admiral Paparo ,

01:16:31.149 --> 01:16:33.371
General Brunson , as you implement this

01:16:33.371 --> 01:16:35.593
program , what are the primary barriers

01:16:35.593 --> 01:16:35.549
that hinder the necessary medical

01:16:35.549 --> 01:16:37.790
cooperation and how can this committee

01:16:37.790 --> 01:16:40.229
help as you begin that effort ? Morning ,

01:16:40.270 --> 01:16:42.540
Senator Duckworth . Um , I , I , I

01:16:42.540 --> 01:16:44.540
strongly endorse your viewpoint and

01:16:44.540 --> 01:16:47.370
also too , I , I strongly endorse , uh ,

01:16:47.939 --> 01:16:49.717
what's essentially a concept of

01:16:49.717 --> 01:16:51.717
operation within what you're , what

01:16:51.717 --> 01:16:53.883
you're saying which is put the medical

01:16:53.883 --> 01:16:56.106
expertise of our allies and partners to

01:16:56.106 --> 01:16:58.217
ensure that that can augment what our

01:16:58.217 --> 01:17:00.500
own medical providers can execute and

01:17:00.500 --> 01:17:03.600
so . So , um , one is , uh , is a

01:17:03.600 --> 01:17:05.959
medevac capability in order to get to

01:17:05.959 --> 01:17:08.750
the location , the agreements to do so ,

01:17:08.959 --> 01:17:11.229
the ability to practice and exercise ,

01:17:11.240 --> 01:17:13.351
so it's not the first time that we do

01:17:13.351 --> 01:17:15.720
it if the unforgiving hour comes and so

01:17:15.720 --> 01:17:17.720
I think uh some of the barriers are

01:17:17.720 --> 01:17:19.720
physical and that is lift , medical

01:17:19.720 --> 01:17:22.180
lift , uh , medevac lift , and then

01:17:22.180 --> 01:17:24.890
some of the barriers are , uh , are ,

01:17:24.979 --> 01:17:27.649
um . I should say , uh , authorities

01:17:28.180 --> 01:17:30.291
and we'd hope for more authorities to

01:17:30.291 --> 01:17:32.402
be able to , uh , broaden our ability

01:17:32.402 --> 01:17:35.240
to plan for this , for , uh , bringing

01:17:35.240 --> 01:17:37.462
to bear the the medical capabilities of

01:17:37.462 --> 01:17:39.979
our allies to , uh , to care for the

01:17:39.979 --> 01:17:42.970
wounded in conflict , uh , so thank you .

01:17:43.220 --> 01:17:46.390
Thank you , General Brunson . Ma'am ,

01:17:47.229 --> 01:17:49.451
uh , one of the things that , uh , that

01:17:49.451 --> 01:17:51.562
you know , and I know you're , you're

01:17:51.562 --> 01:17:53.673
full well aware of this is our health

01:17:53.673 --> 01:17:56.459
care comes from the community . So we

01:17:56.459 --> 01:17:58.681
know yes ma'am OK , yep . Yes , ma'am .

01:17:58.681 --> 01:18:00.737
So we get tremendous amounts of care

01:18:00.737 --> 01:18:02.950
there . What we're trying to do at uh

01:18:02.950 --> 01:18:05.172
at Allgood Hospital at the present time

01:18:05.172 --> 01:18:08.549
is have greater access to profu doctors

01:18:08.549 --> 01:18:11.089
routinely . I need them to be on the

01:18:11.089 --> 01:18:14.770
peninsula in times other than crisis or

01:18:14.770 --> 01:18:17.250
conflict in competition we wanna bring

01:18:17.250 --> 01:18:19.194
them to the peninsula so that they

01:18:19.194 --> 01:18:21.417
better understand the medical landscape

01:18:21.417 --> 01:18:23.472
and what might be required of them .

01:18:23.472 --> 01:18:25.417
We're also looking to UN command .

01:18:25.417 --> 01:18:27.639
There are several nations that provided

01:18:27.639 --> 01:18:29.919
hospitals during the Korean conflict .

01:18:30.089 --> 01:18:32.256
We want the Italians to come back with

01:18:32.256 --> 01:18:34.256
their hospitals again . We want the

01:18:34.256 --> 01:18:36.478
Dutch to come back with their hospitals

01:18:36.478 --> 01:18:38.478
again as well , and those things we

01:18:38.478 --> 01:18:40.533
think we then provide to the greater

01:18:40.533 --> 01:18:42.367
Indope . Family that we might be

01:18:42.367 --> 01:18:44.200
another resource used in time of

01:18:44.200 --> 01:18:46.422
conflict . Thank you . I wanna prove it

01:18:46.422 --> 01:18:48.478
to the critical platforms we need to

01:18:48.478 --> 01:18:50.256
project and sustain forces in a

01:18:50.256 --> 01:18:52.367
congested , uh , contested logistical

01:18:52.367 --> 01:18:54.422
environment , especially our sealift

01:18:54.422 --> 01:18:56.478
fleet . um , Admiral Paparo , do you

01:18:56.478 --> 01:18:56.330
agree that Indo-PACO would benefit from

01:18:56.330 --> 01:18:58.386
the ability to surge replacements of

01:18:58.386 --> 01:19:00.790
naval auxiliary vessels or to conduct

01:19:00.790 --> 01:19:02.734
battle damage maintenance of these

01:19:02.734 --> 01:19:05.209
vessels within the region closer to the

01:19:05.209 --> 01:19:07.850
point of need ? Strongly , I , I urge

01:19:07.850 --> 01:19:10.120
for that , Senator . Because I , I am

01:19:10.120 --> 01:19:11.953
concerned that um in a war naval

01:19:11.953 --> 01:19:14.176
auxiliary vessels would be easy targets

01:19:14.176 --> 01:19:16.287
we might have to fight our way in and

01:19:16.287 --> 01:19:18.509
fight our way out and , and what can we

01:19:18.509 --> 01:19:20.787
do to help you with that effort ? Well ,

01:19:20.787 --> 01:19:23.120
as we enhance our protection capability ,

01:19:23.120 --> 01:19:24.898
we enhance our ability to see ,

01:19:24.898 --> 01:19:27.064
understand the operational environment

01:19:27.064 --> 01:19:29.120
to build . Windows of opportunity to

01:19:29.120 --> 01:19:31.439
execute sustainment capability , you

01:19:31.439 --> 01:19:33.606
know , 9 classes of supply , medical ,

01:19:33.606 --> 01:19:35.839
and so forth , uh , in , in those , in

01:19:35.839 --> 01:19:38.006
those areas . And so , um , first it's

01:19:38.006 --> 01:19:40.228
just the quantities , the quantities of

01:19:40.228 --> 01:19:43.040
TAKEs , AOS , the quantity of gray

01:19:43.040 --> 01:19:46.799
tails , C-17s , tankers , um , that's ,

01:19:46.839 --> 01:19:49.080
that's critical and , um , and then the

01:19:49.080 --> 01:19:51.479
ability to exercise it . So what about

01:19:51.479 --> 01:19:53.560
co-sustainment with our allies like

01:19:53.560 --> 01:19:55.799
Japan or the ROK of those vessels

01:19:55.799 --> 01:19:57.466
because they certainly have .

01:19:57.466 --> 01:19:59.688
Capabilities , especially the auxiliary

01:19:59.688 --> 01:20:01.688
vessels and uh when we game this we

01:20:01.688 --> 01:20:04.209
frequently rely on one another , uh ,

01:20:04.220 --> 01:20:06.470
to do this and then while operating at

01:20:06.470 --> 01:20:08.637
sea , sometimes actually the necessity

01:20:08.637 --> 01:20:10.899
of having one leads us to use a

01:20:10.899 --> 01:20:13.500
Japanese oiler or for an American oiler

01:20:13.500 --> 01:20:17.330
to refuel a coalition ship and so uh

01:20:17.330 --> 01:20:20.180
we , we have to be able to sum all of

01:20:20.180 --> 01:20:22.291
the sustainment capability among us ,

01:20:22.299 --> 01:20:24.521
have the authorities to do so so we can

01:20:24.521 --> 01:20:26.950
turn to it with alacrity . Um , but ,

01:20:27.029 --> 01:20:29.140
uh , I would be more comfortable with

01:20:29.140 --> 01:20:31.362
our own ability and to to contribute to

01:20:31.362 --> 01:20:34.069
that effort with US capability . Thank

01:20:34.069 --> 01:20:36.180
you . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . The

01:20:36.180 --> 01:20:38.291
momentary substitute chair recognizes

01:20:38.291 --> 01:20:40.609
Senator Rosen . Well thank you

01:20:40.609 --> 01:20:42.665
momentary substitute chair thank you

01:20:42.665 --> 01:20:44.890
actual chair Senator Wicker and of

01:20:44.890 --> 01:20:47.330
course ranking member Reed holding of

01:20:47.330 --> 01:20:49.330
course really important hearing . I

01:20:49.330 --> 01:20:51.386
wanna thank Admiral Paparo , General

01:20:51.386 --> 01:20:54.089
Brunson uh for your service , uh , for

01:20:54.089 --> 01:20:56.169
your support and your care and

01:20:56.169 --> 01:20:58.225
everything that you do . Thank you ,

01:20:58.225 --> 01:21:00.280
thank you . So I wanna talk a little

01:21:00.280 --> 01:21:02.040
bit about attacks on digital

01:21:02.040 --> 01:21:05.220
infrastructure by the PRC . So Admiral ,

01:21:05.330 --> 01:21:06.997
our growing concern about the

01:21:06.997 --> 01:21:08.970
vulnerability of Taiwan's digital

01:21:08.970 --> 01:21:11.410
infrastructure is highlighted by the

01:21:11.410 --> 01:21:14.399
frequent attempted sabotage of undersea

01:21:14.399 --> 01:21:16.959
internet cables . These events are part

01:21:16.959 --> 01:21:18.759
of a larger trend of gray zone

01:21:18.759 --> 01:21:20.815
operations or actions short of war ,

01:21:21.009 --> 01:21:23.330
often involving non-military forces or

01:21:23.330 --> 01:21:25.930
proxies are used to exert pressure or

01:21:25.930 --> 01:21:28.470
destabilize regions . The PRC's

01:21:28.470 --> 01:21:30.414
reckless , coercive and aggressive

01:21:30.414 --> 01:21:32.637
activities pose a threat to democracies

01:21:32.637 --> 01:21:35.020
around the globe , and its sabotage of

01:21:35.020 --> 01:21:37.779
those undersea cables has emerged as a

01:21:37.779 --> 01:21:40.899
particularly alarming tactic . These

01:21:40.899 --> 01:21:42.939
cables are essential for our global

01:21:42.939 --> 01:21:45.299
communications , transmitting around

01:21:45.299 --> 01:21:48.859
95% of global internet traffic . They

01:21:48.859 --> 01:21:50.859
facilitate financial transactions ,

01:21:50.899 --> 01:21:53.066
bolster our security , the security of

01:21:53.066 --> 01:21:55.343
our partners and allies . Oh , Admiral ,

01:21:55.343 --> 01:21:57.510
while some experts view incidents like

01:21:57.510 --> 01:21:59.677
the damage to Taiwan's undersea cables

01:21:59.677 --> 01:22:02.229
as merely a test or low level

01:22:02.229 --> 01:22:04.830
enhancement . Others warned they could

01:22:04.830 --> 01:22:06.941
be part of a broader Chinese strategy

01:22:06.941 --> 01:22:09.750
to prepare for future coercion or even

01:22:09.750 --> 01:22:12.020
invasion of Taiwan . So given this ,

01:22:12.270 --> 01:22:14.437
what do you see as the actual threat ,

01:22:14.437 --> 01:22:17.069
um , uh , these incidents posed to US

01:22:17.069 --> 01:22:19.629
national security and what steps is the

01:22:19.629 --> 01:22:21.939
US taking to , uh , effectively counter

01:22:21.939 --> 01:22:24.919
this digital threats ? Senator Rosen ,

01:22:25.000 --> 01:22:27.167
um , you know , as ever , you're quite

01:22:27.167 --> 01:22:29.333
a student in identifying this threat .

