WEBVTT

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I mean , I can tell you both are so

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important information technology ,

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artificial intelligence . We can't fall

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behind . I mean , I , I was trying to

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explain to some folks back home they go ,

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Why is AI so important ? They go , Well ,

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if you , if you're way ahead of AI and

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you have quantum computing , you can

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break codes really easily . I mean , so

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if the other side has it , it puts our

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communications at risk . We map the

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world multiple times over . AI can help

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us decipher what , what things are

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moving , you know , left or right ,

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where , where , where's the aircraft at

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here ? What ships are in and out of

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harbor just that fast . And so it's

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really important that we stay ahead of

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AI . So I appreciate hearing from you ,

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Mr . Mandy , and , and , great , great

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to have you here . I could tell you I

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really enjoyed hearing your last time

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you were here about how you were trying

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to do the art of the possible when it

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comes to spectrum , yet you're gonna

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protect what's important , and I , I

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will tell you , I think the vast

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majority of the Armed Services

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Committee . I think could be all but at

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least I know it's the vast majority we

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wanna protect that part of the spectrum

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that our military needs for missile

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defense , air defense , or whatever it

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may be . So we , and you convinced us

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that you were really working that hard

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to find out what areas we can . Work on

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for for for switching it over what we

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have to actually protect so we look

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forward to hearing more from you . And

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with that I'll just , uh you'll our

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ranking member and my friend Mr . Cana .

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Thank you , Mr . Chairman . I'll keep

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it brief because I know we have , uh ,

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votes as well . I'd like to welcome

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Doctor Mattie and Ms . uh Arrington .

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Thank you for appearing before the

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subcommittee . Uh , we need , of course ,

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IT infrastructure as a foundation for

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many of the systems our war fighters

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depend on . I look forward to hearing

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about your efforts on the er trust

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ecosystem and the current status and

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future of DOD's use of cloud computing

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and authority to operate reform . Uh ,

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on the topic of AI , I look forward to

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hearing how CDAO will be helping to

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guide the department in their efforts

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to ethically and responsibly integrate

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AI into numerous systems , and with

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that , I want to thank again our

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witnesses for appearing and thank you ,

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Mr . Chairman . With that we yield to

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Ms . Harrington . Good morning

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Chairman Bacon . Sorry , my coffee

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hasn't kicked in yet . Let's starting

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over again . Good morning , Chairman

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Bacon and ranking member KAA and

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distinguished members of the

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subcommittee . Thank you for the

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opportunity to testify alongside my

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friend Doctor Mattie , to whom I am

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truly grateful has come to the

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Department of Defense to progress in

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digital transformation . He actually

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has done more in 16 days than one would

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think humanly possible , so thank you ,

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sir . As you know , this committee's

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leadership has consistently empowered

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the DOD CIO to build a robust and

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integrated architecture , ensure

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interoperability , and prescribe

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crucial network and cybersecurity

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standards . This authority includes

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oversight of the information technology

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and cybersecurity budgets across the

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department as it is vital for our

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success . We are committed to working

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with this committee to enhance

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lethality , readiness , and deterrence

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for our war fighters . We are actively

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collaborating with the department of

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government . Efficiency and cost saving

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initiatives in response to the

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secretary's mandate to eliminate

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wasteful spending , we are streamlining

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software procurement by first

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consulting our buyer's catalog prior to

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customization and leveraging that to

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achieve DD data standards across the

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department . The DOD and CDAO are

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securing AI systems and developing

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guidelines to manage AI specific

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cybersecurity risk , ensure strategic

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investment and alignment , and

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implement consistent security standards ,

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including advanced threat detection and

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response . Cybersecurity remains

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paramount . We are focused on identity

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control . and access management ICAero

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Trust and securing the defense

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industrial base . The Defense

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Information Systems Agency , otherwise

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known as DISA , non-classified Internet

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Protocol router network Nipper ,

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Federation Hub , and the DOD CIO's ICA

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Federation framework are driving

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enterprise adoption of ICA . The recent

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mandate for financial and non-financial

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systems to on board to identity

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providers and enable automated account

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provisioning will further strengthen

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our security posture . Our zero trust

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implementation is progressing at a

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rapid rate . Component implementation

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plans outline their paths to target

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zero trust by FY 27 . The success of

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Flank Speed , Thunderdome , and Fort

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Zero in achieving target or advanced ZT

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demonstrates the viability of our

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approach . We are extending this to

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missionar environment , revolutionizing

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secure information exchange with allies

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and partners , and of course protecting

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the DIB is a key priority , and the DOD

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is implementing the CMMC program to

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verify cybersecurity practices by the

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DIB to protect sensitive unclassified

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information . The number of

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self-assessments and independent

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assessments is encouraging and ensures

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industry's commitment to this crucial

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effort . We are moving beyond the

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traditional risk management framework

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to embrace AI powered continuous

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monitoring . This shift along with the

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software fast track initiative will

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accelerate software security delivery

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by focusing on the software supply

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chain and the development environmental

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security . The bottom line is we are

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here to create a culture of

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cybersecurity . That is our job in

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partnership with CDAO , my office is

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developing supply chain risk management

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requirements to establish a common

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operating picture and improve

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interoperability with business systems .

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The joint war fighting cloud capability

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is transforming our IT infrastructure .

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We are streamlining cloud contracts ,

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reducing sprawl , and focusing on edge

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computing to enhance operational

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resilience . Command control and

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communications are fundamental to

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military effectiveness and our

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prioritization initiatives like CAD C2 ,

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Global Command Control Systems joint ,

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electromagnetic spectrum operations ,

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dynamic spectrum sharing , spectrum IT

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modernization , 5G implementation and

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position navigation and timing

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modernization to ensure information

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superiority . Cryptographic

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modernization also remains a priority

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to develop the next generation of

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quantum resistant encryption to ensure

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our continued security for defense

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business systems , DOD is consolidating

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and streamlining business functions and

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data , retiring legacy systems , and

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implementing data-driven portfolio

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management . This transformation will

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improve efficiency , enable data

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integration , and support informed

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decision making . The DOD's CIO's

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annual IT budget certification process

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guided by the capability program

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guidance ensures alignment with

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strategic priorities . This allows the

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department to identify and address

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capability risks , working with

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components to ensure effective resource

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allocation . Finally , cultivating a

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digital workforce is essential to the

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future . Investments in training and

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education and partnerships with

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industry and academia ensures we have

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the talent necessary to meet the

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evolving challenges of the digital

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battle space . Once again , I cannot

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enforce enough the need for a culture

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of cybersecurity , a culture of zero

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trust , a culture of secure by design

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is one of the goals that I have as CIO

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as well while I'm in the role . I look

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forward to your questions and thank you

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for the opportunity to speak to you

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today . Thank you , Mr . Erickson ,

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Doctor Matty . Chairman Bacon ,

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ranking member Conner , distinguished

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members of the subcommittee , thank you

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for the opportunity to testify today .

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Today is my first appearance before

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Congress as the chief digital and

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artificial intelligence officer , and

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I'm glad to be alongside my teammate

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and our acting chief information

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officer to communicate our shared

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commitment and efforts in modernizing

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the defense digital enterprise . The

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testimony today will outline how the

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department is accelerating the adoption

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of data , analytics and artificial

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intelligence AI . I'll highlight our

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key lines of effort aligned with the

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current DOD data analytics and AI

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adoption strategy and the Secretary of

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Defense's directives to revive the war

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ethos , rebuild military readiness ,

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and re-establish deterrences to improve

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joint war fighting capabilities . As

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the department recognized significant

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changes in the digital domain , several

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disparate initiatives were created ,

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like the Joint AI Center and the

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Defense Digital Services . These

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efforts provided several key

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contributions , but it soon became

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clear that more integration across

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efforts was needed to achieve a

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digitally relevant tempo , and the

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department combined all of them to

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create the CDAO . As I rejoined the

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department , the CDAO executes two

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critical congressionally required roles

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and authorities on behalf of the

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Secretary of Defense , the chief data

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officer and the chief AI officer . We

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do this through a traditional policy

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principal staff assistant role . As

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well as through resourcing acquisition

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and capability delivery function , this

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combination of authorities and

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functions has allowed CDO to drive DOD

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adoption of data and AI not only

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through policy direction but through

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tangible delivery of more efficient and

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operable and scalable enterprise data

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analytics and AI capabilities . We

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describe our approach to accelerating

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DOD data and AI adoption through the

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phases of enable , speed , and scale .

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We enable the DOD's adoption of data

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analytics and AI by establishing

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standards , best practices , and

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reusable tools to deliver capabilities

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directly to the DOD users . We

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prioritize speed by investing in the

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necessarily talent . Infrastructure to

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develop and field data and AI solutions

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on accelerated timelines . We plan for

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scale from day one focusing on building

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solutions and architectures at echelon

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that are technically sound , secure ,

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and work across the breadth of the DOD .

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CDAO accelerates capability delivery ,

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sets the foundation for scale , and

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facilitates DOD adoption of digital

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tools by bringing in the best the

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commer the commercial sector has to

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offer . First , we're enhancing access

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to authoritative data . Data is the

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fuel for analytics and AI , and we are

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expanding access to government networks

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and data through our open dagger

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initiative and continuing to implement

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overall data management strategy . By

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using principles such as Valtus that is

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making data visible , accessible ,

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understandable , linked , trustworthy ,

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interoperable , and secure . Second ,

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we're tightly partnered with our chief

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information officer to address the

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administrative and technical hurdle

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hurdles that slow down the deployment

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of digital solutions on DOD networks

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and infrastructure . We do this by

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streamlining the authority to operate

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process and by expanding access to

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modern AI ready infrastructure like

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high performance compute . Third , we

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are removing the requirements man in

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the middle , end quote , by conducting

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frequent experiments on live networks

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with real DOD data . In experiments

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like our global information dominance

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experiment or guide , developers from

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industry , R&D , and government sit

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side by side with our DOD operators to

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better understand their work flows ,

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hear directly about what they need to

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achieve their mission success . Finally ,

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we are working to develop and source

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the best talent both inside and outside

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the department . Our workforce really

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is what will determine success and

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failure for AI enabled capabilities

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within the department we are assessing

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and upskilling our workforce from

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bottom to top . We also need ways to

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integrate and access talent outside the

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department , including academia , FFRDC

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led research , as well as national labs

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and of course our industry partners .

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Our trade win solution marketplace has

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generated real wins and we will keep

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maximizing our acquisition authorities

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within CDAO and with other government

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acquisition partners to accelerate

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technology adoption . In closing , I

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want to emphasize the strategic

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significance of accelerating adoption

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of data analytics and AI across the

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department . By harnessing these tools

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we are enabling our war fighters to

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make faster , smarter decisions . We're

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bolstering our readiness and we are

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enhancing our deterrence . All this

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contributes to a more lethal ,

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resilient , and responsive military

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ready to meet the challenges of any

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threat that comes our way . On behalf

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of my team , I thank you for your

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leadership and prioritizing the defense

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digital enterprise and committed to

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continued transparency with Congress

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and our progress about challenges and

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our way ahead . I look forward to your

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questions . Thank you . uh , I intend

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to ask a question to each of you , and

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then I'll yield to our ranking member .

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I would like to get to all of us before

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we get votes , so if we could all be

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thoughtful about the length of our

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questioning , and we'll try to get

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everybody in . My first question , Ms .

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Harrington , why is the mid-spectrum

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like in the lower 3 megahertz , uh , or

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gigahertz ? Why is that so important ?

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What is the military doing in this area

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that we can't trade off ? Thank you

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Chairman for that question . So in the

13:07.757 --> 13:10.289
lower three of Spectrum 3.1 to 3.45 is

13:10.289 --> 13:12.369
where we carry currently about 1100

13:12.369 --> 13:14.591
different platforms and weapons systems

13:14.591 --> 13:16.647
to protect national security . Those

13:16.647 --> 13:19.580
are are prized , uh , critical

13:19.580 --> 13:22.210
capabilities that we cannot lose to

13:22.210 --> 13:24.266
provide national security , not just

13:24.266 --> 13:26.154
for ourselves but for our foreign

13:26.154 --> 13:28.043
military sales and our allies and

13:28.043 --> 13:30.099
partners that area . The spectrum is

13:30.099 --> 13:32.210
golden , and we need to protect it to

13:32.210 --> 13:34.266
maintain national security and I use

13:34.266 --> 13:36.659
the word golden specifically because

13:36.659 --> 13:38.826
the the only way we can achieve golden

13:38.826 --> 13:40.770
dome right now is having the lower

13:40.770 --> 13:42.937
three of spectrum . It is critical for

13:42.937 --> 13:44.992
national security . I appreciate the

13:44.992 --> 13:47.159
question very much . Thank you , sir .

13:47.159 --> 13:49.381
I can't tell you how important it is to

13:49.381 --> 13:51.326
us knowing that yes , there's some

13:51.326 --> 13:53.381
areas we can maybe work on with with

13:53.381 --> 13:55.437
the industry there's areas we cannot

13:55.437 --> 13:57.603
trade off and . I just know many of us

13:57.603 --> 13:59.548
on the Armed Sources Committee are

13:59.548 --> 14:02.330
gonna . Be the best stewards in Ohio to

14:02.330 --> 14:04.552
protect our national security here . As

14:04.552 --> 14:06.650
I mentioned in my opening speech ,

14:06.659 --> 14:08.890
dynamic spectrum sharing is a potential

14:08.890 --> 14:10.834
capability , but that is yet to be

14:10.834 --> 14:13.001
determined and it is , I , I would say

14:13.001 --> 14:14.779
prudent to ensure protection of

14:14.779 --> 14:17.099
national security for the taxpayer in

14:17.099 --> 14:19.377
protecting the lower three . Thank you ,

14:19.377 --> 14:21.432
sir . Doctor Matty , I'd like to ask

14:21.432 --> 14:25.190
you about C Jazzy2 C Jazzy 2 . I

14:25.190 --> 14:26.801
understand that the previous

14:26.801 --> 14:28.857
administration put this portfolio in

14:28.857 --> 14:32.400
your . Under your organization We get a

14:32.400 --> 14:34.511
lot of mixed feedback here . Where do

14:34.511 --> 14:36.679
you see CANZ2 sitting ? Is it

14:36.679 --> 14:39.239
appropriate to be within your portfolio

14:39.239 --> 14:41.295
or is it better set somewhere else ?

14:41.295 --> 14:43.350
And how , how are we doing with this

14:43.350 --> 14:45.869
program ? Thank you for the question ,

14:46.159 --> 14:48.103
Chairman . I think that , um , our

14:48.103 --> 14:50.479
efforts with CICT have actually been on

14:50.479 --> 14:53.359
a good glide path , and I use that to

14:53.359 --> 14:55.581
reference back to the guide , as , as I

14:55.581 --> 14:57.748
mentioned with our experiment effort .

14:57.748 --> 14:59.859
Um , there's no better way to develop

14:59.859 --> 15:01.637
these types of technologies and

15:01.637 --> 15:03.929
capabilities than by adopting the agile

15:03.929 --> 15:05.985
approach , which is , as I described

15:05.985 --> 15:08.119
earlier , having the developers with

15:08.119 --> 15:10.063
the technical leads as well as the

15:10.063 --> 15:12.239
users so that we can rapidly integrate

15:12.489 --> 15:14.690
whatever those needs are . So for

15:14.690 --> 15:16.969
example with recent um efforts that

15:16.969 --> 15:19.191
we've had in . In our experiments we've

15:19.191 --> 15:21.219
witnessed the ability to link

15:21.219 --> 15:23.840
previously unconnected data sources

15:24.200 --> 15:25.867
from the various services and

15:25.867 --> 15:27.811
components that allow them to make

15:27.811 --> 15:29.922
real-time decisions and once you have

15:29.922 --> 15:32.033
the data structures , you know , once

15:32.033 --> 15:34.200
you have that data structure as a firm

15:34.200 --> 15:36.367
foundation , you can then build on top

15:36.367 --> 15:36.219
of that to get some of these advanced

15:36.219 --> 15:38.275
algorithms that then allow you to do

15:38.500 --> 15:42.000
the types of um . Accelerated in in

15:42.000 --> 15:43.833
speed that we're looking for for

15:43.833 --> 15:45.833
decision making in our efforts . So

15:45.833 --> 15:48.056
back to your question , I think that uh

15:48.056 --> 15:50.056
the partnership that we are able to

15:50.056 --> 15:52.222
bring together with the services , the

15:52.222 --> 15:54.280
joint uh war fighting components as

15:54.280 --> 15:56.070
well as the respective industry

15:56.070 --> 15:58.181
partners have been successful , and I

15:58.181 --> 16:00.126
look to accelerate and expand that

16:00.126 --> 16:02.348
success . Thank you . With 2 minutes to

16:02.348 --> 16:04.570
spare , I yield to the ranking member .

16:04.599 --> 16:06.877
Thank you Mr . Chairman . Doctor Mandy ,

16:06.877 --> 16:09.179
you have such an impressive background ,

16:09.309 --> 16:11.289
uh , obviously your service to our

16:11.289 --> 16:13.456
country for 30 years , but one thing I

16:13.456 --> 16:16.659
also noticed is that you're a PhD from

16:17.070 --> 16:20.549
MIT . Uh , I'd love to get your take on

16:20.549 --> 16:24.510
how important MIT was for your

16:24.510 --> 16:27.140
own background and how important

16:27.140 --> 16:29.140
research universities like MIT have

16:29.140 --> 16:31.619
been for the development of AI , uh ,

16:31.630 --> 16:35.289
in the United States . Thank you for

16:35.289 --> 16:38.349
the question . Um , so I will explain ,

16:38.390 --> 16:40.668
uh , I'm sure that as you would expect ,

16:40.668 --> 16:42.834
um , an experience and the opportunity

16:42.834 --> 16:44.946
to go to such an esteemed institution

16:44.946 --> 16:46.946
like the Massachusetts Institute of

16:46.946 --> 16:49.057
Technology is a phenomenal experience

16:49.057 --> 16:51.112
for , for most people that have that

16:51.112 --> 16:53.820
chance . Um , I went off as , uh , I'll

16:53.820 --> 16:56.042
say as an operations research which you

16:56.042 --> 16:58.150
may be familiar as uh a known

16:58.150 --> 16:59.872
functional area or uh level of

16:59.872 --> 17:02.109
expertise within the army . Uh , the

17:02.109 --> 17:04.109
task that I was given by the senior

17:04.109 --> 17:06.331
leaders when I went there was come back

17:06.331 --> 17:08.665
to us as an enterprise research , folks .

17:08.665 --> 17:10.831
In other words , how do you take those

17:10.831 --> 17:10.030
things that we currently are able to do

17:10.030 --> 17:13.020
and scale them and accelerate them , um ,

17:13.069 --> 17:15.291
and so where I see the opportunities to

17:15.291 --> 17:17.236
work with our premier institutions

17:17.236 --> 17:19.390
because it's not only just about the

17:19.390 --> 17:21.612
workforce development and the education

17:21.612 --> 17:23.612
component , as you know , at places

17:23.612 --> 17:25.668
like MIT , Carnegie Mellon , Georgia

17:25.668 --> 17:27.779
Tech , etc . they , uh , they're very

17:27.779 --> 17:30.001
focused on applying that technology and

17:30.001 --> 17:32.112
accelerating the adoption . Um , into

17:32.112 --> 17:34.168
those new capabilities and so , uh ,

17:34.168 --> 17:36.334
you'll in the future as we continue to

17:36.334 --> 17:38.501
have these types of discussions you'll

17:38.501 --> 17:40.501
hear me talk about the triple helix

17:40.501 --> 17:42.390
where taking the basic research ,

17:42.390 --> 17:44.557
combine it with applied research , and

17:44.557 --> 17:46.446
then scaling that in terms of our

17:46.446 --> 17:46.089
procurement with our industry partners

17:46.089 --> 17:48.256
is absolutely essential for us to move

17:48.256 --> 17:50.367
forward . And Mary , the reason I ask

17:50.367 --> 17:52.533
this is I , I . I wish there were more

17:52.533 --> 17:52.459
people , frankly , in our government

17:52.459 --> 17:54.570
and administration like you . And I'm

17:54.570 --> 17:57.250
hoping your voice , uh , maybe be

17:57.250 --> 17:59.930
emerged because as you know , currently

17:59.930 --> 18:02.839
the NSF is cutting a lot of their

18:02.839 --> 18:06.530
grants to MIT MIT is suing the

18:06.530 --> 18:08.863
administration . Do you think that , uh ,

18:08.869 --> 18:11.469
that's misguided , that we should be

18:11.469 --> 18:13.349
funding the , uh , research

18:13.349 --> 18:15.571
universities like MIT ? I mean , was it

18:15.571 --> 18:17.627
your experience that MIT was wasting

18:17.627 --> 18:19.405
money or do you think these are

18:19.405 --> 18:21.516
important institutions that make your

18:21.516 --> 18:24.050
job easier ? As I said , I think it's

18:24.050 --> 18:25.883
important to have an appropriate

18:25.883 --> 18:27.599
balance between our academic

18:27.599 --> 18:29.599
institutions as well as our applied

18:29.599 --> 18:31.377
research efforts like FFRDCs or

18:31.377 --> 18:33.488
federally funded research development

18:33.488 --> 18:35.266
centers as well as our industry

18:35.266 --> 18:37.266
partners if we're gonna sustain the

18:37.266 --> 18:39.266
growth that's necessary . So if you

18:39.266 --> 18:41.266
look across the , uh , I'll say the

18:41.266 --> 18:43.266
strategic environment in areas like

18:43.266 --> 18:45.377
artificial intelligence , this is not

18:45.377 --> 18:47.488
just a one time type of thing . There

18:47.488 --> 18:49.655
has to be the continual growth and and

18:49.655 --> 18:51.877
acceleration of our development . And I

18:51.877 --> 18:54.099
think that's what allows us to continue

18:54.099 --> 18:56.043
to have our offset uh enhancements

18:56.189 --> 18:58.356
among amongst the consideration of our

18:58.356 --> 19:00.578
peers and adversaries . I hope you'll ,

19:00.578 --> 19:02.800
you know , I , I really respect you . I

19:02.800 --> 19:04.800
think we're lucky that we have your

19:04.800 --> 19:07.022
service , so my questions aren't , uh ,

19:07.022 --> 19:06.829
in any way to put you on the spot , but

19:06.829 --> 19:08.996
I hope you will speak up as one of the

19:08.996 --> 19:11.162
voices in the administration , uh , to

19:11.162 --> 19:13.107
make sure that the funding for our

19:13.107 --> 19:14.996
research universities and NSF are

19:14.996 --> 19:16.773
bipartisan . I think they're so

19:16.773 --> 19:18.885
important , uh , to the , uh , future

19:18.885 --> 19:21.530
of this country . I'm done

19:23.069 --> 19:24.958
Thank you , Mr . Kane . uh , Mr .

19:24.958 --> 19:26.958
McCormick , you , you are up next .

19:27.839 --> 19:30.400
Thank you , Mr . Chair . And thank you

19:30.400 --> 19:32.622
to the witnesses for being here today .

19:32.622 --> 19:34.678
It means a lot to us and how we move

19:34.678 --> 19:36.511
forward in our deliberations and

19:36.511 --> 19:38.829
legislation . uh , Doctor Matty , AI

19:38.829 --> 19:41.000
has become standard in the private

19:41.000 --> 19:43.222
sector , obviously it's making a lot of

19:43.222 --> 19:45.444
advances in the DOD . I feel like we're

19:45.444 --> 19:47.500
a little bit behind right now . Uh ,

19:47.500 --> 19:49.056
this delay has created some

19:49.056 --> 19:51.000
vulnerabilities , uh , both in our

19:51.000 --> 19:53.167
ability to protect our information and

19:53.167 --> 19:55.222
actually advance our weaponry down ,

19:55.222 --> 19:57.278
down range . How are groups like the

19:57.278 --> 19:59.550
Defense Innovation Unit making sure the

19:59.550 --> 20:01.829
DOD stays competitive in the

20:01.829 --> 20:03.885
advancement of the . These contracts

20:03.885 --> 20:05.940
which a lot of times get delayed and

20:05.940 --> 20:07.996
deliberated over and we , I , I feel

20:07.996 --> 20:10.162
like the competitive advantage the CCP

20:10.162 --> 20:12.273
has over us they got one guy making a

20:12.273 --> 20:14.440
decision , everybody just goes forward

20:14.440 --> 20:16.551
here we have to negotiate and there's

20:16.551 --> 20:16.430
favoritism and there's all kinds of

20:16.430 --> 20:19.500
things that delay the most . Efficient

20:19.500 --> 20:21.667
thing to happen doesn't mean we're not

20:21.667 --> 20:23.722
competitive and doesn't mean that we

20:23.722 --> 20:25.833
have , we don't have better ideas but

20:25.833 --> 20:25.099
how do we streamline this process to

20:25.099 --> 20:27.210
make sure we are the most competitive

20:27.210 --> 20:30.420
we can be . So I know that my teammates

20:30.420 --> 20:32.540
over in DIU were here recently and

20:32.540 --> 20:34.762
provided some information and testimony

20:34.762 --> 20:36.984
on the success that they had to address

20:36.984 --> 20:39.151
the issues that you highlighted . Um ,

20:39.151 --> 20:41.207
I will tell you from our role in the

20:41.207 --> 20:43.151
CDAO , uh , we , we appreciate the

20:43.151 --> 20:45.373
partnership with the IU and the efforts

20:45.373 --> 20:47.151
that they have on engaging with

20:47.151 --> 20:49.151
industry . I think that , um , what

20:49.151 --> 20:51.890
we're able to do together is , is they

20:51.890 --> 20:53.890
focus on the speed as you mentioned

20:53.890 --> 20:56.112
before trying to overcome some of those

20:56.112 --> 20:58.334
administrative hurdles we're focused on

20:58.334 --> 21:00.501
how do we architect those solutions in

21:00.501 --> 21:02.612
such a way that they're able to scale

21:02.612 --> 21:04.723
and I think that most folks that know

21:04.723 --> 21:06.779
or are familiar with this particular

21:06.779 --> 21:08.890
technology area understand that . You

21:08.890 --> 21:10.946
can design something , uh , early on

21:10.946 --> 21:13.112
that provides you to have , I'll say a

21:13.112 --> 21:15.334
static framework that doesn't allow for

21:15.334 --> 21:17.557
that growth and that acceleration . And

21:17.557 --> 21:19.723
that's why I think it's important that

21:19.723 --> 21:21.612
we have the various teams working

21:21.612 --> 21:23.723
together in an integrated fashion but

21:23.723 --> 21:25.834
still maintain that core competencies

21:25.834 --> 21:27.890
so that when they focus on how do we

21:27.890 --> 21:30.001
get through those uh process types of

21:30.119 --> 21:32.063
efforts that we can then apply the

21:32.063 --> 21:34.500
appropriate technological rigor so that

21:34.500 --> 21:36.500
it'll be successful in the long run

21:36.500 --> 21:38.611
from a development standpoint . Thank

21:38.611 --> 21:40.667
you . And actually that makes a good

21:40.667 --> 21:42.500
segue to my next question , Ms .