01:22:29.333 --> 01:22:31.556
Most certainly that's that's an element

01:22:31.556 --> 01:22:33.722
of the intention and an element of the

01:22:33.722 --> 01:22:35.833
design , uh , they would do so likely

01:22:35.833 --> 01:22:37.611
with people armed forces , uh ,

01:22:37.611 --> 01:22:39.889
maritime militia which enables them to ,

01:22:39.889 --> 01:22:41.889
uh , execute this operation without

01:22:41.889 --> 01:22:44.000
potentially signaling an intent to go

01:22:44.000 --> 01:22:46.000
to war but by weakening , uh , the

01:22:46.000 --> 01:22:49.040
information , uh , enterprise of , uh ,

01:22:49.120 --> 01:22:51.176
of their , uh , of , of the states ,

01:22:51.520 --> 01:22:53.720
over whom they're , uh , executing

01:22:53.720 --> 01:22:56.729
aggression . And um I think uh a

01:22:56.729 --> 01:22:58.729
greater , well one , I think uh the

01:22:58.729 --> 01:23:01.290
first is , is that uh the ability to uh

01:23:01.290 --> 01:23:03.012
penetrate from an intelligence

01:23:03.012 --> 01:23:04.901
standpoint and to be there in the

01:23:04.901 --> 01:23:07.123
locations where they would be otherwise

01:23:07.123 --> 01:23:09.290
cutting those cables in order to deter

01:23:09.290 --> 01:23:11.512
that activity . Uh , second of all is ,

01:23:11.512 --> 01:23:13.401
uh , the resilience to have other

01:23:13.401 --> 01:23:15.520
redundant networks that enable , uh ,

01:23:15.609 --> 01:23:17.498
those states and their partners ,

01:23:17.498 --> 01:23:19.553
including the United States , Guam ,

01:23:19.553 --> 01:23:21.776
Hawaii , and so forth , uh , to achieve

01:23:21.776 --> 01:23:23.942
that , you know , what we need to do ,

01:23:23.942 --> 01:23:25.665
uh , in the , uh , in , in the

01:23:25.665 --> 01:23:27.553
information and . Environment and

01:23:27.553 --> 01:23:29.609
that's um proliferation in low Earth

01:23:29.609 --> 01:23:32.165
orbits uh and not just one single

01:23:32.165 --> 01:23:33.714
constellation but multiple

01:23:33.714 --> 01:23:35.770
constellations about how we can help

01:23:35.770 --> 01:23:38.084
Taiwan booster uh bolster its digital

01:23:38.084 --> 01:23:40.084
infrastructure . What , what do you

01:23:40.084 --> 01:23:42.417
think we can do to help them be be sure .

01:23:43.189 --> 01:23:46.629
Yeah , I think , um , I think , um . Uh ,

01:23:46.640 --> 01:23:48.807
enabling training them to be able to ,

01:23:48.807 --> 01:23:50.807
you know , I shouldn't say training

01:23:50.807 --> 01:23:52.751
them , but enabling them to , uh ,

01:23:52.751 --> 01:23:54.751
build that resiliency , uh , that's

01:23:54.751 --> 01:23:56.418
required that , uh , if we're

01:23:56.418 --> 01:23:58.529
unsuccessful in our efforts to thwart

01:23:58.529 --> 01:24:00.640
their cable cutting that , uh , there

01:24:00.640 --> 01:24:02.751
are other spectra and other means for

01:24:02.751 --> 01:24:04.973
information technology so they have the

01:24:04.973 --> 01:24:07.196
proper bandwidth to to prioritize those

01:24:07.196 --> 01:24:09.418
functions that they have to within that

01:24:09.418 --> 01:24:11.584
bandwidth and latency that you get out

01:24:11.584 --> 01:24:13.751
of low Earth orbit . Uh , Middle Earth

01:24:13.751 --> 01:24:16.500
orbit among the many commercial , uh ,

01:24:16.509 --> 01:24:18.453
constellations that are going into

01:24:18.453 --> 01:24:20.990
orbit . Thank you . Um , I'm gonna talk

01:24:20.990 --> 01:24:23.212
a little bit about North Korean support

01:24:23.212 --> 01:24:25.270
to Russia because we see a growing

01:24:25.270 --> 01:24:27.603
alliance between North Korea and Russia ,

01:24:27.603 --> 01:24:29.548
particularly in the context of the

01:24:29.548 --> 01:24:31.603
ongoing war in Ukraine . It presents

01:24:31.603 --> 01:24:33.709
new challenges for us in the United

01:24:33.709 --> 01:24:35.820
States and of course for our allies .

01:24:35.899 --> 01:24:38.270
So we know North Korea providing troops

01:24:38.270 --> 01:24:40.140
and munitions to Russia . The

01:24:40.140 --> 01:24:42.251
partnership has potential to fuel the

01:24:42.251 --> 01:24:44.584
conflict and challenge the global order .

01:24:44.584 --> 01:24:46.196
It raises concerns about the

01:24:46.196 --> 01:24:48.362
effectiveness of existing diplomatic .

01:24:48.629 --> 01:24:51.299
Strategies and economic san sanctions .

01:24:51.470 --> 01:24:53.629
So to both of you , um , the

01:24:53.629 --> 01:24:55.629
partnership between North Korea and

01:24:55.629 --> 01:24:57.851
Russia poses a serious threat to global

01:24:57.851 --> 01:25:00.270
stability . So in each of your views ,

01:25:00.390 --> 01:25:02.334
how should the US respond to North

01:25:02.334 --> 01:25:04.446
Korea's military assistance to Russia

01:25:04.470 --> 01:25:06.248
and what diplomatic or military

01:25:06.248 --> 01:25:09.709
strategies should we pursue to prevent

01:25:09.709 --> 01:25:12.830
further destabilization not just uh

01:25:12.830 --> 01:25:14.850
there but within the international

01:25:14.850 --> 01:25:17.017
community so general we'll we'll start

01:25:17.017 --> 01:25:19.589
with you . All right , Senator , uh ,

01:25:19.600 --> 01:25:21.822
one of the things that we have to do is

01:25:21.822 --> 01:25:23.989
what we're doing presently . We've got

01:25:23.989 --> 01:25:26.211
forces there on the peninsula that uh .

01:25:26.211 --> 01:25:29.279
Can impose costs on them . Uh , we also

01:25:29.279 --> 01:25:31.049
maintain lines to continue

01:25:31.049 --> 01:25:33.271
communication so that we might not have

01:25:33.271 --> 01:25:35.438
miscalculation in the region with writ

01:25:35.438 --> 01:25:38.500
large , whether that be on the MDL or

01:25:38.500 --> 01:25:40.950
across the northern limit line in the

01:25:40.950 --> 01:25:43.180
West Sea . I think that we have to

01:25:43.180 --> 01:25:45.500
continue to try to communicate out but

01:25:45.500 --> 01:25:47.722
make sure that we're always prepared in

01:25:47.722 --> 01:25:51.109
the event of a miscalculation . Thank

01:25:51.109 --> 01:25:53.276
you Senator . Hundreds of thousands of

01:25:53.276 --> 01:25:55.387
artillery shells , thousands of KN-24

01:25:55.387 --> 01:25:57.165
missiles , and , you know , and

01:25:57.165 --> 01:25:59.419
manpower is going , is , uh , is , is

01:25:59.419 --> 01:26:01.530
leaving North Korea with the with the

01:26:01.530 --> 01:26:03.641
intent of gaining concession back and

01:26:03.641 --> 01:26:05.939
so first , um , exposure in the

01:26:05.939 --> 01:26:08.390
international community . Uh , is , uh ,

01:26:08.399 --> 01:26:10.520
is one which is to not be shy about

01:26:10.520 --> 01:26:12.680
exposing , uh , this , uh , naked

01:26:12.680 --> 01:26:15.399
aggression using all instruments of

01:26:15.399 --> 01:26:18.640
national power to impose costs on

01:26:18.640 --> 01:26:20.750
individuals to , to , to find , uh ,

01:26:21.000 --> 01:26:22.722
you know , to build the , uh ,

01:26:22.722 --> 01:26:24.889
deterrent , uh , from this , uh , from

01:26:24.889 --> 01:26:27.509
this activity . And then , um , as

01:26:27.509 --> 01:26:29.342
General Brunson has talked about

01:26:29.342 --> 01:26:31.342
earlier and earlier , being wary of

01:26:31.342 --> 01:26:33.565
what is coming back and to be able to ,

01:26:33.565 --> 01:26:35.910
uh , uh , to be able to , uh , be in

01:26:35.910 --> 01:26:37.990
generations of overmatch with what's

01:26:37.990 --> 01:26:40.268
coming back if it's submarine quieting ,

01:26:40.268 --> 01:26:42.390
if it's air defense , if it's missile

01:26:42.390 --> 01:26:44.810
technology , and so , uh , uh , you

01:26:44.810 --> 01:26:46.810
know , it's an area we need to work

01:26:46.810 --> 01:26:49.143
really hard . Thank you , appreciate it .

01:26:50.120 --> 01:26:52.064
Um , thank you very much , Senator

01:26:52.064 --> 01:26:53.953
Banks . Thank you Mr . Chairman .

01:26:53.953 --> 01:26:56.009
Admiral , great to see you again . I

01:26:56.009 --> 01:26:58.009
enjoyed our visit in my office last

01:26:58.009 --> 01:27:00.009
week and we talked about Slickam in

01:27:00.009 --> 01:27:02.120
quite a bit , but I wanted to ask you

01:27:02.120 --> 01:27:04.342
in this setting , um , Slicke in , uh ,

01:27:04.342 --> 01:27:06.453
as we talked about will be one of the

01:27:06.453 --> 01:27:08.287
best tools to deter China in the

01:27:08.287 --> 01:27:10.509
Pacific . But can you talk a little bit

01:27:10.509 --> 01:27:12.842
about the capability gaps that it fills ,

01:27:12.842 --> 01:27:14.787
why , why it's so important in new

01:27:14.787 --> 01:27:18.020
paycom ? Morning , Senator . Um , first ,

01:27:18.080 --> 01:27:20.191
uh , I'm a strong advocate of slicker

01:27:20.191 --> 01:27:22.919
men at the soonest possibility . Just

01:27:22.919 --> 01:27:25.589
because of the doubt . That it , uh ,

01:27:25.600 --> 01:27:29.410
imposes the potential to execute

01:27:29.410 --> 01:27:32.129
uh tactically , you know , presently uh

01:27:32.129 --> 01:27:35.640
there is a gap between um low tonnage

01:27:35.640 --> 01:27:38.049
and high tonnage which on which the

01:27:38.049 --> 01:27:41.250
United States , uh , that gap is a

01:27:41.250 --> 01:27:43.830
critical vulnerability between from 400

01:27:43.830 --> 01:27:46.689
kilotons and below , and it gives us a

01:27:46.689 --> 01:27:49.850
choice of either suicide or surrender .

01:27:50.279 --> 01:27:52.240
When we have to , when we have to

01:27:52.240 --> 01:27:55.669
default straight to strategic weapons ,

01:27:55.959 --> 01:27:58.069
so it gives us the ability to close

01:27:58.319 --> 01:28:02.120
that asymmetry um it also imposes doubt

01:28:02.120 --> 01:28:04.342
on doubt throughout the force and would

01:28:04.342 --> 01:28:06.859
change the calculus of aggression

01:28:07.160 --> 01:28:09.629
inherently just because of the nature

01:28:09.629 --> 01:28:12.759
of those weapons we use nuclear weapons

01:28:12.759 --> 01:28:15.120
every single day because they deter .

01:28:15.810 --> 01:28:18.319
And it's by and , and we use them by

01:28:18.319 --> 01:28:21.229
not using them by having them be a , uh ,

01:28:21.319 --> 01:28:23.486
you know , a potential deterrent , and

01:28:23.486 --> 01:28:25.541
I'm , I'm , uh , quoting Doctor Brad

01:28:25.541 --> 01:28:27.597
Roberts on that who's quite expert .

01:28:27.597 --> 01:28:29.652
Can you talk for a minute ? how does

01:28:29.652 --> 01:28:31.875
that affect the Chinese mindset , their

01:28:31.875 --> 01:28:33.875
decision making ? How , how does it

01:28:33.875 --> 01:28:36.180
deter them ? It raises the cost and the

01:28:36.180 --> 01:28:38.790
implications of attacking any unit

01:28:39.620 --> 01:28:43.259
because uh it raises the stakes and so

01:28:43.259 --> 01:28:46.100
inherently it it inherently uh it

01:28:46.100 --> 01:28:49.379
provides more stability on each side

01:28:49.850 --> 01:28:51.850
because there's not an asymmetry to

01:28:51.850 --> 01:28:54.299
exploit . Um , as you know , last

01:28:54.299 --> 01:28:56.700
year's NDAA direct the the Navy and the

01:28:56.700 --> 01:28:59.419
NNSA to deploy Slick Slicker man no

01:28:59.419 --> 01:29:03.149
later than 2034 . That's 9 years from

01:29:03.149 --> 01:29:05.316
now . Part of that delay came from the

01:29:05.316 --> 01:29:07.482
Biden administration saying that slick

01:29:07.482 --> 01:29:09.538
them in wasn't needed . Do you agree

01:29:09.538 --> 01:29:11.705
that there needs to be stability and a

01:29:11.705 --> 01:29:13.760
commitment from Congress , the DOD ,

01:29:13.760 --> 01:29:15.927
and the Navy to slick them in to speed

01:29:15.927 --> 01:29:18.093
up that process and get it here before

01:29:18.093 --> 01:29:20.350
the 2034 deadline ? I agree 2034 is too

01:29:20.350 --> 01:29:23.379
late . Sooner , please . Good , um ,

01:29:24.669 --> 01:29:26.502
I agree with that as well , uh .

01:29:26.502 --> 01:29:28.558
Admiral , the Army says that it will

01:29:28.558 --> 01:29:31.790
field a long range hypersonic weapon

01:29:31.790 --> 01:29:34.279
with the US Army Pacific Forces this

01:29:34.279 --> 01:29:36.600
fall . That would be the first US

01:29:36.600 --> 01:29:38.767
hypersonic weapon that we put into the

01:29:38.767 --> 01:29:41.899
field . How will this new hypersonic

01:29:41.899 --> 01:29:44.232
capability help you deter China as well ?

01:29:45.399 --> 01:29:47.509
Senator , uh , the nature of a

01:29:47.509 --> 01:29:50.680
hypersonic weapon is to close , uh , in

01:29:50.680 --> 01:29:53.310
time , uh , any actor's kill chain ,

01:29:53.640 --> 01:29:56.720
and if your adversary can strike you 5

01:29:56.720 --> 01:29:58.664
times faster than you can strike ,

01:29:58.664 --> 01:30:00.879
strike your enemy , uh , then it

01:30:00.879 --> 01:30:02.879
incentivizes for strikes with this

01:30:02.879 --> 01:30:05.810
capability . And so , uh , you know ,

01:30:06.000 --> 01:30:08.222
the , the coin of the realm in the 21st

01:30:08.222 --> 01:30:11.200
century is speed . Who does things

01:30:11.200 --> 01:30:14.359
faster wins . And so the ability to

01:30:14.359 --> 01:30:16.759
close distance and execute before

01:30:16.759 --> 01:30:19.080
counter fire can come , the ability to

01:30:19.080 --> 01:30:22.479
execute and then uh move in order to in

01:30:22.479 --> 01:30:25.270
order to thwart counter fire and , uh ,

01:30:25.279 --> 01:30:27.959
your ability to act on ephemeral

01:30:27.959 --> 01:30:30.839
intelligence , uh , for a target to be

01:30:30.839 --> 01:30:33.879
able to reduce that cycle time from uh

01:30:33.879 --> 01:30:37.560
from find fix target track to engage uh

01:30:37.560 --> 01:30:39.680
hypersonics is critical to that and

01:30:39.680 --> 01:30:42.013
it's an asymmetry that exists right now .

01:30:42.229 --> 01:30:44.970
And uh we must close it soonest with

01:30:44.970 --> 01:30:47.310
both uh the army's uh land-based

01:30:47.310 --> 01:30:50.009
convent with with all the with all

01:30:50.009 --> 01:30:52.569
elements of hypersonics including the

01:30:52.569 --> 01:30:54.791
Navy's conventional prop strike , which

01:30:54.791 --> 01:30:56.902
is also not moving fast enough for my

01:30:56.902 --> 01:30:59.125
liking . We we'll talk about that for a

01:30:59.125 --> 01:30:58.689
minute . How much more will it help you

01:30:58.689 --> 01:31:00.745
when the Navy deploys its hypersonic

01:31:00.745 --> 01:31:03.689
weapon too ? Uh , I mean , I think it's ,

01:31:03.700 --> 01:31:07.649
uh , it's step level change , uh ,

01:31:07.660 --> 01:31:09.810
in our ability to gain early leverage

01:31:09.810 --> 01:31:12.819
in any engagement and really any

01:31:12.819 --> 01:31:15.279
conflict . Very good , thank you , I

01:31:15.279 --> 01:31:18.799
yelled back . Um ,

01:31:19.580 --> 01:31:21.589
thank you . I think , uh , Senator

01:31:22.180 --> 01:31:25.410
Kelly is next . Thank you Mr . Chairman .

01:31:25.620 --> 01:31:28.930
Admiral , uh , you were just discussing ,

01:31:29.209 --> 01:31:32.220
um , Slickam and , and I do understand .

01:31:32.899 --> 01:31:36.509
The need and desire for uh a tactical

01:31:37.120 --> 01:31:40.700
option in theater uh certainly provides

01:31:40.700 --> 01:31:43.470
a certain level of deterrence . I get

01:31:43.470 --> 01:31:46.229
that . One concern I have with

01:31:46.520 --> 01:31:49.040
upgrading Virginia class submarines

01:31:49.040 --> 01:31:51.520
with this capability is how it impacts

01:31:51.520 --> 01:31:55.319
the conventional , uh , kinetic

01:31:55.319 --> 01:31:59.270
effect of that submarine . Um , Admiral ,

01:31:59.279 --> 01:32:01.279
would you agree one of our areas of

01:32:01.279 --> 01:32:03.720
overmatch ? With the Chinese and then

01:32:03.720 --> 01:32:07.640
is in our submarine . Uh , attack force ,

01:32:08.000 --> 01:32:10.589
strongly agree , Senator . Uh , do you ,

01:32:10.750 --> 01:32:14.500
do you have any concerns about the

01:32:14.790 --> 01:32:18.419
magazine depth for conventional

01:32:18.910 --> 01:32:21.589
torpedoes if we were to add a tactical

01:32:21.589 --> 01:32:23.709
nuclear capability to Virginia class

01:32:23.709 --> 01:32:27.439
submarines ? Uh , inherently it

01:32:27.439 --> 01:32:29.759
would occupy some of the vertical

01:32:29.759 --> 01:32:32.250
launch system tubes that would be in a

01:32:32.250 --> 01:32:35.279
Virginia class class submarine , so

01:32:35.279 --> 01:32:37.879
there would be a cost , would be a cost

01:32:37.879 --> 01:32:40.046
involved , and , and , and do you , do

01:32:40.046 --> 01:32:42.430
you agree that the likelihood of using

01:32:42.919 --> 01:32:46.350
a tactical nuclear weapon

01:32:46.350 --> 01:32:50.200
is significantly less than the

01:32:50.200 --> 01:32:52.560
likelihood of using a conventional

01:32:52.560 --> 01:32:54.830
torpedo ? Most certainly . Uh , there'd

01:32:54.830 --> 01:32:58.009
be a , a , um , uh , I mean , um ,

01:32:58.180 --> 01:32:59.958
there'd be a , um , a very high

01:32:59.958 --> 01:33:03.589
threshold to employ it . And

01:33:04.149 --> 01:33:07.100
are you concerned with having to take

01:33:07.549 --> 01:33:09.750
Virginia class submarines temporarily

01:33:09.750 --> 01:33:13.379
out of the fleet and out of the AOR

01:33:13.379 --> 01:33:16.669
in order to refit this capability ? My

01:33:16.669 --> 01:33:19.229
assessment is that um there are ways

01:33:19.229 --> 01:33:22.040
where we can do it quickly . However ,

01:33:22.430 --> 01:33:24.750
uh , you know , uh , I'd rather not

01:33:24.750 --> 01:33:26.972
lose the availability of the platform .

01:33:26.972 --> 01:33:28.917
And how about the uh the amount of

01:33:28.917 --> 01:33:31.139
security that would have to be . Put on

01:33:31.139 --> 01:33:33.028
the ship and how that affects the

01:33:33.028 --> 01:33:35.200
overall operation of the conventional

01:33:35.200 --> 01:33:38.189
attack role for the Virginia class subs .

01:33:38.390 --> 01:33:40.612
My assessment is we've done it before .

01:33:40.612 --> 01:33:42.879
You and I lived in that navy and , uh ,

01:33:42.950 --> 01:33:44.672
you know , and I'm in favor of

01:33:44.672 --> 01:33:46.950
executing it and moving fast on the

01:33:46.950 --> 01:33:48.950
security requirements . All right ,

01:33:48.950 --> 01:33:51.029
well thank you . I , uh , I , I do

01:33:51.029 --> 01:33:53.196
understand the need and the deterrence

01:33:53.196 --> 01:33:55.418
factor . I am concerned . That we might

01:33:55.418 --> 01:33:57.251
go down a path and we find out ,

01:33:57.299 --> 01:33:59.521
especially in a conflict , that boy , I

01:33:59.521 --> 01:34:02.620
wish we had the full uh that each of

01:34:02.620 --> 01:34:04.787
these Virginia class subs were full up

01:34:04.787 --> 01:34:07.740
conventional round . So thank you for

01:34:07.740 --> 01:34:09.959
that , Admiral . And General Brunson ,

01:34:10.299 --> 01:34:12.188
there's recent reporting that the

01:34:12.188 --> 01:34:13.799
United States is considering

01:34:13.799 --> 01:34:16.020
withdrawing as many as 10,000 troops

01:34:16.020 --> 01:34:18.100
from Eastern Europe , which would

01:34:18.100 --> 01:34:21.399
signal to Putin our commitment . Um ,

01:34:21.459 --> 01:34:24.439
to our allies and partners in that

01:34:24.439 --> 01:34:27.149
theater is waning . Additionally , UCOM

01:34:27.569 --> 01:34:30.080
handed control of a key logistics hub

01:34:30.729 --> 01:34:33.490
in Southeast Poland over to other NATO

01:34:33.490 --> 01:34:36.250
forces again highlighting this idea of

01:34:36.250 --> 01:34:39.430
wavering US commitment to our allies .

01:34:39.729 --> 01:34:41.951
And to underpin all of this , there are

01:34:41.951 --> 01:34:43.673
rumors within the DOD that the

01:34:43.673 --> 01:34:45.785
department will direct a reduction of

01:34:45.785 --> 01:34:47.840
US presence in South Korea or retask

01:34:47.840 --> 01:34:50.009
these forces to focus on the threat

01:34:50.009 --> 01:34:52.259
from China . So General Brunson . I

01:34:52.259 --> 01:34:54.370
acknowledge you cannot comment on the

01:34:54.370 --> 01:34:56.620
policy , I understand that , but from a

01:34:56.620 --> 01:34:59.299
strategic lens , what impact would a

01:34:59.299 --> 01:35:02.339
force reduction or a retasking of

01:35:02.339 --> 01:35:05.629
forces have on your ability to deter

01:35:05.629 --> 01:35:07.073
North Korean aggression ?