21:42.500 --> 21:44.278
Harrington . Uh , we talk about

21:44.278 --> 21:44.119
integration , we talk about

21:44.119 --> 21:47.290
inefficiencies . Uh , what I understand

21:47.290 --> 21:49.339
is that your responsibilities are

21:49.339 --> 21:52.329
diffused amongst more than 30 chief

21:52.329 --> 21:54.380
information officers at various DOD

21:54.380 --> 21:58.359
components . In all those agencies

21:58.359 --> 22:00.581
and elements and everything like that ,

22:00.581 --> 22:02.526
my , my question is surely there's

22:02.526 --> 22:04.303
gotta be an . An opportunity to

22:04.303 --> 22:06.248
streamline this . What I'm worried

22:06.248 --> 22:08.470
about is you have so many people coming

22:08.470 --> 22:10.692
together and doing so many things , but

22:10.692 --> 22:10.449
how do you make sure that they're

22:10.449 --> 22:12.449
working together and that you're as

22:12.449 --> 22:14.560
lean and mean as you need to be going

22:14.560 --> 22:16.560
forward and that you're not kind of

22:16.560 --> 22:18.782
working against each other ? Absolutely

22:18.782 --> 22:18.770
great question and thank you for asking

22:18.770 --> 22:20.992
it , sir . Uh , what we have done since

22:20.992 --> 22:22.881
I've taken over the seat is we've

22:22.881 --> 22:25.103
collaborated , have brought all the DOD

22:25.103 --> 22:27.640
and CIO CISOs together , um , and

22:27.640 --> 22:30.270
hosing , honing in on our core

22:30.270 --> 22:32.400
requirements and making sure that the

22:32.400 --> 22:35.280
DOD interoperability is primary

22:35.280 --> 22:37.447
function for ours . So what we've done

22:37.447 --> 22:39.489
as far as like the cloud computing

22:39.489 --> 22:42.479
contracts , we are now looking to the

22:42.479 --> 22:44.312
digital catalog for the software

22:44.312 --> 22:47.199
provider if it is not already in the

22:47.199 --> 22:51.180
digital catalog . Each and any CIO

22:51.180 --> 22:53.291
then has to come through my office to

22:53.291 --> 22:55.540
get approval to customize capability

22:55.540 --> 22:57.262
that way we're harmonizing our

22:57.262 --> 22:59.484
capability and interoperability instead

22:59.484 --> 23:01.262
of having disparate information

23:01.262 --> 23:03.318
stovepipes and working with partners

23:03.318 --> 23:05.318
like Doctor Matty . That is the way

23:05.318 --> 23:07.373
that we are going to get to where we

23:07.373 --> 23:09.373
need to be to be a lethal ready and

23:09.373 --> 23:11.429
efficient workforce by harnessing in

23:11.429 --> 23:13.429
the requirements , making sure that

23:13.429 --> 23:15.540
people can't step outside and I . The

23:15.540 --> 23:17.762
way I use it is outside the requirement

23:17.762 --> 23:19.873
box . Any CIO that sees themselves or

23:19.873 --> 23:21.819
CISO as a very different or unique

23:21.819 --> 23:23.989
entity within the DOD , they're going

23:23.989 --> 23:26.156
to have to come to my office and to my

23:26.156 --> 23:28.469
team , which is an entirety of of the

23:28.469 --> 23:30.989
MILDE CIOs and explain why they're so

23:30.989 --> 23:33.100
different . It's a way to collaborate

23:33.100 --> 23:35.211
to bring people together to make sure

23:35.211 --> 23:37.322
that . We're doing the right thing by

23:37.322 --> 23:39.045
not only the taxpayer but more

23:39.045 --> 23:40.989
importantly the war fighter . Um ,

23:40.989 --> 23:43.045
recently we're doing a project where

23:43.045 --> 23:45.305
we're redoing the RMF process and we're

23:45.305 --> 23:47.545
bringing all of those entities , those

23:47.545 --> 23:49.744
many disparate CIOs , to come to

23:49.744 --> 23:51.966
agreement on how to automate and how to

23:51.966 --> 23:54.077
make it faster and more efficient for

23:54.077 --> 23:56.188
the taxpayer , but more importantly ,

23:56.188 --> 23:58.188
the war fighter . OK , and then the

23:58.188 --> 23:57.854
interest of making sure everybody gets

23:57.854 --> 23:59.965
to answer que or ask questions , I'll

23:59.965 --> 24:02.187
yield the rest of my time . Thank you .

24:02.187 --> 24:04.410
You're looking at a seasoned soccer pro

24:04.410 --> 24:07.650
right there . Apparently not Uh , Mr .

24:07.849 --> 24:10.071
Whitesides , you are recognized . Thank

24:10.071 --> 24:11.960
you , Mr . Chairman . Um , I have

24:11.960 --> 24:13.905
basically just two questions and I

24:13.905 --> 24:16.016
would second the comments from , uh ,

24:16.016 --> 24:18.071
the chair in the ranking , uh , that

24:18.071 --> 24:18.010
we're grateful to both of you for

24:18.010 --> 24:20.329
bringing your expertise , uh , to the

24:20.329 --> 24:22.496
department . First question is sort of

24:22.496 --> 24:24.496
a general one from Doctor Matty top

24:24.496 --> 24:26.849
level . It seems like AI is gonna fit

24:26.849 --> 24:30.160
into all different aspects of life and

24:30.329 --> 24:33.109
also all aspects of how we both defend

24:33.109 --> 24:35.859
and uh . And have offensive operations

24:35.859 --> 24:38.099
for the Department of Defense . Are ,

24:38.109 --> 24:40.331
are you in charge of the body that sort

24:40.331 --> 24:42.387
of thinks through almost brainstorms

24:42.387 --> 24:44.609
all of those different ways or how does

24:44.609 --> 24:46.831
the department think about . You know ,

24:46.831 --> 24:48.887
oh , it's gonna have applications to

24:48.887 --> 24:51.053
sonar . It's gonna have an application

24:51.053 --> 24:53.109
to cybersecurity . It's gonna have ,

24:53.109 --> 24:55.276
you know , how do you , how do you get

24:55.276 --> 24:57.165
a sense of because I feel like we

24:57.165 --> 24:59.331
should be making these investments now

24:59.331 --> 25:01.498
across a range of activities that will

25:01.498 --> 25:03.720
take time to develop , but so how , how

25:03.720 --> 25:05.942
do we develop the road map for where AI

25:05.942 --> 25:07.665
will play both offensively and

25:07.665 --> 25:09.887
defensively for the nation's security ?

25:09.920 --> 25:12.142
Representative , thank you for for that

25:12.142 --> 25:14.087
great question . Um , I think it's

25:14.087 --> 25:16.253
actually looking at from both top down

25:16.253 --> 25:18.420
and bottom up . um , so as you know we

25:18.420 --> 25:20.420
have a published , um , AI and data

25:20.420 --> 25:22.939
strategy that supports , I'll say the

25:22.939 --> 25:25.161
major muscle moves the infrastructure ,

25:25.161 --> 25:27.109
the data management , um , the

25:27.109 --> 25:29.119
development of the workforce all

25:29.119 --> 25:30.841
focused on how do we make that

25:30.841 --> 25:33.063
interoperability that as you said , you

25:33.063 --> 25:35.119
have to have if you're gonna play on

25:35.119 --> 25:37.452
the offensive end and the defensive end ,

25:37.452 --> 25:36.800
there's that thing in the middle called

25:36.800 --> 25:39.078
transition we call it interoperability .

25:39.390 --> 25:41.501
And so we have to look at it from the

25:41.501 --> 25:43.557
top level , how do we facilitate and

25:43.557 --> 25:45.668
have the investments as you mentioned

25:45.668 --> 25:47.779
for the infrastructure as well as the

25:47.779 --> 25:49.723
workforce . Now from the bottom up

25:49.723 --> 25:51.739
perspective , there's also a well

25:51.739 --> 25:53.739
acknowledged , um , effort that's

25:53.739 --> 25:55.961
called the capability gap analysis that

25:55.961 --> 25:58.072
the department goes through where the

25:58.072 --> 26:00.183
war fighters based on their readiness

26:00.183 --> 26:02.239
and their , um , assessment of their

26:02.239 --> 26:04.770
ability to execute their orders , uh ,

26:04.780 --> 26:07.420
are able to bring forth where those

26:07.420 --> 26:09.880
gaps are . And what I think that you'll

26:09.880 --> 26:12.089
find over the recent years is an

26:12.089 --> 26:14.660
acceleration and increase because of

26:14.660 --> 26:16.660
these types of efforts that we have

26:16.660 --> 26:18.882
where we send our developers forward to

26:18.882 --> 26:21.104
work with those operators they identify

26:21.104 --> 26:22.938
those opportunities where we can

26:22.938 --> 26:25.270
accelerate and close those gaps with

26:25.270 --> 26:27.548
the appropriate level of technology so .

26:27.800 --> 26:29.911
Again , I know a lot of folks tend to

26:29.911 --> 26:31.800
jump towards the upper end of the

26:31.800 --> 26:33.467
spectrum , if you will , with

26:33.467 --> 26:35.689
artificial intelligence , but there are

26:35.689 --> 26:37.911
a number of , I'll say visualizations ,

26:37.911 --> 26:39.967
analytics , metrics , those types of

26:39.967 --> 26:41.911
things that , um , put you on that

26:41.911 --> 26:44.133
pathway to mature that effort but still

26:44.133 --> 26:46.356
have significant impact that we're able

26:46.356 --> 26:48.522
to leverage . So I think the answer is

26:48.522 --> 26:50.633
we're positioned on the appropriate ,

26:50.633 --> 26:52.856
uh , I'm also statutorily an adviser to

26:52.856 --> 26:54.689
the JOC , the Joint Requirements

26:54.689 --> 26:56.744
Oversight Committee . Um , and again

26:56.744 --> 26:58.911
with my experience , I look forward to

26:58.911 --> 26:58.339
working on that . Look , look forward

26:58.339 --> 27:00.450
to working with you on that because I

27:00.450 --> 27:02.728
think that's super important . Um , uh ,

27:02.728 --> 27:04.617
Merrington , uh , you are a world

27:04.617 --> 27:06.339
expert on cybersecurity and so

27:06.339 --> 27:08.561
unfortunately I'm gonna have to ask you

27:08.561 --> 27:10.617
about some cybersecurity events that

27:10.617 --> 27:12.672
have recently come up . So , uh , as

27:12.672 --> 27:14.617
you know , um , the signal variant

27:14.617 --> 27:16.283
telemessage , which is in use

27:16.283 --> 27:18.172
apparently by many at the highest

27:18.172 --> 27:20.228
levels of our government , including

27:20.228 --> 27:22.395
the former national security adviser ,

27:22.395 --> 27:24.283
was recently hacked . Are are you

27:24.283 --> 27:26.283
familiar with this company and this

27:26.283 --> 27:28.283
product ? Signal , yes , sir . Tele

27:28.283 --> 27:30.395
message . Yes sir , I'm sorry . Yes .

27:30.395 --> 27:32.506
what does tele messagesage do broadly

27:32.506 --> 27:34.728
defined ? Uh , and to end encryption of

27:34.728 --> 27:36.895
capability to communicate with . Point

27:36.895 --> 27:38.950
to point . That's what signal does .

27:38.950 --> 27:41.061
Telees actually archives the messages

27:41.061 --> 27:43.172
that are sent via signal . I mean you

27:43.172 --> 27:45.650
know I call it , but that's OK . I have

27:45.650 --> 27:47.761
a different name for it . I'm sorry ,

27:47.761 --> 27:49.872
sir . OK , sounds good . Yes , that's

27:49.872 --> 27:51.983
right . And that is the actual name .

27:51.983 --> 27:54.039
You're right . So , um , do you know

27:54.039 --> 27:53.969
how many people are permitted to use

27:53.969 --> 27:56.080
this for official business inside the

27:56.080 --> 27:58.463
DD ? the DOD senior leadership , uh ,

27:58.593 --> 28:01.432
to use the SARS capability is

28:01.432 --> 28:03.833
determined by the DOD instructions on

28:03.833 --> 28:06.703
mobile devices . Signal . OK , sorry ,

28:06.993 --> 28:09.215
are you aware that the public reporting

28:09.215 --> 28:11.493
indicates tele messages was was hacked ?

28:11.493 --> 28:13.715
I am aware , sir . Yes . Um , does tele

28:13.715 --> 28:15.937
message back up any messages outside of

28:15.937 --> 28:18.095
the US that are um sent via . US

28:18.095 --> 28:20.151
government leaders , no , sir . So ,

28:20.151 --> 28:22.206
what I was trying to explain is that

28:22.206 --> 28:24.428
the march capability is not used in the

28:24.428 --> 28:26.651
Department of Defense currently . We do

28:26.651 --> 28:28.706
have the appropriate availability to

28:28.706 --> 28:30.928
download on GFE signal , but we are not

28:30.928 --> 28:33.151
allowed to communicate any CUI on those

28:33.151 --> 28:35.485
devices , uh , as per our instructions .

28:35.536 --> 28:37.592
So SMAS capability that intellect is

28:37.592 --> 28:40.176
not used on DOD currently . OK , was it

28:40.176 --> 28:42.869
ever during this administration ? Not

28:42.869 --> 28:45.091
to . OK , I mean , I think the national

28:45.091 --> 28:47.036
security adviser was using it , so

28:47.036 --> 28:49.258
you're saying it's a different agency ,

28:49.258 --> 28:48.790
sir , with different protocols and

28:48.790 --> 28:52.410
different requirements . OK , OK , um ,

28:53.189 --> 28:55.245
cool , I think that's good for now .

28:55.245 --> 28:57.245
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . I yield

28:57.245 --> 28:57.239
back . Thank you , Mr . Latrell , you

28:57.239 --> 28:59.489
are now recognized . Thank you Mr .

28:59.500 --> 29:02.459
Chairman . Good morning everyone and um

29:02.459 --> 29:04.237
for everyone and all my service

29:04.237 --> 29:06.403
veterans and service members in here .