01:35:09.660 --> 01:35:12.540
Uh , Senator , uh , Kelly , uh , the

01:35:12.540 --> 01:35:15.700
28,500 troops that we have on in the

01:35:15.700 --> 01:35:18.060
Republic of Korea are responsible

01:35:18.060 --> 01:35:20.419
wholly for preserving peace on the

01:35:20.419 --> 01:35:22.939
peninsula in the region in Northeast

01:35:22.939 --> 01:35:26.060
Asia . They're a critical component to

01:35:26.060 --> 01:35:28.393
ballistic missile defense in the region .

01:35:28.393 --> 01:35:30.950
They are a critical portion of helping

01:35:31.319 --> 01:35:34.479
the Indo Paycom command see sense and

01:35:34.479 --> 01:35:37.720
understand in the North and to deter uh

01:35:38.000 --> 01:35:40.919
a great many adversaries . The MDT that

01:35:40.919 --> 01:35:42.919
we share with the Republic of Korea

01:35:42.919 --> 01:35:45.439
does not mention an adversary . That's

01:35:45.439 --> 01:35:47.550
always been the way it is . Should an

01:35:47.550 --> 01:35:49.661
adversary arise , the troops that are

01:35:49.661 --> 01:35:51.828
there are prepared well along with our

01:35:51.828 --> 01:35:55.540
Korean allies to meet any mission . And

01:35:56.419 --> 01:35:58.740
Do you feel your force is the right

01:35:58.740 --> 01:36:02.410
size ? For the missions as given ,

01:36:02.439 --> 01:36:05.319
yes , and , and what do you assess the

01:36:05.319 --> 01:36:07.319
impact would be to our relationship

01:36:07.319 --> 01:36:09.375
with South Korea and partners in the

01:36:09.375 --> 01:36:11.541
region if we downsize the force on the

01:36:11.541 --> 01:36:15.330
peninsula ? Uh , what , what I think we

01:36:15.330 --> 01:36:17.108
ought to do , uh , senator , is

01:36:17.108 --> 01:36:19.108
remember that there's diplomacy and

01:36:19.108 --> 01:36:21.660
defense on the peninsula currently . We

01:36:21.660 --> 01:36:23.859
share the unique , uh , focus of being

01:36:23.859 --> 01:36:26.192
able to look at our partners eye to eye .

01:36:26.250 --> 01:36:28.129
Uh , recently , uh , received

01:36:28.129 --> 01:36:30.490
instructions to move assets . We were

01:36:30.490 --> 01:36:32.657
able to talk through those things , so

01:36:32.657 --> 01:36:34.768
we've got to make sure that we , we ,

01:36:34.768 --> 01:36:37.569
uh , use strategic clarity to explain

01:36:37.569 --> 01:36:39.890
what , uh , is being asked of our

01:36:39.890 --> 01:36:41.723
forces . All right , thank you ,

01:36:41.723 --> 01:36:45.419
General . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:36:45.899 --> 01:36:48.066
That would be me right now , so I will

01:36:48.066 --> 01:36:50.470
recognize myself . Um , Admiral Paparro ,

01:36:50.509 --> 01:36:52.509
it's great to see you . Um , always

01:36:52.509 --> 01:36:54.620
appreciate your testimony . He's very

01:36:54.620 --> 01:36:57.240
clear-eyed , uh , to the point . So

01:36:57.240 --> 01:37:00.149
I've long been very concerned about the ,

01:37:00.160 --> 01:37:02.319
the Chinese pres presence , uh , the

01:37:02.319 --> 01:37:04.629
Panama Canal , uh , and what they might

01:37:04.629 --> 01:37:07.229
be able to do with that if , heaven

01:37:07.229 --> 01:37:09.451
forbid something were to happen . Could

01:37:09.451 --> 01:37:12.439
you just elaborate a little bit on Um ,

01:37:12.569 --> 01:37:15.220
how the closure of that , it looks just

01:37:15.220 --> 01:37:17.220
assume that that would happen , the

01:37:17.220 --> 01:37:20.180
closure of that or a , or a , um . Um ,

01:37:20.390 --> 01:37:22.501
an interruption in its availability ,

01:37:22.501 --> 01:37:24.612
how that would , uh , affect the flow

01:37:24.612 --> 01:37:26.779
of both combatants and support vessels

01:37:26.779 --> 01:37:28.890
to the region . Morning , Senator . I

01:37:28.890 --> 01:37:31.001
mean , inherently the geography , you

01:37:31.001 --> 01:37:33.168
know , the , the alternative being all

01:37:33.168 --> 01:37:35.223
the way south around the Horn , uh ,

01:37:35.223 --> 01:37:37.939
that's about a two week transit , uh ,

01:37:38.189 --> 01:37:40.300
think about how critical it is to get

01:37:40.300 --> 01:37:42.770
forces on on front . When the PRC's

01:37:42.770 --> 01:37:46.589
intention is a short sharp war that

01:37:46.589 --> 01:37:48.629
provides a fait accompli to the

01:37:48.629 --> 01:37:50.669
international community and so

01:37:50.669 --> 01:37:52.836
inherently anything that slows us down

01:37:52.836 --> 01:37:55.540
over time and distance is bad for us .

01:37:55.790 --> 01:37:57.401
Now consider that all of the

01:37:57.401 --> 01:37:59.457
shipbuilding in the United States of

01:37:59.457 --> 01:38:01.939
America is east of the Panama Canal ,

01:38:02.109 --> 01:38:04.220
but the preponderance of the threat .

01:38:04.589 --> 01:38:06.979
Is in the Pacific and that just shows

01:38:06.979 --> 01:38:09.500
the inherent logic of the requirement

01:38:09.500 --> 01:38:12.060
for the Panama Canal as ever . Yeah ,

01:38:12.209 --> 01:38:14.709
and I think yes , the concerns that uh

01:38:14.709 --> 01:38:16.660
that we had when it was I think

01:38:16.660 --> 01:38:19.540
mistakenly sort of given away are uh

01:38:19.540 --> 01:38:21.318
even more concerning now is our

01:38:21.318 --> 01:38:24.259
orientation I think . Shifts shifts to

01:38:24.259 --> 01:38:26.370
the Indo-Pacific in a more meaningful

01:38:26.370 --> 01:38:28.592
way . Um , General Bruns , it's good to

01:38:28.592 --> 01:38:30.703
see you . I wanted to ask you , and I

01:38:30.703 --> 01:38:32.870
know that , uh , Admiral Paparro got a

01:38:32.870 --> 01:38:35.203
question somewhat related to this , but ,

01:38:35.203 --> 01:38:36.759
um , concerns about airlift

01:38:36.759 --> 01:38:39.649
capabilities and um . And we don't have

01:38:39.649 --> 01:38:42.009
enough aircraft and many of our , our

01:38:42.009 --> 01:38:44.970
C-130s don't have the survivability in

01:38:44.970 --> 01:38:46.970
a contested environment . Could you

01:38:46.970 --> 01:38:48.859
speak a little bit to the current

01:38:48.859 --> 01:38:50.692
limitations , um , we would have

01:38:50.692 --> 01:38:52.470
supporting forces in the Korean

01:38:52.470 --> 01:38:54.692
Peninsula given our current inventory .

01:38:55.439 --> 01:38:58.560
It's just the , the amount of uh as we

01:38:58.560 --> 01:39:01.229
look at tip fit flows , sustainment ,

01:39:01.240 --> 01:39:03.640
and those things that are required to

01:39:03.640 --> 01:39:06.839
prosecute in the KTO uh , it's why

01:39:06.839 --> 01:39:08.450
we've begun to move . It's a

01:39:08.450 --> 01:39:10.395
recognition of that it's why we've

01:39:10.395 --> 01:39:12.172
begun to move with the combined

01:39:12.172 --> 01:39:14.117
logistics command . It's why we've

01:39:14.117 --> 01:39:16.117
begun to look at how can we set the

01:39:16.117 --> 01:39:18.172
theater now looking at the stores of

01:39:18.172 --> 01:39:20.283
munitions , some of which will expire

01:39:20.283 --> 01:39:22.506
soon , how do we get those replaced and

01:39:22.506 --> 01:39:24.506
then quick fashion so that we don't

01:39:24.506 --> 01:39:26.561
provide drain . Uh , for sustainment

01:39:26.561 --> 01:39:28.395
things in order to prosecute the

01:39:28.395 --> 01:39:30.506
campaign , I'm , I'm readily aware of

01:39:30.506 --> 01:39:32.620
the fact that I'm fighting until help

01:39:32.620 --> 01:39:34.731
comes . That's what we're expected to

01:39:34.731 --> 01:39:37.060
do there , uh , myself and the Republic

01:39:37.060 --> 01:39:39.430
of Korean forces as well as the forces

01:39:39.430 --> 01:39:41.899
apportioned to UN command . Uh , we're

01:39:41.899 --> 01:39:43.955
fighting until they get there , so a

01:39:43.955 --> 01:39:46.121
great many of the extra . that we do ,

01:39:46.121 --> 01:39:48.288
Senator are all aimed at understanding

01:39:48.288 --> 01:39:50.545
what magazine debt needs to be resident

01:39:50.545 --> 01:39:52.712
on the peninsula so that we don't have

01:39:52.712 --> 01:39:54.886
to count on external support coming to

01:39:55.155 --> 01:39:57.377
and so that we might not drain from the

01:39:57.377 --> 01:39:59.377
overall effort but it's fair to say

01:39:59.377 --> 01:40:01.322
that a lot of those plans that are

01:40:01.322 --> 01:40:03.488
being drawn to account for that , uh ,

01:40:03.488 --> 01:40:05.488
are , are meant to address the fact

01:40:05.488 --> 01:40:04.476
that we probably don't have the

01:40:04.476 --> 01:40:06.771
inventory . That we that we need right

01:40:06.771 --> 01:40:08.882
now is that fair to say ? It would be

01:40:08.882 --> 01:40:10.827
accurate . We're challenging those

01:40:10.827 --> 01:40:13.160
assumptions every day , Senator , right ?

01:40:13.160 --> 01:40:15.327
OK , um , Admiral Paparo , I wanted to

01:40:15.327 --> 01:40:17.493
go back to you . Um , I think with the

01:40:17.493 --> 01:40:19.715
is it's related as far as maintenance ,

01:40:19.892 --> 01:40:23.222
um , and availability and execution in ,

01:40:23.231 --> 01:40:25.287
um , in the Indo-Pacific . There was

01:40:25.287 --> 01:40:27.671
recently , um , I think a big win for

01:40:27.671 --> 01:40:29.782
the US and our allies with the , uh ,

01:40:29.812 --> 01:40:32.990
the , the tanker . Um , mission in , in

01:40:32.990 --> 01:40:35.157
South Korea and then we're also seeing

01:40:35.157 --> 01:40:36.823
this obviously with submarine

01:40:36.823 --> 01:40:39.240
maintenance in Australia . um , what to

01:40:39.240 --> 01:40:41.407
you , what's the next big step because

01:40:41.407 --> 01:40:43.573
you've articulated , I think rightly ,

01:40:43.573 --> 01:40:45.518
that speed is gonna matter but the

01:40:45.518 --> 01:40:47.740
logistical hurdles and the vast expanse

01:40:47.740 --> 01:40:49.962
of the Pacific is I think it's hard for

01:40:49.962 --> 01:40:51.962
people to really actually put their

01:40:51.962 --> 01:40:54.018
their mind around it until you put a

01:40:54.018 --> 01:40:56.073
map up , you know , and you just and

01:40:56.073 --> 01:40:58.129
you see just the expanse . So what's

01:40:58.129 --> 01:41:00.073
the next big step to to to address

01:41:00.073 --> 01:41:02.129
those logistical challenges for us ,

01:41:02.129 --> 01:41:04.296
Senator , first , um , enrich the kind

01:41:04.296 --> 01:41:06.490
of work that we're doing in our

01:41:06.490 --> 01:41:08.509
partnership yards . So beyond the

01:41:08.509 --> 01:41:11.520
standard voyage repairs is to do , uh ,

01:41:11.529 --> 01:41:13.950
deeper , deeper repairs for our forward

01:41:13.950 --> 01:41:16.649
deployed naval force is one step and

01:41:16.649 --> 01:41:19.080
then if we can get into the space of uh

01:41:19.330 --> 01:41:21.770
of production of that capability of

01:41:21.770 --> 01:41:24.750
enhancing . Uh , the Korean , uh ,

01:41:24.850 --> 01:41:27.529
worldwide ship capacity , which is , uh ,

01:41:27.569 --> 01:41:30.410
I think 23% of global total is , is

01:41:30.410 --> 01:41:34.250
built in Korea . Uh , Japan is 15% of

01:41:34.250 --> 01:41:36.472
global shipbuilding . The United States

01:41:36.472 --> 01:41:39.250
of America is 1% of shipbuilding . This

01:41:39.250 --> 01:41:41.490
confers immediately to speed , so .

01:41:42.120 --> 01:41:44.470
More , uh , maintenance being executed

01:41:44.470 --> 01:41:47.270
at these uh at these partner yards

01:41:47.520 --> 01:41:49.799
where it makes sense and then the next

01:41:49.799 --> 01:41:51.966
step and uh and uh you know I've heard

01:41:51.966 --> 01:41:54.770
a lot of talk about this from uh . Uh ,

01:41:54.779 --> 01:41:56.612
from , you know , all throughout

01:41:56.612 --> 01:41:59.100
government , which is , uh , which is

01:41:59.100 --> 01:42:01.720
to avail ourselves of our partners

01:42:01.720 --> 01:42:04.100
unique shipbuilding expertise , and

01:42:04.100 --> 01:42:07.660
then while we , we , while we regain

01:42:07.660 --> 01:42:10.379
our own shipbuilding expertise in the

01:42:10.379 --> 01:42:12.529
United States . Thank you , um ,

01:42:12.700 --> 01:42:15.569
Senator Peters . Thank you gentlemen .

01:42:15.640 --> 01:42:17.584
Thank you for being here today and

01:42:17.584 --> 01:42:19.807
certainly uh thank you for your service

01:42:19.807 --> 01:42:22.069
to , to our country . Admiral , uh ,

01:42:22.080 --> 01:42:25.140
Paparo , as you know , exercise , uh ,

01:42:25.149 --> 01:42:27.270
Northern strike in Michigan , uh ,

01:42:27.359 --> 01:42:30.279
brings over 6300 , uh , participants

01:42:30.279 --> 01:42:32.335
from all across the United States as

01:42:32.335 --> 01:42:34.990
well as our international partners to

01:42:35.000 --> 01:42:37.520
to Michigan's National All Domain War

01:42:37.520 --> 01:42:39.464
fighting center . It's the largest

01:42:39.464 --> 01:42:41.687
training area east of the Mississippi .

01:42:42.040 --> 01:42:43.984
Uh , in past briefings before this

01:42:43.984 --> 01:42:46.040
committee , you discussed the , uh ,

01:42:46.040 --> 01:42:48.040
the importance of exercise Northern

01:42:48.040 --> 01:42:49.818
strike to Indo Paycom and , and

01:42:49.818 --> 01:42:51.762
particularly , uh , our ability to

01:42:51.762 --> 01:42:54.096
cooperate with , uh , with our partners ,

01:42:54.096 --> 01:42:56.096
uh , in the region . Uh , could you

01:42:56.096 --> 01:42:58.151
elaborate on your prior comments and

01:42:58.151 --> 01:43:00.096
discuss the importance of Northern

01:43:00.096 --> 01:42:59.990
strike to supporting Indo Paycom's

01:42:59.990 --> 01:43:02.549
mission , please ? Uh , Senator ,

01:43:02.790 --> 01:43:04.901
without giving more of the details of

01:43:04.901 --> 01:43:07.123
what's executed on Northern strike , it

01:43:07.123 --> 01:43:10.939
is , uh , it is a key point of leverage ,

01:43:11.270 --> 01:43:13.870
and I have this , uh , even in my from

01:43:13.870 --> 01:43:16.899
my interlocutors who report that , um ,

01:43:17.109 --> 01:43:19.053
those personnel that returned from

01:43:19.053 --> 01:43:22.109
Northern Strike are changed . Uh , and ,

01:43:22.180 --> 01:43:25.160
uh , so I treasure it and I want more

01:43:25.160 --> 01:43:27.438
of it and I want to expand it and , um ,

01:43:27.439 --> 01:43:29.217
you know , I thank the state of

01:43:29.217 --> 01:43:31.272
Michigan for their diligence in it .

01:43:31.272 --> 01:43:33.495
Well , that's great to hear Edmiral and

01:43:33.495 --> 01:43:35.717
uh happy to hear that and uh yeah , you

01:43:35.717 --> 01:43:34.799
will know that I'm actually

01:43:34.799 --> 01:43:38.120
co-sponsoring a proposal for the NDAA

01:43:38.120 --> 01:43:40.231
with Senator Slotkin to make Northern

01:43:40.231 --> 01:43:42.379
strike permanent . Uh , and funding

01:43:42.379 --> 01:43:44.490
permanent , uh , and I certainly look

01:43:44.490 --> 01:43:46.712
forward to working with members of this

01:43:46.712 --> 01:43:48.823
committee to do that in your words of

01:43:48.823 --> 01:43:50.990
encouragement , uh , I hope we'll help

01:43:50.990 --> 01:43:53.212
that process , uh , move , move along .

01:43:53.212 --> 01:43:55.546
General Brunsen , uh , as you know , uh ,

01:43:55.546 --> 01:43:57.657
Russia is strengthening military ties

01:43:57.657 --> 01:43:59.546
with North Korea through a mutual

01:43:59.546 --> 01:44:01.768
defense pact , troop deployments to the

01:44:01.768 --> 01:44:04.180
Ukraine , uh , and efforts to modernize

01:44:04.180 --> 01:44:06.379
North Korea's conventional forces .

01:44:06.950 --> 01:44:09.310
Meanwhile , uh , China is mounting a

01:44:09.310 --> 01:44:11.229
pressure campaign on South Korea

01:44:11.229 --> 01:44:13.189
through political interference ,

01:44:13.509 --> 01:44:15.731
economic pressure , maritime disputes ,

01:44:15.731 --> 01:44:17.910
cyber operations , uh , targeting

01:44:17.910 --> 01:44:20.077
critical infrastructure , and the list

01:44:20.077 --> 01:44:22.354
goes on . So my question for you , sir ,

01:44:22.354 --> 01:44:24.990
is how is the USFK adapting its force

01:44:24.990 --> 01:44:27.669
posture or training to counter the

01:44:27.669 --> 01:44:30.149
hybrid nature of threats , including

01:44:30.149 --> 01:44:33.649
military cyber . And disinformation

01:44:33.649 --> 01:44:36.640
that's now posed by both Russia and

01:44:36.640 --> 01:44:38.799
China in this region .

01:44:40.990 --> 01:44:43.180
Yes , Senator , so one of the things

01:44:43.180 --> 01:44:45.347
that I believe in the future , whether

01:44:45.347 --> 01:44:47.236
it's in competition , conflict or

01:44:47.236 --> 01:44:49.291
crisis we've got to be able to do is

01:44:49.291 --> 01:44:51.402
we've got to be able to protect we've

01:44:51.402 --> 01:44:53.513
got to be able to sustain , and we've

01:44:53.513 --> 01:44:55.791
got to recognize that our posture , uh ,

01:44:55.791 --> 01:44:57.847
which entails our organization and a

01:44:57.847 --> 01:45:00.069
host of capabilities , it all got to be

01:45:00.069 --> 01:45:02.180
in the right place part of doing that

01:45:02.180 --> 01:45:04.069
is by utilizing the assets at our

01:45:04.069 --> 01:45:06.291
disposable and the authorities inherent

01:45:06.291 --> 01:45:08.402
in other nations that come to join us

01:45:08.402 --> 01:45:10.939
on the peninsula . So , uh , to , to

01:45:10.939 --> 01:45:13.050
sort of keep this clean if you will ,

01:45:13.050 --> 01:45:15.609
we're able to leverage the special

01:45:15.609 --> 01:45:17.720
operations forces within the Republic

01:45:17.720 --> 01:45:19.831
of Korea . We're able to leverage our

01:45:19.831 --> 01:45:22.680
own uh forces whether that be a uh

01:45:22.680 --> 01:45:24.680
military information support team .

01:45:24.850 --> 01:45:27.330
That operates inside embassy spaces or

01:45:27.330 --> 01:45:29.810
whether it's us using them uh along

01:45:29.810 --> 01:45:32.569
with our J 39 to ensure that we're not

01:45:32.569 --> 01:45:35.089
only hardening access to ports but

01:45:35.089 --> 01:45:37.311
we're also testing all our lines as you

01:45:37.311 --> 01:45:39.256
know Senator , we fight off of the

01:45:39.256 --> 01:45:41.478
centric K network . It's important that

01:45:41.478 --> 01:45:43.533
we stay . On that network with cyber

01:45:43.533 --> 01:45:45.589
defense teams and then encourage our

01:45:45.589 --> 01:45:47.700
partners to do the same thing , which

01:45:47.700 --> 01:45:49.922
is what we're doing right now to ensure

01:45:49.922 --> 01:45:52.089
that we limit access to our networks ,

01:45:52.089 --> 01:45:54.256
protect our information properly , and

01:45:54.256 --> 01:45:56.478
look at those whole host of threats and

01:45:56.478 --> 01:45:58.311
how we might counter them on the

01:45:58.311 --> 01:46:00.478
peninsula . Very good , uh , uh , from

01:46:00.478 --> 01:46:02.700
your perspective , is there a risk that

01:46:02.700 --> 01:46:04.589
China and Russia could coordinate

01:46:04.589 --> 01:46:06.811
actions on the peninsula to distract or

01:46:06.811 --> 01:46:08.890
perhaps uh divide US attention from

01:46:08.890 --> 01:46:10.946
other strategic challenges including

01:46:10.946 --> 01:46:13.620
Taiwan uh uh or Ukraine ? How concerned

01:46:13.620 --> 01:46:16.290
are you about that ? I , I'm concerned

01:46:16.290 --> 01:46:18.457
about that from the perspective of how

01:46:18.457 --> 01:46:21.290
they might , uh , enlist the DPRK to

01:46:21.290 --> 01:46:23.700
aid in some form of subterfuge ,

01:46:23.799 --> 01:46:26.330
nefarious activity , or anything else

01:46:26.330 --> 01:46:28.552
that might happen in the region to keep

01:46:28.552 --> 01:46:30.719
us from focusing wholeheartedly on the

01:46:30.719 --> 01:46:32.919
mission of Indo Paycom in , uh ,

01:46:32.930 --> 01:46:34.486
maintaining a free and open

01:46:34.486 --> 01:46:37.229
Indo-Pacific . Thank you , uh , uh ,

01:46:37.479 --> 01:46:39.312
Admiral Papara , Congress , uh ,

01:46:39.312 --> 01:46:41.423
created the , uh , Pacific Deterrence

01:46:41.423 --> 01:46:43.646
Initiative , uh , in fiscal year 2021 ,

01:46:43.959 --> 01:46:46.292
National Defense Authorization Act , uh ,

01:46:46.292 --> 01:46:48.515
to strengthen our military capabilities

01:46:48.515 --> 01:46:50.403
and partnerships , uh , in , uh ,

01:46:50.403 --> 01:46:52.570
Indo-accific region . The PDI is aimed

01:46:52.570 --> 01:46:54.626
to boost deterrence against China by

01:46:54.626 --> 01:46:57.020
investing in force posture in logistics ,

01:46:57.160 --> 01:46:59.439
missile defense , allied cooperation .