29:06.403 --> 29:06.260
Thank you for your service . God bless

29:06.260 --> 29:08.260
each and every one of you . Since I

29:08.260 --> 29:10.427
have Ms . Harrington and Mr . Matty in

29:10.427 --> 29:12.427
front of me , I , I have a very , I

29:12.427 --> 29:14.204
have one question . The CIO CDO

29:14.204 --> 29:16.427
capabilities and priorities printed out

29:16.427 --> 29:18.780
here are amazing , and Lord knows that

29:18.780 --> 29:20.780
the cyberspace that we're living in

29:20.780 --> 29:22.891
each day is our next , and that's the

29:22.891 --> 29:25.002
valued threat moving forward , and we

29:25.002 --> 29:27.058
put so much effort in protecting our

29:27.058 --> 29:30.770
systems . And You may or may not be

29:30.770 --> 29:32.770
able to answer this question . I'll

29:32.770 --> 29:32.609
throw it at you anyway , and if you

29:32.609 --> 29:34.720
because maybe you can point me in the

29:34.720 --> 29:37.569
right direction . When the war fighter

29:37.569 --> 29:40.810
transitions from the DOD to the VA .

29:42.530 --> 29:45.130
All of those amazing records , search

29:45.130 --> 29:48.380
calls , medical records . are more or

29:48.380 --> 29:50.969
less lost in translation . The the

29:50.969 --> 29:53.170
ability for the DOD to communicate to

29:53.170 --> 29:56.420
the VA . And I'll be , I'll be generous

29:56.420 --> 29:58.459
while I'm in the room with you . Is

29:58.459 --> 30:01.130
something that we need to address . I

30:01.130 --> 30:04.859
want the DOD and the VA to make it

30:04.859 --> 30:06.859
completely seamless for the service

30:06.859 --> 30:09.081
member to move into the veteran space ,

30:09.359 --> 30:11.579
have all of that information transmit

30:11.579 --> 30:14.329
or transfer . Without any effort

30:14.329 --> 30:17.369
whatsoever from the veteran . Are we

30:17.369 --> 30:19.369
looking at that ? are we addressing

30:19.369 --> 30:21.609
that ? Is DOD having the conversation

30:21.609 --> 30:23.449
with the VA and saying yes we

30:23.449 --> 30:26.109
understand this is a problem . And this

30:26.109 --> 30:29.520
is how we're moving to fix it . Mr .

30:29.530 --> 30:31.141
Mandy , Doctor , excuse me .

30:33.329 --> 30:36.349
So thank you for the question , um . I

30:36.349 --> 30:38.293
would , I would have to say that I

30:38.293 --> 30:40.405
would have to get back to you on that

30:40.405 --> 30:42.405
specific question just based on the

30:42.405 --> 30:44.516
time that I've had in the sea to work

30:44.516 --> 30:46.571
through that particular issue , um ,

30:46.571 --> 30:48.682
and so I , I'm happy to take that and

30:48.682 --> 30:50.738
get back to you as , as far as I can

30:50.738 --> 30:52.849
find out and what efforts are ongoing

30:52.849 --> 30:55.127
and what the plans are to move forward ,

30:55.127 --> 30:57.127
Ms . Harrington . Absolutely . So I

30:57.127 --> 30:58.793
actually have a great deal of

30:58.793 --> 31:01.016
experience on this since , uh , back in

31:01.016 --> 31:00.910
the days where we call a place called

31:00.910 --> 31:03.430
Spay or I was involved in the original

31:03.430 --> 31:05.540
integration of the DOD and VA

31:05.540 --> 31:07.910
electronic healthcare records and data .

31:08.069 --> 31:10.469
It absolutely does not work uh and sir ,

31:10.550 --> 31:12.661
what I would say is what we are doing

31:12.661 --> 31:14.994
right now with Doctor Mattie and myself ,

31:15.229 --> 31:17.469
we are creating data standards , data

31:17.469 --> 31:19.709
labeling and data tagging . Have never

31:19.709 --> 31:21.689
been used before in the department

31:21.900 --> 31:25.060
where they're harmonized so data in one

31:25.060 --> 31:27.900
disparate source does needs to be

31:27.900 --> 31:30.459
tagged and labeled in a way that it can

31:30.459 --> 31:33.979
transverse from the DOD to the VA and

31:33.979 --> 31:36.459
also as we're using data in , you know ,

31:36.579 --> 31:38.468
as when the president created the

31:38.468 --> 31:40.523
executive order with the cartels now

31:40.523 --> 31:42.690
being terrorist organizations , we are

31:42.690 --> 31:44.912
now using title . 10 Title 40 and Title

31:44.912 --> 31:47.135
50 in a way that we've never used those

31:47.135 --> 31:49.250
capabilities before . So what we are

31:49.250 --> 31:51.530
doing now is groundbreaking on

31:51.530 --> 31:53.569
standardizing data labeling data

31:53.569 --> 31:56.160
tagging so that we get data standards

31:56.339 --> 31:58.569
that go across all the disparate

31:58.569 --> 32:00.680
sources , correct ? Just to clarify ,

32:00.680 --> 32:02.930
so DOD and I'm going to make the

32:02.930 --> 32:05.097
assumption that you're my point person

32:05.097 --> 32:06.597
on this . Yes sir . DOD is

32:06.597 --> 32:09.410
communicating with the VA leadership .

32:10.099 --> 32:12.050
To fix this problem , we are in

32:12.050 --> 32:14.161
communications with the the VA is the

32:14.161 --> 32:16.839
VA receptive ? New leadership ? Yes ,

32:16.890 --> 32:18.946
sir . I , I , I actually live in the

32:18.946 --> 32:20.779
building where Secretary Collins

32:20.779 --> 32:23.001
resides , and I will say that the VA is

32:23.001 --> 32:25.057
definitely cooperative in this , but

32:25.057 --> 32:24.930
this is something at the whole of

32:24.930 --> 32:26.930
government level we're dealing with

32:26.930 --> 32:29.208
that what we're trying to do with ICAN ,

32:29.208 --> 32:31.650
the identity credential access

32:31.650 --> 32:34.449
management is critical to this so that

32:34.449 --> 32:36.689
any member , so if you get out of the

32:36.689 --> 32:39.633
service . Your identity remains so that

32:39.633 --> 32:41.800
the data that is pertinent and related

32:41.800 --> 32:44.863
to you can be directly accessed by you .

32:45.072 --> 32:47.016
That's what we're talking about is

32:47.016 --> 32:49.239
creating this federated network so that

32:49.239 --> 32:51.183
the information that you get while

32:51.183 --> 32:53.294
you're in service should translate to

32:53.294 --> 32:55.294
the VA and it's all within a a vast

32:55.294 --> 32:57.350
data lake that is highly protected ,

32:57.350 --> 32:59.350
but that identity credential access

32:59.350 --> 33:01.623
management is key to it and making sure

33:01.623 --> 33:03.845
that we have the data standards label .

33:03.845 --> 33:06.179
And tagged appropriately and Dr . Matty ,

33:06.179 --> 33:08.401
I don't know if you want to pontificate

33:08.401 --> 33:10.734
on that because that has been , I think ,

33:10.734 --> 33:12.790
one of our , our direct sources of ,

33:12.790 --> 33:12.336
you know , love for each other in the

33:12.336 --> 33:14.336
past , uh , you know what , 6 weeks

33:14.336 --> 33:16.280
that you've been here that that is

33:16.280 --> 33:18.336
absolutely paramount and I will also

33:18.336 --> 33:20.765
address the federal CIO agrees to this ,

33:20.816 --> 33:23.296
um , the , the all of our CIOs are in

33:23.296 --> 33:25.518
agreeance of this . OK , good , and I'm

33:25.518 --> 33:27.574
gonna be in direct contact with your

33:27.574 --> 33:29.518
office multiple times a day , most

33:29.518 --> 33:31.463
likely to make sure this is pushed

33:31.463 --> 33:33.574
forward because if , and I'm sure you

33:33.574 --> 33:35.685
have veterans in your life . Uh , and

33:35.685 --> 33:37.463
they absolutely talked to us as

33:37.463 --> 33:39.518
congressional members and one of the

33:39.518 --> 33:41.352
major complaints I have the same

33:41.352 --> 33:43.518
complaint is that that information and

33:43.518 --> 33:45.740
if you're in uniform in this room , you

33:45.740 --> 33:44.969
need to be paying attention to what I'm

33:44.969 --> 33:47.479
saying to you that information does not

33:47.849 --> 33:50.329
translate or transfer currently and it

33:50.329 --> 33:54.270
is a . It

33:54.270 --> 33:56.437
is such a challenge when you're not in

33:56.437 --> 33:59.150
the military and outside the tribe and

33:59.150 --> 34:01.317
you're on your own , so if we can help

34:01.317 --> 34:03.540
them . We're moving forward , so thank

34:03.540 --> 34:05.707
you very much both of you . Appreciate

34:05.707 --> 34:07.818
it . I , you're back on that note , I

34:07.818 --> 34:09.707
remember when I retired , I had a

34:09.707 --> 34:11.818
photocopy my entire health records to

34:11.818 --> 34:14.020
to to hand over to the VA side of the

34:14.020 --> 34:18.000
house . Mr . Vinman ,

34:18.040 --> 34:20.373
you are now recognized . Thank you , Mr .

34:20.373 --> 34:24.080
Chairman . Um , Doctor Matty , um , AI

34:24.080 --> 34:26.270
is uh obviously a revolutionary

34:26.270 --> 34:28.437
technology and I think offers a lot of

34:28.437 --> 34:31.370
promise , um . And there's an

34:31.370 --> 34:33.537
institutional aspect to this obviously

34:33.537 --> 34:35.537
uh supporting the institution , the

34:35.537 --> 34:37.759
functions , the , the generation of the

34:37.759 --> 34:39.703
force , and there's an operational

34:39.703 --> 34:41.759
component to it and I wanna focus on

34:41.759 --> 34:43.814
the operational side of this because

34:43.814 --> 34:46.169
there are international legal

34:46.169 --> 34:48.939
obligations and law of war obligations

34:48.939 --> 34:51.610
and so can you talk to me a little bit

34:51.610 --> 34:55.260
about how . Um , AI

34:55.260 --> 34:57.482
is being controlled . There's , there's

34:57.482 --> 34:59.538
gotta be a balance obviously between

34:59.550 --> 35:02.870
the speed of making decisions and our

35:02.870 --> 35:05.092
obligations on the law of war , and I ,

35:05.092 --> 35:07.314
I feel like , uh , what I'm seeing from

35:07.314 --> 35:09.479
this administration , uh , uh , and

35:09.479 --> 35:11.560
frankly from the department is a

35:11.560 --> 35:14.560
de-emphasis of our obligations which

35:14.560 --> 35:17.080
really undermine our values as somebody

35:17.080 --> 35:19.191
that served in the in the army for 25

35:19.191 --> 35:21.358
years and half of it as a troop leader

35:21.358 --> 35:24.449
and half as a as a jag . Um , those are

35:25.080 --> 35:27.024
critical obligations . They , they

35:27.024 --> 35:29.919
enable the war fight , uh , and they

35:29.919 --> 35:31.752
are consistent with our values .

35:33.889 --> 35:36.167
Well , thank you for the question , um .

35:37.360 --> 35:39.471
I will , I will share with you that I

35:39.471 --> 35:41.770
think that with regard to that concern ,

35:41.959 --> 35:44.840
um , It's there's there's actually I

35:44.840 --> 35:46.673
would say 4 facets that we think

35:46.673 --> 35:48.784
through when we talk about the notion

35:48.784 --> 35:50.618
of responsible AI , um , first ,

35:50.618 --> 35:52.784
obviously , which is where most people

35:52.784 --> 35:54.507
start the discussion is from a

35:54.507 --> 35:56.507
technology standpoint , a technical

35:56.507 --> 35:58.451
standpoint , how do you design the

35:58.451 --> 36:00.340
system ? How do you architect the

36:00.340 --> 36:02.618
system ? How do you safeguard the data ,

36:02.618 --> 36:04.729
you know , those kinds of things that

36:04.729 --> 36:06.951
you already alluded to that we would do

36:06.951 --> 36:09.284
from an almost institutional standpoint .

36:09.284 --> 36:11.451
Um , the next part of it is those when

36:11.451 --> 36:13.784
you start to go into things like ethics .

36:13.784 --> 36:15.562
Um , the legal aspects that you

36:15.562 --> 36:15.520
mentioned and of course the policy

36:15.520 --> 36:18.120
which is um overarching in terms of how

36:18.120 --> 36:20.231
do you do the sharing so we have , we

36:20.231 --> 36:22.287
have a number of forms including one

36:22.287 --> 36:24.509
over the , um , AI development with our

36:24.509 --> 36:26.620
partners or AI Partners council where

36:26.620 --> 36:29.280
we have currently 16 nations that get

36:29.280 --> 36:31.391
together , work through some of those

36:31.391 --> 36:33.613
issues . How will we share again across

36:33.613 --> 36:35.613
the technology where are the policy

36:35.613 --> 36:37.613
issues , what are some of the legal

36:37.613 --> 36:39.558
ramifications . Um , and so I look

36:39.558 --> 36:41.669
forward , um , as I , you know , come

36:41.669 --> 36:44.002
into the seat to move forward , I think ,

36:44.002 --> 36:46.002
uh , it's probably 6 months for our

36:46.002 --> 36:45.770
next event where we all come together

36:45.770 --> 36:48.048
and talk through those types of things ,

36:48.048 --> 36:50.270
and I'm happy to share the feedback and

36:50.270 --> 36:52.492
the objectives that we have there . But

36:52.492 --> 36:54.714
I think the most important point , like

36:54.714 --> 36:54.530
I said , this notion of responsible AI

36:54.530 --> 36:56.586
has to be multifaceted and cover all

36:56.586 --> 36:58.697
those aspects . Thank you . I think I

36:58.697 --> 37:00.808
would just reinforce this idea that ,

37:00.808 --> 37:03.290
uh , especially when it comes to the

37:03.290 --> 37:06.290
decision to , uh , drop ordinance .