01:46:59.759 --> 01:47:01.926
Uh , sir , could you , could you share

01:47:01.926 --> 01:47:03.815
some specific examples of how PDI

01:47:03.815 --> 01:47:05.759
funding has improved , uh , the US

01:47:05.759 --> 01:47:08.660
force posture or our readiness and what

01:47:08.660 --> 01:47:10.990
steps , uh , can we take to enhance or ,

01:47:11.009 --> 01:47:13.540
or fully operationalize , uh , PDI ?

01:47:14.629 --> 01:47:17.310
Senator , um , uh , an example is the

01:47:17.310 --> 01:47:19.477
joint fires network and our ability to

01:47:19.477 --> 01:47:21.620
move fast in order to execute , uh ,

01:47:21.629 --> 01:47:24.500
the fires function of the among joint

01:47:24.500 --> 01:47:27.430
joint fires , uh , faster . Uh , our

01:47:27.430 --> 01:47:29.597
material improvements throughout the ,

01:47:29.597 --> 01:47:31.819
uh , throughout the theater , um , uh ,

01:47:31.819 --> 01:47:34.129
has enabled us to move faster , uh ,

01:47:34.149 --> 01:47:36.390
and enhancing Pacific deterrence

01:47:36.390 --> 01:47:39.129
initiative , uh , US Indo Pacific

01:47:39.129 --> 01:47:41.979
Command is an adviser to the process .

01:47:42.379 --> 01:47:45.049
The services choose which elements that

01:47:45.049 --> 01:47:47.850
they do is Pacific deterrent initiative

01:47:48.250 --> 01:47:51.799
and as the AOR is 53% of the world ,

01:47:52.290 --> 01:47:54.457
almost any joint force element that is

01:47:54.457 --> 01:47:56.799
acquired is applicable to the Pacific ,

01:47:57.049 --> 01:47:59.689
so more agency for United States Indo

01:47:59.689 --> 01:48:02.729
Paycom enable to close the seams

01:48:02.729 --> 01:48:04.850
throughout the services would enhance

01:48:04.850 --> 01:48:07.970
the already good effect of Pacific

01:48:07.970 --> 01:48:10.026
deterrent Initiative . Right , thank

01:48:10.026 --> 01:48:13.810
you , thank you again . Thank you ,

01:48:13.890 --> 01:48:15.890
Senator Sullivan . Thank you , Mr .

01:48:15.890 --> 01:48:17.890
Chairman , uh , gentlemen , Admiral

01:48:17.890 --> 01:48:19.723
General , I wanna first begin by

01:48:19.723 --> 01:48:21.557
thanking you for your decades of

01:48:21.557 --> 01:48:23.839
service , both of you , your , uh . You

01:48:23.839 --> 01:48:26.006
do , you both do a great job . I think

01:48:26.006 --> 01:48:28.061
sometimes we don't always say that ,

01:48:28.061 --> 01:48:30.859
same with your staffs , um . I have uh

01:48:31.109 --> 01:48:33.387
shown this chart to many , many , many .

01:48:33.850 --> 01:48:36.479
Uh , folks here in the last few months ,

01:48:36.529 --> 01:48:38.696
this is the action that's happening in

01:48:38.696 --> 01:48:40.751
the North Pacific , Admiral , as you

01:48:40.751 --> 01:48:42.862
know , up in the Arctic , very , very

01:48:42.862 --> 01:48:45.810
aggressive Russian , Chinese actions

01:48:45.810 --> 01:48:48.850
into our AI into our EEZ , and the

01:48:48.850 --> 01:48:50.906
unprecedented element of this is the

01:48:50.906 --> 01:48:53.950
joint task force nature . Uh ,

01:48:54.029 --> 01:48:56.196
Russian-Chinese joint strategic Bomber

01:48:56.196 --> 01:48:59.990
task forces last summer in our 8 days ,

01:49:00.109 --> 01:49:02.331
uh , every summer now , last 3 years we

01:49:02.331 --> 01:49:04.589
have joint Russian Chinese naval task

01:49:04.589 --> 01:49:07.700
forces in our EEZ , very aggressive

01:49:07.700 --> 01:49:09.478
pushing out , you know , Alaska

01:49:09.478 --> 01:49:11.549
fishermen from their grounds . So we

01:49:11.549 --> 01:49:14.819
need more everybody's testified we need

01:49:14.819 --> 01:49:16.930
more , uh , infrastructure up there .

01:49:17.149 --> 01:49:19.371
um , Admiral Yu in a classified hearing

01:49:19.371 --> 01:49:21.830
said we need to reopen . This very

01:49:21.830 --> 01:49:25.509
strategic port navy base ADA , by the

01:49:25.509 --> 01:49:27.629
way , I did a little geography test .

01:49:27.689 --> 01:49:31.439
It's over 1000 miles west of Hawaii .

01:49:31.529 --> 01:49:33.640
Most people have no clue about that .

01:49:33.850 --> 01:49:35.739
Uh , it's also the gateway to the

01:49:35.739 --> 01:49:37.461
Arctic . NorthCO commander has

01:49:37.461 --> 01:49:39.628
testified we need to reopen ADAC . The

01:49:39.628 --> 01:49:42.259
CNO has testified . Why do you think

01:49:42.259 --> 01:49:45.169
ADAC is so important ? Admiral .

01:49:46.220 --> 01:49:49.979
Senator , uh , it is a it is a further

01:49:49.979 --> 01:49:52.970
western point which would enable , uh ,

01:49:53.020 --> 01:49:54.909
which would enable and along with

01:49:54.909 --> 01:49:57.020
Erickson , uh , in order to gain time

01:49:57.020 --> 01:49:59.076
and distance on any force capability

01:49:59.076 --> 01:50:01.060
that's looking to penetrate . Uh ,

01:50:01.149 --> 01:50:04.089
Russia's Pacific Fleet , uh , in , uh ,

01:50:04.109 --> 01:50:06.399
in Russia frequently takes that great

01:50:06.399 --> 01:50:09.779
circle route through Alaska and , uh ,

01:50:09.790 --> 01:50:13.439
it would enable up to 10x

01:50:13.439 --> 01:50:15.750
the maritime patrol reconnaissance

01:50:15.750 --> 01:50:18.750
aircraft coverage of that key and

01:50:18.750 --> 01:50:22.310
increasingly effective or increasingly

01:50:22.310 --> 01:50:24.549
contested space . So you , you

01:50:24.549 --> 01:50:26.660
testified in a classified hearing you

01:50:26.660 --> 01:50:28.771
think that we should reopen that just

01:50:28.771 --> 01:50:30.827
now that we're in an unclass hearing

01:50:30.827 --> 01:50:32.771
you wanna . Say that in an unclass

01:50:32.771 --> 01:50:36.029
setting too we should reopen AA and we

01:50:36.029 --> 01:50:38.140
should enhance the ability to operate

01:50:38.140 --> 01:50:40.339
out of Erickson . So , um , thank you

01:50:40.339 --> 01:50:44.069
on that . It has 3 piers , uh , 28,000

01:50:44.069 --> 01:50:46.589
ft runways , a big hangar , 22 million

01:50:46.589 --> 01:50:48.645
gallons of fuel storage , one of the

01:50:48.645 --> 01:50:50.910
biggest fuel storage depots anywhere on

01:50:50.910 --> 01:50:53.990
the planet Earth . The CNO just sent a

01:50:53.990 --> 01:50:57.229
team up there , uh , Navy , State of

01:50:57.229 --> 01:51:01.009
Alaska , the Ale Corporation . And um

01:51:01.009 --> 01:51:03.410
the NorthCO commander just uh reached

01:51:03.410 --> 01:51:05.521
out to me two days ago saying they're

01:51:05.521 --> 01:51:07.688
gonna have a final report completed in

01:51:07.688 --> 01:51:10.169
the next 2 weeks on a low medium to

01:51:10.169 --> 01:51:12.850
high reopening uh scenario . Can you

01:51:12.850 --> 01:51:14.961
work commit to this committee to work

01:51:14.961 --> 01:51:18.089
with the NorthCO commander to get that

01:51:18.100 --> 01:51:20.330
report out in the next 2 weeks ? I

01:51:20.330 --> 01:51:23.009
commit . And then you also have plans

01:51:23.009 --> 01:51:25.129
with regard to Northern edge in terms

01:51:25.129 --> 01:51:27.129
of that really important exercise .

01:51:27.529 --> 01:51:29.696
Using AIDA , can you talk a little bit

01:51:29.696 --> 01:51:31.862
about that to the extent you can in an

01:51:31.862 --> 01:51:33.918
unclassified setting ? United States

01:51:33.918 --> 01:51:35.918
Air Force's concept of agile combat

01:51:35.918 --> 01:51:37.930
employment is the means by which we

01:51:37.930 --> 01:51:40.799
achieve more dynamism among the force .

01:51:41.069 --> 01:51:43.180
And so the 11th Air Force is based in

01:51:43.209 --> 01:51:45.520
in uh Alaska . That is an assigned

01:51:45.520 --> 01:51:47.742
force to United States Indo-Paycom . 11

01:51:47.742 --> 01:51:49.909
Air Force with over 100 5th generation

01:51:49.909 --> 01:51:52.020
fighters up there . The preponderance

01:51:52.020 --> 01:51:54.569
of Indo-Paycom's 5th generation

01:51:54.569 --> 01:51:57.990
fighters is in is in Alaska . And so ,

01:51:58.000 --> 01:52:01.379
uh , we will be exercising the agile

01:52:01.379 --> 01:52:03.799
combat employment concept in this

01:52:03.799 --> 01:52:07.680
summer's northern edge exercise in AA

01:52:07.680 --> 01:52:09.902
is gonna be part of that ? They shall ,

01:52:09.902 --> 01:52:12.069
they will operate out of AAC . Great ,

01:52:12.240 --> 01:52:14.240
um , let me mention one thing , you

01:52:14.240 --> 01:52:16.351
know , that when the president , uh ,

01:52:16.359 --> 01:52:18.526
after his election , he actually put a

01:52:18.526 --> 01:52:20.526
statement out saying we will ensure

01:52:20.526 --> 01:52:23.509
Alaska gets . Uh , increased defense

01:52:23.509 --> 01:52:25.660
investments as we fully rebuild our

01:52:25.660 --> 01:52:28.779
military , especially as Russia and

01:52:28.779 --> 01:52:32.229
China are making menacing moves in the ,

01:52:32.240 --> 01:52:34.407
uh , North Pacific . So that's a quote

01:52:34.407 --> 01:52:36.549
from the commander in chief . I know

01:52:36.549 --> 01:52:38.716
I've raised this with you , but it's a

01:52:38.716 --> 01:52:41.049
little bit of an issue , and , and , uh ,

01:52:41.049 --> 01:52:43.049
just in terms of the urgency , as I

01:52:43.049 --> 01:52:45.049
mentioned , state of Alaska , the A

01:52:45.049 --> 01:52:47.105
Corporation that is the great Alaska

01:52:47.105 --> 01:52:49.216
Native Corporation that owns the land

01:52:49.216 --> 01:52:51.160
there and the US Navy were in ADAC

01:52:51.160 --> 01:52:52.827
couple weeks ago doing a site

01:52:52.827 --> 01:52:54.993
assessment . They're gonna get that to

01:52:54.993 --> 01:52:57.049
us soon . The Alley Corporation I've

01:52:57.049 --> 01:52:56.950
talked to , these are great patriotic

01:52:56.950 --> 01:52:59.310
Americans . Alaska Natives serve at

01:52:59.310 --> 01:53:01.421
higher rates in the military than any

01:53:01.421 --> 01:53:03.421
other ethnic group . In the country

01:53:03.421 --> 01:53:05.532
they would love to do a deal with the

01:53:05.532 --> 01:53:07.699
Navy 9099 year lease or something like

01:53:07.699 --> 01:53:10.240
that , but you know who um checks in

01:53:10.240 --> 01:53:13.959
with them once a year , Admiral on ADAC

01:53:13.959 --> 01:53:17.660
about leasing ADAC , uh . I would guess

01:53:17.660 --> 01:53:19.827
it's not a friendly power . It's not .