37:06.909 --> 37:10.399
Um , That uh we we get this

37:10.399 --> 37:13.689
balance correct for warfighter , uh ,

37:13.699 --> 37:16.800
for you know , lethality but also um to

37:16.800 --> 37:19.239
make sure we meet our obligations and

37:19.239 --> 37:21.350
are consistent with our values and so

37:21.350 --> 37:23.406
this is an area I'm interested in uh

37:23.406 --> 37:25.461
I'd like to follow up with you on as

37:25.461 --> 37:28.280
well . um , second question I have is

37:28.280 --> 37:30.879
related to this , um , sort of digital

37:30.879 --> 37:33.250
environment . my , my colleague , um ,

37:33.280 --> 37:35.280
sort of alluded to this when he was

37:35.280 --> 37:37.558
talking about digital records and . Um ,

37:37.558 --> 37:39.613
actually I think Ukraine provides an

37:39.613 --> 37:41.836
interesting model for this because they

37:41.836 --> 37:44.113
have a , uh , ministry of digital , uh ,

37:44.113 --> 37:46.224
transformation and they have this app

37:46.224 --> 37:48.419
that basically , um , provides just a

37:48.419 --> 37:50.586
ton of resources . It's , uh , digital

37:50.586 --> 37:52.252
documents , online services ,

37:52.252 --> 37:54.141
streamline interactions , digital

37:54.141 --> 37:57.320
identity that helps with not only

37:57.320 --> 37:59.419
transparency but efficiency and

37:59.419 --> 38:01.586
movement of records and I think we can

38:01.586 --> 38:04.219
do this in a very secure manner . Uh ,

38:04.469 --> 38:06.636
and very modern . I mean , the systems

38:06.636 --> 38:08.858
that we use in the department , frankly

38:08.858 --> 38:10.913
are antiquated , so I'd love to hear

38:10.913 --> 38:13.191
your comment on that , Ms . Harrington .

38:13.370 --> 38:15.481
Absolutely concur and agree with that

38:15.481 --> 38:17.592
the transparency and the data flow is

38:17.592 --> 38:19.703
critical . We're working on standards

38:19.703 --> 38:21.814
to harmonize that data and to make it

38:21.814 --> 38:24.037
into , as I was stating , you know , it

38:24.037 --> 38:26.203
needs to be the data has to be labeled

38:26.203 --> 38:28.426
and tagged appropriate in the data lake

38:28.426 --> 38:30.592
because we do have a tremendous amount

38:30.592 --> 38:32.610
of data , but I identity credential

38:32.610 --> 38:34.943
access management so you representative .

38:34.943 --> 38:37.110
To have your credentials to be able to

38:37.110 --> 38:39.221
see all the data that you are able by

38:39.221 --> 38:41.388
by whatever clearance level there's at

38:41.388 --> 38:43.221
that you can see that data at an

38:43.221 --> 38:45.277
instant that is what we're trying to

38:45.277 --> 38:47.499
get to . Um , it will take a minute and

38:47.499 --> 38:49.166
the services and the services

38:49.166 --> 38:51.277
importantly because , uh , you know ,

38:51.277 --> 38:53.499
soldier PCSing from one duty station to

38:53.499 --> 38:55.499
another or ETSing and and accessing

38:55.499 --> 38:57.979
veterans benefits . Um , should be able

38:57.979 --> 39:00.035
to do that in a very streamlined way

39:00.035 --> 39:02.489
that cuts down on , on , uh , uh ,

39:02.500 --> 39:04.278
waste fraud , waste and abuse .

39:04.278 --> 39:06.222
Absolutely . And that's what we're

39:06.222 --> 39:08.333
working for . The Federation of ICANN

39:08.333 --> 39:10.222
is critical . I can tell you from

39:10.222 --> 39:12.167
personal experience I work here in

39:12.167 --> 39:14.500
Washington DC and I live in Summerville ,

39:14.500 --> 39:16.778
South Carolina . And when I go to , uh ,

39:16.778 --> 39:18.611
go to the high side at Nywick my

39:18.611 --> 39:21.090
credentials don't go through so I , I

39:21.090 --> 39:23.620
feel you as well , but that has been a

39:23.620 --> 39:26.070
priority of my , my time and tenure we

39:26.070 --> 39:28.379
are working on that with CDAO and our

39:28.379 --> 39:30.268
other partners across the federal

39:30.268 --> 39:32.212
government because that identity .

39:32.212 --> 39:34.268
Prudential management matters . It's

39:34.268 --> 39:35.879
going to be the lifeline for

39:35.879 --> 39:37.990
individuals from , and I say with the

39:37.990 --> 39:40.046
birth to death within their military

39:40.046 --> 39:42.101
service from when they start to they

39:42.101 --> 39:44.101
they they're ending in their life ,

39:44.101 --> 39:43.770
they have to have access . Thank you ,

39:43.870 --> 39:46.037
thank you for that and we're over , so

39:46.037 --> 39:48.148
I back sorry , sir . Thank you , Mr .

39:48.148 --> 39:50.370
Crank . You're recognized . Thank you ,

39:50.370 --> 39:52.037
Mr . Chairman . Um , and Ms .

39:52.050 --> 39:54.399
Harrington , thank you for your answers

39:54.399 --> 39:56.489
to Mr . Luttrell . I , I , as I was

39:56.489 --> 39:58.545
listening to him , this is something

39:58.545 --> 40:00.545
that we've got to get solved . It's

40:00.545 --> 40:02.711
sort of amazing to me that we've had a

40:02.711 --> 40:04.767
Department of Veterans Affairs for a

40:04.767 --> 40:08.110
few years now , right ? If you and uh

40:08.639 --> 40:10.750
that should be really the role of the

40:10.750 --> 40:13.040
VA is to seamlessly take care of these

40:13.040 --> 40:15.151
folks . So thank you for your work on

40:15.151 --> 40:17.207
that . I I appreciate that it's very

40:17.207 --> 40:19.151
important . Thank you , sir . um ,

40:19.151 --> 40:21.373
Doctor Matty , what steps is DOD taking

40:21.373 --> 40:23.540
to ensure that , uh , AIML systems can

40:23.540 --> 40:26.110
operate at the speed of mission , uh ,

40:26.169 --> 40:28.169
particularly in contested or denied

40:28.169 --> 40:31.080
environments where latency and decision

40:31.080 --> 40:33.191
advantage are , are pretty critical .

40:35.199 --> 40:37.366
Representative , thanks for that great

40:37.366 --> 40:39.800
question . Um , so I think again , I

40:39.800 --> 40:42.199
don't wanna reiterate too much about

40:42.199 --> 40:44.366
the approach that I mentioned with our

40:44.366 --> 40:46.532
guide efforts on the experimentation ,

40:46.532 --> 40:48.643
but you , you make a , an interesting

40:48.643 --> 40:50.255
nuance to with regard to the

40:50.255 --> 40:52.421
operational environment and the impact

40:52.421 --> 40:54.588
of degraded or denied communications .

40:54.840 --> 40:57.062
Uh , so when you think about artificial

40:57.062 --> 40:59.118
intelligence , um , folks , a lot of

40:59.118 --> 41:01.173
folks tend to seem to want to , uh ,

41:01.173 --> 41:03.173
I'll say split that perspective and

41:03.173 --> 41:05.396
There's an AI that we do in the cloud ,

41:05.479 --> 41:08.000
and then there's uh autonomy piece that

41:08.000 --> 41:10.360
we do at the edge . And I think what

41:10.360 --> 41:12.360
we've learned over the last several

41:12.360 --> 41:15.239
years , um , Actually since about

41:15.239 --> 41:18.560
2012 since we had such a an advancement

41:18.560 --> 41:20.560
in the technology with GPUs , etc .

41:20.560 --> 41:22.360
that allowed us to do the high

41:22.360 --> 41:24.638
performance computing at the edge , uh ,

41:24.638 --> 41:26.749
we now see this as a , as a kind of a

41:26.749 --> 41:29.439
spectrum of not so much of here's all

41:29.439 --> 41:31.495
the things that the operator does in

41:31.495 --> 41:33.717
the rear versus here's what's happening

41:33.717 --> 41:35.772
out at the at the front , but really

41:35.772 --> 41:37.828
how do you enable the war fighter at

41:37.828 --> 41:39.661
the I'll say AI at echelon . And

41:39.661 --> 41:41.883
because we know of the environment , we

41:41.883 --> 41:43.995
expect those types of um environments

41:43.995 --> 41:46.106
to be impacting on our communications

41:46.106 --> 41:48.272
and connectivity . You have to be able

41:48.272 --> 41:50.606
to work across the spectrum of autonomy .

41:50.606 --> 41:52.717
And have um our systems that are able

41:52.717 --> 41:54.772
to enable the war fighters in such a

41:54.772 --> 41:57.379
way that when they are degraded or not

41:57.389 --> 41:59.445
able to necessarily communicate they

41:59.445 --> 42:01.667
can have mission success and so I think

42:01.667 --> 42:03.722
that that's a uh an area where we've

42:03.722 --> 42:05.889
seen success whether it's , you know ,

42:06.030 --> 42:08.830
air or ground or sea types of

42:08.830 --> 42:11.550
capabilities that have autonomy va

42:11.550 --> 42:14.745
varying . From tele-op up to uh I'll

42:14.745 --> 42:16.801
say semi-autonomous almost near full

42:16.801 --> 42:19.024
autonomy in terms of their maneuver as

42:19.024 --> 42:21.304
well as their mission platforms and so

42:21.304 --> 42:23.304
on so I think that's a great , uh ,

42:23.304 --> 42:25.471
area that we're gonna continue to make

42:25.471 --> 42:27.693
great progress on but again it all ties

42:27.693 --> 42:29.526
back to enabling the war fighter

42:29.526 --> 42:31.637
because it's the commanders that have

42:31.637 --> 42:33.804
the the uh authorities to employ these

42:33.804 --> 42:35.971
systems in an appropriate manner . And

42:35.971 --> 42:38.082
of course the with the sophistication

42:38.082 --> 42:40.419
of advanced persistent threats , uh ,

42:40.439 --> 42:43.270
and their ability to evade detection uh

42:43.270 --> 42:46.070
through metadata , uh how is DOD

42:46.070 --> 42:48.739
leveraging AI and ML to process and

42:48.739 --> 42:52.070
analyze full packet data at machine

42:52.070 --> 42:53.709
speed and cyber operations ,

42:53.979 --> 42:56.110
particularly , uh , to enable those

42:56.110 --> 42:57.832
real-time threat detection and

42:57.832 --> 43:00.070
responses in in sort of contested

43:00.070 --> 43:02.830
environments . Again , thank you for

43:02.830 --> 43:05.052
the question . I would love to give you

43:05.052 --> 43:07.108
a dissertation , if you will , on AI

43:07.108 --> 43:09.219
and cyber , but I know my teammate is

43:09.219 --> 43:11.330
working this stuff every day , and if

43:11.330 --> 43:13.552
you'd allow me , I'd ask her to kind of

43:13.552 --> 43:15.719
give you some updates on exactly where

43:15.719 --> 43:15.360
we are and what we're doing with that .

43:16.959 --> 43:19.280
Thank you , Congressman . So as we're

43:19.280 --> 43:21.336
moving in the zero trust framework ,

43:21.336 --> 43:23.447
right , that is the entirety . It's a

43:23.447 --> 43:25.280
culture . So we are using AI and

43:25.280 --> 43:27.224
machine learning in the zero trust

43:27.224 --> 43:29.224
environment . We go with the aspect

43:29.224 --> 43:31.280
that the adversary is already in the

43:31.280 --> 43:31.050
network . That's what zeroo trust does .

43:31.280 --> 43:33.629
So we are continuously red teaming our

43:33.679 --> 43:35.735
our environment . Making sure that ,

43:35.735 --> 43:37.957
you know , any kind of obfuscation that

43:37.957 --> 43:39.957
we see or abnormality we're dealing

43:39.957 --> 43:42.123
with in real time , we are not putting

43:42.123 --> 43:44.346
it into , you know , the years ago we'd

43:44.346 --> 43:46.512
write a poem and we'd get to it . It's

43:46.512 --> 43:48.623
being done in a continuous monitoring

43:48.623 --> 43:48.580
capability and zero trust . That's why

43:48.580 --> 43:51.070
we're so forcing it . When we find in

43:51.070 --> 43:54.149
red team our our our platforms , our

43:54.149 --> 43:56.629
weapon systems , uh , the red team

43:56.629 --> 43:58.629
events have to be remediated and

43:58.629 --> 44:00.851
addressed within a certain time frame ,

44:00.851 --> 44:03.018
which is not long at all , and we're ,

44:03.018 --> 44:05.073
we're getting down on it , but if we

44:05.073 --> 44:07.240
didn't have AI machine learning , that

44:07.240 --> 44:06.679
would be something that would be

44:06.679 --> 44:08.623
rudimentary . We are moving at the

44:08.623 --> 44:10.679
speed of relevance to make sure that

44:10.679 --> 44:12.901
we're doing everything we can to ensure

44:12.901 --> 44:15.012
lethality and readiness . Um , that's

44:15.012 --> 44:17.012
why er trust is the priority of the

44:17.012 --> 44:16.883
department to make sure that we're

44:16.883 --> 44:19.216
getting down on this . Great . Well , I ,

44:19.216 --> 44:21.439
I had one more question , but I'm , I'm

44:21.439 --> 44:23.439
out of time . I was gonna ask about

44:23.439 --> 44:25.272
sort of the intersection between

44:25.272 --> 44:27.327
Spectrum Authority and Golden Dome ,

44:27.327 --> 44:29.216
but , um , if you wanna give your

44:29.216 --> 44:31.383
thoughts in a couple of seconds , that

44:31.383 --> 44:33.327
would be great . Uh , right now my

44:33.327 --> 44:35.327
office holds the authority of , you

44:35.327 --> 44:35.202
know , ensuring spectrum for the

44:35.202 --> 44:37.146
Department of Defense . What we're

44:37.146 --> 44:39.256
using it for , it is paramount to

44:39.256 --> 44:41.656
Golden Dome and between R&E Research

44:41.656 --> 44:44.805
and engineering , my office , uh , CDAO ,

44:44.976 --> 44:47.335
and across the , the DARPA , we are

44:47.335 --> 44:49.256
working to make best use of the

44:49.256 --> 44:51.486
spectrum that we have to ensure that we

44:51.486 --> 44:54.125
can provide Americans true security

44:54.125 --> 44:56.236
with Golden Dome . That is our number

44:56.236 --> 44:58.403
one priority , sir . Thank you . Thank

44:58.403 --> 45:00.569
you , thank you , Mr . Chairman . OK .