01:53:19.827 --> 01:53:22.540
It's a Chinese shipping company that is

01:53:22.540 --> 01:53:24.707
certainly in my view , a front company

01:53:24.707 --> 01:53:26.929
for the PLA . So how embarrassing would

01:53:26.929 --> 01:53:29.209
it be to the Pentagon or the Navy ?

01:53:29.790 --> 01:53:31.734
These guys would never do it . The

01:53:31.734 --> 01:53:33.901
alley Corporations all patriotic , but

01:53:33.901 --> 01:53:36.012
if some , let's assume they weren't ,

01:53:36.012 --> 01:53:37.957
and somehow they signed a 100 year

01:53:37.957 --> 01:53:40.068
lease with a Chinese shipping company

01:53:40.068 --> 01:53:42.401
that always is out there looking at AIA ,

01:53:42.401 --> 01:53:44.457
you think that would be embarrassing

01:53:44.457 --> 01:53:46.346
for the US Navy and Pentagon ? On

01:53:46.346 --> 01:53:48.568
substance , I , I think it would be bad

01:53:48.568 --> 01:53:50.790
because uh this is the modus operandi ,

01:53:50.790 --> 01:53:52.957
uh , in the Belt and Road Initiative .

01:53:52.957 --> 01:53:54.790
Imagine having the Belt and Road

01:53:54.790 --> 01:53:56.901
Initiative include Alaska , in one of

01:53:56.901 --> 01:53:59.123
the most strategic ports in the world .

01:53:59.123 --> 01:54:01.234
So we , we have a sense of urgency on

01:54:01.234 --> 01:54:03.401
this , and you know I , I look forward

01:54:03.401 --> 01:54:02.799
to work with you and the committee , Mr .

01:54:02.839 --> 01:54:05.049
Chairman , on this important issue .

01:54:05.120 --> 01:54:09.080
Thank you . I sense a sense of

01:54:09.080 --> 01:54:11.879
urgency . Uh , yes , sir . Senator

01:54:11.879 --> 01:54:13.990
Blumenthal . Thanks , Mr . Chairman .

01:54:14.240 --> 01:54:16.407
Uh , thank you both for your service ,

01:54:16.407 --> 01:54:20.129
uh , Admiral , um . I wanna ask you

01:54:20.259 --> 01:54:23.299
uh . Some questions based on your

01:54:23.299 --> 01:54:27.040
extraordinarily . Impressive experience

01:54:27.040 --> 01:54:31.040
as an aviator , um , as

01:54:31.040 --> 01:54:34.439
well as combatant commander , um .

01:54:35.419 --> 01:54:38.100
We're building new aircraft carriers at

01:54:38.100 --> 01:54:41.520
huge expense . Are you concerned about

01:54:41.520 --> 01:54:44.000
their vulnerability in light of the

01:54:44.000 --> 01:54:46.222
increased Chinese capabilities that you

01:54:46.222 --> 01:54:48.479
mentioned in your testimony , AI ,

01:54:48.759 --> 01:54:51.600
cyber , hypersonic , missiles .

01:54:53.149 --> 01:54:55.729
My guess is the everyday American sees

01:54:55.729 --> 01:54:58.350
an aircraft carrier a huge sitting duck

01:54:58.350 --> 01:55:00.779
out there in the middle of the Pacific .

01:55:01.069 --> 01:55:04.040
Uh , are you concerned ? It's a moving

01:55:04.040 --> 01:55:06.318
duck with the ability to defend itself ,

01:55:06.919 --> 01:55:09.240
uh , unique among airfields as a mobile

01:55:09.240 --> 01:55:12.120
capability . Uh , it is not uniquely

01:55:12.120 --> 01:55:15.189
vulnerable , but it is uniquely

01:55:15.799 --> 01:55:19.040
valuable and the PRC seeing that

01:55:19.040 --> 01:55:22.549
valuable value have made it a it

01:55:22.720 --> 01:55:26.359
a focus because they have every

01:55:26.359 --> 01:55:29.990
other fixed land-based targeting

01:55:30.759 --> 01:55:34.270
complete . It's it's value lay

01:55:34.520 --> 01:55:37.879
in the enormous variety and the

01:55:37.879 --> 01:55:41.120
enormous mass of fires .

01:55:41.890 --> 01:55:44.580
And so , uh , it is not more uniquely

01:55:44.580 --> 01:55:47.189
vulnerable to the PRC , it is more

01:55:47.189 --> 01:55:49.870
uniquely threatening to the PRC , which

01:55:49.870 --> 01:55:52.620
is why they're working so hard , uh ,

01:55:52.629 --> 01:55:54.910
to strike it , and I hear people say ,

01:55:54.990 --> 01:55:56.879
well , in war games we lose these

01:55:56.879 --> 01:55:59.046
aircraft carriers . The war games must

01:55:59.046 --> 01:56:01.700
have a terrible paparo simulator .

01:56:02.200 --> 01:56:04.144
Because I'm going to put them into

01:56:04.144 --> 01:56:06.200
harm's way judiciously and when they

01:56:06.200 --> 01:56:08.520
can strike and it will be my job to

01:56:08.520 --> 01:56:10.742
return those aircraft carriers to their

01:56:10.742 --> 01:56:12.853
home bases after they have done their

01:56:12.853 --> 01:56:15.359
duty so I am no more concerned about

01:56:15.359 --> 01:56:17.248
aircraft carriers than I am about

01:56:17.248 --> 01:56:20.160
destroyers , submarines , squadrons ,

01:56:20.279 --> 01:56:23.910
wings , battalions , regiments , uh ,

01:56:23.919 --> 01:56:27.200
but those fires are the massive fires

01:56:27.200 --> 01:56:29.879
that they bring are absolutely unique

01:56:29.879 --> 01:56:32.950
step level change . Uh , above any

01:56:32.950 --> 01:56:36.609
other particular single unit , and

01:56:36.919 --> 01:56:40.850
you pay me to find ways to protect

01:56:41.220 --> 01:56:43.879
those aircraft carriers along with

01:56:43.879 --> 01:56:45.919
everything else that's in the joint

01:56:45.919 --> 01:56:48.240
force . For every one air to surface

01:56:48.240 --> 01:56:52.160
missile there are one for for one , you

01:56:52.160 --> 01:56:54.229
know , maritime oriented missile ,

01:56:54.479 --> 01:56:57.479
there are 8 others that are designed to

01:56:57.479 --> 01:57:00.899
strike land targets . Uh , and so , uh ,

01:57:00.950 --> 01:57:03.500
you know , I , I , I note that , uh ,

01:57:03.549 --> 01:57:05.271
you know , this topic comes up

01:57:05.271 --> 01:57:07.160
frequently , uh , but you have my

01:57:07.160 --> 01:57:09.629
opinion on it is that , uh , instead of ,

01:57:09.950 --> 01:57:12.339
you know , instead of waxing , uh ,

01:57:12.350 --> 01:57:14.517
into a , into a culture of , well , we

01:57:14.517 --> 01:57:16.794
should give up on this capability , no ,

01:57:16.794 --> 01:57:18.961
we should do something about it and we

01:57:18.961 --> 01:57:21.072
are doing something about it and that

01:57:21.072 --> 01:57:22.850
and that is well included in my

01:57:22.850 --> 01:57:25.017
integrated priorities list that I that

01:57:25.017 --> 01:57:27.183
I presented to the committee . I think

01:57:27.183 --> 01:57:29.660
that answer is uh extremely compelling .

01:57:30.439 --> 01:57:34.399
And thank you for it , uh . Turning to

01:57:34.399 --> 01:57:37.740
submarines . And asking the same

01:57:37.740 --> 01:57:41.200
question . In a different form , are

01:57:41.200 --> 01:57:43.990
submarines more vulnerable today than

01:57:44.370 --> 01:57:47.629
say 3 years ago , 5 years ago because

01:57:47.629 --> 01:57:50.979
of those advanced . Detection and

01:57:51.229 --> 01:57:53.430
countermeasures that the Chinese or

01:57:53.430 --> 01:57:56.700
other adversaries could mount . The PRC

01:57:56.700 --> 01:57:58.589
is growing in their capability on

01:57:58.589 --> 01:58:01.220
anti-submarine warfare , um , which I

01:58:01.220 --> 01:58:03.220
would expect them to do . I respect

01:58:03.220 --> 01:58:05.387
them for doing it . uh , they are more

01:58:05.387 --> 01:58:07.498
vulnerable than they've been before ,

01:58:07.498 --> 01:58:09.109
and that equally confers the

01:58:09.109 --> 01:58:11.220
responsibility for the command , uh ,

01:58:11.220 --> 01:58:14.029
to take the steps that gain more margin .

01:58:14.060 --> 01:58:16.227
I mean , the , the , the United States

01:58:16.227 --> 01:58:19.779
has a generational lead on submarine on

01:58:19.779 --> 01:58:22.189
undersea warfare . And it remains

01:58:22.189 --> 01:58:24.549
critical , absolutely one of my highest

01:58:24.549 --> 01:58:27.189
priorities , uh , the introduction of ,

01:58:27.229 --> 01:58:30.279
uh , quantum computing could well

01:58:30.279 --> 01:58:33.470
enhance the PRC's ability to flood the

01:58:33.470 --> 01:58:37.339
zone . And to target submarines

01:58:37.339 --> 01:58:39.561
and to take that away , they're pushing

01:58:39.561 --> 01:58:41.750
sensors into the sea to find them .

01:58:41.790 --> 01:58:43.957
They're working very hard to find them

01:58:44.149 --> 01:58:45.982
and they're working very hard to

01:58:45.982 --> 01:58:48.390
counter them . I have an equal duty to

01:58:48.390 --> 01:58:50.279
protect those and to preserve the

01:58:50.279 --> 01:58:52.700
unusual , the outsized combat

01:58:52.700 --> 01:58:55.430
capability of those submarines , and I

01:58:55.430 --> 01:58:58.660
take a similar view of refusing to quit .

01:58:59.160 --> 01:59:01.919
On a on a unique capability and on that

01:59:01.919 --> 01:59:05.189
front , if I leave this the the space

01:59:05.189 --> 01:59:07.830
between the surface and the Carmen line

01:59:08.120 --> 01:59:10.176
our adversaries are gonna flood that

01:59:10.176 --> 01:59:12.640
space with capability and become even

01:59:12.640 --> 01:59:14.696
more effective against our submarine

01:59:14.696 --> 01:59:16.862
force . Well , I thank you for both of

01:59:16.862 --> 01:59:19.250
those answers which again I find very

01:59:19.250 --> 01:59:21.640
persuasive . We can't quit on those

01:59:21.640 --> 01:59:23.640
weapons platforms . We just need to

01:59:23.640 --> 01:59:27.129
make them more . Capable and uh

01:59:27.129 --> 01:59:29.209
stronger and uh I look forward to

01:59:29.209 --> 01:59:31.320
working with you on on that mission .

01:59:31.350 --> 01:59:33.461
Thank you very much , Admiral . Thank

01:59:33.461 --> 01:59:35.794
you both for your service to our nation .