45:00.569 --> 45:02.810
I think the time is , uh , we , we got

45:02.810 --> 45:05.032
more a little more time than we thought

45:05.032 --> 45:07.254
so we're gonna do a couple follow on uh

45:07.254 --> 45:06.969
questions and and open up the floor .

45:07.050 --> 45:09.409
So I'm gonna I have one more uh this is

45:09.409 --> 45:11.631
to Ms . Harrington we read in the media

45:11.631 --> 45:13.465
that the department's core cloud

45:13.465 --> 45:15.687
capability contract is due for its next

45:15.687 --> 45:17.631
evolution in broad terms , can you

45:17.631 --> 45:19.853
outline elements that you would like to

45:19.853 --> 45:22.131
see included in this ? Thank you , sir .

45:22.131 --> 45:24.239
Yes , absolutely . So as we go on to

45:24.239 --> 45:26.350
this follow on to this effort , we're

45:26.350 --> 45:28.406
going to make sure that there's more

45:28.406 --> 45:30.517
small business opportunities . That's

45:30.517 --> 45:32.628
thing one . We want to make sure that

45:32.628 --> 45:32.320
everybody has an opportunity to be on

45:32.320 --> 45:34.949
this . We're also , you know , from the ,

45:34.959 --> 45:37.015
the , and I'll use the word the doge

45:37.015 --> 45:39.070
we've learned . Harness the power of

45:39.070 --> 45:41.181
the Department of Defense and looking

45:41.181 --> 45:43.070
at our total buy power that'll be

45:43.070 --> 45:44.959
something you'll see in this next

45:44.959 --> 45:47.181
iteration is the entire buying power of

45:47.181 --> 45:49.348
the Department of Defense . um , we'll

45:49.348 --> 45:51.515
be offering software as a service as a

45:51.515 --> 45:53.570
part of an effective use of the full

45:53.570 --> 45:53.304
force of the buying power of DOD in

45:53.304 --> 45:55.959
this contract . And this will have the

45:55.959 --> 45:58.070
core tenants as I just discussed with

45:58.070 --> 46:01.090
Representative rank of Zero Trust Trust

46:01.090 --> 46:03.146
but verify ensuring that we're doing

46:03.146 --> 46:05.201
our ultimate best looking forward to

46:05.201 --> 46:07.201
this contract , um , and having the

46:07.201 --> 46:09.257
multitudes of capabilities out there

46:09.257 --> 46:11.600
from large . Providers all the way to

46:11.600 --> 46:14.040
the micro providers it's , it's a whole

46:14.040 --> 46:16.360
of uh uh I would say I live by this

46:16.360 --> 46:19.320
motto , sir it's one team one fight uh

46:19.320 --> 46:21.487
so having this contract and having all

46:21.487 --> 46:23.709
the teammates that we possibly can have

46:23.709 --> 46:25.876
on it with the best rates that are the

46:25.876 --> 46:28.042
most efficient use for the tax dollars

46:28.042 --> 46:30.098
is the goal of my department . Thank

46:30.098 --> 46:32.098
you , uh , Mr . Whiteside , did you

46:32.098 --> 46:34.376
have a question ? I , I did , sir . OK ,

46:34.376 --> 46:36.653
is that OK ? um , so just to follow up ,

46:36.709 --> 46:39.489
um , uh , two questions . So number one ,

46:39.629 --> 46:41.796
if you're not using smarsh or whatever

46:41.796 --> 46:44.560
it's called , tele messages at the DOD ,

46:44.889 --> 46:48.090
how is the DOD capturing messages sent

46:48.090 --> 46:50.129
via signal for its legal

46:50.129 --> 46:52.409
responsibilities under the law at this

46:52.409 --> 46:54.810
classification , sir , I , I can't , I

46:54.810 --> 46:56.866
would , I will give you a classified

46:56.866 --> 46:59.088
answer in response . OK , we'll , we'll

46:59.088 --> 47:01.310
need to get that and , and I do want to

47:01.310 --> 47:04.370
make this , this segment . If a product

47:04.370 --> 47:06.439
is hacked and that does hacked , it

47:06.439 --> 47:08.106
does not necessarily mean the

47:08.106 --> 47:10.217
instantiation that is being used by a

47:10.217 --> 47:12.495
department or agency has been expelled .

47:12.495 --> 47:14.606
We do not put just broad capabilities

47:14.606 --> 47:16.828
on devices . We have multiple layers of

47:16.828 --> 47:18.939
security that are enabled and and put

47:18.939 --> 47:20.828
on so that things like that don't

47:20.828 --> 47:23.161
happen to military or senior leadership .

47:23.239 --> 47:25.461
I mean that's part of our goal , but to

47:25.461 --> 47:27.683
talk about that publicly would not be .

47:27.840 --> 47:30.007
Um , something that I could do , but I

47:30.007 --> 47:32.007
will definitely give you a detailed

47:32.007 --> 47:34.118
instruction , uh , detailed report on

47:34.118 --> 47:36.173
how we are providing security to the

47:36.173 --> 47:38.118
devices , the GFE , the government

47:38.118 --> 47:40.007
furnished equipment to our senior

47:40.007 --> 47:42.062
leaders . Absolutely . OK . And then

47:42.062 --> 47:43.896
there's just a follow up on that

47:43.896 --> 47:46.320
question was . Um , you said that the

47:46.320 --> 47:48.629
national security adviser was under

47:48.939 --> 47:50.939
essentially different policies . Is

47:50.939 --> 47:53.106
that what you said ? The the DOD , the

47:53.106 --> 47:55.328
only thing I have oversight into is the

47:55.328 --> 47:57.570
DOD device mobile device authorities

47:57.570 --> 47:59.848
from a whole of government perspective ,

47:59.848 --> 48:01.737
of course , the national security

48:01.737 --> 48:03.848
adviser is texting with the Secretary

48:03.848 --> 48:05.959
of Defense . So the idea that like we

48:05.959 --> 48:08.181
have different policies and potentially

48:08.181 --> 48:10.070
different rules of protection for

48:10.070 --> 48:12.181
cybersecurity strikes me as Maybe not

48:12.181 --> 48:14.590
as effective as as we would like , um ,

48:14.629 --> 48:16.685
you know what I mean like because if

48:16.685 --> 48:19.419
messages on Waltz's phone , you know ,

48:19.510 --> 48:23.060
are , are getting archived by Smarsh

48:23.510 --> 48:25.989
then regardless of whether you know the

48:25.989 --> 48:27.989
Secretary of Defense's messages are

48:27.989 --> 48:29.933
getting archived by Smarsh they're

48:29.933 --> 48:32.156
getting archived by Smarsh on the other

48:32.156 --> 48:34.100
side and so like we need to have a

48:34.100 --> 48:36.360
unified . approach to cybersecurity

48:36.360 --> 48:38.138
between the White House and the

48:38.138 --> 48:40.138
Department of My office actually is

48:40.138 --> 48:42.082
working directly with WApo on that

48:42.082 --> 48:44.249
right now to ensure that we do and and

48:44.249 --> 48:46.249
prior , you know , I would say that

48:46.249 --> 48:49.040
it's not out of neglect or any other

48:49.040 --> 48:50.873
thing other than departments and

48:50.873 --> 48:53.280
authorities have been very . I would

48:53.280 --> 48:55.489
say disparate we've come together .

48:55.540 --> 48:57.879
That is a priority . There are certain

48:57.879 --> 48:59.879
devices that I cannot talk about in

48:59.879 --> 49:01.990
this environment , sir , that they do

49:01.990 --> 49:04.157
have to communicate with that are of a

49:04.157 --> 49:06.435
classified familiar with those devices .

49:06.435 --> 49:08.546
I used them in past administrations ,

49:08.546 --> 49:10.657
and I think a lot of us are wondering

49:10.657 --> 49:12.768
why those devices weren't used um for

49:12.768 --> 49:14.768
these communications that that have

49:14.768 --> 49:16.935
been documented publicly by the by the

49:16.935 --> 49:18.823
press . I would refer back to the

49:18.823 --> 49:21.540
SECD's office and to the NSA and the

49:21.540 --> 49:23.651
National Security Adviser directly to

49:23.651 --> 49:25.873
their offices on their use . I can just

49:25.873 --> 49:27.707
talk to the DOD instructions and

49:27.707 --> 49:29.762
policies we have to close out , Mr .

49:29.762 --> 49:31.762
Chairman , I would just say I think

49:31.762 --> 49:33.873
they need to be listening to you as a

49:33.873 --> 49:36.040
cybersecurity expert , and I , I think

49:36.040 --> 49:38.151
we need to get more expertise in this

49:38.151 --> 49:40.373
area among those those senior leaders ,

49:40.373 --> 49:40.020
and I'll , I'll leave it at that . Can

49:40.020 --> 49:42.187
can would you mind if I just , so what

49:42.187 --> 49:44.409
I would say is that . There are certain

49:44.409 --> 49:47.449
things as time has evolved um ways of

49:47.449 --> 49:49.689
communication . I am one and my team is

49:49.689 --> 49:51.356
working on different uh other

49:51.356 --> 49:53.411
capabilities that we can use to have

49:53.411 --> 49:55.633
further communication because we worked

49:55.633 --> 49:57.745
in a world , you know , remember back

49:57.745 --> 49:59.911
in the day um you know we'd send email

49:59.911 --> 50:02.409
or or snail mail to each other . I'm

50:02.409 --> 50:04.969
not really fond of voice . I think that

50:04.969 --> 50:07.080
there's enough microphones and people

50:07.080 --> 50:09.136
out there in the world that I really

50:09.136 --> 50:11.136
like the idea of text messaging and

50:11.136 --> 50:13.358
ensuring that our senior . Your leaders

50:13.358 --> 50:15.469
can communicate effectively away from

50:15.469 --> 50:17.525
their offices because the government

50:17.525 --> 50:19.691
doesn't function within the building ,

50:19.691 --> 50:19.479
you know , within the Pentagon or

50:19.479 --> 50:21.590
within the White House or within this

50:21.590 --> 50:23.590
building itself . So my office , as

50:23.590 --> 50:25.646
well as , you know , WApo and others

50:25.646 --> 50:27.757
are working to find a common way that

50:27.757 --> 50:29.812
we can have senior leaders have true

50:29.812 --> 50:31.923
secure communications on a day to day

50:31.923 --> 50:33.979
basis . That is something that , you

50:33.979 --> 50:36.201
know , when they say incidents happen ,

50:36.201 --> 50:38.201
it innovates us and and urges us to

50:38.201 --> 50:40.257
make the requirements . And make the

50:40.257 --> 50:42.257
devices and make the the technology

50:42.257 --> 50:44.479
available so it's , it's something that

50:44.479 --> 50:46.423
we are taking as a priority and no

50:46.423 --> 50:48.423
doubt it's I would say the number 2

50:48.423 --> 50:50.646
priority in my office right now . #1 is

50:50.646 --> 50:52.701
another classified uh endeavor , but

50:52.701 --> 50:54.757
this is the #2 priority to make sure

50:54.757 --> 50:56.812
that we do have an effective way for

50:56.812 --> 50:58.868
you even , sir , to communicate with

50:58.868 --> 51:00.979
your colleagues because even what you

51:00.979 --> 51:00.399
say to each other is something that the

51:00.399 --> 51:02.455
adversary is interested in . But yet

51:02.455 --> 51:04.343
again this is not going back to a

51:04.343 --> 51:06.066
cultural thing that we need to

51:06.066 --> 51:07.621
understand . The culture of

51:07.621 --> 51:09.732
cybersecurity throughout the whole of

51:09.732 --> 51:11.955
government , everything that you say to

51:11.955 --> 51:13.788
each other , our adversaries are

51:13.788 --> 51:15.955
interested in . It's not just a senior

51:15.955 --> 51:18.066
leader discussion . It is at the base

51:18.066 --> 51:20.121
level of even staffers . This is the

51:20.121 --> 51:22.177
type of culture that we're trying to

51:22.177 --> 51:24.232
provide and get to and getting those

51:24.232 --> 51:24.100
devices , whether it be , you know , is

51:24.100 --> 51:26.267
it a capability that I can have people

51:26.267 --> 51:28.322
bring your own device with a certain

51:28.322 --> 51:30.267
app lay down on it that you can be

51:30.267 --> 51:32.322
secure ? That's what I'm doing right

51:32.322 --> 51:34.544
now , sir , because it is paramount for

51:34.544 --> 51:36.656
me . Great . Well , I look forward to

51:36.656 --> 51:36.300
the classified briefing when you're

51:36.300 --> 51:38.578
ready to do it . Yes sir . Thanks , Mr .

51:38.578 --> 51:40.744
Chairman . Thank you . I know it was a

51:40.744 --> 51:42.633
colonel . Uh , my phone was being

51:42.633 --> 51:44.856
monitored , so it's , we're all , we're

51:44.856 --> 51:47.022
all under a microscope , uh , with our

51:47.022 --> 51:49.356
adversaries , Mr . Crank . Thank you Mr .

51:49.356 --> 51:51.467
Chairman . uh Ms . Harrington , I did

51:51.467 --> 51:53.689
wanna kind of follow up on the spectrum

51:53.689 --> 51:55.356
question you talked about the

51:55.356 --> 51:57.411
importance of that to Golden Dome uh

51:57.411 --> 51:59.411
and I know that Golden Dome is very

51:59.411 --> 52:01.719
important to this president . Um , has ,

52:01.889 --> 52:04.040
has the administration relayed the

52:04.040 --> 52:06.969
importance of of spectrum to the

52:06.969 --> 52:09.080
Congress of the United States because

52:09.080 --> 52:11.302
as we're talking about reconciliation ,

52:11.302 --> 52:12.913
um , that's certainly been a

52:12.913 --> 52:15.136
consideration that we're considering up

52:15.136 --> 52:17.247
here . And and I think for one of the

52:17.247 --> 52:19.358
top priorities of this administration

52:19.358 --> 52:21.580
it's very important that that be at the

52:21.580 --> 52:24.830
highest levels be relayed to members of

52:24.830 --> 52:26.949
Congress how important that spectrum

52:26.949 --> 52:29.780
authority is uh to Golden Dome .