01:59:35.794 --> 01:59:38.017
Thank you all . Senator Slack and we'll

01:59:38.017 --> 01:59:40.350
be in in just a moment . Let me ask you ,

01:59:40.350 --> 01:59:42.490
um , in res in a , a follow up to

01:59:42.490 --> 01:59:44.101
Senator Blumenthal's line of

01:59:44.101 --> 01:59:46.101
questioning on submarines , we , we

01:59:46.101 --> 01:59:49.209
still need , um , a lot more submarines ,

01:59:49.250 --> 01:59:53.140
do we not ? Strongly agree we have to

01:59:53.140 --> 01:59:55.251
increase our production rates we have

01:59:55.251 --> 01:59:57.362
to invest in the submarine industrial

01:59:57.362 --> 01:59:59.584
base . We have to increase the rates of

01:59:59.584 --> 02:00:01.529
of uh the number of submarines and

02:00:01.529 --> 02:00:03.930
we've got to increase the availability

02:00:03.930 --> 02:00:06.020
of our submarines . And , and , um ,

02:00:06.060 --> 02:00:09.060
you had a valuable exchange with

02:00:09.060 --> 02:00:12.069
Senator Banks about nuclear weapons

02:00:12.500 --> 02:00:15.700
and and uh I , I understood you to say .

02:00:16.779 --> 02:00:20.669
They are useful to us every day because

02:00:20.669 --> 02:00:22.870
of their deterrent effect , is that

02:00:22.870 --> 02:00:26.350
correct ? And also , uh , just because ,

02:00:26.870 --> 02:00:30.379
um , we don't often hear about this ,

02:00:30.790 --> 02:00:33.629
uh , the doctrine of , of the United

02:00:33.629 --> 02:00:37.540
States . Uh , for years has been not

02:00:37.540 --> 02:00:41.500
to rule out a first strike . Is that

02:00:41.500 --> 02:00:43.740
correct ? I affirm that . OK , thank

02:00:43.740 --> 02:00:45.810
you very much . Uh , so just luck ,

02:00:46.779 --> 02:00:48.946
thank you . Apologies for being late .

02:00:48.946 --> 02:00:51.112
Welcome . Glad to have you here , um .

02:00:51.810 --> 02:00:53.866
Uh , I would just like to talk about

02:00:53.866 --> 02:00:55.977
strategy vis a vis China and Taiwan .

02:00:55.977 --> 02:00:57.754
I'm sure you've gotten a lot of

02:00:57.754 --> 02:00:59.921
questions on this . Um , I'm trying as

02:00:59.921 --> 02:01:01.977
the , the co-chair of the bipartisan

02:01:01.977 --> 02:01:05.290
Taiwan caucus , um , to understand what

02:01:05.290 --> 02:01:08.689
our approach is , um , given that we

02:01:08.689 --> 02:01:11.000
talk about the Chinese threat , right ,

02:01:11.169 --> 02:01:13.280
to Taiwan , we talk about , um , that

02:01:13.280 --> 02:01:15.336
we're in a period of vulnerability ,

02:01:15.336 --> 02:01:17.669
right ? We wanna make sure to , um . Uh ,

02:01:17.700 --> 02:01:21.399
be particularly watchful about what's

02:01:21.399 --> 02:01:23.759
going on in Chinese military intentions ,

02:01:24.040 --> 02:01:26.560
but at the same time we're calling into

02:01:26.560 --> 02:01:29.680
question the commitments by allies and

02:01:29.680 --> 02:01:32.649
partners , um , who we would need , I

02:01:32.649 --> 02:01:34.919
think in any Taiwan contingency

02:01:34.919 --> 02:01:37.450
scenario , right ? I think even . The

02:01:37.450 --> 02:01:39.506
Trump administration's your national

02:01:39.506 --> 02:01:41.728
interim national defense strategy talks

02:01:41.728 --> 02:01:43.672
about the importance of allies and

02:01:43.672 --> 02:01:46.169
partners , and I've seen public reports

02:01:46.169 --> 02:01:48.569
from CSIS and others that say that

02:01:48.569 --> 02:01:51.680
actually if there was a war with China

02:01:51.680 --> 02:01:53.839
over Taiwan , if they tried to take

02:01:53.839 --> 02:01:57.799
over Taiwan , um , we could not , um ,

02:01:57.810 --> 02:01:59.921
manage that situation to satisfaction

02:01:59.921 --> 02:02:02.088
if allies and partners weren't with us

02:02:02.088 --> 02:02:04.199
in that fight just there we're so far

02:02:04.199 --> 02:02:06.366
away , the tyranny of geography , what

02:02:06.366 --> 02:02:10.310
we always talk about . Um Um , and I'm

02:02:10.310 --> 02:02:12.569
just concerned that our approach to

02:02:12.569 --> 02:02:14.819
allies and partners is threatening the

02:02:14.819 --> 02:02:16.930
very thing that I think we believe in

02:02:16.930 --> 02:02:19.152
in a bipartisan basis on this committee

02:02:19.152 --> 02:02:20.979
that we need to have a muscular

02:02:20.979 --> 02:02:24.240
deterrent approach . So , Can you tell

02:02:24.240 --> 02:02:27.200
me about the value of allies and

02:02:27.200 --> 02:02:30.399
partners to whatever you need to do in

02:02:30.399 --> 02:02:32.510
that region understanding we're in an

02:02:32.510 --> 02:02:36.310
unclassified space um and um uh

02:02:36.600 --> 02:02:40.399
the dependence we have on other nations

02:02:40.399 --> 02:02:42.640
hosting our forces , allowing

02:02:42.640 --> 02:02:44.862
operations from their from their land ,

02:02:45.149 --> 02:02:47.260
can you walk me through it , please ?

02:02:47.859 --> 02:02:50.419
Senator , good morning , um . Uh ,

02:02:50.629 --> 02:02:52.830
allies and partners have an outsized

02:02:52.830 --> 02:02:54.997
effect . It is the strategic center of

02:02:54.997 --> 02:02:57.219
gravity of the United States of America

02:02:57.219 --> 02:02:58.997
and by having access basing and

02:02:58.997 --> 02:03:01.108
overflight with our allied partners ,

02:03:01.108 --> 02:03:03.069
we have the we have the ability to

02:03:03.069 --> 02:03:05.013
achieve the principles of expanded

02:03:05.013 --> 02:03:08.319
maneuver , and that is to have multiple

02:03:08.319 --> 02:03:11.350
attack vectors across multiple domains .

02:03:11.990 --> 02:03:14.109
Where our adversary would potentially

02:03:14.109 --> 02:03:16.220
just be putting , would be focused on

02:03:16.220 --> 02:03:18.229
the one point , there'd be threats

02:03:18.229 --> 02:03:20.549
coming from multiple points . It would

02:03:20.549 --> 02:03:23.470
confer it confers legitimacy on the

02:03:23.470 --> 02:03:26.299
force . It confers greater access

02:03:26.299 --> 02:03:28.859
basing overflight , freedom of movement

02:03:28.859 --> 02:03:31.069
of the force , and then to the extent

02:03:31.069 --> 02:03:32.680
that allies and partners are

02:03:32.680 --> 02:03:35.160
participating in the in the uh

02:03:35.589 --> 02:03:37.859
operation . It enhances your fire's

02:03:37.859 --> 02:03:39.830
capability as well . So all across

02:03:39.830 --> 02:03:42.108
those fronts , allies and partners are ,

02:03:42.108 --> 02:03:44.839
are critical . You do pay me to build a

02:03:44.839 --> 02:03:48.290
plan that does not fall on the loss of

02:03:48.290 --> 02:03:51.410
a partner . But the cost , the bill

02:03:51.410 --> 02:03:55.200
comes in the form of people capability ,

02:03:55.450 --> 02:03:58.339
money , and time . The more partners

02:03:58.600 --> 02:04:01.209
and allies that we have , the less it

02:04:01.209 --> 02:04:04.370
will be , will be the bill across those

02:04:04.370 --> 02:04:08.319
four domains . So I , I guess , uh ,

02:04:08.450 --> 02:04:11.950
my , my confusion comes with

02:04:12.370 --> 02:04:15.140
my view , again , my , my view as a , a

02:04:15.140 --> 02:04:17.720
senator here that this administration

02:04:17.720 --> 02:04:20.490
is , is implementing a strategy of

02:04:20.490 --> 02:04:22.649
cozying up to our adversaries and

02:04:22.649 --> 02:04:25.319
kicking our allies in the teeth . Um ,

02:04:25.410 --> 02:04:27.299
and I say that as someone who's a

02:04:27.299 --> 02:04:29.354
border state and lives right next to

02:04:29.354 --> 02:04:31.577
Canada , you know , we , we can go to a

02:04:31.577 --> 02:04:33.688
concert in Canada . I mean , it's a .

02:04:33.688 --> 02:04:35.521
It , the , the idea that we need

02:04:35.521 --> 02:04:38.259
partners to make deterring China .

02:04:39.680 --> 02:04:42.589
Affordable and approachable , but that

02:04:42.589 --> 02:04:45.189
we're gonna attack our allies , put

02:04:45.750 --> 02:04:47.750
significant tariffs on again , off

02:04:47.750 --> 02:04:50.390
again on these allies . We're gonna

02:04:50.390 --> 02:04:53.709
humiliate them in public . Speak badly

02:04:53.709 --> 02:04:56.189
and speak ill of them , including

02:04:56.189 --> 02:04:58.356
countries we share intelligence with ,

02:04:58.356 --> 02:05:01.830
is to me the most a strategic thing I

02:05:01.830 --> 02:05:03.870
have seen in a national security

02:05:03.870 --> 02:05:07.790
approach to China . So for all someone

02:05:07.790 --> 02:05:10.359
claims they care about deterring a

02:05:10.359 --> 02:05:13.529
military threat from China , if your

02:05:13.529 --> 02:05:15.669
approach is , and thank you for your

02:05:15.669 --> 02:05:18.310
incredibly articulate description of

02:05:18.310 --> 02:05:20.310
how our allies and partners are the

02:05:20.310 --> 02:05:23.310
center of gravity , your words , um , I

02:05:23.310 --> 02:05:26.379
believe it to my core . Um , I cannot

02:05:26.379 --> 02:05:28.546
for the life of me say with a straight

02:05:28.546 --> 02:05:30.546
face that for all the huff and puff

02:05:30.546 --> 02:05:32.879
this administration puts on about China .

02:05:32.879 --> 02:05:34.720
That they actually give a about

02:05:34.720 --> 02:05:36.498
deterring them because then you

02:05:36.498 --> 02:05:38.609
wouldn't be alienating all the allies

02:05:38.609 --> 02:05:40.759
and partners who live around China .

02:05:41.040 --> 02:05:43.479
And I'm watching the , the Chinese put

02:05:43.479 --> 02:05:46.359
in a base in Cambodia , right ? Sounds

02:05:46.359 --> 02:05:48.910
like a terrible vulnerability for us

02:05:48.910 --> 02:05:50.966
that other allies and partners are ,

02:05:50.966 --> 02:05:53.720
are cozying up to China . So I , I

02:05:53.720 --> 02:05:55.998
deeply appreciate the work that you do .

02:05:55.998 --> 02:05:58.109
We depend on you . We need you all to

02:05:58.109 --> 02:06:00.331
do your work well , but for the life of

02:06:00.331 --> 02:06:02.799
me , I think whatever bravado this

02:06:02.799 --> 02:06:04.855
administration has about China , the

02:06:04.855 --> 02:06:07.160
play is actually being undermined every

02:06:07.160 --> 02:06:09.049
day by the way that they kick our

02:06:09.049 --> 02:06:11.104
allies in the teeth . I yield back .

02:06:11.104 --> 02:06:13.438
Thank you , Senator Slotkin . That , uh ,

02:06:13.438 --> 02:06:15.950
concludes the hearing . We appreciate

02:06:16.200 --> 02:06:18.160
the testimony both in the closed

02:06:18.160 --> 02:06:20.970
session and in this open session , and ,

02:06:21.000 --> 02:06:23.640
um , with that this hearing is

02:06:23.640 --> 02:06:24.310
adjourned .