52:30.149 --> 52:32.371
Absolutely . I think when the president

52:32.371 --> 52:34.260
made the statement , we will have

52:34.260 --> 52:36.205
Golden Dome . That was a clear and

52:36.205 --> 52:38.316
concise message . I can tell you that

52:38.316 --> 52:40.649
my boss , the sectF and the deputy have .

52:40.649 --> 52:42.760
Definitely made that a priority , but

52:42.760 --> 52:44.871
spectrum is something I would look at

52:44.871 --> 52:46.927
as uh uh the critical resources like

52:46.927 --> 52:49.038
beachfront property . There's no more

52:49.038 --> 52:51.093
of it . It's laws of physics . We do

52:51.093 --> 52:53.205
need to look at ways to share it in a

52:53.205 --> 52:55.371
sensible , realistic manner going down

52:55.371 --> 52:57.371
the , you know , as we look forward

52:57.371 --> 52:59.427
into the future because what we have

52:59.427 --> 53:01.538
today in 10 years , what will 6G look

53:01.538 --> 53:03.649
like ? I , that is , you know , 7G is

53:03.649 --> 53:06.179
it 8G and as we're moving in AI , so

53:06.179 --> 53:08.512
we're really looking to our , our study .

53:08.512 --> 53:10.675
On DSS dynamic spectrum sharing , but

53:10.675 --> 53:12.897
the president has made it crystal clear

53:12.897 --> 53:15.231
that we are to protect the nation first .

53:15.231 --> 53:17.286
That is his priority . That has been

53:17.286 --> 53:17.235
his priority since day one , from

53:17.235 --> 53:19.514
securing the border , um , to , you

53:19.514 --> 53:21.570
know , Golden Dome . The president's

53:21.570 --> 53:23.995
desire is to secure the nation and

53:23.995 --> 53:26.162
understanding that the the first three

53:26.162 --> 53:27.995
of the megahertz of spectrum are

53:27.995 --> 53:29.995
critical to national security , not

53:29.995 --> 53:31.884
just for ourselves but our allied

53:31.884 --> 53:33.995
partners . I don't think that message

53:33.995 --> 53:36.051
has ever been any clearer , um , and

53:36.051 --> 53:37.939
Golden Dome is , is an exciting .

53:38.100 --> 53:40.267
approach . I look , you know , I , I ,

53:40.267 --> 53:42.489
I've been to Israel several times and I

53:42.489 --> 53:44.544
look at how effective Iron Dome is ,

53:44.544 --> 53:46.767
and this goes along with my thought and

53:46.767 --> 53:48.711
belief that we must do more in the

53:48.711 --> 53:51.699
non-kinetic sense . With the spectrum

53:51.699 --> 53:54.780
right to have AI and and and and and

53:54.780 --> 53:57.750
sensing to not have a kinetic event

53:57.750 --> 53:59.694
happen and that's what Golden Dome

53:59.694 --> 54:01.806
really is about is sensing when there

54:01.806 --> 54:03.972
is a kinetic activity that we can send

54:03.972 --> 54:06.028
a kinetic response to save lives and

54:06.028 --> 54:08.250
the president , the secretary , and the

54:08.250 --> 54:10.417
deputy have made that abundantly clear

54:10.417 --> 54:12.528
to myself , my office , and everybody

54:12.528 --> 54:14.472
in the department . Yeah , we , we

54:14.472 --> 54:16.583
still , and , and I'm a big supporter

54:16.583 --> 54:18.694
and will be a big proponent of Golden

54:18.694 --> 54:20.694
Dome . Uh , here we still have some

54:20.694 --> 54:22.639
colleagues , uh , on even our full

54:22.639 --> 54:24.694
Armed Services Committee who are not

54:24.694 --> 54:26.694
fans and who do not believe that it

54:26.694 --> 54:28.750
will work , but that's that's them .

54:28.750 --> 54:30.917
I'll let them speak for themselves but

54:30.917 --> 54:32.972
to the point of the legisla have you

54:32.972 --> 54:35.139
had , do you know that the legislative

54:35.139 --> 54:37.194
liaison office of the White House is

54:37.194 --> 54:39.194
actually talking about the spectrum

54:39.194 --> 54:41.306
issue with regard to reconciliation .

54:41.306 --> 54:43.528
Uh , we've got some folks in the Senate

54:43.528 --> 54:45.639
that want to use spectrum sell off in

54:45.639 --> 54:47.750
in the reconciliation process . There

54:47.750 --> 54:49.972
have been areas of spectrum . I believe

54:49.972 --> 54:52.083
that we came to an agreeance of about

54:52.083 --> 54:54.169
425 megahertz with the FCC and some

54:54.169 --> 54:56.810
areas that we could , you know , CRBS ,

54:56.929 --> 54:59.096
which is a certain band that we have a

54:59.096 --> 55:01.270
few systems in . That we can move out

55:01.270 --> 55:03.709
of to make capital markets more

55:03.709 --> 55:05.653
accessible to that , but the lower

55:05.653 --> 55:07.750
three is not in that mix that is

55:07.750 --> 55:09.861
definitely above that . There's there

55:09.861 --> 55:12.100
FCC bands there's , uh , you know ,

55:12.550 --> 55:14.870
higher bands that go through other

55:14.870 --> 55:17.037
agencies , transportation , Department

55:17.037 --> 55:19.203
of Transportation , and that's another

55:19.203 --> 55:21.314
area we need to be considerate of , I

55:21.314 --> 55:23.370
mean . You know , Secretary Duffy is

55:23.370 --> 55:23.209
dealing with a great deal with the

55:23.209 --> 55:25.209
federal , you know , transportation

55:25.209 --> 55:27.320
with air and traffic that those bands

55:27.320 --> 55:29.409
are what they're using . So we have

55:29.409 --> 55:31.631
figured out there's about 425 megahertz

55:31.631 --> 55:35.010
that solidly we can unencumber and let

55:35.010 --> 55:37.177
to be sold , but not the lower three ,

55:37.177 --> 55:39.177
yeah , and , and that's great if we

55:39.177 --> 55:41.288
have a . You know , a compromise that

55:41.288 --> 55:43.510
will work and still allow us to do it ,

55:43.510 --> 55:45.566
but just do me a favor , go back and

55:45.566 --> 55:47.343
double check with the Office of

55:47.343 --> 55:49.510
Legislative liaison and make sure that

55:49.510 --> 55:51.454
they're delivering that message to

55:51.454 --> 55:53.621
Capitol Hill . Yes , sir . Thank you .

55:53.621 --> 55:55.677
Thank you . Mr . Veman , you got our

55:55.677 --> 55:54.939
final question .

56:06.770 --> 56:08.992
Just seeing , you know , if there's a a

56:08.992 --> 56:10.992
credible air defense , uh , for the

56:10.992 --> 56:13.050
homeland , I'm all about it . I just

56:13.050 --> 56:15.719
don't know what it is other than , um ,

56:16.010 --> 56:18.429
the , the , uh . The headline , the

56:18.429 --> 56:21.189
marquee , I guess . So , um , just a

56:21.189 --> 56:23.300
point of clarification , when you say

56:23.300 --> 56:25.356
wapo , do you mean wama Waymo ? OK ,

56:25.356 --> 56:27.578
yes sir , I'm sorry . So just following

56:27.578 --> 56:30.110
up on that line of question , um , so

56:30.110 --> 56:32.166
obviously first of all it seems like

56:32.166 --> 56:34.459
there's like , um , a , a obvious need

56:34.459 --> 56:36.403
for this communication that you've

56:36.403 --> 56:38.403
identified senior leadership in the

56:38.403 --> 56:40.626
executive branch and , and here . And I

56:40.626 --> 56:43.229
hope that there's a uh a means of

56:43.229 --> 56:45.469
developing a a a government system that

56:45.469 --> 56:49.310
we have um uh security and signal is uh

56:49.310 --> 56:51.254
very convenient . People have been

56:51.254 --> 56:53.477
using it for years , but there are some

56:53.477 --> 56:56.979
known um vulnerabilities and so um

56:57.310 --> 56:59.310
that's that's one thing I'd love to

56:59.310 --> 57:01.366
hear comment on that but my question

57:01.366 --> 57:03.588
really comes down to OPSEC , which is a

57:03.588 --> 57:05.477
really a basic issue right ? uh a

57:05.477 --> 57:08.239
private . Is taught opsec in basic

57:08.540 --> 57:11.010
training and the American people and

57:11.010 --> 57:13.177
frankly uniformed service members need

57:13.177 --> 57:16.929
to have um trust that they and family

57:16.929 --> 57:20.770
members are gonna be um safe um and

57:20.770 --> 57:23.629
I had a constituent , uh , a mother of

57:23.629 --> 57:25.969
an F-18 pilot that was uh in the skies

57:25.969 --> 57:28.770
over Yemen at the at the time of uh the

57:28.770 --> 57:31.879
initial assault and she was irate . And ,

57:31.969 --> 57:33.802
uh , so family members , service

57:33.802 --> 57:36.679
members are irate about , um , OPSEC

57:36.679 --> 57:39.320
violations like this . And so what I

57:39.320 --> 57:41.790
wanna hear , um , uh , what I wanna

57:41.790 --> 57:43.901
understand a little bit better having

57:43.901 --> 57:46.068
worked at both DOD and the White House

57:46.068 --> 57:48.179
and there's a potential seamen here ,

57:48.179 --> 57:50.123
right ? If you have folks from DOD

57:50.123 --> 57:53.199
communicating to folks at um at at uh

57:53.199 --> 57:56.679
NSC and they have different criteria

57:56.679 --> 57:58.735
that they don't have a limitation on

57:58.735 --> 58:01.500
the Smarsh uh system , uh , is that a

58:01.500 --> 58:03.760
potential vulnerability , um , because

58:03.760 --> 58:06.290
they're communicating across this sort

58:06.290 --> 58:09.639
of seam , um . Yeah , I'll leave it

58:09.639 --> 58:13.639
that . Thank you Congressman . So the

58:13.639 --> 58:15.806
way we have traditionally communicated

58:15.806 --> 58:18.028
is going into a skiff and having a high

58:18.028 --> 58:20.195
side communication , and that has been

58:20.195 --> 58:22.250
the way we have worked it for many ,

58:22.250 --> 58:24.306
many , many , many years , and we're

58:24.306 --> 58:26.195
evolving , uh , the technology is

58:26.195 --> 58:28.361
evolving , and I will just say that it

58:28.361 --> 58:31.000
is my office along with many others to

58:31.000 --> 58:32.944
ensure that we come up with a real

58:32.944 --> 58:35.056
capability in real time to allow that

58:35.056 --> 58:37.810
communication to go forward . Um , it's ,

58:37.889 --> 58:39.945
it's paramount and our adversaries ,

58:39.945 --> 58:42.222
the opsse of our adversaries , is true ,

58:42.370 --> 58:44.314
um , but we have , I , I think , a

58:44.314 --> 58:47.040
great deal more , uh , concerns when we

58:47.040 --> 58:49.207
have more media presence and knowing ,

58:49.207 --> 58:51.262
you know , we , we talk about things

58:51.262 --> 58:53.262
that happen in real time that every

58:53.262 --> 58:55.373
season go TV camera in the world sees

58:55.373 --> 58:57.540
it in real time , and I happen to be a

58:57.540 --> 58:59.484
personal , you know , I . My first

58:59.484 --> 59:01.915
husband , um , dear friend of mine was

59:01.915 --> 59:04.794
in operation the the operation in

59:04.794 --> 59:07.072
Somalia who's a cork reactionary force ,

59:07.195 --> 59:09.274
and I saw faster than probably the

59:09.274 --> 59:11.554
general saw , um , one of my dear

59:11.554 --> 59:13.443
friends being dragged through the

59:13.443 --> 59:15.610
streets of Mogadishu . So I don't know

59:15.610 --> 59:17.498
that necessarily the phone is the

59:17.498 --> 59:19.610
greatest concern . It is high concern

59:19.610 --> 59:21.832
for communication , but we also have to

59:21.832 --> 59:23.498
understand that TBs and . The

59:23.498 --> 59:25.610
capability of people using TikTok and

59:25.610 --> 59:28.179
Instagram and real-time video sharing

59:28.179 --> 59:31.020
is also , you know , an area of concern .

59:31.030 --> 59:33.100
It's we have to be realistic in what

59:33.100 --> 59:35.267
we're doing and how we're doing it and

59:35.267 --> 59:37.322
understanding the risks that are out

59:37.322 --> 59:39.489
there , absolutely 100% . I would just

59:39.489 --> 59:41.378
say that you made a very forceful

59:41.378 --> 59:43.379
statement earlier in response to my

59:43.379 --> 59:45.490
colleague's question , which I really

59:45.490 --> 59:47.712
appreciated on this issue . But there's

59:47.712 --> 59:49.823
a big difference between , you know ,

59:49.823 --> 59:51.990
being in a in a public environment and

59:51.990 --> 59:54.157
where there are cameras and stuff like

59:54.157 --> 59:56.379
that and communicating in a medium that

59:56.379 --> 59:58.546
you think is secure . Information that

59:58.546 --> 01:00:00.909
is in my mind obviously uh highly

01:00:00.909 --> 01:00:03.350
sensitive and so because when you

01:00:03.350 --> 01:00:05.350
believe there's trust in the system

01:00:05.350 --> 01:00:07.517
you're gonna be a lot more open you're

01:00:07.517 --> 01:00:09.461
gonna be and and especially if you

01:00:09.461 --> 01:00:11.683
don't know that it's uh it's not secure

01:00:11.683 --> 01:00:13.906
so there's a there's a difference there

01:00:13.906 --> 01:00:16.128
between being out in the world and then

01:00:16.128 --> 01:00:18.072
communicating in a system that you

01:00:18.072 --> 01:00:20.183
think is is got . And my office's job

01:00:20.183 --> 01:00:22.294
is to make sure that we do better for

01:00:22.294 --> 01:00:24.406
both you , the Secretary of Defense ,

01:00:24.406 --> 01:00:26.517
the deputy , the president , everyone

01:00:26.517 --> 01:00:28.406
across the board . It's a forcing

01:00:28.406 --> 01:00:30.461
function . It is something that is a

01:00:30.461 --> 01:00:32.517
priority for our office to make sure

01:00:32.517 --> 01:00:34.683
that we have that in rapid time . Um ,

01:00:34.683 --> 01:00:34.120
I would be more than happy to give you

01:00:34.120 --> 01:00:35.953
a classified brief on all of the

01:00:35.953 --> 01:00:37.898
efforts that we're doing to ensure

01:00:37.898 --> 01:00:40.719
security of communications . Thank you

01:00:40.719 --> 01:00:43.479
I appreciate it and the uh 72,000

01:00:43.479 --> 01:00:46.360
veterans , uh , 20,000 or so active

01:00:46.360 --> 01:00:49.600
duty folks and , uh , family members in

01:00:49.600 --> 01:00:51.878
my district will appreciate it as well .

01:00:51.878 --> 01:00:53.878
Thank you and also thank you to the

01:00:53.878 --> 01:00:55.933
mother and to the war fighter in the

01:00:55.933 --> 01:00:58.044
F-16 . Thank you for their dedication

01:00:58.044 --> 01:01:00.211
and service to this mission because it

01:01:00.211 --> 01:01:02.378
is one team , one fight . I thought we

01:01:02.378 --> 01:01:04.211
had our last question , but Mr .

01:01:04.211 --> 01:01:06.044
McGuire just walked in . You are

01:01:06.044 --> 01:01:05.679
recognized . Well , thank you , Mr .

01:01:05.770 --> 01:01:07.937
Chairman . Thanks to our witnesses for

01:01:07.937 --> 01:01:10.270
being here today . A lot going on today ,

01:01:10.270 --> 01:01:12.750
um , Doctor Matty , um . We all know

01:01:12.750 --> 01:01:14.639
that artificial intelligence cons

01:01:14.639 --> 01:01:16.830
consumes a ton of energy . Uh , one

01:01:16.830 --> 01:01:19.830
source estimates that CAT GPT consumes

01:01:19.830 --> 01:01:22.070
enough energy in a year to power over

01:01:22.070 --> 01:01:24.237
20,000 homes , and that number is only

01:01:24.237 --> 01:01:26.459
growing , and that's not even including

01:01:26.459 --> 01:01:28.626
the amount of energy used to train the

01:01:28.626 --> 01:01:30.848
model . So my first question is what is

01:01:30.848 --> 01:01:33.070
DOD's strategy for ensuring it has the

01:01:33.070 --> 01:01:35.181
energy resources it needs to continue

01:01:35.181 --> 01:01:36.848
scaling AI tooling across the

01:01:36.848 --> 01:01:38.903
department so that we can win the AI

01:01:38.903 --> 01:01:42.790
arms race . Thank you , sir ,

01:01:42.860 --> 01:01:44.971
for , uh , attending today and giving

01:01:44.971 --> 01:01:47.193
us the opportunity to speak with you on

01:01:47.193 --> 01:01:49.639
issues like that . Excuse me . Um ,

01:01:50.729 --> 01:01:52.951
Again , having just , uh , entered into

01:01:52.951 --> 01:01:55.062
the position , I know that I actually

01:01:55.062 --> 01:01:57.007
lean on my teammate over here that

01:01:57.007 --> 01:01:59.062
talks about infrastructure and works

01:01:59.062 --> 01:02:01.229
those types of issues out of the CIO's

01:02:01.229 --> 01:02:03.340
office , um , but I will also offer ,

01:02:03.340 --> 01:02:05.396
um , I know there's a lot of concern

01:02:05.396 --> 01:02:07.618
about the large language models and the

01:02:07.618 --> 01:02:09.951
infrastructure that it takes to do that .

01:02:09.951 --> 01:02:11.896
That's why , uh , uh , in previous

01:02:11.896 --> 01:02:14.007
discussions we've had here , we think

01:02:14.007 --> 01:02:16.229
about AI at echelon , so not everything

01:02:16.229 --> 01:02:18.451
is gonna be done in a large data center

01:02:18.451 --> 01:02:18.280
that requires that a lot of the things

01:02:18.280 --> 01:02:21.010
we'll do is AI at echelon . It'll have

01:02:21.010 --> 01:02:23.260
a smaller form factor for the compute ,

01:02:23.580 --> 01:02:25.413
but specifically to address your

01:02:25.413 --> 01:02:27.524
question , I'll , I'll , if with your

01:02:27.524 --> 01:02:29.636
permission , I'll ask my colleague to

01:02:29.636 --> 01:02:31.524
speak about larger infrastructure

01:02:31.524 --> 01:02:33.899
issues . Thank you Congressman

01:02:33.899 --> 01:02:36.066
absolutely critical infrastructure and

01:02:36.066 --> 01:02:37.899
supporting , you know , these AI

01:02:37.899 --> 01:02:40.121
compute models is paramount to national

01:02:40.121 --> 01:02:42.232
security and that is one of the areas

01:02:42.232 --> 01:02:44.288
that we're looking at uh the grid is

01:02:44.288 --> 01:02:44.179
something , you know , it's a , it's a

01:02:44.179 --> 01:02:46.689
fine partnership we have with industry

01:02:46.689 --> 01:02:48.856
to provide critical infrastructure but

01:02:48.856 --> 01:02:50.856
also having enough of the energy to

01:02:50.856 --> 01:02:52.800
actually fund , you know . To make

01:02:52.800 --> 01:02:54.967
these tools work , so that's an effort

01:02:54.967 --> 01:02:57.022
we constantly are are in discussions

01:02:57.022 --> 01:02:59.022
with with the NSC and how we can do

01:02:59.022 --> 01:03:01.078
better with that , um , partnerships

01:03:01.078 --> 01:03:03.078
with associations like EEEI to make

01:03:03.078 --> 01:03:05.245
sure that we are doing the right thing

01:03:05.245 --> 01:03:07.245
to have the power generation for AI

01:03:07.245 --> 01:03:09.614
things like CATEP or Assage or , or ,

01:03:09.655 --> 01:03:11.711
you know , there's a million of them

01:03:11.711 --> 01:03:13.766
out there . Just an FYI I'm sure you

01:03:13.766 --> 01:03:15.877
guys are aware , but in my district ,

01:03:15.877 --> 01:03:17.988
we have a company , BWXT . They build

01:03:17.988 --> 01:03:19.766
nuclear reactors that power our

01:03:19.766 --> 01:03:21.933
submarines and carriers and everything

01:03:21.933 --> 01:03:24.155
else . Um , they're also about to build

01:03:24.155 --> 01:03:26.099
a SMR , small module reactor , but

01:03:26.099 --> 01:03:25.639
they're also about to launch the

01:03:25.639 --> 01:03:28.199
world's first microreactor , which is

01:03:28.199 --> 01:03:30.560
about 50 megawatts each , I think , and

01:03:30.560 --> 01:03:32.616
that could change civilization . You

01:03:32.616 --> 01:03:34.782
you are hitting the nail on the head ,

01:03:34.782 --> 01:03:36.671
and I've been watching that pilot

01:03:36.671 --> 01:03:38.616
program . As it's coming because I

01:03:38.616 --> 01:03:40.449
think that the microreactors are

01:03:40.449 --> 01:03:42.504
definitely , you know , the thing of

01:03:42.504 --> 01:03:41.764
the future . If we can have a

01:03:41.764 --> 01:03:44.084
microreactor on every base and at every

01:03:44.084 --> 01:03:46.764
compute power station , that is the way

01:03:46.764 --> 01:03:48.986
around this , and that actually reduces

01:03:48.986 --> 01:03:51.153
our vulnerability for the adversary to

01:03:51.153 --> 01:03:53.264
get into infrastructure so . I , I've

01:03:53.264 --> 01:03:55.431
been actually following that for quite

01:03:55.431 --> 01:03:57.431
some time , uh , as a proponent for

01:03:57.431 --> 01:03:59.486
nuclear energy . I cannot say enough

01:03:59.486 --> 01:04:01.653
how we need this . Uh , I'm supportive

01:04:01.653 --> 01:04:03.653
of what the department is doing and

01:04:03.653 --> 01:04:05.986
working with our partners on that , but ,

01:04:05.986 --> 01:04:05.469
and it's in your district . You're ,

01:04:05.550 --> 01:04:07.606
you're a lucky man , sir . I went to

01:04:07.606 --> 01:04:09.899
tour BWXD and it was like Star Wars ,

01:04:10.110 --> 01:04:12.277
um , you know , I was also , uh , I've

01:04:12.277 --> 01:04:14.388
been talking with a lot of folks like

01:04:14.388 --> 01:04:14.070
yourselves that are experts in the

01:04:14.070 --> 01:04:16.348
field , and they were saying that . AI ,

01:04:16.348 --> 01:04:19.340
we had like a 30,000 shortage of coders

01:04:20.030 --> 01:04:22.570
and that problem was solved in 2 hours

01:04:22.570 --> 01:04:25.270
with AI because AI codes better than we

01:04:25.270 --> 01:04:28.540
do but I also um learned that chip

01:04:28.540 --> 01:04:30.707
technology is best in Taiwan . I think

01:04:30.707 --> 01:04:33.070
99% of the , the best chips come from

01:04:33.070 --> 01:04:35.189
Taiwan and we have got to that

01:04:35.189 --> 01:04:37.078
technology could have been in the

01:04:37.078 --> 01:04:39.189
United States , but we didn't take it

01:04:39.189 --> 01:04:40.911
seriously , but Taiwan took it

01:04:40.911 --> 01:04:43.133
seriously and China wants that so we've

01:04:43.133 --> 01:04:46.639
got to . Improve chip manufacturing and

01:04:46.639 --> 01:04:48.919
be able to scale it so we can win this

01:04:48.919 --> 01:04:51.639
race war for AI . So actually had the

01:04:51.639 --> 01:04:53.583
opportunity to sit with the CEO of

01:04:53.583 --> 01:04:55.417
Nvidia last week with the deputy

01:04:55.417 --> 01:04:57.583
secretary and the huge investment they

01:04:57.583 --> 01:04:59.528
are making in the United States to

01:04:59.528 --> 01:05:01.750
actually manufacture chips here as well

01:05:01.750 --> 01:05:03.972
as Texas Instruments and others . You ,

01:05:03.972 --> 01:05:06.139
you are correct , um , having chips in

01:05:06.139 --> 01:05:08.709
this country , uh , our and our own is

01:05:08.709 --> 01:05:11.350
a , a definite need . If you were to

01:05:11.350 --> 01:05:14.149
ask Katie Arrington um that we need to

01:05:14.149 --> 01:05:16.389
have a strategy , a national strategy

01:05:16.389 --> 01:05:18.445
about chips , and , and I think that

01:05:18.445 --> 01:05:20.611
this administration is working towards

01:05:20.611 --> 01:05:22.833
having that for our allies and partners

01:05:22.833 --> 01:05:25.000
it's not just us that need the chips ,

01:05:25.000 --> 01:05:24.669
it's we need to make sure that our

01:05:24.669 --> 01:05:26.558
allies and partners have the same

01:05:26.558 --> 01:05:29.030
capability and access um to to win in

01:05:29.030 --> 01:05:31.500
the non-kinetic war , but I'm excited

01:05:31.500 --> 01:05:33.667
about what I've seen from our partners

01:05:33.667 --> 01:05:35.778
and industry . About their investment

01:05:35.778 --> 01:05:37.778
in the United States to manufacture

01:05:37.778 --> 01:05:39.778
chips here so that we can have them

01:05:39.778 --> 01:05:41.778
readily available to us , uh , when

01:05:41.778 --> 01:05:43.833
meeting with the CEO of Nvidia , the

01:05:43.833 --> 01:05:46.570
capability of AI to generate code is a

01:05:46.570 --> 01:05:48.737
good thing but then I , I look at my ,

01:05:48.737 --> 01:05:50.848
my friend Doctor Mattie , right , and

01:05:50.848 --> 01:05:53.070
we need to make sure that the code that

01:05:53.070 --> 01:05:54.848
is being developed by the chips

01:05:54.848 --> 01:05:58.100
themselves is , is , is good code . Not

01:05:58.100 --> 01:06:00.267
double check it , right ? Absolutely .

01:06:00.267 --> 01:06:02.489
That's what I just wanted to say is the

01:06:02.489 --> 01:06:04.656
loop is a real thing and having humans

01:06:04.656 --> 01:06:06.544
in that loop . I'd rather Western

01:06:06.544 --> 01:06:08.767
civilization program AI than folks that

01:06:08.767 --> 01:06:10.989
want our destruction , but thank you so

01:06:10.989 --> 01:06:13.267
much . My yield back . Thank you , sir .

01:06:13.267 --> 01:06:13.060
OK , but on behalf of the ranking

01:06:13.060 --> 01:06:15.227
member Mr . Khan and myself and the 19

01:06:15.227 --> 01:06:17.338
members of this committee , thank you

01:06:17.338 --> 01:06:19.282
for coming in . We appreciate your

01:06:19.282 --> 01:06:21.504
candor , uh , your expertise , uh , and

01:06:21.504 --> 01:06:23.671
we wish you both well as you , uh , do

01:06:23.671 --> 01:06:25.838
your duties . So thank you for a great

01:06:25.838 --> 01:06:25.899
committee hearing . Thank you , sir .